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Development Communication and the Paradox of Choice:
Imposition and dictatorship in comparing Sámi and the SanBushmen
experiences of cultural autonomy.

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Declaration

I hereby declare that the following thesis is my own work and has not been submitted to any other university for examination.

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Durban 10.6.2006
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My sincere gratitude goes also to the members of the Gwi and Gana Bushmen of the Central Kalahari Game Reserve for welcoming us into their community.

My best friend and other half, Nayang, I cannot thank you enough for all your support and help. The same has to be mentioned about my family in Norway, without whose constant understanding and contribution, this thesis could not have been accomplished.

 Were the Sámi’s the aggressors?
Drawing by Robert Wilhelm Ekman in 1849
Reprinted many times, even in a schoolbook
that was used until a few decades ago.
Abstract.

This research project examines the relevance of Kenneth Arrow’s (1951) Impossibility Theorem as a criterion for assessing post-modern critical approaches to development media theories (Servaes, 2002; Melkote and Steeves, 2000). Comparing two distinct indigenous minorities’ experiences with struggles for cultural autonomy, those of Norway’s Sámi and Botswana’s Basarwa, it was found that the media discourses used by NGOs frequently exploit a narrative that validly permits development to be treated as a species of social welfare implementation. Applying Arrow’s (1951) conditions for the democratic summation of diverse preferences, and treating cultural, political, and civil society groups as ‘voters’, it was found that indigenous minority concerns may be best accommodated by linking them to broader issues that exploit historical ties between peoples, with a special emphasis on episodes that have led to coordination in achieving independent ends. Popular memories of such coordination appear to moderate relations between minorities and their national co-habitants, reducing the need for radicalization of indigenous issues and smoothing the path to autonomy.
## Glossary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Basarwa</td>
<td>Official name for several indigenous San groups in Botswana.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKGR</td>
<td>Central Kalahari Game Reserve, Botswana.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ditshwanelo</td>
<td>Botswana Centre for Human Rights.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ETA</td>
<td>Euskadi ta Askatasuna - a terrorist organization organized in 1959 by student activists who were dissatisfied with the moderate nationalism of the traditional Basque party; want to create on independent homeland in Spain's western Pyrenees.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FPK</td>
<td>First People of Kalahari also called “Kgeikani Kweni” by Basarwa.</td>
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<tr>
<td>ILO</td>
<td>International Labour Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRA</td>
<td>Irish Republican Army - a militant organization of Irish nationalists who used terrorism and guerrilla warfare in an effort to drive British forces from Northern Ireland and achieve a united independent Ireland.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nissan Sani</td>
<td>4X4, South African assembled vehicle.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organization.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEPAD</td>
<td>The New Partnership for Africa's Development.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NRF</td>
<td>National Research Foundation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAD</td>
<td>Remote Area Dwellers (SanBushmen of CKGR).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ramsar</td>
<td>The Convention on Wetlands – an intergovernmental treaty which provides the framework for national action and international cooperation for the conservation and wise use of wetlands and their resources. Adopted in the Iranian city of Ramsar in 1971.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sámi</td>
<td>Indigenous group in Scandinavia and North West Russia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SI</td>
<td>Survival International (UK-based non-governmental organization).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWF</td>
<td>Social Welfare Function. To be distinguished from a social welfare choice and a social welfare decision.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TC</td>
<td>Time Code. Time marker information on recorded Digital Tapes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WIMSA</td>
<td>Working Group of Indigenous Minorities in Southern Africa.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>≠Khomeni</td>
<td>Indigenous group (Bushmen) in South Africa.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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I. Introduction.

Minority: a culturally, ethnically, or racially distinct group living within a larger society. When used to describe such a group, the term carries with it a web of political and social implications. (Encyclopædia Britannica)

From my grandmother, I first got to hear stories about a nomadic people living on the tundra among dangerous animals as well as under conditions of extreme Arctic weather. Then as a little boy watching Jamie Uys’s much-criticized film The Gods Must Be Crazy, I understood there was another indigenous group facing problems and struggles of a kind different than my grandmother’s people – the Sámi. The film portrayed the Bushmen as far away from civilization. I remember it looked peaceful compared to my people’s situation, in the middle of a campaign against the construction of a hydro-electric dam (see below). Although heavily criticized, and often stereotyped as an example of bad film-making (cf. e.g., Tomaselli, 1996), this film in fact sparked my interest in other indigenous groups around the world. It follows that the present thesis begins from a position that is based on the experience of myself being from an indigenous group.

My first working experience with the Bushmen of Botswana took place as an assistant to a Masters student who conducted her research in Inalegolo, Botswana, among the Tshase people (or Basarwa). Later, my own research took me to Botswana’s Okavango Delta, where my observations sharpened the desire to investigate further. However, due to recent political events in Botswana (see later), this project is not what I thought it was going to be after I left the Central Kalahari Game Reserve (CKGR), the area upon which this research is based. My research assistant requested me not to use her name, neither her recorded voice, nor her image in this report, for fear of repercussions related to these occurrences. Additional data was also collected during June 2005 at the “Midnight Sun Conference” in Sommaroy, Tromsø, Norway about indigenous law and the Sámi people, as well as other indigenous people’s rights. In this respect, I had to produce this paper without the photographs or first-hand comments I originally wanted to use, in addition to changing my angle of investigation. By the same token, all dates are left out to be sure that sources are protected.

The present research tests the idea that development theories, whether of the modernization or participatory kind, overlook the necessity for beneficiary communities to have already developed both (1) a habit of ordering their perceived options into preference rankings (Arrow, 1951); and (2) possessing sufficient internal diversity for at least some individuals to be indifferent about one or more options available to the community at large. Both these conditions for development, as it were, are based on Amartya Sen’s (1981) approach to socio-economic breakdown. In seeking to provide better analytical methods for understanding the kinds of breakdown that lead to massive deprivation
in the form of famines, Sen develops and tests the concept of *entitlement* (Sen, 1981: 45-51). This in turn depends on a logical relation between *command* and *endowment*, such that the conditions for famines, or *deprivation* in general, arise from social or political relations that affect either the command, or the endowments, or both, of an identifiable section of a national population.

This is of special relevance when considering the case of Botswana. Long proclaimed as a “shining beacon” of liberal democracy in Africa, events inside the country often contradict this perception. During the field research for this project, we encountered widespread deprivation, even starvation, among the Bushmen communities visited. As Kenneth Good (2003: 22) has remarked, “ethnic minorities in the country are increasingly critical of the established ‘TswanaTswana’ … and their inferior position within the supposedly ‘homogeneous society.’” The presence of a liberal constitutional dispensation, with a commitment to market principles for the economy, does not seem to guarantee democracy in a practical sense. This was recognized by Kenneth Arrow, as far back as 1951, who used the analogy between personality integration and social integration to compare methods of aggregating social preferences: “[t]he formal existence of methods of aggregating individual preferences … is certainly a necessary condition for an integrated society. … but whether the existence of such methods is sufficient or even forms an important part of the sufficient condition for integration is dubious” (Arrow, 1951: 2, n.2). Indeed, Arrow receives little attention from theorists in visual anthropology, cultural studies, and development studies. It was only by following up Sen’s numerous references to Arrow as a source in welfare economics that directed me to the work of Arnold Shepperson, a PhD student in the University of KwaZulu-Natal’s Philosophy department, who showed me the decisive concepts of imposition and dictatorship that brought a semblance of order to the confused data gathered from the field.

Arrow’s work makes it possible to develop a rigorous qualitative methodology, building on a mathematical foundation that is *ordinal,* but not *cardinal.* The rationality of this approach is relational and not computational. In this way the researcher can avoid the *a priori* need to assign values to choices, as happens in game theory, for example (see Lewis, 1968), or to assume that it is possible to assign cardinal values to wholly emotional experiences like happiness or pain, that are indifferent to the diversity of individual circumstances and preferences (Arrow, 1951: 9). Analysing samples of auto-ethnographic data in which subjects express preference rankings thus avoids the pitfalls of the researcher having to assign values prior to further analysis. People’s declared orderings of preferences *are* the data and any prior (mis)conceptions in research design are thereby avoided.

In pursuing this project, I have employed the methods of
(1) auto-ethnographic elicitation, using subject-communities’ own construal of their conditions and origins as primary data and as a source of analysis;

(2) reflexive analysis of the relation between researcher and subject-community, taking special note of the common political environments of indigeneity within, and the very notable distinctions between, my own context and that of the subject-community; and

(3) logical and phenomenological (i.e. phaneroscopic, see Tomaselli 1997) interpretation of the key concepts of development. The original hypothesis for the research was developed from theories of media (Siebert, Lerner and Schramm, 1956), diffusion research (Rogers, 1995), and social welfare economics (Arrow, 1951).

In what follows, Section II compares the historical and cultural conditions of the San people who occupy – or recently did occupy – the Central Kalahari Game Reserve in Botswana, with those of the ten groups of Sámi people who live across my home country, Norway, as well as parts of Sweden, Finland, and Russia. The present paper attends only to the Norwegian or Finnmark Sámi, largely because giving added attention to the national indigenous minorities policies of Sweden, Finland, and Russia would have left the thesis more complex than was necessary for the project to hand.

Section III relates the present conditions of these populations to recent political, governmental, and communicational relations and events that led up to the present wide disparity between them. The ways that different actors have used the media in each situation is used to focus the different qualities of relation that have evolved in each relevant situation. The very different developmental paths that each population appears to have followed may call into doubt the comparability of such populations. Indeed, whether either strictly conforms to the definition of an ‘indigenous minority’ at all is an outstanding question. The discussion in Section III proceeds on the basis that other actors (Governmental, Non-governmental, and academic) in both situations almost universally consider both Sámi and San as conforming to the definitions used in the International Labour Organization Convention Number 169 (1989). The section concludes with a brief review of different research perspectives on the general relation between development communication and practice, and the theoretical and ideological debates (if not, polemics) that accompany these perspectives.

Section IV narrows the dissertation’s focus onto the various roles that have been ascribed to communication and media in the context of development. These roles are first reviewed historically, after initially introducing the general problem of development. The four normative theories of the press (Siebert, Peterson and Schramm, 1956), in this Section frame a number of alternatives linking media to development. This is done to indicate how even the most critical of those who sought to replace the somewhat ideologically grounded theory that Siebert et al (1956) had produced,
themselves are as normative in their approach if not as rooted in Cold War discourses (Servaes, 2002; Melkote and Steeves, 2001; McQuail, 2000). In concluding Section IV, it is indicated that all theories of media and the press subscribe to a greater or lesser extent to most of the values originally enshrined in Siebert et al (1956).

Section V revises the earlier discussion to argue that all the major theories used in media and development communication research espouse what is essentially a form of social state that is validly definable in welfare terms, and in relation to which underdevelopment (and development failures) may be analysed in terms of Amartya Sen’s (1981) analysis of famine and deprivation. However, Kenneth Arrow’s (1951) definitive logical analysis of social welfare – his celebrated ‘Impossibility Theorem’ – shows that the attempt to bring greater participatory democratic methods into development planning and implementation may be subject to the same conundrum he found in respect of social welfare: development dispensations that are fair or logical can only be accomplished by imposition or dictatorship, respectively. To accommodate the post-Cold War objections to earlier concepts of development, and the fact that these seem to have failed to account for the unique cultural and traditional forms of practice and knowledge in the beneficiary communities of development programmes, I develop a definition of Cultural State that restates Arrow’s definition of a social state. I suggest that even if one examines ‘beneficiaries’ preferences in cultural as opposed to economic terms, policy may still be subject to Arrow’s Impossibility conditions.

Section VI then sets out an abbreviated formal introduction to Arrow’s (1951) Impossibility Result, stressing the importance of (i) the weak ordering relation (signified R) for its granting equal logical weight to both preference and to indifference; and (ii) the Quasi-ordering relation, Q, for its role as a cycling majority breaking function. The largely innocuous-seeming conditions that Arrow developed in order to relate social welfare to a more or less general conception of free societies are discussed in some detail. These discussions lead to the main analysis carried out in Section VII: that the logical and philosophical foundations of modern political, Humanities, and social science thinking, as developed from Scholastic Nominalism, preclude the possibility of development without imposition or dictatorship. I use the comparative relations to theories of development of the Sámi and the San to show that (i) the development of indigenous minorities proceeds well if there is some record and experience of co-ordination between minority communities and their co-citizens in acting against hazards or dangers common to both; and (ii) that the role of `civil society’ organizations – using the examples of Greenpeace and of Survival International in relation to the Sámi and the San respectively – encourages dictated solutions that often fail to satisfy the indigenes. Section VIII discusses these findings further in the light of Arrow’s conditions for the making of free choices in a
context of change. The status of various state, civil-society, community, and corporate actors in the CKGR development environment is analysed in relation to the issue of indigenous peoples’ concerns, alongside comparable developments in Norway.

This study concludes in Section IX with some considerations concerning subsequent research possibilities that account for the issues found in both Sen and Arrow, as these affect commonly used development anthropology models, theories, and methods. At the same time, these same issues can be found in media and cultural studies and subjected to comparable revisions in accounting for them. In brief, it may be that democracy is a consequence of development, in contrast with the doctrines espoused by both progressive and conservative actors in the globalization debate; neither question the convention that democracy comes first, each merely argues for a different model of democracy (Servaes, 2002; Kerr, 2003; Riker, 1982; see also Giddens, 1989, and Habermas 1987). It should be noted that I use the term `development` very broadly, to mean that process, sometimes planned but more frequently ad hoc, whereby diverse relatively simple communities come to co-ordinate their interactions towards some goals that are necessarily more complex than those they traditionally held to be their own. In the case of European industrial development, for example, the evidence indicates, however, that over a relatively short period of development, there arise the conditions for democracy within which true progressive development can be realized (Kemp, 1985; Chadwick, 1975).

II. Indigenous Diversity: Scandinavia’s Sámi and Botswana’s Basarwa.

Sámi: Any of the descendants of ancient nomadic peoples who inhabited northern Scandinavia. *(Encyclopædia Britannica)*

San: Also called Bushmen an indigenous people of southern Africa, related to the Khoekhoe (Khoikhoi). They live chiefly in Botswana, Namibia, and south-eastern Angola. *(Encyclopædia Britannica).*

The ten Sámi groups inhabit three of the Scandinavian countries and north-western Russia (Figure 1). The *Germania* (AD 98) of Tacitus contains the earliest mention of the Sámi by a European historian. Of the early Scandinavian sources, the most prominent is Otere’s story of English King Alfred (AD 890 *(Cultural Profiles)*). The distribution shown is based on the disposition of the language groups, the largest of which, the DavviSámi (North Sámi), is shown in dark green. The smallest group, shown in red, are the TerSámi, whose language is very nearly extinct. The Sámi are a minority throughout almost the whole of the area they inhabit, with the exception of the municipalities Kautokeino and Karasjok in Norway and Utsjoki in Finland (Eriksson 1997:24).
Throughout Scandinavia, Sámi are found outside the traditional areas shown in Figure 1, because of recent urbanization (including the search for work) and earlier colonization processes in which the Sámi people were forced north of their homeland. A significant part of the Sámi population resides outside core area in major cities like Stockholm and Oslo: “There's a joke among the Sámi's that Oslo is the largest Sámi colony in the world” (*The Sámi Homeland*).

![Map of Sámi distribution across Scandinavia](image)

**Legend**
- Red: TerSámi: Very small group. Language nearly extinct.
- Light orange: Királi Sámi: Culturally strong.
- Orange: Skolt Sámi: Small, reclusive forest culture, language endangered, strong traditions.
- Yellow: Enare Sámi: Small, culturally similar to north Sámi, the dialect is in common with Skolt language.
- Dark green: Davvi or North Sámi: Largest Sámi group, with many speakers of the language, strong cultural traditions in areas like hunting and handicraft, several indigenous-language newspapers and daily radio broadcasts through public service radio channels.
- Violet: Sea Sámi: Own language, small in number.
- Medium bluegreen: LuleSámi: Mountain and Forest culture (Norway and Sweden), with language strong locally.
- Light blue: PiteSámi: Small non- or semi-nomadic culture, language on the brink of extinction.
- Blue: UmeSámi: Culturally strong mountain subgroup of SouthSámi in Swedish Lapland and Mid-northern Norway. Several educational facilities in Norway.
- Dark blue: Aŋel or SouthSámi: Culturally and linguistically strong in Norway, but endangered in Sweden.

As in the case of Botswana’s Basarwa, providing exact statistics on the size of the Sámi population poses methodological problems.

This follows earlier nation state policies of assimilation and repression of the indigenous minorities. However, it is estimated that 5,000-6,500 Sámi live in Finland, 17,000-20,000 in Sweden, about 2,000 in Russia and 40,000-45,000 in Norway. Just less than 10% of the Sámi are engaged in reindeer herding. Parts of the Sámi population gain their livelihood from agriculture, fishing and wilderness industries while many Sámi are employed in the general labour market. (Myrvoll 1999: 11).

The policies of the Nordic states towards the Sámi, from the 19th century until after World War II, were based on assimilation. This meant that the Sámi were expected to replace their own cultural characteristics and language with those of the majority culture. Sámi culture and language, and their perceived traditional economy, were considered obstacles to the consolidation and social development of the national states formed from the earlier Swedish and Danish Kingdoms, Norway attaining independent statehood in 1905. Based on a variant of social Darwinism, this policy led to the Norwegian authorities introducing “reforms that restricted the use of the Sámi language in
schools and forbad (sic) the sale of land to people that could not speak Norwegian. The Sámi culture was oppressed and the people `Norwegianized’’ (Kinsten, 2000), as well as many Sámi lost their language during this period due to the assimilation policy (Minde, 1995; Oskal, 1998; The Sami Homeland).

After 1945, there was a new wave of Sámi mobilisation, this time through the establishment of national Sámi organizations, beginning in Sweden in the 1950s and 1960s. ¹ By 1973, an elected Sámi Parliament was established in Finland. “In Norway, a major change occurred in public opinion about the Sámi situation during the conflict between the Sámi and the Norwegian state over the construction of the Alta/Kautokeino dam” (Magga 1994:43). This hydro power dam was planned and constructed in 1979-1981, in the heart of Sámi territory and created a political crisis due to massive demonstrations from environmental organisations and the Sámi people (including a hunger strike). Archaeological researchers from the University of Tromsø had discovered ancient Sámi rock paintings in the Alta River valley and led the campaign to preserve them from being covered by the proposed dam’s waters (Hood, 1996). The conflict engaged most of the Norwegian population as well as newspapers and TV stations from all over the world whereby the demonstrators actively used the international media during this period to argue for their opinion. This construction was, and still is an important symbol for both the environmental interests in Norway and for the rights of the Sámi population (Minde, 1995; Josefsen, 2003).

However, their arguments were not efficient enough to stop the construction. Today you can see the 110-meter high dam; however, although the “actors lost the case … in many ways they won the future” (Myrvoll, 1999: 12). Yet the campaign for preservation of the rock paintings drew a compromise from the state, in that the dam wall was constructed about 400 metres upstream (see Figure 3) from its originally planned location so that the Alta Valley paintings would not be drowned. The Alta-conflict, with the active help of media, stated some important principles regarding the rights of Norwegian Sámi people. A Sámi Parliament was established in 1989 to recognise their rights, and today one can even see bilingual signboards, both inside buildings and in open public spaces like roads. In sum, the controversy directed much attention to the Sámi fight for their own rights and the legitimacy of the Norwegian authorities which all together improved the political climate for raising Sámi issues (Magga 1994:49).

The Basarwa are commonly understood to be the first inhabitants of present day Botswana, and base their claim to the indigenous first peoples of Botswana on this. Historically organised in nomadic

¹ Post-War Norwegian Sámi mobilization begins in 1948, with the foundation of Sámi Reindeer Herders Association. Later groups include the National Association of Norwegian Sámi in 1968, and in 1979 the Norwegian Sámi Union was established in response to the ongoing Alta protest action (Josefsen, 2003).
bands consisting of a few extended families (ranging from 20 to 50 people), the Kalahari Bushmen subsisted previously almost entirely by hunting and gathering:

Out of a population of 1.7 million, an estimated 50,000 people are Basarwa and a similar number are spread through Namibia, South Africa, Zimbabwe and Angola. The exact figure of the Basarwa is difficult to determine since Botswana does not differentiate on ethnic grounds, therefore numbers of minorities are not recorded in the national census (Le Roux 1999: 15).

Band territories are sometimes as large as 1,000 square kilometres” though for part of the year a particular band would set up camp near a ‘waterhole’ (Barnard, 1992: 4). Unfortunately, today this description of their area is more or less history. In southern Africa, the various groups of foragers are known as ‘Bushmen’, ‘San’ or ‘Khoe’ (also ‘Khwe’) and these include numerous distinct linguistic and identity groupings (Hitchcock, 1996: 15). The various terms used to name this people have problematic histories, and in 1992 the indigenous NGO Kgeikani Kweni (First People of the Kalahari or FPK) suggested the use of ‘/Noakhwe’ (which means ‘First People’). In Botswana, the Bushmen are also known as Basarwa, although the latter term is often deemed to be pejorative as it means ‘those who don’t raise cattle’, indicating a primitive way of life (Barnard and Taylor, 2002: 230-246). In Southern Africa, WIMSA² representatives have decided to use the term San “until such time as one representative name for all groups will be accepted by all” (Le Roux 1999). While giving due recognition to the difficulties associated with all these terms, in the present thesis paper I will use the term ‘SanBushmen’ to distinguish the Botswana bands from other groups in southern Africa. This specific term refers to the Gwi and Gana Bushmen of the Central Kalahari Game Reserve in Botswana in particular (Appendix 3 and 4), the people visited by Professor Tomaselli and undersigned, and who recently have suffered evictions and as a result have gained some prominence in the media.

Figure 2 shows the location of the Central Kalahari Game Reserve (CKGR), within which are also indicated the principal settlements visited during the research phase for this thesis. In the 1950s, the British colonial administration of Bechuanaland undertook a ‘Bushman survey’ and in 1961 created the CKGR. The reserve, covering an area of roughly 52,000 square kilometres, was primarily set up to “protect the food supplies of the existing Bushmen population in this area which has been estimated to approximately 4,000 from the activities of the European farming community at Ghanze” (Taylor, 2000: 19; Hitchcock 1999).

In other words, the ‘game reserve’ was, amongst other things, intended to ensure that there was sustainable numbers of game for the Bushmen to hunt (Survival International: 2005). After independence in 1966, however, the government of Botswana first restricted the hunting practices of

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² WIMSA- Working Group of Indigenous Minorities in Southern Africa
the Bushmen by issuing licenses limiting the number of animals that could be killed annually. In 2002, the year after they charged Bushmen for ‘over–hunting’, the Botswana Department of Wildlife and National Parks said that “it would no longer issue hunting permits to San for use within the reserve” (Maroleng, 2002: 9). Indeed, many of these groups have become dependent on small scale farming in small extended-family settlements, along with hunting and gathering (Associated Press, 2002).

Since January 2002, the government has evicted – or, in its own terms, ‘relocated voluntarily’ (Government of Botswana, 2005) – a number of groups from Old Xade and Molapo within the CKGR, resettling them in permanent settlements, such as New Xade, outside the reserve. In these ‘settlements’ the Bushmen have no land to roam for hunting and gathering, or to raise cattle. Limited to a small allocation of land, the Bushmen have become reliant on government rations, and many are said to have turned to alcoholism (Appendix 3/TC:12:42:15). These settlements have become for many international observers ‘places of death’, due to the rise in alcoholism and HIV/AIDS (Gall, 2001: 236-9). In 2001 the government’s own estimate of Bushmen was 687 living inside the reserve, and 1647 living outside after being ‘relocated’. There are no reliable estimates of the present population in the reserve, but visiting those 3 settlements during the research phase, we met or saw fewer than 60 people in total (the research itinerary excluded one more settlement, Gobe; it is therefore uncertain whether anyone still lives there. We were told by residents at the settlements we did visit that there was no one left in Old Xade).
III. Development, Media, and Public Attitudes to Minorities.

Making sense of the respective political development trajectories of the Sámi and SanBushmen requires a prior analysis. The Bushmen are unable to claim differential treatment or exemption from the Botswana government’s policies of modernization and development; on the other hand, the Sámi have attained to considerable cultural autonomy. Under International Law (ILO, 1989), if the Bushmen were able to claim that they are an ‘indigenous’ group with distinct historical traditions which they wish to preserve, then they could argue for special rights, protection, and exemption from the developmental agendas to which the government is committed (Thornberry, 2002: 33-60). However, the Botswana government rejects the notion that the Bushmen are ‘indigenous’ to the area, therefore precluding them from claiming specific rights or exemption from modernisation. The government argues that the term ‘indigenous’ should not be applied only to the SanBushmen, claiming instead that “all residents of the country are indigenous” (Hitchcock, 1996: 15). Although this particular reasoning is not the main argument supporting the Government’s policy, denial of the Bushmen’s indigenous status ensures that development-related policies are not variably applied to the Bushmen as a distinct cultural group. The government justifies the rejection of the Bushmen’s indigeneity on the grounds that it has always tried to “avoid ethnic identification in its programs, since in its eyes, this is suggestive of the kinds of terminology used by those espousing apartheid (separate development)” (Hitchcock, 1996: 15). In its “documents and policies the government consistently talks of the Remote Area Dwellers (RADs), like any other poor rural Batswana” (Special Report, 2004).³ “Since 1978, the government of Botswana prefers to use the term ‘Remote Area Dwellers’, “defined on the basis of their; (1) spatial location (remote areas outside villages); (2) socio-political status (marginalized); and (3) socioeconomic status (impoverished and subject to discrimination)” (Hitchcock, 2004).

This strategy entrenches the Botswana government’s insistence on maintaining its sovereign right to define nationhood and belonging. In classifying the Bushmen as ‘poor’ – but not as ‘culturally distinct’ – and then devising and implementing policies meant to target poverty, such policies show little concern as to the ‘cultural’ or ‘identity’ erosion that result from the Bushmen’s separation from their land and traditions. Quite naturally, analysts of ethnicity and identity suggest that this approach is problematic: Maureen Akena, a programme officer at Ditshwanelo – the Botswana Centre for Human Rights – is reported as noting that, “the Basarwa need a place where they belong. But how do you recognise their need of a sense of belonging if you don’t recognise their right to their identity?” (Special Report, 2004, see also Appendix 3 and 4). Government policy tends to mirror the opinion

³ In Tswana linguistic custom, Motswana is the common noun predicatable of all persons who are citizens of the country Botswana. Most will speak the language Setswana, and in the plural people of Tswana origin are called Batswana.
of the Batswana public in general and even in the academic sphere (see also Odubeng (2005) and Appendix 5). When interviewed during a 2004 field trip, a Media Studies lecturer at the University of Botswana – who I had assisted when she did her Master fieldwork in Inalegolo 3 years earlier – quite unproblematically asserted that

… when you go to the areas where they live, you will see that the soils are infertile, there is no clean water, they are far away from schools, far away from shops, far away from the post office, I mean they are not in touch. It’s almost like we are living in Botswana and they are living out of Botswana. So it is worrying (Malebane, Appendix 5).

The Bushmen began court action in April 2002, seeking a ruling that the government's termination of basic services to those who had refused to leave the CKGR was illegal. The government had cut water, food and health services in January, arguing that it was too expensive to reach out to the small San communities scattered around the game reserve. As this is written (January 2006), this case is yet to come to an end. Malebane recalls that;

...[i] spent ten days with the whole team with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and … saw Central Kalahari now, all of it, we spent ten days there…and I had a different view altogether now, and I was not accepting why some of them wanted to remain in the bush and also, how do you actually build a hospital or a clinic or a supermarket for seven people, that the government is saying that it is better if they are in one particular area, so the issue is, is the area inside the reserve or outside the reserve but I came across a family that was refusing to move who were actually inside the game reserve. That issue is still in court and I’m not at liberty now to discuss…I don’t know the outcome of that (Malebane, Appendix 5).

In Norway, Sámi demands for collective rights were also based on their claim to the status of an indigenous people, in response to circumstances not of group members’ own choosing. The most important grounds for their claim were (1) that they share cultural bonds; and (2) that “their historical areas of habitation have been incorporated into the nation state through the use of varying degrees of force” (Oskal 1998: 149). Together, these facts imply that indigenous peoples had previously been collectively incorporated into the nation without their consent. In parallel with developments in the perception of the relationship between state and indigenous people, there was a change in the way in which representation through majority election was understood. It was recognised that if votes in an election in a multi-cultural society were given equal weight, ethnic minorities would always be in a minority position, always at the mercy of the will of the majority. Attempts were therefore made to find ways to ensure that the Sámi had a voice and were heard. With the establishment of the national Sámi parliaments, the states accepted the principle of group rights. Not only did the newly established Sámi parliaments lead to a structural change in the national political systems, they also led to a widened understanding of representative democracy (Broderstad 1999: 66).
A feature of the campaigns against the Alta hydro-electric dam project was the intense involvement of international Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) – amongst others, Greenpeace International – in their mobilization and communication aspects. In the case of the Botswana SanBushmen, the organization Survival International, which specializes in advocacy issues affecting indigenous minorities, is by far the most vocal in terms of challenging the actions of the government of Botswana’s action against Basarwa, particularly those in the CKGR. It has published extensively to very wide audiences, especially on the web. Survival’s publicized mandate is to work closely with local indigenous organizations, employing direct personal contact with the tribal communities to provide a platform for them to talk directly with those invading their land: “Tribal peoples must be allowed to speak for themselves. Their own experience is the most persuasive testimony in their defence – that is why governments strive to deny them their voice. Survival breaks the silence by helping them take message to the outside world”:

For over thirty years Survival International has been involved in what it defines as championing tribal peoples’ rights in imaginative ways. Through writing letters to relevant Governments, companies, banks, lobbying, media, United Nations, educating the public, raising funds, discerning information, demonstrations, bringing in tribal representatives to face governments, companies and banks, challenging legal systems, they have been able to change the lives of Tribal peoples across the world (Survival.org).

The organization identifies Botswana’s Basarwa as one of the many tribal peoples with whom it works. Despite Survival’s claim that “there is no more powerful weapon” than the media

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4 The organization’s website (http://www.survival.org.uk/bushmanpr0108.htm) uses strongly-worded headlines in reporting on the issue. Amongst others, these include “The Bushmen peoples – the hidden face of racism today”; “Last Kalahari Bushmen tortured and facing starvation”; “Botswana Ignores Kalahari ‘Bushman’ land ownership”; “Botswana: last ‘Bushmen’ in Kalahari Reserve resist eviction”; “Botswana squeezes Kalahari peoples out”; “Diamonds for land”; “Botswana persecutes Bushmen”; and “ Botswana: Bushmen persecuted to drive them off their land”.

(Survival.org), they report little on the Basarwa’s efforts to speak on their own behalf. Saugestad (2001:34) recounts her shock back in 1992 when she attended a workshop and heard for the first time a Bushman speaking on a public occasion. It was Komtsha Komtsha, who made her aware for the first time that indeed the Bushmen do speak out against the injustices they suffer. Indeed, Komtsha has gone to the length of petitioning Queen Elizabeth II of England; the letter is reproduced as Appendix 1.\(^5\) On the other hand, Survival claims that it was the first organization to draw attention to the destructive effects of the World Bank structural adjustment policies, the major cause of suffering in many poor countries. In contrast, the United States’ Congressional Research Service web page notes that, although

… some San have reportedly accepted the government’s resettlement policy, others are fighting their removal from the CKGR in court. In order to press their case, these San, with the assistance of NGOs, created a unified organization named First People of the Kalahari (FPK) in 1993. In 1996, the San, along with Botswana human rights groups, rallied together to form a negotiating team to press their claims during interactions with the government. The group included representatives from FPK, … WIMSA, Ditshwanelo …, and the Botswana Council of Churches. Their first step taken was to register 250 San as residents of the CKGR. This offered the negotiating team a basis for discussions with the Botswana government. Negotiations did not produce the results acceptable to the San and human rights groups, however, and in April 2002, the San took the government to court in Botswana (Thownsend, 2004).

While Survival is operating from ‘outside’, Ditshwanelo and FPK operate ‘locally’. WIMSA is working both inside and outside the country. Indeed, there is sufficient overlap between the two ‘movements’ messages to narrow the divide between local and outside. Ditshwanelo, FPK, and Survival communicate in almost the same narrative style and tone, reporting the alleged human rights abuses the government of Botswana has perpetrated against the Basarwa.\(^6\)

Ditshwanelo states that the reason that some of the Basarwa had moved could only be due to enticement from government, because they had been promised better facilities and access to basic needs. The ‘enticement’ of which the government is accused (see Malema, 1997) alludes to the issue of modernization; interviewed for a news programme, Local Government Minister Margaret Nasha argues that the Basarwa will achieve their demands through education, and will “represent themselves and represent themselves convincingly” when they have “the right and access to education” (Carte Blanche, 26 February 2002). By further arguing that the Survival-Ditshwanelo campaign against the evictions has the result of keeping the Bushmen away from the mainstream,

\(^5\) Komtsha was one of the leaders of the Central Kalahari Bushmen. There is no record of the letter ever having been delivered to the Queen. The text was published for the first time in Africa Reports, 29 April 2005 (Bridgland, 2005) under the heading “Bushmen to be Denied Homeland.” This article reports that Komtsha was unable to persuade anyone to deliver the letter before he died. During our journey through the CKGR, we heard more than once about letters written to the Queen of England.

\(^6\) Ditshwanelo released a 28-page report to the media, accusing the government of forcefully moving the Basarwa from the game reserve. They alleged that there had never been proper consultation on the resettlement (Malema, 1997).
and away from politics, the government position appears to be that the access to and exercise of rights is tied to place of residence. Indeed, the government has encouraged the resettlement of the San Bushmen since 1986; however, the decision to remove all residents from the CKGR was only taken in late 2001, on the grounds that the state could not permit a section of the people to live without access to modern facilities. (*Carte Blanche*, 26 February 2002).

The San Bushmen question this argument, as one told us “I don’t want to live in a land that is not mine. Those things, if we want them, they must bring them to us here” (See Appendix 4/ TC: 13:39:10; see also Appendix 6); or as Anderson (2002) confirms “if they really want us to modernize why don’t they bring the schools and development to us in our ancestral lands?” On the other hand, some challenge the ‘drive to modernity’ altogether: Daoxlo Xukuri of FPK argues that “Government relief is another way of killing a person; in the Reserve we knew how to provide for ourselves”. Analysts tend to agree: Alice Mogwe of Ditshwanelo explains that “the government gives but does not empower. Its progress is based on dependency” and that Bushmen have gone “from being resourceful to being dependent” all “in one move” (Special Report, 2004). Furthermore, the government claims that relocating the San Bushmen is less problematic than suggested by indigenous rights groups, such as Survival International, on the grounds that their ways of life are no longer distinct and unique, and therefore they no longer need the reserve to protect their cultural distinctiveness. The denial of cultural distinctiveness by the government would make it extremely difficult to claim rights to land and its natural resources, when the Bushmen challenge the legality and legitimacy of current law, as did the #Khomani community in South Africa.

There is a tension between development and identity at work in the San Bushmen case, comparable with that which appears to have been resolved amicably – if not to the complete satisfaction of everybody – in the case of Norway’s Sámi. Clearly, the statutory resolution of the problem of Sámi identity in a national setting occurred after a considerably longer period, beginning well before Norway and Sweden separated in 1905, than has been available in the case of the San Bushmen since Botswana’s independence in 1966. In some measure, the Botswana minority may be seen to be subject, in somewhat more practical terms, to the methodological tension facing anthropologists: a scientific order of knowledge (Foucault, 1970, 1974) may be conceived as ‘vanquishing’ an order of

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7 In 1995, with the assistance of human rights lawyer Roger Chennels (Robins 2001: 7) the #Khomani San community lodged a claim for restitution of land in the Kalahari Gemsbok Park. As Chennels described it (Gall 2001: 239), it had as its fundamental purpose “the undoing of past injustices, reparations where appropriate, and the restitution of equitable rights to land” and was the most successful of all land claims because in March 1999, the #Khomani’s claim was finally settled. Thabo Mbeki (the then deputy President of South Africa) signed a land claim agreement which transferred the title deeds of six Kalahari farms to the #Khomani San Community Property Association (CPA).

8 In an addition to the peace treaty of 1751 between Norway/Denmark and Sweden (the Great Nordic War), a royal decree created a region of “Lapland”. This so called “Lappecodisillen” law still resides on the statute books of both Norway and Sweden. The passing of this law regulates the Sámi hunting and migration rights across the national boundaries of Norway and Sweden (See Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Odin website).
`Priest-craft’ (Rorty, 1980: 327; Shepperson and Tomaselli, 1998) founded on religious, spiritualistic, animistic or other systems based on an enchanted conception of reality. By analogy, development brings forms of social and political order to societies in which some or other enchanted conception of reality has customarily formed the basis for the conduct of everyday life. The problem in both cases lies in the ongoing status of the supplanted epistemology or social order after their replacement (whether with science in the former case or with the socio-political order of the national state in the latter). For instance,

When the … scientific order is faced with cultures predicated on other kinds of world-views, it responds through two mutually exclusive avenues. Either it treats the world-view and behaviour of the Other as `Priest-craft’ and consequently something to be vanquished. Or it views it as an autonomous object of study and manipulation, which needs to be preserved (conserved) as such. … If, however, … the scientific gaze sees the behaviour of the Other as `primitive’ and undesirable, then conservation fails because of the Other’s being relegated into irrelevance. When science is chosen, conservation is impossible because the Other has validity only as an object of study in its `raw’ form (Tomaselli, 1996: 124-5).

Much the same may be said of the problem facing practitioners in the development communication field: if we understand the culture of the Other, it is only so we may replace it with something modern. If we impose modernity irrespective of whether or not we understand what is replaced, then it becomes impossible to preserve the continued identity of the subject-community because within a short time nobody will remember what was worth conservation. Epistemologically speaking, then, the only choice for development would seem to be no development.

IV. Media and the Problem of Development and Choice.

Although the foregoing assumes a state of affairs in which the epistemic distinctions between cultures are conceived to be extreme to the point of incommensurability, the basic point should be noted: orthodox development theory tends to view the beneficiaries as choosing between development and stagnation (or regression). Criticism of development policies almost universally proceeds from the position that beneficiaries need to be provided both with the means of choosing freely when taking strategic decisions about development issues, and with the relevant information about the options or alternatives between which they must choose (; Melkote and Steeves, 2001). The objection made against existing policy usually implies that programmes are imposed without due acknowledgement of cultural issues; Tomaselli’s (1996) point being that scientific thought is inherently incapable of grasping either (1) the frequently ideological assumptions that allegedly inform development strategy; or (2) the `cosmological’ or `ontological’ grounds of `culture’ that
shape the ways beneficiary communities `make meaning’ of their worlds.\(^9\) In the present case, the issue takes on an additional developmental dimension in that much of the debate occurs in the media (much of it sourced to *Survival International*), with rival positions being publicized in both print and electronic media.

Non-Governmental Organizations frequently base their advocacy strategies on the claim that indigenous minorities lack the means, power, or resources to present their side of the decision-making debate to the broader public (*ibid*), and that expert outside assistance – which, of course, includes public relations – will overcome this shortcoming. The NGO sector thus claims a specialist communication function – “giving a voice to the voiceless”, for example – in the environment of ameliorating the exigencies of subsistence in national areas lacking the infrastructure and organizational capacity to ensure social security across the entire country.

This functional relationship between media, communication, and development has its origins in the major expansion in Communication Science during the 1950s (cf., e.g., Tomaselli, 2005). Below I examine a representative example of the material upon which much development communication relies either directly or indirectly: Siebert, Peterson and Schramm’s seminal *Four Theories of the Press* (1956). This text established the dominant paradigm for analyzing global media systems and, in particular, in assessing levels of press freedom in countries and regions of the world. The four theories they identified were (1) the authoritarian; (2) the Libertarian; (3) the Soviet system; and (4) the Social Responsibility paradigm.

(1) In the *authoritarian state system* governments take direct control of media. This system is especially easy to recognize in pre-democratic societies, where the government consists of a restricted, sometimes aristocratic, ruling-class. The fundamental assumption of the authoritarian system is that the *government is infallible*. Media organizations and practitioners are therefore not allowed any independence, although governments may enforce an authoritarian profile without being openly totalitarian. A state that seems to come close to this media system today is Botswana (see University of Botswana (2005), Odubeng (2005) and Appendix 6). The authoritarian system “has been most pervasive both historically and geographically”; the goal of the media under such a system is to support and advance the policies of the government so that it can achieve its objectives (Siebert, 1996).

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\(^9\) It is unclear from Tomaselli’s (1996) treatment of the problem faced by documentary and ethnographic filmmakers, whether the incommensurability between development policy and local knowledge is based on any prior logical analysis of relations other than the economic. Tomaselli’s arguments are essentially of a linguistic nature, arguing that “meaning” (i.e. the semantics of words and propositions) arises from prior ontological differences between the respective world-views of development agencies and beneficiary communities. Proceeding from the main source for Tomaselli’s theory, C.S. Peirce, then meaning is essentially a first-order phenomenon, whereas ontology is elaborated from second-order reasoning about the object of meaning. Effectively, Tomaselli’s treatment may be similar to a category confusion as has been noted in Placide Tempels’s (1958) *Bantu Philosophy*: that the use of language assumes either that speech “was made for the philosophical mind only, or that stupid people who nevertheless can talk and who speak grammatically are also philosophers” (Masolo, 1994: 102). I am indebted to Shepperson for this critique.
1956: 18). Control mechanisms include but are not limited to licensing systems; state censorship; special taxes; and anti-treason and anti-sedition laws in the name of national security. Never the less, authoritarian governments do not object to a discussion of political systems in broad philosophical terms, but stop short of allowing direct criticism of current political leaders and their projects, or overt attempts to unseat the authorities themselves (Siebert, 1956: 26.)

(2) Contrary to the authoritarian theory, libertarian theory holds that man is rational and an end in himself. The happiness and well-being of the individual is the goal of society (Siebert, 1956: 40). The “Enlightenment” gave an impetus to the concept with its call to free humans from all outside restrictions to use their reason. Siebert and his collaborators (1956: 44-47) cite John Milton, John Stuart Mill and Thomas Jefferson as the major philosophical influences behind this concept. The function of the libertarian media is to inform and entertain and to act as a watchdog over the government. Libertarian media are mostly private. Control of the libertarian media is mostly exercised through the “self-correcting” process, the civil courts, and even through licensing, censorship or seizure of offending material; injunctions against the publication of a newspaper may also be used. Voluntary censorship is sometimes practiced while the right of access to government sources is avidly pursued.

(3) Social responsibility theory was an outgrowth of the libertarian theory and was first developed in the 20th century United States by the Commission on Freedom of the Press, which emphasized social responsibility of the press. In addition to inform, entertain and sell, the press should also “raise conflict to the plane of discussion.” (Severin and Tankard, 2001: 310). Press control is mostly in the form of community opinion, consumer action and professional ethics. The main difference between the libertarian theory and the social responsibility theory is that the latter suggests that someone must see that media perform responsibly if they do not do so voluntarily.

(4) Soviet Communist theory focuses on the value of unity – unity of the working class and unity of the Party. For the sake of unity, there is only one right position and only one truth, the absolute truth: the doctrine and policies of the Party. Wilbur Schramm (1964: 114) saw the Soviet political system as “one of the most complete dictatorships in modern history”. Media in communist societies are state-owned and should be a “collective propagandist, collective agitator... and collective organizer” (116). The Soviet system defined the function of mass communications positively and removed the profit motive from publishing and broadcasting. Under the Soviet system, the government had a division of censorship. Other means of control included the appointment of editors, a large number of directives regarding press content and press reviews and criticisms. Soviet systems also differ from the authoritarian ones in that the media organizations have a certain responsibility to meet the wishes of their audience.
Other theories on press systems followed as the decades passed. These include developmental journalism (popular in the Philippines and South Asia), revolutionary media (Hachten, 1999), and democratic-participant media (McQuail, 1994). These successors mostly complement perceived gaps in the established four-theories model. The fundamental objection against Siebert's approach is its lack of flexibility. In order to avoid this weakness, the following relational model may be proposed (Figure 4): 

![Figure 4](http://www.geocities.com/CapitolHill/2152/siebert.html#Vivian#Vivian)

The advantage of this representation of the model lies first of all in its starting-point. The two co-ordinates represent the two elements required for a communication event to occur: context (the medium itself) and content (the message). The diagram, adapted from the original, permits one to conceive the breakdown showing the relationships between strictly given categories as having a spatial character, opening space for conceiving new ideas that relate independently to the existing theoretical models in so far as these new conceptions themselves relate to content and context. 

A further weakness is also apparent when the four-theories model is treated on a purely discursive basis: it does not clearly display its essentially retrospective foundation: Siebert et al are effectively discussing an existing set of dispensations in the context of a contemporary historical trajectory – the Cold War – that was apparent to their readers of all persuasions. Represented spatially, however, each theory can be seen as having a certain epistemological and ideological distance from the others, permitting the analyst to consider innovative alternative press dispensations in prospect. The same coordinate set, that is, can be viewed looking forward in time so that any innovative theory of media can be seen in its relation to existing theories; if the present-day media landscape no longer contains a particular theory, one may simply exclude it from the diagram.
Denis McQuail (2000: 161-162) offers an expanded typology of media theories, revising the 1956 theories under the heading of normative theory paradigms that consider press dispensations in just this prospective manner. Indeed, if one considers that normative approaches have been common in economics for decades (see, for example, Sen, 1982: 432-449; Arrow, 1951, 1963) it would seem almost that McQuail is playing catch-up in as much as his predecessors follow a largely descriptive theory of the press. The five paradigms, in no particular order, are:

1) Liberal-pluralist: essentially Siebert et al’s (1956) model reworked as a prescriptive theory;

2) Social-responsibility: based on norms developed around the pairing of rights/freedoms and responsibilities;

3) Critical: theories that prescribe freedoms in terms of media production and reception that are free of dominant or hegemonic influences;

4) Administrative: norms prescribing ‘media of record’ that provide information, analysis and news to an audience of leaders/administrators in developed nations; and

5) Cultural Negotiation: norms for media practice and goals, based on more or less radically relativistic conceptions of culture, that eschew notions of universal rationality and encourage more or less populist or communitarian notions of solidarity.

Because the present study is principally concerned with the African situation, most attention will be paid to the suggestion that “we need to have a category for ‘development theory’ alongside the liberal and Marxist variants” of media theory (McQuail, 2000: 155). Because of the extent to which it has been embraced in African perspectives following UNESCO’s McBride Commission (1980), McQuail’s media theory paradigms all enumerate more or less special conditions, values, and aspirations that developing countries may use to call for a particular media orientation that prescribes roles serving development goals. However, analysis shows that most of these roles have already been prescribed in some of the earlier four-theories models anyway. But more importantly, the development support role is given precedence to the extent that it takes priority over other rights and freedoms, especially media freedom, where the latter is defined as “the basic principle of any theory of public communications from which other benefits flow”, the protection of which is why there is need to regulate media (McQuail, 2000: 166). This contradicts what McQuail claims is the theory’s other concern: respect for democratic communication as expressed and entrenched in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Skogerbø, 1991: 144-146).
McQuail (2000: Chapters 7 - 8) outlines a number of components that can be referred to as the “public interest”, including plurality of ownership; freedom of publication; diversity of information; diversity of expression of opinion; universal reach; support for the democratic system; respect for the judicial system; and respect for individual and general human rights (McQuail, 2000: 142-144). When viewed in aggregate, these criteria effectively identify development media as a species of public sphere, a neutral space within society, free of both state and corporate control, in which the media should make available information affecting the public good, and facilitate a free, open and reasoned public dialogue that guides the public direction of society (Curran, 2000: 135). Objectivity is a prerequisite to quality information and helps to increase public confidence and trust in what they receive through the media. Objectivity deals with facts, and facts are essential in discourses that take place in the public sphere (McQuail, 2000: 173). These standards entail mixed and divided responsibilities for media, in order to reach alternative social groups and subcultures, and reflect fairly the expression of conflicts and inequalities of society (McQuail, 2000: 175). Media ownership concentration, by contrast, threatens the right to uncensored information and freedom of speech of the individual journalists.

V. Media, Development and Welfare: General normativity in society and culture.

Looking back at the various approaches used in media theory and to develop theories of the press, it becomes clear that all theorists have certain things in common. For all of them, media act to foster democracy. What largely divides them into different camps is their conception of democracy. For Siebert et al (1956), democracy means mainly the US model of two-party representative government with a strict separation of powers. For the more critical school of thought, democracy means participatory democracy in various forms. I have not examined dependency theory in any detail, mainly because this paradigm essentially uses a rhetorical strategy of redefinition to argue that development actually ‘means’ (see Note 6 above) dependency on the developed world. However, the development communication and media theories of Servaes (2002) and of Melkote and Steeves (2001), amongst others, prescribe certain development benefits that flow from free, democratic, and participatory media, also found in the four-theory model. These include:

1) Social stability (authoritarian model);
2) Curbing excesses of the State (libertarian model);
3) Raising conflict to the level of discussion, to reduce public violence (social responsibility theory);
4) Protection of rights (Hamelink, 2001; McQuail, 2000);
5) Developing the public sphere (Hamelink, 2001; McQuail, 2000; ); and
6) Preserving the cultural integrity of communities (Melkote and Steeves, 2001; ).
If these are considered broadly in relation to the goals of development, they are conditions that can be seen as promoting a certain kind of non-oppressive social state. Arrow (1951: 17) defines a social state generally as:

… a complete description of each type of commodity in the hands of each individual, the amount of labour to be supplied by each individual, the amount of each productive resource invested in each type of productive activity, such as municipal services, diplomacy and its continuation by other means, and the erection of statues to famous men. It is assumed that each individual in the community has a definite ordering of all conceivable social states, in terms of their desirability to him. It is not assumed here that an individual's attitude toward different social states is determined exclusively by the commodity bundles that accrue to his lot under each. It is simply assumed that the individual orders all social states by whatever standards he deems relevant.

It is obvious that this model shares the basis used for earlier economic modernization approaches to development, since the definition does not take account of indigenous cultural factors. However, one can exploit this definition in the context of Sen’s (1981) broad concept of entitlement and its collateral concepts of command and endowment. In general, entitlements are defined in terms of the legal ability of persons to command due access to or consumption of the basic goods, services or commodities covered by reigning conceptions of Right; for example, ownership of food

… is one of the most primitive of property rights, and in each society there are rules governing this right. The entitlement approach concentrates on each person’s entitlements to commodity bundles including food, and views starvation as resulting from a failure to be entitled to a bundle with enough food (Sen, 1981: 43).

Food entitlements are part of a person’s broader endowment bundle, that includes land, labour power, and so on (ibid.). In the foregoing, the supposed benefits of the press and other media may not be understood in the same kind of economic terms, although there is no reason to exclude from persons’ endowment bundles such conditions for enjoyment of press and other freedoms as literacy and access to a reasonable education (however the latter may be defined).11

One will not, of course, starve because of illiteracy; but one’s endowment bundle could well be restricted as a result of inadequate literacy skills. Similarly, it is not inconceivable that, as with the Sámi before their lobbying had its effect, adequate literacy in an indigenous minority language would not add to one’s endowment bundle relative to formal system of rights and welfare benefits

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10 Strictly speaking, Sen considers command as a property of the exchange entitlement mapping (EEM), a “function that specifies the set of alternative commodity bundles that the person can command respectively for each endowment bundle” (Sen, 1981: 46). For the present thesis, however, I will use ‘command’ instead of EEM, because this can help with classifying the forms of entitlement ascribable to different actors in the development environment. The reason for this will become clear, because I am specifically interested in the role of non-citizen actors in the fields of both development and of indigenous minority rights, and discuss this in more detail toward the end of the thesis.

11 In 1998 Amartya Sen received the Stockholm Prize in Economics (often mistakenly called the Nobel Economics Prize) for his work on the formal economic nature of poverty. In much of his work Sen acknowledges Arrow as both a predecessor and as a colleague (both were active at Harvard University), and Sen’s relationship with Arrow may be seen as all of protégé, critic, colleague, and elaborator. This does not in any way detract from the enormous intellectual scope of Sen’s inquiries, and Sen may equally be seen as having influenced Arrow’s later work.
available in a country in which another language enjoys priority. To account for these considerations, Arrow’s basic idea can be rewritten to refer to a *cultural* state visualised for development, as:

A complete description of the symbolic power at the disposal of each individual both within and outside his or her community, the quality of critical engagement available to individuals in relation to power, the knowledge, learning, and cultural resources at the disposal of individuals as far as these will facilitate authentic contributions to the symbolic life of communities and societies. It is assumed that each individual in the community has a definite ordering of all conceivable cultural states, in terms of their desirability to him or her. It is not assumed here that an individual’s attitude toward different cultural states is determined exclusively by the symbolic bundles that accrue to her lot under each. It is simply assumed that the individual orders all cultural states by whatever standards he or she deems relevant.\(^\text{12}\)

Thus the media and communication sides of the development problem can be understood as involving how individuals can know and understand the choices available to them in their own context. Each of these conceptions of State may be related to Sen’s (1992) discussion of Freedom. Arrow’s social state is applicable in the context of Well-being Freedom, to “achieve those things that are constitutive of one’s well-being” (Sen, 1992: 57-72). On the other hand, my proposed cultural state is relevant to the question of Agency Freedom, to “bring about the achievements one values and which one attempts to reproduce” (*ibid*.). All but Siebert et al’s Soviet theory of media and journalism meet some or even most of these requirements, even though it may be that none presently meet them all. Essentially, then, attainment of the entitlements empowering *command over the preferential choice* of a valued cultural state is a definition of cultural autonomy that complements the economic autonomy embodied in Arrow’s definition of a Social state.

It is obvious that in the libertarian theory, an individual’s command over symbolic power depends on how he or she disposes of wealth – the richer one is, the more one can draw on exchange entitlements to command social and cultural goods (for instance, for purchasing the technology and bandwidth for communicating on the internet). Under the social responsibility theory, the media institutions ensure access to symbolic power, but the knowledge and learning available to exercise one’s well-being or agency freedoms become limited to that which the organization can pay for. The development support communication model ensures the cultural integrity of indigenous communities, but at the price of communities’ own critical voice. This is mainly (but not only) because development bodies or civil society dispose of agency freedoms that often draw on other cultural resources to make the case for local agency freedom empowerment, often at the expense of their supposed beneficiaries’ *well-being* freedom (the case of Survival International in Botswana is a good example). In the Another Development model (see Servaes, 2002; Melkote and Steeves, 2000;\(^\text{12}\)

\(^{12}\) My thanks to Arnold Shepperson for his interpretation of Arrow that avoids the economic models of development thinking.
Rogers, 1995; Ross and Usher, 1986), the attention is paid to protecting or enhancing traditional or customary agency freedom in an existing cultural state without thinking about symbolic choices that media in democratic societies offer to communities: to protect and enshrine a community’s existing cultural state more or less unchanged would seem to hinder their broader democratic symbolic power and not strengthen it.

VI. Formalising Development and Choice.

In each of the cases discussed above, the options open to beneficiary communities, collectively and as individual members thereof, are often expressed as a choice between binary pairs. Under this scenario, development – the process of taking on a more complex structure of social relations and interactions – can proceed. However, choosing between binary pairs (tradition or modernity; industrial or agrarian economies; agency freedom or well-being freedom; and so on) essentially constitutes development as a choice between the horns of some form of dilemma, and not between options that reflect people’s actual needs, desires, or goals. As beneficiaries, communities almost invariably consist of generations that will experience development in different ways:

(a) elders will live the remainder of their time as essentially surplus members, or as short-lived repositories of community memory;

(b) the generations raising their offspring will have to choose the means and goals through which to negotiate the most suitable future for their children; and

(c) the youngest generation will grow into circumstances they find there, and which they can only compare to the community’s past through their elders’ recollections.

This situation demands that at least three options be available between which beneficiaries can choose, with the further specification that these options be relevant to all who both exercise them and who may be expected to live with them afterwards. In other words, democratic development choices entail at least three different social options, and three distinct social groups who will benefit from them.

In any situation of social choice, the method of summing up the preferences indicated in the public act of choosing runs up against a paradox. This is Kenneth Arrow’s (1951) celebrated General Theorem of the Possibility of Social Welfare Functions, commonly known as the “Impossibility
Theorem”. Informally, the theorem states that “the only methods of passing from individual tastes to social preferences which will be satisfactory and which will be defined for a wide range of sets of individual orderings are either imposed or dictatorial” (Arrow, 1951: 59). By *imposition* Arrow means merely that a definite set of individual preferences is taken to constitute the overall social preference. More specifically, this refers to a situation where a definable group within a society effectively defines what shall constitute the form and delivery of a social good after society has gone through the act of choosing. In practical terms, this merely means that the method of deciding the form of the desired social good rests with a political party or professional expert opinion.

On the other hand, a social welfare function is *dictated* if a single definite individual preference trumps all the corresponding ordering of preferences among choosers other than that specific individual. Given that those who choose may be viewed collectively as an individual (much like corporate respondents are treated as individuals in many legal systems), this means that when a single faction orchestrates the preference for some good within a broader coalition or other social collection irrespective of whether a majority are indifferent to that preferred good, that preference is dictated. For example, if a small Trotskyist revolutionary grouping within a larger socialist trade union grouping threatens to wreck consensus unless their agenda is given equal weight in public communications, then the union grouping’s stated preference for Trotskyite programmes has been dictated by a faction that does not actually command a majority in the organization.

Arrow’s theorem is based on two Axioms, one essentially logical that refers to a general property of weak ordering, the other essentially mathematical, stating the property of *transitivity of ordinal relations*. The first Axiom establishes the property of quasi-commutativity of the relation $R$, for alternative social goods $x$ and $y$:

**Axiom I:** For all $x$ and $y$, either $xRy$ or $yRx$,

where $R$ denotes the relation “prefers or is indifferent to” (Arrow, 1951: 12), and represents a weak ordering relation. A strong ordering is a preference, denoted $P$, and is effectively non-commutative in the aggregation of choices. This is because, from Axiom I, it is necessary that indifference between $x$ and $y$ also imply indifference between $y$ and $x$, given that the relation $R$ is ordinal in either

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13 Arrow’s formal definition of an imposed social welfare function relies on the correspondence between weak ordering relations, $R$, within a set of choosers, and the anticipated corresponding relation $R$ such that society at large either prefers or is indifferent to some social good. Formally, “A social welfare function will be said to be imposed if, for some pair of distinct alternatives $x$ and $y$, $xRy$ for any set of individual orderings $R_1, \ldots, R_n$, where $R$ is the social ordering corresponding to $R_1, \ldots, R_n$” (Arrow, 1951: 28).

14 Formally defined, a dictated social welfare function relies on the relation between an individual preference ordering, $P$, and the overall social preference indicated in the act of choosing. Formally, “A social welfare function is said to be dictatorial if there exists an individual $i$ such that, for all $x$ and $y$, $xPy$ implies $xP_y$ regardless of the orderings $R_1, \ldots, R_n$ of all individuals other than $i$, where $P$ is the social preference relation corresponding to $R_1, \ldots, R_n$” (Arrow: 1951: 30).
order of completing the set \( <x, y> \). In another format, one may denote this property as defining preference as if \( xPy \), then \( \sim yRx \), and if \( yPx \), then \( \sim xRy \), in relation to the weak ordering relation \( R \).

**Axiom II:** For all \( x, y \), and \( z \), \( xRy \) and \( yRz \) imply \( xRz \). A relation satisfying Axiom II is said to be transitive (Arrow, 1951: 13).

This axiom enables one to analyse the preferences expressed in a social environment as a series of pair-wise comparisons. Since the question of social choice is considered specifically in relation to “democratic capitalist” society (Arrow: 1951: 1-2), the only relevant method of aggregating individual choices into a social choice is that of majority voting (Arrow, 1951: 46). In any general process of voting, however, once the environment of social choice expands to contain more than two choosers among three or more options, the well-known phenomenon of a *cycling majority* appears, also known as the Voter Paradox, which is readily demonstrated in the case of three options available for three choosers:

Let \( A, B, \) and \( C \) be the three alternatives, and \( 1, 2, \) and \( 3 \) the three individuals. Suppose individual 1 prefers \( A \) to \( B \) and \( B \) to \( C \) (and therefore \( A \) to \( C \)), individual 2 prefers \( B \) to \( C \) and \( C \) to \( A \) (and therefore \( B \) to \( A \)), and individual 3 prefers \( C \) to \( A \) and \( A \) to \( B \) (and therefore \( C \) to \( B \)). Then a majority prefer \( A \) to \( B \), and a majority prefer \( B \) to \( C \). We may therefore say that the community prefers \( A \) to \( B \) and \( B \) to \( C \). If the community is to be regarded as behaving rationally, we are forced to say that \( A \) is preferred to \( C \). But in fact a majority of the community prefer \( C \) to \( A \) (Arrow, 1951: 3).

In tabular format, this would appear as follows:

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*Table 1.* Sample of voter paradox for three actual choices from three options among three choosers.

In effect, Table 1 merely displays the fact that a society of three choosers may express no overall preference from among three options from which to express their individual priorities. Of course, these expressed priorities also reflect a system of *preferences*, in that (for example) voter 1 prefers \( A \) to \( B \), \( B \) to \( C \), and, by transitivity, \( A \) to \( C \), as Arrow demonstrates. The same kinds of rankings apply to voters 2 and 3. On the other hand, each voter’s prioritization represents an individual selection from a much wider set *preference rankings*, which I will designate \( C(S) \), drawn from the set of all possible pair-wise preferences that may be expressed from then the set \( <A; B; C> \) (the collection
being that from which selections are to be made). The full range of possible alternatives expressed as preferences (that is, for the present ignoring indifference) is therefore:

\[ A P B = R_i \]
\[ B P C = R_{ii} \]
\[ C P A = R_{iii} \]
\[ B P A = R_{iv} \]
\[ B P C = R_v \]
\[ C P B = R_{vi} \]

Where \( P \) denotes the relation “prefers”, for example \( A P B \) means “prefers A to B”, and so on. If one tabulates the expressed priorities as expressed preference rank-orderings (Table 2), therefore, a somewhat different meta-ranking (or, perhaps more correctly, a second-order ranking) is obtained:

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Table 2. Second-order ranking of sample of priorities expressed in Table 1.

It is immediately clear that already there are five rank-orderings between options expressed in Table 2. The pair-wise orderings \( R_{iv} \) and \( R_{vi} \) both refer to alternatives validly chosen from the set \( C(S) \), but which by virtue of Axiom II (the principle of transitivity) actually broadens the range of expressed preferences. Thus the point that Arrow is making is not merely that cycling majorities are still not eliminated by aggregating individual preferences into a function that validly represents the collective social preference for the overall collection of choosers: in effect, Arrow’s Theorem states the conclusion that imposition or dictatorships are the only two fair or logical methods for breaking a cycling majority, respectively.

It should also be noted that although Arrow’s deduction proceeds from an axiom of transitivity in much the same manner as in Game Theory, the theorem is not a variation on the latter. Most commonly, Game Theory is taken to refer to situations of conflict, in which strategies are pursued until players either win or lose according to the rules of the game in question. But there are also

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15 In reality, the nine pair-wise preferences shown in this demonstration are a composition of the six \((3!) = 6\) possible orderings of three items. Although Arrow (1951: 3, n.3) cites one E.J. Nanson as the source for this in an article of 1882, the phenomenon was first noted formally by the Marquis de Condorcet in 1785. See Green-Armytage (2003) for a summary of methods used to break cycling majorities. It is notable in Green-Armytage’s summary that such methods can become extraordinarily complex, while never being wholly satisfactory.
games of *coordination*, in which optimal strategies are directed at accomplishing some common end. David Lewis (1968) notes that different coordination strategies may be ranked as preferences such that certain combinations reflect a range of possible cultural viewpoints (he used the *status quo*, *lone disobedience*, and the *State of Nature* as examples of environments within which coordination is more or less readily attainable). In some respects, then, Arrow defines the method of choosing such that methods of aggregating individual preferences into a social choice cover both competitive and coordination solutions in a given environment.

The logical mechanism whereby Arrow accommodates this is the idea of a *quasi-ordering*, a preference ranking, designated $Q$, that would obtain if society were to consider itself adequately compensated after having adopted the goods chosen (Arrow, 1951: 34-35). The very terminology of this concept explains its relevance: a quasi-ordering is such because it denotes an ordering $R$ that does not *as yet* obtain, but which *would obtain* once implementation is accomplished. The properties of $Q$ are almost identical to those of $R$, with the exception that for alternatives $x$ and $y$, $xQy$ for any individual does not imply $xPy$ for the society at large; it merely implies that *at least one individual* is expected to be better off under $x$ than under $y$. Since the establishment in the present of a future dispensation of preference is not admissible under a strict doctrine of Nominalism, therefore, an expected ordering is necessarily a quasi-ordering, an arbitrary forecast about what *should be the case* if $x$ and not $y$ were to obtain. It follows from this that if we can say of only one individual that they would no longer prefer $y$ to $x$, then if that individual’s ordering is implemented as the social choice, the decision has been made as a dictated function. Similarly, if some set of individuals coordinate their ordering such that they would no longer prefer $y$ to $x$, and that coordination acts to aggregate the ordering of the social choice, then that coordination is accomplished as an imposed function (Arrow, 1951: 28-31).

**VII. The Development Paradox? Impossibility, Choice, and Participation.**

It is notable that Arrow’s conception of an environment of choice (the formalities of which are not necessary for the present thesis) is based on a strictly *modernistic* characterisation of the nature of society:

To the nominalist temperament of the modern period, the assumption of the existence of the social ideal in some Platonic realm of being was meaningless. The utilitarian philosophy of Jeremy Bentham and his followers sought instead to ground the social good on the good of individuals. The hedonist psychology associated with utilitarian philosophy was further used to imply that each individual’s good was identical with his desires. Hence, the social good was in some sense to be a composite of the desires of individuals. A viewpoint of this type serves as a
justification of both political democracy and laissez-faire economics or at least an economic system involving free choice of goods by consumers and of occupations by workers (Arrow, 1951: 22-3).

The reigning (self-proclaimed) post-modern media and communication studies paradigm – following the collapse of the bipolar superpower system (see Kennedy, 1988-89) – makes much of how critically-based collectivist or communitarian systems of thought have supplanted the supposedly individualistic conceptions of human value and political-economic strategy of the earlier era (see, for example, Mudrooroo, 1997). However, the replacement of earlier collective conceptions like ‘class’ and ‘nation’ with more ethnographically derived terms like ‘community’ and ‘culture’ merely shifts the individualist analysis to the level of the collected members of each aggregation. Put more simply: the post-modern state of nature pits singular ‘cultures’ or ‘communities’ against each other in a purportedly politico-symbolic state of nature, in place of Thomas Hobbes’s (1963) early modern conception of the individual in a politico-economic state of nature against every other individual. Effectively, one could say that classical modernist theory in politics and economics admitted of no ‘shades of grey’ between the existent individual and the existent national state; post-modernism identically insists on a comparable gulf between individual existent communities only. All this indicates that the ‘post’ in ‘post-modern’ may more validly be replaced with a qualifier like ‘Hyper’.

Logically, one may treat any given ‘community’ or ‘culture’ as an individual, especially in the context of contemporary notions based on what Charles Taylor (1991) defined as the “ethics of authenticity”, or of theories that inherit the late Enlightenment philosophies of expressivism (see Taylor, 1989). Each individual culture or community has an identity which members are obligated (more or less) to express in their interactions with other groups’ members. At the limit, there is consequently nothing particularly contradictory in positing that in an environment of communitarian social choice each community will express as singular a set of preferences and values as did individual persons under the circumstances Arrow has defined. Most importantly, if one considers that the expressed preference rankings of a community – as asserted in, say, an environment within which is to be chosen amongst alternative development strategies – may be the result of prior coordination solutions internal to the cultures or communities being called upon to choose, then Arrow’s Theorem will hold, irrespective of the transparency and openness of the internal processes by which each community came to its express preference. In the present thesis, this phenomenon is of particular interest in respect of how participatory development communication models seem not to deliver results that are any more acceptable than earlier top-down methods. In what follows, I discuss some of the ways these considerations affect the comparative conditions of the Sámi and SanBushmen.
It is not widely known that many Sámi were active in the resistance movement against Norway’s Nazi occupiers between 1940 and 1945; however, as early as 1957 the Norwegian film “Ni Liv” (Nine Lives, nominated for the Oscar category of Best Foreign Language Film in 1958), brought a measure of awareness to non-Norwegian audiences of this. Based on the true story of Jan Baalsrud, a member of the Norwegian resistance during World War II, the film recounts the fate of a team of resistance fighters who in 1943 had embarked on a dangerous mission to destroy a German air control tower and recruit for the resistance. The mission was compromised, and their boat was attacked by a German vessel. Baalsrud was the only one to escape the Nazi onslaught, and evaded capture for roughly two months, suffering from frostbite and snow blindness. Baalsrud failed in his bid to reach the border of neutral Sweden and took refuge with some Norwegians who happened to have access to the Norwegian underground. While hiding in their barn, he amputated a significant number of his own frostbitten toes with an ordinary knife. These civilians managed to move Baalsrud close to the Swedish border, but were forced to leave him in a snow cave for roughly two weeks before they returned and delivered him to a reindeer herder who finally took him over the frontier to safety (Wikipedia; International Movie Database).

The Norwegian resistance being a relatively coherent national resistance force, with many operations involving action (either armed or reconnaissance) against installations well inside traditional Sámi areas (see Figure 1), it would not be out of place to suppose that many ethnic Sámi resistance fighters soon developed a habit of coordinating with their ethnic Norwegian comrades on operations.

It is not clear whether resistance units were integrated, or whether ethnically-distinct groups cooperated on single operations (or, for that matter, whether there was a mixture of units); in either case, coordination would have been crucial, and a habit of such coordination is not inconceivable on the part of either component. Although Sámi representatives had been elected to the Norwegian Parliament prior to 1940 (Josefsen, 2003), and there was probably some expectation that these would have coordinated more or less freely with their Norwegian colleagues, the experience and habits of coordination in combat are a very different matter. Not least, veterans would have had memories simply not possible for a generation that had not undergone the same experiences. These same veterans, therefore, could have had some measure of influence a generation later, when the Alta/Kautokeino dam protests got underway. The shortfall in the record of Sámi-Norwegian resistance co-ordination is finally being addressed officially: on October 10, 2005, the Norwegian president of the Sámi Parliament Sven-Roald Nystø, announced that finally, “the work done by the Sámi border guides was to be recognized by the Norwegians”. Amongst other actions, a

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16 The German Kriegsmarine maintained several bases in this area, and the Luftwaffe also pursued operations against Allied convoys to and from Archangel and Murmansk from this region.
Documentation Centre is to be set up to acknowledge the Sámi contribution during World War II (Hivand, 2005).

The role of the international NGO Greenpeace in the Alta/Kautokeino protests, and their mobilization of global media to publicise the issue, may therefore be viewed from the point of view of Arrow’s Theorem in so far as – given a memory of cross-ethnic coordination a generation before – this campaign accurately reflected the situation on the ground. Greenpeace hardly can be said to have started anything in connection with the Alta/Kautokeino protests, because this was not the first dam against which Norwegian environmental groups had protested. The main group involved was “Folkeaksjonen mot utbygging av Alta-Kautokeino-vassdraget” (Public Subscription Association Against the Alta-Kautokeino Dam) which short time after being established, had 20 000 members (Jhar, 2004). The Youth and Nature Organization, a branch of the Green Party (Venstre), also carried out a major mobilization drive (Natur og Ungdom). The main problem to be faced in this context lies not in the nature and radicalism of the Sámi autonomy or independence movements. Instead, I want to look at the degree to which the Greenpeace strategy might have led to representations that contradicted Sámi experience of Norwegian nationality through 1945 and beyond. There were some Sámi splinter groups who called for an armed struggle (see, for example, Bjørgo, 2003, for a summary of Sámi extremist links to other armed groups like ETA and the IRA), but their influence was small. More important is Greenpeace, who was the major international NGO involved with increasingly radical opposition to Norwegian whale and seal hunting. They piggy-backed their own agenda onto the established local environmental activism. Although this may have added to the international publicity it did not really change the strategies already being used. The point then, would be to see how far Greenpeace strategists needed to depart from their focus on maritime environmental activism, because that was an issue toward which Sámi were (and remain) largely indifferent.

It is probable that combining the mainly environmental and cultural Alta/Kautokeino campaign with practices unfamiliar to the Sámi, could have largely have made actual Sámi concerns appear marginal, because the whole object of Sámi activism was rooted in more local issues. Thus, the lead-up to the stage when Sámi community and activist leaders could have agreed to argue alongside Greenpeace for a particular cultural choice would possibly have involved (a) more effort in convincing the indifferent that an environmental angle to the cultural issue would improve the Sámi bargaining position; and (b) that such a rhetorical tactic would improve the chances for a more equitable outcome for the implementation of any future autonomy or independence policies. While the first option hardly differs from any text-book situation involving voter persuasion in a settled electoral system, the second in combination with the first introduces a quasi-ordering into the choice
environment: Arrow’s Theorem will hold, and the issue becomes one of whether any function for aggregating preferences will be imposed or dictated.\textsuperscript{17}

(2) The present controversy over the CKGR SanBushmen involves far less extensive historical relations than in the case of the Sámi in Norway. Firstly it needs to be recognized that the Sámi question involved a very different form of historical interaction with their state of residence, some considerations on which I have already outlined. The SanBushmen have related to the state of Botswana for a relatively paltry 39 years, less than half the time Sámi have related to the state of Norway. If one includes the earlier relation with Sweden prior to Norway’s independence in 1905, it is clear that the SanBushmen have little comparable history upon which to draw. It is because of this that the relation between the CKGR communities and Survival International must be seen as more decisive than had been the case with Greenpeace and the Sámi; Survival very much calls the shots in terms of strategy and intervention programme design, having little immediate reason for compromising in the way Greenpeace did. Indeed, there is little about which the SanBushmen can actually form preference rankings: their situation involves something closer to a dilemma than an environment of choice. On the other hand, I have already noted that the CKGR Bushmen do not themselves oppose development (Andersson, 2002, see also Appendix 3 and 4); it is, rather, the NGO FPK\textsuperscript{18} that mobilises mainly post-modern (hyper-modern) theory to claim that the SanBushmen do not really need development.

The issue is such that there is little that can be characterised as a viable quasi-ordering for the Bushmen in their relation with the state. On the other hand, the response of the Botswana government suggests that their political security is high enough for them not to consider any alternatives that might conceivably act to reduce their apparently secure hold on power. But this situation may be more artificial than the marker of some ‘authentic’ quality in Motswana culture. In the first instance, the state is signatory to a very restricted set of international Declarations. Although signatory to the UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 1966, the Ramsar Declaration, and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, there are other such conventions that Botswana has yet to ratify. In the present context, the most noteworthy of these is ILO Convention No. 169, concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries (1989. See Appendix 2). In large measure, it is possible to consider the range of ratified conventions as a proxy for the range of choices from which a developing state and its citizens could propose social and cultural choices for which individuals (classical or hyper-modern) might express a preference ordering, or toward which they might be indifferent. Decisively, if there are more

\textsuperscript{17} Recent Greenpeace initiatives in Scandinavia seem to have adopted a more co-operative strategy than that employed in the Alta/Kautokeino protests; see Pitkanen (2005).

\textsuperscript{18} FPK – First People of Kalahari
options from which choices might be made, it is easier to make a credible case for the quasi-ordering of any possible social or cultural choices based on issues covered by such conventions.

(3) Reading Arrow’s (1951) arguments, it would be easy to dismiss the conclusions as irrelevant in a post-national environment. However, I have noted that it is possible to consider much of the ‘post’ in these objections to be ‘hype’, in the sense that the ‘posted’ concept (the nation, modernity, the War, or whatever) may in fact have shifted into a sort of hyperbolic mode of expression without any fundamental change in the logic of the concept in question. Never the less, nations still occupy most of the land surface of the planet. They still enter into, maintain, and extend relations with other nations through more or less credible multilateral arrangements (for example, the credibility of British Commonwealth membership may not be the same as membership of, say, the OECD; each organization nonetheless has clout in its more or less restricted sphere of influence, and members do well not to sniff at this). The exaggerated individuality assigned to collectives in post-modern theory applies as much to nations as to cultures and communities: all that has changed is that there are more entities that may occupy the state of nature than the nations and economic classes of classical modernity. The system of organizing social and individual preference rankings in classical modernity exploited easily understandable choices like peace and war, on the one hand, and habitually understood choosers like industrial classes and individuals on the other. That is: choices were usually made between two understandable alternatives offered to two or more choosers between them. Under these conditions, a cycling majority is not possible, and the Impossibility Theorem is effectively bypassed (Arrow, 1951: 46-48).

However, the post(hyper)modern environment of political, social and economic choice not only ensures the plurality of choosers necessary for a cycling majority, it practically guarantees a sufficiently diverse range of existing cultural and social goods, unevenly distributed, between which any regional or local society might be required to choose. In other words, the concept of development must somehow accommodate both the permanent possibility of cycling majorities if it is to meet the norm of democracy; and deal with the many, if not indefinitely so, ways that functions might be imposed or dictated in breaking the cycles. Media and civil society as major elements of the communication aspect of development are, naturally, by no means exempt from this condition. Clearly, the presence of a plurality of single-issue NGOs, news services, news media, and even entertainment media, further adds to the possibility that those involved with development are likely to have an increasingly difficult task distinguishing the wood from the trees.

In the case of the Sámi in Norway, certain issues close to Greenpeace (the effect of the Alta/Kautokeino dam on salmon spawning, for example) were effectively irrelevant as far as the Sámi were concerned. By contrast, issues close to the CKGR SanBushmen are effectively irrelevant.
in terms of the Botswana Government’s interpretation of its own constitution. Yet neither locally irrelevant issue will go away; their irrelevancy is practical and not logical, in that the former qualifier refers to issues of immediate concern, whereas the latter applies to reasoning that stands or falls with the test of reality in the long run (see Peirce, 8.12). However, the additional influence of general-issue conventions governed by multilateral bodies, whether social, economic, or political, may act to stabilise the process of formulating alternatives proper to given local or regional development. The parties faced with the task of introducing new institutions, services, policies, practices, and commodities, are effectively designing a quasi-ordering; indeed, they are offering to impose a method of summing up the preferences expressed by those party to the implementation of a new basket of goods (social, political, economic, cultural, or otherwise). At the same time, and here is where the presence of single-issue movements can complicate matters, there will be much communicational activity (not to mention activism) aimed at raising to prominence the quasi-ordering of singular participants, whether individual persons, communities, cultures, or other relevantly associated groups. This activity has the possibility of leading to the summation of preferences being dictated, at the expense of other preferences or indifference. Logically speaking, the preference ordering of the CKGR communities, as a single-issue campaign, may readily be interpreted as a potentially dictated quasi-ordering in relation to the broader policies and projects of the State; the absence of a relevant statutory foundation in a ratified convention essentially renders this issue irrelevant at worst, or at best a matter of State indifference. In the following section, I relate the foregoing to the specific topic of how development theories may give rise to irrelevant demands, and whether the nominalistic custom of treating development needs as single-issue problems hampers development instead of facilitating it.

VIII. On the Conditions of Development and the Logic of Impossibility.

It is entirely reasonable to expect of development programmes that they meet the needs of the broadest possible constituency of beneficiaries. Indeed, it would not be too much to say that the principal criticism of development theory, diffusion theory, development communication theory, and other related subjects, is that they provide insufficient guidance as to how development should be structured to meet the needs of all (see, for example, Melkote and Steeves, 2001: 332-334). An element of this criticism, then, has comprised various analyses of shortcomings in reigning concepts of democracy as this has been used in diverse ways to specify how development needs should be assessed and their fulfilment carried out. Early theory tended to attract the criticism that theories took specific models of representative government too much for granted; in general, given the prominence of US power in the post-1945 era of national liberation struggles and subsequent
programmes for Third World development, critics have noted that the US model of two-party government frequently does not serve the development needs of newly-independent states (Melkote and Steeves, 2001: 6; Servaes, 1999: 22). In response, various variations on the theme of participatory democracy have been mooted as more relevant systems for developing nations, often on the grounds that local custom and tradition are informal versions of this model, anyway (Kerr, 2001; see also Donnelly, 2001).

However, one could equally validly argue that such participatory models require considerable sophistication on the part of electorates, and that such capacities are not present in newly-liberated societies. In the present thesis I duck this issue by considering not specific models, but seeing the extent to which the matters considered above may be applicable in the cases reviewed, by applying as criteria the conditions for free choice that Arrow outlined for his analysis of social choice in modern nations. This is justifiable mainly because there is no logical contradiction involved in seeing development as a species of welfare implementation subject to the same constraints discussed above. Thus, the five conditions that Arrow imposed on the environment of choice could be considered as a reasonable set of touchstones for assessing both the formulation and the implementation of development strategies and projects. I have already discussed the two conditions that tend to define the impossibility of strictly individualistic choice models, those of non-dictatorship and non-imposition, and how readily these can logically be violated in practice. In context, they are ranked among the other three conditions defining the freedom of choice for social welfare functions as follows:

Condition 1: Sometimes labelled the `condition of unrestricted scope', this merely states that any social welfare function should aggregate some sufficiently wide range of three or more permissible individual preference rankings into a true social ordering (Arrow, 1951: 23-24).

Condition 2: The condition of Positive Association of Social and Individual Values: if one alternative social ranking rises or does not change in the preference ordering of individuals, then the same alternative should not fall in the corresponding social ordering after implementation of the welfare (here, development) function (Arrow, 1951: 25-26).

Condition 3: The condition of the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives: we shall not permit an alternative social state to include alternatives not already in the environment of choice before choosing occurs (Arrow, 1951: 26-28). The most common example used for illustrating this condition is that of the election candidate who dies or is otherwise incapacitated before the result of an election is announced; the dead candidate necessarily must be treated as irrelevant, so that
voters’ preference rankings without the deceased candidate must remain the same when aggregated into a social choice.

I have already covered Conditions 4 and 5, and merely repeat them here under the headings Arrow used in his discussion.

Condition 4: The condition of Citizens’ Sovereignty: this is the condition, based the definition reproduced in note 7 above, that a social welfare function is not to be imposed (Arrow, 1951: 28-30).

Condition 5: The condition of Non-Dictatorship: this is derived from the definition reproduced in note 8 above (Arrow, 1951: 30-31).

Each condition considered separately is highly reasonable from the point of view of the minimal requirements for a democratic state, albeit restricted to libertarian models. Using majority voting as the means of aggregating citizen preferences into a Social Welfare Function (SWF), however, although each condition “looks innocuous enough, … taken together they seem to produce a monster that gobbles up all the little SWFs in the world” (Sen, 1979: 38).

It can readily be seen that Condition 1 does not hold in environments where fewer than three preferences are offered. A two-party system in which two choices of policy or social good are offered cannot yield a cycling majority, and therefore conditions 2-5 will be met without dictatorship or imposition. In other words, the classical US system (electoral college, party primaries and all) is inherently stable, if somewhat restricted in how social goods are to be construed; welfare debate readily descends to either-or rhetoric at the expense of potentially more viable alternatives for which no party exists. Any such alternative will only enter the environment of choice at the expense of an already institutionalised welfare system. Similarly, the appearance of a third choice that garners enough support to establish a third party and three options that can be ranked, destabilises the system. There is still much that is likely to be written and said about how Ralph Nader’s\textsuperscript{19} candidacy affected the outcome of the 1999 Presidential election.

In other contexts, however, and very particularly in the developing world where multi-party proportional-representation systems are the norm, more than two choosers (in the form of party memberships acting as voting blocs) and more than three options are invariably available. Development goals, conceived as social goods to be adopted by choosing from an ordered ranking of alternatives, become subject to one or more of the following unstable outcomes: (1) cycling; (2)

\textsuperscript{19} Former administration activist in USA, who formed an independent political party in the presidential elections of 1999 and 2003. Well known for interventions on consumer issues in the 1960s and 1970s.
stasis through indifference to imposition; and/or (3) one-party rule as a dictated function finds favour with a majority. So far, the present thesis has described two fundamentally distinct examples of how states have accommodated, on the one hand, and effectively ignored on the other, an indigenous minority under their constitutional jurisdiction. I have also reviewed in outline, some of the relevant theoretical approaches to the kinds of media and communication tasks that researchers consider relevant to the business of development in contexts where indigenous minorities are present. To bring these two parts in relation to each other, I have drawn on the problem faced in an environment of social welfare choice – that is, the logical paradox stated in Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem – to suggest that development communication theory and practice must confront this paradox in order to have any confidence of accomplishing their ends in a non-dictatorial manner at least. I now conclude with a preliminary sketch of how these considerations apply to the situations covered earlier.

(1) The Sámi experience of attaining to cultural-political autonomy within the ambit of the Norwegian state indicates that minorities might best accomplish this sort of end if they can link their needs to some wider issue that is independent of their specific situation. In this particular case, the attempt by Greenpeace to impose on the Sámi campaign the environmental dispute over the Alta/Kautokeino dam’s effect on salmon spawning would effectively have introduced an irrelevant alternative into their autonomy campaign. By the same token, had Sámi activists adopted some or other Greenpeace issue, they would have imposed an irrelevant alternative onto whatever processes were already underway between themselves and the Oslo government; from the latter’s viewpoint, it would not be too much too say that the unprecedented adoption of the salmon spawning issue by Sámi negotiators and activists would have effectively meant that a Greenpeace quasi-ordering had come to dictate any possible autonomy dispensation (if, of course, the latter is construed as a social good in Arrow’s sense). However, the mobilization of cultural issues like the rock-paintings that the dam’s waters would have covered, is readily interpretable as a relevant good, and thus not in violation of Condition 3; in this matter, then, the publicity and communication capacity of Greenpeace made a positive contribution, albeit not one that would arguably have been decisive in the long run.

The Kalahari SanBushmen, quite literally, have no comparable issue to mobilize in support of their cause. The media and advocacy campaign of Survival International does not place the Botswana government under any political obligation to respond in any way at all: they have not ratified the relevant convention, and hence are not obliged to act. In effect, this leaves the Kalahari community in a kind of limbo. On the one hand, they have experienced a certain level of international academic and development support, and have some precedent in appealing to outside agencies (as, for
example, Komtsha did in appealing to Elizabeth II in a manner proper to Botswana’s pre-independence status as a British protectorate). On the other hand, these forms of support have been informed by what might best be called ‘mythical’ conceptions of Bushman identity, the perception of the community as a people trapped in time (see, for example, Tomaselli, 1996, for a critical review of these perceptions). As such, their condition leaves them caught between having to abandon what the outside world treats as their most characteristic identity mark, and preserving this identity at the expense of participation in the social goods available to other communities. When an organization like Survival assumes an advocacy role on the part of this community, therefore, it must give primacy to those elements of Bushman identity that put a heavy burden of coordination on other prospective development beneficiaries who are not part of the SanBushmen community, while actively shielding the latter from sacrificing their perceived uniqueness through the adoption of innovative social goods. In other words, the SanBushmen only benefit from development in so far as they do not benefit from it. This is sufficiently illogical not even to register as a dictated social welfare function, let alone an incomplete or insufficient one. It is a choice that practically violates all Arrow’s conditions.

(2) The dilemma that the CKGR SanBushmen face actually has little in common with the situation in which the Sámi were able to treat their autonomy as a viable social welfare alternative. Possibly the most glaring difference between their respective conditions is the lack of precedent: Bushmen have no record of coordination with any state upon which to draw, other than some limited operational alliances with South Africa’s apartheid military in Angola (Godwin, P. 2000); the Sámi could, at the very least, draw on the relatively recent experience of coordination in combat with the Norwegian anti-Nazi resistance. The longer history of Sámi coordination in Norway’s elective politics simply reinforces the precedents of any other coordination relationships that may have been forged. The Sámi situation, therefore, permitted their autonomy campaign to include continued coordination with Oslo as an option, such that this condition would have remained an element of people’s ordering after any prospective autonomy resolution. In other words, Sámi cultural autonomy would not have violated Arrow’s Condition 2. For the Kalahari communities and the Botswana state, on the other hand, any prospective coordination would effectively be an innovation, sufficiently radical to disturb the preference orderings of at least those Motswana who would be called upon to rank such coordination as an option. Effectively, this is interpretable as a change that would violate Condition 2, because to add this alternative to people’s existing ordering is to change that ordering. Another strategy is therefore necessary, which, naturally, is likely to violate either Condition 4 or Condition 5, if not both.
(3) The Botswana government is in the interesting situation that they have no option but to consider any form of targeted development, whether benefiting the SanBushmen or any other minority (indigenous or otherwise), as an irrelevant alternative that violates Condition 3. Were government analysts to recognize this, however, they would also have to acknowledge their failure to coordinate with other nations constitutes an individual quasi-ordering that defines what preferences other nations ought to hold; that is to say, to acknowledge Bushmen’s development as violating Condition 3 requires that the Botswana government violate Condition 5. They are effectively dictating an indigenous-minority welfare function to the international community, to the extent of dragging out FPK’s court challenge – launched in 2002, first heard in July 2004, postponed in August, and still to be renewed (US Dept. of State, 2005) – and thereby keeping the matter sub judice. Thus the State’s argument that the Basarwa have no special claim to indigenous status remains tied up in litigation, delaying any challenge to the reigning public and academic opinion (see, for example, Malebane, Appendix 5).

IX. Conclusion.

Analysing development communication by conceiving ‘development’ as a species of social and cultural good institutionalised through a welfare function, permits one to proceed from the logical basis of Arrow’s Theorem. This has the added advantage that Arrow (1951: 21) explicitly acknowledged the philosophical doctrine of Nominalism as the basis for modern conceptions of society, welfare, and community. Since the post-modern paradigm is itself in practice radically nominalist, therefore, there seems to be no reason for excluding Arrow’s somewhat disconcerting conclusion from consideration when confronting Africa’s generally disappointing experience of development since the first wave of independence in the 1950s. It was Arnold Shepperson, who is exploring features of Arrow’s deduction that show a remarkable parallel with the logical work of C.S. Peirce, who suggested the logically persuasive isomorphism of the process of development implementation with the process of social welfare choices. There is some risk in having followed this line of analysis, of course, because the development communication literature has no references to Arrow. It may be too easy, for example, to accept Arrow’s five conditions without asking if these do not reflect too much of a bias in favour of American political ideals. But, as we developed the analysis of a mountain of development theory it became clear that the often fractiously contradictory positions taken by theorists frequently reflect norms that by no means depart from Arrow.

Thus the contemporary focus on the necessity for establishing and nurturing participatory practices in development quite reasonably follow from Arrow’s Conditions 2 and 4, that is, of the positive
association of individual and social values, and of citizens’ sovereignty, respectively. The Sámi experience, by the same token, has shown some reason to accept as valid Condition 3, the independence of irrelevant alternatives. It was somewhat surprising, therefore, to discover that the attitude of the Botswana government in respect of SanBushman development needs, can also be logically described in terms of Arrow’s conditions: a state that is not signatory to some international or multilateral convention, agreement, or protocol is **logically indifferent** to the issue the relevant agreement covers. There is no violation of Condition 3 if the Botswana government chooses to ignore the SanBushman development problem; but this is accomplished at the price of violating Condition 4.

An odd outcome of the present analysis has been that Arrow’s **five** original (1951) conditions seem to work better in the broader context of development, than the **four** he proposed in the second edition of his classic (1963). It is clear when viewing the original conditions 2 and 4 together, that they represent a weakened version of the Pareto Principle (which essentially states that if everybody prefers some $x$ to some $y$, then $x$ is to be chosen – or $y$ excluded – as a social decision). Even these reduced conditions still conclude with the Impossibility Result. As Sen (1982: 288-290) has noted, however, attempts to weaken this and other conditions, particularly 3 and 4 enumerated above, often lead to even more outlandish results that defy any attempt at fitting them into anything remotely resembling a modern democratic dispensation. It would appear that keeping the original conditions 2 and 4 instead of combining them into the weakened Pareto Principle accommodates the logical status of agencies that fall outside of the classes, individuals, and states that comprise the actors in classical welfare economics. Especially in respect of the relations between states and indigenous minorities, the role of civil-society and non-governmental participants can be understood as influencing the preferences of minority groupings generally. However, because such bodies are generally constituted around single issues instead of a more or less complete basket of welfare goods, there are two possible outcomes that are best analysed under Arrow’s original second and fourth conditions:

1) whether, for a development-welfare organization $A$ that advocates around any given issue $x_i$ in relation to a minority $M$, contradictions might arise if other organizations $A^I, A^II, \ldots$ and so on, advocate single-issue alternatives $y, z, \ldots$ and so on in the same environment of choice; and

2) whether such situations as encountered in practice in contexts like, amongst others, Mozambique, Papua New Guinea, the Balkans, and East Timor, also exhibit the logical properties I have elaborated above.

There seems, therefore, to be some value for the development sector in adopting Arrow’s Theorem as a touchstone for assessing providers’ and facilitators’ qualitative compliance with norms of
democratic practice in the broad modern constitutional sense common among developing nations. At the same time, however, the logical consequence of these proportional multiparty systems is the permanent possibility for cycling majorities to occur in the aggregation of social choices; in respect of development, Arrow’s conclusion that this paradox is only avoided by imposing or dictating a summation of preferences has to be confronted. That a given grouping within a community – like the Sámi Reindeer Herders’ association, for example, or the group associated with Bushman leader Dawid Kruiper in South Africa (McLennan-Dodd 2003: 29) – may appropriate to itself the role of the ‘public face’ of all members of an indigenous minority, should also be analysed through the lens of the Impossibility Theorem. Such developments also raise an important question: what qualities define a community as indigenous when there are such widely disparate developmental outcomes between groups that equally qualify as such under the rubric of ILO Convention 169? Article 1 of the latter provides two definitions applicable of indigenous peoples as:

… tribal peoples in independent countries whose social, cultural and economic conditions distinguish them from other sections of the national community, and whose status is regulated wholly or partially by their own customs or traditions or by special laws or regulations; [or]

… peoples in independent countries who are regarded as indigenous on account of their descent from the populations which inhabited the country, or a geographical region to which the country belongs, at the time of conquest or colonisation or the establishment of present state boundaries and who, irrespective of their legal status, retain some or all of their own social, economic, cultural and political institutions. (ILO, 1989: 1.1a, 1.1b)

Clearly, both definitions may be interpreted as applicable to the Sámi, while only the second is equally clearly relevant to the San of Central Botswana. In the case of the Sámi, historical records and recollected experience of co-ordination between communities of the first kind and their co-citizens in national states, appear to have an influence on development possibilities.

On the other hand, the absence of independent records of a community’s presence in a territory (such as, for example, may be inferred from Roman writings about the inhabitants of Scandinavia) opens up space for indigenous status to be either claimed, imposed or dictated. The former mode of ascription naturally applies when a community’s status is reviewed jointly by government, community and civil society in terms of the criteria developed for ILO Convention 169; the latter mode may be well resorted to by any one party’s further ends that might conflict with conventionally co-ordinated goals enshrined in, say, a country’s national constitution. Ironically, therefore, the Botswana government’s insistence that the CKGR San Bushmen will develop as a community outside the CKGR, and ‘represent themselves convincingly’ when they have exploited “the right and access to education” (Carte Blanche, 26 February, 2002), seems to offer more potential for ultimate cultural autonomy than presently seems to be the case. As with the Sámi, who were in a better position to co-ordinate with their Nordic fellow countrymen after the early ‘Norwegianization’ policies of the
early 20th century, so the CKGR communities may yet find that future opportunities to redress their present dearth of historical co-ordination will be more readily recognized and grasped after a generation or two of imposed development. It is thus worth taking note of the ILO Convention’s article on the relocation of indigenous peoples, which states that if

… the relocation of these peoples is considered necessary as an exceptional measure, such relocation shall take place only with their free and informed consent. Where their consent cannot be obtained, such relocation shall take place only following appropriate procedures established by national laws and regulations, including public inquiries where appropriate, which provide the opportunity for effective representation of the peoples concerned (ILO 1989: 16.2; emphasis added).

Indeed, this may indicate that the strongest element of the Basarwa case is that the Government take development to the community. Even if this strategy entails the opening of the Game Reserve to some controlled mining or other interests, a move like this appears to have the potential to make development opportunities available to all the communities of the Central Kalahari. As such, development of this type entails a form of imposition that can readily be monitored in terms of independent criteria associated with wildlife and environmental conservation, all the while opening up new options toward which the Basarwa and the other Central Kalahari communities can develop relations of preference or indifference. Given the role of development in the creation of independent preferences among the Sámi, comparably imposed conditions in Botswana seem logically to offer a more viable strategic option than activism.

To close, then, I would suggest that development advocates and activists consider it an imperative that dictated functions be treated as unacceptable, in line with any form of democratic practice. On the other hand, and this was the most unexpected conclusion reached, it may be best that the civil society sector accept that development goals, as social goods introduced as innovations in previously marginal societies, can only be institutionalised by imposition. A marginal community towards whom a state is indifferent, may therefore benefit more directly from solutions imposed more explicitly for the benefit of other communities. This is, simply, because their marginal status renders their needs as irrelevant alternatives in the overall ordering of government preferences (perceived as violating Condition 3). On the other hand, some measure of coordination between their interests and those of their neighbours is easier to accomplish, in so far as these neighbours’ interests have a presence on the state’s radar screen. The task for the development agencies, then, is to assist those closest to all the communities in a given environment of choice, to facilitate adoption of innovations within the most marginal communities, and ameliorate the disruption such innovation necessarily brings. Put differently: a dictated solution entails a single community’s interest being elevated to the status of determining what will be the interest of all; an imposed solution has the potential at least to account for a range of interests, even if not immediately satisfying any one of them completely:
If we are to live our lives in peace and harmony, and if we are to achieve our ambition of improving the conditions under which we live, we must have both freedom and discipline. For freedom without discipline is anarchy, and discipline without freedom is tyranny (Nyerere, 1974: 34).
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3. Film.


Appendix 1. The Komtsha Komtsha letter to the Queen of England.

Her Highness,
The Queen of England,
England.

Dear Great Queen,

My name is Komtsha. I am an old man. I am a Bushman. If we are too small, or if you have forgotten, you must ask other people what a Bushman is and where they live.

When I saw a man from England, I asked him to give message to you. It is the message of our pain and suffering. The [Tswana] people are stealing the land from my people. I must answer my people. I say I do not know why they [the Tswana] can come and do so. The Great Woman from England will know. She will know the truth.

Not very long ago you gave the Tswana people their land [at independence in 1966]. At that time when you came here what did you see? Were there only trees and black people here? Is that why you did not talk to us? The Tswana people think you have given us to them. They do not understand you did not see us and that is a mistake.

If you did not give us to them, then you must tell them now that they must let us go. They are killing our land. They do not understand the animals or the land. They are wasting everything and soon nobody will be able to live. We have always lived with the animals. They are our friends. The Tswana people are chasing us away from the animals.

You must not answer the Tswana people. This is my word to you. You must send your word to me.

I must first see your answer before we can talk to the Tswana people.

Please do not wait too long,

Kompsha Komtsha

This letter was written by one of the leaders of the Central Kalahari Bushmen. It was never delivered to the Queen and was published for the first time in Africa Reports, 29th April 2005 (Bridgland, 2005) with the heading “Bushmen to be Denied Homeland” According to this article, Komtsha was unable to persuade anyone to deliver the letter before he died. During our journey through the CKGR, it was more than one time we heard about letters written to the Queen of England.
Appendix 2. C169 Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, 1989

Convention concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries
(Note: Date of coming into force: 05:09:1991.)
Convention: C169
Place: Geneva
Session of the Conference: 76
Date of adoption: 27:06:1989
Subject classification: Indigenous and Tribal Peoples
Subject: Indigenous and Tribal Peoples

The General Conference of the International Labour Organisation,

Having been convened at Geneva by the Governing Body of the International Labour Office, and
having met in its 76th Session on 7 June 1989, and

Noting the international standards contained in the Indigenous and Tribal Populations Convention
and Recommendation, 1957, and

Recalling the terms of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and
the many international instruments on the prevention of discrimination, and

Considering that the developments which have taken place in international law since 1957, as well as
developments in the situation of indigenous and tribal peoples in all regions of the world, have made
it appropriate to adopt new international standards on the subject with a view to removing the
assimilationist orientation of the earlier standards, and

Recognising the aspirations of these peoples to exercise control over their own institutions, ways of
life and economic development and to maintain and develop their identities, languages and religions,
within the framework of the States in which they live, and

Noting that in many parts of the world these peoples are unable to enjoy their fundamental human
rights to the same degree as the rest of the population of the States within which they live, and that
their laws, values, customs and perspectives have often been eroded, and

Calling attention to the distinctive contributions of indigenous and tribal peoples to the cultural
diversity and social and ecological harmony of humankind and to international co-operation and
understanding, and

Noting that the following provisions have been framed with the co-operation of the United Nations,
the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations, the United Nations Educational,
Scientific and Cultural Organisation and the World Health Organisation, as well as of the Inter-
American Indian Institute, at appropriate levels and in their respective fields, and that it is proposed
to continue this co-operation in promoting and securing the application of these provisions, and
Having decided upon the adoption of certain proposals with regard to the partial revision of the Indigenous and Tribal Populations Convention, 1957 (No. 107), which is the fourth item on the agenda of the session, and

Having determined that these proposals shall take the form of an international Convention revising the Indigenous and Tribal Populations Convention, 1957;

adopts this twenty-seventh day of June of the year one thousand nine hundred and eighty-nine the following Convention, which may be cited as the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, 1989;

PART I. GENERAL POLICY

Article 1

1. This Convention applies to:

(a) tribal peoples in independent countries whose social, cultural and economic conditions distinguish them from other sections of the national community, and whose status is regulated wholly or partially by their own customs or traditions or by special laws or regulations;

(b) peoples in independent countries who are regarded as indigenous on account of their descent from the populations which inhabited the country, or a geographical region to which the country belongs, at the time of conquest or colonisation or the establishment of present state boundaries and who, irrespective of their legal status, retain some or all of their own social, economic, cultural and political institutions.

2. Self-identification as indigenous or tribal shall be regarded as a fundamental criterion for determining the groups to which the provisions of this Convention apply.

3. The use of the term peoples in this Convention shall not be construed as having any implications as regards the rights which may attach to the term under international law.

Article 2

1. Governments shall have the responsibility for developing, with the participation of the peoples concerned, co-ordinated and systematic action to protect the rights of these peoples and to guarantee respect for their integrity.

2. Such action shall include measures for:

(a) ensuring that members of these peoples benefit on an equal footing from the rights and opportunities which national laws and regulations grant to other members of the population;

(b) promoting the full realisation of the social, economic and cultural rights of these peoples with respect for their social and cultural identity, their customs and traditions and their institutions;

(c) assisting the members of the peoples concerned to eliminate socio-economic gaps that may exist between indigenous and other members of the national community, in a manner compatible with their aspirations and ways of life.
Article 3

1. Indigenous and tribal peoples shall enjoy the full measure of human rights and fundamental freedoms without hindrance or discrimination. The provisions of the Convention shall be applied without discrimination to male and female members of these peoples.

2. No form of force or coercion shall be used in violation of the human rights and fundamental freedoms of the peoples concerned, including the rights contained in this Convention.

Article 4

1. Special measures shall be adopted as appropriate for safeguarding the persons, institutions, property, labour, cultures and environment of the peoples concerned.

2. Such special measures shall not be contrary to the freely-expressed wishes of the peoples concerned.

3. Enjoyment of the general rights of citizenship, without discrimination, shall not be prejudiced in any way by such special measures.

Article 5

In applying the provisions of this Convention:

(a) the social, cultural, religious and spiritual values and practices of these peoples shall be recognised and protected, and due account shall be taken of the nature of the problems which face them both as groups and as individuals;

(b) the integrity of the values, practices and institutions of these peoples shall be respected;

(c) policies aimed at mitigating the difficulties experienced by these peoples in facing new conditions of life and work shall be adopted, with the participation and co-operation of the peoples affected.

Article 6

1. In applying the provisions of this Convention, governments shall:

(a) consult the peoples concerned, through appropriate procedures and in particular through their representative institutions, whenever consideration is being given to legislative or administrative measures which may affect them directly;

(b) establish means by which these peoples can freely participate, to at least the same extent as other sectors of the population, at all levels of decision-making in elective institutions and administrative and other bodies responsible for policies and programmes which concern them;

(c) establish means for the full development of these peoples' own institutions and initiatives, and in appropriate cases provide the resources necessary for this purpose.

2. The consultations carried out in application of this Convention shall be undertaken, in good faith and in a form appropriate to the circumstances, with the objective of achieving agreement or consent to the proposed measures.
Article 7

1. The peoples concerned shall have the right to decide their own priorities for the process of development as it affects their lives, beliefs, institutions and spiritual well-being and the lands they occupy or otherwise use, and to exercise control, to the extent possible, over their own economic, social and cultural development. In addition, they shall participate in the formulation, implementation and evaluation of plans and programmes for national and regional development which may affect them directly.

2. The improvement of the conditions of life and work and levels of health and education of the peoples concerned, with their participation and co-operation, shall be a matter of priority in plans for the overall economic development of areas they inhabit. Special projects for development of the areas in question shall also be so designed as to promote such improvement.

3. Governments shall ensure that, whenever appropriate, studies are carried out, in co-operation with the peoples concerned, to assess the social, spiritual, cultural and environmental impact on them of planned development activities. The results of these studies shall be considered as fundamental criteria for the implementation of these activities.

4. Governments shall take measures, in co-operation with the peoples concerned, to protect and preserve the environment of the territories they inhabit.

Article 8

1. In applying national laws and regulations to the peoples concerned, due regard shall be had to their customs or customary laws.

2. These peoples shall have the right to retain their own customs and institutions, where these are not incompatible with fundamental rights defined by the national legal system and with internationally recognised human rights. Procedures shall be established, whenever necessary, to resolve conflicts which may arise in the application of this principle.

3. The application of paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article shall not prevent members of these peoples from exercising the rights granted to all citizens and from assuming the corresponding duties.

Article 9

1. To the extent compatible with the national legal system and internationally recognised human rights, the methods customarily practised by the peoples concerned for dealing with offences committed by their members shall be respected.

2. The customs of these peoples in regard to penal matters shall be taken into consideration by the authorities and courts dealing with such cases.

Article 10

1. In imposing penalties laid down by general law on members of these peoples account shall be taken of their economic, social and cultural characteristics.

2. Preference shall be given to methods of punishment other than confinement in prison.

Article 11
The exaction from members of the peoples concerned of compulsory personal services in any form, whether paid or unpaid, shall be prohibited and punishable by law, except in cases prescribed by law for all citizens.

Article 12

The peoples concerned shall be safeguarded against the abuse of their rights and shall be able to take legal proceedings, either individually or through their representative bodies, for the effective protection of these rights. Measures shall be taken to ensure that members of these peoples can understand and be understood in legal proceedings, where necessary through the provision of interpretation or by other effective means.

PART II. LAND

Article 13

1. In applying the provisions of this Part of the Convention governments shall respect the special importance for the cultures and spiritual values of the peoples concerned of their relationship with the lands or territories, or both as applicable, which they occupy or otherwise use, and in particular the collective aspects of this relationship.

2. The use of the term lands in Articles 15 and 16 shall include the concept of territories, which covers the total environment of the areas which the peoples concerned occupy or otherwise use.

Article 14

1. The rights of ownership and possession of the peoples concerned over the lands which they traditionally occupy shall be recognised. In addition, measures shall be taken in appropriate cases to safeguard the right of the peoples concerned to use lands not exclusively occupied by them, but to which they have traditionally had access for their subsistence and traditional activities. Particular attention shall be paid to the situation of nomadic peoples and shifting cultivators in this respect.

2. Governments shall take steps as necessary to identify the lands which the peoples concerned traditionally occupy, and to guarantee effective protection of their rights of ownership and possession.

3. Adequate procedures shall be established within the national legal system to resolve land claims by the peoples concerned.

Article 15

1. The rights of the peoples concerned to the natural resources pertaining to their lands shall be specially safeguarded. These rights include the right of these peoples to participate in the use, management and conservation of these resources.

2. In cases in which the State retains the ownership of mineral or sub-surface resources or rights to other resources pertaining to lands, governments shall establish or maintain procedures through which they shall consult these peoples, with a view to ascertaining whether and to what degree their interests would be prejudiced, before undertaking or permitting any programmes for the exploration or exploitation of such resources pertaining to their lands. The peoples concerned shall wherever
possible participate in the benefits of such activities, and shall receive fair compensation for any damages which they may sustain as a result of such activities.

Article 16

1. Subject to the following paragraphs of this Article, the peoples concerned shall not be removed from the lands which they occupy.

2. Where the relocation of these peoples is considered necessary as an exceptional measure, such relocation shall take place only with their free and informed consent. Where their consent cannot be obtained, such relocation shall take place only following appropriate procedures established by national laws and regulations, including public inquiries where appropriate, which provide the opportunity for effective representation of the peoples concerned.

3. Whenever possible, these peoples shall have the right to return to their traditional lands, as soon as the grounds for relocation cease to exist.

4. When such return is not possible, as determined by agreement or, in the absence of such agreement, through appropriate procedures, these peoples shall be provided in all possible cases with lands of quality and legal status at least equal to that of the lands previously occupied by them, suitable to provide for their present needs and future development. Where the peoples concerned express a preference for compensation in money or in kind, they shall be so compensated under appropriate guarantees.

5. Persons thus relocated shall be fully compensated for any resulting loss or injury.

Article 17

1. Procedures established by the peoples concerned for the transmission of land rights among members of these peoples shall be respected.

2. The peoples concerned shall be consulted whenever consideration is being given to their capacity to alienate their lands or otherwise transmit their rights outside their own community.

3. Persons not belonging to these peoples shall be prevented from taking advantage of their customs or of lack of understanding of the laws on the part of their members to secure the ownership, possession or use of land belonging to them.

Article 18

Adequate penalties shall be established by law for unauthorised intrusion upon, or use of, the lands of the peoples concerned, and governments shall take measures to prevent such offences.

Article 19

National agrarian programmes shall secure to the peoples concerned treatment equivalent to that accorded to other sectors of the population with regard to:

(a) the provision of more land for these peoples when they have not the area necessary for providing the essentials of a normal existence, or for any possible increase in their numbers;

(b) the provision of the means required to promote the development of the lands which these peoples already possess.
PART III. RECRUITMENT AND CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT

Article 20

1. Governments shall, within the framework of national laws and regulations, and in co-operation with the peoples concerned, adopt special measures to ensure the effective protection with regard to recruitment and conditions of employment of workers belonging to these peoples, to the extent that they are not effectively protected by laws applicable to workers in general.

2. Governments shall do everything possible to prevent any discrimination between workers belonging to the peoples concerned and other workers, in particular as regards:

   (a) admission to employment, including skilled employment, as well as measures for promotion and advancement;

   (b) equal remuneration for work of equal value;

   (c) medical and social assistance, occupational safety and health, all social security benefits and any other occupationally related benefits, and housing;

   (d) the right of association and freedom for all lawful trade union activities, and the right to conclude collective agreements with employers or employers' organisations.

3. The measures taken shall include measures to ensure:

   (a) that workers belonging to the peoples concerned, including seasonal, casual and migrant workers in agricultural and other employment, as well as those employed by labour contractors, enjoy the protection afforded by national law and practice to other such workers in the same sectors, and that they are fully informed of their rights under labour legislation and of the means of redress available to them;

   (b) that workers belonging to these peoples are not subjected to working conditions hazardous to their health, in particular through exposure to pesticides or other toxic substances;

   (c) that workers belonging to these peoples are not subjected to coercive recruitment systems, including bonded labour and other forms of debt servitude;

   (d) that workers belonging to these peoples enjoy equal opportunities and equal treatment in employment for men and women, and protection from sexual harassment.

4. Particular attention shall be paid to the establishment of adequate labour inspection services in areas where workers belonging to the peoples concerned undertake wage employment, in order to ensure compliance with the provisions of this Part of this Convention.

PART IV. VOCATIONAL TRAINING, HANDICRAFTS AND RURAL INDUSTRIES

Article 21
Members of the peoples concerned shall enjoy opportunities at least equal to those of other citizens in respect of vocational training measures.

Article 22

1. Measures shall be taken to promote the voluntary participation of members of the peoples concerned in vocational training programmes of general application.

2. Whenever existing programmes of vocational training of general application do not meet the special needs of the peoples concerned, governments shall, with the participation of these peoples, ensure the provision of special training programmes and facilities.

3. Any special training programmes shall be based on the economic environment, social and cultural conditions and practical needs of the peoples concerned. Any studies made in this connection shall be carried out in co-operation with these peoples, who shall be consulted on the organisation and operation of such programmes. Where feasible, these peoples shall progressively assume responsibility for the organisation and operation of such special training programmes, if they so decide.

Article 23

1. Handicrafts, rural and community-based industries, and subsistence economy and traditional activities of the peoples concerned, such as hunting, fishing, trapping and gathering, shall be recognised as important factors in the maintenance of their cultures and in their economic self-reliance and development. Governments shall, with the participation of these people and whenever appropriate, ensure that these activities are strengthened and promoted.

2. Upon the request of the peoples concerned, appropriate technical and financial assistance shall be provided wherever possible, taking into account the traditional technologies and cultural characteristics of these peoples, as well as the importance of sustainable and equitable development.

PART V. SOCIAL SECURITY AND HEALTH

Article 24

Social security schemes shall be extended progressively to cover the peoples concerned, and applied without discrimination against them.

Article 25

1. Governments shall ensure that adequate health services are made available to the peoples concerned, or shall provide them with resources to allow them to design and deliver such services under their own responsibility and control, so that they may enjoy the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health.

2. Health services shall, to the extent possible, be community-based. These services shall be planned and administered in co-operation with the peoples concerned and take into account their economic, geographic, social and cultural conditions as well as their traditional preventive care, healing practices and medicines.
3. The health care system shall give preference to the training and employment of local community health workers, and focus on primary health care while maintaining strong links with other levels of health care services.

4. The provision of such health services shall be co-ordinated with other social, economic and cultural measures in the country.

PART VI. EDUCATION AND MEANS OF COMMUNICATION

Article 26

Measures shall be taken to ensure that members of the peoples concerned have the opportunity to acquire education at all levels on at least an equal footing with the rest of the national community.

Article 27

1. Education programmes and services for the peoples concerned shall be developed and implemented in co-operation with them to address their special needs, and shall incorporate their histories, their knowledge and technologies, their value systems and their further social, economic and cultural aspirations.

2. The competent authority shall ensure the training of members of these peoples and their involvement in the formulation and implementation of education programmes, with a view to the progressive transfer of responsibility for the conduct of these programmes to these peoples as appropriate.

3. In addition, governments shall recognise the right of these peoples to establish their own educational institutions and facilities, provided that such institutions meet minimum standards established by the competent authority in consultation with these peoples. Appropriate resources shall be provided for this purpose.

Article 28

1. Children belonging to the peoples concerned shall, wherever practicable, be taught to read and write in their own indigenous language or in the language most commonly used by the group to which they belong. When this is not practicable, the competent authorities shall undertake consultations with these peoples with a view to the adoption of measures to achieve this objective.

2. Adequate measures shall be taken to ensure that these peoples have the opportunity to attain fluency in the national language or in one of the official languages of the country.

3. Measures shall be taken to preserve and promote the development and practice of the indigenous languages of the peoples concerned.

Article 29

The imparting of general knowledge and skills that will help children belonging to the peoples concerned to participate fully and on an equal footing in their own community and in the national community shall be an aim of education for these peoples.
Article 30

1. Governments shall adopt measures appropriate to the traditions and cultures of the peoples concerned, to make known to them their rights and duties, especially in regard to labour, economic opportunities, education and health matters, social welfare and their rights deriving from this Convention.

2. If necessary, this shall be done by means of written translations and through the use of mass communications in the languages of these peoples.

Article 31

Educational measures shall be taken among all sections of the national community, and particularly among those that are in most direct contact with the peoples concerned, with the object of eliminating prejudices that they may harbour in respect of these peoples. To this end, efforts shall be made to ensure that history textbooks and other educational materials provide a fair, accurate and informative portrayal of the societies and cultures of these peoples.

PART VII. CONTACTS AND CO-OPERATION ACROSS BORDERS

Article 32

Governments shall take appropriate measures, including by means of international agreements, to facilitate contacts and co-operation between indigenous and tribal peoples across borders, including activities in the economic, social, cultural, spiritual and environmental fields.

PART VIII. ADMINISTRATION

Article 33

1. The governmental authority responsible for the matters covered in this Convention shall ensure that agencies or other appropriate mechanisms exist to administer the programmes affecting the peoples concerned, and shall ensure that they have the means necessary for the proper fulfilment of the functions assigned to them.

2. These programmes shall include:

(a) the planning, co-ordination, execution and evaluation, in co-operation with the peoples concerned, of the measures provided for in this Convention;

(b) the proposing of legislative and other measures to the competent authorities and supervision of the application of the measures taken, in co-operation with the peoples concerned.

PART IX. GENERAL PROVISIONS

Article 34
The nature and scope of the measures to be taken to give effect to this Convention shall be determined in a flexible manner, having regard to the conditions characteristic of each country.

Article 35

The application of the provisions of this Convention shall not adversely affect rights and benefits of the peoples concerned pursuant to other Conventions and Recommendations, international instruments, treaties, or national laws, awards, custom or agreements.

PART X. FINAL PROVISIONS

Article 36

This Convention revises the Indigenous and Tribal Populations Convention, 1957.

Article 37

The formal ratifications of this Convention shall be communicated to the Director-General of the International Labour Office for registration.

Article 38

1. This Convention shall be binding only upon those Members of the International Labour Organisation whose ratifications have been registered with the Director-General.

2. It shall come into force twelve months after the date on which the ratifications of two Members have been registered with the Director-General.

3. Thereafter, this Convention shall come into force for any Member twelve months after the date on which its ratification has been registered.

Article 39

1. A Member which has ratified this Convention may denounce it after the expiration of ten years from the date on which the Convention first comes into force, by an act communicated to the Director-General of the International Labour Office for registration. Such denunciation shall not take effect until one year after the date on which it is registered.

2. Each Member which has ratified this Convention and which does not, within the year following the expiration of the period of ten years mentioned in the preceding paragraph, exercise the right of denunciation provided for in this Article, will be bound for another period of ten years and, thereafter, may denounce this Convention at the expiration of each period of ten years under the terms provided for in this Article.

Article 40

1. The Director-General of the International Labour Office shall notify all Members of the International Labour Organisation of the registration of all ratifications and denunciations communicated to him by the Members of the Organisation.
2. When notifying the Members of the Organisation of the registration of the second ratification communicated to him, the Director-General shall draw the attention of the Members of the Organisation to the date upon which the Convention will come into force.

Article 41

The Director-General of the International Labour Office shall communicate to the Secretary-General of the United Nations for registration in accordance with Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations full particulars of all ratifications and acts of denunciation registered by him in accordance with the provisions of the preceding Articles.

Article 42

At such times as it may consider necessary the Governing Body of the International Labour Office shall present to the General Conference a report on the working of this Convention and shall examine the desirability of placing on the agenda of the Conference the question of its revision in whole or in part.

Article 43

1. Should the Conference adopt a new Convention revising this Convention in whole or in part, then, unless the new Convention otherwise provides-

(a) the ratification by a Member of the new revising Convention shall ipso jure involve the immediate denunciation of this Convention, notwithstanding the provisions of Article 39 above, if and when the new revising Convention shall have come into force;

(b) as from the date when the new revising Convention comes into force this Convention shall cease to be open to ratification by the Members.

2. This Convention shall in any case remain in force in its actual form and content for those Members which have ratified it but have not ratified the revising Convention.

Article 44

The English and French versions of the text of this Convention are equally authoritative.

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Appendix 3. Log Tape 1: Kukama Settlement (translated from Setswana).

Time inn (TC): Kukama settlement

12:33:00 Them: What did the wild life authorities say to you?

US: They did not say much, they just asked if where we were going to pass, which gate. Then we went in (CKGR).

US: Do you guys often get people passing here and asking you guys questions?

12:34:32 Woman in Red: Not many people come around and ask questions except some American tourist who come around and ask questions.

US: Have you heard of an organisation called survival international?

12:35:44 Woman in Red: We know some but we don’t know others, they all look the same, they are all white! But we have heard about that organisation.

US: Is this the place were you guys grew up, has you family always been here?

12:36:48 Woman in Red: This is our home, this is our mother and our father was also buried here and so did our grandparents whose graves are also here. I can just say it’s a place of my ancestors have lived (comments the woman with a green head cloth). In general the family history is here.

US: back in time, has the Botswana government tried to remove you or tried to sabotage your way of living here.

12:38:24 Them: ever, we have never heard of such a thing, the reason why we are surprised is because now, it’s the very first time we ever hear that we have to move

US: what reasons did the government give them for moving?

12:39:45 Woman in red: they say we should move for the wild animals, and I don’t understand because our grandparents stayed here with these wild animals and we grew with them and its just the way of our lives. Now all of a sudden we are told to move.

US: where are you supposed to move to?

12:41:05 They, (the Government officials) say we should move to New Xadi and Kaudane, but we don’t want our kids to come back to the reserve to see the animals with money because we don’t. Have the money; we want them to grow up with the privilege of experiencing to live with the wild animals as we did
Us: so do you want the life which is outside of the reserve, with TV., schools, hospitals etc.

12:42:15 Them: no, no, no! We really can’t cope being out there, being alcoholics and that’s what we are not used to here, and people who have gone out there are alcoholics

Us: what about the hospitals that have been built outside the reserve for you?

12:44:05 Them: well if we can still move when we are sick, we’d rather just ride our donkey’s from here and back, but moving, no! -even if you die we die on the way.

Us: so what is this paper on the tree for? (Government sticker in the nearby tree with information of survey with a plane in low altitude)

12:45:15 Woman in red: Ah, we were just told that an aeroplane will be in the area soon, so we shouldn’t be afraid when we see it

Us: do u guys know what it (the plane) is coming to do here?

12:46:10 No, we only hear that its here to survey the soil, weather they are looking for diamonds we don’t know.

Us: Does u know that there are diamonds in the area?

12:47:03 Woman in red: We do not know really, but we are saying that since we are people who reside here, we deserve to be politely asked and not just be walked upon as if we are not human. We should be respected, even if they survey and find these diamonds they should not just take us by storm. The least that can be done is tell us that we found something in your land and politely step aside, like they would do for every body. Like u see how you guys came here and asked us politely if u could talk to us, which was the way, not just coming here to the CKGR forcing cameras in our faces just because we are Basarwa’s. No, that approach doesn’t work.

Us: when was the first time u heard that you had to move out from the reserve?

12:48:30 Them: we had water drums here and they are now taken

Us: how does u get water now? (The question started a long section of statements; the following is an abstract of repeated monologues from most of the group gathered around “our” tree).

12:49:30 Please we beg you people as you go around please tell your fellow people about us, well not the government coz that will just be a death sentence. Please voice our complaints.

12:50:30 They (the government) has served us with death sentence, I mean when you take water, medical facilities, it means that even if you die it does not matter. I’m afraid of saying this.

12:51:43 Our grand parents did not drink water often, only when it rained. Their bodies were used to that. Even we could have been like that, we don’t know what thought the government to come and give us water, food and medical facilities.
If I was to give you an example now: If u bring me something today and I eat it and bring it again tomorrow, I’ll get used to it and think this is the person who can help me live better. That what the government did, he made us get used to water and that a person got medical facilities and food. Now that we are not getting those things we are really struggling.

I am surprised by the fact that I used to get pension money from the government and it suddenly stopped.

They stopped the money in 2002. They don’t give the money until she moves out.
Appendix 4. Log Tape 2: Molapo Settlement (translated from Setswana).

Time Inn (TC): Molapo Settlement

US: How come that you are still inside CKGR
13:27:45 We had left and came back. There was nobody here, we had all gone and came back. We left that summer and came back the same winter.

US: Why did you come back?
13:28:55 We never wanted to leave from here.

US: Then why did you move initially?
13:29:22 Because we were pressurised/forced.

US: Are you not afraid to be here since you had left the park (the question brings discussion)?
13:30:28 This is our land; we don’t know it as a park because we originated here. This is just a new generation thing. Back in Seretse Khama days we never heard this.
13:30:49 The Government says we went and asked to move which is not true
13:31:28 They were saying we should move from here because it is a place for wild animals when we did not want to move. That’s why we are back; now it is a case we don’t even know who is going to win.
13:33:55 They don’t want white people coming here, -initially they had locked the gates, we went and told people who are representing us, and then they were opened.

US: Where do you get your water from?
13:35:14 initially, the government gave us water then they took everything away.

US: did you have water tanks here or what?
13:36:05 They used to deliver water to us.

US: How do you get your pensions?
13:36:52 We get it outside. Before, they brought the money to us.

US: Where do you get the water from now?
13:37:30 Nowhere, only when it rains. We plough and get watermelons and drink.
US: If you are allowed to live here. How do you earn a living?

13:38:10 When I am here I don’t need a lot of things.

US: Why don’t you want to go and live in a settlement with hospitals, schools and modern facilities?

13:39:10 I don’t want to live in a land that is not mine. Those things, if we want them, they must bring them to us here.

US: How many people are living in this settlement?

(No answer)

US: Are you allowed to hunt?

13:44:35 No, we are afraid.

US: The same question I asked before to someone, they said that the animals are dangerous for you.

13:45:06 What do they kill? There is no animal dangerous to us. That’s a lie. There are lions here, they are our pals, when they kill we go to their pray and take the rest of what the lions kills.

US: Why does not the government see this?

13:45:00 I don’t understand because what you are talking about. I was thought by god, not a human being.

US: So the government never discussed with you the developments that would occur outside the park?

13:47:54 They said we were going to find white houses there build for us.

US: So no schools were there

13:48:29 The schools are there but they are theirs not ours.

13:49:50 Before they made schools for us at Xadi and said they were ours, so how did it happened that they moved them so fast. Again they said the new Xadi area was the hunting place, and then they turned around started taking people in, beating them, so who will we believe them.

US: Why does not the government want to talk to us?

13:51:10 Because they are crooks, if you are not careful they will take you down but WE have realised that know.

US: So you were born here, just like your generations before you?

13:53:00 This is the place, their grave are here.
US: So where do you kids go to school?

13:53:57 They go to school in Ganzi, and they live at school. They were taken yesterday.

13:56:27 The only car that comes around here is the car that comes to get the kids when they go to school, and then if you ask to get a lift they refuse.
Appendix 5.

Interview: Amelia Malebane, Lecturer in the Department of Media Studies, University of Botswana.

OM : Let us start with the academic issue. In your view, how do you think the University of KZN can cooperate with your university. Do you do research with the camera as a method of documentation?

AM : Well, first of all, you are asking about relationships between the universities. I think the rest of the world over is talking about collaborative work within universities. The first thing we can do is to share and exchange ideas and share papers and do stuff together, so collaborative work, yes. The use of the camera inside the university and for research, the University of Botswana has a research center, research unit. And the center for academic development and inside the center for academic development you have all kinds of audio-visual equipment that lecturers and academic staff can use for their research work. And the Department of Media Studies by its very nature will have equipment such as cameras and stuff.

OM : You are familiar with Prof. Sissel Saugestad work. Is there anyone here working on the Basarwa issue as intensely as she was?

AM : Well, I don’t know if I can say Sissel’s work was intense but I think it made a tremendous contribution to Basarwa research. There’s now the Basarwa bibliography which says who has done so much work on the Basarwa and Sissel has a lot of prominence in the pages of this volume and she herself was the mastermind behind it as well, but more and more scholars are involved in Basarwa research inside this University and every scholar will take a specific topic which is close to their heart so whatever Sissel was working at is different from one who is working on dietary patterns of Basarwa for example.

OM : How is the interest of the Botswana students to follow up and do research out there on the Basarwa issue?

AM : Well in the past there was not so much necessary sort of want or desire but it has slowly changed now, the university of Basarwa research center here encourages people to go into the so-called not-used-to-dos of research also because to get research done in Botswana you need a special permit from the office of the president. And so the issues of the minority groups in Botswana, the issues were not very comfortable with the issues for scholars especially the ones coming in from outside the country, coming to investigate, anthropologists coming to observe the primitive peoples of Africa so the government of Botswana has been not so happy with people coming in to do research and also even if you are a Motswana to do research on these specific sort of hot issues or sort of the issues that are between parliament etc. they are reluctant to give the permits for those, but also just the nature of the relationships of the society of Botswana in general... there has been lack of interest in studying the minority groups. But that perception has changed, as I said the bibliography can show you how much research has been done now so maybe that was so ten maybe twenty years ago right now I’m sure there’s someone doing research on the Basarwa

OM : So in the future with the work Tomaselli has done and arguing down there with the Bushmen, where do you see that we can make closer relationships here…with the common topic of the Bushmen and Basarwa on both side of the border
AM: There is a lot that can be done but the unfortunate thing is that a high number of Basarwa do not have much education as it were, so the unfortunate thing is that much as we want to work with them the rest of the world is looking at us doing work for them and the rest of the world is now saying that we must work with them and there’s talk of community-based programs etc. so I cannot answer that except if I would know the direct focus and the intent of this scholar and the relationship with Basarwa what exactly will be taking place as long as it now gives much more leeway to the Basarwa themselves and of course you know that they are the holders of local knowledge so whatever person goes in there to research must have this respect at the back of their minds that much as possible not for them but with them. And so even at the University of Botswana here we have Basarwa students inside this university and whatever we do there was this land case at the High court the other day we took them all to listen to the court proceedings and we get them to get involved. So with the Basarwa research center we have been talking a lot about the center must be run by Basarwa students themselves. One of the students, she has just finished her Masters in the UK she is a member of the Basarwa she [served] at the centre even though I hear that she is leaving now to go for further studies elsewhere but it’s interesting to have her at the center for Basarwa research because she can directly link with the language, with the culture, with her people. And remove the backpack, the difficulty of the backpack, if you enter a foreign culture.

OM: Do you feel it’s difficult to work with the Basarwa issue, you as a member of the committee of Vision 2016?

AM: I guess every issue would be difficult if it had some thorns in it, but I’ve worked a lot with the Basarwa, I call myself a friend of the Basarwa. I’ve produced a film, the Spiral of Silence two years ago which looks at the challenges of representations of the diverse cultural groups of the Botswana and my film more specifically on the Basarwa and whether they received the reportage from the media as it were as compared with [inaudible] by the way it’s not just the Basarwa who are the minority there are other minority groups in Botswana the focus is standard to go with the Basarwa because they were seen as the most disadvantaged, more but I’ve worked with them and I had no problem working with them as it were, I had a problem dealing with their situation that was affecting my research when I was seeing their living conditions and stuff but doing research with them was not a problem. Also because most of them have become [asimmiles], they speak SeTswana so I didn’t have to struggle with the click-click language, etc. But getting into the common place and getting in the fieldwork, and discovering that you are coming from heaven and they are living in hell that touches you, and each time I screen my film to audiences and my students I still have tears in my eyes when I think about the life and their living conditions. And I also appreciate the fact that some of the Basarwa say that this is the lifestyle that they want to keep. So these are the dynamics of the whole discussions of Basarwa.

OM: What do you think about the way they are living now, and the fact that they want to live the way they have been living for a thousand years?

AM: I think that everything changes except for the law of change. And I think that maybe the concept of development is what we should be looking at as scholars. How do we bring the development to the so-called undeveloped or less developed peoples. I think the issue that we can contest about is the development and how it is brought about to the Basarwa. If you have not informed anybody about the importance of insuring their house or their equipment, you are not going to laugh at them or think of them as stupid if their equipment burns down if you have not told them about the importance of insuring their property. So if Basarwa do not understand these very concepts of development which in 2016 what the government wants to do and why they are doing the things they do, of course common sense says there will be resentment. And that’s why perhaps some of them are saying they do not want to go. So my argument is maybe just on the approach of the development to Basarwa issues and Basarwa as a people, as I say, everything else changes.
When you go to the areas where they live, you will see that the soils are infertile, there is no clean water, they are far away from schools, far away from shops, far away from the post office, I mean they are not in touch. It’s almost like we are living in Botswana and they are living out of Botswana. So it is worrying.

OM : What about you did your research in Inalegolo, you saw alcohol misuse and people missing opportunities to go hunting. What do you think that they have been removed, and these moves have not been successful?

AM : I don’t think it is not successful. I just say that the very concept of maybe the very injection of development in these areas and these people. When I was working on my film and was watching so much alcohol in the compounds of Inalegolo and Kutuku three years down the line a whole team of us were sent by the president on the 5th of March, there was a Civicus World Assembly here, it was their first time to come to Africa and Botswana hosted the World Assembly and the theme was acting together for a just world, and so before the beginning of the assembly his Excellency the president requested some people from different bodies to go to the CKGR to get involved and see more so that we can inform the rest of the 200 countries that were here attending the world assembly to get a clearer picture. So when I was in Inalegolo and when I was in the disputed Central Kalahari Game Reserve and the new settlement, it was a new picture. They have hospitals, nice clean water, a huge supermarket…and when I was looking back to Inalegolo I was like no...who wants to live in a place like Inalegolo? I spent ten days with the whole team with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and I saw Central Kalahari now, all of it, we spent ten days there…and I had a different view altogether now, and I was not accepting why some of them wanted to remain in the bush and also, how do you actually build a hospital or a clinic or a supermarket for seven people, that the government is saying that it is better if they are in one particular area, so the issue is, is the area inside the reserve or outside the reserve but I came across a family that was refusing to move who were actually inside the game reserve. That issue is still in court and I’m not at liberty now to discuss…I don’t know the outcome of that.

OM : But the policy of the government is to bring the children to the school and not the school to the children. Isn’t that so?

AM : Yes but that matter is still within the courts and it’s not for me to comment on that with so much intelligence. What I do know is that the contested issue right now is that they are actually settled inside the game reserve so the courts are going to define whether who came first, was it them or the border…to separate the land? So I cannot claim authority over that one now because they are saying they were there first and the government is saying no but you know in 18-whatever we were here first. So whether they are bringing the school to them or the school coming to them is an issue of where is each one of these items being brought to or from. Is it to the reserve or away from the reserve? So the court ruling will decide and say they are justified to be inside and so destroy everything else that is there. But when you look at all over the world I don’t know how they can actually live together with the animals in the same place.

OM : Well but the Sami in Norway do.

AM : Yes but the Sami in Norway live with animals that are less dangerous.

OM : But I guess their culture here is so they can deal with the lions.

AM : It’s different. The culture is to deal with the lions but remember that these people do not come from the Game Reserve. Remember way back in times of history. Let me take you down to Walvis Bay and let me take you down to Cape Town, to Port Elizabeth, let me take you down South Africa where there are actually their remains and you know that’s where they came from. These
men were fishermen and fisherwomen, if you like. So they just came into Botswana over 20 000 years ago but they really were...maybe after many years, adaptation and stuff like that. But the contention in my mind is not that they actually come from this bush because they didn’t come from there many years ago. Okay they’ve got acclimatized to this situation but they are not happy even by themselves just living in the bush. They want stuff there. They want water, they want bread, they want butter. Even though they want it inside the game reserve where they are living. But they are also hungry for the new things and the new developments. So it’s not like they really want to live in the bush with nothing, with no spring water, no coconut or no butter, no. They really also want to enjoy the fruits of the …you know. So it’s not like they want to be completely left alone…which I think has been a misunderstanding the world over, that they really want to be left alone. And I was just looking and reading an article not so long ago of…an article in Brazil…of a gentleman from Survival International who produces an article and shows that Basarwa are dying of diamonds…but I don’t think the focus of our discussion is on diamonds and Basarwa. I’m just saying, for example this has been information that has been misleading: it’s a diamond and a stone in a very nicely manicured hand and it’s a special report on the Kalahari people and this story is misleading that they have been moved out for diamonds and things like that and imagine seeing that in Brazil, so it is actually misleading to have these kinds of reports.

OM : Okay, the second issue is how the Basarwa are communicating within themselves, the different villages, the different tribes within Botswana. In South Africa we find that there is a communication problem where you have the authorities and it’s a matter of degree. They have a leader. How is work within the Basarwa? Do they have spokesmen like Dawid in South Africa?

AM : Yes they do. The famous Sesana who is on the cover of that picture (the DeBeers picture that she just showed us), and other Basarwa activists and other organizations, Working Group of Indigenous Peoples (WILSA) by Makao Njo (sp.) who is also a member of the Basarwa group. There are several of them, they have their spokespeople yes.

OM : Do you think that they are working well, there are no conflicts between the different groups?

AM : I would not know. I would say that it is only my hope that they are working well together but I don’t know whether WILSA is working together with the First Peoples of the Kalahari. I do know that they have a common objective for the advancement of Basarwa issues but whether they have good relations I know not.

OM : Well I have not read this Vision 2016 but I don’t see that the indigenous people of Botswana represented or mentioned in particular in the Vision 2016 plan?

AM : The government of Botswana wants to be...Vision 2016 says we want to be a tolerant, united and proud nation. And so the government of Botswana is accepting everybody really.

End of Interview
Appendix 6. The research assistant comment.

Never a chance for a holiday. It felt like this year just stated as last ended. I was really looking forward for the trip to this part of my country I had never been to before. To see another fellow tribe which said to be a minority, the Basarwa? Growing up in Botswana I’ve always thought of them as an interesting tribe which has still held on to theirs roots, (lifestyles wise), and I feel they are real to themselves unlike to rest of us in urban areas, who are moving towards western culture as if we never had a culture of our own. I really admire these inhabits of the Kalahari who are said to be the first people of our country.

The trip began and the excitement accelerated. I had heard a lot about these people, from their life to the case they are facing now with our government about their eviction. It is a pity I won’t see most of them in Central Kalahari Game Reserve (CKGR) since it is roomed that almost all of them have left the reserve to go out to our “civilisation”.

(Anyway what is civilisation? Is it the infrastructure, alcoholism, westernization?)

On our arrival in the reserve we passed into the gate and there it was the feeling of being in total wilderness, the pure beauty of Mother Nature with fresh air and no pollution in any kind. I could not ask for more and felt proud of being a Motswana and seeing such beauty with foreign visitors. I felt like a true holiday away from the city and its noise, wow! not even network on the phone, what a great get away. It was almost dawn when we arrived at the campsite, only to be greeted by a flogg of giraffes, what a beauty! As most of my friends I was not an experienced “camper”, and there I was, amazed by my campmates skills and survival “techniques” and how relaxed they were in the middle of nowhere, among dangerous animals. The tents were pitched and the food was prepared in no time ahead of the bad weather to come. With the bad weather outside during the night was scared the tent was going just fly away with us inside. The wind was just something else than home and this time without concrete shelter I felt small, surrounded and trapped by Mother Nature.

Early in the morning we started on the sandy roads with the cars constantly on 4x4, it was quite an experience to see and hear a vehicles engines working on maximum power when necessarily in deep sand. Before lunchtime we arrived at the first settlement called Kukama. We were greeted by the women there who made me wonder where the men ware. Politely we greeted and started charting with them. What great people who just welcome strangers into their homes? They said men had been gone for the past few days to get water which to my surprise was not there. They confirmed that they had water supplies before which the government took away from them as the pressure of the eviction grew.

I was amazed by the simplicity of their lifestyle, and as the conversation dwelled on I was saddened by their tragic stories they told. They were devastated by the fact that they had to move from the only homes they had ever known and their grandparents ever had. Who would not, but the government is doing it for a “good course”. What good will comes from putting a person through a transition that they never deemed necessary? Then, the big issue of the truth: From what I gathered these people feel that they were owed the truth about the real reason of their eviction. They said was rumoured that they were move because of the discovery of diamonds in their land, which the authorities claim is not true.
By mid-day, after 3-4 hours of driving and 150 km, we suddenly saw 3 vehicles parked and we went to said hello and confirm if we were still on the right route. It was South African tourists having a lunch break with beers and a lot of food. They really can enjoy themselves. The journey moved on across the reserve to the next settlement and just around sunset we made a stop, tired from driving in the sand which consumes even more hours. This was at the heart of the reserve and really the only thing we were looking forward to was a meal and good sleep as the next campsite was hours away. Just like the first settlement everybody gave us attention, only this settlement as bigger the previous one, but I could sense reluctance in them talking to us. Politely we asked them if we could pitch our tents in an open space closer to their settlement as the next campsite was far but they flatly refused. And that was quite alarming. The reason for that was that they were horrified by the thought of wildlife authorities who they claimed sometimes patrols their settlements at nights and they could get into trouble if they discovered they talked to white people/people from outside the reserve which apparently was a sin.

Well as far as I knew this democratic country where anyone is free to welcome whoever they want in into their home as long as they are in the country legally and no one will tell me otherwise, but then there it was the fear in their faces. We sensed that it was not a good idea and we decided to move on. By then my head was pumping with questions I didn’t have answers to, I was simply seeing a different side of the country.

The trip to the next campsite took much longer than anticipated as we got lost on the way, and just before the next settlement out of darkness there it was, fire light appearing from a distance which as we approached was a settlement called Molapo. We made stop to ask for directions to the nearest campsite. This was a different crowd from the last one we met. They were very relaxed and even gave us someone to take us to the campsite only to find a non cleared campsite filled with grass of approximately a metre high. Our “guide” thought it was quite dangerous to arrive this late and try to pitch out our tent in this place with so much grass due to dangers from snakes. I was delighted when he invited us to put up the tent nearby their huts in the settlement. Next to their place it was clearer and space enough for our tents. Thank god we met these people. We gladly accepted the invitation.

The next morning, was our last day in the reserve we woke up to a full breakfast made from our Cadac stove. There two 4x4 Toyotas in their yard, but in moving condition in condition. We later found out they had bought them with the compensation money they got from the government which they claimed was between P5000 or about R6000 . this was money they got to start a new life outside the reserve. Their question was, how can they leave their homes to start a new life with money enough for only a couple of months. We were just about to leave them when we went to them to extend our appreciation for letting us use their land for the night. We ended up chatting around the fire! We learned that this was the village where the Bushman spokes person Roy Sesana originated from. During our talk I could not ease the feeling that thought they had been treated unfairly, by being told to evacuate the only land they had ever known, the land that bears the graves of their grandparents, all for a little lump of compensation money as they claimed. One of them actually commented “if the government want to see transitional change in us, perhaps they must bring the change to us, just as it is done to all other parts of the country”. Another said that this transition also had to carried out truthfully; “if we are moving for the diamonds be mined here, let it be and lets be compensated accordingly as it would have been done for any other tribe here in Botswana. What this meant I did not know.
His statement was quite startling as I asked myself if all this was done to these people because they are considered as undermined and inferior minority somehow. Well most of the Basarwa origin people are not as illiterate as most Botswana’s, thus they felt their rights were being walked upon for reasons like this. They felt that somehow the other cultures, i.e. those in authorities are not giving the respect they believe they deserved, ‘as the first people of Kalahari’. Well I don’t know if it is so because there are not many people of Bushmen origin in high positions/ranking places who could have stood up for their rights, or it is so because of their high illiteracy level that the elite can dictate to them what to do. What I ask myself after this journey in remote, exotic Botswana is if these people wanted to move from the reserve, why are they back? Was it so that they were forced to leave because of devastating situations like no water and no pension rights etc. given a situation like this a person will leave not out of their own will but because of the fear of remaining dying of thirst.

I tend to ask myself where the rights of these people went since it looks like a sin for them to voice out their opinions from what they said. Where is it leading us as the citizens as we are seeing deportations of intellectuals like Professor Kenneth Good at University of Botswana, who are voicing their opinions in this issue.