EXTERNAL RADIO BROADCASTING:

IDEOLOGY AND PROPAGANDA IN THE DISCOURSE

A Content Analysis of Radio RSA’s News Reports

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À la piéuse mémoire de

Linda S. Khuwayo
I declare that this dissertation is my own work, and that other people's works have been fully acknowledged. I further declare that I have never submitted this work before for an award of a degree to any University. It is being submitted in partial fulfilment of the Degree of Master of Arts in Culture, Communication and Media Studies at the University of Natal, Durban.

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15 September 2003.
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That's it! Ça y est! Acta fabula est! It has been a long journey, not to freedom, but to a kind of achievement. It started as a doubtful project, an enterprise filled with fear and despair, a venture that I feared would never see tomorrow. I have made it! More than a mere academic achievement, this is a fulfilment of an ambition for which I did not have all the necessary means. Premonitorily, it started that cloudy and rainy day of November 12, 2000 in Kinshasa. It has now come to an end, a happy ending I would say. I am really grateful for many wonderful people whose support was very decisive for this achievement. Like signposts, they were all there for me making this journey much easier than it could be.

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her professionalism. Having acknowledged all these and other debts, I must recognise that the shortcomings which might be found in this study are my own responsibility. May they be regarded as a reflection of the limitedness inherent to our human nature.
Abstract

Propaganda, ideology, and news reports: three concepts which will constitute the pivot of the present study. These concepts at a first sight seem to belong to different worlds, but reveal unsuspected and deep links between them. An in-depth study will reveal that these links can be so deep that the three concepts turn out to be essential and necessary for the understanding of one another. In this way, the concept of Propaganda cannot be thought out of a particular ideological context or an ideology which drives it. As suggested in different studies the concept propaganda cannot be treated separately from the issue of ideology (Selucky, 1982; Teer-Tomaselli, 1992; Sproule, 1994; Jowett & O’Donnel, 1999 among many others). In the same way, propaganda and ideology cannot be conceived of out of a motivated and oriented system of communication which vehicle them: media organisations. The main task of this study on ideology and propaganda in news reports is to disclose these intricacies by showing how they relate to and influence each other.

However, the study of the triad ideology-propaganda-news and the nature of their relationships cannot pass under silence a related issue that they raise necessarily, namely the issue of objectivity and neutrality in the news report as it appears in the market theory of news. Is the claim of objectivity and neutrality in the news a legitimate one? Considering that the news is charged with the basic objective of informing, educating and entertaining on one hand and taking the media and the news as carriers of a certain ideology (Selucky, 1982) on the other hand, is it possible to talk about objectivity and neutrality in the news reports? It seems that broadcasters and those working in the media industry do not report on facts ‘out there’ and ‘naked’ reality. News reports are already (and always) constructed in a certain way, according to a particular context or in line with the views of those in position of power (political, economic or moral) who appear to shape what the mass believe in.

This argument contradicts the optimism demonstrated by McQuail (2000: 172) who points out that the process of observing and reporting should, thus, not be contaminated by subjectivity, nor should it interfere with the reality being reported on. McQuail seems to assume that an individual reporter can get out of his/her subjectivity (which is quite difficult
to imagine given the fact that one can only thinks and reports as an already-situated-individual) and report on an ‘uncoloured’ and ‘decontextualised’ reality -which is equally hard to figure out. “The media”, argues Brian McNair (1999: 12) “do not simply report, in a neutral and impartial way, what is going on in the political arena around them”. He goes on to suggest that media reports “are laden with value judgements, subjectivities and biases”. This last argument suggests therefore that news reports must be seen in line with power, ideology and hegemony instead of being looked at solely in terms neutrality and objectivity – which are difficult to assert totally.

It is only when news reports are seen in relation with ideology, power and hegemony that it becomes possible to understand how they can be used (or misused) and utilised (by those who own and control the media) to convey ‘official’ ideas, to persuade in an attempt to shape public opinion and change the perception of the audience. Seen in relation to power, ideology and hegemony, news reports and mass media easily can be linked to the concept of propaganda in the sense that the use of particular media and the selection (or omission) of particular news as well as the massive orchestration of those news can turn an assertion into a self-perpetuating and obvious truth, which is exactly what propaganda tends to achieve in order to secure a given hegemony.

The present study is a ‘close-up’ on the content of the former SABC’s external service, Radio RSA’s new reports during October-November 1985. As an external broadcaster during a time when South Africa was facing international isolation, political boycott, economic sanctions as well as increasing internal uprising, more specifically during the mid-1980s insurgencies, Radio RSA was assigned a particular mission with regard to the external audience: to correct misconceptions, lies and distortions of which South Africa was an innocent victim and to present the South African version of reality.

The study will be deployed in six chapters. It will start in its first chapter as a discussion of different theories of news -as developed in Teer-Tomaselli’s research (1992)- in order to find out which one supports better the argument that sees ideology as a ‘mental framework’ informing the construction of news reports. The chapter will carry on discussing the concept
of ideology (Althusser, 1969; Hall, 1977; 1996; Tomaselli & Tomaselli, 1986) and the way it operates: 'smoothly' and unconsciously. This will help to view propaganda in connection to the work of ideologisation of which it is a continuation. As a form of communication, propaganda will be seen both as a pro-active (offensive) and retro-active (defensive) attempt aimed at shaping the mind and winning the hearts of audiences where the 'smooth' work of ideologisation has failed. The second chapter will discuss the context that contributed to the creation of Radio RSA and in which it had to operate. Understanding the context in which a message is broadcast enables to make sense of that message. In the context of crisis Radio RSA could be seen as a propaganda arm of the National Party government more than it was the voice of South Africa, meaning the voice of all South Africans. In the third chapter I present and discuss the methodology I used in this research. My objective was to identify the main characteristics of Radio RSA's news reports during the crisis period of the mid-1980s. In this kind of research which deals with human motives, I favoured a qualitative inquiry and, therefore, used a content analysis in a descriptive manner in order "to identify what exists" (Wimmer & Dominick, 1983:140) and reveal the story behind those reports. The three last chapters deal with international as well as internal events that the South African government grabbed as dreamed opportunities to state its case in public. The selection of these events and the angle of report reveal a self-oriented motives.
Acronyms/Abbreviations

ANC- African National Congress
CHOGM- Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting
FRELIMO- Front for the Liberation of Mozambique
MPLA- Movement for Popular Liberation of Angola
NP- National Party
OAU- Organisation of African Unity
PAC- Pan African Congress
PFP- Progressive Federal Party
PLF- Palestine Liberation Front
PLO- Palestine Liberation Organisation
RENAMO / MNR- Mozambique National Resistance Movement
SABC- South African Broadcasting Corporation
SACP- South African Communist Party
SADCC- Southern African Development Coordination Council
SADF- South African Defence Force
SWAPO- South West Africa People's Organisation
UN- United Nations
UDF- United Democratic Front
UNITA- Union for the Total independence of Angola
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CHAPTER I: IDEOLOGY AND PROPAGANDA IN THE NEW S

The present chapter is an attempt to trace and discuss the essential links that unite the triad Ideology – Propaganda – News. My contention is that the report or the transmission of news, beyond the basic and ideal(istic) objective of informing, educating and entertaining ‘objectively’ and ‘neutrally’, is more often then not value laden and ideologically constructed. Selucky (1982) and Sproule (1994) have shown that even in the most apparently innocent report or radio programme such as reports on a religious ceremony or school programme, one can find trends of ideological orientation and biases furthering the ends of those in position of power. It is in this respect that propaganda can be understood as a form of communication used to enforce an hegemonic position and point of view.

I. Theories of news and communication

In her study on The Politics of Discourse and the Discourse of Politics. Images of Violence on The South African Broadcasting Corporation (July 1985 – November 1986), Teer-Tomaseelli (1992) gives a useful account of three basic theories of news construction upon which the present study will be based:

The Market Theory: this theory views news as a neutral commodity with the basic objective of informing, educating and entertaining. Based on a utilitarian approach of the news, which sees the news simply in its functionality, the market theory of the news is less concerned with the issue of objectivity and neutrality as such (these two notions seem to be taken for granted), than the profitability and utility of the news, seen as a commodity. It is assumed that media report firstly and foremost on ‘facts’ that can interest the audience or that the audience can be interested in. This trend obviously leads communication and journalism practices to seek ‘sensational’ news in order to attract audiences and therefore to increase profit. The communicator’s concern is mainly on profit making; and the only link which unites the sender and the receiver is that of the market. This theory draws mainly on the ideas of classical liberalism and refers to the knowledge that the press should be a free market place of ideas wherein the best should be recognised and the worst fail. It is in this sense that news
can be conceived of as a valuable neutral commodity, that is news in which the sender does
not take side of or back any political orientation and show a certain degree of impartiality and
non-partisanship, the main concern being, as it has been said, profit making.

The second theory of news construction that Teer-Tomaselli develops is the *Mass
manipulative theory*. This theory sees the media as an agent of powerful interests within
society, and the audience as a passive and receptive agglomeration, likely to be won over by
the power of media. Contrarily to the market theory of news, the manipulative theory sees
communication as a “social interaction through massages” (Gebner, 1967) in which an
explicit and intended (motivated) objective, going beyond market motivations, is central. In
the case of a political communication, for instance, the communicator “hopes that there will
be some positive (from his or her point of view) impact on the political behaviour of the
recipient” (McNair, 1999:11). The communicator does not see the receiver simply as a
potential ‘buyer’ of news but as a potential target to influence. In this interaction, as it can be
noted, there is an intention by the source of the message to manipulate the destination by
using and choosing deliberately which events to report on and which angle to favour.

Central to the mass manipulative theory are two basic assumptions: the manipulability of the
audience on one hand and the persuasive power of mass media on the other. The rationale
behind the notion of manipulability of the audience and, concomitantly, the persuasive power
of the media is a set of widely accepted assumptions about modern society and individuals
within it. Individuals in modern societies, it is assumed, are seen to be atomised, alienated
and rootless since the ties of family and traditional authorities (church, communities) have
been swept away by the phenomenon of enlightenment, in such a way that individuals will be
inclined to follow the ‘common trend’ of the society or the majority of it. It is worth noting
that commercial advertising and marketing strategies are based on the same rationale. The
modern man (and woman), de-rooted from his/her traditional ties and beliefs, easily follows
the common trend communicated and advertised in the media. Similar to this theory is
another quite simplistic assumption current in the 1920s and early 1930s of the uniformity of
basic human nature. It was assumed that since biological mechanisms are the same in each
and every individual, his/her response to a particular stimulus (in this case media communication) is likely to be the same.

Consequently, mass media are believed to play a significant and crucial role in conveying messages and persuading audiences. Supporting this argument is the transmission model or information theory developed by Shannon and Weaver (1949). In this theory, information is conceived of as a process which "begins with a source that selects a message, which is then transmitted, in the form of a signal, over a communication channel, to a receiver, who transforms the signal back into a message for a destination" (McQuail, 2000: 46). According to this model, the audience is seen as essentially passive. Based on the 'magic bullet' image, on which the perceived persuasive power of media is based, the mass mediated message is "presumed to act on the individual rather like a hypodermic syringe or billiard ball, producing a direct effect (...)" (McNair, 1999:20). This one-way, mechanistic and deterministic model of communication is precisely "in line with the conception of mass society in which a small elite with power and money could use the powerful instruments of media channels to achieve persuasive and informational ends". (McQuail 2000: 48)

To sum up, the mass manipulative theory indicates that the media cannot be as 'neutral and objective' as the market theory suggested. Instead it argues that there is a particular orientation (let alone the term bias) behind the selection/omission of news in the interest of those who own and control the media or for commercial viability – since the news can be considered as a commodity. Those who own (financially) and/or control (politically) the media have the power to manipulate and give them a particular orientation favouring their interests and furthering their objectives. "The mass manipulative theory", argues Tesser-Tomaselli (1992:14), "views the distortion of the news as a deliberate attempt by the powerful sectors of the society to directly intervene in the production and censorship of the news". There is therefore an obvious link between the media and the power, be it political or economic. Nacos (1994:19) refers to this link as the symbiotic relationship between press and public officials. "While the free market place of ideas remains the ideal (…)", she comments, "the press remains dependent on economic markets and the political arena".
In the South African case the link between the political economy and the media or what Teer-Tomaselli (1992:12) refers to as “evidence of interlocking interest of capital and media industry” can be easily traced. In the relationship (at the edge of confrontation) between the press and the South African government, major group industries or publishing groups (Argus, Times Media Limited, Anglo-American, Sanlam or the South African Associated Newspapers SAAN), each of which supporting a particular nationalism, have played a significant role in controlling either the English-language press, the Afrikaans press or what was called the Black press. This ownership and control of the media turned the latter to be part of the political struggle for or against the apartheid regime. Giffard and Hachten’s Total Onslaught. The South African Press Under Attack (1984) and Finnegans’s Dateline Soweto. Travel with Black South African reporters (1988) illustrate how the South African media have been co-opted and utilised in the conflict between various nationalisms (English, Afrikaans and Black). Evidence of this can also be found in the reaction of both English and Afrikaans presses to the Muldergate scandal (1978) in which key members of the then government were involved or in the reaction to the media restrictions accompanying the State of Emergency (1985 – 1990).

The third theory of news construction developed by Teer-Tomaselli (1992) is the Dominant Ideology framework. It sees the media as the major carriers of ideology. In opposition to the market theory of the news in which ‘the institutions dealing with the news attempt only (neutrally) to satisfy a public demand’, and complementing the mass manipulative theory of news which sees the distortion of news as a deliberate and conscious attempt to direct and control public opinion, the dominant ideology framework suggests that the ‘hidden hand’ behind the news construction and orientation is not as tangible and visible. The hand is actually ‘hidden’, unconscious and works pervasively. In the dominant ideology framework, the distortion of news can be regarded as an “unconscious and unstated process of interpreting the world in term of a conventionally acceptable ideological standpoint” (Teer-Tomaselli, 1992:15). The Dominant Ideology framework, as a theory of news construction introduces an element worth mentioning: the unconscious work and influence of ideology in the selection of news to report on.
Far from being a visible and predetermined set of beliefs imposed by dominant groups of individuals upon other people, ideology can be regarded as the persuasive mental structure which, as Tomaselli & Tomaselli (1985: 3) have put it, “frames everything we see, believe and do”. The above quotation suggests that in news construction, there is more than just the basic objective of informing, educating and entertaining the audience neutrally: the construction of news is tainted with values and motives which makes the report value laden and self serving. The quotation indicates that the mass manipulative theory can be extrapolated to suggest a process of distortion, deforming or reforming of news and reality, not by dominant groups or individuals but by the unconscious work of ideology.

Before moving further discussing how deep is the work of ideology in the choice and selection of news, I would like to point out that the above mentioned quotation raises a number of questions on the concept of objectivity (and neutrality) as well as on the understanding of the concept of reality. If we admit that ideology “frames everything we see, believe and do” then it should also be admitted that there is no such a thing as an objective reality ‘out-there’ for all to see. There are only interpretations of reality. The more ideologies, the more various interpretations of reality. Commenting on this ‘non-existence’ of a unique and universal reality, Tomaselli and Tomaselli (1985:2) remark: “what is obvious to one person is invisible to another, (...) what is put across as incontrovertible fact is perceived through our ideology, and what is presented as reality – there for all to see- is a constructed and controlled interpretation”. In the same line, Hall (1982:65) stresses on the constructed nature of reality and put even a step forward by showing the work of media in this construction. He argues that reality can no longer be viewed simply as a given set of facts: it is the result of a particular way of constructing the reality. This is also the view Teer-Tomaselli (1992:15) sustains when she states that news [as a report on reality] is a mediated product: the result of a process of selection by journalists in terms of pre-existing categories and news values, which are processed through a particular set of bureaucratic structures and practices.

This last argument by Teer-Tomaselli has the advantage of showing both the constructed and controlled nature of news and reports on reality. It also points out the ‘symbiotic relationship'
between power (those in position of authority, either politic or economic) and the media. In a capitalistic environment, such as the South African society, whereby power is control over the means of production, there is no doubt that media organisations (as well as the content of the media) will forcibly reflect the interests and ideas of those who own them. Thus from being the control over the means of production, power has turned to be regarded as the control over the media of communication. From this argument, another link can then be established between power (control over the means of production), the dominant ideology (the mental framework of those in power) and the media which is supposed to carry and reflect this ideology: the account of those who control the media of communication will easily be the “perceived reality of others” (Nacos, 1994:16). This later interaction will be developed later in this chapter. For now it suffices to mention that similar to the issue of reality in news reports, the claim of objectivity in the media, the ‘telling it as it is’ remains problematic as journalists themselves are, in a way or another, consciously and subconsciously informed by markets demand, political pressure or affinities and more importantly, their own ideology. The enduring symbiosis between reporters and officials (Nacos, 1994) or what French journalist Daniel Carton (2003) has termed “connivences entre politiques et journalistes” (“Connivance between politics and journalists”, see http://www.rfi.fr/actuchaudes/...06/02/2003) makes the issue of objectivity in the media even difficult to sustain. Thus, in this way the presumed objectivity can only be seen at once as a moral ideal, a set of reporting and editing techniques, and an observable pattern of news writing; but never as an achieved goal.

With this argument, it is clear that the market theory of news construction with its claim of objectivity in news reporting is unsuitable to sustain theoretically the present study on Ideology and propaganda in external radio broadcasting. The selective (oriented) choice of news and articles to be published in a given newspaper, the selective choice of certain images to be shown on TV (and the omission of others) at a particular moment of the day, on a particular channel; the selective choice of a particular angle taken by journalists when
reporting on events; the selective choice of who could be quoted and interviewed\(^1\), for instance, during the State of Emergency in South Africa (1985 – 1990) and the 'non-selection of other articles, images, events, channels, moment of the day, person to show and interview on public media are all indicators of a particular orientation taken by media organisations in news reports and reflect the impact of ideas and the ideology of those in power, in which the media naturally evolve.

The above discussion on theories of news (as developed by Teer-Tomaselli, 1992) aimed at finding out which one could support the present study on ideology and propaganda. The market theory with its ideal(istic) claim of objectivity and neutrality does not view news reports as 'oriented' and 'motivated'. It does not take into account ideological and propagandistic component of media communications. The mass manipulative theory, which is grounded on a 'two-sided' notion of manipulability of the audience/persuasive power of the media, sees media reports as object of diverging and even opposing interests. Taken in that perspective, media content will no doubt be subject to manipulation in order to support and further particulars interests. Propaganda, which has everything to do with manipulation and persuasion, seems to fit easily in the above theory. However, taken as it is, the mass manipulative theory does not fully account for the manipulation process. To explain the process of manipulation, this theory stresses disproportionately on factual and conscious interventions of those in position of power in the selection and production of news. While this can be true, it should not however be lost from sight that the process of manipulation, to be effective and long lasting is an in-depth and 'unconscious' work of ideologisation. The dominant ideology framework, which emphasises on the ideologically constructed nature of news and/or the unconscious work of ideology on the selection of news, fits better in providing a useful framework to the present study. It accounts for both the manipulation aspect of propaganda and the unconscious nature of ideology in communication.

\(^1\) Substantiating this biased orientation with regard to the choice of people to be interviewed or quoted is the following statement by Dave Overton: "It was illegal to quote what they [National Party authorities] called a banned person and most of the people in the liberation movements were banned people and as such they could not be quoted" (see appendix C.1.).
Before moving further, I would like to point out that the perspective against which I understand the concept of propaganda is the one which sees propaganda in a top-down, one-way model of communication. In this type of classical communication it is assumed that the audience will decode and read the message as initially intended by the communicator (propagandist). I am fully aware, however, that further research on the effects of media in the 1950's and 1960's have shown that many variables can affect the reception and reading of the message. There is always a potential for differential reading depending on the context of reception, political affiliation, religion, gender, among others. In this respect, Stuart Hall (1980: 138) has provided a list of differential decoding positions:

The *dominant-hegemonic* position, when a message is decoded entirely within the encoder's framework of reference. The *negotiated* position, which acknowledges the legitimacy of the hegemonic definitions to make the ground significations, while, at a more restricted, situational level, it makes its own ground rules. The *oppositional* decoding, the point when events which are normally signified and decoded in a negotiated way begin to be given an oppositional reading.

It is clear that most propagandists evolve in the dominant-hegemonic position whereby it is believed that the targeted audience will share (or already shares) the world-view underlying the construction of the news, "[their] interpretation of the facts behind current political and economic debates, and [their] preferred solutions" (McNair, 1999:31)

**II. The significance of ideology as a mental framework**

When reflecting on ideology and its role in the media practice Ian Connell (1984:75) notes that the media belong first and foremost to the realm of ideology. In saying so, Connell recognises the pervasiveness of ideology in the media. This argument can also be found in Tomaselli and Tomaselli’s *Media Reflections of Ideology* (1985:2). They state:

When reporting on the world around us, it is necessary to engage our ideology. Only once we have cut through our ideology which guides our view can we (...) begin to comprehend how our view of the world is structured, to report on actual conditions of existence and to write about objective processes.
Connell’s quotation as well as Tomaselli and Tomaselli’s clearly suggest that our view of the world - as well as how we report on it - far from being ‘inmaterial’, ‘universal’, and ‘unincorporated’, is strongly influenced by our own particular ideology and bears, therefore, the limitations of what is particular and limited within a period of time. Ideology then appears to be this internal - but unconscious - force which drives our interpretation of the reality we experience around us.

What is then ideology and how does it work? Stuart Hall (1996:26) provides a useful definition of ‘ideology’:

By Ideology I mean the mental framework - the language, the concepts, categories, imagery of thought, and the systems of representations - which different classes and social groups deploy in order to make sense of, figure and render intelligible the way society works.

Hall’s definition is very useful in the sense that it helps to understand how ideology can be a powerful force commending our interpretation of the world. By stating that ideology is a ‘mental framework’, Hall implicitly suggests that it works unconsciously: we come to be aware of its influence only when faced with another (different) framework. It is this unconscious nature of ideology which makes us to take for granted the world around us. Ideology makes “each individual thinks that only he or she and other ‘like-minded’ people have correct interpretation of reality” (Tomaselli & Tomaselli, 1985:1).

Althusser (1969, cited in Hebdige, 1993: 7) has more appropriate words to describe this unconscious nature of the work of ideology over people’s minds:

ideology has very little to do with ‘consciousness’(...). It is profoundly unconscious... Ideology is indeed a system of representations, but in the majority of cases, these representations have nothing to do with ‘consciousness’: they are usually images and occasionally concepts, but it is above all as structures that they impose on the vast majority of men, not via ‘consciousness’. They are perceived - accepted - suffered cultural objects and they act functionally on men via a process that escapes them.

It is now easy to understand the contention by Tomaselli and Tomaselli (1985:2) that ideology is not a system of ideas imposed by other. It operates naturally and imposes itself in
people's mind as long as they share the same environment from which it has emerged. It performs just like myth in its function of naturalisation and normalisation of reality around us to such extent that "the quite contingent foundations of the utterance become common sense, right reason, general opinion" (Barthes, 1963:165).

Ideology thus extends its shadow and tentacles upon people's mind in such a way that the possibility of escaping from it becomes a 'non-sense': we can only think, operate and report on the world and reality around us within a certain and (pre-) determined 'mental framework'. It is in this perspective that the definition of ideology provided by Althusser (1971:233) can be well understood. He defines ideology as:

The lived relation between men and their world, or a reflected form of this unconscious relation (...). In ideology, men do indeed express not the relation between themselves and their conditions of existence, but the way they live the relation between them and their conditions of existence.

Althusser's definition of ideology stresses once more on the 'naturalness', 'pervasiveness' and 'unconsciousness' of ideology. These three characteristics will be of some importance in the discussion about the way media institutions define what should be taken as reality when reporting on facts and events.

Earlier on in the discussion about the dominant ideology framework it has been stated that media can be considered as important carriers of ideology. Given the fact that ideology does not exist in isolation from the lived conditions of existence, it can then be argued in the same way I argued about the notion of reality that there is no such a thing as The ideology, likely to annihilate all the others. There is a diversity of ideologies depending on every one's position in the society, his/her 'lived conditions'. If so, how then do we justify the existence of a 'dominant ideology' which informs and guides media practices? In other words, how come that some ideologies gain dominance and others not only remain marginal but are actually marginalized?

When considering ideology as being related to and grounded in a particular socio-economic context, it goes without saying that it will be shaped according to the structure of that
particular society. As a superstructure informing practices, ideology relies on and needs the (social) infrastructure to take form and to be effective. "Ideology", say Tomaselli and Tomaselli (1985:3) "arises out of our quotidian existence and is indivisibly part of that set of social structures which make up social activities and experience"

The answer to the above question on how some ideologies gain dominance and others are marginalized requires then that we have a close look at how society is structured and how power is distributed. Which individuals, groups or classes have more say in determining social order or deciding how things and (other) individuals, classes and groups should be looked at and regarded. It is obvious that those who have and control the means of production (either politically or economically) are the ones who define the social order and what should be looked at as reality. Their 'mental framework' will have the chance to gain public exposure more than others' mental framework. Even in the case of an alternative or oppositional press, in which an alternative 'mental framework' is striving to emerge and uproot the dominant one, the situation will turn up to be the same: the ideas of those controlling this oppositional press will, if they succeed to reverse the situation, be adopted by the mass as the (current) dominant ideology. A particular ideology gains dominance over the others only when it is adopted and shared by those who control the means of material production. This point of view has been well developed in Marx's *German Ideology*,

The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas: i.e. the class which is the ruling material force of the society is at the same time its ruling intellectual force. The class which has the means of material production at its disposal, has control at the same time over the means of mental production, so that generally speaking, the ideas of those who lack the means of mental production are subject to it. (Marx & Engels, 1970)

This means, in Hall's (1977:332) terms that the

'definition of reality' favourable to the dominant class fractions and institutionalised in the spheres of civil life and state, comes to constitute the primary 'lived reality' as such for the subordinate classes. In this way, ideology provides the 'cement' in a social formation, preserving the ideological unity of the entire social bloc. This operates (...) because they [dominant classes] strive and to a degree succeed in framing all competing definitions of reality within their range, bringing all alternatives within their horizon of thought. They set the limits – mental and structural-
within which subordinate classes 'live' and make sense of their
subordination in such a way as to sustain the dominance of those ruling
over them.

The media only reflect and reproduce the existing mental framework in which they evolve. As suggested by Selucky (1982:9) the media do not impose an ideology on the audience, but rather share with it a common field of ideological representation which define and limit both the production and the reception of the messages. An essential 'cause-effect' link is therefore established between the control of the means of material production and the definition of reality, which obviously favours the dominant ideology. Put in other words, the dominant ideology is the ideology of dominant classes at a given period of time, in a given society, so that when the power and control changes hands the previous dominant ideology ceases to be dominant.

In their critique and discussion on *The Dominant Ideology Thesis* (1980:8), Abercombie, Hill and Turner seem to agree on this 'cause-effect' link between ruling class and the determination 'reality' in society. While in control of the means of production and the media of communication, those in position of authority can also determine what should be considered as reality in the society, as long as they stay in such position. There is not a kind of 'annihilation' or incorporation of (subordinate) ideologies and cultures in a 'unique' (dominant) ideology. Abercombie, Hill and Turner contend that there are still a variety of ideologies, but only one can emerge as dominant by having a public exposure or being publicly noticeable. In fact, when we talk about 'dominant ideology', we implicitly acknowledge one or more subordinate ideologies over which the dominant one dominates. The two realities co-exist and interrelate. Subordinate ideologies will remain in such position until they get access, in their turn, to institutions which can enable them to have a public expression. By refuting the 'incorporation' position, Abercombie, Hill and Turner have restored Marxism in a dynamic perspective of a dialectic relationship between classes: one today's dominant class/ideology is tomorrow's subordinate class/ideology. It is in such perspective that what is known as 'alternative' or oppositional media in modern democracies can be understood. They support alternative or oppositional ideologies in order to give them
a public exposure. It is assumed that the more subordinated classes get public exposure, the more they are likely to take part in public affairs.

Talking about institutions which give ruling class ideas public expression, I join Tomaselli and Tomaselli’s (1985: 3) contention on the use of certain institutions by the State to enforce the ruling views and ideas. They argue that the state intervenes in public life in an attempt to secure the optimum conditions for the reproduction of capitalist relations of production. As a set of public institutions (government, courts, policy and army), the state has been often associated with the idea of force, coercion, or hegemony (Gramsci, 1977). It has therefore the means of enforcing its ideas and determining a particular orientation favouring its (‘public’) interests. Those in position of power have thus the means (through the state apparatus) of making their ideas become dominant ideas. They constitute therefore the dominant class. Althusser’s study of ideology (1971), points out a number of institutions used by the state for this purpose, the Repressive State Apparatuses (the police, the military and the civil servant) and Ideological State Apparatuses (the church, the institution of the family, schools, the media) whose function is “to reproduce submission to the rules of the established order, to give currency to the world view of the ruling class and to make the dominant ideology the ‘common sense’ of all the classes within the social formation”.

In the South African case, social practices under the apartheid regime were a result of a particular ideology which “argued that racial separation [was] a natural, moral and inevitable condition predicated on cultural and racial differences and on moral attitudes” (Tomaselli, Tomaselli & Muller, 1987: 23). Holding state institutions or what Althusser termed as the Repressive State Apparatuses (police, army) and the Ideological State Apparatuses (Schools and Media), the apartheid regime could easily implement its ideas and ideology giving them public exposure in such a way that they slowly and unconsciously became “the individual’s world view from inside looking out” (Tomaselli, Tomaselli & Muller, 1987:23). Laurence (1979: 70) insists on the role played by public media and other organisations in and outside South Africa in giving public exposure to the (dominant) view supporting and furthering apartheid interests. He states:

The white’s (South African) view of apartheid was disseminated throughout the world in places as various as German newspapers, British
public schools, the American congress and New-Zealand business gatherings, while the viewpoint of the black South African majority even on the most urgent matters must usually depend on a few liberal newspapers, church groups, anti-racist organisations and occasional book.

The consideration of the use of these state institutions, especially the media, by the ruling power to carry and enforce the dominant ideology and ideas is of great significance in the present discussion. It is an open window to what can be looked at as government’s public information. It is a democratic and legitimate requirement that those in position of power and authority use public media to communicate with citizens, to inform, explain and instruct in order to reach a mutual understanding - as it is for citizen to communicate to those in power through the same or other media. Sproule (1994:94) finds it legitimate for governments to use public media in the public interest; a “government’s need to act in the public interest”, he says “carries the obligation to help the citizen to understand their socio-political world”. The media can then be used to carry the dominant ideology which explains the coherence of the dominant class and in a certain degree the coherence of the society as a whole.

Nevertheless, this ‘smooth communication’ can only happen in ideal(istic) situations where the ruling ideology effectively and efficiently maintains a certain coherence and harmony in the society. This is mainly the case in hegemonic situations,

in which a provisional alliance of certain social groups can exert total social authority over other subordinate groups, not simply by coercion or by direct imposition of ruling ideas, but by winning and shaping consent so that the power of the dominant classes appears both legitimate and natural (Hall, 1977).

At this stage, it is important to ask what will then happen in other situations where the existing “hegemony breaks down” (Selucky, 1982:10) or “in those instances in which the semantic grid is no longer deemed sufficient to hold together a disintegrating social formation” (Tomaselli, 1992:20)?

To answer this question, we should have a close look at the principles which underpin media and broadcasting practices. Media are supposed to operate with a certain degree of ‘objectivity’, ‘neutrality’ and ‘impartiality’ or ‘balance’ (if not effectively, at least as a principle) in such a way that when reporting on events there is always “more than one
definition of the situation available to the audience" (Hall, 1977:345). In an earlier
discussion, it has been stated that objectivity and neutrality of the media remain problematic
since everyone is always and already determined by a particular ideology and “like everyone
else, news reporters and the organisations that back them are subjective” (Sproule, 1994:51).
Thus in ‘normal’ situation, that is when the social formation is held together, the (public)
media reflect and reproduce the existing and dominant ideology in a ‘smooth’ way, almost
‘unconsciously’. However, in ‘abnormal’ situations, there will be more than just the basic
objective of informing, educating and entertaining. In their (democratic) right to
communicate with citizens, the ruling classes or the government will be tempted to “make
the strongest possible case in favour of their position” (Sproule, 1994:98).

It is now clear that in addition to their ‘work’ as carriers of ideology, the media can also be
used (or misused) with the aim of “subverting the discourse for the direct support of one or
another of the major positions within the dominant ideology” (Hall, 1977:346). According to
Selucky’s study on Propaganda and Ideology (1982), this process of “subverting the
discourse for the direct support of one or another of the major positions within the dominant
ideology”, can be understood as propaganda. Selucky’s understanding of the concept of
propaganda provides a insight on how to disclose the intricacies of the relationship between
propaganda, ideology and the media. The media are used both in the process of
ideologisation and in propagandistic activities. As a form of communication using a
dogmatic and exhortatory mode of address, propaganda can also be regarded as a conveyor
of ideology when ‘informative communication’ fails to secure the existing hegemony. Both
ideology and propaganda can be regarded as content of the media in the sense that media
content (news, educative programs or entertainment) can either be ideological or
propagandistic.

It is worth noting that in all these characteristics, propaganda is tightly connected to the
concept of ideology in such a way that it cannot be understood out of the work of
ideologisation, thus propagandistic activities must be seen in the context of the “state of
ideological struggle” (Teer-Tomaselli 1992:38), that is the struggle to preserve the existing
hegemony. Selucky (1982:9) is more explicit on this essential link:
Propaganda is defined not only in relation to ideology, but also and above all, as secondary to it: hegemony is achieved through the media ideological ‘work’ which is ideological specifically in its narrative form and ‘mode of address’, that is, the way in which it positions the subject vis-à-vis the range of representation in the discourse.

III. What is then propaganda and how does it operate?

For many decades, the concept of propaganda has been an important feature in the study of communication. At one stage, it has even been regarded as the archetypal form of communication and in all discussions and definitions about the term it has been presented as a form of communication. This appears clearly in Qualter’s (1972: 27) definition of propaganda as

the deliberate attempt by some individual or group to form, control, or to alter the attitude of other groups by the use of the instruments of communication, with the intention that at any given situation the reaction of those so influenced will be that desired by the propagandist.

Sproule (1994:1) also emphasises on this link when he sees propaganda in the manipulative dimensions of communication which is defined as “efforts by special interests to win over the public covertly by infiltrating messages into various channels of public expression”. In their study on Propaganda and Persuasion (1999:6), Jowett and O’Donnell provide a more recent understanding of propaganda and its mode of operation. They define propaganda as “the deliberate, systematic attempt to shape perceptions, manipulate cognitions, and direct behavior to achieve a response that furthers the desired intent of the propagandist”. This definition has the advantage of bringing to light the ‘manipulative’ and ‘directive’ nature of communication discussed in the mass manipulative theory of news construction.

In these definitions and understanding of propaganda the main focus is on the link between propaganda and communication. They shed a light on the main reasons for which propaganda has been paralleled and likened to communication. Propaganda is based essentially on the same “mechanistic cause-effect/ sender-receiver model” (Teer-Tomaselli, 1992:33) which has been referred to as the ‘classical model of communication’ in which it finds its essence and strength. It is a linear and one-way process in which a given stimulus (message)
produced by the sender is likely to engender, in a mechanistic and predictable way, a particular response (effect) in the receiver. In this perspective, the receiver is mainly regarded as an inactive recipient.

However, as it has been noted earlier in the chapter, it should be recognised that the sender-receiver model has been gradually discredited and replaced by newer directions in communication studies. Further researches in this field have acknowledged a more active receiver and conceded that although the sender constitutes an important component in the process of communication, many other intervening variables and factors can actually determine the effectiveness of the transmission of messages. For example, the research conducted in the mid-1960 has seen the introduction of ‘uses and gratifications’ theory of communication to alter the stimulus-response model. According to this new trend, “the audience is active and makes motivated choice, based on previous experience with the media” (McQuail & Windahl, 1993: 134). Hall’s (1980: 138) “differential decoding” is another example of this move from the classical model of communication.

In addition to this argument, Teer-Tomaselli (1992: 36) points out the contradiction inherent to the concept of propaganda based on the sender-message-receiver model. On one side, this model and propaganda along side tend to view the receiver as ‘passive, malleable, emotional and irrational’ and easily persuaded when faced with propagandistic content. On another side, the same receiver is seen as ‘autonomous, fully rational, and able to weigh arguments, compare and judge’ when faced with ‘informative communication.

Despite these critiques and shortcomings of the concept of propaganda and its dependence on the legacy of a static view of communication as transmission of news, it should be noted that the classical model of communication still constitutes the framework within which propagandistic activities are viewed and conceived of. Accordingly, the propagandist is “defined unproblematically in terms of his or her manipulative intentions and assumed success in achieving them” (Teer-Tomaselli, 1992: 36).
The manipulation of messages and the subversion of the discourse appear to be the main characteristic of the concept of propaganda. The sender (propagandist) strives to manipulate deliberately the information with the intention of achieving an intended objective in the audience. The purpose of propaganda seems to be therefore to promote a partisan cause that “furthers the desired intent of the propagandist” (Jowett & O’Donnell, 1999:6). In this way, propaganda exceeds the mutual understanding which characterises ‘informative communication’ and is linked, as Jowett and O’Donnell (1999:3) have put it, “with a clear institutional ideology and objective”. The aim is to send out an ideology to an audience with a related objective. In propagandistic activities, the focus is solely put on the propagandist, his/her ideology and his/her intention to manipulate the audience. It has never been in the interest of the audience. “People in the audience may think the propagandist has their interest at heart, but in fact, the propagandist’s motives are selfish ones” (Jowett & O’Donnell, 1999:9).

How then does the propagandist achieve this subversion of the discourse and manipulation of information? A close look at various definitions of the concept of propaganda provides us with basic characteristics of propaganda (see Table 1 below) which shed the light on how it operates and in which way it can be distinguished from the idealised ‘free’ and balanced communication.
### Basic Characteristics of Propaganda

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Non-Propaganda</th>
<th>Propaganda</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Transmission of skills or information (‘informative communication’);</td>
<td>Transmission of value dispositions, value laden;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presents all sides of the story (events) and leaves the audience to make its mind;</td>
<td>Presents a prefabricated argument and imposes it on the audience;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presents the merits and drawbacks of views under discussion;</td>
<td>Plays on emotional attitudes and feelings;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two-sided and well-balanced</td>
<td>Present only one side of the story, the ‘official’ side of the event, which favours and secures the ruling class; or hide parts of information which can affect negatively the propagandist.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The purpose of the information is to promote mutual understanding between the sender and the receiver (share ideas, explain or instruct).</td>
<td>The main purpose of the information is to promote the objectives of the sender, not necessarily in the interests of the receiver.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Presented as it is in contrast to ‘free communication’, propaganda is overtly a biased communication aimed at influencing the recipient in a (pre-) defined way. It mainly plays on emotions instead of using the reason. It drags the audience on an emotional terrain, using arguments which affect only the heart of the audience in such a way that the audience will not use its mind to reason. Propaganda does not stress on the process of winning the audience. It jumps quickly and drains the audience to prefabricated conclusions favouring its interests.

Sproule’s definition of propaganda as “those efforts (...) to win over the public covertly” provides us with a clue on how actually propaganda operates. In his or her attempt at ‘winning [the] hearts and [the] minds’ (Carruthers, 1995) of the audience, and in fear of

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2 This table is adapted from Teer-Tomaselli (1992: 35)
alerting people’s critical faculties that some one is trying to manipulate the information, the propagandist will try to hide the manipulative aspects of the information by selecting only events and stories which strengthen his/her position and minimising or even rejecting (omitting) those which are likely to tarnish his/her image. It should be noted that when those news and events favouring the interest of the ruling class have been selected, the next step by the propagandist is to engage in a ‘massive orchestration of communication’ by infiltrating all the channels of communication (government agency action, scientific research, religion, news, educational classroom and entertainment) and all the media (newspapers, TV and radio stations and the internet) in such a way that the information becomes a self-perpetuating truth. This is exactly, as it will be demonstrated later, the mechanism used by the National Party government (ruling class) in South Africa during apartheid as well as during the State of Emergency. Using public funds to sustain a wide campaign of propaganda or even buying external newspaper or magazines and other media in order to instil ideas supporting the apartheid regime was part of a massive orchestration of communication project by the National Party government. The disclosure of this project in the late 1970s led to what has been known as Muldergate scandal. (See Laurence, 1979; Hachten and Giffard, 1994).

If the selection/omission of news is the first technique used by the propagandist to manipulate the information and the audience, a second and most sophisticated technique of manipulation is known as coverture. The propagandist will try by all means to hide the source of information in order to increase the credibility with the audience. The coverture of propaganda renders it more pernicious as it is difficult to apprehend. According to the degree of coverture and the accuracy of the information, most studies on propaganda distinguish white, gray and black propaganda. Propaganda is said to be ‘white’ when the source of information is known and the information is accurate. In this type of propaganda, the communicator “attempts to build credibility with the audience, for this could have usefulness at some point in the future” (Jowett & O’Donnell, 1999:12). The propagandist knows that the accuracy of the information will contribute to enhance his/her image. In ‘gray’ propaganda, the source of information may or may not be correctly identified and the accuracy of information is uncertain. Contrarily to white and gray propaganda, in ‘black’ propaganda, more often known as ‘disinformation’ the source of the information is not identified, and the
information is either incomplete or inaccurate. The aim of the propagandist is to mislead the audience. In this respect, Jowett and O’Donnell (1999: 20-21) have developed two models of ‘black’ propaganda: Deflective source and the Legitimating source.

*Figure 2*: Deflective source and the Legitimating source models

**a) Deflective source model**

The propagandist (P) creates a deflective source (P1), which becomes the apparent source of the message (M). The receiver (R) perceives the information as coming directly from P1 and does not associate it with the original propagandist.

**b) Legitimating source model**

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³ The graphic and comments are taken from Jowett & O’Donnel, 1999: 20-21
The propagandist secretly places the original message (M) in a *legitimating source* (P2). This message (now M2), as interpreted by P2, is then picked up by the propagandist (P) and communicated to the receiver (R) in form of M3, as having come from P2. This legitimates the message and at the same time dissociates the propagandist (P) from its origination.

The ‘massive orchestration of communication’ has been pointed out as one of the ways at the disposal of the propagandist to manipulate information and to enforce his/her ideology. The assumption behind this argument is that the more channels the propagandist uses, the more likely he/she is to reach his/her objectives. It is in this sense that Martelanc et al. (1977) argue that propaganda, in order to be effective and efficient needs to be continuous, lasting and total, meaning that it should cover all the channels of communication in such a way that the audience has no choice but to listen, to read or to see. This also implies that the efficiency of propaganda depends on how widely messages are disseminated. However, I would add to this argument that the efficiency of propaganda also depends on the appropriateness of the media used in relation to the targeted audience. Some media will be more efficient than others depending on where and when they are used, even though Jowett and O’Donnell (1999: viii) are confident that the advent of a whole range of new communication technologies and the imminent promise of a myriad of channels for disseminating information constitute by themselves opportunities for the increasing of propaganda activities. This can only be applied in places where these new communication technologies are a reality.

On the African continent, for example, due to the high level of illiteracy and poverty, the most appropriate medium to reach people and to disseminate information (in urban as well as remote areas) seems to be the radio. In the same vain, Heuva (2000: 3) remarks that in developing countries, radio broadcasting has been the most popular form of communication, because of its potential to reach mass audiences, the majority of whom are poor and illiterate. This has been possible mainly due to the technological development which saw the old crystal radio sets being replaced by valves wireless in the mid 1920s, and most importantly the appearance of transistors at the beginning of the 1960s. It obviously constituted a revolution in the affordability of radio sets. The invention of transistor "enabled radio set to
be built which consumed less power and were much cheaper to buy" remarks Crisell, (1994: 12), and therefore making it affordable for most common people. Illustrating this argument, Paulu (1981: 350, cited in Crisell, 1994:12) remarks that radio sets had become so cheap that there were 2.53 sets to each household, or virtually one set for every man, woman, and child in the United Kingdom. Though at a much less degree, these figures can be reflected in most households on the African continent. Discussing radio broadcast in Africa and linking the increasing number of radio sets to its low cost, Fardon and Furniss (2000, 1) remark that by the mid-twentieth century there were estimated to be something over a million radio sets in Sub-Saharan Africa; at the end of the century this figure may well have reached 100 million. Over the same period, the real cost of the cheapest radio set probably dropped to about one-thirtieth of what it had been at the outset.

As the most popular form of communication, radio broadcasting is therefore more appropriate for propagandistic objectives not only because it is affordable, but also because, as Martelanc et al (1977: 8) have suggested, “of all the means of communication, the spoken word is the most unwieldy to restrain”. Given the fact that radio uses human voice and can accompany the listener in other different activities (unlike television and newspaper), it has been identified as “an ‘intimate’ mode of communication”. Its messages frequently reach the listener in circumstances of solitude and privacy, remarks Crisell (1994: 13). “Radio is much more a personal thing, coming direct to the listener”, comments McLeish (1994: 3). For African populations due to their characteristic oral tradition, human voice seems to be likely to give life to an argument, an illusion of presence and a reinforcement of reasoning more than what can be achieved by written words or visual texts. For these reasons and in this context, an external radio broadcasting aimed at African populations is more likely -this is the propagandist’s hope- to reach its objectives and to win people’s hearts and minds.

Earlier in the in this chapter, I pointed out that the reports or the transmission of news, beyond the basic and ideal(istic) objective of informing, educating and entertaining ‘objectively’ and ‘neutrally’ are more often then not value laden and ideologically constructed. As such, they can be used to promote and ‘propagate’ directly or indirectly that particular ideology. Describing the rise of radio broadcasting in independent Africa, Heuva
(2000: 4) points out on how the radio broadcasting was co-opted for self-serving objectives. He notes:

At independence the new rulers saw what a powerful tool radio was and made it an important tool for the dissemination of their policies and political and economic programmes. In this way radio can be used and misused by different groups, in different societies at different times.

With this argument, it appears that the more widely a radio can be listened to, the more efficient will be the impact of its message. An external radio broadcasting fits well in that mission of winning hearts and minds especially when the global public opinion seems to be the prize to win. In this respect it has been argued that “basically all external services are propaganda services motivated by the sublime assurance that certain beliefs, ideas and ideologies are superior to those of other states, and that conversion is therefore indicated” (Data, October 1971). The autocratic nature of radio is another advantage making the radio easy to be used for propagandistic purposes. Unlike the print media, radio is restrictive and more selective in the choice of news it offers to the listeners. In the print media for instance, “the reader scans pages choosing to read those items which interest” (McLeish, 1994: 6). In the radio however, “the selection process takes place in the studio and the listeners is presented with a single thread of material” (ibidem).

This is the perspective against which I have chosen the situate the study of Radio RSA, an external radio broadcasting in a time when the (all white) South African government needed to sell a good image to the rest of the world. In the following chapter, I will endeavour to situate Radio RSA in the broad context of its creation and its mode of operation when supporting the South African government (dominant class) and furthering its objectives.
CHAPTER II:
RADIO SOUTH AFRICA: THE "VOICE OF SOUTH AFRICA"

In the pre-Hitler era Benjamin Kidd wrote: 'It is clearly in evidence that the science of creating and transmitting public opinion under the influence of collective emotion is about to become the principal science of civilisation, to the mastery of which all governments and powerful interests will in future address themselves with every resource at their command.'

(...) Quite clearly, the situation calls for the development, by the State, of machinery for the dissemination of ideas and knowledge which will enable the Government to reach the minds of all of our ten million people with speed, ease and clarity. (SAB BNS 1/1/266 C17/73)

This is a quote of an 'unedited' and confidential Memorandum from the Sentrale Argies Bewaarplek under the title: *An Analysis of the Deficiencies of State Publicity and Propaganda since 1939, and A Constructive Plan for The Efficient Conduct of State Publicity and Propaganda* (Union of South Africa, government archives, Pretoria, November 18, 1943). The memorandum was prepared and issued by a group of experts and professional of media and marketing information advising the government on how to use effectively the media in order to disseminate information and opinion during the crisis period it was facing. Almost four decades later, Kidd’s prediction quoted in this memorandum was a tangible reality. The (all white) South African government had mastered the science of ‘disseminating’ ideas and knowledge so well and so good that Laurence (1979) believed that “no country’s propaganda [was] more geared than South Africa’s”.

The present chapter consists of a presentation of Radio RSA whose status and mission were as controversial as the government that created it. Referred to by the Prime Minster, Dr. Verwoerd as the “Voice of South Africa”, *(SABC-Radio stations news script, October 28, 1965)* the radio was believed by others to be no more than a propaganda tool for the National Party government. This was a result of the conflictual context in which it was launched and was supposed to evolve. The nation and the government were facing a ‘total onslaught’.

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1 Central Archives Depot.
2 The term 'total onslaught' borrowed from a militaristic vocabulary was the code name used by P. W. Botha (who was then South African Prime Minster), General Magnus Malan and others from the South
referred here as the "communist threat" and Radio RSA as an external radio broadcasting, under the (strict) regulations of the State of Emergency, was called to be part of the 'total strategy' as far as international diplomacy was concerned. By its high performance and the quality of its programming, the radio achieved its mandate of getting South Africa's (the government's) viewpoint across the globe, while showing the world that there was more to the country than apartheid.

A brief and superficial examination of some of the features of the radio will reveal that the station's performance was like a double edge sword. On one side the radio's news reports undeniably bore all the characteristics of 'free' information: accurate, two-sided, relevant and well targeted. On the other side, this highly performance could be considered and analysed as a way of preparing the ground for further self-interested information. In Jowett & O'Donnell's (1999) terms, this is precisely what can be qualified as 'white' propaganda, for the line between 'informative communication' and white propaganda can be being difficult to clarify.

A Nation under stress

From the early 1960's, the republic of South Africa was caught in turmoil of violence; it underwent many increasing crisis after the Sharpville riot or unrest and the following massacres in which "69 people lay dead and 180 were injured" (Hachten and Giffard. 1984:57). These events as well as many others in the 1970's (the June 1976 Soweto events which left 575 people dead (ibidem: 4)) and the mid 1980's which led to the declaration of a State of Emergency (characterised by media restrictions and, consequently, affecting the freedom of expression as well as the freedom of access to information) turned the

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6 In response to the 'total onslaught', Botha and his cabinet intended to react by a 'total strategy' which consisted in seizing and understanding every activity of the state as a function of total war. (See, Rogers 1985: 17).

7 Similar to the label terrorist, the choice and use of the term 'riot' or 'unrest' is politically connoted or may have a socially constructed meaning. For 'one man's freedom fighter is another's terrorist' (Carruthers, 1994:2). To avoid any connotation to my statement, I will use both of them.
international spotlight and attention on South Africa as never before. As a consequence, the Republic of South Africa was roundly censured abroad. The United Nations Security Council adopted several resolutions condemning the South African government for "massive violence against and killings of African people" (Hachten and Giffard, 1984:57). The condemnation of the South African policies by the United Nations Security Council was only the beginning of reactions by the international community. All over the world movements of protestation rose up. They called for the boycott of South African products, its political isolation and the banning of sports and cultural exchanges with the country. Confronted with this growing hostility, international pressure and sanctions on one side and facing increasing unrest/riots in the country on the other side (see Finnegan, 1988; Teer-Tomaselli, 1992), the South African government found itself in a state of unprecedented stress. To the international community sanctions, as well as to the internal crisis, the South African government responded by a vast campaign of lobbying and a series of measures including emergency regulations, media restrictions and censorship. The unfolded State of emergency, considered by many as an unfavourable publicity for the South African government abroad was the climax of these measures and reflected the general mood that prevailed in the country during this crisis period.

The State of Emergency

The state of emergency was first and foremost a set of media restrictions affecting print, televiual as well as audiovisual media in what was seen as an attempt at redrawing the boundaries of law or restoring order. It was regarded by many as "draconian measures

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8 See, for instance, the letter (S/4279, 25 March 1960) dated 25 March 1960 from the representatives of 29 members of the United Nations requesting an urgent meeting of the Security Council "to consider the situation arising out of the large-scale killing of unarmed and peaceful demonstrators against racial discrimination and segregation in the Union of South Africa" (The United Nations and Apartheid, 1945-1994, p. 244).
9 See General Assembly resolution: The policies of apartheid of the government of South Africa - Apartheid in Sports (A/RES/2775D (XXVI), 29 November 1971. This resolution "calls upon individual sportmen to refuse to participate in any sports activity in a country in which there is an official policy of racial discrimination or apartheid in the field of sports". In the same vein, the Security Council Resolution (S/RES/181(1963), 7 August 1963) "solemnly calls upon all states to cease forth with the sale and shipment of arms, ammunitions of all types and military vehicles to South Africa"
against the media” and the “strictest since World War II” (De Beer, 1998: 104). As far as internal media were concerned, the State of Emergency could be considered as a ‘defensive’ strategy, a set of measures and regulations adopted by the National Party government to protect and to shield South African audience from ‘perverse’ influence. The National Party government, says Teer-Tomaselli (1992: 1), “needed to shield the electorate from the knowledge of the extent and intensity of oppositional responses to the structures and implementation of apartheid”. With regard to the external media however, it is pertinent to find out how the State of Emergency restrictions affected the South African Broadcasting Corporation’s external service: Radio RSA. It is important at this stage to look at some of the regulations affecting the media under the State of Emergency and particularly during the period under study (October – November 1985). The regulations under Public Safety Act (PSA) on the 21 July 1985 stated that the SAP Commission, or person acting on his authority, could control reporting and transmission of news on conduct of security forces maintaining public safety and terminating the emergency (Reg 6(1)(i)). Four months later, on the 2nd November 1985, the regulations were amended as follow:

Without a consent of a SAP Commissioned officer, no one is allowed to manufacture, reproduce, publish or distribute in or outside South Africa: any film, reproduction or sound recording of a public disturbance, strike of boycott, the damaging of property; or assault on or killing of person; or of people and security forces involved in these incidents’ (Proc 208 GG 10001)\(^{10}\).

It is vividly clear that under these regulations media in general and the government controlled SABC’s external service in particular could not report anything which could tarnish the National Party government. Instead, Radio RSA could only excel in an ‘offensive’ strategy: a pro-government propaganda in order to win external hearts and minds. The State of Emergency regulations and restrictions on the media can thus be considered as part of the methods used by the South Africa to protect its image in and out of South Africa. Inside South Africa, the government, as it has been said, “needed to shield the [white] electorate from the knowledge of the extent and intensity of oppositional responses to the structures and implementation of apartheid” (Teer-Tomaselli 1992: 1). Describing the State of Emergency

\(^{10}\) Cited in Teer-Tomaselli, 1992: viii
as far as the internal press was concerned, Finnegan (1988: 168) speaks about “drastic new restrictions on the press, sweeping new powers for the security forces, and the arbitrary imprisonment of thousands”.

However, while ‘protecting’ the internal audience from ‘subversive’ information, the government was also involved in (offensive) methods of manipulation of information and media in order to clear and whitewash its image. “The manipulative controls [of the media]”, remark Hachten & Giffard (1994: viii), “comprise the state machinery used both to suppress unfavourable information and to promote a positive image of official policies at home and abroad”. This attempt to brainwash people’s mind was justified by the fact that among National Party officials it was strongly believed that the hostility of the international community toward South Africa and its isolation were the results of lies and distortions in the media both in South Africa and abroad. This is clearly evidenced in a speech delivered in Parliament by the then Prime Minister, Dr. Verwoerd: “the position in which we have landed (...) at the UN is to a large extent the result of inaccurate reports and a wrong interpretation of the policy of the Government” (Hachten & Giffard, 1994: 59-60). The same animosity against foreign press is found several years later in a speech by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, R.F. Botha accusing an article of Newsweek as being dripped “ with enmity hate” against South Africa (South African Digest, March 25, 1983). In fact the article argued that South African blacks were still suffering ill treatment despite the government’s proposed constitutional reform. Along side with the incriminated Newsweek article, the foreign press as a whole was considered by the government officials and pro-government press as a “deliberate denigration of efforts to build a better South Africa” (Rapport, March 20, 1983) or an attempt to “detract from the genuine reform plans of the government” (The Citizen, March 21, 1983).

Other complaints have been raised by National Party officials that there was a resurgence of organised press campaign against South Africa in which it was presented as a country where oppression and slavery were still a perceptible reality. It was even believed that three-quarters of British Press items were said to be concerned with ‘negative subjects’ about South Africa, which increased an unfortunate impression to the British reader (Hachten &
Giffard, 1994). The (all-white) South African government therefore saw itself as a victim of a well-orchestrated international campaign through the media. The ANC’s Radio Freedom broadcasting from its Zambian exile, Radio Moscow, Radio Peking as well as the external service of Radio Tanzania were all accused of carrying out anti-South African propaganda. South Africa was “in peril from a total onslaught by its enemies foreign and domestic”, said Mr. P.W. Botha (Hachten & Giffard, 1994).

The Communist threat

The South African government was believed to be in peril from a total onslaught by its enemies foreign and domestic. Reading from declarations made by government officials and other apartheid ideologues, it appears that the ‘total onslaught’ could actually be identified and labelled: the (all white) South African government was ‘in peril from communism’. Communist ideology and ‘lies’ were believed to be at work in South African ‘terrorist’ organisations (ANC, SACP, and PAC). Explaining the motives behind the launch of Radio RSA in the context of the ‘communist peril’, Dr Hertzog, the Minister of Post, Telegraph and Radio services stated:

Nobody could help being struck by the amount of suspicion throwing and lies which were spread by radio stations in communist countries (...). In the world of today, it is necessary that the voice of the truth should be heard and it is in order to gain the ear of the world that South Africa is constructing more powerful transmitters’ (The Star, March 05, 1965).

In fact it was reported that there were roughly 80 countries maintaining regular broadcasts beyond their borders, and they were on the air for something like 14,000 hours a week. Of this total, the former USSR, Red China and their satellites (communist countries) were responsible for more than 5,000 hours weekly (Radio SA, October 1971). In another article, (Data, December, 1972:9), the allegation of ‘lies’ and ‘distortions’ originating from communist countries was made even clear:

Communist broadcasts are particularly virulent in their attacks on the West and in exhorting revolution – and broadcasts from Prague, Peking, Moscow, East Germany and Cuba account for an unhealthy proportion of weekly external broadcasts.
In a SABC’s *Current Affairs* release (*Springbok Radio*, 07/05/1968), the new transmissions of *Radio RSA* were reported to be serving a purpose of particular importance in [the then] world circumstances: to add another voice for the free world against the communists in the vital, and disputed region of the earth, South Africa.

From these statements, and many others of the same nature, the real objectives of the radio were set up. Most significantly, these statements were the reflection of the global or international mood which prevailed in the World since the early sixties: the cold war between the West capitalist and the East communist, and the mutual suspicion which unfolded. The ideological battle for leadership found a favourite terrain in the media, especially the external broadcasting. Therefore, *Radio RSA* was called upon to take an active part in the war of words.

In what Teer-Tomaselli (1992: 280) described as ‘a period of internationally increasing anxiety on the question of [communism and] terrorism (...)’, the (all white) South African government was facing a fierce internal unrest/riot which was either inspired by communist ideology\(^\text{11}\) or allegedly supported by communist (if not ‘terrorist’) countries. The National Party government therefore found itself involved in an international warfare (the war against communism/terrorism declared by the West). It aptly used this context and opportunity as a justification and legitimisation of its policies, actions and repression inside the country as well as in neighbouring countries (Angola, Mozambique, Lesotho and Zambia) which it accused of hosting and/or supporting South African ‘terrorist’ organisations.

The above factors (international isolation and boycott, criticism from foreign press, the growing unrest/riot at home as well as the communist threat) were regarded aspect of the ‘total onslaught’, a context in which Botha and Malan’s ‘total strategy’ could be well understood. “Total strategy”, Botha suggested, “requires, among other measures, a

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\(^{11}\) On August 3, 1986, the ANC’s Freedom Radio was quoted saying: “The destruction of colonialism and the winning of national liberation is the essential condition and the key for future advance to the supreme aim of the Communist Party. This is the establishment of a socialist South Africa laying the foundations of a classless communist society” (Cited in Teer-Tomaselli, 1992: 43).
supporting and conforming press” (Hachten & Giffard, 1984: 3). Many years before that speech, in a similar crisis period (January 1962\textsuperscript{12}) the then Minister of information, Frank Waring, in an interview with a London Times correspondent, called upon the press “to contribute toward an informed and balanced public opinion on South African affairs at home and abroad” (Cited in Hachten & Giffard, 1984: 232). From such declarations, it can be argued that the press in general and the broadcasting in particular were explicitly called upon to be part of the struggle to counter malicious criticism on South Africa. In other words it was called upon to take side and consequently to move away from the ideal of objectivity\textsuperscript{13}.

To contribute toward an informed and balanced public opinion on South Africa at home and abroad was the mission assigned to the Information Department and therefore to the media in South Africa. The South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) was already fulfilling the task of creating an ‘informed’ and ‘balanced’ opinion on South African affairs inside the country. There was however a strong need for an external service to cater for the audience in Africa as well as in other parts of the world. In this respect Hachten and Giffard (1984) share

\textsuperscript{12} Sharpville massacre, 1961.

\textsuperscript{13} Government restrictions or interference in media reporting during ‘crisis periods’ is not restricted or confined to South Africa. The ‘unpopular’ US-UK led Gulf War II or War on Iraq (March 20, 2003) has seen American media being called upon to be ‘patriotic’. In what seems to be a self-censorship effort, American information networks and televisions refrained themselves from reporting on American war casualties. While European and other TV stations (Al-Jazeera) were offering wide coverage on these casualties or showing images of American dead or captured troops, American media were either selective or silent. The reason behind this apparent self-censorship is found in this statement:


\textit{(in fact, the 500 embedded journalists obey the 12 pages rules issued by the Pentagon pertaining to the coverage of the conflict. The Pentagon can allow a live broadcasting of images when they are found appropriate by the authorities. The Pentagon can also decide to close up the tap).}

Few weeks before the conflict in Iraq, the British administration raised strong concern about the interview by Tony Ben with President Saddam Hussein on the British Channel 4 about the ‘disputed’ issue of weapons of mass destruction. The Iraqi president was given an opportunity to state his own case in public while the British administration sees this as ‘an undue publicity given to someone who was disgraced’.
the view that the utilisation of transnational shortwave broadcasting to improve and enhance the image of South Africa throughout Africa and overseas was an ‘era of high priority’ for the (all white) South African government. “The need for an advocate to state the case of South Africa on the air was obvious (...)”. *(Data, December 1972)*.

*Radio RSA: context of launch and characteristics*

The launch of *Radio RSA*, the South African Broadcasting Corporation’s external service in 1965 was therefore a response to the attacks against the South African policies. *Radio RSA* was established to act not only as a foil against the ANC’s Freedom Radio¹⁴, and to break the isolation in which the South African government was. It also had to counteract various “voices from African countries campaigning for independence (...)” such Ghana, Ethiopia and Egypt which targeted black listeners in South Africa and Namibia” (Heuva, 2000a: 4). It was meant to be the “Voice of South Africa” as announced by the Prime Minister Dr Verwoerd in October 1965 *(SABC news release, 28.10.1965)*. The title ‘The Voice of South Africa’ (in the same line with ‘The voice of America’) was not an accident rather a very apt description of the station. In Dr Verwoerd’s view, South Africa’s point of view, angle of reality on what was happening in the country and on its borders were not being heard enough by influential business and political elements across the world. The radio had also a major role to play in informing South African embassy staff on what the South African position on events and actions was. South Africa was seeing itself as the ‘innocent’ victim of blatant lies, unbelievable distortions, misunderstanding, prejudices and misinterpretations from other countries around the world.

Born in May 1965, the huge transmitting station of *Radio RSA* from which the voice of South Africa could reach its listeners around the world was situated in Bloemfontein at about 64 kms south of Johannesburg. With its two 100 kw and four 250 kw transmitters that could be connected to any of the 28 antenna mats *(Family Radio and TV, June 6-13, 1976)*, *Radio RSA* ensured that South Africa’s voice was clearly heard. With this capacity, *Radio RSA* was

¹⁴ See the interview with Mr. Bret Wilkinson, *(appendix C2)*
known to be the strongest voice in Africa, competing with top international shortwave stations such as Radio Moscow, Radio Peking and The Voice of America. Its signals were so strong and clear that they could even be picked up from a car radio set in places as far a field as California where they came through as strongly as American shortwave transmitters (Family Radio and TV, June 6-13, 1976; Personality, February 12, 1977). "There are few periods of the day" acknowledge Hachten and Giffard (1984: 224), "from early morning to mid evening when Radio RSA signals cannot be picked up through the continent (...)". This clearly meant that Radio RSA dominated other radio stations in Africa in entering what could be termed as 'the battle of airwaves'.

The station was administrated in an unusual way. As a "potent instrument of South African diplomacy and international political communication" (Hachten & Giffard, 1984: 224), the radio was sponsored by the Foreign Affairs department but under an act of parliament it was administrated by the South African Broadcasting Corporation. Thus it could not be said to be a direct wing of Foreign Affairs, but part of the Public Broadcaster. Autonomy was limited to editorial policy, and even that was put under the strain of SABC observation. Paradoxically Radio RSA enjoyed an editorial independence: from the outset, the Foreign Affairs department admitted not to be broadcaster, and left the station very much to the radio itself, only asking for extensive coverage of South African politicians and their travels around the world. The SABC had some editorial control, but was given the message that as an external broadcaster, Radio RSA had to say more than the national broadcaster to have some credibility with the listeners.\footnote{Personal conversation with Mr. Thami Nteteni and Interview with Mr. Bret Wilkinson (appendix C2)}

By June 1976, its airtime totalled 23 hours a day, covering 42 news bulletins and 23 commentaries in various languages (Family Radio and TV, June 6 - 13, 1976). In its well-planned attempt to reach as many people as possible and for many other reasons that will be discussed later in this chapter, Radio RSA used to broadcast in many different languages including western (English, French, Dutch, Portuguese and Spanish) as well as African languages (Swahili, Nyanja and Tonga). The recruitment policy was very interesting. The
English service was, of course, employing South African personnel, but the other languages were run by people from areas of the world that spoke those languages. This help in many ways. In several instances those journalists were known by the listeners they were aiming at. Yet the SABC/Foreign Affairs department had a hold on these staffers, with the possible threat of deportation always present to keep them in check. Throughout security checks were done on all staff\textsuperscript{16}.

From its conception and launch as well as in the context of what was believed to be a ‘total onslaught’ against South Africa, Radio RSA’s mission was set up clearly: to “help people understand the South African way of life and to put over the South African image” (\textit{Sunday Express}, March 14, 1965). It was called to play a significant role in the ‘total strategy’ as far as international diplomacy was concerned, and aimed at correcting false ideas, ill founded and pre-conceived allegations and assertions about South Africa, many of which emanating from abroad (particularly communist countries) and being exacerbated inside South Africa. Besides news programmes, there were a cluster of other documentary, and entertainment styled programmes. The idea was to uniquely capture listeners with entertainment and knowledge while quietly giving them a South African angle on latest news events. The languages followed the countries of interest to South African politicians and businessmen.

\textit{Radio RSA: Objectives}

Describing Radio RSA as a friendly and personal broadcasting station which serves the cause of international understanding, Darrol (\textit{Personality}, February 12, 1971) is more specific on the objective assigned to the radio: the aim of the radio is “to spread the South African spirit, aspiration and realities abroad so that the international community can have something positive on which to base their opinions on this country.” From this, it was then clear that Radio RSA could not be deterred from promoting what could benefit or further the interest of South Africa.

\textsuperscript{16} Interview with Mr. Bret Wilkinson (\textit{appendix C2})
News and reports had a very special significance on Radio RSA. Their quality and accuracy guaranteed the success of the radio. Each news bulletin consisted of accurate reports on international and African events as well as the latest information from a target area to which the programme was beamed. In the context of the war of words between the South African governments and its ‘enemies’, Radio RSA found it necessary to counteract the ‘untruth’ and all the ‘misinterpretations’ with truth. An article in Data (December 1972: 9) talks of Radio RSA as offering “what is acknowledged as one of the most topical, reliable and objective news services on shortwaves”. The goal of Radio RSA then was to portray conditions in South Africa and elsewhere as they were – objectively and true of facts. Programmes were designed to clarify misconceptions, to present facts that countered criticism, promoted international understanding and dispelled ignorance. They seemed to bear all the characteristics bestowed to what has been termed as “free information” as opposed to propaganda.

Government officials have even been quoted claiming they were not using propaganda to attract international sympathy towards South Africa. “We believe the South African cause is quite good enough as it is and does not need a propaganda service”, said Dr Albert Hertzog, Minister of Post Telegraph and Radio Services (Sunday Express, March 14, 1965). “We don’t broadcast propaganda”, commented Mr Greyling, Head of Radio RSA, “we don’t try to whitewash the South African political situation” (Family Radio and TV, June 6-13, 1973). It seemed that the radio policy was not to strike back at South Africa’s opponents or attackers, but to present ‘reality’ of the situation in a positive way.

The professional way in which Radio RSA was set up and did its work meant that it quickly established itself as a global player, even if many of its listeners knew that it formed a devious propagandist role for the South African government (Myttton, 1993). Even members of “Freedom Radio” had to comment on its professionalism17. It used to present much worthwhile information, and gave unique and various information about many things, all with an African flavour. The popularity and success of Radio RSA were also the result of its

17 Personal conversation with Mr. Thami Ntetcni; Interview wit Mr. Dave Overton (appendix, C1); Interview with Mr. Bret Wilkinson (appendix, C2)
‘impartiality’, ‘objectivity’ and ‘immediacy’. There were reports saying that the majority of Black African delegates to the United Nations listened regularly, often daily, to Radio RSA “to keep a breast of events on the continent” (Data, December, 1972). A Current Affairs article issued by the SABC Survey on May 12, 1972 quoted a Ghanaian newspaperman describing Radio RSA as “the most informative and intelligent on African affairs of all stations including the Africa service of the BBC”.

This was apparently one of the reasons why Radio RSA had so many listeners around the world. As a tangible proof of this popularity, it was reported that in the year 1978, Radio RSA received 53,688 letters from its listeners (Annual Report of the SABC, 1978: 97, cited by Hachten & Giffard, 1984: 225). Some of these letters were dealing with the reception quality, others were expressing surprise that “conditions in South Africa [were] not as they [were] sometimes painted abroad” (South African Digest, February 20, 1970). Some others were expressing “support (...) for South Africa’s effort to solve her problems in a peaceful way and the strong criticism expressed against governments which (...) interfered in the domestic affairs of South Africa in an improper way” (Hachten & Giffard, 1984: 225), while many others were simply expressing appreciation of Radio RSA’s impartiality and fairness.

From all these facts, it can be asserted that Radio RSA was really and undoubtedly involved in a ‘free communication’, in presenting only facts and South African ‘reality’ objectively and neutrally. Otherwise the 53,688 regular listeners situated all over the world as well as many other before and after 1978 could not rely on Radio RSA’s news reports. They would instead be considered as ‘irrational’ audience, unable to weigh arguments and to detect what was going wrong behind the ‘scene’ of Radio RSA.

However one can ask if the claim by Dr. Hertzog in Sunday Express saying that the South African cause was quite good enough as it was and did not need propaganda or Mr. Greyling claiming that they did not try to whitewash the South African political situation was not an suggestion and an implicit acknowledgement of this very purpose. Claiming that the South African cause does not need a propaganda service seems paradoxically to be a confession and a tacit invitation to dig more and deeply. There is seemingly more to be learnt behind this
apparent honesty and sincerity. And these claims contradict the statement by the head of the external service, Theus van Heerden, admitting that “propaganda, there obviously must be, in the same way that both the BBC world service and the Voice of America often put the case for their countries” (Sunday Times Colour Magazine, July 14, 1974). With this revelation, it becomes even imperative and appropriate to ask how much did Radio RSA whitewashed the South African political situation in what was described as the ‘War of Words’.

Obviously, a first glance at Radio RSA’s programmes does not show any sign of overt propaganda. News reports that were favourable to the South African political situation as well as the unfavourable ones found their way into Radio RSA programmes, so that listeners could make their mind by themselves and draw their own conclusions. This matches quite well with one of the characteristics of ‘free information’ (see Table 1) which is described as the one that ‘presents all sides of the story and leaves the audience to make its mind’.

What listeners were listening to on Radio RSA was a mixture of news, news commentaries and discussions, documentaries, interviews with important personalities as well as light entertainment, all presented in a highly professional way. An article in Family Radio and TV (June 6-13, 1976) is even more ‘praiseful’ about Radio RSA’s programming:

> each programme is both entertaining and enlightening—a fairy easy recipe as foreign listeners welcome materiel on wildlife, indigenous music, geography, economics and social developments, and with South and southern Africa in the news so much and so often they often feel deprived until they tune in.

In addition to this performance and efforts to gear programmes to local interests, Radio RSA had many other apt and original ways of getting in touch with and gaining the heart and minds of its listeners.

**Radio RSA: ‘Voice of South Africa’ or ‘Propaganda arm for the NP government’?**

The above discussion aimed at situating the launch of Radio RSA in the context of ideological battle of the cold war era. Radio RSA was regarded as part of the ‘total strategy’ opposing the ‘total onslaught’ referred here as the ‘communist threat’. According to its
initiators, the radio, deliberately named ‘The voice of South Africa’, was launched in order to correct misunderstanding, ‘lies’ and ‘distortions’ disseminated in foreign media (mainly communist) about South Africa. At the same time it was meant to “spread the South African spirit, aspiration and realities abroad so that the international community can have something positive on which to base their opinions on [the] country” (Personality, February 12, 1971). Thus, in its pro-active mission, the radio was meant to promote and further the interests of the South African government.

However, behind this apparently noble and innocent mission of correcting misunderstanding and informing, there is a strong suspicion that, beside its role as the Voice of South Africa, the radio was much more playing as a propaganda arm for the National Party government. The context in which the radio had to perform its role could not honestly guarantee a totally ‘free’ information. Nevertheless, before going in an in-depth analysis of Radio RSA’s news reports in order to corroborate or repudiate this allegation, it is interesting to look at some of the features of the radio under the light of theories and practices of the concept of propaganda and to find out how they appear.

Carruthers (1995: 3) refers to propaganda as “the self-interested nature of the process by which governments (or indeed their opponents) communicate with the audiences”. Jowett & O’Donnell (1999: 9) share the same view in arguing that propaganda strives to achieve a response that furthers the interests of the propagandist. “People in the audience may think the propagandist has their interest at heart, but in fact, the propagandist’s motives are selfish ones”. Radio RSA had many ways of softening the resistance of its audience and winning their hearts. Using apt and clever strategies, the radio was able to shade the suspicion of its listeners who obviously thought that it was only promoting their well-being while the radio was busy preparing the ground for another battle. The following lines present some of the strategies and opportunities used by the radio to win the hearts and minds of its audience.
Commenting on how propaganda operates, Martelanc et al. (1977: 7) have this to say:

A well-planned propaganda scheme is a mass one, but it is most effective when it gives the impression that it is especially meant for each individual, that it addresses an individual personally, that it is tailored to his need.

Propaganda plays by emotion and personalised interaction between the communicator (propagandist) and the recipient; and apparently radio broadcasting is well placed to play this emotional role. Teer-Tomaselli & de Villiers (1998: 155) acknowledge this fact when they state:

Unlike television, radio often appeals more to inner thought process, therefore it often has greater personal impact than other media. Radio is direct and personal, and is frequently listened to individually.

Moreover, when speaking the language of the listeners, the radio gives the impression of personalising the encounter with its listeners and is therefore more likely to speak to their heart.

The use of many different languages on Radio RSA and the recruitment of native speakers of those languages was aimed at widening the radio audience as it has been said before; but most significantly it was a well-thought attempt to speak to the heart of listeners in their own language, using their own jargon. It was an attempt to break down the anonymity inherent to media of mass communication and to make each and every listener to feel concerned. The use of a particular language could be interpreted as a gratification for the speaker of that language and therefore dispose his/her heart and mind to listen carefully to Radio RSA.

In addition to this, it appears that in its efforts to gain the confidence of its listeners and to strengthen its listernership Radio RSA was providing the latest information from a target area to which the programme was beamed. There could not be a better way of making the targeted recipients feel important, considered and honoured. Far from being just anonymous listeners, they were given a name and addressed to directly.
Facilitative or informative communication

In their study on Propaganda and Persuasion, Jowett and O’Donnell (1999) describe ‘white propaganda’ as a form of communication in which the sender presents him/herself as a ‘good guy’ and has the best ideology and ideas. The information is accurate and bears all the characteristics of an ‘informative’ communication. But what is hidden here is the fact that the sender is attempting to build credibility with the audience “for this could have usefulness at some point in the future” (Jowett & O’Donnell, 1999:12). In this particular case, Radio RSA was known as being a highly renowned station for the quality of its programmes. Its Afrikaans lessons were among the best; it was even reported that about 3 400 people living outside South Africa were learning Afrikaans over the air and sent in their tape recordings for correction and comment. “We are the only country to actually correct the homework”, said one of the teachers (Family Radio and TV, June 6-13, 1976).

To camouflage its propagandistic nature, the radio was sending to the world non-political news and apparently innocent and neutral programmes such programmes on agriculture, health, science, nature and others. Dr Verwoerd’s statement at the launch of the radio (October 1965) was very ‘forward looking’. He captured what Radio RSA had to evolve into: no listener will continue to listen to absolute propaganda. The station had the opportunity to describe actual events and actions that were sometimes banned or withheld in South Africa itself. Propaganda came only in the angle of reporting such events and actions. In other words, the truth was not withheld, but only angled in a certain direction.

The ‘Communist threat’ pre-text.

South Africa is, and always has been, anti-Communist and unreservedly committed to the cause of the West. Her leaders have repeatedly stated that the Republic would do her duty in the event of a military confrontation between the West and communism’ South African Quiz, published by the South African government and distributed free in large numbers through the world (Cited in Laurence, 1979: 171).
The above quotation clearly indicates to which extent the South African government was determined to ‘fight’ against communism. However one can wonder if the government was honest in its motives or this was just an opportunity it grabbed to take revenge against countries that were hosting revolutionary/‘terrorists’ organisations. What is clear is that in the context of Cold War between the West and Soviet Union, the South African government was inclined to equate terrorism and communism (Teer-Tomaselli, 1992: 280) labelling ‘terrorist’ or ‘communist’ whoever opposed and criticised its policies (Laurence, 1979: 176). The fight against terrorist organisations under the ‘pre-text’ of fighting communism was the hidden objective of the (all-white) South African government. It also jumped upon this opportunity to try to break its isolation, playing the ‘good boy’ role in order to gain support from western countries, mainly the United Kingdom and the United States. In this respect, South Africa presents itself as a frontline country in the fight against communism, a western-Christian democracy among ‘barbarians’ or “the West’s bastion against communism in Africa” (Laurence, 1979: 173). Hence its involvement in the Mozambican civil war along side with insurgent movements RENAMO in Mozambique, and backing UNITA in Angola. South Africa wanted aptly to attract sympathy of the so-called ‘free world’, the West. Being the ‘Voice of South Africa, Radio RSA was obviously reflecting the current battle of words.

*The Broederbond influence.*

No one can study the South African Broadcasting Corporation history without referring to a secret Afrikaner society: *Broederbond* (Brotherhood or organisation of brothers). This secret, all male, white Afrikaner Broederbond has been considered as the real force behind the scenes in South African public life in general and the SABC in particular. Only those Afrikaners who were loyal supporters of the National Party government could belong to this organisation. Moreover, as Hachten & Giffard (1994: 204) remark, “Not only Prime Ministers and cabinet members but top leaders in the church, education, labour, police, the media, universities, and the farming community [were] Broeders”.

The dominance of the Afrikaner Broederbond through the National Party in political and cultural spheres of the country was evident and omnipresent. But “perhaps nowhere were
these tendencies more evident than in the SABC which, as a broadcasting institution, was at the confluence of all these sites of struggle” (De Beer, 1998: 155). As a cultural organisation, the Afrikaner Broederbond was strongly exercising its influence both in the radio programming, discourses as well as in the structures and operations of the radio. However powerful and important as it was, the Broederbond organisation was paradoxically left out from public exposure and deliberately kept secretive. It was not even mentioned in passing, says Laurence (1979: 53). Omission was in fact one of the many propaganda techniques the National Party was delighted in. Radio RSA, being part of the public broadcaster and in the same time the voice of South Africa, could not escape the insidious influence of this organisation. Commenting on the management of the radio, Dave Overton, who was a News researcher at Radio RSA asserts that similar to the SABC, the top management of Radio RSA was [and had to be] Broederbond. “It was an open secret that if you are not a member of that organisation, you would reach a certain level where you would reach the ceiling”18. In its news reports no mention was directly or indirectly made about the existence of this organisation even tough it was working pervasively and unconsciously just like ideology impacts on the selection (or non selection) of particular news.

The above discussion about the structure of the station reveals the ‘double-edge sword’ nature of Radio RSA both in its structure and in its programming. In some of its aspects, the radio was highly performant and competitive. In other aspects its motives and objectives were ambiguous. This is an invitation to dig more and deeper to find out how much Radio RSA whitewashed the political situation in South Africa. The following chapter is a content analysis of Radio RSA News reports in October-November 1985.

18 Interview with Dave Overton, Appendix C.1.
CHAPTER III:  
METHODOLOGY

The aim of the present study is to reveal the propagandistic orientation of news reports on Radio RSA during October and the first half of November 1985. More specifically, I intend to find out how the apartheid regime was portrayed and defended on Radio RSA's news reports and consequently to what extent its ideology was subtly and daily disseminated on the radio, in the context of the 'War of Words' characteristic of the cold war era, a context of political isolation, economic sanctions and internal uprisings.

It then follows that the framework against which this study should be understood is a combined theory of ideology, propaganda and news as discussed previously in the first chapter. It has been stated that the amount and quality of attention that editors, 'primary definers' and 'gatekeepers' give to particular events is frequently ideologically motivated. Consequently the selection/omission of particular news is likely to bear all the characteristics of a persuasive communication or propaganda (be it overt or not): an attempt to achieve a desired and intended response in the audience. As suggested by Ithiel de Sola Pool (1965) (cited in Martelane et al. (1977:13) "the distribution of attention to various action of various subjects in international relations" is therefore a significant indicator in the analysis of communicators' intentions. It reveals their attempt to give the audience an insight into controversial aspects of the issues, forging upon them certain political or ideological orientations.

Bearing this insight in mind, I undertook to collect Radio RSA's recorded news reports covering a period of six weeks starting from October to the first half of November 1985. I also conducted some interviews with former Radio RSA's journalists and reporters who were dealing with the day to day running of the radio in the 1980's: Dave Overton (now retired), Bret Wilkinson and Tony Machikila. In addition to these interview, I had a number of (informal) conversations with Mr. Tami Ntseteni who was responsible for the ANC Radio...
Freedom from its Zambian exile. The aim of these interviews was "to obtain descriptions of events or scenes that are normally unavailable for observation" (Lindlof, 1995: 5) and to have an insight from those who had a first-hand experience of propaganda on Radio RSA. Conversations with Mr. Ntenti were likely to give a valuable insight on how Radio RSA’s content was perceived outside by an organisation set to counteract its effect.

Having to choose between Radio RSA’s news bulletins and news reports for this inquiry, my choice went to news reports labelled under the name of Radio Today, a mixture of news, commentaries on topical events and new developments as well as interviews of selected personalities. They featured speeches by and interviews with key role players on the international scene as well as in the South African saga (presidents, ministers, and other international personalities). They are therefore likely to provide an ‘official’ and authorised point of view as well as the ideological orientation intended and desired by the communicator. “One official way to get objectivity”, says Sproule (1994: 151) “is to report the official material”. This argument as it will be discussed later, is itself a double-edge sword in the sense that reporting official statements obviously guarantees a kind of objectivity but it can also be seen in the same time as a “facilitative communication” (see Jowett and O’Donnell, 1999: 22) for propaganda purposes. “News derived from ‘exclusive interviews’ becomes a conduit for a self-serving propaganda of, by, and for these sources”, warns Sproule (1994: 156). It can turn to be a mutual ‘back-scratching’ activity between politicians and journalists: the former being assured of a wider coverage of their message and the later gaining credibility for scoops and ‘official’ news.

A glance at these reports and interviews revealed that they could actually be compiled around major international events which had marked the international scene and the South African history during the period under study:
- the Commonwealth Summit in Bahamas (October 1985) and a call for stronger sanctions against South Africa;

19 Radio Freedom, the ANC radio in exile was broadcasting from Lusaka, Zambia. It was mainly used to counteract to propaganda messages broadcast on Radio RSA and to provide its listeners with the ANC’s ideology. In this sense it can equally be considered as a propaganda tool for the ANC.
- the highly mediated hijacking of an Italian cruise liner the *Achille Lauro*;
- the alleged communist threat as well as civil wars in Angola and Mozambique.

On the internal scene:
- the constitutional reform promised and undertaken by the state president, P.W. Botha;
- the visit of the official opposition party and University of Stellenbosch students to the ANC in Lusaka.

The hypothesis of the present is that the South African government utilised these events as dreamed opportunities to state its case in public and break its international isolation; to legitimise its action and repression against those it labelled (following the general trend at that time) terrorist organisations; to present itself as a genuine and tolerant democracy and a key role player for the stability and development of the whole southern Africa. It thus follows that in my analysis, I will consider these major events as ‘sign-posts’ or themes against which to evaluate the use and level of propaganda on *Radio RSA*. Following Holsti’s (1969:53) insight which posits that “if the source [of information] has characteristics $A$, then messages containing elements $x$ and $y$ will be produced; if the source has characteristics $B$, then messages with elements $w$ and $z$ will be produced”, my assumption is that the choice and the depiction of these particular events by *Radio RSA* are likely to reveal and reflect the motives and the ‘characteristics’ of a self-interested messages from South African officials.

The choice of this time period is motivated by the fact that the 1980’s bear a wider political significance both in South Africa and on international level. In the second half of 1980’s the South African government faced crises in every sphere: economic, political and ideological. There was a significant increase of political tensions and violence which led the NP government to declare a five-year ‘State of Emergency’ (see Teer-Tomaselli, 1992). On the international level, the 1980’s were considered as the most intense period of the Cold War. It saw several governments fighting and reacting violently against organisations deemed as terrorists and which were “consistently greeted as a manifestation - potential or actual- of international Communist intrigue” (Carruthers, 1995: 11). Under the pretext of fighting the international battle against terrorism and communism, the South African government intended to repress its opponents and political insurgencies.
Having to analyse ideology and propaganda (expression of human subjectivity), I favoured qualitative analysis rather than the quantitative one. This approach provides an understanding of human motives and emotions which by-definition cannot be quantified and measured. In the same line, Williams, Rice and Rogers (1983: 27) assert that a qualitative analysis, “provides a theoretical connection between the intentions of individuals and organisations producing media content and possible social consequences related to the audience use of that content”. Gatekeepers’ motives in selecting (or omitting) particular news are likely to be adequately apprehended by a qualitative approach which situates them in the real context where they have been expressed. “Qualitative methods are more suitable than quantitative methods for addressing certain questions of culture, interpretation and power”, says Lindlof (1995: 10). Although I am fully aware of the limitations inherent to this type of inquiry in regard with its allegedly lack of objectivity, impreciseness, value laden nature, I also understand interpretive inquiry as a coherent way of studying communication. The present study is therefore a qualitative inquiry that intends to give an understanding and interpretation of the ‘world’ behind the news as they were reported on Radio RSA “just as one wends through the allusions of others texts to understand this text” (Lindlof, 1995: 28).
CHAPTER IV: QUEST FOR INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT

Parading public exposure

During the mid 1980s, the South African government was under immense pressure: economic sanctions, state boycott and political isolation. It followed that any international exposure or any agreement passed with an international body or company, as little and insignificant as it could be under different circumstances, was magnified and given a significant publicity on Radio RSA. For the South African government, this was intended to show that South Africa was not as isolated as the international and ‘hostile’ media was suggesting. This massive exposure was also meant to help audiences to realise that South Africa was not a pariah state as it appeared.

The first illustration of this quest for public exposure can be found in the agreement between the government of South Africa and an American computer manufacturer Hewlett-Packard. The commitment made by this well-known computer manufacturer to fund the establishment of a chair in manufacturing control system at the University of Witswatersrand in Johannesburg was of great significance for the South African government. The glamour surrounding this event was likely to raise the question ‘what made this agreement between a government and a company newsworthy’. It appears that the most important thing in this event was more than just the mere fact of Hewlett-Packard investing in South Africa. Had the same agreement been made ten years earlier or ten years later it would not probably have the same exposure and significance as it got in October 1985. Should the same company and its investment originate from Lesotho, São Tome and Principe or Sierra Leone in the same circumstances there would not probably be so much publicity.

A comment made by Professor Roy Marcus, Dean of the Witswatersrand Engineering Faculty, shed a light on the reason why this event was newsworthy for South African officials and Radio RSA: “It [the event] represents a commitment by an American company for further investment in South Africa and this is significant in the current disinvestments
scenario" (Radio RSA, 01.10.1985)²⁰. The value of this news, as it comes out in this declaration from an expert lies in what it represents or stands for much more than in what it is given to see. Beyond the apparent meaning of this event lies the meaning it does not show. This meaning is indeed more important than the mere fact of a company investing in South Africa which could occur anywhere or anytime. This example illustrates adequately the difference Lippmann (1922: 7) establishes between factual news and truth. "News and truth are not the same thing, and must be clearly distinguished", he suggested. "The function of news is to signalize an event; the function of truth is to bring to light the hidden facts, to set them in relation with each other, to make a picture of reality on which we can act". And South African ‘truth’ or the (hidden) reality in this ‘current disinvestments scenario’ is that South Africa is not completely isolated: it can still have business contacts and count on ‘good’ friends such as the United States of America²¹ through Hewlett-Packard.

A call for ‘good neighbourliness’

In the search for normalising its relations with the outside world, the South African government was not targeting only western countries. Normalising its relations with the immediate neighbours and bettering its image beyond its borders was also a top priority. The South African government, through its ministry of Foreign Affairs, was involved in a tense and multileveled political activity aiming at that attempt. Illustrating this objective were the sudden interest and concern in the agenda of the South African Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Ron Miller, for the well-being of the whole region of southern Africa. In a 4'32" interview on Radio RSA, Mr. Ron Miller emphatically believes in a good ‘neighbourliness’ as a way of improving relations between South Africa and other countries in southern Africa:

We are put together geographically, we share the same problems, I think we have a lot in common and South Africa can play a very important role in providing solution to our neighbours (Radio RSA, 04.10.1985).

²⁰ Reports which are labelled under the name Radio Today are those from foreign correspondants, while those labelled under the name Radio RSA were from Radio RSA’s studios in Johannesburg.

²¹ Many other countries were still having (unofficial) economic ties with South Africa: the United Kingdom (as it will be seen later) is among them.
Ron Miller signalled is intention to achieve this goal “through good contacts and relations with our immediate neighbours in Southern Africa” or by encouraging business contact, agricultural contact and other services “which are of mutual interest of all of us here on the southern tip of Africa”.

The above statement was made the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, an official and authorised voice speaking on behalf of South Africa. Unlike any other speaker, the Deputy Minister was more likely to capture the attention of listeners and his message is likely to receive a (hopefully) positive response from his listeners. The choice of the person to be interviewed on a public channel is not a hazardous one. Modern journalism tends to focus on celebrities or already-known figures to catch the attention of audiences and to sell the product that is the news and its intended meaning.22 This process, regardless of the content of the news, has been considered by Sproule (1994:154) as a propagandistic activity. "When journalism becomes beholden to the cult of celebrity, news coverage becomes part of a covert, propagandistic process of manufactured social reality", argues Sproule.

The oriented and motivated (if not biased) nature of this message does not lie solely in the choice over an 'already-known' public figure able to make an impact. A look in the content of this message reveals a tendency to play by emotion in an attempt to win the hearts of listeners. In appealing for unity in a partnership for a same and shared destiny, the Minister seemed to be pulling emotional strings and playing on the feelings of togetherness in the southern region of Africa. He wanted to sell the idea that the southern Africa can be a community of peoples associated for ‘mutual interest’, that the South African government is not an immoral regime condescending and excluding black people. It was rather a caring regime ready to provide solution to its (black) neighbours. This is clearly illustrated in the

22 Getting ‘official experts’ and public figures to give their opinion on matters of public concern is likely to draw the attention of the public and attain a positive response and credit from the audience. To illustrate this argument, Sproule (1994: 166) mentions the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. which was successful in “retailing its exports to the news media” to promote a conservative view of foreign policy. The Center consisted of, among others, Henry Kissinger (Secretary of State under presidents Nixon and Ford), Zbigniew Brzezinski (foreign policy adviser to President Carter) and James Schlesinger (Secretary of both Defense and Energy).
Nkomati Accord signed between the Governments of South Africa and Mozambique. The accord consisted in a ‘peace initiative’ move in a form of non-aggression pact between South Africa and Mozambique. The accord also included normalisation of economic relations between the two countries. Commenting on this achievement, the deputy minister stated:

our neighbours in Mozambique will recognise that we really are their good partner in the Nkomati accord and we do want to develop the Nkomati accord to the maximum benefit of both Mozambique and South Africa. (...) we are very kin to reestablish mutual confidence between Mozambique and ourselves (Radio RSA, 04.10.1985).

It is worthy noting the frequent use of inclusive terms in Mr. Ron Miller’s speech such as ‘together’, ‘share’, ‘same’, ‘common’, ‘neighbour’ and ‘mutual confidence’. The Deputy Minister is at work here trying to conquer African listeners on an ‘already agreed-on’ ideology of the OAU. According to Jowett and O’Donnell (1999: 282), this is precisely how propaganda can be successful: “successful propaganda relates to the prevailing mood of the times”, they argue, and “messages have greater impact when they are in line with existing opinions, beliefs, and dispositions” (Jowett and O’Donnell 1999: 290). The prevailing mood and existing dispositions to which the Deputy Minister relates his exhortation is the ‘unity of Africa’ as proclaimed in the Organisation of African Unity. The South African government wants to show that it can be part of the family.

The propagandistic side of this speech also can be found in the fact that it misguides the listeners. It gives the impression that South Africa was negotiating this peace agreement from a position of strength and as a ‘big brother’ helping his young ones, whereas the country did not have much choice but to negotiate. In an extensive analysis of the Nkomati accord, Erasmus (1984) mentions different factors that pushed the South African government to the table of negotiations with its neighbours. The South African government’s move toward Mozambique was seen as an attempt to create a breach in the newly established Southern African Development Coordination Council (SADCC) by seducing Mozambique.

23 The accord was signed on the banks of the Nkomati River, on the South African – Mozambican border in March 1984.
24 The Southern African Development Coordination Council (SADCC) was created by the ‘frontline countries’ (Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and

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Moreover, the South African military campaign in Namibia and Angola was becoming extremely costly, with “the running expenses of the Namibian war being said to amount to a million Rand a day” (Erasmus, 1984: 2). Arguing that the Nkomati accord was not a charity case of South Africa and that South Africa was equally beneficiary as was Mozambique, Erasmus concludes:

It would then be ‘misleading’ to create the impression that South Africa was in an unassailable position throughout and that the relationship with neighbouring states is a completely one-sided affair (Erasmus, 1984: 2).

Another context which was likely to provide a positive response to the Deputy Minister’s call was the southern African countries dependency on the South African economy. In a region where almost every country relied on the South African economy and savoir-faire, there could not be a better offer than that. This appeal was likely to instil doubt and create dilemma in the minds of governments on either to cut all ties with South Africa or to starve. It could only receive a positive response from Radio RSA Africans listeners.

The seduction of neighbouring countries seemed to be just a short-term objective for the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs. It was used as a springboard towards creating understanding on the international level. It is therefore appropriate to question even the genuineness of the Deputy Minister’s ‘humanitarian motives’ toward southern African countries. Behind this call for togetherness seem to lay other self-serving motives. Discussing propaganda and persuasion, Jowett and O’Donnell (1999) describe propaganda as any communication technique whereby audiences believe that the communicator is starving for their interest, while his/her motives are egoist ones. In such communication, the propagandist is only pursuing his/her own objective. “People in the audience may think the propagandist has their interest at heart, but in fact, the propagandist’s motives are selfish ones”, warn Jowett and O’Donnell (1999: 9).

Zimbabwe] with the objective of lessening their economic dependence on South Africa (Erasmus, 1984: 1) or “to liberate our economies from their dependence on the Republic of South Africa” (Hanlon, 1989: 13).
The South African government's objectives are clearly stated in the following quote from the Deputy Minister's declaration:

Our first priority toward our improve image and relations with the OAU will be through good contacts and relations with our immediate neighbours in southern Africa. We can then try to move forward from there towards the heart of Africa and from there of course we hope we will be able to jump the Atlantic to the United Nations (Radio RSA, 04.10.1985).

In its attempt to win the international community sympathy and recognition (which is the real motive and objective), South Africa uses her neighbours and counts on their recognition of her as a good partner for a mutual benefit.

*South Africa's response to economic sanctions*

If the use of 'good neighbourliness' was only one aspect of the South African multifaceted quest for international recognition, many other events were used as fora for this attempt. The Commonwealth Heads of Governments Meeting (CHOGM) at Nassau in Bahamas (October 1985) presented another opportunity for South Africa to air her voice publicly. Unlike other Commonwealth summits, the Bahamas CHOGM was of great significance for South Africa: it was to discuss among other issues economic tough sanctions and political isolation against South Africa. This was indeed very important for the National Party government.

The call for economic and diplomatic sanctions against South Africa was seen as a great threat for the National Party government and threatened the unity and credibility of the Commonwealth association itself with some countries menacing to leave the organisation due to strong disagreements about the way to go (See Freeman, 1997: 155-165). Opinions were thus diametrically divergent among governments on whether or not stronger economic sanctions were to be imposed on the South Africa government. For some these measures were the only way to go in order to solve the South African crisis. Sharing this point of view were, among others, the 'frontline countries' in Africa (Botswana, Zambia and Zimbabwe), Australia, Canada and India. For these countries "the time has come indeed it has passed to apply real pressure on Pretoria to dismantle apartheid. Sanctions (...) are just a small part of an important part of the effort to ensure that ultimately morality prevails in South Africa"
(Radio RSA, 16.10.1985). Some other countries did not share this view, alleging that the call for sanctions would be more harmful than it could bring about some change in South Africa. Leading this group was the British government for whom further economic sanctions obviously would be damaging for the very people whom it was trying to help -that is the underprivileged- those who were finding hard to find employment (Radio Today, 07.10.1985). These countries were instead prepared to only send a ‘psychological’ signal to Pretoria.

In the midst of these diverging opinions and options South Africa also raised its voice. It undertook to explain its position and illustrate how harmful these measures would be for the entire region of southern Africa. It is worth noting at this point that if the British government’s concern in opposing sanctions against South Africa was (officially) to protect an already suffering (black) population from unemployment, the South African government’s concern was surprisingly highly altruistic and humanitarian. It was concerned not for its own people but for its neighbours in southern Africa. For the South African deputy minister of Foreign Affairs, economic sanctions against South Africa were going to affect not only South Africa, but also and more strongly its neighbours whose economies rely on the South African expertise. The Deputy Minister warned:

It is this strategy [of calling for sanctions] which is going to be totally counterproductive not only in South Africa but the whole of southern Africa. I believe that if this sanctions campaign goes further or disinvestments goes further then we are going to find out that our immediate neighbours are gonna suffer the most and they are gonna suffer the longest. And we don’t want that to happen. I believe that we must go out and explain to people who are propagating sanctions against South Africa what the real consequences of their sanctions are going to be; it is going to be an absolutely nobody interest to propagate sanctions and disinvestments in South Africa because everybody south of Capricorn is going to suffer as the result of that (Radio RSA, 04.10.1985).

To illustrate this fear, it should be noted that countries such as Zambia and Zimbabwe, which were not sufficiently strong economically, could commit an ‘economic suicide’ in pushing for tough sanctions against South Africa. They have been “tightly linked to South Africa by trade, transportation and communication networks” notes Freeman (1989: 146) and they cannot survive without her.
Additionally, the South African government strongly believed that this campaign for sanctions was partly the work of the ‘enemies’ outside of South Africa and motivated by economic interests. “This all campaign of sanctions and disinvestments” said the Deputy Minister, “is only going to serve the aims of the enemies of southern Africa and not our friends and allies”. The finger was obviously being pointed to business competitors who supposedly were going to benefit from South Africa being economically isolated. Reasons explaining the animosity of which South Africa was victim from its competitors in trade were frequently, lengthily and emphatically beamed on Radio RSA:

the key protagonist for sanctions this time is not the black countries in the Commonwealth, it is Australia; it is by any account one of the oldest white members of the Commonwealth (...). Australia has interests, we are competitive with Australia economically, we have very little trade with Australia, but we compete with Australia in the Far East, we sell coal to countries in the Far East in competition with Australia. It in fact suits Australia’s interests and it is a great deal of self-interest involved here (Radio Today, 16.10.1985).

The motives behind the Australian government’s campaign for sanctions against South Africa probably were self-serving. Indeed that country benefited from sanctions against South Africa. As Freeman (1989: 153) pointed out, Australia was a trade competitor with South Africa, notably in regard to coal and other minerals as well as wine and fish. However, more surprisingly, the Deputy Minister deliberately forgot to mention that the British government was fiercely leading the anti-sanctions campaign and literally fighting Pretoria’s battle for precisely the very same reasons.

The Bahamas Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting gave Mrs. Thatcher’s administration the opportunity to make it clear that it was not prepared to cooperate with the Commonwealth calling for tough sanctions against South Africa. Commenting on how determined Margaret Thatcher was, Freeman (1989: 142) notes that she was prepared to take the Commonwealth to the brink of dissolution in defence of continuing economic relations with South Africa. She rejected responsibility for possible defections from the Commonwealth saying that in any case, “it’s their club…not mine” (Freeman, 1997: 160). This was considered as an obvious outrage to the basic principles of the Commonwealth association which, according to the Canadian Prime Minister Mulroney, should “rise above
balance sheets and commercial trading patterns" (Freeman, 1997: 161). Mrs. Thatcher’s attitude toward the South African government made some Commonwealth leaders say that Britain was ‘an ally of apartheid’ (Mugabe) or that it was not the leader anymore – not in the Commonwealth- because it was compromising its basic principles for commercial ends (Rajiv Gandhi).

At this point it is worth asking why the Commonwealth State members were strong in demanding that the British government joins the pro-sanction camp. In other words, what made the Thatcher administration stand so strongly against economic sanctions imposed on South Africa? What was the substance of this ‘mother-child’ like relation between Britain and South Africa? Historic reasons and humanitarian motives are not sufficient enough to explain this position. The response came later in Vancouver (Canada, June 1986) when Mrs. Thatcher contended that she regarded support for sanctions ill-considered. She questioned the morality of depriving non-white South African of employment and of Britain being forced to import strategic minerals from the main alternative supplier, the Soviet Union (Freeman, 1997: 160). “What is the point” argues Mrs. Thatcher, “of causing further unemployment in Britain (...) and in South Africa”? (Radio Today, 22.10.1985). Here lie the real motives behind the British administration’s strong stand against economic sanctions against South Africa. With its $2.5 billion in trade with South Africa and £3 billion in investments25, the importance of Britain in joining the Commonwealth sanctions was therefore unquestionable and would certainly make a great difference in persuading Pretoria to dismantle the apartheid system.

For the British administration, there was no great and urgent need to be harsh toward the South African government which was already working toward introducing fundamental change in order to accommodate every people in the country (The issue of fundamental change will be fully developed later in this chapter). Speaking at the Conservative Party conference in Britain on the need for and benefit of fundamental change in South Africa,

which can be achieved without violence, the British Foreign Secretary, Sir Geoffrey Howe exhorted his listeners:

There must be fundamental change and we must be ready to use our influence, to use our long-standing link to South Africa to promote that fundamental change. But, says this government, but says this conference, change by people means change without violence\textsuperscript{26}. That is why we have already supported measures from the discouragement of supporting contacts to the banning of diplomatic relations with South Africa. \textit{(Radio Today, 11.10.1985)}.

‘Concession’ and ‘constructive engagement’ are the words the Thatcher administration seemed to put forward instead of pressure and sanctions. In an ‘exclusive’ interview with a \textit{Radio RSA} journalist, David McNiel, the British Prime Minister justified the Conservative Party’s rejection of economic and state boycott imposed to South Africa by the United Nations or the Commonwealth:

We are trying to be constructive; we are trying our best to help to bring about a kind of discussion which will lead to satisfaction of people of all background, colour, race and creed so that they can take part in the government of South Africa. Construction and constructive at all time is our message. \textit{(Radio Today, 22.10.1985)}

Along side with her Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mrs. Thatcher defends the reforms taken by the South African government as positive steps and therefore urged moderation in the call for sanctions (Freeman, 1997: 160). “I think one has to recognise”, she pleaded, “that the South African government has done a very great deal in the last three or four months, which has not been done before or maybe ought to be done before” \textit{(Radio Today, 22.10.1985)}.

In its quest for international recognition, the South African government could not dream of valuable advocates of such an international stand as Sir Geoffrey Howe and Mrs. Thatcher. It was believed that, given its position and credibility in the international community, the British administration could lead the way, in one direction or another, for other major Western leaders, particularly the US president, Ronald Reagan, who was reportedly still

\textsuperscript{26} When the minister is speaking about ‘change without violence’, allusion is clearly made to the ANC who has opted for armed struggle as one of its strategy to bring change in South Africa.
reluctant to engage in sanctions against South Africa (Freeman, 1997: 191). The South African government was aware of that and was prepared to make use of it as a loud speaker.

At first glance, there seems to be no sign of overt propagandistic activity in reporting on the British position with regard to the sanctions campaign in the Bahamas. However, a close look at the way it was done and the choice of interviewees provides us with some more insight in the matter. Out of five (5) reports in relation with the Commonwealth summit in Bahamas (See appendices (B) 17, 22, 23, 29, and 30) only one (22) provides a debate around the issue of sanctions between the pro- and anti-sanctions protagonists. The others (four) give a one-sided account favouring the views of those opposing sanctions. Sir Geoffrey Howe, the British Foreign Secretary (17) thought that economic and state boycott against South Africa will only “diminish and not increase effective pressure on the South African government to introduce fundamental change” (Radio Today, 11.10.1985). The reports feature Mr. Gordon Martin, a Radio RSA reporter covering the Bahamas summit (29). In this regard, Mr. Martin plays an important role, as a reporter, in selecting and defining according to his ideology and political orientation what makes the news: the emphasis on the role played by the British Prime Minister, Mrs. Thatcher. Sir Shridath Ramphal, the Commonwealth secretary general (23) is also on record. He has been reported saying that the Commonwealth was conscious of the importance of working toward consensus and that maybe they could do some work aiming at South Africa coming back into the Commonwealth\textsuperscript{27} (Radio Today, 16.10.1985). And finally the report displays an exclusive interview with Mrs. Thatcher, the British Prime Minister and leader of the anti-sanctions campaign (30).

An imbalance in the reporting between the pro- and anti-sanctions protagonists seems apparent. Radio RSA’s coverage of the Bahamas summit does not feature extensively the views of any important pro-sanctions protagonist such as Mulroney, of Canada, Bob Hawke of Australia, Rajiv Gandhi of India, Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia and Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe who, according to Freeman (1997: 155) “led the Commonwealth effort to

\textsuperscript{27} South Africa has been suspended from the Commonwealth organisation since early 1960’s after the Shaperville massacres. But since then, it has always been on the agenda of various Commonwealth summits due to its unacceptable ‘system of institutionalised racialism and repression, and its destructive relationship to neighbouring countries’ (Freeman, 1989: 142).
persuade Margaret Thatcher to support stronger sanctions”. In doing so, the radio station deliberately chooses to favour one side of the story, giving the audience a partial (if not partisan) view of the event and therefore defining the reality they have to believe in. This is precisely what has been termed propaganda in theories and studies on this subject. While the purpose of informative communication is to create “mutual understanding of data that are considered to be accurate (...) the purpose of propaganda is to promote a partisan or competitive cause in the best interest of the propagandist” (Jowett and O’Donnell, 1999: 26). It was in the best interest of the South African government was to win the minds of the international community.

Use of deflecting sources

When listening to the British administration’s concern about the damage of economic sanctions on the (black) South African population, one can logically have the impression of listening to the South African government itself having at heart the well being of its population. “We remain convinced that further economic sanctions will be very damaging for the very people we are trying to help, that is the underprivileged, those who are finding hard to find employment” (Radio Today, 07.10.1985). This is not a South African official speaking; it is Mr. Steve Britten, leader of the group of British Members of Parliament (MP’s) visiting South Africa. Using more or less the same pathetic words, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sir Geoffrey Howe and the Prime Minister, Mrs. Thatcher, insisted on the same highly humanistic interest for Black South Africans who would have suffered from unemployment as the result of sanctions. Surprisingly, there is not a single word from a South African official stressing openly and specifically on this matter.

The South African government seems to have found a more neutral, presentable and powerful voice to air its plea. What are the need and the morality of imposing sanctions and more suffering to (black) people you would like to free? seems to plea the British administration on behalf of the South African government. Propaganda strategists in Pretoria were fully aware of the impact this technique can produce in the audience. This is an illustration of what Jowett and O’Donnell (1999: 20) have termed deflective source of
propaganda whereby the propagandist (in this case South Africa) creates a more ‘lookable’ deflective source (Britain) which becomes the apparent source of the message in order to divert the attention and eventually the grief of the audience and create sympathy. The argument aims to soften the international community’s perception on South Africa using humanitarian motives/arguments.

Justifying her stand to reject implacably further sanctions against South Africa, Mrs. Thatcher argued that there was no morality in “British being forced to import strategic mineral from the main alternative supplier, the Soviet Union” (Freeman, 1997: 160). Put in other words, in the views of Mrs. Thatcher and at a certain extend for the international community standard, it was ‘immoral’ and almost sinful to get involved with the Soviet Union. She was aware of the kind of reaction she wanted to get from the international community. Given the context of the international cold war prevailing in the 1980s, any argument aiming at out casting communism and discrediting any link with the Soviet Union would create a positive impact in the West. This argument will be discussed later in the chapter. For now it suffices to mention that the British administration was a talented and well-trained advocate for the South African case.

To make sure that its message was clearly understood by the international community and that it seriously meant what it said about the regional implication of sanctions against its government, South Africa put forward the decision of a possible repatriation of foreign mine workers of Lesotho origin. Officially this decision was motivated by the fact that South Africa was faced with a ‘very high unemployment rate’ and therefore “it [was] the duty of the government to (...) ensure that its own people have jobs first” (Radio Today, 13.11.1985). This obviously raised a great concern in the Lesotho’s government which sees this decision as a retaliation measure taken by South Africa²⁸. “Lesotho is being easily a wiping boy for South Africa; we are a hostage state”, complains Mr. Desmond Sixishe,

²⁸ Lesotho was allegedly harbouring ‘terrorist’ organisations (ANC and alike) which were threatening the South Africa government. It was therefore a declared policy of the South African government to attack ANC basis in neighbouring countries. Erasmus (1984: 1) mentions South African raids that have been carried out in Mozambique and Lesotho.
Lesotho's minister of information. "South Africa intends to fall out all her frustrations (...) caused by international community's sanctions" (Radio Today, 13.11.1985).

The South African threat was real and its decision fully understandable. However, hiding behind employment reasons to achieve certain objectives appears here as a cynical propaganda strategy by the South African government. It has chosen to use economic ties with its neighbours as a direct instrument for political influence. Studying the South African economic interest and the issues of security in southern Africa, Bienen (1985: 76-77) remarks:

What is clear, and has been so from the start of South Africa's economic relations with African states, is that economic cooperation and economic punishment are in the service of South Africa's foreign-policy goals and domestic security concerns. (...) It has used its economic relations as a weapon first and foremost.

The main focus of this interview is more an attempt to reveal than to hide South African real motives. Basotho mine workers were not a great impediment for South Africa to implement its employment policy: The country could create more jobs for its own people and still employ the Basotho "as they are specialised mine workers" contends Mr. Sixishe (Radio Today, 13.11.1985). The main objective of this interview was to turn the international spotlights on what could happen in Lesotho if the international community does not release its pressure on Pretoria. Illustrating this objective is the question put forward by Jonathan Hargreaves, Radio RSA's journalist: "How in fact will react the economy of Lesotho (...) if something like this ought to happen (sic)?" Mr. Sixishe's response is even clear in corroborating South African government's intention:

It will affect it greatly, there is no doubt that we will be faced immediately with a work force that will be looking for work of close to or for more than 150,000 people. Our budget will suffer very big measure constraints as the result of the money that will not be forthcoming from the mineworkers' earnings, which constitutes a substantial part of our annual budget. And of course (...) their contribution to the farming in the country to agriculture as they finance most of their families agricultural activities" (Radio Today, 13.111985).

29 It has been known that Lesotho along side with Malawi and Botswana has more migrant labourers abroad than they had wage earners at home' (Bienen, 1985: 76).
Here again, one can have the impression of listening to a South African official speaking through Mr. Sixishe. Pursuing its objective of attracting the attention of western countries through Lesotho, South Africa goes on to show the Lesotho’s Minister of Information which way to go and which step to take in order to release the grip on his country:

We have contacted certain international agencies in New York, in London and we are continuing to alert the international community of the decision by South Africa. We are contacting the international trade union movement to make it aware of what is going on here. We are contacting all the people who we expect will react in our favour (Radio Today, 13.11.1985).

The South African government’s expectation was that whenever the international community would focus its attention on the Lesotho’s plea, South Africa would also benefit from the fall out. In this case, the Lesotho’s Minister of Information was used not only as a (pathetic) deflective source of information for the South African government, but more importantly, as a worm in order to capture the attention of “international agencies in New York and in London”. The international community was called upon to react in favour of Lesotho, but in fact the real beneficiary would be South Africa. We are dealing here with a case of virtual hostage taking with the intention of persuading or achieving a particular objective. South Africa is surreptitiously using a sort of coercion on Lesotho in order to influence public opinion in its favour. This can be likened precisely to propaganda because, in Schmid and de Graaf’s words, “Violence and Propaganda have much in common. Violence aims at behaviour modification by coercion. Propaganda aims at the same through persuasion” (Schmid and de Graaf, 1982, cited in Carruthers, 1995: 4). South Africa is using both coercion and persuasion: the former to achieve the later. In this case the ransom will be a decrease in the call for sanctions.

Through coercion or persuasion, propaganda strategists in Pretoria or Johannesburg were frequently resorting to deflective sources or what Laurence (1979: 61) has termed “indirect sources” on Radio RSA. The selection criteria of these would-be ‘sources’ was interesting one. The more a potential visitor was likely to move in the corridors of power and decision making instances in the West, more specifically in the USA, Britain, France or Germany, the
more he/she could stand a chance of being eligible for an exclusive interview on the *Voice of South Africa*.

In the context of political isolation and state boycott, the South African government was eager to use this means and to invite visitors and tourists to come and see by themselves what the ‘reality’ was. Freeman (1997: 162) cites for instance the strong debate raised in Canada over the advertisement published in the *Globe and Mail* by a South African government agency inviting Canadians to come to South Africa to ‘see for yourself’. The National Party government was reportedly renowned in organising (if not persuading) foreign visits to South Africa and paying the full expenses in an attempt to create defictive sources of favourable information when they return into their respective counties. It hoped that these visitors and tourists would take back to their country good impression and spread the good news about South Africa all over the world. On the importance of tourism in South Africa as an image builder for the outside world, the South Africa’s former Ambassador to Washington, Dr Brand Fourie comments:

> From the political and also image point of view you cannot overstate the importance of tourism. If you can bring here a million eventually two million tourists per year, there is no better way practicable in my opinion (...) to correct the kind of perception that has been created by the media of South Africa. You get this people here and they go back. You must realise it is not only million or two million but they’ve got relations, they’ve got friends, they spread the word, they bring more tourists here. You get the snowballing effect and it is one of the most effective ways that I sincerely believe of restoring or recreating a different image for South Africa (*Radio RSA*, 15.11.1985).

Involved in these operations of selling South Africa abroad were, among many others, the government-controlled South African Tourist Corporation or the South African branches of international business associations which reportedly “flew in 231 guests from thirteen other countries for an ‘all expenses paid’ tour of South Africa to correct misrepresentations and give the true facts” (Laurence, 1979: 61-62).

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30 Hachten & Giffard (1984: 229-261) and Laurence (1979: 43-47) give an extensive coverage and analysis of the ‘Muldergate’ scandal of which this issue is part.
Illustrating this eagerness in the search for foreign visitors and tourists as potential advocates is an exclusive interview with two members of a group of seventeen United States former prisoners of war in Korea (1950 - 1953)\footnote{The Korean War (1950 - 1953) was fought by the US/UN coalition to oust the communists from Seoul (South Korea) and in an American determination to unify North and South Korea under a capitalist government. "The story of the American failure to do so is the climactic chapter of the Korean War" (Whelan, 1990: 193).}, MM. Walter Mayo and Bart del Ashmet on their impressions on South Africa after their visit to the country. The invitation made to these two US former prisoners of the 1950 - 1953 Korean war may provoke laugh and amusement: the distance in time (the early 1950’s) and the place where this event took place (miles away) should disqualify this event as news worthy for South Africa 35 years later. Moreover there is nothing exceptional in being a former prisoner of war, nor is there in the 1950 - 1953 Korean War itself. One can thus question the relevance of such an event for South Africa and the objective behind this interview. There might be nothing exceptional in being a former prisoner of war, but for the South African government a US former prisoner of war visiting an ‘excommunicated’ South Africa bears another significance. There is nothing exceptional in the 1950 - 1953 Korean War itself, but when linked with the allegedly South African active participation in the fight against communism, the event bears another significance and becomes news worthy for South Africa in the context of state boycott and political isolation.

South Africa needed appropriate advocates and witnesses to remind the international community about its valuable (but unfortunately forgotten) contribution in the Korean War. Mr. Walter Mayo seemed to be the unexpected advocate for the South African case:

> I think America during the Korean Ward should have been extra thankful to South Africa for having come to our support, supposedly through the United Nations and the support they gave to us I think and I know was tremendous during the Korean War (US former prisoner of war, Walter Mayo on Radio RSA, 14.11.1985).

Supporting this argument, Mr. Robert Swann, the Radio RSA’s journalist, did not wait to nail down the international community for its ungratefulness towards South Africa: “this point is sometimes forgotten overseas that South Africa was an ally of other Western countries during World War II and was also an ally fighting the communist during the Korean war” (Radio RSA, 14.11.1985).
Who could voice the South African plea more emphatically and pathetically than a US former prisoner of war who has witnessed and knows (as he claimed) how valuable was the South African support? The choice of these US former prisoners of war is very significant. In fact *Radio RSA* was aware of how much the United States administration and its people value and honour their prisoners of war. Whelan (1990: 331) speaks about “the great wave of revulsion and moral outrage” in the US caused by the figures of American prisoners of war in the hands of ‘Communists’32. More recently the case of a 19-year old Jessica Lynch, US former prisoner of war in Iraq who has recently received state honours in her home town of Palestine, West Virginia, illustrates the same point. “America doesn’t leave its heroes behind”, said the United States Central Command spokesperson, Jim Wilkinson, at her rescue (*Daily News*, April 2, 2003). As a hero, a prisoner of war is likely to touch the hearts of American people and the South African officials could not let this opportunity of scoring some points fly away.

Read between the lines Mr. Mayo’s argument suggested that instead of being ungrateful to South Africa by imposing sanctions, the United States administration and Western countries should have been thankful (‘extra thankful’, he recommended): she is an important ally in fighting communist. Seemingly, this fact alone should have given South Africa a free ticket into the international community and convince the ‘free’ world to join her in the fight against terrorist organisations and communism. It is note worthy that Mayo’s argument is nearly the same than the one used by the US administration during the recent US-UK war on Iraq (March 20 – May 1)33 which was led without the UN approval. Bush administration and American citizens blamed the French government of being ungrateful to the United States due to its refusal to join the ‘coalition’ forces to topple the Iraqi government. According to the US administration, the French government had moral obligation and debt to join the coalition forces in recognition of the help it received from Americans troops during the

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32 The communists reported a total of 11,559[p]risoner of war], of whom approximately 7,100 were South Koreans, 3,200 were Americans, and 1,200 were from Britain and other UN countries’ (Whelan, 1990: 331).
33 Officially the War on Iraq finished on May 1st when the US president George W. Bush declared an end of major combats in Iraq, although since then US troops continue to face stiff resistance and to succumb in daily attacks by Saddam’s loyalists.
Second World War. The argument used by both South Africa and US could be summarized as follow: ‘I helped and supported you in the past, you have to return the favour’.

Returning the favour and being courteous to South Africa was the least the United States and European countries could do in the case where they were not prepared to recognise the reality evolving in South Africa. According to the South African government the reality in South Africa was much different from what has been said and publicised in international media upon which the international community bases its sanctions. “Much of the OAU and the United Nations hostility toward South Africa is also based on ignorance of what is happening here in South Africa”, complained the South African Deputy Minister of foreign affairs, Mr. Ron Miller (Radio RSA, 04.10.1985). Fortunately for South Africa, there are genuine people who really recognise the real South African reality. Among these ‘casual’ advocates are the two US former prisoners of the Korean War who complain about the wrong portrayal of the South African reality in American media.

the extent of the problems as far as the portrayal in the American news media are monumental as they come across the television screens and our newspapers. But I think they are overblown and I’ve been absolutely impressed with the infrastructure, the economic development in this country, the road nets, the railway net, the industrial capacity and that’s a revelation to me, because I really don’t think that most Americans realise the extent ... eh... the development of this country. (Mr. Walter Mayo, Radio RSA, 14.11.1985)

and give their good impression about the country:

I was tremendously impressed not only with the diversity of the typography of the country, the climate but most impressively with the people: their warmth, their hospitality, and also how much alike we are and the South Africans are to each other. And it has been absolutely amazing that how many common interests and how many common values that we share and this has come out in our exchanges and talking with people and just in casual conversations and meeting people throughout the country (Mr. Bart del Ashmet, Radio RSA, 14.11.1985).

The South African situation was believed to be ‘overblown’ out of proportion at least according to South Africa’s advocates attempted to convince the world that South Africa had much many things to offer and achievements to display than just apartheid: the above two
quotations are there to prove it. Moreover the two advocates of the South African case believe that those who are pushing for sanctions are interfering in South African internal affairs. Forgetting that he was a prisoner of war miles away from his country because of other people’s ‘internal affairs’, Mr. Bart del Ashmet, contends:

'It seems to me like we are dealing with seductive morality these days instead of facing the fact that you solve your own problems and let us solve ours, 'cause we got as many problems as you have maybe not the same way but we've got our own problems. (Radio RSA, 14.11.1985)

The meaning one can draw from the above contention and that Radio RSA intended to send out is that there are things the international community should have been worried about much more than just apartheid and political divergence. South Africa was eager to find people who shared this point of view. The reports on the celebration of the fortieth anniversary of the United Nations gave South Africa an opportunity to demonstrate that there are topics which could be discussed in such international gatherings other than apartheid. Conjointly with the UN conference where heads of states and governments were to deliver important messages concerning various political crises in the world (communism and terrorism, Israel and Palestine crisis, South Africa’s policy of apartheid among others), the US first lady, Mrs. Nancy Reagan was addressing women at the 2nd anti-drug abuse conference.

Unlike other speakers at this conference, Mrs. Reagan did not get involved in politics. Her worries and interests were placed on another register which, according to the Mr. Kallenbach the Radio RSA’s reporter, causes as much damages as (if not more than) political crisis [such as apartheid]: drug abuse. Reading between the lines, Mrs. Reagan’s speech as reported on Radio RSA in this context of general outcry, suggested that there are many topics and crisis around the world which require as much attention (if not more) as the crisis in South Africa. As suggested by Mrs. Reagan herself, “each nation has unique problems and ways of solving them, (...) one cannot change the world in the morning but we can certainly work harder” (Radio Today, 22.10.1985).

Paradoxically this was the subject that attracted the attention of South African authorities and obviously Radio RSA’s reporter, Michael Kallenbach. This apparent ‘no-news’ (compare to
heads of states’ speeches on major crises in the world) surprisingly was news worthy and made headlines on *Radio RSA*. The aim was to divert listeners’ attention on a hot topic (apartheid) and to focus it on something less embarrassing to South African officials. This is precisely a type case of self-ideological censorship where the reporter chooses and selects its news according to his dominant ideology, subconsciously and without any external pressure, and avoids any embarrassment. Despite the fact that Mr. Kallembach, reporting from the United Nations in New York, was not under an explicit censorship from his editor in Johannesburg, his report and choice of angle of report were heavily marked by the need to whitewash the South African situation. “Even though overt censorship is less frequent today”, asserts Sproule (1994: 159) “the gatekeeper’s connection remains an inherent defect of a democracy that relies on news for its intellectual nourishment”.

Winning hearts and minds of the public by the use of a dispassionate and logical argumentation appealing to the critical faculties of the audience is likely to gain its confidence and credibility. Compared to the propagandistic overt use of emotions and inaccurate information, a dispassionate and apparent objective reporting can be more effective, acknowledge Jowett and O’Donnell (1999: 295). The audience will rely on the apparent objectivity and be confidant much more than if it realises that “someone is trying to win them over” (Sproule, 1994: 3). However there is a propaganda technique which does not fool the public around though, but in which the audience’s critical faculties are not alerted. The message is being instilled without the audience knowing that someone is trying to win his sympathy for a self-serving objective.

As another register, entertainment can be the best illustration of covert propaganda. When people are being entertained, they are likely to let down their critical guard and be permeable to all sort of self-interested messages. Having analysed different types of entertainment (film, circus, theatre and music) and the way they can convey propaganda messages, Sproule, (1994: 236) asserts: “today’s merging of entertainment and content produces a species of public communication in which self-serving messages are obscured or hidden behind a charming and essentially irrelevant façade”. This shows that entertainment can be a double-edge sword: on one side it is harmless and provides amusement. On the other, this
harmlessness can be use to hide self-interested objectives and distort or enforce a particular kind of information.

The 15'13" long special programme on the international festival (Eisteddfod) held in Roodepoot and broadcast on Radio RSA is a typical case of a covert propaganda through entertainment. The festival (of an ‘international’ cachet) featured people young and adult from various countries of the world. The comments made by a proud Kobus de Beer, Vice Chairman of this international festival gives the tone of the significance of this event for South Africa:

If one talks about international representations no lees than fifty-nine entries from outside the borders of the Republic of South Africa, amounting to one thousand two hundred and thirty-four individuals have been received for this festival from twenty countries from all over the globe’ (Radio Today, 08.10.1985).

For Mr. de Beer and in a large extent the South African authorities, the organisation and especially the success of this event were a great challenge. The idea was to prove a point to the international community in a context of state boycott: South Africa still has many friends; twenty countries have responded positively to its invitation, including France, China. A glance in this Roodepoot festival does not reveal any propagandistic message: it is simply a cultural activity that helps to create understanding and friendship between people around the world. However, given the context of state boycott and international isolation in which South Africa found itself, the organisers of this solemnly-called ‘international festival’ hoped that this cultural activity would certainly help to portray South Africa as a ‘lookable’ country, a country that can accommodate big events. Therefore the emphasis is put on the number of countries which are represented (20) and specific countries (China and France, permanent members of the Security Council of the United Nations) which are likely to soften the international community perception about South Africa.

34 In its ‘War on Iraq’ (March 20 – May 1, 2003) the United States administration has also claimed to have built a ‘large coalition’ (Britain, Spain and Italy) to topple the Iraqi government despite the disapproval of the United Nations.
The point made by South Africa here was much less what participants said about themselves or their performance. It was first and foremost what they thought about being invited and taking part to this event in South Africa. The festival itself might be a ‘non-political event’, but the focus on its ‘international’ aspect aimed to achieve some highly political objectives: that UN political sanctions against South Africa were not effective, many countries actually ignored them. The second objective was to destroy the international community’s morale in its call for sanctions against South Africa and an implicit invitation for other countries to follow the example set by China and France.

Moreover the manner in which this event was covered suggests what Jowett and O’Donnell (1999: 6) have termed a “directive communication with an objective that has been established a priori”. Illustrating this argument is the question asked by the Radio RSA’s reporter to different participants, especially those from China and France. “Have you participated as a group to other festivals outside of France?” or “And you travel around the world, you go to other countries?” These questions are very suggestive: they obviously lead to the answer and the objective intended by the communicator, a response “that furthers the desired intent of the propagandist” (Jowett and O’Donnell 1999:9): South Africa was posited as entirely part of the global world, along side international destinations. “We have been to Europe first and then we go to South Africa”, acknowledged the participants from China. The meaning behind this expected and ‘desired’ response was that even isolated South Africa was still able to organise events of an international cachet and be part of the family. The important message was that South Africa is not an isolated ‘pariah’ state as portrayed in ‘hostile’ media around the world.

Referring to songs and dances performed by the representatives from China, the Radio RSA reporter is notably praiseful of the ancient (meaning stable) tradition of China: “the one that you did this afternoon for instance, that was the one that teaches grace and elegance; (...) it goes back thousands of years”. The objective seemed to be the capture of the feelings and emotions of listeners from China by appealing to their pride. This is a case of “facilitative communication” (Jowett and O’Donnell, 1999: 22), an attempt to soften, among others,
Chinese audience whose countries is a UN Security Council members. This event, with no explicit political message is however politically and ideologically oriented.
CHAPTER V:
SOUTH AFRICA AND INTERANTIONAL CRISIS

The thesis thus far has argued that the South African government used international events as platform to request recognition and reintegration in the international community. However given the fact that its image was tarnished and its name blacklisted on the international scene, Pretoria resorted incessantly to more presentable voices, to state its case in public. In the same vain, the present chapter will discuss two major topics which have marked the international scene in the 1980s, notably terrorism and communism threats. The following discussion will particularly focus on how the South African government turned these issues to be its own personal battle. The aim was to use international cover and support in a private and personalised battle, and thereby to legitimise its repression against insurgent movements.

Terrorism threat

The mid-1980s was a period of internationally increasing anxiety on the question of terrorism, emphasised particularly by the Thatcher and Reagan administrations in Britain and the United States respectively, although other advanced industrial countries shared their concern. The period also saw an upsurge in the media coverage of the topic world-wide. (...) Even relatively sober non-emotional newspapers, such as the Christian Science Monitor, which until 1978 did not even have an index entry for ‘terrorism’, reflected the growing obsession with ‘terrorism’ and ‘terrorist incident’. By 1986, the reportage in The Monitor had increased 500-fold, as compared to 1977 (Teer-Tomaselli, 1992: 280).

The growing obsession with international ‘terrorism’ and ‘terrorist incidents’ in the media was the general trend in the mid-1980s. As an illustration of how incrusted the words ‘terrorism’ or ‘terrorist’, their meaning and implications were in the mind of common and ordinary South African people (with not necessarily a sophisticated or academic background) is the anecdotal use of the Zulu words such as abashokobezi or Amaphekula Zikhuni which were often used to designate the ANC and other insurgent movements in South Africa.

35 Literally: ‘those who uproot the trees in a rude manner’. The term was applied to those who were using the ‘bush’ or clandestine routes to go into exile or to come back to South Africa as well as those who operate underground (Source: personal conversation with Beauty Khuzwayo).
36 Although the present study is not about audience’s reception of propaganda messages, but rather about how messages were constructed to persuade and to achieve a self-interested objective, however it is useful to assess at this stage how powerful was the South African propaganda campaign as far as
Another illustration is found in the following event: when reporting on what had happened on board of the hijacked Italian cruise liner *Achille Lauro*, the South African hostage, Anne Schröder, had this to say: "he [the cruise liner captain] had to bring all our passports and gave them to the (moment of hesitation) terrorists" (*Radio Today*, 17.10.1985). The moment of hesitation before she said the highly meaningful word of 'terrorist' can be interpreted in many different ways. It might mean anything than a mere pause in the speech. However, in the context of the war of words, this fact reflects two overlapping and conflictual lexical paradigms: on one hand, her own set of words which were probably going to come first but which were repressed or confused, on the other, the words she has been told to say and to believe in. Her moment of hesitation paradoxically said more than what she uttered. Corroborating this argument is this assertion by Conor Cruise O'Brien, (cited by Carruthers, 1995: 13):

> In politics and ideological struggles, words are weapons, not analytical tools. The use of the designation 'terrorism' constitutes a declaration of illegality of the political violence referred to. So whether we use the term, refrain from using it, or hesitate to use it, has a bearing on how long the political violence is likely to continue and how many lives it will cost.

From this it can be asserted without doubt that one of the objectives assigned to South African media (internal and external) was to instil fear and distrust in the mind of people about ‘terrorist’ organisations that were operating in the country.

On the international level, South African officials and *Radio RSA* as an external broadcaster attempted to make use of the international awareness about terrorist activities around the world in order to crack down their own ‘terrorists’ and thus to legitimise their repression. Therefore it was a subject of great concern and disappointment for the South Africa government to see that these terrorists were ‘red-carpeted’ and given assistance abroad where they were recognised as national liberation fighters. In fact the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and other international bodies had reaffirmed "the right of peoples to self-

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the internal audience was concerned. According to Jowett and O'Donnell (1999: 296) to assess the strength of propaganda messages the analyst can also look at "the audience's adoption of the propagandist's language, slogans, and attire". *Abashokobez* was precisely one the propagandist slogans adopted by the South African public.
determination...and...the speedy granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples” (Motshabi, 1989: 128). It has been acknowledged that many states, including the United States and the United Kingdom, had official ties or contact with the ANC, and even Mrs. Thatcher has not gone so far to condemn ANC activities as illegal (Ibidem, 1989: 128).

It is in this context that Radio RSA made a great case out of a New York Times’ report about top United States officials meeting with the ANC, which was described as ‘the group trying to overthrow the South African government’ (Radio Today, 8.10.1985). Radio RSA’s report released an interview with the United States State Department spokesperson, Mr. Charles Redman, admitting: “US diplomats have indeed met with ANC from time to time; it’s our intention to continue these contacts” (Radio Today, 8.10.1985). The wide coverage of this event can be seen as an attempt by the South African government to discredit the Reagan administration for its support to an illegal organisation whose aim is to overthrow a legal government. In other words, the South African is telling the world that while the international community is dealing with ‘terrorism’ and their threat to the global peace, the Reagan administration is busy flirting with a terrorist organisation, the ANC.

The hijacking of an Italian luxury liner, the Achille Lauro in the Mediterranean Sea, was another incident which gave the South African officials and Radio RSA a great opportunity to stir the terrorist threat and to find amazing parallels with the South African situation. The hijacking of the Achille Lauro marked the beginning of October 1985 in a particular way as an international event. Six hundreds passengers from various nationalities including United Stated of America, Britain and South Africa were kept hostages at gun point by four Palestinians, members of the Palestinian Liberation Front (PLF) of Mr. Abul Abass. In the process, the hijackers killed a 69-year American man (because he was Jewish, says the report) who was confined to his wheel chair, and dumped his body into the sea. This dramatic event lasted five days during which the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) leader, Yasser Arafat - from his Tunisian exile- and the Egyptian government were negotiating the release of the hostages. At the end of the negotiation, the hijackers were persuaded to leave the ship and to fly back to their freedom. However the United States authorities who were tracking the ship by satellite sent USF.14 aircrafts to intercept and force down the plane
carrying the four PLF hijackers to land in Italy for proper prosecution. The broadcast also reported that American authorities expressed their anger and frustration to the Italian government over its failure to arrest the PLF leader, Abul Abbas\textsuperscript{37} and to carry out the extradition of the four hijackers to America as requested.

Despite the distance separating this dramatic event from the South African saga and its apparent irrelevance in the South African crisis, it received a very wide coverage on Radio RSA. Remarkably it was reported professionally from almost every angle featuring major key role players in the crisis and ‘experts’ (See appendices (B) 10-11, 14-16, 19, 21, 24-25). The reports feature PLO chief, Yasser Arafat, insistently denying any involvement in the hijacking or any link with the hijackers (10). The White House spokesperson, Mr. Larry Speakes, was reported qualifying the hijackers as ‘terrorists’ and the hijacking as a ‘terrorist act’ which had to be punished to the maximum extent (14). The Italian Prime Minister is on record announcing the killing of the American citizen (15). The captain of the “Achille Lauro” stepped in saying he had two machine guns pointed at him and had no choice but to obey (25). The American president, Mr. Ronald Reagan, was reported expecting the terrorists to be extradited to the United States where they could probably face a death penalty for the killing of an American citizen (16). The Israeli Defense Minister, Mr. Rabin, is on record addressing American Jewish fundraisers in Jerusalem and urging Arab leaders to distance themselves from PLO chief, Yasser Arafat and his terrorist organisation as a prerequisite for a lasting peace in the Middle-East (24). The report also featured the PLF leader, Mr. Abul Abbas exhorting his followers in Arabic (24), the American ambassador to Rome, Mr. Maxwell Rabb, expressing Washington’s anger and frustration at Rome’s decision to allow Abul Abbas to depart secretly under a false name (19). Professor Deon Hasson, Lecturer in Public Law at the University of Pretoria, is also on record commenting the arrest of the four Palestinian hijackers and the legal implications of the American action in terms of international law (21). To end this wide and in-depth coverage of the hijacking drama is an interview with a valuable witness, Anne Schröder, one of the South African hostages talking about experiencing the hijacking (25).

\textsuperscript{37} Mr. Abul Abbas was reportedly apprehended in Iraq by the American forces during the US-UK led war on Iraq in April 2003, after 18 years of hiding and running.
The hijacking of the Italian luxury liner the *Achille Lauro* had a positive fallout for the National Party government in South Africa. Despite having taken place miles away from the South African soil, this event was newsworthy for the South African authorities. It was very close to South Africa in the reality of its meaning and implications, and had blatant similarities with what was going on in the country. The ANC, as well as other organisations (the Pan African Congress (PAC) and the South African Communist Party (SACP)), that opposed the apartheid regime were unarguably labelled as terrorist organisations. They allegedly were involved in terrorism and the killing of civilians in South Africa in the same way as the PLO in Israel, the Irish Republican Army (IRA) in United Kingdom or the PLF on the Italian luxury liner where an American citizen was murdered.

The South African government, through its external service, *Radio RSA*, seemed to be surprisingly concerned with the killing of the American citizen (one passenger over 600). Looked at in a context where South Africa was eager to score political points by all means, this unexpected concern was driven less by altruistic and compassionate motives than by the significance of the victim’s country of origin. For *Radio RSA* and, in a certain degree for the international community, a murder of an American citizen seems to bear more significance and is likely to engender more replications than the murder of any other citizen. This is illustrated by the intense diplomatic ballet that followed the hijacking of the ship and the deployment of American military arsenal to force down the plane carrying the four Palestinian hijackers-terrorists.

What is more significant for the South African authorities is the tough and ‘inspiring’ reaction they are expecting from the Reagan administration. This expectation is adequately substantiated in the comment made by *Radio RSA*’s correspondent in Washington, Connie Lawn:

> The question now is what step, if any, will the Western world take to avenge this action. The United States have spoken of punishment and retaliation several times (...) the reaction to this incident has been strong in this country

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38 American casualties in different operations in the world have always attracted wider media coverage and bear much more important replications than other nationalities have. Illustrating this allegation is the media coverage on American casualties in Somalia (1993), Kenya (1998) and more recently in Iraq (2003) detrimentally to the death of local people.
and it is possible that might lead to some military action by the America or perhaps by Israel on behalf of the United States (Radio Today 10.10.1985).

This seems to be more than just a comment. It reflected the wish of the South African government to take the American reaction as an example to be followed in dealing with its own 'terrorists' at home. The US administration's use of force to avenge the murder of its citizen, wherever the crime was committed, was greeted by Pretoria as a clear sign sent to countries that are hosting terrorist organisations seeking to overthrow the South African government. South Africa was in a process of justifying its military and retaliatory actions undertaken in neighbouring countries (Mozambique, Lesotho, Angola and Zambia) due to these countries' housing South African 'illegal' and 'terrorist' movements. South Africa, seemingly, was telling neighbouring countries that "a country had both a moral and a legal right to move preemptively against terrorists" (Comment, 30.04.87, cited by Teer-Tomaselli, 1992: 284). Larry Speakes' words (Radio Today, 10.10.1985) stressing that "there must be no asylum for terrorists or terrorism" must have been a source of inspiration and encouragement for the South African authorities.

The South African government was also interested in Britain's refusal to meet with two members of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO), and the UN rejection of inviting PLO chief Yasser Arafat to speak at the UN summit. These actions in Pretoria's eyes were the beginning of erosion in terrorist organisations' standing. Authorities in Pretoria wanted to urge the world, especially the United Kingdom, United States, and United Nations to apply the same measures to the ANC and other terrorist movements because of their involvement in terrorist activities and killing of civilians in South Africa.

Furthermore it was also reported that King Hussein of Jordan and other Arab leaders seemingly were taking distance from the PLO after the Achille Lauro situation in the Mediterranean Sea. It was an opportunity for the National Party government to appeal to

39 It was also the declared policy of the South Africa government to attacks ANC's bases wherever they might be.
40 Motshabi (1989: 125) mentions and explains different legal bases on which South African was grounding its raids in neighbouring countries. They are: self-defence, anticipatory self-defence, hot pursuit and reprisal.
neighbouring countries surrounding South Africa, especially the frontline countries, to cut their ties with the ANC and stop supporting and hosting terrorist movements that are seeking to topple the South African government, as a prerequisite for a lasting peace in the southern region of Africa. It can therefore be asserted that destabilisation of neighbouring countries was a conscious policy and the South Africa’s first line of defence against ‘terrorist’ attacks emanating from these countries.

Reports of the hijacking of the Achille Lauro contained valuable information which South Africa would not wait to seize as a precious opportunity to nail down its enemies. “The hijackers believed that they would find asylum in Syria; at one point they seemed to want to make for Libya, then changed their mind”, claimed the Achille Lauro’s captain (Radio Today, 17.10.1985). Even if the hijackers did not actually find asylum in Syria or Libya (as they were planning) in Pretoria’s eyes this only fact was enough to prove that these two countries, especially Libya were involved at some point in terrorist activities. From there it was easy to put a link between Libya’s connection to international terrorism network and what was taking place at home in regard with the ANC insurgency. It was alleged that the ANC had several contacts with Libya and other international terrorist organisations around the world, namely the PLO (Teer-Tomaselli, 1992: 283). If the international community could see the link South Africa was trying to establish between Libya, the PLO, the PLF and the ANC, then South Africa’s action and repression against its insurgents and neighbours could find a kind of legitimacy; then, as an ultimate objective, South Africa could be recognised as a valuable partner in the fight against international terrorism.

The report also mentioned that the hijackers were playing Arab music; they were armed with Russian made kalachnikov rifles, grenades and explosives (Radio Today, 10.10.1985). This is not a mere description of details. In the context of the international cold war and mutual suspicion between the West and the East, the designation of the enemy, especially if this enemy is called Russia, Soviet Union or Communism is very significant. The report implies that the Soviet Union was somehow behind the PLF hijackers/terrorists and that it is certainly ideologically inspiring and supporting other terrorist movements around the world by providing them with all sorts of weapons. In fact, Pretoria has made allegations according to
which the Soviet Union was not only instilling and inspiring the ANC and other national liberation movements in the region with its ideology, but more importantly, it was providing them with conventional weapons (Erasmus, 1984: 15). The Movement for the Popular Liberation of Angola (MPLA), the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO) and the South West Africa People's Organisation (SWAPO) were all sharing 'sympathy' with communist revolutionary ideology and receiving substantial military support from the Soviet Union. When discussing the Soviet threat to southern Africa, Legvold (1985: 49) asserts: "Moscow has pressed forward with diplomatic, military, and party ties with Angola and Mozambique (...) it has assumed a large part in supplying and training the ANC". This was enough to push South Africa in the international fight against communism which was seen to inspire terrorism. The South African government intended to take its full responsibility in this fight for its own security and the stability of the entire region of southern Africa.

**South African regional responsibility against Communism**

South Africa has no illusion about its relative power, but it does have regional responsibilities: responsibilities for the security of its own people and responsibilities for the security of the people of South West Africa/Namibia. And even now, SWAPO is sending major units southwards as part of the Soviet directed offensive with intention of opening new fronts in its terrorist campaign against the people of South West Africa/Namibia (*Radio RSA*, 04.10.1985)

This is the South African Ambassador to the United Nations, Mr. Kurt von Shirnding, speaking during a UN Security Council debate about the Soviet Union's vendetta against South Africa. According to the South African government, the Soviet Union and its ideology were a real threat for South Africa and the whole region of southern Africa. It was behind insurgent and communist-inspired movements (ANC, SWAPO) or regimes in southern Africa (Luanda, Maputo and in certain degree Lusaka). It is therefore the South African right and moral obligation to protect itself and to protect the region. As it has been said previously, destabilisation of neighbouring countries has been part of the South African foreign policy in attempt to achieve this objective. This was done either directly by the South African Defence Force (SADF) in Lesotho, Zambia and Botswana or through surrogate armies: the Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), the Mozambique National Resistance
Movement (MNR or RENAMO) and, in a certain degree, the Ndebele rebels in Zimbabwe 'who pillaged, murdered, and created untold disorder in the south-western section of the country' (Rotberg, 1985: 5). Before analysing the South African rhetoric about this self-granted regional responsibility, it is useful to assess how real and imminent was the Soviet Union's threat for South Africa and the southern African region.

Studies on the Soviet Union involvement and policy in southern Africa do not show a well-thought and steady line of commitment, as it is the case with former colonial powers of the West. Rather they reveal a 'sporadic' and almost opportunistic commitment in accordance with limited interests. Soviet leaders seemed to seek more influence than real estate. Illustrating this argument is Legvold's (1985: 31) study on the Soviet threat to South Africa in which he states:

For Soviet leaders, only regions on Soviet borders - Europe, the Persian Gulf, northeast Asia - are strategic preoccupations; only they are approached with strategic criteria constantly uppermost; only they regularly make it into the daily agendas of the men at the top. Areas beyond are regions of opportunity, attractive precisely because change does not automatically threaten the underlying East-West balance and Soviet advances do not inevitably risk provoking superpower confrontation.

In fact, when looking closely at Soviet priorities in regard with its foreign policy, the third world in general, and consequently southern Africa, came only seventh and only last respectively in these priorities (see Legvold, 1985: 28-29). According to this author, the Soviet leaders' involvement with the third world is a tiny part of their policy of "promoting (and protecting) change in tune with their notions of a more desirable world". Promoting a more desirable world, fundamentally different from the one advertised by the United States and other western countries, seems to be the long-term objective of the Soviet leaders. In this sense, the real battle of the Soviet Union was ideological and the real adversary was the West. The Soviet Union thus intervenes only to counteract and dislodge ideologically Western countries from their former colonies. This is substantiated by the Soviet calculated interest in the newly independent African states which happened to be "revolting against Western tutelage and eventually Western political ways" (Legvold, 1985: 31). Broadly speaking, the Soviet involvement with most African states south of Sahara can be traced back at their independence from the West: Ghana (1957), Guinée (1958), Congo (1960), Angola
and Mozambique (1975) for a ‘new revolutionary front’. Therefore it goes without saying that the Soviet’s ideological and (if necessary) punctual military support went first and foremost to movements and regimes that were resisting and opposing colonialism and apartheid. It was also offered to fight minority rules as was the case in Angola, Zimbabwe and Mozambique and as was still the case in South Africa and Namibia in the 1980s.

This is where the all-white South African government felt threatened by the presence of communism at its door steps. This is exactly the context against which South Africa’s self-granted regional responsibility should be regarded. The question to be asked at this stage is how South African authorities perceived the communist threat for South Africa. The answer to this question will determine the level of honesty in Radio RSA’s reports with regard to this matter. If the Soviet was a real and imminent threat to South Africa and its neighbourhood, then how do we explain the South African clear victories in Angola, its unquestionable success in its declared policy of destabilisation, the imposition of its hegemony in nearly the whole region and above all the Nkomati non-aggression pact with a marxist-oriented Mozambique. On the other hand if the Soviet was not an imminent threat, what were the real motives behind this involvement in the international fight against communism. It seems that the ‘communist threat’ was just a good pretext and cover for other self-serving motives. In this regard, Laurence (1979: 171-176) has revealed some fundamental incoherence pertaining to the use of the word ‘communist’ (to designate the enemy) and the South African government’s stand against communism. Contrarily to what it claimed, South Africa seemed to be more communist that what it has been pretending:

South Africa has in fact been claiming for years that it is ‘the West’s bastion against communism in Africa’. But evidence is piling up that South Africa’s definition of ‘communism’ is a quite extraordinary one, and some observers are already remarking that where human freedoms are concerned, the black worker born in Johannesburg is in reality less free than the Russian worker in Moscow or the Czech worker in Prague (Laurence, 1979: 173).

The above description of the Soviet Union’s motives, long-term objectives as well as targets both internationally and in southern Africa reveals, as it has been said previously, a ‘discontinued’ and ‘dispersed’ policy which could not stand a ‘head-to-head military conflict with the United States in Central America or in southern Africa’ (Legvold, 1985: 30). The
non-existence of a clear evidence about the imminent Soviet threat in southern Africa made Rotberg (1985: 10) contend that “the Soviet ‘total onslaught’, so craftily employed by white South Africa to bolster its defenses never existed and does not represent a credible future threat”. In regard with recent history, this can easily be likened to the US Weapons of Mass Destruction that Saddam Hussein was accused of possessing and which ironically have never been found yet. In this sense, it can be said that the communist threat constituted more a pretext for propaganda than a real motive for the South African involvement in the international fight against communism.

Let us look now at Radio RSA’s reports on the alleged Soviet threat. I will start the analysis with this long speech by the South African Ambassador to the United Nations, Kurt von Schirnding, on the Soviet Union’s vendetta against South Africa during a Security Council debates. (Radio RSA 04.10.1985):

Soviet pilots are flying some of Angola’s MIG 23 aircraft and MA25 helicopter gunships, the very same gunships that they are using to slaughter the people of Afghanistan. It is clear, Sir, that the Soviets are directly involved and are in fact commending the current: MPLA offensive. No doubt, the Soviet Union sought to take advantage of the current international vendetta against my country to serve and expand its influence in our continent; no doubt, it imagines that it could intervene militarily in southern Africa with impunity. Mr. President, South Africa has no illusion about its relative power, but it does have regional responsibilities: responsibilities for the security of its own people and responsibilities for the security of the people of South West Africa/Namibia. And even now, SWAPO is sending major units southwards as part of the Soviet directed offensive with intention of opening new fronts in its terrorist campaign against the people of South West Africa/Namibia. Mr. President, despite our limited capabilities it must be understood that South Africa cannot and will not simply shared its responsibilities. Those involved should understand and understand clearly that there will be no cheap victories. Mr. President if the Council would like to establish what is happening in southern Angola my government suggests they send a fact finding mission to the area to establish who is fighting whom, who is directing the operations, what armaments are being used and what the people of Angola would like to see happening in their country and they will then discover what support UNITA enjoys in Angola. And if the MPLA wishes to confirm this, let him hold free elections, let the people of Angola determine their future in a peaceful manner instead of by destroying one another in this endless civil war; a civil war which has been instigated by foreigners for the promotion of their own interests (...). And as recently, Mr. President, as this morning, Secretary
of State of the United States is quoted in the *New York Times* as follows, and I quote:

'We must also remember what is happening in El Salvador and throughout Latin America of the past five years and for that matter what is today happening in Nicaragua, Cambodia, Afghanistan and Angola where people are fighting and dying for independence and freedom'.

Mr. President, South Africa is committed to peace and stability in southern Africa and my government has often gone on record to invite the leaders of southern Africa to come together, to negotiate and to work out solutions to the problems of the region.

"Soviet pilots are flying some of Angola’s MIG 23 aircraft and MA25 helicopter gunships, the very same gunships that they are using to slaughter the people of Afghanistan. It is clear, Sir, that the Soviets are directly involved and are in fact commending the current MPLA offensive", claimed Mr. von Shirnding. This statement does not bear any sign of hesitation or doubt. Just like an ‘ex-cathedra’ truth, this strong affirmation is similar to what Sproule (1994: 6), when describing propaganda, has referred to as “conclusions packaged in attractive language, often entirely without support of developed reasons or arguments”. The South African Ambassador wanted to appear convincing in order to give a kind of credibility and strength to his allegation. The message also implies that South Africa did not receive this information from a third person, and that this statement is certainly not a second-hand information but a very true fact: the soviets are commanding the “current MPLA offensive”. This is quite similar to the US Secretary of State, Mr. Colin Powell’s presentation of ‘evidence’ about Saddam Hussein possessing Weapons of Mass Destruction at the United Nations in February 2003.

Mr. von Shirnding’s argument would have been incomplete if he did not add to his exhortation the note about Soviet Union using machine guns to “slaughter the people of Afghanistan”. The stress on the word ‘slaughter’ implies a deliberate and evil act of the Soviets; it also aims at ‘delegitimising’ the Soviets presence in Angola and in the region. Therefore, in Pretoria’s eyes the international community should not adopt the policy of ‘let us wait and see’. It should rather take its responsibility and act urgently before the people of
Angola get slaughtered by the Soviets. Otherwise, seems to warn Mr. von Shirnding, ‘South Africa does have regional responsibility’, [if the international community does not take its].

The Soviets might have been in a process of slaughtering the people of Angola; but the Ambassador has concealed the fact that South Africa’s policy of destabilisation in Angola has cost “more than 900 000 lives since the beginning of 1980” (Hanlon, 1989: 173) and more than a thousand children were dying each week “needlessly because of destroyed health facilities” (ibidem, 179) caused by South Africa. This deliberate omission, however, speaks more loudly than it was meant to by Mr. von Shirnding. It was mainly designed to demonise the Soviet Union. If we understand propaganda as an incomplete information “deliberately designed to weaken adversaries” (Jowett and O’Donnell, 1999: 22), then it should be stated that in offering a one-sided account of what was happening in Angola Radio RSA along side with the South African Ambassador to the UN were in a process of misleading the international community with the aim of gaining support and recognition over the Soviet Union.

We have seen the same rhetoric and pattern of exhortation in the months preceding the invasion of Iraq by US and UK forces (March 20, 2003). First the ‘demonisation’ of the enemy by showing how real, devilish and imminent is his threat (Saddam’s torturing and killing of his own people and the nuclear weapons that can be launched within 45 minutes). Then follows the harassment of the international community to act urgently before it is too late (substantiating this is the tense diplomatic effort by both the US and UK to bring into the ship as many UN Security Council members as possible). Finally the threat to move without the international community which is not brave enough to take its responsibility. All these techniques (dogmatic assertions and half truths) by both South Africa in the eighties and US-UK coalition in 2003 aim at showing the good willingness of one’s intention in order to win support while tarnishing the image of the enemy.

The South African Ambassador carried on showing the genuineness of South Africa’s intentions in the region. Using a ‘carrot and stick’ strategy, the South African government wanted to show that not only there would be no cheap victories for Soviets and allies, but it
could also initiate a sincere peaceful resolution to the conflict in Angola. As pompously reported on *Radio RSA*, “Mr. von Schirnding (...) took an unusual step of presenting a draft resolution to the Council which among other things demands that all foreign forces be withdrawn from Angola” (*Radio Today*, 04.10.1985). Addressing the UN Security Council, Mr. Von Schirnding declared:

Mr. President, if members of the Council fail to give consideration to this draft resolution, I will invite them to tell us with what aspects they disagree. And let me say, Mr. President that this is a sincere and a serious attempt by my government to bring about peace in our region. It is not an attempt to score political points or to push in blame for the development of the current situation in Angola. On the contrary, Mr. President, it is designed to serve the interest of Southern Africa as a whole.

It is true that the South African government “has often gone on record to invite the leaders of southern Africa to come together, to negotiate and to work out solutions to the problems of the region” as claimed Mr. von Schirnding. However, and this is where lies the self-serving objective, the South African Ambassador deliberately did not point out that it is also true that these ‘peace and stability’ agreements[^1] *Made in South Africa* or à la Pretoria were more often obtained under economic or/and military threat. Moreover they were always in South Africa’s advantage, i.e. in exchange for neighbouring countries rejection of harbouring the ANC and acceptance of South African policy on the homelands. It is also true that South Africa had been on record as violating these agreements. “When confronted with evidence of continued South African support of an insurgency against Mozambique”, comments Motshabi (1989: 125), “the South African Minister Foreign Affairs, R.F. Botha, conceded ‘technical’ violations of the Accord [of Nkomati]”.

In the speech quoted above, the South African Ambassador to the United Nations refers to the United State Secretary of State’s allusion in the *New York Times* to the American involvement in Central American conflicts, as well as in Afghanistan and Cambodia.

[^1]: South Africa’s non-aggression pacts with its neighbours are fully detailed in Erasmus (1984: 15-22). Non-aggression pacts have been signed covertly or openly with Swaziland (1982), Mozambique (1984), Lesotho, Botswana and the South African homelands. But Pretoria has failed to reach the same agreements with Angola and Zambia.
Although this allusion appeared anachronistic in the present situation, it however was of great significance for Mr. von Schirnding. South Africa was in a process of looking for international support for its involvement in southern Angola; therefore this appeal seemed to be particularly addressed to the US administration which showed its responsible involvement in similar communist-provoked crisis around the world. The argument went as follows: 'if the US has showed determination and responsibility in the fight against communists in El Salvador, Nicaragua, Cambodia and Afghanistan, it or we should show the same determination and responsibility for the same reason in the Angolan crisis'. The bottom line was that South Africa was looking for an international community’s recognition of the parallel nature of what was happening in southern Angola, and thereby a legitimisation of its military campaign in Angola.

The strategy of searching for the blessing and a much needed support of a ‘big brother’ in the alleged fight against a communist threat was not new, and certainly South Africa was not the first to use it. The United States administration has always been known for its desire to weaken communist and Marxist ties wherever they appeared: Afghanistan, Cambodia, North Korea, Cuba, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Angola and Mozambique, among many others. Given its international position, it was therefore a valuable ally in this fight against communism, for real as well as alleged reasons.

In the wake of the Second World War, the British government economically weakened, and facing insurgencies and unrest in some of its colonies which were paradoxically the most lucrative and on which she could count to get rid of its debts (Malaya, Kenya among others)\(^{42}\), found no better scapegoat than communist machination in these insurgencies. The only way to fight successfully this alleged communist influence was to seduce the US administration, change its attitude towards the British Empire and drag it in the newly stamped ‘international communist threat’. Commenting on Britain’s strategy, Carruthers (1995: 12) notes: “The Empire could be projected as a necessary line of defence against the encroaching Red hordes, and lengthy counter-insurgency operations could be justified in

\(^{42}\) About these and other insurgencies against the British government, see Carruthers, 1995.
precisely in these terms". Officially, the British government needed United States support in the fight against communism to prevent the Soviet expansionist crusade for psychological territory. The real reason for this appeal was that the British government feared that the Soviets were fomenting already latent anti-colonial unrest in the colonies.

In the same vain, the South African government saw the fight against communism as a battle for "ideological allegiance" (Carruthers, 1995:12) and its self-granted regional responsibility consisted precisely in being this "necessary line of defence" (Carruthers, 1995: 12) or "the West’s bastion against communism in Africa" (Laurence, 1979: 173). "With the collapse of the Portuguese colonial empire in both Mozambique and Angola, the Rhodesia’s independence as Zimbabwe" remarks Teer-Tomaselli (1992: 135), "South Africa became the last frontier against the perceived Communist-inspired onslaught, a realization that made it necessary to find black allies both internally and in the neighbouring states". It was therefore essential for the South African government to drag in this officially international fight as many supporters as it could, preferably the US and the UK even though in reality it was fighting its own battle against the ANC and other insurgent organisations.

The South African invasion of Angola then was justified as the only way to stop the communist ideology from expanding further in the south. However, it is worth noting that neither in Mr. von Shirnding’s declaration nor in other reports on this matter (see appendices (B) 2b, 3, 6, 8, 12 and 33) was mention made of the fact that the SADF was pursuing the ANC and SWAPO militants in Angola; nor is there of mention the fact that South African insurgencies were being accused of finding moral support from communist-inspired regimes of Angola and Mozambique. It appears therefore that the South African government did not want to personalise this fight and hence to reveal its personal motives behind its presence in Angola. The fight maintained its credibility and strength if it was to be seen solely under cover of the international community. When the real objectives of a message are deliberately concealed, this is called propaganda.

Concealing the real motives is one of several techniques which have been used in many of the South African government communication about its presence in Angola and the fight
against communism; South Africa also resorted to deflection source model of propaganda to conceal the real source of message (most often violent) or to give credibility and a new impulse to its allegations. In this respect, it made great use of UNITA in an attempt to weaken the MPLA’s grip on the country and, as consequence, the communist influence in the region. Resorting to UNITA or other anonymous groups in this multifaceted propaganda campaign was useful not only for UNITA’s own military operations on the ground but also for the SADF under covered operations. Substantiating this argument is the following event reported in Hanlon (1989: 173):

South African Captain Wynand du Toit was captured in May 1985 trying to blow up an Angolan oil installation. In his pack was a tin of paint. He explained that ‘After the attack we were supposed to paint “Viva Unita” on the tarred road...to leave the impression that Unita did the operation’.

Or this citation from de Kock’s (1998: 116) testimony:43.

The weapons brought to South Africa had a number of uses. We used them ourselves, for training, for cross-border operations and when we wanted to appear not to be ourselves –as was the case, for example, when we used Chinese explosives to blow up Cosatu House.

In the first case, South Africa would succeed in destabilising Angola without being identified: concealing of the source of the (violent) message. In the second case, by using explosives from China (a communist country) to pass a message, South Africa wanted to direct the blame onto a communist-inspired movement: the ANC who would then appear as the perpetrator of the attack. Here again the real source of the message would be hidden.

In fact UNITA’s voice was more credible than South Africa’s when speaking about Soviet’s military involvement in the Angolan crisis and the imminent communist threat for the southern region of Africa. In Pretoria’s eyes, UNITA’s leader, Dr. Jonas Savimbi, was a key witness of the perceived Cuban-led, Soviet assisted attack in Angola. He could then be used valuably to deflect the real source of many of such following messages delivered by Jonas Savimbi on Radio RSA:

43 Colonel Eugene Alexander de Kock was a South African police at the notorious Vlakplaas farm north of Pretoria where he was Head of the section CI, a Unit supposedly focussed on fighting organised crime. Mr. de Kock was in reality the National Party government’s assassin-in-chief.
We have to explain to the people why we fight and also to explain to some African countries, Western countries the scope of this direct Soviet involvement. So the people will be aware that what the Russians have massed here in this country as armament in terms of planes, in terms of tanks, in terms of armour, it is not only to fight against a guerrilla movement, it goes beyond that; it resorts to the strategy of the Soviet Union of global...eh... subjugation of the southern Africa. That's why we think that people will feel like us, that we should not become the slaves of the Soviet Union, they should join hands with us and cooperate with us. And also we find a deep understanding from many African countries about what is happening here at this moment (Radio Today, 08.10.1985).

A comparison between Mr. Von Schirnding's speech to the UN Security Council, 04.10.1985 (appendix 2b), and Mr. Savimbi's allegation on the Cuban-led, Soviet assisted MPLA attack on Mavinga, 08.10.1985 (appendix (B) 8) reveals blatant similarities in their form as well as their content in such a way that it becomes quite clear that one of these two declarations is a reflection or a reflected message of the other.
Fig. 3. Similarities between Mr. Shirnding and Mr. Savimbi’s speeches

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A strong affirmation about Soviet direct involvement in the fight in southern Angola</th>
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<tr>
<td>“It is clear, Sir, that the Soviets are directly involved and are in fact commending the current: MPLA offensive” (Mr. Schirnding).</td>
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<tr>
<td>A clear identification and description of Soviet weaponry which, in both cases, is useful to sustain this allegation of Soviet direct involvement.</td>
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<tr>
<td>‘Soviets pilots are flying some of Angola’s MIG 23 aircraft and MA 25 helicopter gunships’ (Mr. Schirnding).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Similarity in the effort to uncover and denounce the hidden and malicious plan of the Soviets in southern Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>The Soviet Union sought to take advantage (...) to serve and expand its influence in our continent’ (Mr. Von Schirnding)</td>
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<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>Similarities in the effort to explain to the international community the real nature of the fight in southern Angola and the quest for international recognition:</td>
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<tr>
<td>‘Mr. President if the Council would like to establish what is happening in southern Angola my government suggests they send a fact finding mission to the area to establish who is fighting whom, who is directing the operations, what armaments are being used’ (Mrs. Von Schirnding).</td>
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The similarities between these two declarations, which are four days distant from one another, are likely to answer the question who informed who or who is talking on behalf of
who. As a first hand witness in the Angolan crisis and after he has probably listened to Mr. Schirnding’s declaration at the UN Security Council on 04.10.1985, Mr. Savimbi seems to have been requested to reflect the South African view on this matter. This is a typical illustration of deflective source and a massive orchestration of information wherein the same message is emanating from different sources echoing and corroborating each other. This propaganda technique consists in repeating the same message in an attempt to force the meaning intended by the propagandist in the mind of listeners.

Elsewhere in the report, Mr. Savimbi talks about the Soviet assisted MPLA plan “to destroy the liberated area” (Radio RSA, 08.10.1985). The use of the terms such as ‘liberated area’, liberation movement, liberation struggle, freedom fighters is value laden and highly suggestive. It indicates a double and concomitant process: self-legitimisation by delegitimising the other, the enemy or the opponent. In the views of Jonas Savimbi and certainly for the South African government, the area is referring to has been ‘liberated’ and freed from communism influence which, according to western countries standard, is a big achievement. It ultimately suggests that the conflict in Angola is much more than just a conflict between UNITA and MPLA. It is located on another level, as already suggested it is a conflict between two ideologies: liberalism and freedom on one hand, communism and a highly institutionalised set of beliefs on the other. From this perspective, it can then be deduced that UNITA is not fighting its own battle, rather it is fighting the ‘free world’’s battle. It should therefore be assisted and supported.

This argument tends to feature Angola as the gate through which the enemy and communist threat can (if not prevented) get into South Africa. It then follows that UNITA is playing the watchdog role. Stressing on how significant for southern Africa is the fight that is taking place in Angola and consequently how essential and crucial is UNITA’s role in this fight are the (already biased) questions put forward by Radio RSA to Mr. Savimbi: ‘Where would you situate the conflict in Angola, in the southern African region?’ (Radio RSA, 08.10.1985) or ‘What will happen if UNITA is destroyed?’ (Radio Today, 13.11.1985). I contend that these questions are already biased and self-serving because they already assume and suggest that
the conflict in Angola has something to do with the region of southern Africa and therefore the southern African region will face a disaster if UNITA is destroyed.

For Mr. Savimbi the answer is more than obvious:

I think that is the key. If UNITA is overrun by Russia, by the force that Russia supports, it is the first step for problems in Namibia, for problems in Zambia, for problems in Zaire, for problems in Botswana and finally for problems in South Africa. *(Radio RSA, 08.10.1985)*

A month later (13.11.1985), when celebrating ten years of independence of Angola, Mr. Savimbi expanded this idea:

If UNITA is destroyed the Russians have got a major place, a major spot where they can launch other operations to overthrow moderate countries like Zaire, where the American interests are at stake; to influence the Namibian issue, to influence the South African situation. Then I think we have to see the situation here in Angola in term geostrategic interest of the West and the East. *(Radio Today, 13.11.1985)*

It is startling to note the progress and evolution in these two arguments. In the first response, UNITA is presented as the before last barrier against communist advance southerly. Being the last barrier and following the wisdom that says ‘prevention is better than cure’, South Africa sees herself implicitly invited to step in before the Namibian situation as well as hers get out of hand. The second argument goes even further and seems to invite all those who have something to loose or to gain in this conflict depending on how fast they assist or not UNITA: the ‘moderate Zaire’ 44, the US administration which has got interests in Zaire (now DRC) and than again the South African government whose future depends on how it deals with communist-inspired ‘terrorists': ANC and SWAPO. A question to be asked at this stage is what drives Mr. Savimbi to show such great concern about what would happen in Zaire, in Namibia, in South Africa or for the US interests in Zaire if UNITA is destroyed. Similar to the altruistic concern showed by South Africa for the well-being of the entire region of

44 This country was already involved in the Angolan civil war, if not militarily, at least by providing (American) logistic support and rear bases to UNITA troops. The decisive involvement of MPLA troops in the 1997 Zairian civil war aimed at overthrowing Mobutu’s regime was seen as a revenge taken by Luanda to pay back Kinshasa’s involvement in Angolan crisis in the eighties.
southern Africa, this is a deliberate attempt to influence favourably the international community’s opinion and to gain its support.

South Africa can then legally justify its presence in Angola as a necessary move of a pre-emptive objective. Pretoria seems to have had a moral obligation to prevent communism from invading the southern region of Africa. In this respect, it was firmly convinced on the crucial role UNITA could play in countering Russian influence in the southern African region. The report by Radio RSA’s Davo Holt Biddle on UNITA’s celebration of ten years of independence in Angola is unarguably explicit in praising UNITA’s achievement: it describes emphatically UNITA’s troops which had “captured soviet military vehicles, tanks, multiple rockets launchers, armed troops carriers and alike” (Radio Today, 13.11.1985). In a final attempt to use UNITA’s voice as a deflective source for South Africa, the report featured Savimbi’s pathetic call upon the people of the free world to realise that the battle for the control of all southern Africa is being waged here and anything happening to Angola will have a repercussion on the all situation in southern Africa (Radio Today, 13.10.1985).

When listening to this report, one would not hesitate to retrieve South African wish, concern, fear and determination to prevent the spread of communist ideology. Like Mr. Savimbi, Pretoria considers the situation in Angola in terms of geostrategic interests for the region and for South Africa: the spread of communism will certainly comfort SWAPO militants combating in Namibia and the ANC’s ‘terrorists’ who are threatening its security at home. It was believed that victory over communism will certain bring peace and stability both in the region and in South Africa.
CHAPTER VI:  
SELF-JUSTIFICATION PROCESS

In its quest for international recognition the South African government did not restrict its actions exclusively in retroactive operations. These mainly consisted at defending its stand or ‘responding’ (either violently or diplomatically) to the international community’s expectations as well as its opponents’ quests for transformation. It was also actively involved in a proactive campaign aimed at showing its willingness to adapt to the new political environment and requirements of South Africa, with the ultimate (but concealed) objective of self-justification. The South African government wanted to draw the international attention and win its sympathy and recognition. It therefore undertook a number of measures to achieve this objective. They included the highly publicised and trumpeted constitutional reforms undertaken in the mid-1980. From a historical perspective, these changes were not the first ones; they were rather a result and a part of a long process of transformation that started in 1913; but being at an important historical crossroad and given the replications they engendered, they bear a particular significance. This will then be the main focus of the present chapter.

Parading a cosmetic reform

Teer-Tomaselli (1992: 132 - 140) gives an extensive account of different steps of reform underwent by the apartheid regime since the Native Land Act of 1913. These different steps can be summarised as follow:

- Classical apartheid: institutionalised by the Native Land Act of 1913 and legalised as apartheid in 1948. It installed segregation on the racial basis. White South Africans were allocated 87% of the land area while Blacks were restricted in ‘reserves’ representing 13% of the nation’s land.

- The first major change in the system: Economic restructuring in the 1970’s. The South African economy was moving from essentially primary activities (mining and agriculture) with a cheap and migrant labour force to a secondary type of economy.

45 A more humanistic designation for these ‘reserves’ is ‘homelands’.
the industrialization. This needed a settled labour force. Following the need for this structural change in the economy, the 1913 Native Land Act required some change to accommodate somehow Blacks' demands and aspirations. Differently appreciated and seen as half measures which did not touch the core of apartheid and gave very little advantage to the Black majority until the mid 1970's uprising, this reform however constituted a significant breach in the apartheid system.

- The establishment of a Tricameral Parliament in 1984 (House of Representatives for Coloureds and House of Delegates for Indians in addition to the previously existing House of Assembly for Whites) was another major step in the on-going process of reform. The Tricameral Parliament was working along side with a 'President's Council', a sort of Senate whose role was "to advise the government on constitutional and other matters" (Teer-Tomaselli, 1992: 137).

The last step of the above-mentioned constitutional changes was indeed a great achievement of which the National Party government was proud. But as it will be seen later, and as Rotberg (1985: 9) has remarked:

white South Africa, re-emphasised the total exclusion of the nation's African majority from all participation in the affairs of the central government of the country. Minority rule was reiterated, with doors slammed shut on African aspirations for the future.

Instead of soothing the South African crisis, the establishment of a tricameral parliament in 1984, from which the black majority was still excluded only succeeded in exacerbating a highly volatile climate of violence and insurgencies. It is in this context that I situate the next step in the reform: the constitutional dispensation announced by the South African President Mr. P.W. Botha on 25.01.1985 at the Cape Congress of the National Party in Port Elizabeth:

I said so in Parliament earlier this year. It is the conviction of the government that any eventual constitutional dispensation will have to take into consideration the multicultural nature of the composition of our population in this country. The structures in which this co-operation will take place must be the result of negotiation with the leaders of all the communities. Here I include traditional leaders, (...) leaders, political leaders, church leaders as well as leaders of specific interest groups such as business people, etc. In order to
further the process of reform I announced on the 25th of January this year that leaders of black communities must be involved in inquiries that concern the positions of those communities. In this regard, the role played and to be played by the President’s Council should also be considered. Therefore, if the need exists among the leaders of black communities and population groups to participate within the president council in inquiries and submission of proposals to me as the Head of the State and the government on matters that concern those communities, I am willing to reconsider the structuring and the functions of the president council to make provision for their participation in that president council. (Radio RSA, 01.10.1985)

In the present analysis, particular attention will be given to the President’s Council which is the major point in Botha’s speech (Radio RSA, 01.10.1985). According to the 1984 Constitutional reform, the President’s Council

was made up of sixty members: twenty from the white chamber, ten from the Coloureds, five from the Indian. Fifteen members were selected by the President, and ten selected by the opposition parties of all three chambers (Teer-Tomaselli, 1992: 137).

Thus, in terms of the new constitutional dispensation provision could be made for the participation of black leaders in the President’s Council. Leaders of black community could be allocated some ‘slots’ in the President’s council, (“if [only] the need exists”, said the President) and their role was clearly defined: “to participate within (...) in inquiries and submission of proposals (...) on matters that concerns those communities” (Radio RSA, 01.10.1985).

As small and insignificant this reform could be, however it constituted for the National Party government and the President P.W. Botha a great achievement which they could parade to the outside world as “foundations and guidelines for constitutional development in South Africa” (Radio RSA, 15.11.1985), and a valuable concession made towards Black South Africans in order to calm down political tensions. Nevertheless, it is quite difficult to share this optimistic view when we consider that black people, who represented more than 72% of the South African population (See Laurence, 1979: 197) paradoxically were represented only at a Senate level, with a mere consultative voice. These superficial changes, in Teer-Tomaselli’s (1992: 138) words, could be considered as a “cosmetic adaptation”. To
corroborate the superficiality of these constitutional transformations, Rothenberg (1985: 10) remarks:

the message of the riots [which followed the announcement of these reforms] was that Africans derided the reform initiative, viewed it as merely cosmetic, and understood more perfectly than outsiders that whites were still unwilling to share power with blacks or to make any meaningful political concessions to the country’s majority.

For the National Party government, the current political dispensation was seen as the greatest opportunity given to the black majority to participate actively and effectively in the country’s politics within the President’s Council. Unlike the previous different steps in the reform, the 1985 constitutional dispensation was the one which seemed to take into account black population’s aspirations for power sharing. In Pretoria’s eyes, this was the highest it could jump and the best it could offer in order to accommodate the black population for an “orderly reform” (Radio RSA, 15.11.1985). Consequently all the communism mongers, anti-apartheid activists and political opponents (official and unofficial) were urged, in a ‘take-it-off-leave-it’ style, to join the government in this pre-defined scheme for peace and stability or to face the law.

It was against this constitutional dispensation that every political activity then was judged. It represented an ultimate criteria, in a ‘road map’ approach, determining the worthiness or unworthiness of any political activity pertaining to the future of South Africa, especially ANC’s activities. The South African government wanted to kill two birds with one stone. On one hand, the reform was presented to the international community as a proof of Pretoria’s genuine willingness to accommodate black population’s demands and aspirations in order to win sympathy and recognition. On the other, this was in reality a devious legal act to ‘short-circuit’ the opponents and in terms of which the ANC was accused of causing disturbances. To a certain extent, South Africa succeeded in achieving this objective as far as the British administration was concerned. When opposing Commonwealth tougher sanctions against South Africa, the British Prime Minister, Mrs. Thatcher invoked and referred to this reform as one of the reasons for which the sanction option should not be considered. She wanted to push the idea that South Africa had already embarked on a process of political transformation and was doing quite well. “I think one has to recognise”, Mrs. Thatcher pleaded, “that the
South African government has done a very great deal in the last three or four months, which has not been done before or maybe ought to be done before" (Radio Today, 22.10.1985). Supporting Thatcher’s attitude in favour of Pretoria is another declaration from the British Foreign Secretary, Sir Geoffrey Howe: “There must be fundamental change and we must be ready to use our influence, to use our long-standing link to South Africa to promote that fundamental change. But, says this government, but says this conference, change by people means change without violence” (Radio Today, 11.10.1985).

**Self-legitimisation/delegitimisation of the enemy**

“It is the conviction of the government that any eventual constitutional dispensation will have to take into consideration the multicultural nature of the composition of our population in this country” said the South African President, Mr. P.W. Botha (Radio RSA, 01.10.1985). The reformed political dispensation was presented as an initiative originating solely and purely from the National Party government’s magnanimity in the best interests of South Africa. Botha appeared to believe that the government should have been praised for that. According to this line of argument, those involved in violence and disturbance were doing so to prevent the implementation of the constitutional reform for their own selfish motives, who should have been blamed and outlawed. Broadly speaking, this was how the South African crisis, as far as the constitutional reform was concerned, was presented in October-November 1985. In Pretoria’s eyes the situation was as simple as that: the hero should have been acknowledged and praised, the foolish delegitimised.

When looking at the coincidence between the present constitutional reform and the increase of disturbance prior to and following Botha’s “orderly reform”, it becomes appropriate to ask few questions in order to determinate the honesty and genuine willingness of the South African government’s move toward constitutional transformation. From the start, it should be established that there was a link between these two phenomena; therefore the question to be asked at this stage is the following: was the orderly reform an independent process which the disturbance aimed to prevent, or was it a timely and calculated response to the existing crisis situation? The answer to this question can be found in the expression ‘orderly reform’ itself. The President referred to ‘orderly reform’ certainly in opposition and reaction (I will say in
response) to ‘disorderly reform’ that ‘terrorists/communists’ would have liked to bring through violence. If the current political dispensation was an opportune response because (and not in spite) of the situation of violence and crisis, then we should interrogate the genuineness of this act itself. The National Party government’s attempt to discuss this political dispensation as a ‘free gift’ toward Blacks should then be considered as a deceitful act for a self-serving objective: to gain international community’s sympathy. Similar to the Nkomati Accord discussed previously, the 1985 political dispensation was not a ‘free gift’ from the National Party government to the black population (as it seemed to be presented outside the country), but a forced move. In reading more closely the facts before and after the announcement of the constitutional reform it seemed that the all white South African government did not have much choice in this particular context but to reform. The apartheid regime had no choice but to “adapt or die” (Teer-Tomaselli, 1985: 132).

With regard to the disturbance following the constitutional dispensation, another question can be asked in these terms: was the disturbance a reaction to the content of Botha’s orderly reform or a rejection of the reform as such? While Rotberg (1985: 10) and others observers considered the shortcomings in the content of the political dispensation and its inherent discrimination as the main cause of riots and disturbance, Mr. P.W. Botha and his cabinet saw the current disturbance as a reaction to the reform per se. The ANC was accused of having decided to launch its attacks and disturbance in order to prevent the implementation of political transformation. Addressing a special session of the President’s Council on the possibility of Black participation in that Council, the President did not hesitate to the find a cause-effect link between the constitutional dispensation and the increase of disturbance. Asking the question

Why is that the campaign to destroy orderly reform is becoming more severe exactly when the foundations and guidelines for constitutional development of South Africa are being laid? (Radio RSA, 15.11.1985),

his own extensive response to this question is even clearer in supporting his allegation:

It seems to me that there can only be one answer: there are people (...) South Africans outside the country for whom orderly reform is a ‘sin in the sight’ and extremely dangerous. They are endangered by it because what they want to do with this country will not be done if the basis of democracy is broadened in an orderly manner. It poses a threat to them because an orderly and peaceful
community leaves no space or opportunity for power addicts to intimidate people. (...) I believe that the government's sustained steps of reform over the past years are exposing the sinister attempts of these people. We are lifting the veils on the real motives of these people with South Africa that are hidden behind a front of (...) of morality (Radio Today, 15.11.1985)

In a long interview on Radio RSA, the South African Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Ron Miller, corroborated the President's statement on this matter, making the ANC's disturbance appear as an act of sabotage in the pursuing of power:

the problem with the ANC, its real problem, is that it does not want to talk about sharing power, it does not want to talk about participating with other groups in South Africa in governing South Africa. They want to take over power (Radio Today, 18.10.1985).

Using strong affirmations and broad conclusions which do not leave any space for argument or discussion, both Mr Botha's and Ron Miller's allegations criminalize the ANC on the basis of their pre-defined constitutional dispensation. The South African government maliciously blamed to the ANC for refusing to play the game by the rules established in Pretoria. The plan aptly had been manoeuvred in advance: legally the ANC would not have any reason to fight; in other words, the reasons it undertook its armed struggle would no longer be valid since the government had decided to make provision for black participation in decision-making process. In the eyes of international observers, the ANC's motives for fighting would appear irrelevant and the ANC itself would be seen as an illegal movement; it would therefore outlaw itself and lose its credibility in front of its supporters and the international community while the National Party government would appear in good light. Mr. Ron Miller saw and explained the challenge between the National Party government reform versus ANC and the United Democratic Front (UDF) as a surrogate internal wing of the ANC. In his words, the UDF fermented 'unrest',

I think one has to look at what the ANC is trying to achieve. You know the more successful we are in our reform programme in South Africa, the less relevant the ANC and the UDF will become. And it's precisely because we were making strides and we were gaining ground in the reform process that the ANC and the UDF decided to start urban unrest (...). The truth is that the ANC wants to take over South Africa, that they don't want to share power in South Africa the way we are doing. And the more successful we are the more the ANC is gonna try to disrupt matters using violence. Now that is the very core of our objection to the ANC. They are not interest in a peaceful solution
here, which all people share in political decision making (Radio Today, 18.10.1985).

On the basis of this ‘legal’ political dispensation the NP government could then justify its harsh measures regarding any attempt to initiate dialogue with the ANC, be it by the students, the official opposition (Progressive Federal Party, PFP) or businessmen. The withdrawal of the passports of eight Masters University of Stellenbosch’s students wishing to meet with the ANC Youth Brigade was an adequate illustration on how unwavering the NP government was on this matter. In fact the South African Minister of Home Affairs had justified this decision by saying: “it could be the ANC’s declared aim to bring about change in South Africa through violence. It was in line with this factor that the passports were withdrawn”. (Radio Today, 18.10.1985). Expressing his contempt for the leader of opposition’s visit to the ANC, Mr. Ron Miller declared: “I believe that this attempt to initiate dialogue with the ANC will eventually rebound on his party and himself” (Radio Today, 19.10.1985). He also pointed the finger at the ‘unpatriotic’ behaviour of businessmen who, despite the State President’s appeal to them to restrain voluntarily from going to Lusaka, decided to initiate dialogue with the ANC, a dialogue which was not in “South Africa’s strategic interest”, said the Deputy Minister (Radio Today, 18.10.1985).

It has been acknowledged that the unemployment situation in South Africa was one of the many reasons justifying the massive enrolment of black young people in ‘terrorist’ activities supposedly organised the ANC and the UDF. Explaining the reasons why terrorists organisations enjoyed popularity in black urban areas, the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs was adamant on the unemployment reason: “(...) of course there had willing participants [into violent activities] by those people who are unemployed, who are angry at the system because of the lack of employment and they then got these people through intimidation to participate in township violence” (Radio Today, 18.10.1985). Whether through intimidation or not, it was a fact that black people massively supported the ANC and other black organisations. The Weekly Mail (September 13-19, 1985) released a survey conducted among black people both in urban and rural areas on “which organisations and leaders command black support”. It revealed that 31% of people were in favour of Nelson Mandela and the ANC, 16% for Bishop Tutu, 14 % for the UDF while the NP and Inkhata Freedom Party shared each 8% of
favourable opinion. This could also explain the reluctance among black people to participate in Botha's President's Council.

One of the National Party government's strategies to solve the South African crisis was to resort to opportune and 'ad hoc' measures in response to one specific problem. As it has been discussed earlier, this attitude of moving just 'a tiny little bit' illustrates the unwillingness of the NP government for significant concessions towards black people, although these measures were trumpeted to the outside world as a significant achievement for the South African government. This is the context against which we should understand the great optimism expressed by the South African Minister of Manpower, Mr. Piet du Plessis in regard with the government's achievement in tackling the unemployment issue:

I am more optimistic about the future than I have been a couple of weeks ago. First of all as you've already ...ch...as you may know already we have allocated an additional five hundred million Rand for the creation of jobs on a short term and we want to get that new job out of ground as soon as possible and that in itself will make the substantial contribution to alleviate the unemployment position. As a second point which gives me more hope for the future and which makes me more optimistic is that there are already signs that the expected economic (...) will realise in the near future and as soon as we manage to increase our economic growth rate automatically more jobs will be created and the unemployment problem will lessened (Radio Today, 12.11.1985).

Seen in the context of increasing unemployment and the fear that the unemployed youth could be an easy prey for terrorist and communist organisations the current South African move on this unemployment issue, resorts more on propagandistic motives than anything else. The South African government wanted to show its willingness to deal with the critical situation of unemployment and to correct its imbalances; in so doing it would demonstrate to the outside world that the ANC and UDF do not have any valid reasons to resort to violence.

The accent of the speech bears indications that these measures were more retroactive than proactive as they were portrayed on Radio RSA. They were not a result of a genuine will to alleviate the unemployment situation for black South Africans, but rather the only way to go the quickest possible. In support to this argument is the frequent use of terms such as
‘already’, ‘in a short term’, ‘as soon as possible’ or ‘as soon as’ reflecting the urgency which was required in dealing with this implosive situation. “We have allocated an additional five hundred million Rand for the creation of jobs on a short term and we want to get that new job out of ground as soon as possible and that in itself will make the substantial contribution to alleviate the unemployment position”. The general impression that comes out of this declaration is that the reform should be done as quickly as possible before the situation gets out of hand. There should not be any delay to find a solution to the current unemployment crisis. With this move, the South African government wanted to appear in full control of the situation both in and outside the country. The constitutional reform was displayed as a tangible proof of its willingness to correct the apartheid legacy and to accommodate the black majority. This was believed to be enough to correct the South African image abroad.
CONCLUSION

Can news be objective and neutral? Can news, especially when beamed on an external service (radio or television) and aimed at an external audience, be free of self-motivated objectives? This was the initial question that prompted my curiosity and put me on the way of this research. The present study is an attempt to answer this question by going through Radio RSA’s news reports in order to provide an understanding of these news reports, a ‘story behind the news’. In the particular context of the mid 1980s crisis, Radio RSA faced important challenges: on one hand it had to report on events taking place in the country as well as on the international scene with a certain degree of objectivity; on the other, it had the mission of correcting misconceptions about South Africa and whitewashing its image abroad.

I then contended that the notion of objectivity in the sense of reporting on events ‘as they are’ could not be fully supported given the fact that media reporters are already situated and ‘contextualised’. I also argued that ideology works subconsciously, as a pervasive framework defining the reality to believe in and report on. In the case of South Africa, for instance, National Party officials might not be physically present in the newsroom deciding on each single item to broadcast, but Radio RSA’s journalists and reporters seemed to have been driven from inside, unconsciously. “I never heard of anything about overt instructions that you do this, from the Foreign Affairs department” recalled Dave Overton (see appendix C.1)

I choose to read this ‘story behind the news’ against the background of major events that had marked the international scene during October and the first half of November 1985: the Commonwealth Heads of Government Summit in Bahamas, the hijacking of an Italian luxury liner, the Achille Lauro, the international fight against terrorism and communism, and on the internal scene, the 1985 constitutional dispensation which was aimed at including black representatives in the President’s Council. The significance of these events for this analysis is that they constituted ‘instruments’ to measure the use and level of propaganda in Radio RSA’s discourse. In fact the South African government used these events as public platform either to state its case or to legitimise its actions and repression in and out of the country.
I also discussed the intensive use of def ective voices by the South African authorities (in Chapters IV and V). Given the fact that its image was tarnished abroad, South Africa resorted to def ective sources as more presentable advocates to correct what was believed to be misinterpretation of its reality or to influence public opinion on its case. The British Prime Minister, Mrs. Margaret Thatcher and her Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sir Geoffrey Howe played a valuable role in that campaign. With regard to the British involvement on South African side, it was argued that the economic ties the British government had with South Africa made it difficult for Mrs. Thatcher and her cabinet to support or impose sanctions on South Africa. South Africa also used unexpected advocates such the two US former prisoners of war who found that South Africa was being unfairly treated, the Lesotho Minister of Information who urged international organisations to look at the Basotho mineworkers' situation in South Africa and finally UNITA’s leader, Jonas Savimbi, who put forward the idea that the civil war in Angola was part of the Soviet Union's plan to expand communism in South Africa, and therefore inviting (implicitly) South Africa to step in and stop that threat.

The propagandistic aspect of this reports does not lie in the reports as such, but rather in a well-thought and motivated selection made over them as well as the angle of reporting. There were certainly many events to report on, but the choice of these particular events and the omission of others reveal more than they hide a meaning set up a priori by editors, primary definers or policy makers (in this case the National Party) and orienting the reports. The National Party’s ideas and ideology constituted a pervasive grid according to which Radio RSA’s reports were selected and broadcast to the world. In this sense, the radio was offering to its listeners ‘ready-to-eat’ messages, instead of letting them build their own meaning and understanding of the events. “The truth was not withheld, but only angled in a certain direction”, acknowledged Brent Wilkinson (see appendix C.2.). This tendency of imposing on the audience a prefabricated argument or conclusion in favour of the ruling class is what has been referred to as propaganda.
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MULTIPURPOSE

23 October 2002

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Dear Mr. Kilonda

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1 Title(s)/Description of recording(s):

- An interview with David Willey with Anne Schroder, SA on board the "Achille Lauro", about experiencing the hijacking. (Radio Today), broadcast 17/10/1985, 3'02"

- An interview by Chris Nickin with Philip Verster, Chairman of the SRC at the University of Stellenbosch, about the withdrawal of the passports of eight Matie students wishing to meet with the ANC youth Brigade. (Radio Today), broadcast 18/10/1985, 2'03"

- An interview by Chris Nicklin with Gordon Martin, covering the Commonwealth summit in the Bahamas, about the outcome of the decision on SA and the role of Mrs. Margaret Thatcher, British Prime Minister. (Radio Today), broadcast 22/10/1985, 3'28"

- An interview by Steve Britten with Ron Miller, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, about the student efforts to have talks with the ANC. (Radio Today), broadcast 18/10/1985, 3'25"

- A report by Michael Kallenbäch on speeches at the United Nations as part of its fortieth anniversary celebrations with actuality of Nancy Reagan addressing women at the 2nd anti-drug abuse conference. (Radio Today), broadcast 22/10/1985, 2'25"

- An interview by David McNiel with British Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher on her concessions on sanctions against SA introduced at the Commonwealth summit in the Bahamas. (Radio Today), broadcast 22/10/1985, 2'25"

- A report by Davo Holt-Biddle on Unitas celebrations of ten years of independence in Angola, with actuality of Dr. Jonas Savimbi on the importance of Unitas in maintaining the Southern African situation in countering Russian influence. (Radio Today), broadcast 13/11/1985, 2'56"

- An interview by Jonathan Hargreaves with Desmond Siseshe, Lesotho's Minister of Information about Lesotho's concern about a SA threat of foreign workers possibly being repatriated. (Radio Today), broadcast 13/11/1985, 3'10"

- A report by Keith Chalkley on Sir Geoffrey Howe speaking at the Conservative Party Conference in Britain on the need for fundamental change in SA (which can be achieved without violence). (Radio Today), broadcast 11/10/1985, 1'52"

- A report by David Willey on the American Ambassador to Rome, Maxwell Rabb, criticising the Italian government for letting the Palestinian Liberation Front Leader, Abu Abass, escape. (Radio Today), broadcast 14/10/1985, 2'19"

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- A report by Jeffrey Blyth on reports that some Americans had been killed on board the hijacked "Achille Lauro", with actuality of the ship captain's radio message. (Radio Today), broadcast 9/10/1985, 1'54"

- Actuality of PLO Leader Yasser Arafat interviewed by Ted Koppel, about the hijacking of the "Achille Lauro", an Italian luxury liner. (Radio Today), broadcast 9/10/1985, 1'22"

- A special programme by Barry Jones on the international Eisteddfod being held in Roodepoort, with actuality of various participants and Kobus de Beer, Vice Chairman of the International Eisteddfod at Roodepoort. (Radio Today), broadcast 8/10/1985, 15'13"

- Bea Reed in conversation with well-known broadcaster Nevile Dawson about Springbok Radio, coming here from Australia in 1951, famous personalities he has met and worked with. (Radio Today), broadcast 11/10/1985, 14'32"

- An interview by Steve Britten with Jerry Wiggen, Leader of the group of British MPs' at the conclusion of their visit to SA, on their views of damaging economic sanctions against SA, and that transition can only be achieved in prosperity. (Radio Today), broadcast 7/10/1985, 2'12"

- A report by Michael Kallenbach on Angola and SA taking their cases to the Security Council at the United Nations, with actuality of the Angolan Ambassador to the UN, Eligio de Figueredo and SA Ambassador to the UN, Kurt von Schirnding. (Radio Today), broadcast 4/10/1985, 2'57"

- An extract of a speech by the State President, Mr. P.W. Botha on the possibility of Black participation in the President's Council, addressing a special plenary session of the President's Council. (Radio RSA), broadcast 15/11/1985, 2'11"

- An interview by Robert Swann with Walter Mayo and Bart del Ashmet, two members of the group of 17 US former prisoners-of-war in Korea on their impressions of South Africa after their visit to the country. (Radio RSA), broadcast 14/11/1985, 1'34"

- An extract of a speech by the State President, Mr. P. W. Botha, on the announcements that the Government is to proceed with initial stages of its Mossel Bay Gas Extraction and Conversion Project, addressing the President's Council on 14/11/1985. (Radio RSA), broadcast 15/11/1985, 2'45"
An interview by Pieter Raubenheimer with Dr. Brand Fourie, South Africa’s former Ambassador to Washington on the importance of tourism to South Africa as an image builder in the outside world. (Radio RSA), broadcast 15/11/1985, 3’

An interview with the Minister of Manpower, Mr. Piet du Plessis, on the unemployment situation in South Africa. (Radio RSA), broadcast 12/11/1985, 4’10”

An interview by Jerry Schuitema with Dr. Simon Brand, Managing Director of the Southern African Development Bank on the discussions he had with bankers in Europe on the South African standstill position concerning debts. (Radio RSA), broadcast 9/10/1985, 3’38”

An interview by Robert Swann with Carl Kopishke of Madsion Wisconsin on the group of 17 United States former prisoners-of-war in Korea who visited South for a reunion. (Radio RSA), broadcast 14/11/1985, 1’13”

An interview by Pat Rogers with the Deputy Minster of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Ron Miller on the rumpus caused by the 8 University of Stellenbosch students’ intended visit to the ANC Youth Wing in Zambia. (Radio RSA), broadcast 18/10/1985, 10’35”

An interview with Dr. Frederick van Zyl Slabbert leader of the PFP, who issued a joint statement by the PFP and the ANC after the two delegations met in Lusaka during October 1985. (Radio RSA), broadcast 14/10/1985, 7’18”

An interview by Ricardo Branco with the President of the UNITA movement, Dr. Jonas Savimbi on the Cuban-led, Soviet-assisted MPLA attack on Mavinga - a UNITA stronghold in Southern Angola - which has been repulsed. (Radio RSA), broadcast 8/10/1985, 3’44”

An interview by Elma Botha with Prof. Deon Basson, lecturer in Public Law at the University of Pretoria on the arrest of the 4 Palestinian terrorists after the hijacking of the Italian cruise liner, the Achille Lauro and the legal implications of the American action in terms of international law. (Radio RSA), broadcast 14/10/1985, 3’30”

An interview by Johan Yssell with Prof. Roy Marcus, Dean of the Wits Engineering Faculty on the announcement of American computer manufacturers, Hewlett-Packard that they are to fund the establishment of a Chair in Manufacturing Control Systems at Wits. (Radio RSA), broadcast 1/10/1985, 1’44”

An interview by Frans Possa with South African Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Ron Miller on improving relations between South Africa and its neighbours in Southern Africa. (Radio RSA), broadcast 4/10/1985, 4’32”

An extract of a speech by the State President, Mr. P.W. Botha on his agenda for constitutional reform at the Cape Congress of the National Party in Port Elizabeth. (Radio RSA), broadcast 1/10/1985, 2’40”


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Appendices B.: Transcripts of Radio RSA’s news reports

1. Interview and reports wherein the South African government is seeking normalisation of its relations with neighbours, international support and advocates. The all white South African government strives to break its isolation and whitewash its image on the international scene. For that it does not hesitate to grab opportunities to state its case in public, to seize the perch tended by those who oppose (ANC) violent strategies, international sanctions and boycott and who can eventually support its policies or at least, show a kind of understanding. (1, 4, 5, 9, 17, 18, 22, 23, 29, 30, 31, 34, 35, 36, 37)

Report! Interview 1: An interview by Johan Yssel with Prof Roy Marcus, Dean of the Wits Engineering Faculty in the announcement of American computer manufacturers, Hewlett-Packard that they are to fund the establishment of a Chair in Manufacturing Control Systems at Wits. (Radio RSA), broadcast 1/10/1985

Prof Roy Marcus:
I think it really represents a commitment by an American company for further investment in South Africa and this is significant in the current disinvestments scenario. The Hewlett-Packard... eh money is being designated to the establishment of the Hewlett-Packard chair in manufacturing systems and will be located in the faculty of engineering.

Johan Yssel: Why was it decided to use this money for manufacturing systems? How will South Africa benefit from it?

Prof Roy Marcus:
I think the first important thing is that most major universities (...) retain their attention towards manufacturing and this will give Wits an opportunity to be in the forefront of manufacturing technology. I think the other important fact is it will enable the university to prepare South African industrialists to meet the onslaught of higher technology manufacturing (...) to accept the benefit of higher technology manufacturing; and I firmly believe that if South Africa does not take the initiative we gonna be faced with the same scenario that the Americans gonna be faced with and let's be frank that other automates emigrate or evaporate.

Johan Yssel: We just have productivity week. What relation is there between high tech manufacture and productivity?

Prof Roy Marcus:
It is interesting, Johan, to see that there have been three major international surveys looking at the relationship between labour, capital and technology in terms of the increase of productivity. If on average the surveys you find (...) technology 59%, so we now actually have to accept the vital role that technology plays in terms of increasing productivity.
Report / Interview 4: An interview by Frans Possa with South African Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Ron Miller on improving relations between South Africa and its neighbours in Southern Africa. (Radio RSA), 4/10/1985

Mr. Ron Miller:

We intend doing this through a number of different channels, the most important which is to keep our communication channels open: we want to talk to people across a wide spectrum. This is not only confined to politicians and members of the government but we would also like to encourage business contact, agricultural contact and other services which are of mutual interest of all of us here on the southern tip of Africa. We are put together geographically, we share the same problems, I think we have a lot in common and SA can play a very important role in providing solutions to our neighbours. Our neighbours on the other hand can help us as well in the development of the whole region. I must say that one of the most important means of communication is (...) political and this we intend to do more through the informal contact than through formal contact at this stage.

Frans Possa: What about an apparent breakdown in trust over the Nkomati Accord; will it also receive a top priority?

Mr. Ron Miller:

Absolutely! We are giving this absolute top priority. We are very disgraced about the misinterpretation and the misapprehension of what has taken place in the last few weeks. We believe that once we’ve cleared up this misunderstanding of what the intentions of South African government were, that our neighbours in Mozambique will recognise that we really are their good partner in the Nkomati Accord and we do want to develop the Nkomati Accord to the maximum benefit of both Mozambique and SA. Yes we are very kin to re-establish mutual confidence between Mozambique and ourselves.

Frans Possa: Now how will relationships be bettered with the Organisation of African Unity and the United Nations in the absence of formal diplomatic links?

Mr. Ron Miller:

Well that’s a very difficult one indeed, eh... you know we are all aware of the fact that the OAU is very strongly against South Africa and we find this reflected in the United Nations and all the organisations and institutions of the United Nations. They are totally against SA, so that is a very difficult one. But let me say that I think we must approach this problem on a step by step basis. Our first priority toward our improve image and relations with the OAU will be through good contacts and relations with our immediate neighbours in Southern Africa. We can then try to move forward from there towards the heart of Africa and from there of course we hope we will be able to jump the Atlantic to the United Nations. I must say of course that much of the OAU and the United Nations hostility towards South Africa is also based on ignorance of what is happening here in South Africa and I believe that we have... eh... absolute responsibility and this is one of our top priorities in terms of foreign affairs is to communicate what is really happening in southern Africa and in South Africa in particular to organisations such as OAU and the United Nations through those other nations.
who recognise what reality is here in SA for instance Britain and America and the United Nations and perhaps our neighbours in southern Africa to the OAU.

**Frans Possa:** The frontline States had called on the Western countries to broaden and intensify sanctions against South Africa in spite of the economic interdependence of states. Now what is this country's strategy in this threat?

Mr. Ron Miller:

Well, we have to do everything possible to correct this... eh... to change this strategy; it is this strategy which is going to be totally counterproductive not only in South Africa but the whole of southern Africa. I believe that if this sanction campaign goes further or disinvestments go further then we are going to find out that our immediate neighbours are gonna suffer the most and they are gonna suffer for the longest. And we don't want that to happen. I believe that we must go out and explain to people who are propagating sanctions against South Africa what the real consequences of their sanctions are going to be; it is going to be an absolutely nobody interest to propagate sanctions or disinvestments in South Africa because everybody south of Capricorn is going to suffer as the result of that. It also creates a climate of hostility and confrontation between ourselves and other nations and this is not conducive to reform. We at the moment are busy with the most significant reform in the history South Africa and I believe that we require encouragement and not admonition from our neighbours and people in other organisations and countries around the world. In shortly we say that I think this all campaign of sanctions and disinvestments is only going to serve the aims of the enemies of southern Africa and not our friends and allies.

**Report/Interview:** An interview by Steve Britten with Jerry Wiggen, Leader of the group of British MP's at the conclusion of their visit to SA, on their views of damaging economic sanctions against SA, and that transition can only be achieved in prosperity. (Radio Today), broadcast 7/10/1985

Jerry Wiggen:

As always with South Africa the complexities... difficulties in understanding the very very many views (...) delight in Islamic country, there are sometimes (...) some politicians. Well I speak like a politician myself.

Steve Britten: Why do you (...) some of the politicians?

Jerry Wiggen:

I think there are so many ways of doing these things, I think the opportunities in the past have been missed and at some extent (...) delay and well is demanding now a change. And the faster you have to make the more difficult it will be to do.

Steve Britten: You are obviously going back to Britain and report back what will you say then?
Jerry Wiggen: Well I think the first thing in relation to the British government is that we do support those (...) British government; I think they were reluctant to join in the very limited sanctions (...) they could not be the only country in the North not to join in those very limited measures; (...) conflicts in few weeks time if any country in the Commonwealth (...) standing against (...) I think that the mission is well understood here; equally we remain convinced that further economic sanctions will be very damaging for the very people who we are trying to help what is the underprivileged, those who are finding hard to find employment.

Steve Britten: How do you think the rest of the Commonwealth will react when you’re totally "concerned"?

Jerry Wiggen: Well it’s difficult to say but not to much understanding of the problem I suspect (...).

Steve Britten: How do you think that the people that you’ve met in this country feel about sanctions?

Jerry Wiggen: Well we have not talked to only white; (...) there is an extremist view that despite the effect of sanctions, but life is still worthy; I don’t share that view and the sensible people we met from all communities and from all races and colours were all against further sanctions because they believe that the effect of (...), draft investment (...) from work and all the things (...) undesirable of all (...) prosperity.

Report/Interview 9: A special programme by Barry Jones on the international Eisteddfod being held in Roodepoort, with actuality of various participants and Kobus de Beer. Vice Chairman of the International Eisteddfod at Roodepoort.
6th participant from La Paz, Bolivia (in Spanish):

Kobus de Beer:
If one talks about international representations no less than 59 entries from outside the borders of the Republic of South Africa, amounting to one thousand two hundred and thirty-four (1234) individuals have been received for (...) from twenty countries from (...) the globe.

Another speaker:

Difficult yes, but with gratitude, (...) there so much (...) to throw that little stone in the water and to see it clipping out all over the world. As you heard announced from stage by his Excellency Mister H.K. Young today, by our president Mr. Flemming where people meet each other, people from Spain and Austria meet each other and Switzerland (...) festival, I think make friends here in South Africa at the Eisteddfod. I think that is what is all about and that puts six to seven hundred people, voluntary people unstintingly to work day after day, we are all incredibly (...) by all so full of gratitude and joy and just overwhelmed with all the magic that is occurring (...).

(Music)

Barry Jones: And one of the (...) at Florida Lake in Roodepoort this year is the happy combination of young adult suggesting the four traditions we carried on from one generation to the next. Here is the view of the group from the Lenouche de Long Sable in France:

French participant:

We try to make the young people of our region love our traditions, our roots; and in our country we have also tiny group of children, you see, and we come from the middle of the French Atlantic Coast (...) harbour, fishing harbour and very famous sea sight resort. And our costumes and our traditions recall the everyday life for fishermen at the beginning of the century. Our harbour was very famous at the end of the nineteenth century for his fisheries and ship yachts. It was the first ship yacht of the Atlantic coast in France.

Barry Jones: I'm still looking at two of your lovely ladies; may I have this most incredible (...) work, that I take it's a very very old tradition.

French participant:
Ok! There are two...eh...two special hats, if I can speak so, the smaller one was worn everyday even for working by fishermen wives; but the marvellous hat was only worn for feasts.

Barry Jones: Have you participated as a group in other festivals outside of France?
French participant:
Yes, of course! And I must say that twenty-five years ago we participated in Wales at the festival of Langouleme and we got the third place at this festival and it's a very very wonderful memory for us.

(Music)

Barry Jones: Ancient too are the songs and dances of the Far East, many of them stretching back thousands of years. (...) alive at (...) for eighty-five by a group of young dancers from the Republic of China.

Chinese participant:
(...) the old times, yes yes we like that very much, not just our nation, we like all (...) other countries and our country, we like: the new and old. Yes we like them.

Barry Jones: How are you chosen for your group? How do you become a member of your group?

Chinese participant:
We are some students from different universities or colleges. And we were recommended from our schools and then there is a test for us and then they pick us up and there are about one hundred members to take part in the test and then finally we have twenty-two members in our group.

Barry Jones: And you travel around the world? You go to other countries?

Chinese participant:
Yes! We have been to Europe first and then we go to South Africa. We were...eh...we have traveled around about... for about ten countries in total.

Barry Jones: Tell me about some of the dances that you do. They are obviously very old. The one that you did this afternoon for instance, that was the one that teaches grace and elegance; (...) it goes back thousands of years.

Chinese participant:
It's our traditional dance; and it means that everybody should be polite, and yes (...) and it's meaning. And so (...) and Chinese is very polite to everybody and it's very graceful.

Barry Jones: Do you still have time for Disco dancing?

Chinese participant:
(Laugh) yes! But it's very different; but we like just as I said we like the new and old (laugh), and it is different meaning; but I think we have to learn some new thing, ... but we have to know what do you come from and what our culture, right, so... (Laugh).

(Music)
Barry Jones: With the aid of an interpreter we learn something about the musical traditions of the mountain Kingdom of Switzerland.

Participant from Switzerland:
We like to dance very much in Switzerland. The place I come from we do like folk dancing, folklore, something like this and everybody enjoys very much. In our group in (...) we've got few young people, the average age is about twenty years, twenty-one years.

Another participant (form Switzerland):
I'm very happy to come here because to go to the south of Africa... you can't go if you like to go; it was (...) a happiness for us to go...because you've a lot of people who have work at home... because they are fanners and they can't go on holiday when they want to go. And so we (...) to come here. And They like South Africa.

(Music)

Barry Jones: Near at home there has been a research on the interest on the songs and the dances of Kavango. And there (...) and their spokesman speaks Afrikaans:

Participant from Kavango:

(...) 

(Music)

Barry Jones: Back in the southern hemisphere one of the groups producing the most authentic musical sounds is from Bolivia in South America.

Participant from Bolivia:

I come from La paz and they also playing Buenos Aires. The name of the group actually signifies the all area from the north of Argentina right up to Ecuador and it can be divided into four regions, what the area was called before Cortez landed in South America. And as I play on (...) they will be very “courteous” to especially Indian music, instead of the usual what they do usual Latin American music.

Barry Jones: So in other words more ethnic, less commercial music.

Participant from Bolivia:

Yes, yes, especially I'd say the “altiplano” the music that you get on the “altiplano”, on the Bolivian highlands. But themselves, the all group usually dedicate themselves to Latin American music.

(Music)

Kobus de Beer, Vice Chairman of Roodepoort International Eisteddfod:
Wednesday is International Youth Day, where the peace message, the international peace message would out from the South African child to the rest of the children of the world, that would be marvelous day, because the Thursday we have (...), Friday is the battle of the (...), the male voice choirs; it's just too marvelous, it's always that ever popular thing and you know what is stimulating is that the (Black...) increase in that specific section has escalated by at least three hundreds percent, which is incredible.

Barry Jones: Kobus de Beer, Vice Chairman of Roodepoort International Eisteddfod, he thus mentioned 1985, is the year of the youth.

(Music)

Report/Interview 17: A report by Keith Chalkley on Sir Geoffrey Howe speaking at the Conservative Party Conference in Britain on the need for fundamental change in SA (which can be achieved without violence). (Radio Today), broadcast 11/10/1985

Keith Chalkley: Mr. Geoffrey Howe said what the British government wanted is the establishment of a democratic government in South Africa which will be acceptable to all South Africans. To (...) he said the Conservative Party condemned apartheid, but he went on:

Sir Geoffrey Howe:

(...) so there must be fundamental change and we must be ready to use our influence, to use our long standing link to South Africa to promote that fundamental change. But, says this government, but says this conference change by people means change without violence. That's how we familiar have already supported measures from the discouragement of supporting contacts to the banning (...). Should I make apologies for that? I don't apologise either for our rejection of economic and state boycott. I understand these actions (...). For I don't believe that the step of that kind would achieve the aims of those (...). They would diminish and not increase effective pressure on the South African government to introduce the fundamental change (...) necessary. No one is determined to (...) more (...), more directly to South African leaders about the need to reel change than Margaret Thatcher. I know, because I was there when she gave them a piece of her mind. Margaret Thatcher and I will go together to the Common Wealth Heads of government meeting next week with the same conviction of a need to change in South Africa. And (...) respect (...) for the principle (...) this conference this afternoon.


Report/Interview 18: Bea Reed in conversation with well-known broadcaster Neville Dawson about Springbok Radio, coming here from Australia in 1951, famous personalities he has met and worked with. (Radio Today), broadcast 11/10/1985

Sir Ramphal:

What the world community feels, what most countries and people feel is that the time has come indeed it has past to apply real pressure on Pretoria to dismantle apartheid. Sanctions and (...) you mention are just a small part of an important part of the effort to ensure that ultimately morality prevails in SA.

Gordon Martin: Dr "Worrol" South African ambassador you (...) what has...the Commonwealth view is that you (...) respond united pressure, is that are you thinking South African government will respond?

Second participant:

Well I asked you Mr. "Demble Be" the Commonwealth is an ill assortment of nations and countries; the real Commonwealth had... eh... was very clearly identified with parliamentary democracy, rule of law, human rights and things of that kind. And I don't think the British public will take offence; what I want to say is the (...) Commonwealth is something else. In the first place objective...on objective analysis South Africa's record on human rights and democracy is much better than most of the African countries, the African members of the Commonwealth. (...) I think it's extremely important to make the point that... what Susan is talking about is moral pressure; and the fact is where (...) South Africa might (...) it could have right, it could have reservation on so many international legal point of view, interference from EEC countries; from the Commonwealth...eh...the Commonwealth as a moral force... eh... is treated with utmost contempt...and... you see (no just a second), just one point: the key protagonist for sanctions this time is not the black countries in the Commonwealth, it's Australia, it is by any account one of the oldest white members of the Commonwealth (...). Australia has interests, we are competitive with Australia economically, we have very little trade with Australia, but we compete with Australia in the Far East, we sell coal to countries in the Far East in competition with Australia; it in fact suits Australia's interests and it is a great deal of self-interest involved here. When politician Mr. (...) start talking morality (...) and the fact is that when Mr. Hawke says these things, there are Australia's interests (...) are being served in (...) but one is not talking, and Susan is not talking about a particular country, is talking about the Commonwealth collectively. Now he calls in an interview which he gave the press conference, which he gave about a week ago just before going of to London when he released his report, he said that he wants to establish in South Africa one (...) democracy. Now why does not that message apply to Nigeria, why does not that message apply to Uganda, why does not that message apply...eh...to some of the other political disasters which there are in the Commonwealth? He speaks of human rights violations in the little chapter that there is on human rights, in this report, there is not a single measure mentioned as there is today in the Sunday Telegraph, and there is widely reported in Amnesty International report in 1985 on human rights violations throughout Commonwealth. The atrocities which occur, 200,000 people killed in Uganda, since the last meeting of (...), there is no mention of that. So what I'm saying to you is that in so far as the Commonwealth want to convey messages to the South African government those messages are...will be perceived in South Africa by the government and by the supporters of what is an elected government will be perceived for what they are as (...)

Gordon Martin: But hold on a second. What will they... what effect they have on the South African government? (...) Whatever they are perceived as. If they should take effect (...) trade
sanctions, if they are "banning " on flight, "banning" on export of food, products, what effect will it have on the government?

Sir Ramphal:
I take your point. There will have no political effect on the government for the reason which I mentioned, if anything by stiffen resentment, that is a psychological nature. The economic effect on South Africa is likely to be limited. Their effect on our neighbours is going to be extraordinary. Because while South Africa will not engage in any kind of retaliatory reaction given the economic interdependence of the countries of southern Africa, given the fact that some (...) of the export of Zimbabwe, Zambia, Malawi those where South Africa (...) to find that it was economically not a practical proposition to have (...) travelling around this countries. I would like to know from Susani what provision is going to make for the economies of those countries.


Gordon Martin:
Pointing out that this was the (...) independent Commonwealth Conference ever with 41 out of 47 possible Heads of government present, Mr. Ramphal said they were all conscious of the importance of working toward consensus, and he added maybe they could do some to work at (...) by (...) to South Africa coming back into the Commonwealth. Mr Ramphal said that (...) end of the day but was not part of the consensus and there could be a question of loosing faith (...)as to where they could stood.

Mr. Ramphal:
But at this point of time I nearly (...) my accustomed optimism, I (...) a consensus conclusion which includes all the parties of the conference.

Gordon Martin:
(...) BBC interview, the New Zealand Prime Minister, Mr. Lange took him (...) and gave his four days to (...) which the British Prime Minister Mrs. Thatcher will be hearing. Mr. Lange said Britain had (...) any time determinate South Africa economically. The question was (...) how far Britain will accommodate the pressure (...) here. He acknowledged they were telling (...) do it (...) injury in a common core. (...) from the Britain’s point of view he said but form the point of view of the Commonwealth, I am right.

Mr. Lange:
Mrs. Thatcher, (...) every body (...) conference to tell (...) talk to you (...) return to New Zealand is the pledge (...) (poor quality of the recording).
Report/Interview 29: An interview by Chris Nicklin with Gordon Martin, covering the Commonwealth summit in the Bahamas, about the outcome of the decision on South Africa and the role Mrs. Margaret Thatcher, British Prime Minister. (Radio Today), broadcast 22/10/1985

Gordon Martin:
Everyone is (...) believed that they were able to find efficient common denominators between Mrs. Thatcher, the implacably opposed to sanctions, and those who wished to see the application of sanctions against South Africa. And it's in a way quite interesting even in some extent amusing the way in which various, let say of the more fiery things leader are now saying how cooperative Mrs. Thatcher was. President Kaunda of Zambia, for example, said that Mrs. Thatcher has now made a U turn, but she (...) in her thinking; and Mr. Gandhi in fact said that there has never been any real difference between Mrs. Thatcher in the shares and the flight of apartheid. The difference was on the (...) matters of the infection of their (...) South Africa.

Chris Nicklin:
A few moment ago you use to say it is common denomiating (...) Mrs. Thatcher's words of that (...) concession-non-sanction.

Gordon Martin:
Mrs. Thatcher said (...) offering the used measures, she realised that others were keen on sending what she described as the "psychological signal" to Pretoria, so by doing along with these measures however miniscule this was enough to (...) what I've described as common denominator; it was in fact I know when she offered the two steps on (...) and on non funding a play mission it was a that point that they bargain so to speak was disrupted.

Chris Nicklin:
The Commonwealth accord speaks of the six months times ban to see if any concrete change actually takes place in South Africa. Who is going to decide though what exactly constitutes concrete change?

Gordon Martin:
Well I think this is all still very much up in the air, the number of heads of governments including interestingly Mrs. Thatcher herself has been appointed to develop with the Secretary General of the Commonwealth Mr. Ramphal the modalities of the effort to assist the process of political dialogue in South Africa. Part of that plan as you know is to select the Group of Eminent Persons but no one so far has any clear idea of who those persons would be and whether they would be expected to make (...) examination in South Africa or what.

Chris Nicklin:
Now the accord said that it's the reasonable progress then some Commonwealth members will consider some (...) quite tough measures to (...).

Gordon Martin:
Mrs. Thatcher would not go along with those (...) however Mrs. Thatcher's phase at this conference for British House of common yesterday. Mrs. Thatcher said it once again that

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(….) opposition to sanction, she said what is the point of causing further unemployment in Britain and (…) for the (…) unemployment in South Africa.

Report/interview 30: An interview by David McNiel with British Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher on her concessions on sanctions against South Africa introduced at the Commonwealth summit in the Bahamas. (Radio Today), broadcast 22/10/1985

Margaret Thatcher:
Absolutely (…) two things: first (…) we can’t see that there is a ban on the import of Krugerand; Krugerand (…) have virtually stopped coming, but nevertheless the Commonwealth (…) to give a signal and show we agree to try to do that. The second (…) was a game that helps to find policy of doing this a little bit more which is important; we are not going to stand tax payers money on the promotion of trade mission or trade (…). They felt that it was important if extra psychological signal (…) very very far cry (…) all export and import from South Africa which were able to convince them (…).

David McNiel:
My next question of setting up the Group of Eminent Persons; do you really think that South African government will receive such a group?

Margaret Thatcher:
I must honestly hope so, because (…) constructive suggestion in how can we help and how can we (…) provide some sort of international framework for the next step to take place (…) in South Africa (…) and it should (…) that the present system cannot last quite (…) the mass is not part because this apartheid cannot last, that there is a gap (…) South Africa (…) industry (…) present economic difficulties. We’re trying to be constructive; our best we help to bring about a kind of discussion which will lead to satisfaction (…) by people of all background, colour, race and creed can take part in the government of South Africa, construction and constructive (…) at all time is our message.

David McNiel:
The Commonwealth approach speaks about six months time banned to see if there is concrete changes which are going to take place. Who is going to decide, who is going to evaluate what is concrete progress?

Margaret Thatcher:
(…) a group of five or six countries is going to send people to South Africa to make contact with the South African government. I think that (…) if (…) sometimes the next day (…) actively preparing for the next stage, I think one has to recognise that the South African has done a very great deal in the last three or four months (…) has not been done before or maybe ought to be done before. There is a lot more it ought to be done (…) and we (…) in South Africa which gives right to people of all races, creeds, colours to take part in the government of South Africa.

Michael Kallenbach:
President Reagan's wife Nancy was at the United Nations to kick off this week's event, but unlike others here she did not get involved in politics. She and more than 30 other first ladies were kept away in a UN conference-room during Mrs. Reagan's second anti-drug abuse conference of this kind. A similar one was (...) by Mrs. Reagan in Washington last April.

Nancy Reagan:
The announcement for needing we can't change large, but on (...) basis we can begin plans for work it all. And it is a (...) beginning. Each nation has unique problems and ways of solving them, but together we can set an example. One can't change the world in the morning but we can certainly work harder.

Michael Kallenbach:
Mrs. Reagan added that drugs can kill not just the addict but the family too. Then just on the whole (...) general assembly got underway. First to speak from the Marxist ruled Nicaraguan leader, Daniel Ortega who challenged president Reagan to normalise relations with his Central American Republic and if he was willing, said the Nicaraguan leader, then President Reagan should give reply from the general assembly watch room on Thursday. Next Israel, its Prime Minister Shimon Peres, urges the assembly to hold out a peace talk to Jordan, even though most of the delegates left the chamber. Mr. Peres said Israel was ready to end its stage of war with Jordan and called for a face-to-face peace conference either in Amman, Israel or any other place. But the Israeli leader was adamant about one thing: that the president of the PLO and those who support terrorist organisations must be excluded. Mr. Peres said that such a peace conference should have an open agenda and possibly get underway before the end of this year. So far there's still no comment to the Israeli proposal form the Jordanian delegation to the United Nations. Last this week more than eighty Heads of states or governments will address the assembly. The main event culminating with the speech by President Reagan and other members of the Security Council on Thursday. That's the day the UN charter was signed forty years ago.

For Radio Today, this is Michael Kallenbach at the United Nations.


Desmond Sixishe:
South Africa has for the first time stopped threatening but has taken a decision that this will be implemented. I think when you say they have (...) is that you mean that they say they will not do it now, not yet but in fact the decision has been taken.

Jonathan Hargreaves:
(...) contract with the South African government there?
Desmond Sixishe:

We have sent a message to the South African government to expressing our dismay at the fact that certain decision can be taken without consultation with Lesotho; as it is, I mean it is our own people who will be affected and who have thought that there was a certain amount of contradiction on the matter.

Jonathan Hargreaves:
The idea of possible repatriation has been mentioned by the South African government previously though; has the Lesotho government made any contingency plans in the event of this sort of things happening?

Desmond Sixishe:
Well certainly, I mean any reasonable responsible government would take contingency measures; we are taking very serious contingency measures. But it must be stated quite categorically that low amount of contingency will completely wipe of the effect of any sanctions that South Africa applied against Lesotho.

Jonathan Hargreaves:
But South Africa has said that this is not an imposition of sanctions. It has merrily to look after its own people.

Desmond Sixishe:
No I think that we, Lesotho is being easily wiping boy by South Africa. We are hostage state, South Africa intents to fall out all her frustrations about...caused by the stings of the international community's actions against South Africa.

Jonathan Hargreaves:
But there is a very high unemployment rage in South Africa; do you know how to think it is the duty of the government here to in fact insure that its own people have jobs first?

Desmond Sixishe:
Well, that is a very understandable emotion; I mean that is a very understandable thing to do. But South Africa can survive with those workers. They are a very important sector in the South African economy, especially the Basotho as they are specialised mineworkers. I cannot see Basotho being replaced in fact by any nationality in South Africa at the present time.

Jonathan Hargreaves:
How in fact (...) the economy of Lesotho do you think will react if something like this ought to happen?

Desmond Sixishe:
It will affect it greatly, there is no doubt that we will be faced immediately with a work force that will be looking for work of close to or for more than 150,000 people. Our budget will suffer very measure constraints as the result of the money that will not be forthcoming from the mineworkers' earnings which constitutes a substantial part of our annual budget. And of course they are (...) and their contribution to the farming in the country to agriculture as they finance most of their families agricultural activities.
Jonathan Hargreaves:
Have you had any contact with some of the major bodies employing foreign workers such as the chambers of mining in South Africa?

Desmond Sixishe:

No! We have contacted certain international agencies in New York, in London and we are continuing to alert the international community of the decision by South Africa. We are contacting the international trade union movement to make it aware of what is going on here. We are contacting all the people who we expect will react in our favour.

Report/interview 35: An interview by Robert Swann with Walter Mayo and Bart del Ashmet, two members of the group of 17 US former prisoners-of-war in Korea on their impressions on South Africa after their visit to the country. (Radio RSA), broadcast 14/11/1985

Walter Mayo:
I think America during the Korean war should have been extra thankful to South Africa for having come to our support, supposedly through the United Notions and the support they gave to us, I think and I know was tremendous during the Korean war.

Robert Swann: This point is sometimes forgotten overseas that South Africa was an ally of other Western countries during World War II and was also an ally fighting the communists during the Korean war.

Walter Mayo:
That's true. We were allies in World War I, World War II and then also you assisted ( . . ) crisis ( . . ) that we had at that time before that you were also in Korea; and I think a lot of the Americans have forgotten that. You helped with our satellite system, you were in the most important shipping ( . . ) of the world, you have strategic material that we need and we need the support of South Africa and the United States as much as you need our support here and I think this is not recognised by the people of the United States where they should.

Bart del Ashmet:

I was tremendously impressed not only with the diversity of the typography of the country, the climate but most impressively with the people: their warmth, their hospitality, and also how much alike we are and the South Africans are to each other. And it has been absolutely amazing that how many common interests and how many common values that we share and this has come out in our exchanges and talking with people and just in casual conversations and meeting people throughout the country.

Robert Swann: Do you think that our problems are more or fewer than you anticipated?
Walter Mayo:

The extent of the problems as far as the portrayal in the American news media are monumental as they come across the television screens and our newspapers. But I think they are overblown and I've been absolutely impressed with the infrastructure, the economic development in this country, the road nets, the rail way nets, the industrial capacity and that's a revelation to me, because I really don't think that most Americans realise the extent... eh... the development of this country.

Bart del Ashmet:

It seems to me like we are dealing seductive morality these days instead of facing the fact that you solve your own problems and let us solve ours, 'cause we got as many problems as you have maybe not the same way but we've got our own problems.

Report/Interview 36: An extract of a speech by the State President, Mr. P. W. Botha on the announcements that the Government is to proceed with initial stages of its Mossel Bay Gas Extraction and Conversion Project, addressing the President's Council on 14/11/1985. (Radio RSA), broadcast 15/11/1985

The decision was taken after comprehensive studies proved that the gas reserves are of an economic exploitable quality and quantity. These projects can be established on a financially viable basis. The capital cost will be in the region of approximately 3.500 million Rands. It will be financed without resorting to extensive loans. The financing of these projects will come to a large extent from available resources of the central energy fund. It will further be supported by anticipative private sector participation. We have calculated that approximately some 10,000 new job opportunities will be created during the pick of the construction phase. This figure could be doubled if the satellite industries are taken into account. The job opportunities will come in many instances in completely new technological spheres. There is development to be done, new skills to be mastered and the demand to rise to new heights of achievement. Further details of this and other challenging projects which will grant the private sector further opportunities of becoming involved in the government's (...) projects will be announced by the minister of mineral and energy affairs at the appropriate time in the near future. I trust that these imaginative projects will afford South Africans the opportunity to yet once again demonstrate the spirit which made this country the industrial giant of Africa. The time for initiative and creativity is again with us. I trust that these projects and the vigour with which the private and public sectors will meet these exiting technological challenges will dramatically illustrate the commitment of all South Africans to the future. It should also act to demonstrate the government's enthusiasm and dedication to create a prosperous South Africa for all her people.

Report/Interview 37: An interview by Pieter Raubenheimer with Dr. Brand Fourie, South Africa's former Ambassador to Washington on the importance of tourism to South Africa as an image builder in the outside world. (Radio RSA), Broadcast 15/11/1985

Dr. Brand Fourie:

Tourism is an outmost importance, the outmost importance from two points of view, from the economic financial point of view: it’s very evident that if you look at what is happening in
many other countries of the world where tourism plays an important part; the importance that you gonna touch to the (...) your balance of payment concerns the facilities it creates for employment, the money it brings into the country. From the political and also image point of view you cannot overstate the importance of tourism. If we can bring in here a million eventually two million tourists per year, there is no better way practicable in my opinion (...) a kind of perception that has been created by the media of South Africa. You get these people here and they go back, you must realise it's not only million or two million but they've got relations, they've got friends, they spread the word, they bring more tourists here; you get the snowballing effect and it is one of the most effective ways that I sincerely believe of restoring, of recreating a different image for South Africa.

*Pieter Raubenheimer: How do you (...) can the negative publicity against South Africa be countered?*

*Dr. Brand Fourie:*

We here in South Africa of course we've got to do our share. You cannot rectify everything simply by publicity campaign. Of great importance and first and foremost we must bring about the situation here where we put an end to disturbances, because that is one aspect that hits very hard abroad. We've got to continue, as it seems to me it's the absolute determination of the government, the State President has said so and (...) of continuing on the road of reform and creating a sort of political situation and set up here where it becomes more acceptable to a great number of this country and hence also create a situation where you've got greater well-being, social well-being, economical well-being and political well-being for a greater number of people in this country.

*Pieter Raubenheimer: What role do you say must every South African play in creating a better image for the county?*

*Dr. Brand Fourie:*

I think one should always start with yourself at home. We've got to work, we've got to work harder. We've got to start being respondent, we've got to cooperate, we've got to realise that we've got to work together for the benefit of South Africa as a whole and what is important from (...)following...from the question you've put to me in projecting that kind of approach to the outside world and make it clear to the outside world that we stand together, we are proceeding in a peaceful way, on the road that the government has taken and above all that we are not (...) by anybody else but what we are doing, we are doing in the interest of the people in this country and we continue on that road.
2. Interviews and reports in which the South African government is seeking to present the ANC as a terrorist organisation, equating it with terrorism, finding similarities between the ANC and international terrorism. Radio RSA had made wide coverage and report on the "Achille Lauro" hijacking drama, on the terrorists-hijackers, the alleged links between the terrorists and the PLO leader Yasser Arafat, and the murder of an American citizen. It had found links between this terrorist organisation and the ANC and those who support them. It implicitly called for the same kind of treatment to give to the terrorists-hijackers of the "Achille Lauro" and the ANC and its supporters. (7, 10, 11, 14, 15, 16, 19, 21, 24, 25)

Report/Interview7: A report by Connie Lawn on the Reagan administration admitting that it meets with members of the ANC, with actuality of State Department Spokesperson Charles Redman. (Radio Today), broadcast 8/10/1985

Connie Lawn: A regular administration confirms in the column in the New York Times which states top official they've met with the group trying to overthrow the South African government. According to State Department spokesman, Charles Redman:

Charles Redman:
US diplomats, diplomats have indeed met with the ANC from time to time; it's our intention to continue this contact as (…)

Connie Lawn: The official will not confirm a report by Oliver Tambo who says an (…) official will also meet with him when he visits Washington. In the mean time the prestigious Washington (…) has confirmed it has stopped representing South African Airways. They did so as the (…) criticised its representation of the airline (…).


Ted Koppel: (…) you are opposed to this kind of incident and yet many times over the past year the voice of the PLO over Baghdad radio has taken claim for incidents against civilians, civilians in Israel.

Yasser Arafat:
No, what you are mentioned is not accurate. You know that we are all…the PLO is completely against all kind of terrorism against civilians. It is obvious and clear. And I have announced it by myself, as the Chairman of the PLO.

Ted Koppel: You also used to announce on years ago, Chairman Arafat, with all due respect that you had nothing to do with the black September organisation. But on your own document (…) that was not so.
Yasser Arafat:
You have to understand that...eh...there are groups who are outside...eh...we can't control, as there are many groups in Italy, the Italian government cannot control and the same time in Japan there are some groups which the Japanese government can't control and many...we are...like any other government which cannot control all (...).

Report/Interview 11: A report by Jeffery Blyth on reports that some Americans had been killed on board the hijacked "Achille Lauro", with Actuality of the ship captain's radio message. (Radio Today), broadcast 9/10/1985.

Jeffery Blyth: In New Jersey where several passengers come from and in Miami relatives made apprehensive phone calls to Washington. But there is no official news and no names of whom might be first victim of hijackers. That is yes indeed there has been killing; last night a radio telephone call from the ship's captain monitored here in New York cut doubt on the report. In his radio message the captain appealed to ships of various nations gathering in the Mediterranean not to try and board the ship to try and rescue the hostages.

(voice of hostages screaming and crying and probably the ship's captain talking over the radio)

The key words (...) were everybody on my ship is fine and in good health: please do not try to do anything. There is something (...) that if any of the passengers have been killed (...) he didn't make that comment (...) the ship when he put it to Alexandria or elderly over 65 are not in good health. (...) to board the ship rather make the trip to Cairo with the rest of the passengers. Early this morning (...) who are tracking the ship by satellite said the liner is still in the eastern Mediterranean about half way (...) coast of Syria. There were reports that the ship might pull (...) or alternatively head back to Alexandria. (...) Alexandria (...) Egyptian and Italian officials or representatives of PLO leader Yasser Arafat who is insisting that the hijacking was not planned by him. He (...) from Tunis last night that he might be able to negotiate the release of the hostages if the ship should return to Egyptian waters.

Interview/Report14: A Report by Connie Lawn on the murder of an American on board of the "Achille Lauro", with actuality of White House spokesman Larry Speakes as well as one of the passengers on their experiences. (Radio Today), broadcast 10/10/1985

Connie Lawn:
Isolate allies confined to a wheel chair and barely able to speak 69 year old man (...) was killed by the Palestinian and dumped into the sea. His wife as well as other (...) British citizens (...) next victims according to the captain of the Italian motor liner but they kill no others because talks with some of the governments involved will be gone and (...). When the White House confirmed the murder, spokesman Larry Speakes expresses the outrage of the Reagan administration.
Larry Speakes:
The United States remains determined to see that those responsible for this (...) act be brought to justice and punished to the maximum extent. There must be no asylum for terrorists or terrorism.

Connie Lawn:
Mr. Speakes made it clear the resolution of the affair is the responsibility of the Egyptian government. The White House official said the United States was consulted about the arrangement for ending the crisis. He said they advised strongly against the release of the terrorists or concession to them. There was no doubt that terrorist attack due took place from the moment that they take over. CBS news talked to one of the former prisoners still on board of the ship (...):

Passenger:
One of the terrorists were totally (...) threatening us (...)

CBS Journalist:
Could you tell me something about the hijackers did they ever strike anyone or ...you say they (...). How did they do that?

Passenger:
(Inaudible)

Connie Lawn:
The question now is what steps if any will the Western world take to avenge this action. The United States have spoken of punishment and retaliation several times but (...). But (...) of reaction to this incident has been strong in this country and it is possible that might lead to some military action by America or perhaps by Israel on behalf of the United States. (Connie Lawn, Radio Today, Washington).

Report/Interview 15: A report by David Willey on the resolving of the hijack drama of the "Achille Lauro" involving the killing of an American passenger. (Radio Today), broadcast 10/10/1985

The first news of the missing American was given by the Italian Prime Minister. G.P. told the news conference in Rome that the ship’s captain had informed him about the man disappearance during a radio telephone call after the hijackers have been persuaded to leave the vessel in Port sight. The victim, Mr. Leon K. was confined to a wheel chair and was 69 years old. It was presumed that his body has been dumped over board, G.P. said. The Italian government is clearly relieved that the peaceful end to the kidnapping (...) through the intervention of the PLO and the Egyptian government. But this act of sea piracy has shown out inconsistencies in Italian attempts to keep up good relations with every body in the Middle East. The government has decided a cabinet meeting later today whether to (...) for the extradition of the four hijackers. The owners of the luxury liner have decided to continue the cruise interrupted by the hijacking. The "Achille Lauro" is now in port sight being
searched by Egyptian security authorities (...) to the Israeli port of "Ashdod" where the 600 passengers who were (...) in to Egypt and who have now arrive in Rome on (...) have been invited to rejoin the tour if the wish to do so. Many of them surprisingly have said they would like to continue their holiday. The captain of the "Achille Lauro" has been telling the Italian radio and television (...) interview about how the American passenger was killed. Captain (...) said that he knew about Mr. K. murder because one of the Palestinian hijackers has his thighs and his shoes covered with blood. He said the hijackers told him: "now we've killed one of them". (...) the captain knew about the hijacking he said it was only when he heard the burst of machine gun (...) on Monday at lunch time. He was called to the beach by loudspeaker and ordered at gunpoint to head toward port sight. Two of the hijackers run to (...) the passengers in cruise in one of the dining room while another remained on the beach with the gun pointing to the captain's back. Captain L. who comes from the (...) said the hijackers plaid Arab music at high volume on a radio set and originally believed that they would find asylum in Syria. He said they were armed with Russian made kalachnikov rifles, grenades and explosives. He said that at one point the hijackers seem to want to make for Libya, then changed their mind.

For Radio Today, this is David Willey, in Rome.

**Report/Interview 16: A report by Connie Lawn on the White House announcement that USF.14 aircraft forced down the plane carrying the four Palestine Liberation Front hijackers to land in Italy for proper prosecution, with actuality of White House spokesman Larry Speakes and President Ronald Reagan. (Radio Today), broadcast 11/10/1985**

**Connie Lawn:**
The White House announced US jet forced down the plane carrying the four terrorists. It is now in Italy. Spokesman Larry Speakes made the announcement in a midnight White House briefing:

**Larry Speakes:**
As (...) action, US military forces today (...) over international airspace they (...) falling the "Achille Lauro" terrorists. The aircraft was diverted to the airbase at seven hour Italy. In cooperation with the government of Italy, the terrorists were then taken to the Italian custody for (...) legal proceedings. Earlier today (...) that the terrorists will be flown from Egypt to their freedom the president reacted that US forces intercept the aircraft and escort it to a location where the terrorists will be apprehended by those with the (...) jurisdiction. USF14 aircraft flying from the (...) on the (...) on the international airspace and intercepted it. They instructed it to follow them and escorted it to the military base (...). This operation was conducted without firing a shot.

**Connie Lawn:**
Larry Speakes said President Reagan expected terrorists to be extradited to the United States where they may be given a death penalty for the killing of an American citizen. The White House statement came after another long day of controversy and confusion; President Reagan himself was the major source of that confusion. At first he indicated it would be all right with him if the PLO trials the terrorists just as long as they are punished. But he said they can do so if they have a structure of a nation and an organisation. This statement of course confers
nationhood on the PLO (...) secretary (...) only established government can trial them, President Reagan quickly issued a clarification.

*President Reagan:*
I did not mean to imply that I say with them, giving a trial (...) attempting to do justice to the hijackers. But I really believe that the PLO if the hijackers were in their custody should turn them over to a sovereign State which has jurisdiction and could prosecute (...).

*Connie Lawn:*
President Reagan added he should not have made the statement he (...) originally about the PLO and nationhood. In his words: “as mad as I am (...) instead of justice”.
Connie Lawn, Radio Today, at the White House.

*Report/Interview 19: A report by David Willey on the American ambassador to Rome, Maxwell Rabb, criticising the Italian government for letting the Palestinian Liberation Front leader, Abu Abass, escape. (Radio Today), broadcast 14/10/1985*

Ambassador Rabb called twice during weekend upon Italian government leaders to express Washington’s anger and frustration at Rome’s decision to allow Abul Abass to depart secretly under a false name. Abass and one of his collaborators left Rome on Saturday night on board of Yugoslavia airline flight (...) Belgrade and (...) entire operation which involved him transferring from one aircraft to another right on the airport tarmac. The American ambassador expressed his government incomprehension at the Italian failure to arrest Abass and to carry out the extradition requested by the United States. However, observers in Rome believe the ambassador should not be so amazed that the Italians knew what they were doing; they were under great pressure from the PLO leader Yasser Arafat who helped them to end the liner hijack drama without huge loss of lives. To keep to the bargain which included safe conduct for the high-ranking Palestinian escort aboard the (...) plane. If they arrested Abul Abass the Italians might be liable to a severe escalation in active terrorism by Palestinian groups which is the last thing they want. The four Palestinian hijackers remain in a prison on the island of Sicily charged with the murder of an American passenger on the hijacked cruise liner, kidnap and piracy not to mention illegal possession of weapons. Italians have promised Americans to bring the hijackers to trial as speedily as they can. Police enforcement and army (...) were brought in to Syracuse to illuminate the antiquated prison, (...) held (...) they can be transferred to a more secured prison on the Italian main land. The hijacked liner captain and crew and the twenty-two passengers who remained on board for the voyage back to Italy can be sure of a hero’s welcome when the liner docks in Geneva on Wednesday. All Italy has been following the dramatic event for the past five days on their radios and televisions set. And Italians know that although they may have raffled the favours of the United States, the (...) will soon blow over. After all they have the hijackers in custody and ambassador Rabb told reporters after meeting the Italian Prime Minister that the strong ties of friendship between Italy and the United States remain firm. This is David Willey in Rome reporting for Radio Today.
Report/Interview 21: An interview by Elma Botha with Prof. Deon Basson, Lecturer in Public Law at the University of Pretoria on the arrest of the four Palestinian terrorists after the hijacking of the Italian cruise liner, the "Achille Lauro" and the legal implications of the American action in terms of international law. (Radio RSA), broadcast 14/10/1985

Prof. Deon Basson:

It is one of the most important rules of international law that an aircraft of one country may not violate airspace of another country. The only exception on this rule is when there is a treaty which governs air traffic. The American aircraft in this instance was clearly not part of the civil aviation and accordingly they acted unlawfully according to international law when they forced down the aircraft on another country's territory. It should however be pointed out that another country can still give consign to the violation of its territorial air space. Further more the fact that a person is taken into custody unlawfully should not hinder his earring in accord of law, the fact that a code of a country has jurisdiction to trial an alleged criminal must thus be judged independently of the fact that he was taken into custody unlawfully.

Elma Botha: Whose responsibility will any further legal steps be?

Prof. Deon Basson:

(...) the question is which country has jurisdiction to hear the alleged hijackers. It is clear that the country whose ship is, the so-called flag's state in this case Italy as well as any other country in whose territorial waters the hijacked ship found itself, the so-called coastal state have concurrent jurisdiction to trial the alleged hijackers. The question whether the USA has jurisdiction to trial the alleged hijackers is not so easy to answer. One possibility can be that the United States has jurisdiction to trial these alleged hijackers because hijacking is regarded as an universal crime, which endangers the international community, and thus all country has jurisdiction to trial the alleged hijackers. It is however only certain that piracy is such a universal crime and because hijacking is not piracy by reason of the fact it is committed for political ends, it cannot be regarded as a universal crime. Another ground on which the United State court might trail the alleged hijackers is the fact that the murdered is an American citizen. The international law seems to allow a state to trial persons who had done... who committed crimes against citizens of their country on a foreign territory. But it is doubted whether this will be in the general interest of the state to trial such alleged criminals who committed crimes against their citizens. It is interesting however to note the fact that Italy acknowledges this ground of jurisdiction and that the alleged hijackers are now in custody of Italy. It must extradite into United States and will most probably regard the United States as having jurisdiction to trial the alleged hijackers. So the legal position at the moment is that the alleged hijackers must be extradite to the United States to trial them on the alleged crimes and it is to Italy to decide whether they want to extradite these alleged criminals.
Report/Interview 24: A report by Peter Allen-Frost on a tape of the conversation between "Achille Lauro" hijacker and PLF leader Abu Abass, with actuality of the tape and Israeli Defence Minister Rabin on the possibility of peace with King Hussein of Jordan. (Radio Today), broadcast 17/10/1985.

Peter Allen-Frost:
The (...) of the "Achille Lauro" has had a definitely positive fall out for the Israelis. The PLO and the allied organisations seemed definitely tied to an active piracy and the murder of an American citizen because he was Jewish. The spotlight was taken of Israeli airway against PLO basis in Tunisia, an attack which was retaliation for three Israeli Yasmin, (...) and (...). Britain's refusal to meet with two members of the PLO was in Israel's eyes perhaps the beginning of an erosion in the PLO standing. The UN refusal to invite PLO chief Yasser Arafat to speak at the UN to some extent bears out the Israeli contention. In Israel, report that Premier Shimon Peres met recently with the top official from the Middle East, a secret meeting for which Peres left the country for a day. King Hussein also would perhaps appear to be somewhat distancing from the PLO and Israel is urging the Jordanian monarch to continue this move, to emulate the late President Anwar Sadat of Egypt and sit down for peace talks. Defence Minister Rabin speaking to American Jewish fundraisers here in Jerusalem:

Mr. Rabin:
I believe the time is right now that another Arab leader, the king of Jordan, will decide to follow President Sadat. I believe that this time is a time of Jews to Jordan. After what has taken place in (...), in Barcelona, with the Italian ship, that there is no need to convince the Jordanian king that it is Arafat with the PLO, this would not be a gift. King Hussein has to make up his mind and to decide: does he want peace with us? If he wants, without Arafat; with Palestinian leaders, yes. Anyone of the authentic leaders of the West Bank (...), the (...), to join with him would be fine with us. And I believe that they have to participate in the peace process because the fate of their future will be decided in these negotiations. Therefore, this is the moment for him to make up his mind.

Peter Allen-Frost:
Israeli chief of military intelligence appeared on the local television and released part of the tape recording which the Israelis say was made during the hijacking of the Italian ship. They say it's the Palestinian official known as Abu Abass speaking in Arabic to the hijackers on board the liner. It was monitored by Israeli military intelligence.

Abu Abass speaking in Arabic:
(...)

Peter Allen-Frost:
In the Arabic language tape Abu Abass who identifies himself by his (...) name Abu Haled appeared to know the hijackers and to have passed the messages. The Israelis say this proves Abu Abass by no means knew the hijackers and knew their plans to hijack the ship. Peter Allen-Frost in Jerusalem reporting for Radio Today.

David Willey:
There were singing and tearing by the 350 crew members as the huge (...) blue and white liner edged slowly towards the (...) side. Relatives of the crew who (...) neighbourhood were allowed to board the ship first; there was a (...) team of family re-union. Only 19 passengers remained on board on the return journey from both sides. Nine of them were South Africans. And Anne Schroder from Johannesburg told me that the hijackers had some difficulty in making out what nationality they were when they separated the British and the American passengers on board from the rest.

David Willey:
Tell us, what happened?

Anne Schroder:
(...) and he had to bring all our passports and gave them to the (moment of hesitation) terrorists. And then they called us our names and we had to come forward and they ask if this is your passport and they could not understand, they don't know where South Africa was, they keep saying America, America. (...) South Africa, but they couldn't understand. They didn't know until one of the crew said to them Zaire, and then they said good, that we were good guys. That we were not from America.

David Willey:
So they thought you were good guys.

Anne Schroder:
(Laugh), Yes! Eh not really, I mean (...) they separate the American and the British on one side and they put all the other people on the other side.

David Willey:
And you were with the other people?

Anne Schroder:
Yes!

David Willey:
What was the attitude then after they said you were good guys?

Anne Schroder:
Well, they didn't! I mean they kept every now and then they come across (...) tried to clarify whether we were Americans and they look our passport again; they couldn't understand we were South Africans.
David Willey:

(...) told me that the four hijackers took (...) to keep away while they held the passengers and crew hostage. In the ship dining room I saw the bullet hole in the ceiling caused by (...) machine guns (...) the terrorists, with which they intimidated those on board. The captain of the “Achille Lauro” was mobbed by Italian journalists when he appeared in the lounge. He looked tired. Asked why he had obeyed the orders of the hijackers, he said: “I had two machine guns pointed at me on the bridge. The terrorists said they were more than twenty (...) together. They gave me orders so I thought it was opportune to believe everything the terrorists told me”. Late in the day, the “Achille Lauro” is due to leave Genoa on its next cruise. The rule will be the same as last time but there will be no (...) of the Egyptian port. About a hundred of the six hundreds passengers booked (...) on this cruise have cancelled their reservations. The owners of the “Achille Lauro” say they have lost almost a Million Rand as the result of the disruption of luxury cruise by the hijackers. And this is David Willey in Genoa reporting for Radio Today.
3. Interview and report in which South Africa is presented as having 'regional responsibilities'. The South African government seems to bear the regional responsibility to protect the southern tip of Africa from communist influence, to lead to the development of the whole region. Consequently international sanctions and boycott against South Africa will only have disastrous repercussions on the region. They will not affect only South Africa; instead, they will affect more strongly neighbouring countries such as Malawi, Zimbabwe, Zambia, and Botswana among others who rely on the South African economy and support (savour-faire) movements that are fighting (their) 'communist' regimes such as UNITA fighting MPLA in Angola and RENAMO against FRELIMO in Mozambique. (2b, 3, 6, 8, 12, 33)


Soviet pilots are flying some of Angola's MIG 23 aircraft and MA 25 helicopter gunships, the very same gunships that they are using to slaughter the people of Afghanistan. It is clear, Sir, that the Soviets are directly involved and are in fact commending the current MPLA offensive. No doubt, the Soviet Union sought to take advantage of the current international vendetta against my country to serve and expand its influence in our continent; no doubt, it imagines that it could intervene militarily in southern Africa... eh... with impunity. Mr. President, South Africa has no illusion about its relative power, but it does have regional responsibilities: responsibilities for the security of its own people and responsibilities for the security of the people of South West Africa/Namibia. And even now, SW APO is sending major units southwards as part of the Soviet directed offensive with intention of opening new fronts in its terrorist campaign against the people of South West Africa/Namibia. Mr. President, despite our limited capabilities it must be understood that South Africa cannot and will not simply shared its responsibilities. Those involved should understand and understand clearly that there will be no cheap victories. Mr. President if the Council would like to establish what is happening in southern Angola my government suggests they send a fact finding mission to the area to establish who is fighting whom, who is directing the operations, what armaments are being used and what the people of Angola would like to see happening in their country and they will then discover what supports UNITA enjoys in Angola. And if the MPLA wishes to confirm this, let him old free elections, let the people of Angola determine their future in a peaceful manner instead of by destroying one another in this endless civil war, a civil war which has been instigated by foreign (...) for the promotion of their own interests. That, Mr. President, if the MPLA chooses to continue the civil war, why should it be only partly entitled to call on a system, the United States Congress by appealing? The Clark amendment has already recognised the admissibility of aiding UNITA. And as recently, Mr. President, as this morning, Secretary of State, Schutts, of the United States is quoted in the New York Times as follows, and I quote:

"We must also remember what is happening in El Salvador and throughout Latin America of the past five years and for that matter what is today happening in Nicaragua, Cambodia, Afghanistan and Angola where people are fighting and dying for independence and freedom".
Mr. President, South Africa is committed to peace and stability in southern Africa and my government has often gone on record to invite the leaders of southern Africa to come together, to negotiate and to work out solutions to the problems of the region.


Michael Kallenbach: Once again Angola has taken its complaints against South Africa to the Security Council. And this time it's about South Africa's military occupation in southeastern Angola earlier this week. Although there is no resolution before the Council Angola has cooped for condemnation of South Africa. Here is UN Ambassador Elídio de Figueiredo.

Elídio de Figueiredo:

The rap of my beloved country by the (...) troops, the desecration of our land the murder our people, the violation of the Angolan sovereignty, all compel the government of the people's Republic of Angola to come before the Council again, and again, an yet again for as many times as it takes to get some concrete international action which will lead to the suspension of these racist attacks.

Michael Kallenbach: Angola said that more than fifty of its troops were killed by the South African military, and the Security Council by failing to act has not fulfilled its obligation under the UN charter. But South Africa argued in the Council that Angola had compromised itself by allowing Cuban and Soviet troops on its soil. The South African Ambassador Kurt von Schirnding accused the Soviet Union of taking advantage of the current international vendetta against South Africa to further expand its influence in Africa. No doubt, he added, it imagines it can intervene militarily in southern Africa with impunity. Mr. von Schirnding then took an unusual step of presenting a draft resolution to the Council which among other things demands that all foreign forces be withdrawn from Angola.

Kurt von Schirnding:

Mister President, if members of the Council fail to give (...) consideration and to (...) to this draft resolution, I will invite them to tell us with what aspects they disagree. And let me say, Mr. President, that this is a sincere and a serious attempt by my government to bring about peace in our region. It is not an attempt to score political points or to push in blame for the development of the current situation in Angola. On the contrary, Mr. President, it is designed to serve the interest of southern Africa as a whole.

Michael Kallenbach: Nevertheless, diplomats fear to not take the South African resolution terribly seriously and it sounds like leaders of the Council will (...) on it. The debate will continue later today. At the United Nations, this is Michael Kallenbach reporting for Radio Today.
Report/Interview 6: A report by Michael Kallenbach on the meeting of the UN's Security Council which condemned SA for its raid into Angola, with actuality of Vernon Walters. (Radio Today), broadcast 8/10/1985

Michael Kallenbach: This is the second time in just over two weeks that the Security Council has condemn South Africa for its military operations in a neighbouring country. And once again, South Africa was accused of using Namibia as a springboard for such attacks. During the debate, the United States administration was accused of helping sustain the South African regime. These charges were (...) by Vernon Walters at the end of the debate. The United States said earlier (...) on a paragraph in the resolution which called for increase military aid to Angola. Ambassador Walters said why will the US deplore the South African attacks in South East of Angola last week, increased military supplies will only increase tension.

Vernon Walters:
The diplomacy of the United States in the region is geared to peaceful negotiated solutions. It is to a deeper and more lasting settlement (...). My government (...) to recognise (...) they should realise the necessity of turning back (...).

Michael Kallenbach: Later this week, a United Nations team consisting of three countries from the Security Council will leave for Angola to investigate details of (...) South African (...). The team is expected to report back to the Council by the middle of November. At the end of this debate, the South African delegation here presented its (...) draft of resolution to the Council. It called for the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Angola. (...) one diplomat said the all exercise was only done to make a point.

Report/Interview 8: An interview by Ricardo Branco with the President of the UNITA movement, Dr. Jonas Savimbi on the Cuban-led, Soviet-assisted MPLA attack on Mavinga - a UNITA stronghold in Southern Angola- which has been repulsed. (Radio RSA), broadcast 8/10/1985

Dr Savimbi:
We consider the situation here in Mavinga is controlled, is calm as you are see... eh... they come time to time with the aircraft to try to destroy the (...) but as far as the threat of the offensive I think it has been battled and the enemy is returning to their own basis in Quito (...), I think.

Ricardo Branco: Do you think that this is a victory for UNITA or is it just part of... eh... a strategy of the MPLA to weaken UNITA and come back for the final offensive?

Dr. Savimbi:
I think this time they did not want just to make a small offensive; they had in their plan very big offensive, to come to take Mavinga to go down to Jamba and to destroy the liberated area. They were surprised by the firm and brave determination that our soldiers have put up that’s why now they are withdrawing. But we know that they will try again, they will try again but this plan was not only to weaken UNITA, it was to destroy UNITA. As they did not succeed, now I think they are going to reorganise and will try again.
Ricardo Branco: And where are you going from here?

Dr Savimbi:

From here I thing we have to consolidate our areas, we have to continue our own strategy of expanding and explain to the people why we fight and also to try to explain to some African countries, Western countries the scope of this direct Soviet involvement. So the people will be aware that what the Russians have massed here in this country as armament in terms of planes, in terms of tanks, in terms of arma, it is not only to fight against a guerrilla movement, it goes beyond that, it resorts to the strategy of the Soviet Union of global... eh... subjugation of the southern Africa. That's why we think that people will feel like us, that we should not become the slave of the Soviet Union, they should join hands with us and cooperate with us. And also we find a deep understanding from many African countries about what is happening here at this moment.

Ricardo Branco: Do you think that there is a growing sympathy towards UNITA from Western countries?

Dr Savimbi:

I think yes! From what I've gathered some few days ago when I went abroad, I found that the people they have realises that the Russians are exaggerating; they are using to much power against a liberation movement; and if you remember it was for the first time that the declaration from the State Department were becoming to the line that we wanted, the State secretary for African affairs Dr Crock then for the first time said the reconciliation between UNITA and MPLA was needed in order to find a solution to problems of Angola which was what we wanted. And also the State Secretary himself also he said that there are freedom fighters fighting for their own freedom in their own country. And I think there is awareness on the side of some Western countries to understand that the time has come for them at least to show the sympathy towards UNITA.

Ricardo Branco: Where would you situate the conflict in Angola in the southern African region?

Dr. Savimbi:

I think that is the key; if UNITA is overrun by Russia, by the force that Russia supports, it is the first step for problems in Namibia, for problems in Zambia, for the problems in Zaire, for the problems in Botswana and finally for the problems in South Africa.

Report/Interview 12: An interview by Ossie Gibson with Gen. Constant Viljoen, Head of the SADF, about his role in the Nkomati Accord, as well as their aid to Frelimo and attempts to find a solution in a "Camp David" situation. (Radio Today), broadcast 9/10/1985

Gen. Constant Viljoen:
I cannot say what FRELIMO expected in this regard but I think FRELIMO had to explain the worsening situation on the security it feels. If you study the development of the military situation in Mozambique (...), you find that the (...) steadily rising without even sharing the
signs of the exact date of the NKOMATI. So what was expected on the NKOMATI signing that there will be a sudden collapse of RENAMO did not take place (…) previously existed that the SADF is totally maintaining RENAMO, is actually fighting for RENAMO in (…) stopping the aid of South Africa will cause the total collapse of RENAMO. It’s not the fact that it could not even see in the (…) of the signing of NKOMATI. This causes of course big problems for FRELIMO and surely they were looking for a scapegoat to blame in this regard and I think it was handy and logical that they should turn back and say (…) this support is still going on. We gave a lot of aid to FRELIMO, whenever we decided that we should cooperate with the FRELIMO government we offered various (…) for example, we gave a total (…) about 4 million Rands worth of aid, radio sets, military radio sets, vehicles, ration packs. We also offered some other aids, we offer the protection of the (…) Maputo communication lines, rail way, roads and also the power line. This we did because at that stage we considered it would be the interest of South Africa. We never of course recommended that the government (…) the protection of the Kabora Bassa power line because this power line is not possible to defend against the attacks of RENAMO.

Ossie Gibson: Don’t you think it would have been in your interest to reveal earlier what was the nature of secret trips and communication and talks with RENAMO?

Gen. Constant Viljoen:
I wish to bet on the first indication of this need to go public in this regard, (…) matter of fact that I have suggested to my minister that we should do this. However when the President himself and the minister of defence denied this allegations and showed very clearly the reasons for this support we did not consider this necessary however in the mean time the FRELIMO government has arrived (…) more allegations. And this was blown up in the international and in the internal press in South Africa to such an extent that we (…) necessary to go into more details and this is the reason why we have done so now.

Ossie Gibson: Do you have a perception that the situation could still be rectified?

Gen. Constant Viljoen:
I’m convinced that the situation can be rectified. We must not be too sensitive in this regard; and I hope that the FRELIMO people on one side and also the RENAMO people on the other side will on one or another stage get to realise that there is only one solution to this and that is they must find a way of solving their differences, and I think the best way of them finding means and ways of doing this is to arrive at “Camp David” situation which is exactly what we try to establish with Deputy Minister (…) efforts to move into the RENAMO territory. We are trying to establish a “Camp David” situation, and I’m sure the (…) isolated base (…) where we can put this people together to talk without interference from the outside, without the propaganda effort by both. I think it is very advisable. In fact I regard this as the only solution.

Davo Holt-Biddle:
Dr. Savimbi addressed an international news conference in the Unita’s capital Jamba before a military parade which saw (...) units of Unita troops (...) now among bush fighters in the world, captured couple of prisoners and also captured soviet military (...) tanks, multiple rockets launchers, armures, troops carriers and alike. When asked just how important was the struggle in Angola, Dr. Savimbi answered this:

Dr. Jonas Savimbi:
The central committee of our Party UNITA decided to launch once again an appeal to all those Angola patriotic forces to come together and to substitute the word confrontation by the word dialogue. At the same time to call upon the people of free world to realise that the battle for the control of all Southern Africa is being waged here and anything happening to Angola will have a (...) on the all situation in Southern Africa.

Davo Holt-Biddle:
Asked what will happen if UNITA was destroyed, Dr. Savimbi said:

Dr. Jonas Savimbi:
If UNITA is destroyed the Russians have got a major place, a major spot from where they can launch other operations one to overdraw moderate countries like Zaire, like where the Americans interests are at stake; to influence the Namibian issue, to influence the South African situation. Then I think we have to see the situation here in Angola in term of geo-strategic interest of the West and the East. It is why I hope that those dealing with these problems in the United States will at this time show courage and will and determination because without the presence of -I don't talk in terms of physical presence- without the intervention of the Americans the Russians will have the same ease go as they had in 1976. Because if in 1976 there was not a black amendment, the Russians were cautious to intervene in Angola. I hope this is the time for the American to put the records straight.

For Radio Today, this Davo Holt-Biddle in Jamba, Angola.
4. South Africa is economically viable better than other countries; it is a safe destination for investors:
- it can absorb foreign investment;
- it can use foreign investment productively;
- it can improve the well-being of the people the whole country and the whole region.

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Report/Interview 13: An interview by Jerry Schuitema with Dr. Simon Brand, Managing Director of the Southern African Development Bank on the discussions he had with bankers in Europe on the South African standstill position concerning debts. (Radio RSA), broadcast 9/10/1985

Dr. Simon Brand:

We were visiting various banks in Western Europe...eh...not...eh...in the first place to talk about the South African foreign bad situation but to inform (...) development bank's plans for many few years are, but of course the debt situation that come up and even discussion. There were still some uncertainties about the digression of the (...) arrangement, but these are things (...) sorted out. The encouraging point that I picked up all along that (...) without any exception, and we visited quite a number of banks is that it is a good realisation in the financial circles that South Africa is basically a country that can absorb foreign investment productively, that can use it productively to improve the well-being of all the people of the country. And there also seems to be...eh...eagerness to (...) to the situation where (...) with South Africa can be resumed. The prevailing attitude does not seem to be one of (...) as an objective that South Africa should now over a period of time repay all the foreign debt and in fact become a capital exporting country and have to maintain (...) on the balance of payment indefinitely which will of course mean maintaining a very high or very low average cost rate with all the problems (...). The perception rather seems to be that the problem that we are running (...) is a temporarily one relating to short term debt and that once that has been satisfactory sorted out that will be a return to a period where there can be a net inflow of capital for investment (...) in South Africa again.

Jerry Schuitema: (...) the development bank projects, what (...) will be founded from foreign (...) and how successful have you been? What you are looking at in fact is (...) that you think you can return to at least (...) normality of getting foreigner's bank.

Dr. Simon Brand:
Well I think we have not made any use of (...) before (...) we were planning first capital market issue to begin to establish ourselves in those banks (...) that for (...) for the next few years (inaudible)
5. The all-white South African government tempts to present itself as a genuine democracy:
- it allow different points of view, favourable as well as unfavourable ideas, criticism
- its official opposition can travel to Lusaka and meet with (a terrorist organisation such as) the ANC
- the students can defy their government, travel to Lusaka and express their opposition to their government policies.

The all-white South African government is attempting to justify itself and its action and put all the blame on the terrorist organisation: the ANC. (2a, 20, 22, 26, 27, 28, 32, 34, 35, 37, 38).

Report/Interview 2a: An extract of a speech by the State President, Mr. P.W. Botha on his agenda for constitutional reform at the Cape Congress of the National Party in Port Elizabeth (Radio RSA), broadcast 1/10/1985.

I said so in Parliament earlier this year. It is the conviction of the government that any eventual constitutional dispensation will have to take into consideration the multicultural nature of the composition of our population in this country. The structures in which this cooperation will take place must be the result of negotiation with the leaders of all the communities. Here I include traditional leaders, (...) leaders, political leaders, church leaders as well as leaders of specific interest groups such as business people, etc. However, I want to put it clearly to those leaders who indicated that they want to participate in negotiations on the future of the country, that they will be expected to make a choice: leaders cannot pay lip service to the principle of negotiation while at the same attempting to cover their rears against radical elements which do not want to negotiate. It is an attitude of neither fish nor fresh and one cannot serve two masters at the same time. In order to further the process of reform I announced on the 25th of January this year that leaders of black communities must be involved in inquiries that concern the positions of those communities. In this regard, the role played and to be played by the President’s Council should also be considered. Therefore, if the need exists among the leaders of black communities and population groups to participate within the President’s Council in inquiries and submission of proposals to me as the Head of the State and the government on matters that concern those communities, I am willing to reconsider the structuring and the functions of the president council to make provision for their participation in that president council.

(Hands clapping).

Report/Interview 2b: An interview with Dr. Frederick van Zyl Slabbert, leader of the FFP, who issued a joint statement by the FFP and the ANC after the two delegations met in Lusaka during October 1985 (Radio RSA), broadcast 14/10/1985

Dr. Frederick van Zyl Slabbert:
( ...) follows, members of the executives of the ANC and the FFP met for a day on Saturday the 12th of October 1985 and discuss wide range of issues relevant to the current South African situation. Apartheid lies at the heart of the present crisis; both sides shared the urgent need to dismantle apartheid and to establish a united non-racial democratic South Africa. Both are deeply concerned to conserve the human and natural resources of our country and to remove one of the most important factors affecting the stability of the whole southern
African region. Areas of differences were discussed in a frank and cordial atmosphere. In particular there were differences on the role and the centrality of the armed struggle in bringing about fundamental change. On the question of a national convention as a basis for devising a constitution for a united non-racial democratic South Africa, the PFP explained its position that such a convention could only take place when certain conditions were met. The ANC stated that it does not consider that there has come in to being at the present moment a climate under which it can consider a negotiated solution of the crisis or negotiated resolution of the crisis. At the same time, the ANC does not rule out for all time either a convention as a means of devising a constitution or negotiations as a means of resolving the crisis. Both believe that one of the urgent issues is to secure the unconditional release of Nelson Mandela and all political prisoners and detainees. Both sides are agreed that the meeting was extremely useful and if necessary would happen again; that is the end of the joint statement. That in elaborating all matter I can say that (...) of this year we in the PFP and I in particular made it clear in parliament that we would seek to negotiate or talk to or discuss with any of the relevant political factors in this country ways of finding a resolution to our crisis and to our conflict that would be of such nature that bloodshed could be avoided or violent confrontation kept down. But it is against this background that we were prepared to talk to anybody including the ANC, also to promote the politics of negotiation. Although we differ and we did differ fundamentally on the question of violence and the armed struggle, the ANC members stressed that for them this was the last resort which was decided upon only when all democratic and constitutional means have been denied them and that as South Africa effectively is dismantled of apartheid and moves towards a genuine democratic constitution, the issue of violence and armed struggle will become increasingly irrelevant. I personally find it a tragedy that we are locked into a circle of escalating violence and we made this quite clear to the ANC and we see it as a tremendous challenge for all of us committed to non-violent change to demonstrate that there is a viable and effective alternative. The ANC insisted that there can be no real negotiation in the form of a convention or something similar as long as the apartheid structures forcing racial and group memberships persists and as long as political leaders are detained in prison. I believe there is a substantial agreement on this across a wide spectrum in South Africa. A conducive climate for negotiations has to be created and this means restoring voluntary association and doing a way with all forms of statutory racial discrimination. I come away encouraged by the fact that although there may be substantial disagreement and even misunderstanding between the major actors in the South African drama, that there are not insurmountable and that the negotiated way, a way from violence and confrontation can be found. However, if all sides define the situation in an all or nothing term, violent confrontation will be inevitable. The first step to avoiding this is not only to destroy apartheid but to bury it good and proper. We also discussed the question of the convention alliance, and it was clear to us that there were some serious misunderstandings on the part of those present as to what we had in mind, we made it clear that this was not a new political party or a rival organisation, but in fact that this was an attempt to bring together movements and organisations who were committed to a non-racial democracy in South Africa and who were opposed apartheid. We also made it clear that such a conventional alliance cannot call a national convention, but can only work towards creating the pre-conditions for such a national convention. And we also made it clear because there were some...eh...some reaction to the fact that Inkhata was involved in such an alliance, we made it quite clear that neither Inkhata, nor the PFP regarded a conventional alliance as an alliance of only these two bodies. I stressed the fact that this was made clear also by chief Minister Buthelezi...eh...that he did not see this as an exclusive movement or organisation. Nevertheless it was clear to us that there were very practical problems that had to be resolved and that they said that they were going to reconsider the situation in the light of the fresh information that have been given and they might review (...) later on. I think those were the most important issues that were raised, but if you want to ask questions you are free to do so.
Report/Interview 26: An interview by Chris Nicklin with Philip Verster, Chairman of the SRC at the University of Stellenbosch, about the withdrawal of the passports of eight Matie students wishing to meet with the ANC Youth Brigade. (Radio Today), broadcast 18/10/1985 (2'03")

Philip Verster:
We first decided that we are continuing our request to the government to reconsider on the fact that they have taken our passports in. We (...) like to continue in our effort to establish dialogue with the ANC Youth Brigade.

Chris Nicklin:
What's the feeling like on campus among lecturers and students about your meeting with the ANC?

Philip Verster:
We have already received notice (...) group of lecturers have sign a petition backing us all the way to continue; among the students we have diverse actions; I believe there is a lot of students against this initiative, but (...) there is a lot of students backing us completely.

Chris Nicklin:
And what's the feeling like about the withdrawal of your passports?

Philip Verster:
We are shocked. I think that would explain everything.

Chris Nicklin:
Just as your passports were withdrawing you said it was a (...) for the half of landers of the Afrikaner Youth to contribute toward a possible improvement of the country's present crisis, how do you think you can contribute to this?

Philip Verster:
Well, I can give you a long statement on that; but I can simply say in one sentence that the vide between the ANC and the Afrikaners has become so wide that only by going we are already contributing to closing this gap.

Chris Nicklin:
But what about the Minister of Home Affairs statement on the matter that it could be ANC's declared aim to bring about change in South Africa through violence and it was in the line with this factor that your passports were withdrawn?

Philip Verster:
Firstly I believe (...) that ANC discussion and dialogue; one group sends convictions (...), try to alter the convictions of another group and one can (...) compromise between the two groups; and I believe this is the initiative that we'd like to (...) the line that we'd like to strike in our discussions; definitely not even enough to think that we can change anything, but we can set a certain standard, we set the preach and start the discussion that can possibly lead to a better situation.
Report/Interview 27: An interview by Pat Rogers with the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Ron Miller on the unrest caused by the University of Stellenbosch students' intended to visit the ANC Youth Wing in Zambia. (Radio RSA), broadcast 18/10/1985 (10'35")

Mr. Ron Miller:
Obviously from the government's attitude (…) part (…) very clear that we are going to very actively discourage people in respect with (…). But (…) as far as students are concerned I don’t neglect (…) harm ridge (…) action, because we are doing this not because that they are students, but because of the interest of South Africa. But this is something which of course has developed because of the attitude of the businessmen and the attitude of the official opposition. And one of the problems with the oppresses of course is that once they start then there is no end of people who want to go up and speak to the ANC, it becomes a sort of a fashionable thing to do.

Pat Rogers:
So you think the government should in fact control any visit to the ANC, if at all?

Mr. Ron Miller:
Yes they’re bad sign, they are bad sign; in fact we are prohibiting visit to the ANC.

Pat Rogers:
You said on television last night that it would be strategically unwise for the students to talk to the ANC at this stage. What did you mean by that?

Mr. Ron Miller:
Well, not only the students but the … any other body such as businessmen and so on. South Africa presently is engaged in a tremendous conflict with the ANC, like an iceberg 90% is not visible to the eye. There is a tremendous battle going on for control of the mine, of the blacks in South Africa and their loyalty and their support. And the ANC is a very well organised, communist organisation and they as you know with the violence in the townships are very active in trying to subvert the whole of South Africa. And the South African government has for a long time been with a counter-action, 90% of which one can’t see with the eye either. And this business of people beating (…) to the ANC (…) is (…) the (…) South Africa effectiveness in terms of each NP – ANC strategy.

Pat Rogers:
So just to get back to the issue of talks from the government point of view, you would not talk to them unless they were not (…)

Mr. Ron Miller:
That’s right yes! You see that is…or they may seem that it’s just a symbolic gesture, the problem with the ANC, its real problem is that it does not want to talk about sharing power, it does not want to talk about participating with other groups in South Africa in governing South Africa. They want to take over power.

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Pat Rogers:
So what about the sentiment within the country at the moment; the leader of the opposition has just spoken to them, should one not listen to this voice of reason as well?

Mr. Ron Miller:
One should certainly listen to people, there is no problem with that particularly (...) kind of the leader of the official opposition. But the leader of the opposition does not have the experience which the government had of many years of ANC activity and what its objectives and strategies are. You know if one speaks to the military or if he speaks to the (...) people, that 90% which is not visible to the eye is horrific and quite trusting.

Pat Rogers:
But as leader of the opposition should he not be kept informed?

Mr. Ron Miller:
Yes, yes the President has often made the offer to the leader of the opposition to come to him or to the government for briefing; and that has happened, and I think the leader of the opposition has a fairly good idea of what is all about.

Report/Interview 28: An interview by Steve Britten with Ron Miller, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, about the students' efforts to have talks with the ANC (Radio Today), broadcast 18/10/1985

Steve Britten: Mr. Miller could I ask you firstly and just briefly whether you accept the motivations and good intentions of the students, leaving aside for the moment the arguments that follow from there.

Ron Miller:
Undoubtedly they were sincere but I think misplaced...eh...intentions.

Steve Britten: Now if in fact they see it as a step towards solving differences by discussion instead of by force, could they (...) argue that if they are old enough to carry arms for their country they are old enough to take that kind of peace initiative.

Ron Miller:
Yes I don’t think the question revolves about the capability so much of the students here as it does the security interests of South Africa. We are essentially at war with the ANC, they are at war with South Africa and we have to defend ourselves. And as the President has said on many occasions negotiation with the ANC will not solve the problem until the ANC itself decides to abandon violence as a means to bringing about change, and that is really what the problem revolves around here, not so much what the students want to discuss with the ANC but the fact that it is not in South Africa’s strategic interest to have these negotiations at present.
Steve Britten: Mr R Miller, is it not very heavy authoritarian action to take to... eh... withdraw or refuse passports to law-abiding citizens of the country?

Ron Miller:

Well when it comes to the security interest of South Africa and in particular the... eh... violent actions which the ANC is executing in South Africa, then I believe one has to act very drastically. But I would like to point out that initially the State President had warned the private sector not to go ahead with the visit to Lusaka to discuss matters with the ANC for very (...) reasons which the president gave that unfortunately the business sector decided to ignore that request from the State President, we asked them to voluntary not... eh... to decide voluntary not to go to Lusaka and they chose to ignore that. Now you know one can only ask so many times and eventually the State had to act in the interest of all the citizens and that has happened now because it is apparent that people are not voluntarily prepared to listen to the advice which we give them.

Steve Britten: I would like to come back to that but first of all if we could look at the timing of this action... eh... we have refused the appeal for clemency for "M" who is going to hang, there have been more factual shootings by the security forces in Cape Town, and now this action all at the time when the Commonwealth government leaders are meeting in the Bahamas to discuss among other things sanctions against South Africa. I think that a lot of people out there thinking (...) again.

Ron Miller:

Yes (...) the timing of the actions such these which I must admit and the government will always admit are drastic actions, are dictated by events and the potential threat to South African security and that is of paramount importance not the political replications as such or their visa taken into very serious consideration will one makes these extremely difficult and delicate decisions. But in the end, the overriding consideration (...) other consequences of not making the decision and we have decided in the case of the students and the contact with the ANC that this very moment it is not in the interest of SA for those negotiation for discussions to go ahead.

Steve Britten: Now if we could look for a moment at the consequences of taking the decision. Have you (...) those Commonwealth government leaders who are going to push for sanctions against South Africa. Do you accept that that is the price you have to pay?

Ron Miller:

Well you know the people who are going to take umbrage for this decision are really the people who are supportive of the ANC strategy for using violence against South Africa in an attempt to bring about a political change here. I think the people who are well informed and understand the position of South Africa and understand our position will in fact not take umbrage at this statement. A number of countries will find themselves in an embarrassing position because of the pressure which will be exerted on them by other countries who don’t have the same understanding. But I’m confident that those people who have South Africa’s
interest at heart will understand the position and will allow their ground against political pressure.

*Steve Britten:* Now I don't know how well informed you think the leader of the opposition is, but he has today described the action as struggling and stupid. Could you comment?

*Ron Miller:*

Well you see, the leader of the opposition himself has been (...) to talk to the ANC for whatever reasons he wants to talk to them; I believe that this attempt to initiate a dialogue with the ANC will eventually rebound on his party and himself. But that is for him to decide the wisdom of that; I make this point out to that the leader of the opposition finds himself in a particular position, he has parliamentary privilege, that is why we were prepared to allow him to go out and talk to the ANC. But that does not pertain to the students from Stellenbosch University.

*Steve Britten:* Now we will get back to the point you made earlier that the PFP has had a delegation go up there, businessmen have had delegation go up there; now why not for them not ok for the students.

*Ron Miller:*

Well in the case of the business community the State President appealed to them to voluntarily decide not to go and visit the ANC for the very sound reasons which the State President gave, namely that it is not in South Africa's strategic interest for these dialogue in context to go on at the moment and not until the ANC in fact (...) violent. There is also a security risk to South Africa with information being given to the ANC which perhaps they should not have, perhaps unintentionally given to them; but nevertheless there is a risk for South Africa.

*Steve Britten:* But why were the businessmen allowed to go? Is this because they are more affluent, more influential lobby?

*Ron Miller:*

No, we had hoped they would decide voluntarily not to go; they then decided to go and in the light of that the State has now taken a very firm stand on future application for passport to go and talk to the ANC.

*Steve Britten:* And has that, Mr. Minister, has that been (...) by the fact that the students represent in a sense Afrikaner domain and the government might be more sensitive about such an approach coming from them?

*Ron Miller:*

No, I don't think that this is the overrunning consideration, maybe one possibility, but it's certainly not the major reason; the major reason has been given in a statement by the Minister of Home Affairs is a (...) contact is a threat to our national security and that is why the government decided not to give it to them.
Steve Britten: And we see this now as a precedent, there will be no more sitting down and talking to the ANC by any other delegation's body or organisations.

Ron Miller:
I think on probability that is correct, yes.

Steve Britten: Now, is that wise if one considers that Mr. Van Zyl Slabbert, Dr. Van Zyl Slabbert for instance has come back from such a meeting saying that he believes on the basis of the meeting that there appears to be some room for manoeuvre, some basis for discussion between the ANC and the government?

Ron Miller:
I doubt (...), I think there is a lot of room for discussion with the ANC; but we cannot engage in that discussion with them until they stand aside from violence; as long as their strategy is to overthrow South Africa by violent means, then the room which there is for discussion, the areas of negotiation which are there are not relevant or valid.

Steve Britten: Mr. Minister, their strategy of violence, is that their first option? Or is that their last resort?

Ron Miller:
It's their present option and in terms of their own perception of South Africa; we say it is not the correct option, we say that there are other avenues available to them immediately. Perhaps avenues which were not there before to come and negotiate with the government in terms of our request for black leaders who represent a constituency to come and tell us what their ideas are about the new political dispensation in which blacks can also participate in decision making process. Then I will be the first to admit that perhaps that avenue was not for the ANC many years ago, but it certainly is there today and the necessity for violence is no longer valid.

Steve Britten: Mr. Minister, one accepts the reservation you make, but if one looks at the practical reality in South Africa that many of the black townships are at flame and the situation there is being controlled if not directly by the ANC, but by their surrogates in spirit. Now can you ignore the reality in any kind of a discussion towards settling the situation in South Africa?

Ron Miller:
Yes I think one has to look at what the ANC is trying to achieve. You know the more successful we are in our reform program in South Africa, the less relevant the ANC and the UDF will become. And it's precisely because we were making strides and we were gaining ground in the reform process that the ANC and the UDF decided to start urban unrest; of course there had willing participants by way of those people who are unemployed, who are angry at the system because of the lack of employment and they then got these people through intimidation to participate in township violence. The truth is that the ANC wants to take over South Africa, that they don't want to share power in South Africa the way we are doing. And the more successful we are the more the ANC is gonna try to disrupt matters
using violence. Now that is the very core of our objection to the ANC. They are not interest in a peaceful solution here, which all people share in political decision-making.

_Steve Britten_: Now you have said the government has said it is prepared to talk to African leaders but they have not in fact come forward and in spite of some suggestions that the ANC represents (...) percent of the black people, other surveys have shown that the percentage is in fact much greater than that. Can you really avoid in the end having to talk to them and isn't it better perhaps with these unofficial bodies, like business...eh...and students and so opening the way for you?

_Ron Miller:_

Well let me come on the first part; first there is the fact that there is intimidation and violence at the moment...eh...undertaken by the UDF and the ANC against leaders who are prepared to work within the system or talk to the government...eh...is causing a problem. It’s not an (...) impediment but it’s a serious practical problem at the moment and we have to (...) the peace and security re-established in the urban areas of South Africa and the black urban areas that leaders legitimately (...) will come forward again. Secondly, you know the problem is...eh...with the ANC, they don't want to talk about the same solution as we do. They want to talk about capitulation by the whites. Mr. Van Zyl really and his group who went to see the ANC in Lusaka will be able to confirm that. And I'm certainly if you talk to Dr. Van Zyl the leader of the opposition (...) he will confirm that the ANC's intent is not to share power but to take power over in South Africa.

_Stevé Britten_: Mr. Ron Miller Thank you for joining us on network.

_Report/Interview32: An interview with the Minister of Manpower, Mr. Piet du Plessis, on the unemployment situation in South Africa. (Radio RSA), broadcast 12/11/1985_

_Mr. Piet du Plessis:_

I am more optimistic about the future than I have been a couple of weeks ago; first of all as you've already...eh...as you may know already we have allocated an additional five hundred million Rands for the creation of jobs on a short term and we want to get that new job out of ground as soon as possible and that in itself will make the substantial contribution to alleviate the unemployment position. As a second point which gives me more hope for the future and which makes me more optimistic is that there are already signs that the expected economic (...) will realise in the near future and as soon as we manage to increase our economic growth rate automatically more jobs will be created and the unemployment problem will lessened.

_RSA:___Mister Minister, how are you going to monitor the all money that you allocated to the individual organisations that are involved in the job creation opportunity?

_Mr. Piet du Plessis:_

Well that is not an easy task indeed. But you know we've allocated the money to different departments and institutions, and they will be responsible for the (...) handling of that money.
We will monitor the spending of that money to the end of the treasury as best as we can. The other institutions like the development bank and the small businesses development corporation they have mechanisms to monitor their expensive. I'm sure that this money is going to be used very fruitfully and because we have already started with job creation programs last year on a very small scale and we have achieved success especially with the training of the unemployed. And as I announced earlier tonight we hope that we could train (...) unemployed through my department and that through the development board we are trying another (...) 70,000 which will only as far as training is concerned they give us a total of more and 200,000 people. Now, we also invited the private sector to come with situations and with skills whereby short terms employment can be created and I am positively sure that the private sector will come forward with very good ideas; and that's a part from the actions of government departments and also municipalities can take part in that and also the provincial administration, and the more all (...) departments and institutions (...) that we will have success in creating a substantial envelop in new jobs.

RS4: Mr. Minister, would you be right promising that the department is really subsiding and alleviating the critical unemployment problem in the country?

Mr. Piet du Plessis:
Well you see, as far as training is concerned, I've already said that we have already achieved success. As a matter of fact we've already trained about 16,000 people. The other departments are in trouble here planning to get those schemes of the ground and I'm absolutely positively sure that in (...) we will definitely have substantial results that will alleviate the unemployment.

Report/Interview 38: An extract of a speech by the State President, Mr. P.W. Botha on the possibility of Black participation in the President's Council, addressing a special plenary session of the President's Council. (Radio RSA), broadcast 15/11/1985

I think the time has come to take a good look at the composition and the functions of the President's Council. (...). The President's Council would like to submit any suggestion or advice concerning this possibility to me. I will welcome it. I've earlier referred to people within and outside the country who are attempting to put the spook in the wheel of the process of reform; I also referred to the fact that the attacks on South Africa are gaining impetus; again I'd like to ask the question: why is it that the campaign to destroy orderly reform is become more severe exactly when the foundations and guidelines for constitutional development in South Africa are being laid? It seems to me that there can only be one answer: there are people (...) South African outside the country for whom orderly reform is a 'sin in the sight' and extremely dangerous. They are endangered by it because what they want to do with this country will not be done if the basis of democracy is broadened in an orderly manner. It poses a threat to them because an orderly and peaceful community leaves no space or opportunity for power addicts to intimidate people. They run a risk with southern Africa's people and nations form a bastion against intervention by forces not well disposed toward us. I believe that the government sustained steps of reform over the past years are
exposing the sinister attempts of these people. We are lifting the veils on the real motives of these people with South Africa that are hidden behind a front of (...) of morality.
Appendix C. Interviews

C. 1: Interview with Dave Overton

Question: From historic point of view what was the purpose of establishing the defunct Radio RSA?

Dave: I think the purpose was, after the establishment of apartheid, I think there was obviously tremendous amount, a lot of criticism about the policy around the world. The South African government at that time wanted from its point of view to correct what was thought as misperceptions. In actual fact what it was doing was sanative something mainly apartheid which was an enormous task to do. Radio RSA’s broadcasts to the world were not overt propaganda. Its news bulletins in terms of what were included, the most important thing is what was left out, was fairly credible. I have spoken to the African National Congress returnees from exile who told me they listened to the bulletins and actually said although there was no news positive about the African National Congress, they were able to get a fair idea of what was happening in South Africa and the whole world. As far as what was left out we are now hearing through the “Truth and Reconciliation Commission” the sort of things that were done by the apartheid government, like the arrests, torture, secret killings - obviously these were not broadcast by Radio South Africa (RSA), nobody in South Africa knew about this until it was revealed.

Question: How was Radio RSA administered? What would you say about the style of management during the life span of Radio RSA? Could you also tell us about how it was funded?

Radio RSA was always funded by foreign affairs department. It was a project of Foreign Affairs basically. The budget was provided to the South African Broadcasting Corporation, and they administered it. I think we need to look at the SABC when we talk about Radio RSA, because that management style was pervasive throughout the SABC. We know that most of top members or top management were members of a secret Afrikaner pro-government Broederbond. It is certain that the top management of Radio RSA were also Broederbond. It was an open secret that if you are not a member of that organisation, you would reach a certain level where you would reach the ceiling. So the style of management of Radio RSA should be seen in the context of SABC as a whole. Radio RSA was part and parcel of SABC in terms of its management.

Question: Let us talk about the recruitment policy on staff and languages broadcast.

Well I have never been part to the criteria used. I know that they recruited people from a number of overseas countries and from within Africa. So there were a number of foreigners working for Radio RSA. I don’t think these people were politicised. They were journalists who just wanted to do their work.

Question: Lets talk about the content. What kind of programmes was beamed to Africa and the world, and how many languages were catered for?

Let us start with the most controversial programme which was the ‘comment’. Radio RSA never produced comments of its own. These were all written by SABC’s own commentary section and were distributed throughout all SABC. Radio RSA was one of the many customers who received and was told to broadcast them immediately after the news bulletins.
It was not Radio RSA staff who wrote the commentary. There was unhappiness among Radio RSA staff about some of the more tendentious commentaries. If one would examine the old log books, one would see comments criticizing the ‘Comment’ as “unacceptable, propagandistic and slanted”. Around about 1992 when South Africa began its reform programme, SABC closed down the commentary section. And these comments were not available to Radio RSA. As far as programme material was concerned (a number of programmes, medical type programmes, listeners programmes, development programmes and, as far as I can remember) there was no propaganda in it. It was informative, educative and no propaganda. Where there was a slanting there was a more slanting in news and programmes of omission rather than commission. There was nothing positive about any liberation movements. There was no revelation of actually what was going on in terms of reality on the ground with military cross border type operations like what was happening in Angola. This soft reporting was very sketchy and skimpy reporting. But this was an era of censorship; we never got the truth of what was happening. As far as I can recall, South African troops had gone into Angola. Everybody else in the world knew that South Africa had gone into Angola, but South Africa denied this. This is the kind of credibility gap by omission that resulted. So it was rather propaganda by not telling rather than overt propaganda. There was the real propaganda but that was not the real substance of it.

Question: Since the Voice of South Africa was funded by Foreign affairs department was there any editorial independence by the station if so to what extent?

Foreign affairs department did not interfere with editorial independence of Radio RSA. Executive Editors liaised with the department of Foreign Affairs to find out what their priorities were. I never heard of anything about overt instructions that you do this from Foreign Affairs department.

Question: What kind of response did Radio RSA receive, since during this period African governments did not want to talk to the Apartheid government in South Africa?

Quite a big element in the broadcasting strategy was to have competitions, prizes given. There was an effort to engage listeners to encourage them to write back into the competition. So there was definitely a large number of letters that were received. I seem to recall there was an estimated figure of 15 million letters received from around the world. This kind of figures worked out according to a formula based on a number of letters received by an international broadcast. Subsequently one of our Executive Editors claimed that because there was an element of people writing for prizes, this could have distorted the listenership figure. But even well known world broadcasters have said that trying to get continental figure in Africa is actually an estimate on a regional basis.

Question: What sort of competition did Radio RSA give to other international radio stations?

Radio RSA’s successor, Channel Africa, round about 1996: one of the British Broadcasting Corporation’s commentators said Channel Africa KiSwahili service was giving the BBC a run for its money in East Africa. That was freely admittance. Whether or not, Radio RSA was very competitive, I wouldn’t know. There were letters that were received from all over the world. I recall people writing from as far a field as from South America, North America and India. Radio RSA targeted Australasia and one listener in North America wrote to say he picked Radio RSA in his car when he was driving back from work. So there were so many letters from listeners from all over the world. Yes it had a far reach.
Question: What prompted Radio RSA to change to Channel Africa?

I think the powers that have been in place at that time change. The National Party government was still in power but it gave up power officially just as 1994 election was held. There was an interim power sharing transitional arrangement, but it was officially a government until after 1994 elections.

In 1992 the National party saw the writing on the wall and it prodded the SABC to put its house in order. There was a transformation process which was initiated in the whole of SABC about the year 1992, whereby retirement packages were offered to people who could not identify with the new order - a lot of people left SABC and Channel Africa. Channel Africa held its transformation process, whereby an outside consultant was brought in to facilitate the process. Staff and management were asked for their input on how they saw the new Channel Africa. Its mission and vision statements were developed. The whole question of restructuring and reducing the pyramid structure was addressed and a much flatter structure was developed. It was a great period of change. I personally was very pleasantly surprised as there was not a lot of conflict because of the use of an outsider facilitator. If it were not for this there would have been a lot of conflict, people jostling for positions and infighting - however, that was all avoided.

The Head of Radio division then Govin Reddy commented that Channel Africa transformation was way ahead of the restructuring of the SABC. The target had been in SABC to rectify various historic imbalances in terms of the make up of staff. There were certainly not many black staff members in terms of overall population and they set certain targets over a number of years to change the status quo. Channel Africa was way ahead of that, so there was genuine and thorough out transformation at Channel Africa. The only problem with Channel Africa was that after the last Executive Editor who had been an incumbent during the apartheid era left, the Executive Editors’ office was like a revolving door. There was numerous acting Executive Editors some of them acting for a few months some of them unempowered because they couldn’t make any policy decision. This sort of things went on and when we got an Executive Editor, the man was dismissed within a year, and another acting person came in and this fostered a culture of uncertainty.

Question: In your view what did Radio RSA achieve as far as its mandate was concerned?

Well I think that it did not strive to be a visibly propagandistic station. It tried to present facts but they were limited set of facts. Propaganda was perpetuated by omission. Never the less one could get an idea of what was going on in the world. Radio RSA carried world news and to a certain extent what was going on in South Africa. The whole question of what the liberation movements were doing was ignored. It was illegal to quote what they called a banned person and most of the people in the liberation movements were banned people and as such they could not be quoted. If for example Oliver Tambo made a statement in Stockholm and the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) and Voice of America (VOA) carried that story, Radio RSA could not carry it because Oliver Tambo was a banned person. Carrying that story would be prosecuted. So there was a huge area in which Radio RSA did not operate, that actually created credibility gap. But within the limits of what it did cover it was, in the words of returnee exiles, “a source of news worth listening to”. Radio RSA had supporters in North America and Europe among various conservative people who were pro-South Africa, but clearly one would question wasn’t this really carrying the past to New Castle to people who are already converted?
Question: What are the new challenges being faced by International Radio Broadcasting?

Well one needs to cast one’s mind back to the late 1980s when the cold war ended. Every single International Radio broadcaster found itself in crisis. The whole purpose of the international broadcasting was propagandistic, and there was no gain saying about that. The Voice of America had Radio Free Europe which was beamed to former Soviet Union because it was purely a propagandistic radio station, Radio Moscow, Radio Peking and Radio Tirana were doing the same thing in reverse. All of a sudden when the cold war ended, the question had to be asked what are we going to do now? I know that the Voice of America actually thought of closing down. There was a mad scramble to try to find new mission and vision statements. And basically as far as the West was concerned, was to say well, we believe in advancing the principles of democratisation and human rights, development and openness that sort of thing; so this became the new mission for International broadcasting. But the problem was because International broadcasting was seen as a strategic weapon in the cold war and at that point there was plenty of money available for that, they were competing against their counterparts in the Eastern block, all of a sudden it was no longer regarded as all important, strategic.

It is well you know to advance democratisation but that is not the same as dealing with a perceived enemy, so the funds started drying up, and Radio Canada International did a number of feasibility studies early 1990s to try to find ways funding itself through advertising on shortwave but it did not work. All International broadcasters are still under pressure and there is no doubt about that. So we need to try and be imaginative and find out whether there are ways we can reduce government commitment to at least demonstrate to government that we are doing something to actually alleviate the burden on the taxpayers. There is no historical example for a self-funding International broadcaster. The government has to look at it and say is it actually delivering value? If it is it has got to have the lion’s share of the budget. I believe that South Africa is no exception. This is a strategic decision which has to be made I frankly think that the government is getting great value for Channel Africa. Channel Africa’s budget is far too less as compared to other International Radio budgets. And it is doing a huge job in Africa and it is the only Broadcasting station which broadcast from Africa to Africa and can address issues that are thought through an African consciousness. There are other broadcasters that broadcast to Africa but they have always to think in terms of how is the host country going to react to what has been said. There are certain issues that are coloured by perceptions at home and these are definitely western perceptions (We are superior and we know best what they need). So Channel Africa can perform a very valuable role. If we were to cease broadcasting Africans would have to accept broadcasts from other countries telling them how they saw Africa and not how Africans see Africa.
C.2. interview with Brent Wilkinson

1) Radio RSA was established to act as a foil against the ANC's Freedom Radio, and to overcome communications sanctions against South Africa. The title "The Voice of South Africa" was not an accident but a very apt description of the station. South Africa's point of view and angle of reality on what was happening in the country and on its borders was not being heard by ex-South Africans, and influential business and political elements across the globe. It also had a major role to play in informing South African embassy staff on what was the South African position on events and actions. To camouflage the propagandistic nature of Radio RSA's news, neutral programmes on health, science, nature and others were used to send non-political news to the world.

2) Dr Verwoerd's statement was very "forward looking". He captured what Radio RSA had to evolve into. No listener will continue to listen to absolute propaganda with little hold on actual events. Thus the station had to be given the opportunity to describe actual events and actions that were sometimes banned or withheld in South Africa itself, the propaganda came in the angle of reporting such events and actions. In other words, the truth was not withheld only angled in a certain direction. "Disseminate the truth" being the edge of the sword.

3) The station was administered in an unusual way. It was sponsored by the Foreign Affairs department but under an act by Parliament, it was administered by the South African Broadcasting Corporation. Thus it could not be said to be a direct wing of Foreign Affairs, but part of the Public Broadcaster. Autonomy was limited to Editorial policy, and even that was put under the strain of SABC observation. Money was no object, but the adherence to budget was enforced by the SABC.

4) The recruitment policy was very interesting. The English service was, of course, very South African, but the other languages were run by personal from the areas of the world that spoke the language. This helped in several ways. In several instances those people were known by the listeners they were aiming at. Yet the SABC/Foreign Affairs department had a hold on these staffers, with the possible threat of deportation always present to keep them in check. Thorough security checks were done on all staff.

5) As was said previously, besides news programmes there were a cluster of other documentary, and entertainment styled programmes. The idea was to uniquely capture listeners with entertainment and knowledge while quietly giving them a South African angle on latest news events. The languages followed the countries of interest to South African politicians and businessmen, e.g. Spanish, German, French, Hebrew, English, and Mandarin, to name a few.

It is strange to say, but there was editorial independence in Radio RSA. From the outset, Foreign Affairs admitted not to be broadcaster, and left the station very much to itself, only asking for extensive coverage of South African politicians and their travels around the world. The SABC had some editorial control, but was given the message that as an external broadcaster, Radio RSA had to say more than the national broadcaster in order to have some credibility with the listeners.
7) The professional way Radio RSA was set-up and did its work, meant that it quickly established itself as a global player, even if many of its listeners new that it performed a devious propagandistic role for the South African government. Even members of "Freedom Radio" had to comment on its professionalism.

8) The reason for its popularity is that it was professional, presented much worthwhile information, and gave unique and varied information about many things, all with an African flavour.

9) The station achieved its mandate of getting South Africa’s (the government’s) viewpoint across the globe, while showing the world that there was more to the country than apartheid. The government was happy and so were the listeners.

10) The transformation from Radio RSA to Channel Africa was the only option. After apartheid, the station –which now had an international name- needed a mission. It was no longer needed for Propaganda. By using brain-storming sessions, it was indicated that one of the major challengers facing the new South Africa was its re-emergence into the African family. It was realised that the station could play a big part in that regard, together with the view that Africa was seen both within and out through western eyes, and not African eyes. Channel Africa could afford a unique perspective of the continent along the lines of the African Renaissance. A third motive was that the new station might be able to create some of its budget through sponsorship and advertising due to its unique position on the continent.

11) The main challenge facing International Radio Broadcasting comes in the form of technology: the Internet, satellites, computers, television etc. Shortwave has a limited lifespan, and the new technology means that there is more information available to everyone. As it gets easier and easier to get information about anything, so international broadcasters will have to look at acting as wholesale broadcasters and not news initiators.
C.3.: Interview with Tony Machilika

As a non-South African working for Radio RSA which had the reputation of being no more than 'a mouthpiece' of the Foreign Affairs department during apartheid and most importantly during the 'State of Emergency' (1985 – 1990) in its efforts to win the hearts and minds of people in Africa and around the world, how did you explain back home what you were doing?

Answer: I am no politician and therefore there was no explanation except to say I was working.

On the 26th September 1968, president Kaunda of Zambia declared: "Mr Voster you can broadcast until doomsday, but you will not change our stand..." (RDM, 26.09.1968). What could such a declaration do to you as a professional/journalist knowing that there were people out there strongly opposed to your radio policy?

Answer: It is very interesting to note that not everybody subscribes to what is said on radio. You will find people who will accept what they hear and those that oppose.

What was your relationship with the editor, the Minister of information or the Bureau of information? In other words, how far the National Party government and the ruling class could intervene in your work as journalist at Radio RSA?

Answer: Every External service has guidelines to follow. Whatever is the case national interest is always the first priority.

Studies on ideology present this concept as a mental framework which guides ("unconsciously") the way we view and report on reality, the way we believe and relate to the world around us. How deep was your awareness of the 'hidden hand' behind the radio policy? Were you aware of what was going on in newsroom, who was deciding on what?

Answer: The newsroom was run just like any other newsroom of any External Service. However what was at heart at that time was to send messages of goodwill and understanding to the World in the interest of the then government.

On the 21st July 1985, the National Party government declared a partial "State of Emergency" (affecting 36 magisterial districts in South Africa). The recordings on Radio RSA's news reports during this period do not explicitly mention this event. What was the radio policy in regard to the declaration of the State of Emergency? Was the silence (omission) adopted deliberately to preserve the image of South Africa abroad?

Answer: Radio RSA tried to present facts but they were limited facts. Its propaganda was perpetuated by the very omission or the silence you have indicated in your question. As the whole idea was to send a message of goodwill and understanding to the world no listener would continue to listen to absolute propaganda with little hold on actual events. Thus the station had to be given the opportunity to describe actual events and actions that were
sometimes banned or withheld in South Africa itself. The propaganda came in the angle of reporting such events and actions.

Talking about the content of Radio RSA. What kind of programmes was beamed to Africa and to the World?

Answer: The ‘Comment’ was the most controversial of the programmes of Radio RSA. However take note that these ‘Comments’ were note written by employees of Radio RSA. They were written by SABC’s commentary section, and were distributed throughout SABC. Radio RSA was one of the many customers who received the Comments and read them on its radio after the news bulletins. Most staff members of Radio RSA did not like the commentaries as they saw them as being propagandistic and slanted. Apart from the commentary, there were entertainment programmes, Tourism and other developmental programmes that were featured. The whole idea was to capture listeners with entertainment and knowledge, while quietly programmes giving them a South African angle on the latest news events. The languages that Radio RSA used followed the countries of interest to South Africa then, e.g. Spanish, German, French, Portuguese, Dutch these are European languages and Kiswahili, Chinyanja, Lozi, Tsonga were the African languages.

Being in the media for quite a long time, can you say something about the significance of external radio as a propaganda tool?

Answer: The World Service of the BBC was established with the objective of among other things “to be the world’s best known and most respected voice in international broadcasting, thereby bringing benefit to Britain. In South Africa, remember there was the apartheid government with its policies of separate development. I believe there was a lot of criticism around the world on this policy. The South African government then established Radio RSA so as to give its point of view to the world. Radio RSA broadcasts to the World were not overt propaganda. Its news bulletins in terms of what was included, the most important thing is what was left out, was fairly credible. The message was to send goodwill and understanding of the government policy, which every external service does like Britain’s World service. Any government which runs an externals service has national interest at heart.