Discourse in the South African English-language press: past, Polokwane and prospect

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Abstract

The African National Congress (ANC) has effected a shift in political discourse since the succession by President Jacob Zuma from Thabo Mbeki following the 2007 National Elective Conference in Polokwane. Subsequent political re-alignments have led to a strengthening of the tri-partite alliance, and a perceived policy shift. However the current state of political play has made evident the tensions within the alliance, fronted by the trade unions on the left, and the elitist culture that has developed within the upper echelons of the ANC. This research examines how the political and economic discourses represented by different ruling factions of the ANC-led alliance transcend into assumptions regarding the role and function of the media. It plots policy developments and shifting ANC elite discourse on the media at various conjunctures since the early 1990s. Developments in the South African media are primarily studied from a political economy approach to ownership, control and transformation, as informed by the economic policies of the ANC. Specific focus is given to the economics of the five press houses, Independent Newspapers, Media 24, Caxton, Avusa and M&G Media. A critical content analysis, informed by a critical approach on discourse theory, is undertaken on various editorials and exposition pieces in five newspapers, Daily News, Witness, Citizen, Sunday Times and Mail and Guardian during the ANC elective conference in Polokwane, December 2007. This sample represents the five press houses under study. This study will offer insight into the English-language press’ response to the power struggle and succession debate, represented by Zuma on the one hand and Mbeki on the other, and therefore engage Zuma’s critique of the media being politically out-of-synch with society. This content analysis in context with the examination into the political economic transformation of the press, as well as personal representation of the ANC elites in the press, will be used to analyse the general discourse of English-language press at this time.
Acknowledgements

This project has been a four-year long process beginning at a time of great change in the South African political landscape, new leaders emerged promoting new policies with the promise of change. Four years down the line and the political environment has changed immensely once again. Keeping this project current without losing sight of its initial intent has been a challenging task. This coupled with the challenge of self-motivation, and the distractions of everyday life makes for a seemingly endless task. The one constant has been Prof. Keyan Tomaselli, ever available and interested, yet stern although encouraging. Thank you for all the guidance you have given, as well as the opportunities presented. It has all been worth it. CCMS (Centre for Culture, Media and Society) has an excellent culture of learning and team work; support and advice always readily available. Thanks to Marc Caldwell for his guidance on the theory and analysis aspect of this research and to Jeanne Prinsloo for her reading and insight.

Finally to my parents, your support and sacrifice over the past eight years of tertiary education has been immense, for that I am truly grateful.
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<tr>
<td>AMPS</td>
<td>All Media and Products Survey</td>
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<td>ANC</td>
<td>African National Congress</td>
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<td>BBBEE</td>
<td>Broad Based Black Economic Empowerment</td>
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<td>BEE</td>
<td>Black Economic Empowerment</td>
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<td>CA</td>
<td>Content Analysis</td>
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<td>CDA</td>
<td>Critical Discourse Analysis</td>
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<tr>
<td>COSATU</td>
<td>Congress of South African Trade Unions</td>
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<td>DA</td>
<td>Discourse Analysis</td>
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<td>DTA</td>
<td>Discourse Theory Analysis</td>
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<tr>
<td>FXI</td>
<td>Freedom of Expression Institute</td>
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<td>GEAR</td>
<td>Growth, Employment and Redistribution strategy</td>
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<td>JSE</td>
<td>Johannesburg Stock Exchange</td>
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<td>LSM</td>
<td>Living Standard Measurements</td>
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<td>MDDA</td>
<td>Media Development and Diversity Agency</td>
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<td>MMA</td>
<td>Media Monitoring Africa</td>
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<td>NP</td>
<td>National Party</td>
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<td>RDP</td>
<td>Reconstruction and Development Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>SABC</td>
<td>South African Broadcasting Corporation</td>
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<tr>
<td>SACP</td>
<td>South African Communist Party</td>
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<td>SANEF</td>
<td>South African National Editors Forum</td>
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<tr>
<td>TML</td>
<td>Times Media Limited</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAAN</td>
<td>South African Associated Newspapers</td>
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<tr>
<td>UDF</td>
<td>United Democratic Front</td>
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Chapter 1: Introduction

Developments in the South African political landscape, post-Polokwane (December 2007), including a change in national leadership and a perceived shift in political discourse by the ruling African National Congress (ANC), exerted negative knock-on effects on the media. The counter-argument, which is gaining more popularity amongst senior members of the ruling party and its alliance partners (ANC, Congress of South African Trade Unions [COSATU] and South African Communist Party [SACP]) (see Ceruti, 2008), targets the media for having an allegedly detrimental effect on socio-cultural and political developments, because it is seen not to be aligned with the national interest.

A 2010 editorial posted in The Mercury argues that South African democracy stands at a crossroads (Quintal, 2010). It suggests that as a country South Africa can venture positively into the future democracy or regress into the past with censorship, restrictions and media management. The statements issuing forth from government, including the establishment of a Media Appeals Tribunal (Boyle, 2007) and the proposed Protection of Information Bill (Quintal, 2010) are unprecedented in their attack on media freedom under the discourse of ‘developmental media’ – evident in the position proposed in the 2009 Public Service Broadcasting Amendment bill. The implementation of any Act aimed at information censorship can be manipulated for narrow political ends, and a state run or managed media will pose a threat to democratic rule.

This position of government is not new, and has been boiling under the lid for a number of years, occasionally spilling over in the form of political outbursts from leading figures. The extent to which these outbursts hold ground is mostly limited to the feeling of being personally scrutinised by the media, a consequence of holding public office (see Tomaselli & Teer-Tomaselli, 2008). This research aims to better ascertain where and how this shift in media policy comes to the fore, and if it holds any ground other than sheer personal attacks by the ANC elite.

Problem statement and context

Following the election of Zuma as president of the ANC, at the party’s 52nd National Elective Conference, there occurred renewed debate regarding the transformative role of media. The debate centres on comments made by Zuma in “The voice of the ANC must be heard” which appeared in the online journal ANC Today. Zuma states that the media is “[…] politically and ideologically out of sync with the society in which it exists.” (Zuma, 8 January 2008). He provides numerous
reasons for his claims, such as; the economic forces at play within the free market media industry, issues of vast differences in race, class and ideology as well as the current media environment as a result of existing policy. This article echoes an earlier keynote address by Zuma to the South African National Editors Forum (SANEF) (2001). These two articles, as well as other documents published by the ANC such as the Media Charter (cf. Louw, 1993), an address by Thabo Mbeki to SANEF (2003), as well as the most current policy statement issuing forth from the ANC at a National Policy Conference “Transformation of the Media” (2007), provide the periodisation for this study. These statements and policy documents, amongst others, offer insight into the discourses propagated by different constituencies within the ANC over the past two decades, regarding the perceived role and function of the media.

In South Africa the media is argued to potentially play a significant role in the transformation of the country. During the country’s transition to democracy in the 1990s much attention was paid by various political parties and social organisations to the idea “that a ‘New South Africa’ ha[d] to be built” (Louw, 1993: 4). In doing so one of the main objectives was to transform South Africa from a previously closed society to an open one that represented all the cultures, beliefs and ideas of the majority. The media was recognised by those involved in the transition, such as the ANC and National Party (NP), as a key channel in this rebuilding process (Louw, 1993). Since 1994 this transformation has been dominated by changes in political dispensation, the rise of certain class ideologies and various economic developments (Teer-Tomaselli & Tomaselli, 2001).

Zuma is a critic of this role, and states that rather than using the ability it has to better transform South African society, the media is driven by self-interested, sectional financial motives. He comments; “[w]e are faced with the virtually unique situation that, among the democracies, the overwhelmingly dominant tendency in South African politics, represented by the ANC, has no representation whatsoever in the mass media” (January 8, 2008). Zuma implies in this statement that the media are driven by the interests of the economic elite and not the ruling majority – the working class represented at Polokwane by the Zuma-lead ANC alliance. Instead of presenting a discourse in line with the politics, policy and ideology of the ruling majority (as represented by Zuma), the media favours neo-liberal discourse coincident with its own commercial interests, and therefore the interests of the (white) economic elite – according to Zuma (2008). This study will track statements and policy issuing forth from constituencies within the ANC and its alliance partners, regarding the normative function of the media in South Africa at various moments since the initial democratically-centred policy debates of the early 1990s. Reference is also given to specific events or issues in the press at various points that have resulted in response or reaction by the ANC. This to gauge the assumptions broadcast by different constituencies as to how the media
ought to function is society, in relation to how they actually function as a result of the political and economic climate they are situated. A sample of English-language newspaper articles will study the position the press takes in relation to the discourse articulated by ANC constituencies, and will focus specifically on the case study of the December 2007 ANC National Elective Conference. A critical content analysis will be the method employed in the analysis of the role the press has in articulating representations and contestations through discourse.

The English-language press’s construction of the power struggle and leadership succession at the ANC National Elective Conference in Polokwane was criticised at the time by the Zuma faction of the ANC for presenting a discourse aligned to specific class interests informed by a certain economic standing in society. The Zuma faction of the ruling party at this time articulated a discourse strongly aligned to the left and working class in their quest to win support and gain a ruling majority. This discourse was at the time in opposition to Mbeki’s neo-liberal economic stance that was perceived to favour the new (black) economic elite. The press is a site for ideological contestation that manifests itself through discourse. Zuma believes the press is not engaging in this contestation as it should, or as he would like it to, and therefore proposes overt state intervention.

The following research questions apply to this study:

- What normative theories have preference within certain ANC constituencies?
- What have been the assumptions propagated by different constituencies within the ANC regarding the media, and how are these assumptions presented in the English-language press?
- What are the implications of these positions in relation to media democracy?
- What is the response of a sample of the English-language press to the power struggle and leadership succession, represented by Zuma on the one hand and Mbeki on the other, as represented in their discourse during December 2007? How is this contestation for the ANC leadership represented in the sample?

**Structure of argument**

The chapters that follow will interrogate the discourse(s) presented by the different ANC-led alliance constituencies (as promulgated by ANC elites) relating to the normative function of the media. These positions are informed by the ideological stance taken by the different and sometimes directly competing elites within the ruling alliance. The representation the press gives to these
respective elites will provide an assessment from the side of the media in terms of its content output as a result of the political climate in which they operate.

**Discourse and media theory**

Theoretical tensions within the study of discourse as a result of various theoretical and analytical positions are made evident in a discussion on ideology and discourse theory. The concept of ideology and its Marxist implications on false consciousness as a result of economic class determiners adds further to the complexities of discourse and its theory. Laclau and Mouffe’s (cf. Torfing, 1999; Laclau, 2006) post-Marxist inspired critique of discourse theory positions discourse as an engagement with social relations at specific points in history so to make meaning of actual lived realities. The displacement of the concept of ideology and its replacement with discourse is a feature of the post-Marxist discourse theory paradigm. This is mainly for the reason that ideology is associated with the negative conception of social consciousness serving class and political ends (Torfing, 1993; Pervis and Hunt, 1993). Power, too, plays a dialectic constitutive role in the construction of knowledge and discourse, and is a point of departure from Marxist interpretations of ideology.

Discourse theory is applied to the media and the normative theories associated with the idealistic role and function of the press within certain discursive structures or ideological realities. McQuail (1991) however proposes a break with the traditional normative approaches to media theory, for a more critical approach that incorporates case specific ideological determiners, politics and other such power relations between the media and its society. To this end McNair proposes a “chaos theory” (2006) that involves an interpretation of the ideological process within the media, including production, consumption and social action. This as opposed to the control approach that focuses more exclusively on the ownership of media and the ideological influence as a result of this. This allows for a pluralist interpretation of media and its content production and output, societal factors influencing media practitioners and their content. Hall’s (1982) theory on the signification of ideology is a point of departure from the theoretical analysis of discourse to its more critical analysis in terms of coded media text.

The final part of this chapter will be to examine the theoretical approaches of critical discourse analysis (CDA) (Fairclough, 1995) and discourse theory analysis (DTA) in relation to the normative media theory so to better interpret discursive structures in relation to codes within media texts.

**ANC positions on the media & transformation**

This chapter will interrogate academic literature, government policy, ANC elite position and actual media transformation since the late 1980s, with specific focus on the press. It will give context to an
investigation into discourse in the press, by assessing the discourse(s) presented by the ruling ANC on the media during the late apartheid years, the initial policy debates of the 1990s and the subsequent years of neo-liberal economic policy. The official position of the ANC government in terms of policy has allowed the media to develop and transform in a certain way, driven primarily by the overarching neo-liberal economic policies of the past two decades. Coupled with redistributive economic policy, this has resulted in a media market that has engaged transformation to some extent, as the emergence of a new black elite has benefited from ownership change in the major press houses. However, a substantial segment of ownership is still in white hands, notably Independent Newspapers. The largely self-regulated press has been free of much state meddling, although since the early 2000s an anti-press discourse has been presented by Mbeki and, more recently by Zuma, as is reflected in statements issued by these elites as well as in official policy. This has resulted in outright attacks on media freedom, and a shift towards a more soviet or developmental media policy. The central focus of this critique on media transformation and elite discourse on the industry is to understand the rationale behind the current shift in ANC media policy and elite discourse. On the surface it appears to be because of a perceived lack in transformation, however the press’ coverage of Mbeki’s and Zuma’s personal and public lives has also been a catalyst for the discourse shift.

**Discourse critical content analysis**

The final part of this research is to analyse a sample of newspaper articles from five English-language publications (*Citizen, Witness, Daily News, Sunday Times* and *Mail and Guardian*), a sample that represents the five press houses under study. The sample is taken from the period of the 2007 ANC Polokwane conference and the method for analysis is a discourse inspired content analysis of codes defined by the discursive structure and context of this particular study. The coding required to identify the nodes does require a degree of interpretation – that is, finding intentions of synonymy, antinomy, metaphor and metonymy within each node in NVIVO 8. These codes are counted using the quantitative software package NVIVO 8. The results of the content analysis are examined in relation to i) the overall sample under analysis (i.e., a comparison between nodes of different newspapers), ii) in relation to the ownership patterns of the five press houses (what the content output may imply about the economic and ideological position of the company that produces the texts); and finally, to the broader social, political and ideological implications. What does the research reveal about the normative function of the media, in contrast to the actual situation and the ideal position proposed by Zuma and other ANC elites?
Aims, relevance and significance of the study

This study will assess the current state of the relationship that exists between the media and the ruling government (ANC). The significance of such a study in a post-Polokwane climate of uncertainty with regard to the future of state media relations is quite evident. The extent to which Zuma has returned to early ANC assumptions about the media, as discussed by Teer-Tomaselli (1993), saw a Stalinist policy in the late 1980s early 1990s shift toward libertarianism, modified by a developmentalist approach (Teer-Tomaselli, 2001), perhaps now qualified by a revisionist Soviet model (Tomaselli & Teer-Tomaselli, 2008). The media in a democratic setting exhibits certain mandates or functions (McNair, 2003). Normatively speaking, in a democracy there is little room for a mandate to represent the ideas and discourses of the ruling party as presented by its elites, above all others. This raises serious concerns about the hegemonic position adopted by the state.

Perhaps of more significance to this particular study are to the actual and perceived discourses presented by the contesting ANC elites, represented Zuma on the one hand and Mbeki on the other. The chapters to follow will interrogate ANC discourses on the media, and the representation of ANC elite discourse in the press. Both Zuma and Mbeki have received a lot of public and press attention critical of their discourses. The rationale behind the reaction of both elites and the party itself relating to the attacks on the media is complex and requires further investigation. On the one hand it appears as if the attacks on media freedom by Mbeki and later Zuma stem from personal grievance with press coverage and representation of their respective personal and public discourses. However, they and the ANC argue the shift in discourse on media policy is as a result of policy shift in line with the national interest. The specific case study of discourse in the press during the 2007 Polokwane conference provides a catalyst for this investigation as Zuma’s subsequent dissatisfaction with the press’ coverage of the power struggle at the conference. This research questions whether Zuma’s reaction stems from the perceived national policy shift from the Mbeki administration, in line with a developmental working class discourse presented by Zuma during the conference. Or rather, is it a result of personal dissatisfaction with the coverage he received? In both instances each scenario presents serious concerns for the function of a free press under a democratic dispensation. This research also sheds light on the actual representation of discourse in the press and, by doing this, provide insights into whether the transformation that has taken place in terms of ownership and control has translated into a specific discourse output by the press.
Chapter 2: Discourse, ideology and the media

The media in its current post-apartheid context is perceived to function as a largely independent body fulfilling the role of a watchdog, free from much external class informed political and ideological positioning (Fourie, 2002: 32-34). The relationship between the media’s idealistic independence and the influence of external societal forces such as class informed economic and social policies as well as ideologies is the central theme of this discussion on discourse and ideology in the South African media. Discourses presented by the ANC and its elites at various conjunctures in post-apartheid South Africa have gone some way in transforming the media since the early 1990s, informed by manifest ideology within the ruling party, broadcast by its elites through the discourse they present. This chapter will conceptualise ideology and discourse by examining theoretical interpretations and explanations of the two terms in relation to normative media theory, so to better understand how the media come to represent and interpret dominant discourses in society.

The overall purpose of this research is to address allegations made by Zuma concerning the representation of the ANC in the South African English-language press, and to investigate the actual representations made by the media. This is in response to the statement; “every day brings fresh instances of a media that, in general terms, is politically and ideologically out of synch with the society in which it exists” (Zuma, 8 January 2008). There are a number of problematic issues with this statement that need to be identified and further interrogated before addressing the real issue under investigation.

The first of these relates to what Zuma is saying (or more importantly trying to say) about the media – that it is not representing his faction of the ANC nor his discourse as he would like it to. Secondly, Zuma’s statement is further compounded by the use of the term “ideologically”, implying that South African society or the whole of the ANC has a specific ideology, and that it is represented by Zuma and the ANC he represents. Lastly, the media should only represent the politics and ideology of a Zuma-lead ANC. This would contravene the democratic, social responsibility model. Rather, the case is that the ANC and its elites present discourses in line with these ideologies, so to gain popularity and win power. It is not the responsibility of media to represent discourses articulated by ruling elites, but rather to provide a platform for critique, debate and informed communication within the public sphere (Grossberg et al., 1998: 385).
Discourse and ideology

The terms discourse and ideology are often used within similar contexts. The discussion to follow will contextualise the theoretical approaches to the terms so to better understand the application of ideology and discourse within this study. The two terms however similar do share different theoretical paradigms and definitions (see Purvis and Hunt, 1993).

Ideology is the organisation of ideas, attitudes, beliefs and values into coherent patterns, systems of thought or symbolic systems, concerned with relations of power (Thompson, 1990). While discourse describes sanctioned statements which have some institutional force, and therefore has a profound influence on the way that individuals act and think (Mills, 1997: 62). Both discourse and ideology have some defining link especially in terms of power relations. However when describing an ideology or ideologies in relation to the representation of ideas and attitudes within the public sphere a distinction needs to be made between ideology and manifest discourse.

Defining discourse and ideology

Ideology studied within a neutral paradigm alludes to the existence of ideologies occurring at an equal level. This neutral position provides little critique in terms of ideological struggle, supporting the co-existence of numerous ‘equal’ ideologies. Ideology from this view is considered as a singular aspect of social life, having little or no impact on other aspects. Ideology may be as important or useful to dominant groups in the maintenance of power or subordinate groupings in their struggle (Thompson, 1990: 53). This positive conception focuses on the construction of social consciousness as a site for the struggle of competing ideologies as real and lived experiences and beliefs (Purvis and Hunt, 1993). However ideology is often linked with, and perhaps more commonly presented as the negative, a means to sustaining oppressive social relations within society (Thompson, 1990: 44).

Socially powerful groups impose their ideas’ or ‘consciousness’ (ideologies) on subordinate groups. This process presents itself mainly because of the varying economic conditions present in particular societies, as economically powerful groups seek to maintain their (material) dominance. A negative conception of ideology is “essentially linked to the process of sustaining asymmetrical relations of power – that is the process of maintaining domination” (Thompson, 1984: 4).

“‘Ideology is a process accomplished by the so-called thinker consciously, it is true, but with false consciousness. The real forces impelling [an individual] remain unknown to him; otherwise it simply would not be an ideological process’” (cf. Therborn, 1980: 4). An individual, although conscious about the ideas, beliefs and values he or she may have, even though they may be of a false consciousness, simply accepts them without further examination or thought. This is a consequence of the unequal power relations within society, as well as, at the same time a
prerequisite for the creation and maintenance of these relations of power-domination in the first place. This Marxist-materialism interpretation has come under much criticism from those authors writing from within the critical conception of ideology such as Thompson (1990) and Laclau and Mouffe (cf. Torfing, 1999).

As opposed to the neutral conception that is geared towards knowledge and understanding, the critical conception as Thompson (1990) defines it, is geared towards the Marxist ideals of critique and liberation. Thompson’s specific analysis of ideology differs from the Marxist tradition, and is concerned with the “ways in which symbolic forms intersect with relations of power”; he goes on to define ideology as a means of establishing and sustaining relations of domination (1990: 56). Where his interpretation differs from the negative conception of the term is that ideology does not have to be false, but rather is concerned with how ideologies serve specific contexts and circumstances in power relations (1990: 57). Five modes of the operation of ideology are identified in this critique, including; legitimation, dissimulation, unification, fragmentation and reification (1990: 60). These modes are used to maintain, sustain or alter power relations within society at a specific period in history. Ideology is a mode through with certain power is given to symbolic forms, for example, nationalism or patriotism is a symbolic form given to Thompson’s mode of unification.

Discourse is “a particular way of talking about and understanding the world (or an aspect of the world)” (Phillips and Jørgensen, 2002: 1, original italics). Texts (written, spoken, visual and audio, see Fairclough, 1992: 17-19) are discursive in nature and are not produced in isolation of external, non-linguistic social practices (including political, economic, cultural and ideological) (Fairclough, 1992). Discursive acts therefore construct and reinforce lived realities; people make sense of their lives and their society through discourse (Mills, 1997). Language is regarded as a form of social practice, language in action (Fairclough, 1992: 63). Building on this understanding of discourse as a particular way of thinking about and understanding the world, Fairclough notes that “[d]iscourse is a practice not just of representing the world, but of signifying the world, constituting and constructing the world in meaning” (1992: 64). As a result, a dialectical relationship arises in discursive practice, discourse as a construction of social practice, and at the same time this social practice as being constituted in discourse (1992: 65). Defining discourse(s) however is more of a problematic task, both at theoretical and practical levels, considering its interdisciplinary scope, including influences from numerous theoretical paradigms such as cultural theory, critical theory and political theory - implying the abstract nature of the term (Mills, 1997; see also Wood and Kroger, 2000). A distinction also needs to be made between a discourse and discourses. The latter refers, for example, to a discourse of Christianity and could include a number of (similar) discourses (text, behaviour, utterance etc.) that describes Christianity (religious, humility, morality,
etc.). The former is a set of rules and procedures employed in the production of particular discourses (see Mills, 1997: 62).

From the onset of this chapter it is important to note that discourse and its study (discourse analysis) (DA) are robustly contested concepts whose definition, it seems is beyond the scope of discourse studies itself. Methodologically, theoretically and analytically, the field is enormously diverse (Richardson, 2007: 21).

Discourse(s) and the maintenance of a particular discourse(s) within the context of class, political and ideological struggle (conflict) are in constant battle for dominance. This reference to “discourse as a mode of political and ideological practice” implies that political and ideological (social practices) are “naturalized” in discursive practice, and that in turn is dependent on the reality of social practices (Fairclough, 1992: 67). Political and ideological practices are not independent of each other, but rather work hand-in-hand in achieving (through discursive practices) their own ends. For example, liberalism under the Mbeki administration became the naturalised economic system in South Africa. Discourse, through power or knowledge, seeks to maintain this dominant position of capitalist economic power. At the same time discourse as a political practice aims through political power relations, to “establish, sustain and change power relations” (Fairclough, 1992: 67). If there were to be a political and / or ideological shift towards a more leftist socialist economic dispensation (e.g. power / class struggle), this shift in power would be, or should be represented, constituted and constructed through and in discourse. Discursive shifts are therefore a naturalised process which is more often than not inevitable, and often rooted in political and ideological practices (Torfing, 1999).

Expanding on Fairclough’s (1992) concept of discourse as a mode of political and ideological practice, Fowler suggests that discourse is “socially and institutionally originating ideology, encoded in language” (1991: 42, emphasis added). Thompson writes, “to study ideology is, in some part and some way, to study language in the social world”. If this is the case then considering the understanding of discourse thus far (as text / language in a social context) it can be assumed that to study discourse is to study ideology (1984: 3). However Teun van Dijk warns of equating the study of ideology with that of discourse, arguing that the link between discourse and ideology is an indirect one because of the social cognition that exists between them, such as attitudes, opinions and knowledge (1996: 7-37).

This research will employ a poststructuralist approach to the study of discourse (power and language). Discourse will be studied within a “discursivity” paradigm; language or texts are considered social practices and studied in relation to the material, institutional and social contexts (Sonderling, 1994, 12).
Discourse Theory

The discussion to follow on the theory of discourse is situated within a post-Marxist paradigm (see Purvis and Hunt, 1993; Torfing, 1999; Laclau, 2006 and Carpentier and DeCleen, 2007). The works of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe attempt to synthesise discourse theory and its development from Marxism to its current state of post-Marxism – their approach is a Gramsci-inspired critique of structural Marxism (Torfing, 1999). Discourse Theory investigates the ways in which social identities have been constructed historically and therefore also draws upon Althusserian-inspired critiques of ideology and human subjectivity (Torfing, 1999: 3).

Marxism and class
Changes to the political, economic and cultural norms in society as Marxism suggests, is created by class conflict linked to ideological struggle (see Barrett, 1991 and Therborn, 1980). Those who own the means of production share a different social consciousness or reality from those who do not and therefore can control the consciousness of the ‘non-owners’, through domination. This is because they share a different social reality (as determined by materialism). Those ‘owners’ are said to have power over the non-owners in an ideological sense because of economic reasons, humans are subject to these ideological forces that are uncontrollable and even incomprehensible to them (see Singer, 1980: 29-34). This approach has been developed by Marxists as historical materialism, and adapted to the study of discourse – “the economy is the ultimate centre of the social structure” and everything including discourse is centred on it (Therborn, 1980: 31-49; Torfing, 1999: 39). In a Marxist tradition, during any given period, ideology is revealed by uncovering the material conditions of production – the means of production, as well as the relations of production (the ways the society structures the relations between individuals, particularly through the division of labour) – which together make up the mode of production. It is this materiality of human production that is argued to directly influence consciousness and therefore ideology; social reality is not determined by consciousness, but consciousness by social reality (see Plamenatz, 1970).

This Marxist notion of ideology as economically determined within the ‘base-superstructure’ framework is an oppressive one-sided view towards ideologies themselves, as the superstructure excludes all social cognition outside of the sphere of production as being false (Purvis and Hunt, 1993: 481). However it has been and still is a useful model in the reference to, and in understanding elements within the specific operations of particular ideologies (Hornsey, 1996: 254). The base-superstructure metaphor explains that the entirety of social relations relating to the social production of their existence (i.e. civil society) forms a society’s economic base, from which arises a superstructure of political and legal institutions (i.e. political society) including public discourse.
The base corresponds to the social consciousness (politics, religion, philosophy, and so on) and it conditions the superstructure. Ruling class-interests determine the superstructure and the nature of the ideology used to justify this superstructure. This action is feasible because the ruling class controls the means of production. Within a Marxist tradition of materialism, class (or membership to a group) is determined by the economic structure of society, the ‘owners’ and ‘non-owners’, while from a position of sociology, class is determined by those with power and those without.

Laclau and Mouffe discard the notion of Marxist ideology and the argument of the base and superstructure as being separate entities, and rather present discourse as a decentralized structure in which meaning is constantly negotiated and constructed, as opposed to being falsely imposed by ruling class interests (cf. Torfing, 1999: 40). Discourse, as opposed to ideology therefore is defined as “a system of differences within which the play of signification extends infinitely due to the absence of a transcendent signified [the economic center]” (1999: 40). The shifting center (economic superstructure), as a result of constant struggle for its full achievement by the subject, is what leads to the concept of discourse, this as meaning is constantly negotiated and re-negotiated to achieve the ‘center’ at specific points in history.

For Marx the ideological universe is predominantly class-determined by class-practices; experience, ideology and power (Therborn, 1980: 41). The ideas that a group of people (or class) may share, are not necessarily their own. This because an unequal power relationship is created within society because of material considerations. Ideas of the ruling class (those owning the means of production) will be the dominant ones, and therefore the subordinate class subject to them. This reverts back to the notion of false consciousness existing within the realm of ideology. Much critique of Marxist political theory has been as a result of the reduction of political ideology to that of class ideology. Rather, as proposed by Laclau (1996; 2006), political and discourse theory should incorporate Althusser’s (1994) theory of human or political subjectivity – the construction of ideological subjects through interpellation. This is as a result of the centre economy not being the focal point of discursive practice. The reduction of discourse to class ideologies supresses the subjectivity of individuals or groups by attributing a false conciseness and therefore there is no room for hegemonic practices and articulations, merely domination by group one over the other (Torfing, 1999: 42).

If ideology within a Marxist tradition is the imposing of false ideas on subordinate groups in society by the economic elite, and discourse is the constant struggle and negotiation by groups and individuals for meaning, how do powerful groups of individuals come to present and maintain their meaning as the truth? Michel Foucault (1972) argues that in order to attribute power to something (a symbol) the production of knowledge (truth) is required, i.e. “meaning” serves to establish and
sustain relations of domination (Thompson, 1990: 56). Central to Foucault’s early archaeological writings is the concept of discourse, not as merely ‘groups of signs’, but as ‘practices which form the objects of which they speak’ (Foucault, 1972: 49). His concern with discourse is with the rules, systems and procedures which constitute what is proposed as truth or knowledge at any historical point, and with how it is established, sustained and modified (Prinsloo, 2009: 82-83). Prinsloo goes on to say of Foucauldian writings on power and knowledge that “a discourse exists within a ‘space’ or a relationship between specific ‘institutions, economic and social processes, behavioural patterns, systems of norms, techniques, types of classification [and] modes of characterisation’” (2009: 83). The subject (or object) is at the centre of Foucault’s thesis on power and discourse, implying that power (or discourse) is constituted within the subject (object), as well as that subject (object) being constituted by power (or discourse). In other words power is inscribed within discourse(s), and not outside of them. This marks a break with the early Marxist tradition of ideology which argues that power is imposed or exerted on the superstructure by the external economic base. Foucauldian thought would suggest that discourse is a means of transferring and maintaining power (Pervis and Hunt, 1993: 488). “When the rules that determine discourse reside in discourse, only this language that refuses to oppose reality to appearance, knowledge to opinion, object to subject, world to representation, truth to power, is commensurable with a notion of a power that produces discourse and at the same time is produced by discourse (Wandel, 2001: 380). Discourse therefore in this context is the attribution of power and truth to the meaning making and through this meaning and truth power is in turn created. Hegemonic practice is a means of maintaining and contesting this power.

**Hegemony**

Antonio Gramsci’s (cf. Torfing, 1999) concept of hegemony can be read in the tradition of Marx’s and Engel’s writings in terms of the maintenance of control over society though ideological means, as outlined above. This is because “ideology plays a crucial role in the construction of Hegemony” (Torfing, 1999: 113). However, the great difference in Gramsci’s approach from that of classical Marxism is the nature of that ideological control. Theoretically, there is a greater focus on ideology and language in Gramsci’s approach, and the role of discourse (as represented in institutions such as the media) in the struggle over meaning (Hall, 1982: 78). The struggle over meaning, so as to maintain the dominant ideas in society, is according to Gramsci a “cultural process, in which the media [play] a great role” (McNair, 2003: 62). The maintenance of power by the ruling class through discourse, for Gramsci, in contrast to the views expressed by a Marxist approach, does not consist of ideology as false consciousness. Rather hegemony functions by placing members of subordinate classes within social institutions and structures that support the dominant classes (see
Hegemony is won when the ruling class has eliminated the opposition and succeeded as ruler of the state – hegemony is maintained through this discursive practice (Torfing, 1999: 27). An example of silent domination is seen in the subscription of working class men to service in the state’s armed forces – by doing so the subordinate classes unwittingly subscribe to ruling hegemony.

The concept of ideology in this theoretical approach is presented in a positive light as opposed to the more negative understanding of the term in a Marxist paradigm. This is based on the separation of ideology from the economic base, and rather interprets ideology in terms of “psychological validity”, not too dissimilar to Althusser’s concept of human subjectivity (Barrett, 1994: 236). The “organisation of consent” or hegemony interprets ideology as the perceived authority by individuals and sections of society that the ideology they subscribe to is their own ideology, as opposed to being imposed (as false consciousness) by the ruling class – i.e. they consent (1994: 238). This consent to which Gramsci refers is manifested in the institutions of the ruling elite, and unlike in a classical tradition, these institutions are not necessarily based on economic factors. Rather, as in the case of the media, ideological hegemony is institutionalised in the media itself, from the owners that control the production, to the cultural workers that produce the content and the individuals that subscribe to it – a type of organic process of ideological dissemination.

**Subjectivity**

Unlike Gramsci’s approach, Althusser maintains a base-superstructure approach in his interpretation of ideology, finding it difficult to separate economic determinants form ideological considerations (1995: 24), i.e., the determining nature of the base on the superstructure (Althusser, 1994: 104-106). For Althusser, as in keeping with classical Marxism, ideology always expresses class positions, however a more positivist approach is taken referring to ideology as having a material existence.

Althusser’s (1994) conception is that the operation of ideology is in terms of the formation of human subjectivity, linking Marxist social theory to psychoanalysis. He also departs from the idea of ideology being a body of ideas or thought but rather as a social process of address, inscribed in material social matrices (see Torfing, 1999: 18-32). This concept of ideology implies that each individual is able to identify him / her-self within society as ‘the Subject’ of their own reality constituted through specific determinations (including material), i.e. a citizen of a state, or member of a particular class (regardless of history). Individuals are “interpellated” as subjects through discourse (meaning-making), while ideology is a process that represents the interests of social categories such as classes which are constituted through individual discourses (Pervis and Hunt, 1993: 483-484). Hence, Althusser summarises ideology as follows; i) the interpellation of
‘individuals; ii) their subjection to the subject, iii) mutual recognition of subjects and Subjects, the subjects’ recognition of each other, and the subject’s recognition of himself; and iv) the absolute guarantee that everything really is so (Althusser, 1994: 135). Ideology thus in contrast to a Marxist conception of the term, is viewed in a more positive light as individuals identify themselves as subjects of their own reality, as a result of their reality, instead of being subjected to a false one.

Althusser’s theoretical explanation of ideology is presented as the maintenance of the ruling power’s ideas and beliefs via “concrete social processes embodied in the material signifying practices of a collectively of ‘ideological apparatuses’ – the family, school, churches and the media” (Bennett: 1995: 52). Althusser’s interpretation of ideology is along the lines of human subjectivity – how individuals and groups in society relate to the real world – as a medium through which people experience the world (i.e. the media) (Gurevitch et al., 1995: 24). Individuals are subject to and subjects of their own realities. Within a discursive structure hegemonic struggle is fought with the aim of winning or maintaining power.

The insight gained from Althusser’s thesis on ideology and state apparatuses is that these ideological state apparatuses are ideological in nature and represent ideologies in each respect. These ideologies although not false, are informed by the ruling class in society, who control the interests of the apparatuses. To this end “ideology = an imaginary relation to real relations […] endowed with a material existence” an individual freely recognises ideas in which they believe (Althusser, 1994: 126). For example, in respect of an ideological state apparatus, the media, if an individual believes in being informed of events going on in society, he buys a newspaper, and will consciously act according to what he reads, although this is not guaranteed. Consequently, the same individual will buy a newspaper that speaks to his ideology, even if he is consciously unaware that the ideology he subscribes to is that of the ruling class (the class with the means of production). The point to be made here, from reading Althusser, is that the ideological state apparatuses, as in the case of the media, allows for ideological contestation to arise, as a result of human subjectivity and the existence of ‘material ideologies’ (Althusser, 1994: 125).

To sum up, in a sense ideology and discourse refer to the same aspect of social life, the participation of individuals in the understanding, meaning making or consciousness of life and certain aspects of social life. Power and power relations is very much a part of construction and maintaining meaning at specific points in history. This consciousness and meaning making is borne through language and other systems of signs, as a means of making sense of lived realities. Where the two theoretical conceptions of the terms differ is in the interpretation of consciousness. Ideology within a Marxist tradition of dominance and coercion focuses on the ways in which a lived
experience or consciousness is connected to external positions and interests. This implies a false consciousness, as an individual’s reality is constructed around that of dominant positions (i.e. the ruling class). In contrast, discourse theory within a poststructuralist neo-Marxist tradition considers consciousness as an engagement with social relations at specific points in history so to make meaning of actual lived realities (see Purvis and Hunt, 1993: 474-476). The displacement of the concept of ideology and its replacement with discourse is a feature of the post-Marxist discourse theory paradigm, mainly for the reason that ideology is associated with the negative conception of social consciousness serving class and political ends (Torfing, 1993; Pervis and Hunt, 1993). The removal of discourse from the economic centre and the associated constraints this has on the concept of ideology, coupled with the attribution of internal power to discourse provide a basis to which discourse, can now be interpreted and contextualised within social institutions such as the media.

**Discourse and media theory**

The media is a site for the production, distribution and consumption of discursive acts. The media (and communication) has specific properties and characteristics geared towards discourse production and distribution, including the time-space parameters of communication, the channel of communication and, more importantly for this study, the relationship the media has between public and private institutions (Fairclough, 1995b: 35-42). The relationship between the public and private within a democratic setting occurs because of the existence of a political public sphere (see Fairclough, 1995b: 44). Political institutions can refer to certain elements of state such as government, as well as public officials, while private institutions could be business and citizens. Jürgen Habermas’ (1989) theory on the public sphere and the concept of “the practice of open exchange of views and discussion about issues of general social importance” is the site for the manifestation of discourse produced by and in the media (Boyd-Barrett, 1995: 230). Newspapers have the ability to send the same information to millions of people at the same time. This is one reason why and how newspapers exercise ideological power through discourse (Fowler, 1991: 122). The other factor according to Fowler is the “political and economic circumstances of the newspaper industry [that] give it vested interests in mediating ideas from particular perspectives […]” (1991: 122). He further makes the point that “discourses of the Press, again like all discourses, relate to its own institutional and economic position” (1991: 120). This critique on “horizontal communication”, that sees the media as applying more of a vertical top-down approach to communication, informed by certain social, political and ideological interests, is a major concern of this research (see Sonderling, 1998: 12). The investigation of discursive practices in this research is
not concerned with the production of news from a journalism perspective (i.e. professional ethics or norms, attitudes and characteristics associated with its practice), but rather from an institutional perspective, i.e., the ownership and control of the newspaper industry in South Africa, in relation to the socio-political climate. Therefore the media industry and more specifically the press (as business, social organisation and area of discursive practice) is both a site, discursively, for the construction and constitution of ideology through discourse. This is as a result of its positioning as a cultural / social institution within the public sphere as well as it being a business responding to economic and even political influences (see McQuail, 2000). It is however argued that “the critical political [and ideological] function of mediatized communication is weakened by the interests of [these] large-scale organisations which dominate the public sphere (Chouliaraki, 2000: 293).

Below is an adaptation of a three-dimensional conception of discourse used by Fairclough to illustrate the processes of discursive constructs within media texts;

![Three-dimensional conception of discourse](image.png)

**Figure 2.1:** Three-dimensional conception of discourse (Fairclough, 1992: 73)

Referring to **Figure 2.1**, the largest block represents social practice concerning political and ideological, amongst other social practices within a society that are usually the dominant positions in the world / society at a given time. Discursive practices are then produced in the context of social practice. Therefore a dominant ideology existing in a society (the norm) is constructed, constituted and maintained through discursive practice. This is as a result interpreted as a type of hegemony; “leadership as much as domination across the economic, political, cultural and ideological domains of a society […] power over society” (Fairclough, 1992: 92). The text is the product of the interaction between social practice and discursive practice, and is thus through discourse a representation or construct of social practice. The two-way arrows in the figure represent the
dialectic relationship in discursive constructs or structure. This is representative of the interaction and relationships between each level in the model. It reinforces the position that power is constructed as well as constituted in discourse (see Fairclough, 1992: 73-100).

Media theory, like that of discourse theory draws much influence from theory relating to social relations. Two dominant paradigms are identified as key proponents. These are; the Marxist and liberal-plural paradigms (see Gurevitch, Bennett, Curran and Woollacott, 1995). For Marx, in a materialist tradition, the media function not just to maintain social order within society but for the maintenance of elite domination – i.e., a means for the ideological hegemony to maintain its control in and over society (McNair, 2006: 21). In this tradition, media output is seen as being biased towards the dominant elites (maintaining a false consciousness). The writings of Marx and Engels (cf. Singer, 1980) did not spell out detailed theories in response to the relationship between the media and society – rather their ideas about historical materialism and the ideological nature of the media have given rise to numerous theoretical approaches, especially writings in a leftist tradition (Bennett, 1995: 42).

In contrast, the liberal paradigm draws upon theories on the political economy argument, the free market system and plurality. The basic argument of this paradigm relates to how the media is best positioned, due to political and economic influences, to serve the public (Grossberg, Wartella and Whitney, 1998: 381).

Normative media theory argues how the media is organized economically and as a result of political circumstances, the context in which they operate determines how they function and ultimately the content they produce. The discussion on discourse and ideology above will give context to an interrogation of media theory and more specifically normative theory.

Normative media theory
Normative implications of democracy (Keane, 1991) mandate the media, as an information communication authority, to function in a specific way. This is in order to assist citizens so that they are able to make better, informed decisions in their participation within the democratic process, and ultimately transformation (see McNair, 2003). A normative theoretical approach to the issue of a free-press versus a state-press (implied by Zuma) involves exploring the general standards and norms that are associated with the behaviour or function of the press within each instance. Within a political communication setting there are three relationships that exist; between the media and the state, the state and its electorate and the media and the electorate. These are not three separate relationships but rather one large and complex one. It is a relationship that is determined by certain behavioural and ideological conditions even pre-conditions: “it is virtually impossible to separate
ideas about the ‘objective’ relationship between media and society from ‘normative’ or even ideological considerations” (McQuail, 2000:142). Normative press models seek to define how the press should function within society. Rather than providing a descriptive account of the performance of the press, or criticising the press, normative press theory argues for certain press systems and to what extent these systems correspond with the actual socio-political environment, as a result of ideological positioning. This theoretical approach, however, rarely correlates with actual conditions (Grossberg et al., 1998: 375-395). Rather, what this paradigm attempts to do is provide a framework for the relationship that exists between the media and society depending on the system in which the media operates, defined by ideological positions.

Media systems around the world can be classified according to four main types of models within the normative paradigm, these being; authoritarian, libertarian, social responsibility and soviet-tolerance. These normative paradigms provide a theoretical understanding into “a rather uncertain and contested position within the field of ‘communication science’, partly because it leads inevitably into questions of ideology, politics, law or ethics, which are not easy to deal with in a ‘scientific’ way, according to the ‘dominant paradigm’” (McQuail, 2000). The four theories outlined by Siebert et al. (1956) provide a framework for understanding the context (political, economic, social and cultural) in which the media operates in specific societies. The four theories (or more, if McQuail’s additional theories of development and democratic-participation are included, 1987) are critiqued by McQuail (2000) and Grossburg et al. (1998) for their general nature and for not describing or underling any actual media system. They argue that most national media institutions and practices and most relations between the state and media display a mixture of several elements. For example, the libertarian and social-responsibility, with hits of soviet-authoritarian agendas post 2007, is seen in the case of South Africa post-1994.

Classical liberalism or libertarianism is the best model for examining the press within a democratic setting, because the theory was born out of the idea of freedom of expression, as it fits the many capitalist democracies where a free-press is the norm. Liberalism as a theory of media performance is predicated upon classical liberal economic theory. This implies that under a democratic system where freedom of expression is a most important characteristic, everyone has the right to contribute to debate within society and within the public sphere, because of the associated free market system (Grossberg et al. 1998: 381). This is one of the main reasons why a free-press is generally considered a pre or co-requisite to democracy, as it is in line with the core characteristics and ideologies of liberal capitalist democracy.
Liberal critical theories point out the various shortcomings of the approach; such is the case in the social responsibility model, which says that the media should be “truthful, accurate, fair, objective and relevant” (McQuail, 2000). Habermas’ theory on the public sphere and its relationship with media, state and society suggest in this regard the idea of the media as a fourth estate. A social-responsibility model would suggest, in a democratic setting, the media function in the same light as an estate in public life. This position is the mainstream counterpoint to the liberal capitalism viewpoint (see Doyle 2002). Ideally, the press should provide a forum for the exchange of ideas, presenting the widest variety of views (thus fulfilling its role as a fourth estate). The press should avoid stereotyping and provide a representative view of the society – i.e. represent a wide array of ideological viewpoints. This is accomplished, if the press is responsible, and effectively self-regulated. If it could not achieve this, then the government would have to establish its own media and more directly intervene to assure that the press was responsible in its mandate to inform, educate and involve citizens in public life.

The term media as a fourth estate derives from the other three arms of the government namely the executive, legislator and judiciary. This would imply that the media plays a key role in the politics of democratic countries, as it is regarded so highly by political organisations and actors. Citizens choose their political actors and representatives in many ways, though mainly by a shared ideology that they have in common or the fact that they simply agree with certain policies. The media’s role is to mediate and communicate various and diverse political and public discourses. This enables citizens to make better, informed decisions in their participation within the democratic process, i.e. voting (McNair, 2003). The ways in which the media does this is to firstly inform citizens, as well as educate them, secondly to provide a platform for the formation of ‘public opinion’, take up a watchdog role, and finally to provide for an advocacy of all political viewpoints (McNair, 2003).

This is a departure from the libertarian notion, in that within a libertarian model the state is not to be seen as directly intervening in the role of the fourth estate – the media. This implies that the media plays an important role in the political structures and processes of the state (see also Unger, 1990; McChesney, 2002). In another departure from libertarianism, the media is suggested as the “common carrier” of ideas. The press has obligations to present different ideas, and not only those in a dominant position of power. This departs significantly from the libertarian idea that the media are wholly free to promote only those ideas of their own choosing – or the ideas of the ruling class (whom control the material interests of the media) (see Doyle, 2002: 383).

Theories on the political economy of the media, situated within a libertarian paradigm and those situated within a social responsibility paradigm, i.e., the analysis of state-regulation / economic issues vis-à-vis ethical journalism are not easily juxtaposed. However to further clarify the two
theoretical paradigms employed in this research the following distinction between the two needs to be made. Liberal political economic theories on the media suggest that the media is an economic as well as cultural institution responding to economic and political factors in society. The media positions itself to maintain and or challenge the political and economic norms in a society. This theoretical approach within capitalist societies maintains the media’s self-interest approach, as opposed to a more social responsibility paradigm. The latter assumes that the media although economic and political in nature, must be socially and even ethically responsible in the content it produces. This, with the aim to enable consumers (citizens) to make balanced informed decisions. A later discussion in Chapter 3 presents the argument of a developmental media as opposed to a public media as an example of the complexities of a socially responsible media.

Zuma’s position post-2007 highlights the point that the media can be driven by its own economic, political and ideological agendas, and that this may detract from its social-responsibility function within society. It may also diminish its pluralist voice in that only the interests of those who serve the media’s economic ends are represented. However, Zuma’s and the ANC’s response to this possible occurrence is to censor the media, which will only further deviate from its social-responsibility and democratic duties.

Considering the position of the ANC post-Polokwane it is worth exploring the Soviet model, as it would best fit the comments made and the discourse presented by Zuma’s attacks on the media. As part of this framework, issues of structure and ownership within the media becomes apparent, where “[t]he question of freedom arises both in relation to the state but also in relation to economic and other powerful interests in society.” (McQuail, 2000: 144). The premise of a Soviet theory does not favour free expression, but according to McQuail (1994: 128) does propose a positive role for the media in society, with a strong emphasis on culture and information and on the task of economic and social development. This would fit with developmental discourse presented by Zuma at Polokwane. In many respects Soviet theory is authoritarian in the way it is exercised (i.e. the proposed media tribunal of 2009 and the proposed Protection of Information Act (2010) in a South African context). The media under this model is expected to be responsible and serious and to reflect the diversity of social structure and culture.

The Soviet model as is with the case with the others discussed is out-dated and often not relevant to the actual media systems in place. To this end McQuail proposes abandoning the four theories;
not most, countries, the media do not constitute any single ‘system’, but are composed of many separate, overlapping, often theoretically inconsistent elements (1991: 67)

Perhaps what is needed is a more modern and consolidated theoretical approach to the study of media in society, one that considers the general norms of the above proposed models of analysis, but provides for a more theoretically sound argument in terms of discourse and ideology. This will give more context to a discussion on the representation and construction of discourse in the media, as opposed to a more general reasoning as to how the media ought to function under specific dispensations.

**Control and Chaos Theory**

What Brian McNair proposes in *Cultural Chaos* (2006) provides for a modern and consolidated approach to the study of ideology [discourse] within the media, while at the same time presenting his own theory of chaos (in relation to the media and ideology).

> the reproduction of capitalist societies requires ideological control; the media are a key ideological apparatus in the control of ruling elites; the media are effective in generating variants of false consciousness, not least in time of war and global crisis.” (McNair, 2006: 34)

A chaos theoretical approach proposes in the tradition of writers such as Francis Fukuyama (1989) the thesis of “the end of history”, i.e., the end of ideology (see McNair, 2006: 74-86). Its post-Cold War approach outlines the global re-alignment of ideology where there is no real case of far right / left ideological positions as was the case during the Cold War. This is not to say that they have disappeared, rather there is no strong contrast between class based ideologies. These have been weakened by various social transformations post-war (Thompson, 2000: 112) (see previous discussion on discourse theory). This approach critiques the control paradigm presented by historical-materialism and presents a “multi-causality” chaos paradigm (McNair: 2006: 48). The control paradigm in the Marxist tradition of Althusser’s writing on ideological state apparatuses positions institutions such as the state and media as being at the disposal of ruling elites, implying that institutions such as the media are linked to dominant groups in society by economic, political and even cultural connections (2006: 35). In contrast, the multi-causality chaos paradigm involves a multifaceted interpretation of the ideological process within the media, including production, consumption and social action, as opposed to the control approach that focuses more exclusively on the ownership of media and the ideological influence as a result of this. The chaos approach allows for a pluralist interpretation of media and its content production and output, societal factors influencing media practitioners and their content. The production of content is therefore not an issue
of ideological imposition, but rather an interaction of all social factors in society, as seen in Fairclough’s 3D model in Figure 2.1 above.

Most importantly, McNair suggests that if the social environment changes, then so will the content out-put, irrespective of the desires of the dominant groups in society (2006: 48). This is not always the case, as there are many other factors that influence content output, not least of which are economic determiners. The holistic take on ideological dissemination within the media proposed here implies that the ANC will have to contend with the other power blocs in South Africa, and that the imposition of their ideology / discourse on society will not be an easy task, especially in a liberal climate. The situation might be different if the ANC forces a soviet-authoritarian type model for the media.

The cultural studies paradigm takes an entirely different approach to the study of ideology within the media, moving away from a political and economic study of class, politics and society to focus on the programmes and the messages that are produced by the media (cultural industry) (Hall, 1980: 392). The critical tradition in cultural studies poses the question, “how is ‘the ideological’ to be conceived in relation to other practices within a social formation”, i.e., within the media (Hall, 1982: 65)? Texts produced by the cultural industry (the media) are studied within a cultural studies paradigm as a means of sustaining systems of domination, coupled with the media’s economic interests driven by material considerations (i.e. making a profit) (Golding and Murdock, 1998: 84). Discourses interpreted by the media are seldom re-produced as the same discourse because these cultural texts are mechanisms for regulating of public discourse, and must consider (or are influenced by) a variety of other discourses and positions (1998: 85). Hall’s use of signification in describing the articulation of ideology in relation to other social practices (discourse) implies that meaning is a social production and that language is a specific medium in which meaning is produced (1982: 67). Dominant discourses are therefore conceived when one meaning is regularly re-produced and by this re-production made to be legitimate (Kariithi and Kareithi, 2007: 467). Discourses are therefore signified in codes or shared assumptions about something or a particular event.

Hall’s theory of dominant discourses is read in close consideration to Gramsci’s idea of hegemony, “the media are not the primary definers of news events but their structured relationship to powerful primary definers has the effect of giving them a crucial role in reproducing the definitions of those who have privileged access to the media as ‘accredited sources’” – for example, advertisers (Wren-Lewis, 1983). Within a democratic context the press is considered a free autonomous institution and it is therefore understandable that they may produce their own hegemonic discourses. Or on the other hand, because of this autonomy they are not affected by hegemonic power blocs. However if the role of the media is to inform, and to inculcate individuals
with values, beliefs and codes of behaviour that will integrate them into the institutional structures of the larger society, this role then requires systematic propaganda” (Herman & Chomksy, 1996: 166).

**Critical analysis of discourse**

Developments in discourse theory have seen a shift from a structuralist approach on discourse analysis toward a poststructuralist or postmodern one (see Mills, 1997: 76 and Potter, 1996: 68-96). Within a structuralist paradigm the study of language or linguistics involves the formal aspects of language, i.e., the langue and parole (Sonderling, 1994). Within this paradigm the study of language can also be approached through semiology. Semiology is the study of sign processes or signification as well as communication signs and symbols, both individually and grouped into sign systems. Simply it is the study of how meaning is constructed and understood within various texts (see Weedon, Tolson and Mort, 1980: 177-185). The introduction of the concept of discourse to that of the study of language however marks the poststructuralists’ shift away from the structuralists’ emphasis on the langue and parole (Sonderling, 1994: 12). Foucault and Michel Pêcheux (cf. Sonderling, 1994) mark this break with the structuralist study of discourse as merely a study of the structure of language to the inclusion of context within the text (social practice, i.e. ideological struggle) (see Mills, 1997: 26 and Thompson, 1984: 223). The early works of these two theorists have informed many other poststructuralist writings on discourse by the likes of Fairclough (1995a), Potter and Wetherell (1987), Fowler (1991) and Laclau and Mouffe (cf. Torfing 1999 and cf. Carpentier and De Cleen, 2007).

The influence of poststructuralism in the study of discourse has resulted in a shift away from a more traditional paradigm of research, as located in scientific approaches, toward an interpretive paradigm (Mills, 1997). Discourse analysis as a result not only examines discourse as an open-closed occurrence, but more importantly how realities come to be what they are, that they are able to be different, and therefore can be changed (Hammersley, 2003). This specific study will contextualise the specific poststructuralist approaches to the study of discourse, namely; critical discourse analysis (CDA) and discourse theory analysis (DTA) as theoretical approaches to the study of discourse structure within content and not as methods in discourse analysis.

**Discourse analysis as method or paradigm**

The analysis of discourse includes several approaches that vary both in theoretical and methodological stances, depending on the position the researcher approaches discourse, i.e., from psychology, critical linguistics, media studies etc. (see Mills, 1997). Discourse analysis in social
psychology, conversation analysis, pragmatics and critical discourse analysis are just some of the selected methods employed in analysing discourse (Wood and Kroger, 2000: 20-22).

Discourse analysis is generally employed as a method of analysing discourse or discursive acts, but as Martyn Hammersley (2003) argues, the distinction between discourse analysis as a method employed in the analysis of discursive acts and as a paradigm supported by theoretical approaches is not as clear cut. Discourse analysis is thus “not only about method; it is also a perspective on the nature of language and its relationships to the central issues of social science […] not only practices of data collection and analysis, but also a set of metatheoretical and theoretical assumptions about a body of research claims and studies” (Wood and Kroger, 2000: 5).

The situation of discourse analysis as either a “method” to be used in social science research when examining discursive texts, or as an exclusive self-sufficient paradigm used is social investigation - a theoretical approach to understanding human life - is subject of much debate (Hammersley, 2003). Hammersley’s (2003) critique is centered on the work of Potter and Wetherell’s (1987). Potter and Wetherell (1987) conception of discourse and its analysis is situated within a psychology paradigm – ‘discourse as action’ (see Potter and Wetherell, 1987). A constructionist approach to discourse analysis proposes the idea of discourse as action, and how discursive acts (for example, a journalist writing a newspaper editorial) appear to individuals as objective and existing in the real world (truthful and relevant) (see Potter, 1996). This places “emphasis on the generative power of discursive acts” (how the real, meaning and ‘power’ are attributed to the words of a newspaper editorial) (Hammersley, 2003: 756).

Methods in discourse analysis seek to examine how and why social goings-on are constructed in the way that they are. Discourse analysis can also be employed within the context of history or social reality, researchers may use these discursive strategies to explain why the world is constructed in the way that it currently is. This may involve the provision of a socio-historical context, wider social philosophy and theory in analysing discourse (Wood and Kroger, 2000). This is often an implicit act in discourse analysis, becoming however more explicit in a critical analysis of discourse.

Related to this debate between method and paradigm are the various tensions that exist in doing discourse analysis (Burman and Parker, 1993). Four specific tensions have been identified: firstly between text and context (what specific context will the researcher refer to in order to interpret a text); secondly the distinction between doing discourse analysis as ideological critique and traditional positivist methods masquerading as discourse analysis; third is between the use of conceptions of power / knowledge and a range of other approaches which are simply descriptive;
and finally (as has been critically explored by Hammersley, 2003) the tension between theoretically informed work and research where the data ‘speaks for itself’ (Burman and Parker, 1993: 10-12).

The positions of Hammersley, Burman and Parker, (1993) are that discourse analysis should not be viewed as a self-sufficient paradigm, stating that it is a reflexive application, and that instead should be a single method used in conjunction with other qualitative and quantitative approaches to social science research. Even this they argue will not solve the reflexive nature of discourse analysis.

In response to Hammersley (2003), Potter (2003) argues from a discursive psychology paradigm against some of the critiques of method and situation of discourse analysis raised by Hammersley. However, for different “confusing” reasons Potter too suggests discourse analysis is not necessarily a singular paradigm, mainly for the reason of the complex interaction of “imperial and rhetorical engagement” with other approaches, theories or paradigms (2003: 784). The relationship discourse shares with other approaches, i.e., mainstream psychology and ideological critique prevents it from assuming a paradigm on its own. This too has implications for discourse analysis as method, in that it draws on many other areas of enquiry, it therefore is not sufficient to lay out a set of guided rules when applying it as method. This is further compounded by the definition, understanding and practice of discourse, because discourse is not simply language analysis, and includes a societal aspect of analysis, as opposed to just words on a page (2003: 785). Potter suggests when applying discourse analysis to a topic of research questions are asked in the form of:

*What is an X? How is an X done? How is X managed in the context of Y?*  
The logic of these questions is conversational and rhetorical; they emphasize action and construction. They do not mix easily with questions involving factors and outcomes. Methods or analytical approaches do not tend to be freestanding - they are typically associated with broader principals and assumptions. (Potter, 2003: 786, original italics)

Potter however warns about combining discourse analysis with other methods that make assumptions about discourse, such as content analysis, saying this may lead to incoherence (2003: 787). However, as will be discussed in Chapter 4 this research will employ discourse analysis as a meta-theoretical paradigm to inform a content analysis on newspaper texts.

Selecting the correct approach or theoretical paradigm in discourse analysis can be made simpler by exploring the differences that exist between approaches. The different ways in which ideologies are conceived, the role of discourse in the construction of the world and the analytical focus are three elements used in differentiating approaches to discourse analysis (Phillips and Jørgensen,
The two figures below illustrate the situation of three varieties of discourse analysis in relation to their ideological stance; how they constitute the world and their analytical focus;

Discourse is constitutive  Dialectical relationship  Discourse is constituted

Discourse Theory  Critical Discourse Analysis  Discursive Psychology
(Foucault)  (Althusser)  (Gramsci)  (Historical materialism)

**Figure 2.2:** the role of discourse in the construction of the world (Phillips and Jørgensen, 2002: 20)

Everyday discourse  Abstract discourse

Discursive Psychology  Critical Discourse Analysis  Discourse Theory
(Foucault)

**Figure 2.3:** Analytical Focus (Phillips and Jørgensen, 2002: 20)

The above two figures, in relation to the three discourse analytic methods, discursive psychology, discourse theory and critical discourse analysis, presents a clearer picture into their theoretical positioning within a discourse analysis paradigm. The theoretical positioning of each analytic method determines the approach to text and its analysis. Macro-textual approaches such as critical discourse analysis use a broader definition of text, seeing texts as “materializations of meaning and/or ideology” (Carpentier and De Cleen, 2007: 277). What a macro-textual approach to discourse focuses on is meaning or the representations of ideologies within texts, i.e., text in context, and not so much the structure of language used. This specific research, situated within a poststructuralist approach to media texts (within normative and political economy paradigms), best fits a “[s]ocialcultural change and change in discourse” approach to critical discourse analysis as developed by Fairclough (Wood and Kroger, 2000: 206) (see Fairclough, 1992 and 1995a).

**CDA versus DTA**

Carpentier and De Cleen (2007) propose the use of discourse theory as analysis, within this same macro-textual paradigm. Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory has been employed as a research method in the analysis of media texts, as seen in James Curran’s (1997) attempt to articulate a radical democratic (normative) theory of the media. This approach differs from the more traditional
liberal, Marxist and communist theories, and is cited as an example of how discourse theory is employed when analysing the media (cf. Carpentier and De Cleen, 2007: 273). Torfing (1999: 210–224) distinguishes three domains where discourse theory is used as method and paradigm when studying discourse within the media; firstly studying discourses about the media and their place and function in society; second, focusing on discourses of the media, i.e., on the form and content of the discourses produced by the media; and finally defining media discourse.

From a discourse-theoretical viewpoint, media are seen not just as passively expressing or reflecting social phenomena, but as specific machineries that produce, reproduce and transform social phenomena. The media are not just one of the societal sites where discourses circulate, but also discursive machineries that can be considered (Carpentier and De Cleen, 2007: 274).

In critical discourse analysis the media is seen as an important public space and media discourse is studied as a site of power and social struggle (Wodak and Busch 2004: 109–111). The focus of analysis is placed on political issues such as racism, nationalism and gender (Richardson, 2007). As evident in Figures 2.2 and 2.3 above, the work of Foucault has been influential in the “popularisation” of the term discourse, as well as its analysis as method (Fairclough, 1992: 37). His social theory approach to discourse and the importance he places on the relationship(s) that exists between discourse and power as well as discourse and knowledge (authority and legitimacy) has been one of the influential elements in Fairclough’s work on critical discourse analysis (see Sonderling, 1998). “CDA is consolidated […] as a ‘three dimensional’ framework where the aim is to map three separate forms of analysis onto one another: analysis of (spoken or written) language texts, analysis of discourse practice […] and analysis of discursive events as instances of social cultural practices” (Fairclough, 1995a: 2). This approach has strong epistemological links with Hall’s theory of representation and ideology as discussed previously in this chapter (Kariithi and Kareithi, 2007: 468) and is similar to the one presented by Torfing (1999) in relation to DTA. The theory of encoding / decoding (Hall, 1980) in this research is read in conjunction with Fairclough’s CDA; however more shall be said on its theory and application in Chapter 4 in relation to coding of content (as method).

It is also important to not confuse and substitute approaches in critical discourse analysis with that of discourse analysis (Potter, 2003). Fairclough’s critical discourse analysis is situated in a poststructuralist paradigm as opposed to another variant of critical discourse analysis, such as that proposed by van Dijk (2006), whom rejects the notion of poststructuralism. Van Dijk adopts a cognition approach to analysing the relationship between discourse and social structures. As opposed to Fairclough who analyses discursive events as social and cultural practices (Wood and
Rog, 2000: 207; see also Schaffner and Holmes, 1996). This method “approaches discourse as a circular process in which social practices influence texts, via shaping the context and mode in which they are produced, and in turn texts help influence society via shaping the viewpoints of those who […] consume them” (Richardson, 2007: 37). This circular process discussed by Richardson relates to Fairclough’s three fold approach, firstly a textual analysis, of which content analysis is one form, secondly the consideration of discursive practices in news discourse (i.e. the institutional character of text production and consumption, Fairclough, 1995a: 58) and finally the social practices embedded in the context of texts (Richardson, 2007: 37-46).

CDA and DTA can both be labelled critical, as they “investigate and analyse power relations in society and formulate normative perspectives from which a critique of such relations can be made with an eye on the possibilities for social change” (Philips and Jørgensen 2002: 2). Both approaches draw strongly on the concept of hegemony in the social struggle for representation and power; however where they differ is in the theoretical paradigm each situates its approach to the study of discourse. CDA maintains a Marxist critique of material and class domination, while in discourse theory and its analysis takes an all-encompassing approach to discourse-as-representation, supported by its social ontology; power is constituted in discourse. The latter approach also provides theoretical support for the in-depth analysis of the construction of political identities, embedded in the sociology of conflict and antagonisms (Carpentier and De Cleen, 2007: 278). The theoretical approach to the study of discourse analysis (DTA), is best placed to examine discourse in macro-terms, and is employed in the interpretation of social and political discourse in this study, CDA is however best placed to explore discourse in media texts because of concern with the text and language (Carpentier and De Cleen, 2007: 274-275).

In this instance both the models of CDA and DTA are employed in a theoretical interpretation of the construction of discourse, and not as method for the analysis of discourse. The first of the three domains referred to above by Torfing (1999), when studying discourse within the media, has already been discussed in relation to normative media theories discussed in this chapter. The next part of this study will be to explore the content of discursive texts produced in relation to the specific case study of the ANC power struggle at Polokwane. This will be done by identifying using CDA and DTA as theory the discourses presented by elites within the ANC. These discourses will be interrogated in the chapter to follow. The final part will be to examine the content produced by the various press houses under study in relation to the political economic climate in with the media operate (or how ANC elites perceive them to function) so to interpret or define the discourse of the media (each press house).
Chapter 3: Shifting discourses: ANC positions on press transformation

Research dealing with media and democratisation in South Africa, not surprisingly, has been strongly influenced by the profound changes in socio-political power that led up to the political changes of 1994 and those that have ensued since then. The resultant social transformation is evident in the shifts in media ownership, and although the changes have been often made in the name of greater democratisation, it is not always certain that the power struggles have, in fact, led to greater diversity, accountability and responsibility in the media. A major emphasis on political-economic analysis in South African media research has responded to the need to gain a critical understanding of these transformations in ownership and control of the media, and the implication this has for a responsible media (see, e.g., Olorunnisola and Tomasi, 2011).

The chapter that follows will present a review of ANC party and elite discourse as presented by the public figures of Jacob Zuma and Thabo Mbeki, as well as the press’ interpretation and representation of these discursive position(s). It will track periodically the shift in official party policy from the late 1980s to its most recent on the perceived role and function of the media. The chapter will also identify ANC factional and elite positions on the media as presented in official statements and coverage by the media. The final part will be to examine the transformation of ownership within the five press houses as of 2009, within the framework of national policy on the media as implemented by the ruling party. A review of political economy research into media transformation will contextualise the 2009 ownership patterns. This will provide the context to a textual analysis of discourse in the press at the 2007 ANC National Elective Conference.

Political discourse in South Africa during the 1980s and 1990s saw a shift from “apartheid” towards “non-racialism”, mainly as a result of pressure from social practices external and internal to political parties, including a shift towards a new neo-liberal world order in the early 1990s. The transforming, independent and democratic press thrived under the neo-liberal economic policies of the Mbeki lead ANC, allowing for minimal media management by the state. However, more than a decade on and yet again another major shift in ANC discourse on the media is evident in this ‘post-Polokwane’ period. The chapter will present the shifts in patterns of political discourse on the media, as propagated by various factions within the ANC, from the late 1980s up to 2009. An examination into the politics of the ANC elite will include (broadly) the early transformative years (late 1980s to early 1990s), the Mbeki years, including his administrations neo-liberal policies and
finally the power struggle between himself and Zuma and the latter’s emergence out of Polokwane as ‘leader of the poor’ and working class. The antagonistic ANC elite positions will be explored in relation to personal and public discourses presented by the elites as well as political economy approaches on the media, including official government policy. A political economy approach “examines how media and communication systems and content reinforce, challenge or influence existing class and social relations”, with specific focus on how economics influences political and social relations (McChesney, 2000: 110). The political economy approach initiated by Tomaselli et al. (1987), followed through to Olorunmisola and Tomaselli (2011) and their respective authors examines how texts (representation) negotiated their contexts (industry structuration, politics and economics) in response to changing political economic conditions. A “radical-structural approach” is employed, that explores in relation to theories on the political economy of the media, its ownership and control, and the role the state is perceived or intended to play as propagated by the various factions within the ruling party alliance (Teer-Tomaselli, 2008a: 39).

From apartheid and militancy to non-racial policy debate

South Africa, since 1994, is a democratic state insofar as the country’s citizens are able to freely and fairly elect their political representatives, and are privileged with certain freedoms as law abiding members of the state. This is a far cry from the oppressive, undemocratic “racial capitalism” that prevailed under apartheid (see Saul and Gelb, 1981). The media in both instances (under democracy and apartheid) often aligns itself with the objectives and interests of the hegemony. This is either because of political and ideological reasoning, economic factors or out of fear of being marginalised or banned (see Tomaselli et al. 1987). The media can function in the maintenance of hegemony or as in the case of the “alternative press” challenge or provide an alternate option to the dominant class or position in society (see Tomaselli and Louw, 1991). The ideal ‘function’ of the media under democracy – as a system of freedom and choice – would be to strike a balance between the two above ‘functions’ so to act in a more objective and inclusive nature. The media is expected to normatively fulfill certain functions that aid in social, political and economic development, and in South Africa’s case – transformation. However this ‘ideal’ function for the media within a democratic dispensation is not always enacted. This could be for a number of reasons including either political or economic influence.

Media research during the 1980s critiqued the then corporate and state media for their hegemonic position in supporting racial capitalism that was apartheid (Saul and Gelb, 1981). Theoretical issues of hegemony and ideology formed the basis for a political economy analysis on
the press in the country during late apartheid. These theoretical frameworks examined the press with regard to social control in the newsroom, ideological trajectories, including those of the ANC and the NP, and ownership wars between conservative and more liberal fractions of Afrikaner capital. The press as a whole had to maintain a relationship with the apartheid state so to avoid being marginalised or even banned. The different pro-apartheid and largely anti-capitalist Afrikaner press supported apartheid on the one hand (Tomaselli, et al. 1987). While on the other, the anti-apartheid pro-capitalist press critiqued apartheid, and how they responded to reformist elements within it. During the 1980s the press was dominated by these two groups, the white English-language newspapers who were linked to the interests of mining capital, and produced more liberal critiques of the apartheid government (the two press houses were Argus and South African Associated Newspapers [SAAN] / Times Media Limited [TML]). The second group on other end of the spectrum, the Afrikaans-language newspapers supported Afrikaner nationalism and the apartheid state (the two press houses were Nasionale Pers and Perskor) (Muller, 1987). They served as key institutions for the articulation of nationalist ideology, even while some of them questioned the establishment from time to time (see Tomaselli & Dunn, 2001). Reformist veligte (enlightened) elements led by Nasionale Pers defeated the Perskor conservatives to win then ground for a post-apartheid future (see Muller, 1987).

As the ANC and any other radical opposition organisations were all banned up until the early democratic debates in the 1990s, much opposition to the apartheid state came from within the press (see Louw, 1993). These oppositional discourses came from mainly two sectors, the more liberal English-language press and the so-called black alternative press.

In response to the apartheid state, liberal discourses in certain sectors of the press informed much of the critique during the 1980s. The critiques under the banner of libertarianism were largely penned by influential editors writing from within the English-language press, such as the Sunday Times’ Joel Mervis, (1989), The Star’s Harvey Tyson (1987; 1993) and The Witness’s John Conyngham (1997) (see also Blatchford, 1997; Rich, 1997). These authors examined how the media functioned under apartheid, drawing detailed sketches of the contestation between a brutal authoritarian government and a liberal English-language press attempting to resist it, while simultaneously advocating capitalism as the preferred mode of production over that of Afrikaner National Socialism. The English-language Press (with the exception of the government-owned Citizen) generally, was anti-apartheid, but often ambivalent in its critique. Many of the English liberal press editors, however, played key roles in exposing government wrongdoing and significantly shaped political outcomes (see Tomaselli and Nothling, 2008). Liberalism however “appeared to many of the younger black generation an elitist creed for the well-educated white
middle class, one which failed to develop any radical alternative agenda to the now hegemonic apartheid ideology” (Rich, 1997).

The Alternative or the ‘black’ press provided an alternate discourse to both English-language and Afrikaans presses. This faction of the press during the 1980s cultivated literacy, social organization and resistance, in pursuance of democracy and social justice (Tomaselli and Louw, 1991). Its discourse could be described as being within the “‘Congress Tradition’”, i.e., ANC, and COSATU discourse (Louw, 1993: 177). The authoritarian nature of the apartheid state was often felt by the press, if it was felt to be too ‘alternative’ in its critique of the state. An example of the NP government’s handling of the press is seen in their response to eleven newspapers that carried full-page advertisements asking the government to unban the ANC on 7 January 1987. Within a day the Police Commissioner prohibited publications from explaining the policies of banned organisations (Abel, 1995: 263). This faction of the press however serviced a smaller, poorer and more marginalised black demographic, giving it an insignificant section of advertising spend, as well as readership. This lack of exposure limited the commercial voice of the alternative press in comparison to the two dominant press houses (Argus and SAAN).

By the end of the 1980s political change was unavoidable, due to global political and economic pressure as a result of the general trend towards capitalism and liberal democracy. The formation of the United Democratic Front (UDF) in 1984 had cultivated a more liberal ideology in political parties including the ANC, and incorporated a broad spectrum of political and ideological standpoints (Rich, 1997). These united organisations presented a non-racial discourse, arguing apartheid-capitalism and class oppression as the enemy, rather than the white-Afrikaanner (Tomaselli, 2000: 281). The media was identified as a means for both communication and mobilisation by the UDF against this racial class-based capitalism, and to this end the alternative press was the source of much of this discourse (see Tomaselli and Louw, 1991).

However, as noted by Louw during the early democratic policy debates (1993: 179) the challenge going forward into democracy is for this segment of the press not to lose its alternative voice within a new dispensation. This would however be difficult due to commercial forces within a liberal-capitalist economy, and the already existent monopoly – to this end Louw suggests possible state subsidies. This is however risky and could lead to a new state run press faction.

The ideological positioning and ensuing discourses presented by the UDF, ANC and NP during the late 1980s presented several possible scenarios for the role and function of the media going forward into the 1990s. Basing his analysis on normative media theory, Arnold De Beer (1989) sketched different forms of media control depending on the outcome of the political change. These included: either an authoritarian media, a developmentalist model, a Soviet Like system or if an optimistic outcome, a social responsibility / libertarian system. He takes a functional analysis
approach to the press post-apartheid, debating the possible scenarios for the media depending on the sway of the new ruling bloc. De Beer bases his scenarios on the four theories of the press – predicting a type of,

idealistic view of the Social Responsibility-Libertarian approach by the ANC shifting from a Soviet type approach at the height of apartheid (1989: 37) (see also Tomaselli, 1989). The *Business Day* during this transitional period proposed that “[a]fter a century of participation in the economy, (the blacks) own little of it…But they are flexing their muscles aggressively. The question is whether the black working class will follow the democratic path to First World status chosen by most of Western Europe or the Marxist road trodden by Russia and China” [In addition De Beer notes] the government should be placed in a position where it could communicate with the black community via a Press system that would be acceptable for the solution and not the aggregation of South Africa’s problems (cf. De Beer, 1989).

The then *Weekly Mail*, part of the alternative press, printed a discourse in line with UDF and ANC perspectives, and was a platform for broadcasting ANC messages during the late 1980s. A letter issued by Nelson Mandela, detailing the economic policy of the party during this period leaned towards a Nationalist / socialist ideology. The ANC is quoted saying “The future economic system would be of a transitory nature which could, however, lay the foundations for socialism. This implies a mixed economy where certain sectors are nationalised and others remain free enterprise” (see *Weekly Mail*, 26 January 1990). Louw notes that by 1992 the ANC had shifted its discourse from one of non-racialism under the banner of a UDF in the 1980s, to a black-nationalism during early transitional talks, while the NP government shifted towards a more non-racial discourse – evident in the unbanning of several oppositional, black-led political parties (1994: 26).

A shift in national and ANC policy leading up to the fall of apartheid was not restricted to economic and political issues, but rather included social issues relating to the transformation of civil society, including the media. The ANC is argued to have shifted from a non-racial position to a Stalinist-black-nationalist discourse to a more liberal ideology following UDF discussions, ultimately to be positioned as a social responsibility / libertarian discourse in the early 1990s (see Teer-Tomaselli, 1993; Rich 1997).

**Policy debates of the 1990s**

Civil society took the lead in the early transformation talks; there was much debate as to the best way to approach the topic of media transformation (Jabulani, 1991; Rhodes Media Workshop, 1990; Pinnock, 1993; Louw, 1993 etc.). Transformation needed to not only occur at a national government level but also to filter through to all aspects of political and social life, including public and commercial media (Teer-Tomaselli and Tomaselli, 2001; Wasserman, 2011). These debates
were dominated by the centre-left and centre-right of the political spectrum; the ANC felt that a major transformation of the media needed to be undertaken and situated its early (democratic) policy along the lines of a mixed market economy or “social democratic policy” (Louw, 1993: 13; De Beer 1989). The ANC recognised the need for a largely commercially and politically free media, but factions within the party also felt the need for a portion of the media to be socially and politically aligned with the ruling party. This was evident in early policy talks centred on broadcasting (Currie, 1993).

The ANC risked treading a similar path to that of the previous NP government, in their want for a party-aligned national broadcaster (see Jabulani! Freedom of the Airwaves Conference 1991, cf. Teer-Tomaselli, 1993: 227-240). This position was opposed at the time by a more centre-right NP which possibly foresaw a future ANC-led government, and were looking out for their own interests by proposing a liberal media free from political meddling. The NP feared that their own interests would not be looked out for under a social-democratic system, but rather as was the case under their rule, a party-aligned media would be established. The NP also knew that economically, as was the state of ownership in the print media at the time, their interests would be well looked after (see Louw, 1994).

A Draft Media Charter (1991) resulting from an ANC policy seminar referenced the need for an independent monitoring structure for the press, as well as the establishment of an ANC biased newspaper (see Teer-Tomaselli 1993: 236 and cf. Louw, 1993: 329-340). Teer-Tomaselli noted that this “militancy and partisanship” displayed by the ANC during early debates on media ownership suggested that the party would revert back to similar policies of censorship and control exercised by the NP government under apartheid (1993: 236). However the dominance of the dailies The Sowetan and City Press appealing to a black market would make it financially difficult for the ANC to set up their own party focused newspaper (Teer-Tomaselli, 1993: 236). Subsequently, due to internal pressure from within the ANC, and an investigation into the economic viability of establishing their-own newspaper, a shift in internal policy took place. The Draft Media Charter was replaced by the ANC Media Charter of 1992. The ANC policy on the media and its transformation that eventually emerged out of these debates was in line with a more independent framework for the media. The policy debates would eventually see the ANC adopt a mixed economy approach (Louw 1993: 17). This would imply that not only are the freedoms associated with a democratic media (freedom of speech, access to information etc.) a priority going forward, but that these freedoms were not restricted to the classes who have the financial means and access to media, both from a consumption and production perspective. The implementation of a mixed model would be vital to successful and meaningful transformation in the country, and not only
within the media. If a neo-liberal policy were to become the hegemonic discourse of the ANC, transformation and the redistribution of wealth and power would remain in the hands of the economic elite and new ANC elite, at the risk of meaningful redistributive measures benefiting the working classes and poor (Rick, 1997: 16).

**Neo-liberal economic policy**

The re-introduction of South Africa into the global economy presented new opportunities as well as challenges for its institutions, democracy and redistributive transformation. One such challenge was to transform media institutions into a bone fide fourth estate, this in light of the global trend of neo-liberalisation. The liberalisation of state-owned media enterprises like public broadcasters and *The Citizen* was seen as imperative to this, and consonant with global standards (Heuva et al., 2004). This period saw the formulation and implementation of policy regarding the media, so as to stimulate transformation and reconstruction. Research into the media and democratisation was thus dominated by how various actors perceived the best way forward in terms of new policy and appropriate regulation of the media (Collins, 1992; Kaplan, 1990, 1992; Mpofu et al., 1996; Jabulani, 1991). Ownership in the print industry shifted dramatically as black-dominated capital bought out white-owned conglomerates, for example; Johnnic, owner of Times Media (Tomaselli, 1997). Policy developments paralleled these mergers, acquisitions and buyouts. The resultant policies enacted during this decade of the 1990s permitted a relatively unrestricted and self-regulated media, allowing for a speedy reintegration into the global economy (Olorunnisola and Tomaselli, 2011). The organic unregulated shift to black ownership between 1993 and 1996 was spurred on by Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) legislation across the economy as a whole, encompassing all sectors (see Boloka, 2011). BEE proposes certain policy instruments to achieve economic development and transformation agendas. These include legislation and regulation, preferential procurement, institutional support, financial and other incentive schemes. In addition, government will seek partnerships with the private sector to accelerate the BEE process (see Olorunnisola and Tomaselli, 2011).

Since the 1980s much has changed in the way of ownership and control of the press. However, it is debatable as to whether much has changed in the way of class or ideological representation, much debate centered on the rate of transformation has questioned this, as to whether greater transformation in the press in terms of ownership, translates into greater representation in the content produced. This is especially true where few dominant players make up the market.
About 5.7 million newspapers are sold per annum in South Africa. In terms of circulation and readership, 4 large media companies (Media 24, Avusa, Caxton and The Independent) dominate the print media industry. These 4 companies also own the majority of printers and distribution companies. In post 1994 South Africa the print media landscape has not transformed much in terms of ownership and control and is still majority owned and controlled by white shareholders. In spite of various interventions by the state through promotion of transformation processes and BEE, the majority of print media in South Africa is still owned / dominated by a few companies and individuals. (MDDA and Z-Coms, 2009: 129)

**Political economic analysis**

The transformation of the South African media and more specifically the press from the early 1990s, has centred along the paradigm of “transitology”. This process describes the transition to “democracy and marketization” and has been in-line with the national premises of the new South Africa. The neo-liberal policies under the Mandela and Mbeki administrations pushed the country in this specific direction (see Sparks, 2009: 195). The global shift towards late capitalism resulted in a stronger analytical focus on global and economic determiners such as convergence and digitization within the South African media, coupled with “the demise of socialism and communism, and of historical materialism (Marxism) as a critical method” (Tomaselli and Dunn, 2001: 1-2). Perhaps central to media and democratisation research in South Africa, in terms of its political economy is the recognition that there must be an interaction between the multifaceted social, political and cultural determiners of the country on the one hand and the economic forces at play on the other. How transformation occurred and the way the media framed nation-building and the quest for a unified identity became a key area for analysis (Teer-Tomaselli, 2001; Tomaselli, 2003; Narunsky-Laden, 2004, 2008; Wasserman, 2005). This paradigm suggests that the media is affected by the dominant ideological positions within society.

The media as an institution was the first sector of the South African economy to engage in transformation. This was evident in terms of shifting patterns of ownership that started as early as 1993, which saw the Fortune 500 Anglo-American conglomerate disinvesting from the media industry that it had always needed for self-protection and for legitimating English-dominated capital, and indeed, capitalism itself. For the first time in over one hundred years ownership of Anglo’s two huge press houses, Times Media and Argus, found new owners (Teer-Tomaselli and Tomaselli, 2001). Times Media was bought by black-owned union pension capital, Argus by Irish interests, and *The Sowetan* was sold to a black entrepreneur. The exception to the BEE trend was Argus, now called Independent Newspapers, which remained in foreign white hands, though the company moved fast to promote blacks to editorships on its major titles (Berger, 2001).
The focus on state-media relations must remain a priority in a transitional society where struggles over the ownership and control of capital, representation, markets and audiences plays out in an environment where both economic and racial issues remain fore-grounded in an industry itself undergoing rapid change globally (see Boloka, 2003). The post-Polokwane ANC has brought back into focus much that was debated during the 1990s regarding media transformation, a debate dominated in academic circles by those adopting a more “liberal” approach to media transformation and those seen to be advocating a “left-wing” position. These two positions were clearly spelt out in a series of articles published in *Transformation*. Gibson Mashilo Boloka and Ron Krabill, (2000: 77) accuse Guy Burger (1999: 112) of adopting a liberal approach to the issue of transformation, while Berger attacks the “left-wing” writings of Tomaselli (1997) and Sandile Memele (1999) for being too dismissive of the transformation that has taken place in the media. Whilst Burger lauds the efforts made to transform the media in terms of race and ownership, Boloka and Krabill caution against taking a narrow-minded approach to transformation. Socio-economic concerns relating to class, language and gender are areas that too need to be factored into transformation (2000: 76). Transformations in South Africa involves not only a new political dispensation (see Duvenhage, 2005), but new classes and fundamental redistributive economic policies centered on BEE. The post 1994 neo-liberal polices allowed for the economic elite to remain largely in control of the media (the white minority, and new black elite). This excluded the majority of black working class South Africans and thus does not present a discourse in line with a working class ideology (For intensive debates on this see Berger, 1999; Boloka and Krabill, 2000; Duncan, 2000; Steenveld, 2004; Wasserman and De Beer, 2006). “Post-apartheid economic restructuring has intensified [social] stratification, with interracial inequality increasing relative to interracial inequality. The upper class has become de-racialised and better off […] while the marginal working class has grown and is worse off and has largely fallen through the social safety net” (Seekings and Natrass, 2005: 337). This analysis suggests that class is an enduring determinant in South Africa, a point laboured by Zuma in his Polokwane elective discourse.

**Mbeki discourse and the media**

Under the Mandela and Mbeki administrations the ANC did not involve itself much with debates on the media, and were guided by the policies established during the initial debates, as outlined in their Media Charter (see ANC, 1992), and ultimately informed by the constitution of 1996. The industry, and more specifically the press, was left largely unregulated apart from the establishment of regulatory or monitoring bodies created by the industry itself, such as SANEF (1996), FXI, Media Monitoring Africa (MMA), The Press Council / Ombudsman and other statutory bodies. “After the 1994 elections, the ANC’s interest in media policy seemed to wane somewhat”, and the media
industry was allowed to transform (or not) liberally under the guise of commercially friendly political economic policy (Duncan, 2008b: 3).

It is not until the ANC’s 51st National Elective conference that there occurred any major shift in policy and discourse on the media. At this conference the party released a document ‘Media in a democratic South Africa’ (ANC, 2002). This marked the beginning of a shift in official party policy, and referenced the need to “ensure balance in the reflection of the needs and interests of the South African citizens […] and the projection of their voices on all major national developments” (2002: 5). Economically there were also slight tendencies towards “policy that either did not fit or went against this kind of [neoliberal] logic [such as] progressive and supportive trade union policy […] privatisation was given strong verbal support but rather little real privatisation took place. Instead, the state took care to create regulatory agencies with reference to telecommunications, broadcasting, etc.” (Freund, 2004: 46). This shift was due to increasing class disparity, and growing pressure from the left to fast-track social and economic development for all. The Mbeki administration termed this position the media should fulfil within a democratic South Africa, as being in line with the “national interest” (de Beer and Wasserman, 2005: 45).

This slight shift in discourse was followed by an address by Mbeki to SANEF on press freedom in 2003, where he presented a more hostile discourse towards the commercial press. In this address he referenced a critical stance taken by sectors of the press on the African Peer Review Mechanism, criticising African leaders, including himself for “seeking to perpetuate the notion of what they called ‘African politics as usual’, by trying to deny democracy and human rights through excluding political governance from the areas covered by the NPRM” (SAPA, 2002). For this he blamed an ill-informed (allegedly) white-owned press for mistrust in African affairs (2003: 5-6), but did not go as far as saying this was due to a lack of transformation in the press, as this would go against the free market neo-liberal policies his government had put in place. The concern raised by the media was in whose national interest they should act, the publics or the ANC-led government – with the latter raising concerns of state interference in media discourse (de Beer and Wasserman, 2005).

Mbeki’s native intelligence and ideology is apparent in this discourse on the African Renascence and his anti-colonial stance informed by racial identity, as well as his much publicised HIV / AIDS discourse (see Johnston, 2005). The extension of his personal discourse of the “native” – a term used to describe a new identity for South Africa – the ‘African-ness’ of a post-colonial dispensation, often came under fire from the press because of his preoccupation with race and ethnic identity. This came to shape his discourse on political and social matters like HIV / AIDS (Roberts, 2007: 268-269) (see also Wasserman, 2011). Mbeki was thus constructed in public sphere discourse as a result of his own personal discourse – that of an Africanist and aloof academic. His discourse was
therefore never aimed at the non-intellectual working class, portraying him as a “distant” leader disregarding the interests and needs of the South African people (Prinsloo, 2009: 87).

Mbeki’s general criticism of the media, according to Wasserman, was the way in which the media constructed his own African identity. According to Wasserman, as a result of framing media debates and research around issues of transformation and ownership, the opportunity for the reiteration of categories of identification becomes more apparent, as the role of media can also serve as processes through which identities are constructed (2011: 117). It has already been discussed that as a result of political, social and economic circumstances at a specific point in history the media tend to react or function in specific ways. The alternative press reacting to the inequalities of the apartheid state or the English-language press’ tentative criticism of it is an example of this. This research broadly tracks the transformation in South Africa and its media in relation to the ANC and its elites, discussing discourse presented at various moments so to establish any shifts in discourse by these elites and the ANC. Therefore assess whether or not any meaningful transformation (shifts in ownership and control) of the media has seen a shift in discourse on the media by these elites, or the media’s representation of elite discourse. Wasserman would argue for example that the representation of Mbeki’s discourse is as a result of the media’s economic and ideological positioning.

Towards the end of Mbeki’s second term in office his criticism of the press turned from one concerning representation of identity to “overt manipulation of the process to favour [his] camp in the ANC” (Duncan, 2008a: 36). This occurred in response to a challenge by Zuma on Mbeki’s attempt to hang on to power. Duncan suggests that a subtle bias crept into the SABC’s (South African Broadcast Corporation) board’s composition, so to represent an elite pact between political elites supportive of the Mbeki presidency and business (2008a: 36). This interference with the independence of the national public broadcaster bought back reference to apartheid style, and early militant media policy of the ANC. This was a drastic departure from the neo-liberal policy of the ANC at the time – all in an attempt to hang on to power (an African political leadership style Mbeki tried so hard to dispel).

Overall, in spite of its highly consolidated and commercial nature, the print media have often exercised relative autonomy from the ruling elite, and broken some significant stories about elite misconduct. Including the much publicised Arms Deal that saw government official’s benefit from lucrative arms tenders in the 1990s (see Feinstein, 2007) and Zuma’s rape trial. However, this occurred within a framework that assumed the normative nature of ANC rule within a post-apartheid capitalist framework. This “healthy tension” between the news media and government is
beneficial for the development of pluralist democratic dispensations (Hofmeyr, 2001: 210). There is, however, a fine line between healthy tension and the compromising of press freedoms.

**Zuma’s ‘developmentalist’ discourse**

State-media relations after the 2007 Polokwane conference is the focus of political economic literature on the media at this point, due mainly to another political transition of elites within the ruling ANC (see Tomaselli and Teer-Tomaselli, 2008; Sparks, 2009). Much of the politics surrounding the party just prior to and post-Polokwane has been represented, mainly in the press, as a clash between Mbeki and Zuma, and their respective quests for political power. On the surface, it appears as if there was a struggle between the entrenched neo-liberal policies of Mbeki’s administration on the one hand, and Zuma’s close ties with COSATU and the SACP (the working class) on the other (see Ceruti, 2008). It is through the propagation of these political discourses that Mbeki and Zuma are seen to symbolically represent different classes in South African society. These antagonistic class and factional divisions were viewed as serious splits within the ANC at the time, ultimately resulting in a new discourse emerging, presented by Zuma. This chapter attempts to situate the ANC’s media policy in relation to discourse presented by certain elite factions within the party, some more overt than others.

As has already been noted, ANC elites have become more vocal in their criticism since the early 2000s; arguing in general that the media’s ability to reflect a diversity of views and interests in society was constrained by the still-untransformed media, whose current ownership and control structures were shaped under apartheid (Tomaselli and Teer-Tomaselli, 2008). The shift from a liberal discourse on the press during the late 1990s gradually presented hints of state dissatisfaction and hostility towards it by the early 2000s (see Hofmeyr, 2001; Johnson, 2005). This translated into interventionist discourse by Mbeki leading up to 2007 (see Duncan, 2008a). However, this is perhaps now qualified by a revisionist authoritarian model in light of the 2007 political transition from Mbeki to Zuma, and the latter’s out-right attack on media freedom (Tomaselli and Teer-Tomaselli, 2008). This coupled with developments, such as the Amended Film and Publications Act, (2009), the proposed media tribunal, broadcasting discussion document (2009) and proposed information Act (2010) that would grant oversight over content of television, cinema screens and print media. This raises questions as to the patrimonial stance the then, and now post-Polokwane, political administrations was taking towards the media (see, Tomaselli and Teer-Tomaselli, 2008: 174).
The moment when the media find themselves under attack is comparable to De Beer’s (1989) four scenarios of a post-apartheid media. Fast-forward twenty years; this chapter aims to address the same questions in the context of yet another major political transition in the country. The Zuma administration and its ruling alliance seeks to aggressively address the lack of majority representation – and to this extent Zuma (2008) feels a soviet / aggressive social-responsibility or as the ANC has termed it; a developmentalist agenda will address the lack of black working class discourse in the South African press. The discourse assumed by the Zuma faction of the ANC during the lead-up to the Polokwane conference was a pro-poor authoritarian / socialist approach to policy, believed by the alliance faction to be a discourse of the majority, a discourse that would take power away from Mbeki. Zuma targeted the media after his elective, class based victory, expecting it to fall in line with this new policy stance and discourse.

The analysis of South African society (including its politics) from a position of class presents a rather precarious picture. This because, as far as the ‘left’ is concerned, the organisation of the working class into an ‘organised labour’ (COSATU) within a capitalist dispensation has yielded little in the way of economic benefits for the majority. Rather, it has presented those in a position of power, both from within the working class and those from other classes (who own capital), with a means of economic benefit at the expense of the majority. The working class is used in capitalist class-building, and as an empowerment tool for investment in capitalist enterprises (benefiting few) (Glaser, 2001: 131). The neo-liberal policies of Mbeki have created the environment for this class oppression to take place, and thrive under capitalism. However, the existence of class alter-ideologies (Therborn, 1980), in opposition to Mbeki’s neo-liberal policies such as his Growth, Economic and Redistribution Strategy (GEAR) reared their head within the tripartite alliance in 2007 (Beall, Gelb and Hassim, 2005: 688; see also Ryklief, 2002: 111-114). The view of COSATU is such that neo-liberal economic policies like GEAR entrench South Africa as a free-market-driven capitalist society in which the rich get richer and its members the working class poor are negatively affected (get poorer) (Prevost, 2006: 173). GEAR is Mbeki’s orthodox neo-liberal economic policy that replaced its predecessor the RDP in 1996. Patrick Bond (2004: 45) highlights this ideological position presented by Mbeki, making mention that to impose neoliberal macro-economic policies, ANC leaders adopted a nation-building project along fairly classic lines, by talking left while walking right, a process that became simultaneously more vocal and unbalanced under the leadership of Mbeki. Mbeki sacked Zuma as deputy president in 2005 amidst already growing tensions between Mbeki’s ANC and COSATU. Zwelinzima Vavi (general secretary of COSATU) spoke in support of Zuma, presenting him as yet another of Mbeki’s victims. Zuma’s name became linked with the imagery of resistance to inequality, and a battle between Zuma and Mbeki had
become the battle between the working class and Mbeki’s pro-capitalist policies (Ceruti, 2008: 111-112). This ultimately translated into a struggle for the heart of the ANC that eventually played itself out during the party’s national conference in 2007, with Zuma emerging as leader of the party, symbolically representing a victory for the working class. This symbolic working class victory at Polokwane made more apparent the class tensions that existed in South Africa. It is further exacerbated by the emergence of a class separate to the capitalist elite and the working poor majority; a ruling political elite that is both a capitalist elite, and an elite that strives to present a discourse that mobilizes working class ideology. The class with means of production will control the output of ideas – meaning the dominant political power must fall in line with the ruling economic class. Alternatively, as suggested by Zuma (2008) the political power bloc should create its own platform for communicating ideology, in order to become the ruling class. This creates an unusual dynamic in that the elite of the political power bloc are in fact members of both that bloc and the economic power bloc, as they too subscribe to an elitist capitalist class (this in turn affords them the opportunity to lead).

The emergence of the two ideological blocs in the lead up to and during the Polokwane conference resulted in increasing tension and contestation for representation in the media (Tomaselli and Teer-Tomaselli, 2008).

The discourse on policy direction for national government, as broadcast by Zuma and the alliance partners post-Polokwane, is informed by a developmentalist agenda – a state driven by an ideology of development where it does all it can to promote and facilitate growth and social development. The developmental state is used as an ideology to drive politics and ensure coherence. This developmental discourse, as suggested by Freund (2007), may be very well an attempt at political coherence now that president Mbeki has moved off stage. The premise of his policy was to combine growth and social development, promoting high state spending on public works programmes, high levels of redistribution as well as skills development. This combination was not fully realised by the Mbeki administration (see Freund, 2007), but was capitalised on by Zuma and the alliance during the run up to Polokwane in an attempt to secure a populist working-class majority.

**Zuma and media**

Zuma, whose personal behaviour has been pilloried in the press since his implication in corruption relating to the arms deal, his 2005 sacking as deputy president and 2006 rape trial, is a proponent of a directly transformative role for the media. His instrumentalist development agenda emerged early on in an address to the South African National Editors Forum in 2001. His position in 2008 however was perceived as a result of a policy shift within the ruling alliance and his subsequent
links to an openly socialist trade union (COSATU) and the Communist Party, members of the ruling alliance (see Prevost, 2006; Ceruti, 2008). The discourse presented by Zuma during this period, although informed by his feelings of personal grievance with the media was one in line with a developmental discourse promoting a shift towards the left, all with the aim of winning the majority vote. However the ANC Policy Conference has come and gone. Something important did not happen: the much vaunted push from the left (COSATU, SACP) on current economic policies. Those looking for a move to the left were disappointed. Broad policies were endorsed as they stood; the ANC has in the past decade seen a general trend towards the left as “Mbeki began to elaborate the role to be played by a ‘transformative and developmental state’ […] at the beginning of his second term, in 2004.” (Lodge, 2009: 253). Statements issued by the ANC after 2007 implied no overt policy shifts towards the left, not insofar as what was previously initiated by the Mbeki administration (Business Day Online, 31 October 2008). This however has not stopped Zuma and the ANC from pursuing the media for its lack of compliance with the agenda of the ruling party and state – according to the ANC. This strengthens the assumption that the attacks on the media by the ANC elite stem from a feeling of personal grievance. The rationale provided by Zuma for a more compliant media include the taming of the economic forces at play within the free market; the alleviation of race-class disparities; and a rhetorical developmental agenda where the media are harnessed to the interests of the state / party (Zuma, 2008).

Early positions taken by Zuma on the press, as presented in his 2001 SANEF address, promoted the healthy debate within the public sphere between the state and the media, as the latter fulfills its watchdog role. This was coupled with hint at a warning that “the media should seek a common understanding of [ANC and the state’s] common objectives and, in this, take into account the national interest and priorities” (Zuma, 2001). This meant that a developmental discourse presented by the elite within the ruling party would see civil society take an active role in promoting the interests of the state. This would mark the beginning of a shift in ANC discourse on the media, as built upon by Mbeki, referenced in the above discussion.

In the mid-2000s there emerged a string of unsavory press exposés of Zuma’s personal and public life including the much publicised corruption and rape trials, and his resultant dismissal from government. If the ANC had already seen a shift in policy thinking on a more compliant media, then the subsequent press coverage would only add to the feeling of dissatisfaction by the ruling party and some of its elite.

The Zuma rape trial received extensive coverage in the press. The coverage is an example of the kind of populist discourse promoting him as a man of the people with popular support, legitimated
along customary, cultural and class lines (Prinsloo, 2009: 87). This is in contrast to the aloof elitist discourse of his now predecessor Mbeki. The press’ coverage during the trial highlighted the celebrity status of Zuma by making his appearance in a motorcade of black luxury cars with numerous bodyguards running alongside, a performance that was reported on and illustrated photographically (Prinsloo, 2009: 87). This discourse presented by Zuma (as represented in the press) speaks to a black middle and working class as something to aspire toward – that a former Zulu herd-boy is capable of achieving such heights and status or “a response by the African working-class people to a social crisis (Sitas, 2008: 88). As was with the case of Mbeki, Zuma constructed himself, and was constructed in the press, along strong ethnic and social lines – the difference comes in the class each respective discourse spoke to. Zuma’s leadership style in contrast to Mbeki’s disengaged persona is more traditional and people focused. The manner in which Zuma approached the discussions between his party and Inkatha during peace talks in Kwa-Zulu Natal during the 1990s speaks to his inclusive dialogue and traditional charm (see Sitas, 2008). This draws similar correlation to the Polokwane conference a year later, matching the discourses of the two personalities against a backdrop of a power struggle built around class, even personal and ethnic aspirations.

Jeanne Prinsloo (1990: 91) argues that the actual coverage of the Zuma case within the media was framed within the discursive order of journalism. Informed by their code of professional ethics, the press took on the mantle of the fourth estate in their criticism of Zuma as an influential public figure, framed within a concern for public good, thus, observing the independence and the watchdog nature of the press within a democratic setting. In contrast, Zuma would disagree with this position, as is evident in his and the ANC’s attacks on media freedom post 2007.

The most recent discussion document published by the ANC at its June 2007 policy conference is titled “Media Transformation”. The party highlights some of the progressions, shortcomings and challenges of a democratic media. A major concern raised at this policy conference, as well as that coming out of Polokwane, was the slow transformation in terms of ownership and control (particularly the press). Therefore as a result the alleged side-lining of poorer classes who don’t have access to the media, and strong enough, economic, influence over what is produced. Subsequently, out of these two conferences emerged the ANC’s strongest soviet-authoritarian position on the media, calling for more state intervention into the transformation of the media landscape, and more oversight in the form of a media tribunal being set up to deal with appeals against the media / press (Kruger, 2008). Zuma states that rather than using the ability it has to transform South African society, the media is driven by self-interested motives. The self-interested motives he refers to, in his view, emanate out of the neo-liberal economic climate Mbeki created
and supported. He comments; “[w]e are faced with the virtually unique situation that, among the democracies, the overwhelmingly dominant tendency in South African politics, represented by the ANC, has no representation whatsoever in the mass media” (8 January, 2008). Zuma goes on to argue that as opposed to representing the dominant ideology within South African society, the media represents the ideas and values of the minority (the capitalist elite). In the discussion document *Transformation of the Media* the ANC (2007) said of the media:

> The media is consequently one of the sites of ideological struggle with which the ANC - like other social actors - has sought to engage. [...] The reality is that the media - in South Africa as in every other society - is a major arena in the battle of ideas. All social forces are therefore engaged, to varying degrees and with differing success, in efforts to ensure that the media advances their ideological, political, social, economic and cultural objectives. It is a product of the various political, social, economic and cultural forces that exist within a society. It is a battle of ideas, and, as such, the media is part of the battle for power (Zuma, 2008 quoting the ANC, 2007).

Zuma claims that those classes who have the economic power control the media’s interests, i.e., commercial media will respond to the interests of the class that supports them financially. “The freedom of the South African media is today undermined not by the state, but by various tendencies that arise from the commercial imperatives that drive the media” (Zuma, 2008).

The concentration of ownership, particularly in the print sector, has a particularly restrictive effect on the freedom of the media. The process of consolidation and the drive to cut costs through, among other things, rationalisation of newsgathering operations, leads to homogenisation of content. It was to answer this deficiency that the 52nd National Conference called for the movement to develop its own media platforms, making use of available technology, to articulate its positions and perspectives directly to the people (Zuma, 2008 quoting the ANC, 2007).

An example of the current policy direction of the public broadcaster, the SABC can be used to illustrate the implications a developmental even socialist discourse has for policy on the media in an attempt at “repositioning broadcasting for national development” (see *Government Gazette*, July 2009: Vol. 539). Developmental broadcasting (or media) is neither the same nor a substitute for public service broadcasting. Defining public service broadcasting is notoriously difficult but its central role is two-fold: to foster and strengthen democracy by providing citizens with the information they need to exercise their citizenship and, second, to hold centers of power to account. Public service broadcasting is, like the judiciary, a social institution charged with exercising an independent role in a democratic society of holding other centers of power to account, thereby
enabling citizens to exercise their democratic rights and obligations in an informed way. The difference between public and development broadcasting can be illustrated by stating that development broadcasting would contribute to the implementation of a government’s development policy whereas public broadcasting would make clear to viewers and listeners any differences between the development policies of the government and those adopted by other political parties (and interest groups). A development broadcaster would be focused on contributing to delivery and implementation of a particular development policy whilst a public broadcaster would be focused on enabling viewers and listeners to make informed and reasoned choices between different development models and policies. By definition public service broadcasting provides for plurality, thus it must serve minorities (language, taste, class, ethnic etc.) as well as majorities. A development framework derived from the central state might diminish / disregard minorities in an attempt at furthering its own national development agenda. It is vital that the public service vocation of broadcasting in South Africa is maintained so that public service media can continue to discharge its independent role in the service of democracy (see CCMS, 2009). Although slightly off topic, the policy direction adopted by the Zuma-led alliance in relation to public broadcasting makes the point that a developmental discourse adopts a similar approach outlined in a social responsibility model (see Chapter 2). The risk is that if the media does not fulfill its developmental mandate set by the state – direct intervention is often a consequence (see McQuail, 2000). This runs the risk of creating an authoritarian / soviet media system (see Tomaselli and Teer-Tomaselli, 2008).

With respect to the press, The New Age, the latest edition to the commercial English-language newspaper industry, has been linked to the ruling ANC – said to be presenting news in line with the national interest. The Mail & Guardian describes owners, the Gupta family, and the ruling party as having close ties; “tight-fisted approach and authoritarian management style of the Guptas, the controversial family close to President Jacob Zuma that is funding the project” (Sole, Tabane and Brummer, 2010). The paper comes some years after the initial discussions in the 1990s around a party focused newspaper. As it did then, in this current period where media freedom has come under renewed attack, the introduction of an ANC-supporting newspaper raises concerns about the party, and the state’s agenda setting – as the ANC might find it tempting to use its ownership ties to generate coverage in line with its own discourse. Tawane Kupe in an editorial in one of the first publications of The New Age dismisses this, using the example of the already saturated print media market, for a lack of diversity in ownership – citing apartheid throwbacks Naspers and Irish-owned Independent group as examples (2010: 11)

The concerns raised by the ruling party of the position and function of the media in the current political climate raises serious implications for media policy going forward. This shift in discourse has been equated to the perceived policy shift within the ANC as it aligns itself with its social and
political allies on the left (Ceruti, 2008). However the extent of this re-alignment is questioned, as it appears that the aggressive discourse on the media is restricted to certain ANC elites who feel aggrieved by the media. The concern as raised by Tomaselli and Teer-Tomaselli (2008) is that the system will revert back to the apartheid years of media management, the main difference being the actors. This seems likely given the proposed media appeals tribunal and Information Act (2010).

Boloka and Krabill (2000) argue the transformation of the media to be short-sighted if not approached within the context of current socio-political, class and ideological determiners. If the elite are driven by their own class interests and fail to service the poor by implementing pro-poor policies, one can argue the extent to which real social transformation will take place, if the discourse presented by Zuma is just a front to win support. The same is the case for the media, just because ownership has changed and there are more black-owned newspapers, it does not mean that their newspapers represent the interests of black people. So to say that transformation in the media is only measured on ownership and control would be naive, but rather should be assessed from a range of socio-political, economic, class, cultural and ideological standpoints. It would also be a mistake to classify this approach on transformation as “left-wing” as it does not advocate a socialist or authoritarian approach to transformation, i.e., greater state intervention. Rather that the media become more diverse not only in their ownership and control, but also as a result of economic and social transformation (see Wasserman & Botma, 2008). There is a fine line however, between the media being more representative of the majority of citizens, and becoming a mouth-piece of the hegemonic bloc. The ANC’s current developmental position and statements emanating from the party regarding media freedom threaten to cross this line.

The approach to transforming South Africa, by the ANC, has seen several shifts since the late 1980s. Characterised by hints of African Nationalism in the 1980s, then modified towards a humanistic non-racial institutionally-based interpretation in the 1990s (see Teer-Tomaselli 2011 and Tomaselli and Dunn, 2001). At Polokwane Zuma presented a party-political, class based social and political transformation agenda. This shift displayed hits of the nationalist paradigm put forward during the 1980s, as discussed earlier. However post-Polokwane, and having secured power, Zuma has reverted back to the non-racial institutionally-based interpretation as seen during the Mandela and Mbeki administrations.

**Case study: the five press houses**

The discussion to follow will examine actual transformation in terms of ownership and control specific to the four press houses as of 2009 namely; Independent Newspapers, Avusa, Naspers
(Media 24) and Caxton, as well as a fifth independent group M&G Media. Keyan Tomaselli suggests that transformation in the South African media (press) should be studied in terms of three historical trends: i) opposing historical ideologies (Afrikaner Nationalism versus English liberalism), ii) oppositional discourses, iii) and post-apartheid trends of nation-building and empowerment (2000: 279). Thus far the discussion has contextualised transformation in the press since the late 1980s, examining the competing ideological discourses presented by the press and political elites at various points. It has already been argued that the competing discourses presented by the various factions of the press during the 1980s as well as the state-media relations of the apartheid government, coupled with an extreme nationalist policy, informed early ANC policy on the media in the 1990s. This discourse was drastically shifted as a result of the influence of neo-liberal discourses from the global community and from within the ANC itself. This pushed the party in a specific free-market direction which had knock-on effects for redistribution of power and wealth. This allowed industries such as the media to ‘transform’ in a specific direction, despite redistributive policies like BEE. This direction was not welcomed by the ANC post-Polokwane, given the shift towards a developmental discourse as presented by party factional elites.

An assessment of 2009 ownership and transformation in the press as a result of the neo-liberal policies enacted as well as specific redistributive measures such as Broad Based Black Economic Empowerment (BBBEE) will go some way in assessing the validity of the comments regarding the media made by Zuma. The English-language press during the Polokwane elective conference was criticised at the time by the Zuma faction of the ANC for presenting a discourse aligned to specific class interests informed by a certain economic standing in society. The rational for this is provided by Zuma in his critique of the press, saying that the media does not represent the policies / politics and hence ideologies of the ruling party, because of economic factors and influences. A statistical analysis of trends in ownership, readership and advertising (economics) of the five press companies (and their respective publications) will shed light on the relationship that exists between ownership and output. More specifically this research will investigate if newspaper ownership (and the extent of transformative ownership in terms of empowerment) has an impact on market segment (readership). This will provide insight into the assumed content output (discourse) presented by each publication – to be examined in more detail later in a critical content analysis.

The research sample that will inform this case study will include the Media Development and Diversity Agency (MDDA) and Z-Coms (2009) study into Trends of Ownership and Control of Media in South Africa. A primary analysis into the measurable trends of newspaper readership
demographics as provided by a 2009 South African Advertising Research Foundation (SAARF), All Media and Products Survey (AMPS) will also be used as a reference point.

Print media is by far the largest section of media in South Africa, in terms of the number of titles and ownership. The predominant language of the press is English, followed by Afrikaans and IsiZulu. The print media consists of two broad categories: the major media players and the independent publishers (Members of the Association of Independent Publishers). There are 5 major media players: Naspers through its subsidiary Media24; Caxton; Avusa; the foreign owned Independent Newspapers and the fifth largest company is Primedia (Primedia is however not involved in newspaper publishing) (MDDA & Z-Coms, 2009). One publication from each publisher and one independent publisher (M&G Media) will be examined in terms of circulation, readership and demographics. Table 3.1 identifies the five publishers by ownership, publication and circulation. The discussion to follow provides a brief profile of the five press houses and their respective publications (English-language newspapers) under study in this research.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Press House</th>
<th>Owner / Shareholding</th>
<th>Percentage Black Ownership</th>
<th>Percentage White Ownership</th>
<th>Listed</th>
<th>Foreign Ownership</th>
<th>Newspaper Titles Owned</th>
<th>Total (National) Newspaper Readership p/a</th>
<th>Publication / Newspaper</th>
<th>Publication (National) Readership</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Media 24</td>
<td>85% Naspers; 15% Welkom Yizani</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>367503416</td>
<td>The Witness</td>
<td>153000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent Newspapers</td>
<td>Independent News &amp; Media (Tony O'Reilly)</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>204151961</td>
<td>The Daily News</td>
<td>512000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caxton / CTP</td>
<td>5.32% Group Directors; 8.58% Caxton Share Investment (Pty) LTD; 17.18% ElementOne Ltd; 39.16% Caxton Ltd; 29.76% General Public</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>50.97%</td>
<td>49.03%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>135913757</td>
<td>The Citizen</td>
<td>485000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avusa</td>
<td>25% Mvelapanda; 75% Listed on JSE</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>133702360</td>
<td>The Sunday Times</td>
<td>4229000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M&amp;G Media</td>
<td>87.5% Newtrust Company Botswana Limited; 10% Guardian Newspapers Limited</td>
<td>*87.5%</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>10.00%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>465000</td>
<td>The Mail and Guardian</td>
<td>465000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The Mail and Guardian is owned by a Black Naturalised South African Citizen (Trevor Ncube)

Table 3.1: Newspaper ownership, publication and circulation as per MDDA & Z-Coms (2009) and AMPS Newspaper Readership (2009ab)
Naspers (Media 24)

Naspers is a multinational media group with principal operations in print media, including newspapers, magazines, printing and book publishing. Naspers was founded as Die Nasionale Pers (The National Press) aimed at the Afrikaner population during apartheid. At first it only published, *Die Burger* which was the official mouthpiece of the National Party (see Muller, 1987). Post-1994, the print media arm of Naspers falls under Media24, which controls Naspers’ newspaper and magazine publishing as well as printing activities. As noted earlier in a discussion on the Afrikaans press, due to the political nature of South Africa during the 1980s, media companies like Naspers had to publish within certain limitations. This primarily for economic reasons, because if the Afrikaans press were perceived by the NP government to be deviating from the political status quo, there would be economic consequences. These consequences were felt by the likes of the alternative press. Media24’s newspaper division publishes five national dailies: *Daily Sun; Die Burger; Beeld; Volksblad* and the *Natal Witness* (predominantly still publishing in the Afrikaans market). The *Daily Sun* is the largest paper in South Africa (see MDDA & Z-Coms, 2009: 46-50). In 2001, Naspers took 50% in the last remaining independent daily, the *Natal Witness* (Berger, 2004: 61). The *Witness* has always been a liberal paper, supporting a multiplicity of ideologies ranging from the ANC’s to Inkatha Freedom Party’s (see Conyngham, 1997). The acquisition of the paper by Naspers reinforces the concern raised by Louw (1993) regarding the creation or maintenance of an oligopoly, and the implications this has for an alternative position (1993: 176). This reinforces Zuma’s position, implying that few players equals less diversity. However the move by Naspers indicates the publisher’s intent to diversify its content output by appealing to a more liberal market. Thus Naspers has branched off from its dominant Afrikaans orientation – an indication of transformation post-1994, as well as a gap in the market previously untouched by the company.

The *Witness*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National readership: 153 000 (Monday – Saturday)</th>
<th>Readers</th>
<th>Profile %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Age</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-24</td>
<td>43 000</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-34</td>
<td>30 000</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35-49</td>
<td>41 000</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50+</td>
<td>39 000</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Gender</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>86 000</td>
<td>56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>67 000</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3.2; *Witness* readership trends (demographics)

**Independent Newspapers**
Independent Newspapers is owned by Independent News & Media Plc. (a ‘multinational media group’) in which Irish businessman Tony O'Reilly is the major shareholder. He first acquired a stake in Argus Newspapers in 1994 from Johannesburg Consolidated Investments (Anglo American) and renamed it Independent Newspapers (see Berger, 1999). In the 1990s Argus was South Africa's major newspaper group, selling more than 50% of all daily newspapers in the country. The group receives about 48% of total advertising spend in the paid newspaper market. (MDDA & Z-Coms, 2009: 40-41). Independent Newspapers publishes 15 daily and weekly newspapers in the country's three major metropolitan areas. *The Star* is the group's flagship daily newspaper. Other dailies are the *Cape Argus*; the premier isiZulu newspaper *Isolezwe; Daily News*;
Cape Times; the Mercury and Pretoria News. The group has aggregate weekly sales of 2.8 million copies and reaches about 63% of English readers (MDDA & Z-Coms, 2009: 40-41).

**Daily News**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National readership: 512,000 (Monday – Friday)</th>
<th>Readers</th>
<th>Profile %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Age</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-24</td>
<td>82 000</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-34</td>
<td>162 000</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35-49</td>
<td>140 000</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50+</td>
<td>125 000</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Gender</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>300 000</td>
<td>59%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>212 000</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Race</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>91 000</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian</td>
<td>132 000</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>267 000</td>
<td>52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coloured</td>
<td>23 000</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Education achieved</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Up to High School</td>
<td>119 000</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matric</td>
<td>272 000</td>
<td>53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tech/University/Other post-matric</td>
<td>122 000</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Household income</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Up to R4999</td>
<td>102 000</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R5000-R7999</td>
<td>82 000</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R8000-R10999</td>
<td>73 000</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R11000-R19999</td>
<td>95 000</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R20000-More</td>
<td>160 000</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Living Standard Measures</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LSM 1-3</td>
<td>8 000</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LSM 4-5</td>
<td>36 000</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LSM 6</td>
<td>94 000</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LSM 7</td>
<td>81 000</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LSM 8</td>
<td>87 000</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LSM 9</td>
<td>139 000</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Caxton

Caxton is an investment holding company whose subsidiaries are primarily involved in the printing and publishing of books, magazines and newspapers. Caxton merged with Perskor (with assets including CTP and Penrose) in 1999. CTP owned 74% of Caxton publishers and printers (see Boloka, 2003: 61). Perskor had initially bought the apartheid-government created Citizen, only to be taken over by Caxton in the late 1990s (Louw, 1993:175). Caxton / CTP is one of the largest publishers and printers of books, magazines, newspapers and commercial print in South Africa. Including 130 newspapers: 89 are wholly owned; 41 are co-owned. The regional and local newspaper division stables 57 free and 32 sold Caxton fully owned titles (89) and co-owns a further 34 free and 7 sold titles (41). The group publishes the Citizen daily a compact tabloid (see, MDDA & Z-Coms, 2009: 51-52).

The Citizen

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National readership: 485 000 (Daily)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Readers</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Readers</th>
<th>Profile %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15-24</td>
<td>41 000</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-34</td>
<td>113 000</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35-49</td>
<td>217 000</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50+</td>
<td>114 000</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Readers</th>
<th>Profile %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>357 000</td>
<td>74%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>128 000</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Race</th>
<th>Readers</th>
<th>Profile %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>111 000</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian</td>
<td>19 000</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>338 000</td>
<td>70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coloured</td>
<td>16 000</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education achieved</th>
<th>Readers</th>
<th>Profile %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Up to High School</td>
<td>119 000</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matric</td>
<td>222 000</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tech/University/Other post-matric</td>
<td>145 000</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.3; Daily News readership trends (demographics)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Household income</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Up to R4999</td>
<td>140 000</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R5000-R7999</td>
<td>78 000</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R8000-R10999</td>
<td>57 000</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R11000-R19999</td>
<td>101 000</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R20000-More</td>
<td>108 000</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Living Standard Measures</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LSM 1-3</td>
<td>3 000</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LSM 4-5</td>
<td>83 000</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LSM 6</td>
<td>114 000</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LSM 7</td>
<td>64 000</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LSM 8</td>
<td>61 000</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LSM 9</td>
<td>112 000</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LSM 10</td>
<td>48 000</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.4: Citizen readership trends (demographics)

Avusa

Avusa Limited, the newest player in the print sector - established on the 1st February 2008 – and born out of South Africa’s redistributive policies of BEE. This resulted from an unbundling of Johnnic Communications Limited (Johncom) in 2007 whereby ElementOne Limited retained the Caxton shareholding and Avusa purchased Johncom’s operating media and entertainment assets. Originally Omnimedia Corporation (owned by Anglo American) owned Times Media Limited (TML). Johnnic Communications is a coalition of black business groups and trade unions, and the National Empowerment Consortium bought TML from Omnimedia Corporation in 1996 (see also Berger, 2004). The National Empowerment Consortium took over Johnnic and this coincided with the establishment of a joint venture between British group Pearson’s and TML, under which the former acquired half of TML’s Business Day and Financial Mail. Gibson Boloka notes that during the 1990s and into the 2000s BEE consortiums, amongst them groups such as Nail, Johnnic, and Kagiso Media, entered the media industry by buying stakes in historically white owned media firms (2003: 62). Avusa Limited was formed as a wholly owned subsidiary of ElementOne so to acquire and hold all of ElementOne’s directly-held operating media and entertainment assets. Mvelaphanda Holdings is an example of this, which owns 25% of Avusa, whilst the balance is owned by other public shareholders. Avusa publishes the Sunday Times, South Africa’s biggest Sunday newspaper, as well as the Times, the Sowetan, Business Day, Sunday World, Daily Dispatch and Saturday Dispatch amongst others (MDDA & Z-Coms, 2009: 42-46).
### Sunday Times

#### National readership: 4 229 000 (Sunday)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Readers 000</th>
<th>Profile %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15-24</td>
<td>1 040 000</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-34</td>
<td>1 053 000</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35-49</td>
<td>1 360 000</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50+</td>
<td>776 000</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Readers 000</th>
<th>Profile %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>2 412 000</td>
<td>57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>1 817 000</td>
<td>47%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Race</th>
<th>Readers 000</th>
<th>Profile %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>744 000</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian</td>
<td>277 000</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>2 825 000</td>
<td>67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coloured</td>
<td>383 000</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education achieved</th>
<th>Readers 000</th>
<th>Profile %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Up to High School</td>
<td>1 186 000</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matric</td>
<td>1 787 000</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tech/University/Other post-matric</td>
<td>1 255 000</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Household income</th>
<th>Readers 000</th>
<th>Profile %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Up to R4999</td>
<td>1 059 000</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R5000-R7999</td>
<td>689 000</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R8000-R10999</td>
<td>591 000</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R11000-R19999</td>
<td>876 000</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R20000-More</td>
<td>1 014 000</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Living Standard Measures</th>
<th>Readers 000</th>
<th>Profile %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LSM 1-3</td>
<td>90 000</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LSM 4-5</td>
<td>619 000</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LSM 6</td>
<td>800 000</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LSM 7</td>
<td>634 000</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LSM 8</td>
<td>562 000</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LSM 9</td>
<td>881 000</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LSM 10</td>
<td>643 000</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 2.5**: Sunday Times readership trends (demographics)
M&G Media (Mail & Guardian)

The *Mail & Guardian* was launched in 1985 by a group of journalists who had been retrenched after the closures of two of South Africa’s leading liberal newspapers, the *Rand Daily Mail* and *Sunday Express*. The paper was originally known as the *Weekly Mail*. The early shareholders were liberal professionals, academics and business leaders who contributed a few thousand Rand each as a gesture towards maintaining a tradition of critical journalism in an increasingly harsh political climate. During the Eighties, the *Weekly Mail*, part of the alternative press grouping, built up an international reputation as a vocal apartheid critic, leading to a number of clashes with the government that culminated in the paper’s suspension in 1988 (Louw, 1991: 177). In 1995, London based *The Guardian* became the majority shareholder in the paper, which was later renamed the *Mail & Guardian*. In 2002, the *Guardian* reduced its shareholding to 10%, selling a majority share in the newspaper to Newtrust Company Botswana Limited, owned by Zimbabwean publisher and entrepreneur Trevor Ncube. Having relocated to South Africa, Ncube also took over as CEO of the company (see http://m&g.co.za). Herman Wasserman and Gabriël Botma argue that although the transformation in the print media post-1994 (both ownership and executive) resulted in greater representation (racially), the perspective and orientation of the mainstream print media remained informed by the search for lucrative audiences. They say, “[t]o exacerbate the situation, the previously alternative, anti-apartheid print media publications disappeared after democratisation (with the possible exception of the weekly *Mail & Guardian*, having evolved from the erstwhile alternative *Weekly Mail* to a more high-brow mainstream publication, yet retaining a critical perspective)” (Wasserman & Botma, 2008: 3).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National readership: 465 000 (Weekly)</th>
<th>Readers 000</th>
<th>Profile %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-24</td>
<td>90 000</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-34</td>
<td>107 000</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35-49</td>
<td>182 000</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50+</td>
<td>85 000</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>306 000</td>
<td>66%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>159 000</td>
<td>34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Race</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>108 000</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian</td>
<td>11 000</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3.6: *Mail & Guardian* readership trends (demographics)

**Findings and analysis: ownership of the press**

The purpose of this analysis is to establish trends in ownership and control of the press in the country during and post-Polokwane. By examining the transformation processes since the fall of apartheid context is given to the actual on-the-ground change. Guy Berger (2004) best sums up the optimism for transformation following largely constructive policy debates in the 1990s:

Upon the ending of apartheid rule in 1994, observers could have been forgiven for thinking that [South] African media would be able to flourish unhindered. The prognosis looked good for political and economic reasons. First, it was clear that the political environment – though considerably eased compared to the restrictions of the 1980s – would be radically liberalised […] Second, it seemed logical to assume that with the black majority coming to power, the old white-oriented media would rapidly be overtaken by the thitherto struggle-oriented and alternative media serving the constituency that was coming of political age. The black market with rising
wealth, education and expectations would mean huge media opportunities (2004: 45).

This optimism has subsequently been replaced in academic writings by a more critical stance on the rate and extent of transformation in the press (see Tomaselli, 1997; Wasserman & Botma, 2008; Boloka & Krabil, 2000).

This chapter attempts to bring together these concerns about transformation and assess whether statements that suggest that “[m]arket segmentation largely correlates with persistent racial categories” (Wasserman & Botma, 2008: 4), and that the mainstream media are biased towards the Mbeki administration’s neo-liberal economic policies and reject attempts by, for instance, new social movements to change the dominant order (see, Jacobs 2004). It has already been established that the media in a democratic setting is a site for public and political discourse, and a struggle site for greater representation and influence. As of 2009, an independent and self-regulated organ of civil society is a far cry from state intervention and party-press alliances under apartheid. This neo-liberal environment gives rise to economic segmentation and therefore biased representation as a result of financial incentives driven by investors and advertisers; “[T]he media’s political positioning now only becomes evident through a critical reading of their structures, routines and discourses. Such a reading brings to light a fragmentation and disproportionate distribution of symbolic capital indicative of the fractures and contestations in broader society, as well as of continuing political power struggles” (Wasserman & Botma, 2008: 4). Wasserman and Botma go on to say that “little attention has yet been paid to how these macro-shifts translate to the micro level of individual media products” (2008: 4).

This chapter will assess the macro-shifts in ownership so to provide context to a later examination into the micro-implications of these ownership trends, as represented in the discourse(s) presented by segments of the press at the 2007 Polokwane conference. The findings to follow of the macro-shifts in ownership shall be presented and interrogated in terms of overall ownership, market segmentation and readership demographic.

Ownership
Ownership within the four press houses (Naspers, Caxton, Avusa and Independent Newspapers) and one independent house (M&G Media) has been assessed according to four types of ownership; black ownership, white ownership, public listing and foreign ownership (represented in Figure 3.1 and Figure 3.2 below). The percentage of ownership within the market on a whole is largely equal, with each of the four ownership types representing a quarter of the whole market. Although the market is greatly transformed when compared to its make-up during the 1980s, the figures below
indicate a worrying trend some two decades into transformation. Taking the total market percentage white ownership (30%), albeit, marginally this segment of the market is still the largest portion of the pie, and in a country where the white population is by far a minority, it says transformation is far from complete. Add to this the foreign ownership (22%) and the portion of total industry ownership not in the hands of the previously-disadvantaged, is greater than half. What this implies about the overall state of the industry, when approached from a political-economic perspective, is that the neo-liberal climate in which the democratic state has been born into, has allowed for the dominant players and ethnic groups to remain strong players within the industry. Reasons for this include the self-regulated environment and the white minority remaining a major economic bloc post 1994, both as a result of the political-economic policies of the Mandela and Mbeki administrations. Another finding to note is the percentage of foreign ownership. This suggests on the one hand confidence in South Africa as an investment destination for foreign capital, and an affirmation of the neo-liberal policies of the ANC under Mbeki (transformation non-the-less). But on the other hand, it is still a portion of the market not in the hands of the black majority. An unknown entity is the public listed market segment. This however does indicate a trend to more public involvement in the print media industry, which is positive in that investors ideistically have a say in the media they produce and consume. Apart from Independent, not listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE), Avusa shares, for example, can be bought by anyone with a street address and a utility. The promotion of public buy in should be one imperative of government and the media companies, as an extension to BBBEE policies. This would encourage black business people and unions to purchase more shares to ‘transform’ the industry. This is how take-overs are done globally (see Tomaselli, 2003). However it is unlikely these investors are representative of the majority – the working class, poor majority Zuma speaks to.

![Figure 3.1: Percentage ownership distribution – press house specific](image-url)
Figure 3.2: Percentage ownership – all press houses

Segmentation

To what extent do these trends in ownership translate into the percentage of market segmentation, i.e. does ownership (type – as discussed above) have implications for the percentage publication market segment (i.e. titles owned) and the nature of those titles?

M&G Media, the only independent player, has a single publication – *Mail & Guardian* – and therefore a small market. Given its history (as discussed above) the paper is associated with more critical publication, and a real ‘forth-arm’ of the state.

As for the four other press houses, their market segmentation in terms of publications owned, is quite diverse. Figure 3.3 indicates that Caxton has the largest market share, most of its business being focused on community publications, and whose readership is therefore more diverse. This however does not translate into percentage market readership as Figure 3.4 shows, only reaching 16% of the market. This again because of the nature of their publications – the *Citizen* makes up a large portion of this market segment, because it is not a community driven publication.

Naspers / Media 24, previously an Afrikaans-focused entity during apartheid, has maintained its strong Afrikaans focus, publishing extensively in that language, i.e. maintaining its market dominance. The group does however own several English-language newspapers including the popular *Daily Sun* tabloid aimed at the large middle-income black market (see MDDA & Z-Coms, 2009). This is an example of the political economic transformation policies enacted in the early 1990s. It makes up by far the largest segment of the market in terms of total readership (44%). When viewed in relation to ethnic ownership of the group, a large percentage remains in white hands. The *Witness* has been chosen for analysis because it is a Kwa-Zulu Natal based newspaper,
and formally part of the independent press group, far from the perceived Afrikaner trend in within the group. This may suggest that the Naspers has diversified in its content output by diversifying its ownership in the press. Or as suggested earlier will diminish the critical independent voice prided by the alternative press as a result of monopolies forming. An interrogation into the content output of this specific newspaper will examine the extent to which transformation has or has not occurred in Naspers.

The third largest press house by publications owned is Independent Newspapers – representing a substantial (24%) total national readership, as well as attracting the largest portion (48%) of commercial-market advertising spend (MDDA & Z-Coms, 2009: 41).

The group that has undergone the most significant transformation in terms of ownership is the Avusa group. It has 25% black ownership, and a majority listed, but has a smaller market share and fewer publications compared to the other three press houses (excluding M&G Media). This is made up for by its flagship publication the Sunday Times, attracting the largest portion of readership in relation to the four other publications surveyed in this study (see Figure 3.5).
Demographics

The final point of analysis is demographics and is assessed in terms of class and race; Tables 3.2 – 3.6 spell out market segmentation per publication. Three areas that should receive closer analysis are those of race, income and education level as they give an indication as to the socio-demographics (race and class) of South Africa. The above tables therefore reference consumption per publication, per class group.

By far the dominant player in the market, in terms of this specific case study is the Sunday Times with an almost 75% of the market share, with an almost 70% of that readership located in the black-market, and only 17% white readership. The majority readership across race lines is situated in the middle-to-upper income bracket (60%) earning in excess of R 8000 per month. 72% of the market
is educated, holding at least a Matric, and 30% of that being educated post-Matric and in tertiary institutes. It can be read into these results that a large percentage the national readership of the Sunday Times is an educated, white-collar worker of black ethnicity. And the working class therefore does not take up a substantial portion of the readership. The Avusa group which owns the paper has been a site of several mergers and acquisitions driven by an empowerment policy. It is likely that the readership of the paper, much like the group itself, has a neo-liberal sympathetic ideology.

The Mail & Guardian has a much smaller market share, and as established above, a more critical line on current affairs. A large portion of the papers’ market is well educated and in the upper-income group. Ethnically, 69% of the readership is black, suggesting that the dominant segment of this market is the black elite, who would have benefited from the neo-liberal policies of the past two decades, but retain allegiance to a more ‘alternate’ and critical voice, associated with the anti-apartheid press in the 1980’s (58% of the demographic being over the age of 35).

The Daily News is an interesting case. The paper is a Kwa-Zulu Natal based publication, with a larger Indian readership (26%), however the black segment of the market is still greater than 50%, educated and majority middle-class in terms of income (64% are earning in excess of R 8000 per month).

The emergence of conglomerate-owned tabloids which cater for the majority lower-income black audiences (Wasserman & Botma, 2008) – including Caxton’s Citizen – are proving to be popular forms in terms of readership. 70% of the Citizen’s readership is black. However, in contrast to the above three publications, readership is distributed more equally between the upper and lower ends of the earning market. This suggests that the content produced by the paper be of a more diverse nature, critical of both class positions.

The final newspaper under review is the Witness, a regional, KwaZulu-Natal paper, owned by Media24. The black readership in this publication is the lowest out of the five in this case study, with a high the Indian and white readership (56%). The education level at 38% High-school and 37% Matric is not as high as seen in the other publications, suggesting that a majority of this readership is working class (not-skilled). This is however not reflected in the income statistics, which indicate an even split between upper and lower income readers.
Although much in the way of ownership in the press sector has been transformed, there is still a significant amount of transformation that needs to take place in order to fully reach government’s racial vision of a truly transformed society. Transformation since the early 1990s has taken place under the guidance of the ANC’s neo-liberal economic policies, allowing the economic elite from the previous dispensation to maintain much in the way of economic power, and a new black elite to emerge driven by redistributive policies such as BEE. This is seen in current ownership trends where the majority of press ownership is still in white hands (30%), with a smaller section being black elite owned. However this does not translate into the same percentage terms when examining consumption of newspapers by race and class, as the race demographics reflect a high black consumption percentage of the news publications, albeit majority the elite and middle class.

These findings will give context to the study to follow on discourse within the five publications and assess what the above findings imply about content output per publication by examining a sample of discourse presented at a specific period. The discourses presented by the two personalities of Zuma and Mbeki, based along fairly ethnic lines on the one hand and class-based ideological positioning on the other, set up a dynamic for the contestation of power at the Polokwane conference. The extent to which political and economic ideology of the ANC-left was the deciding factor in the outcome, or rather a personality power struggle provides the context for an analysis of discourse in the press during this period.

Figure 3.5: Five case specific newspaper (national) readership
Chapter 4: Critical content analysis

The various discourse(s) presented by the ANC and its elites as well as the media (in relation to the ruling power bloc) post-1994 has already been discussed in detail in the previous chapter. Chapter 2 gives understanding into the broader function of discourse and power at a societal level, and in relation to public institutions like the media. It described how discourses come to entrench and be entrenched (dialectic relationship) in media systems. This chapter will use the theoretical approaches of CDA and DTA to interpret and re-interpret the discursive structure surrounding the Polokwane elective conference so that codes can be established and analysed using a type of critical content analysis. The purpose of this is to identify the relationships between codes, newspaper texts and discursive structures during the conference.

Content Analysis

As opposed to the complex, subjective nature of discourse analysis, content analysis is much simpler in its methodology involving a quantitative approach in analysing texts, “based on measuring the amount of something” (Berger, 1991: 25). Bernard Berelson defines content analysis as “a research technique [or methodology] for the objective, systematic and quantitative description of the manifest content” (1952: 18). Apart from the existence of various kinds of content analyses (Berger, 1991), it seems reasonable to view this research technique as being less prone to the conceptual confusion, than is the case with discourse analysis. Content analysis is thus concerned with manifest content, and with doing research that is both objective and repeatable, something that is difficult to accomplish with discourse analysis.

Content analysis is used, on the one hand, as a generic label to cover any method that involves analysing content. On the other hand however, it is used to describe a specific analytic approach (Deacon, Pickering, Golding and Murdock, 1999: 115). This research will employ content analysis as a specific analytic approach guided towards “the analysis of frequencies in manifest content of messages using the identification and counting of key units of content as the basis of its method” (O’Sullivan et al., 1994: 62). Important here is that content analysis looks to uncover trends that exist in texts, in order to provide comparative points of view between and within text under analysis. Thus conventional content analysis (as method) is understood to be “the coding of text into mutually exclusive categories, the counting of category occurrences, and their statistical
analysis” (Wood and Kroger, 2000: 32). A conventional approach to content analysis is the method used in this study.

Berelson’s (1952) definition of content analysis is based on three assumptions regarding its theoretical basis: firstly that it assumes a relationship between intent and content or between content and effect; secondly he assumes that content and its production, interpretation and analysis is common; and finally that a quantitative description of communication is meaningful (Richardson, 2007: 15-21). The latter two assumptions have however come under much criticism. Klaus Krippendorff (1980) is one such critic, and has strongly objected to Berelson’s restricted definition of content analysis. One of his main concerns is that the method of content analysis is commonly mistaken for extracting content from the data as if it is objectively contained in them. He argues that, “[…] messages and symbolic communications are generally about phenomena other than those directly observed” (1980: 23). The relationship that the text has with outside social systems / institutions therefore needs to be taken into account (discursive structure). This debate surrounding the relationship between text and context, and subsequently how and why (because of context - external factors to the text) certain codes are chosen as opposed to others is the central crux of content analysis theory and methodology. This interpretation of content analysis questions the methodology’s relationship to discourse and its analysis. The two methodologies (content analysis and discourse analysis) both aim to examine text in context. However, a closer examination seems to suggest that the difference between content analysis and discourse analysis in relation to the notion of context is a matter of emphasis and scope rather than a conceptual one. The former tends to focus more on local context whilst the latter tends to take a broader or an extrinsic view of context (Richardson, 2007). The two approaches also differ as discourse analysis does not involve the coding of texts into categories, and the subsequent statistical analysis of the coded variables. Content analysis involves the coding of texts and the then counting of these codes.

This research proposes Content Analysis as method and CDA and DTA as theoretical paradigms used in determining codes. In the context of this study the discourse that informs the subject matter (the content) is the ANC Polokwane power struggle between Zuma and Mbeki. By examining the discursive structure surrounding the Polokwane conference in 2007, in relation to newspaper articles and other written materials related to the study, a smaller sample size (i.e. the coded categories as well as the relationship between the codes) is achieved. Theories of discourse and its analysis (not discourse analysis as method) will be engaged so to interpret the discursive structure of the text(s) under analysis. As discussed in chapter two, social practices, ideology and political practice are constituted in and constitutive of discourse. A content analysis of these codes will then
be employed as a method in counting patterns of similarity and difference between codes in relation to the specific newspapers.

**Case study: discourse in the press at ‘Polokwane’**

This specific case study will subject 105 English-language newspaper articles across five newspaper titles and five press houses to a critical content analysis. The timeframe for analysis will incorporate the 2007 ANC National Elective Conference at Polokwane and will include samples taken one month prior to the Conference, during (December, 16th – 20th) as well as the weeks leading up to the comments made by Zuma on the media (8 January, 2008). The media’s response to his comments will also be examined. The articles are drawn from the following publications: The *Citizen, Witness, Daily News, Sunday Times* and *Mail and Guardian*. These titles were selected because they represent a wide spectrum of ownership by media companies who are involved in the English-language newspaper industry (see Chapter 3).

**Applying critical content analysis**

The first step in the process of quantitative content analysis is to source the newspaper articles and other materials related directly to the ANC’s 2007 Conference. The material is then organised into categories based on the vehicle of publication (newspaper), and their chronological sequence (date / timeline). All material is converted into digital text for computer analysis. The qualitative textual analysis computer programme, NVIVO 8, is used to analyse relations between ‘nodes’ found in each article; and where the different nodes are determined by codes relating to discursive structure.

NVIVO 8 is designed for qualitative researchers working with very rich text-based and / or multimedia information, where deep levels of analysis on small or large volumes of data are required. The software is used predominantly by academic, government and commercial researchers across a diverse range of fields, including social sciences such as anthropology, psychology, communication, sociology, as well as fields such as forensics, tourism and marketing (see QSR 1999 – 2009, http://qsrinternational.com). Qualitative research software such as NVIVO 8 aids the researcher in interpreting and organising unstructured information. It does not do the thinking for the researcher but is a platform that enables and facilitates qualitative data capturing, analysis and interpretation. Within critical research NVIVO 8, as a research tool, is situated on the one hand within a textual paradigm as media text is studied as stand-alone data. The text is assumed to offer its own formal code on how interpreters should make meaning of it (Teer-Tomaselli, 2008a: 39). On the other hand the radical-structural paradigm this specific research is situated in is more easily facilitated by the use of a qualitative computer programme like NVIVO 8. This because the data
being analysed is more easily accessible, better organised and more user friendly. This allows for
dater to be critically captured and analysed.

The results of the content analysis using NVIVO 8 are used to identify the *discursive* boundaries
between contending statements that either represent or constitute the context under discussion. In
this way the parameters of contending discourses can be identified, and any shifts in language use
can be identified.

*Selecting and defining the research sample*
Sampling involves a rigorous procedure when selecting units for analysis from a larger sample, in
this case the specific newspaper articles from various publications over a two month period (Du
Plooy, 2001: 99). The research sample for this study is defined firstly by the source of text, i.e., the
newspaper. It has already been made clear that the newspapers that have been selected for this
particular study are representative of the four press houses and one independent publisher in the
South African print news market.

The second parameter is the type of newspaper sample selected. This case study identifies four
categories; letters / commentary, general articles, press reports and opinion / editorial / column
pieces. The sample breakdown per publication type is represented in Table 4.1 below. Letters or
commentary pieces refer to articles that are either written by the general public in response to a
specific issue raised in the newspaper, or articles that involved commentary from the general public
or ANC members. General articles cover events and reports on and around the happenings of the
conference itself. These reports are mostly factual and report actual events. Press reports are similar
to general articles, but are produced by a press association (e.g. South African Press Association).
These reports may appear in different newspapers but are edited differently by each newspaper.
Opinion pieces or editorials refer to articles written by editors of newspapers, select contributors
including academics and ANC elites. These articles focus on analysing events and offering expert
opinion. For example an opinion editorial in the context of this study may be written by the SACP
leader offering his opinion on the succession debate.

The final parameter identified is the period of publication. The sample is taken across a two
month period. However, this is further defined by publications pre-Polokwane, during the
Polokwane conference and post-Polokwane. This breakdown is represented in Table 4.2, reflecting
a total of 105 newspaper texts under study.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Letters / Commentary</th>
<th>Witness</th>
<th>Daily News</th>
<th>Citizen</th>
<th>Sunday Times</th>
<th>Mail &amp; Guardian</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>Total</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
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</table>

**Table 4.1:** Total research sample (publication type)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pre-Polokwane</th>
<th>Witness</th>
<th>Daily News</th>
<th>Citizen</th>
<th>Sunday Times</th>
<th>Mail &amp; Guardian</th>
<th>Total</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>16</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>29</td>
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<tr>
<td>Post-Polokwane</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 4.2:** Total research sample (period)

**Nodes and Codes**

Krippendorff cites nine aspects in approaching the design of a content analysis: applying the framework for content analysis; searching for suitable data; searching for contextual knowledge; developing plans for unitising and sampling; developing coding instructions; and searching for contextually justifiable procedures; deciding on qualitative standards and budgeting (1980: 170).

This section will describe the process for developing coding instructions, and will draw on critical discourse analysis as theory, as well as Hall’s theory on encoding and decoding. NVIVO 8 allows a researcher to accurately analyse large amounts of textual data, which would be extremely difficult for an unaided researcher. While a content analysis is typically considered to be a research technique that is based on the measuring of something, the coding required to identify the nodes does require a degree of interpretation – that is, finding intentions of synonymy, antinomy, metaphor and metonymy within each node. This is where a traditional (positivist / quantitative) approach to content analysis becomes subjective in deciding what to count (Deacon, Pickering, Golding and Murdock, 1999: 120-122). This is because there is no standard set or list of codes to be counted. These codes need to be defined by the researcher, in conjunction with relevant local context, defined by the research objectives of this study. Discursive practices / social practices are encoded and decoded in media texts (Hall, 1980). These social and discursive practices are therefore embedded in social and power relations (i.e., ideology can be encoded). The media as institutions engaged in these ideological power relations shape our understanding and meaning making through the texts they produce (Richardson, 2007: 42-43). Hall’s encoding / decoding model suggests that ideology / discourse is coded in language or signs and that this coded language through hegemony becomes naturalised. Institutions / individuals produce discourses and
institutions like the media through signification naturalise these discourses. This paradigm will be used in conjunction with Fairclough’s CDA so to identify discursive codes (or structures) in the sample of newspaper articles relating to the ANC Polokwane conference.

It is useful at this point to re-state the overall research problem – the study of discourse in the press during the Polokwane conference;

The English-language press’s construction of the power struggle and leadership succession at the ANC National Elective Conference in Polokwane was criticised at the time by the Zuma faction of the ANC for presenting a discourse aligned to specific class interests informed by a certain economic standing in society. The Zuma faction of the ruling party at this time articulated a discourse strongly aligned to the left and working class in their quest to win support and gain a ruling majority, as opposed to Mbeki’s neo-liberal economic stance that was perceived to favour the new economic elite. The press is a site for ideological contestation that manifests itself through discourse. Zuma believes the press is not engaging in this contestation as it should, or as he would like it to, and therefore proposes overt state intervention.

The intention of the content analysis to follow will be to answer the following question concerning the above problem statement;

What is the response of a sample of the English-language press to the power struggle and leadership succession at Polokwane in December 2007? As represented by the discourses of Zuma on the on hand and Mbeki on the other. How is this contestation for the ANC leadership represented in the sample? Is it represented in relation to class discourses presented by each individual, or does it feature the personalities and leadership styles of each individual more prominently?

Coding is the process of bringing together passages in data that seem to exemplify an idea or concept. As such, coding is a way of abstracting from the source data to build a greater understanding of the forces at play. This involves identifying references to different ideas, concepts or categories within the sources and linking them to the nodes which represent them. This process for identifying codes is a circular – recurring process, as represented in Figure 4.1. Coding generates ideas during the actual coding of material. It brings together all the material related on a category or case throughout all sources. This allows for a review of coded passages in context and can lead to the creation of new, finer categories as new understandings of meanings in the data are gained. Coding also facilitates the seeking of patterns and theories (see QSR 1999 – 2009, http://qsrinternational.com).
Codes are forms of social knowledge which are derived from social practices and beliefs although they are not laid down in any statute. Codes organise our understanding of the world in terms of ‘dominant meaning patterns’, patterns which vary from culture to culture and from time to time but which we largely take for granted and which are uppermost in our minds when we interpret things or think about them (Dyer, 1982: 135). The codes for this research are identified in conjunction with a set of guided research concerns or questions (Deacon et al., 1999: 121). These research questions are established by the context given to the discourses presented by the ANC, Zuma, Mbeki and the media in Chapter 3, as well as from an initial reading of the sources selected for this case study. The codes will be identified in Chapter 5 to follow.

Nodes in NVIVO 8 are containers for ideas within the research sample and contain the evidence within sources supporting them. Creating and exploring nodes is a way to think ‘up’ from the data and arrive at higher level explanations and accounts. Coding is the process by which the researcher nominates a portion of a source which relates to a node. The relations between these nodes include synonymy, antinomy and metonymy.

Figure 4.1 represents the process of critical content analysis to follow. First, the in-depth discursive structure is identified within the context of the research. These discursive constructs are then coded in NVIVO 8. The final part will be to conduct a content analysis of the coded material. It is important to note that this process is a circular one and involves the reading and re-reading and coding and re-coding of material so to best define an accurate code selection.

![Figure 4.1: Critical Content Analysis method process](image-url)
Limitations

There are two possible limitations to this research that need to be acknowledged briefly. Firstly, the case study is confined to English-language newspapers only. The second possible limitation is the subjective nature of the research method employed, and locating unobtrusive messages relevant to this particular research (Wigston, 2009: 34). Codes are determined by the researcher within the context of this study, and therefore are subject to a certain amount of subjectivity. However, through research conducted in the previous chapters, and the context this research supplies, subjectivity is confined and limited.
Chapter 5: Texts in context: discourse in the press

Jacob Zuma, in a post-Polokwane statement, criticised the media following its coverage of the ANC’s 52 National Elective Conference. In the article “The voice of the ANC must be heard” that appeared in the online journal ANC Today, he told his constituents that the media was “[…] politically and ideologically out of synch with the society in which it exists” (January 8, 2008). He goes on further to imply that sections of the press did not reflect the ANC or his faction of the alliance in true fashion. Zuma even states that the press predicted that his faction was not going to win power at the Polokwane conference:

The outcome of the 52nd national conference in Polokwane is a most recent example of the media yet again becoming a victim of its own propaganda and manipulation. Some are correctly asking themselves: “how did we get it so wrong?”, while others now use every opportunity to “prove” that there is something that was seriously wrong with ANC delegates at Polokwane. (January 8, 2008)

The purpose of this case study is to gauge the press’ reaction to the power struggle between Zuma and Mbeki at the Polokwane conference in 2007. The previous chapter described the research sample and method for analysing content in the press. This chapter shall identify the process for determining coding instructions and present the results of a content analysis of the coded material.

An analysis of the findings will be two-fold. Firstly the results are analysed in terms of representation, per code, in the press. For example, does the English language press predict, as Zuma suggests, the Mbeki faction will win power over the Zuma faction at the conference. The analysis of the results of a content analysis for codes relating to media bias towards each individual, will gauge the support each newspaper has for each individual pre and post-Polokwane.

The second part of the analysis will examine the findings of the content analysis in relation to the findings of the case study on the political economy of the five respective press houses (see Chapter 3). The purpose of this comparison between the content output and the political economic situation of the respective press houses is to determine any correlation between the two. For example a newspaper that is bought and read by low LSM groups should imply that the content produced during the Polokwane period is bias towards the economic polices proposed by the Zuma faction, and may even be bias towards Zuma himself.

The coding instructions identified for this case study are determined by an examination of the discursive structure surrounding the Polokwane conference. This includes economic and policy
issues as well as the leadership styles and personalities or characters of both Zuma and Mbeki. The analysis of the discursive structure informed by theories on CDA are identified and discussed in detail in Chapter 3 of this study. What follows is a summary of the discursive structure used in the coding process. Nineteen codes or “nodes” have been identified and divided into three “tree nodes” in the qualitative textual analysis computer programme, NVIVO 8. These tree nodes are; Thabo Mbeki, Jacob Zuma and Press reaction to ANC Polokwane presidential succession. The first will describe nodes referring to the character, leadership style and politics of Mbeki, the second Zuma and the third set of nodes relate to the press reaction to each individual (Mbeki and Zuma) as well as reaction by the press to the leadership contest. The codes are as follows;

- **Code 1** - Mbeki’s leadership style in a positive discourse
- **Code 2** - Mbeki’s policies or politics as presented in a negative discourse
- **Code 3** - Mbeki’s policies or politics as presented in a positive discourse
- **Code 4** - Mbeki’s character or personality represented in a negative discourse
- **Code 5** - Mbeki’s character or personality represented in a positive discourse
- **Code 6** - Mbeki’s leadership style in a negative discourse
- **Code 7** - Zuma’s policies or politics as presented in a positive discourse
- **Code 8** - Zuma’s character or personality represented in a negative discourse
- **Code 9** - Zuma’s character or personality represented in a positive discourse
- **Code 10** - Zuma’s leadership style in a negative discourse
- **Code 11** - Zuma’s leadership style in a positive discourse
- **Code 12** - Zuma’s policies or politics as presented in a negative discourse
- **Code 13** - Reference to a power struggle between Zuma and Mbeki in a negative discourse
- **Code 14** - Reference to a power struggle between Zuma and Mbeki in a positive discourse
- **Code 15** - Reference to neither Mbeki nor Zuma being fit to rule the ANC
- **Code 16** - Reference to no policy debate or shift in policy
- **Code 17** - Reference to policy debate or shift in policy being central to power struggle
- **Code 18** - Reference to the media’s bias towards Mbeki
- **Code 19** - Reference to the media’s bias towards Zuma

**Codes 1 – 6** fall under the tree node Thabo Mbeki, **codes 7 – 12** under the tree node Jacob Zuma and **codes 13 – 19** under the tree node press reaction to ANC succession.

The discursive structure describing the character and leadership style of Mbeki, as interrogated in Chapter 3, is summarised as being of an Africanist intellectual, who is perceived as being distant and aloof. His character influences his leadership style, which is perceived and presented in public
discourse as distant and alienating of his constituency as a result of his aloofness. Mbeki’s obsession with power and controlling power from the top down is made apparent in his meddling and influence with the SABC board, as discussed earlier. The codes established against the discursive structure of Mbeki and the Polokwane conference focus on these traits. Mbeki is an aloof, distant intellectual, and a power hungry leader. The politics or policy of Mbeki has too been discussed in great detail, situating his economic policy within a neo-liberal discourse. This policy direction is often presented in a positive discourse; however the discourse presented by Mbeki on HIV/AIDS for example has received much criticism within public domain (see Chapter 3).

In contrast the leadership style and personality of Zuma is of a more inclusive, grass-roots and ethnically informed nature. The populist almost celebrity appeal of Zuma, identified during his rape trial by the motorcades, body guards and large support base, is contrasted and sometimes complimented by his humble, rural Zulu-boy character. His links with organised labour and the implications this has for policy shift in the build up to the conference informed the discursive structure around Zuma’s policy propagations in the attempt to win support and power. His rape trial and corruption charge are often cited in public discourse presenting Zuma as a corrupt leader, with little moral values.

Both elites go into the Polokwane elective conference presenting or being constituted in the above referenced discourses. The press’ interpretation of the two elites and the power struggle within the party further contribute to the discursive structure surrounding the conference. The reaction of the press to the power struggle and the allegiances of specific newspapers (if any) to each elite will too form part of this case study. This informs the coding instructions for the third set of codes under analysis.

What follows is a summary of the report and findings produced by the NVIVO 8 content analysis.

**Research findings and analysis: discourse in the press at ‘Polokwane’**

The results of the content analysis are represented below in **Figures 5.1 – 5.12.** Each node, grouped by tree node, is analysed against three attributes; publication, publication type and period of publication. The figures represent the results of the content analysis using NVIVO 8 and describe how often each code appears against each attribute. As content analysis is the counting of codes the graphs represent how many codes have been counted per attribute. The y-axis describes the number of coding references. The x-axis describes the associated attribute, i.e. publication. The term coding reference indicates how many times each code is identified within each attribute, therefore can be counted as often as identified against any one attribute. For example referring to Figure 5.1, code 2
is counted 7 times in the Mail and Guardian newspaper over the period of analysis (one month prior, during and one month post the Polokwane conference). It is possible for this code to be counted seven times is one article or seven time over several articles. Each tree node and the relating three figures that represent the results of the content analysis are interpreted and analysed individually. When a phrase, headline or sentence is quoted as an example of a node relating to a specific code, the reference number used to refer to the source in NVIVO 8 is given as the reference. For example Daily News 1 will refer to an article in the Daily News. In the primary reference list all newspaper articles are referenced in full, indicating the specific NVIVO 8 source code.

Figures 5.1 – 5.3 refer to codes 1 – 6 and relate to the discursive structure around Thabo Mbeki. The code that receives the highest count in terms of how often it is referenced is Code 6 with a count of 56 nodes. This code refers to Mbeki’s leadership style in the negative. Examples of some of the nodes identified in code 6 include; “Mbeki has been using state powers to drive personal agendas” (Daily News 5), “Mbeki to go for another term, he might end up becoming like Mugabe, who refuses to step down from power” (Daily News 9), “Mbeki’s critics in the alliance want him and his centralist leadership style to be replaced” (Sunday Times 1) and “his prickly, remote and autocratic leadership style” (Witness 17). The code is counted the most in the Witness, Citizen and Sunday Times. Mbeki’s character or personality (code 4) is referred to in the negative 15 times in the Witness, but does not occur as often in the other four publications when compared to code 6. This implies that when it comes to Mbeki, the Polokwane succession debate and leadership battle is more about leadership style than personality or policy issues. Codes 2 and 3 are counted far less when compared to code 6. The total number of nodes counted for codes 2, 4 and 6 which refer to Mbeki in the negative in general is 93 in contrast to a count of 23 referring to him in the positive (codes 1, 3 and 5). The Witness offers the most positive discourse on Mbeki, with 5 nodes relating to code 3 which references his politics or policies in the positive. Examples of such nodes are; “such a record of economic success as Thabo Mbeki” (Witness 15) and “South Africa on balance has done well under his presidency” (Witness 9). The majority of positive coding for Mbeki relates to the economic successes he has had during his presidency.

The nature of the publication is represented in Figure 5.2 and indicates that the majority of the sample is made up of editorials or opinion pieces, indicating that the sample is critical in nature as opposed to general articles or press reports which offer factual accounts with limited critical analysis. The final Figure 5.3 in this group indicates that in the build up to the conference the press attention given to Mbeki in general is higher compared to coverage post-Polokwane. 36 nodes were
counted for code 6 pre-Polokwane, implying that Mbeki went into the conference with a high disapproval rating in terms of the press’ discourse.

**Figure 5.1;** Coding for Thabo Mbeki by Publication

**Figure 5.2;** Coding for Thabo Mbeki by Publication Type
Similarly the findings for Zuma indicate high negative discourse around his leadership style, as was the case for Mbeki. **Code 10** in Figure 5.4 indicates 38 negative nodes when it comes to leadership style, including the following examples; “a man steeped in the disgrace of alleged corruption, vulgar misogyny and ill-informed beliefs on Aids, and who has proved himself irresponsible in managing his personal finances”, “Zuma-land, a world of corruptibility and lack of ethics” (*Mail & Guardian* 17), “unproven candidate” (*Citizen* 1) and “little respect for the law. His populist instincts would sabotage South Africa’s economic growth and his dependence on better-educated advisers and old cronies would open the door to massive corruption” (*Witness* 4). However in contrast to the overall sample taken for the Mbeki tree node, interest in Zuma across the coding instructions is higher. This indicates that media interest in him, his personality and character (**codes 8, 9, 10 and 11**) is more pertinent and possibly financially attractive in terms of readership appeal. **Code 11** presents Zuma’s leadership style in a positive discourse, having as the *Daily News* describes, “indisputable leadership charms” (*Daily News* 2). This code has the highest node count of 41 in comparison to the other 6 codes. However having said this, **code 10** which presents Zuma’s leadership qualities in the negative, has a node count of 40. This suggests that the coverage on Zuma a lot more critical and un-bias, when compared to that of Mbeki. It also indicates that the press is a lot more critical of Zuma, as an unproven leader. An example of a positive node that sums up the press’ interpretation of Zuma’s leadership (**code 11**); “Jacob Zuma, with the ability to
recognise the importance of collective work rather than individualism and temptation to work for one’s own personal ‘legacy’, is an example of nodes comparing and contrasting Zuma’s leadership style and character to Mbeki’s” (Mail & Guardian 15). Both code 7 and 12 which refer to Zuma’s policies, including developmental and working-class friendly economic policies are the lowest counted codes of the sample, as was the case for the Mbeki tree node. This again means that the discourse on the leadership contest at Polokwane is not constructed in the press as a battle for left or right, but rather a battle of personalities and leadership styles. The individual newspapers offer mostly equal coverage per node, the exceptions are the Witness which has a high count for code 10, suggesting that the newspaper is most critical and questionable of Zuma’s leadership abilities. The paper however does offer the most diverse coverage in terms of the codes referenced, as is the case with the Mbeki codes. The Daily News was the smallest sample size, and therefore accounts for the limited nodes counted. The Mail & Guardian offers the most positive discourse on Zuma’s character and leadership style with a count of 22 node references, in comparison to the other four publications (codes 9 and 11). The paper refers to his personality and leadership potential as such; “Thanks to his warmth and charm, Zuma is capable of uniting the tripartite alliance and reaching out to ordinary citizens” (Mail & Guardian 4).

As was the case with the Mbeki sample, the majority of sources are critical opinion pieces or editorials (see Figure 5.5). There is little evidence to suggest that there is a trend for press coverage at the different periods of this study (pre-, post- and Polokwane) as seen in Figure 5.6.

Figure 5.4; Coding for Jacob Zuma by Publication
The final set of codes to be interpreted relate to the tree node ‘press reaction to ANC Polokwane presidential succession debate’. **Figure 5.7** indicates the results per publication and shows that **Code 13** – reference to a power struggle between Zuma and Mbeki in a negative discourse has the
highest node count of 79. **Figure 5.9** indicates that the build-up to the conference received the most negative coverage, noting a decline during and post-Polokwane. The *Sunday Times* and the *Witness* are the most critical of the leadership battle implying that it is a “bitter contest between the two” and that there is a rift in the ANC, “voting delegates appear to be evenly and bitterly divided” (*Sunday Times* 2). A trend that continues in these findings is the *Witness*’ even coverage of the conference and the two leaders. **Code 14**, which represents the leadership battle in a positive discourse, has 11 nodes in the *Witness* represented as such; “Polokwane was grass-roots democracy at work” (*Witness* 13) and “it is unlikely that there would be drastic policy changes at least to start with. In other words the country’s relative economic strength would be maintained […] and a general adherence to the rule of law would continue” (*Witness* 18). This code saw an increase of node references post-Polokwane; this is in line with the noted decline in coverage relating to the power struggle in the negative (see **Figure 5.9**). A large portion of the sample in this tree node references a lack of policy debate or shift in policy at or as a result of the Polokwane leadership succession. **Code 16** is counted 23 times with the *Mail & Guardian* being counted the most in this code, making the point that “the ANC NEC has not changed much in terms of its class orientation or even the general representation of our society” (*Mail & Guardian* 11). Only 9 nodes out of the 105 newspaper articles sampled references a shift in economic and political policy as being central to the succession debate and power struggle. The *Mail & Guardian* 19 as referenced in **Code 17** goes as far as to report that “the leadership battle between Mbeki and Zuma is not merely over personalities, but is based on major policy differences between them”. This statement however goes against the trend indicated in this analysis which presents the leadership battle in the press sample as being more about personalities and leadership styles than policy. This is seen in the high number of nodes related to Mbeki’s and Zuma’s personalities and leadership style as indicated in **Figures 5.1 and 5.4**. This is in contrast to the low count of nodes referring to the policy of each individual. **Code 15** relating to neither Zuma nor Mbeki being fit to lead the ANC received the most node count in the *Witness*.

There was little or no overt press bias towards any one of the elites, as indicated in codes **18 and 19**. The only major bias that was referenced relates to Mbeki’s interference within the SABC, and his use of the broadcaster as his own personal mouthpiece. The *Citizen* 26 notes the duties of a public broadcaster; “our so-called public broadcaster has a duty here. Instead of devoting so much time to Thabo Mbeki, put Zuma on air. Let’s hear him”. Although this does not relate directly to a newspapers bias towards Zuma or Mbeki, it does expose Mbeki for being a self-serving leader who will use the media for his own ends. **Figure 5.8** represents the scope of the research sample in terms of publication type.
Figure 5.7: Coding for Press reaction to ANC Polokwane presidential succession by Publication

Figure 5.8: Coding for Press reaction to ANC presidential succession by Publication Type
For the most part the press coverage of the ANC elective conference and leadership battle sampled in this case study was un-bias and reflected a divers and critical assessment of the ANC presidential succession. No single publication is identified as being overtly biased towards any single ANC elite member, as balanced coverage is observed across the board. However certain newspapers did present content more or less critical of either Mbeki or Zuma. The remainder of this chapter will interpret the above findings in terms of the political economic contexts of each newspaper.

**Contextualising the findings: press ownership and content output**

The Chapter 3 findings from the case study: the five press houses will be interpreted with the findings of this chapter’s case study: discourse in the press at ‘Polokwane’. This interpretation will give further context to the content output of each newspaper as a result of the ownership, market segmentation and demographic patters for each of the respective press houses.

The *Daily News* sample is the smallest of the five publications including only 9 sources in the content analysis (see Tables 4.1 and 4.2). This will have a bearing on the results as a larger sample will provide for more accurate analysis when compared to the sample size of the other publications. However the articles for all the publications are chosen from within the same sample parameters,
which may indicate less interest in the conference and the leadership battle when compared to the other publications.

The other regional newspaper, the *Witness* offers the most divers and objective coverage of the leadership battle and the contestation between the characters and leadership styles of Zuma and Mbeki. However, does appear to be more negative towards the personality of Mbeki, but offers equal criticism of both elites leadership style. The paper is a throw-back to the once alternative press during the apartheid years, but now falls under the Naspers / Media24 banner. The incorporation of the *Witness* into the publishing fold by Media 24, born out of stanch Afrikaner interests, suggest the extent the company has gone to transform its brand and the diversity of media output in the country. This is further supported by the results of this case study, as the coverage given in the *Witness* across all the codes is the most widely distributed (see Figures 5.1, 5.4 and 5.7). This indicates that the paper is divers and critical in its output.

The *Mail & Guardian* is another of the previous alternative press publications that has maintained its critical edge post 1994 as an independent publisher. The paper is most critical of Mbeki with high node counts against the ANC elite in the negative. However the coverage is mixed for Zuma, with more positive nodes counted for his character and leadership style. This may possibly appeal to the older black elite demographic referenced in Chapter 3. This demographic may possibly be made up of ANC veterans who are ready for change in ANC guard. The paper is the most critical of the lack in policy debate as indicated in Figure 5.7. The *Mail & Guardian*’s supposed critical orientation is not reflected in the diversity of it’s the nodes counted across the coding references. However it is most critical of the policy of Mbeki and Zuma, as well as the lack of policy debate in general. This would appeal to the papers largely economic elite and older readership that may be more critical of government performance rather than elite personalities.

The NP had controlling interests in the *Citizen* under apartheid however following a merger with Perskor is now published by Caxton in tabloid form. The style of the paper (tabloid) accounts for the limited critical commentary in the sample, only 6 opinion pieces out of 28 sampled (see Table 4.1). The paper shows a wide ranging coverage of the coding references especial when referring to the Zuma tree node. However the paper is a lot more critical of Mbeki than it is of Zuma. The demographics of the paper are 70% black, but more evenly distributed between the income and education level groupings. This fact and the tabloid nature of the newspaper may account for the spike in coding for Zuma when compared to that of Mbeki, as Zuma’s populist even celebrity appeal speaks to the newspapers style and most likely audience.

The weekly *Sunday Times* published by black empowerment company Avusa is the last newspaper under analysis in this case study. The paper shows high disapproval towards the leadership battle as well as the leadership style of Mbeki. However the rest of the coverage as
indicated in the codes 7 to 12 in Figure 5.4 remains balanced. The paper is by far the largest in terms of market share when compared with the other four. As discussed in the Chapter 3 a large percentage of the national readership of the Sunday Times is educated, white-collar workers of black ethnicity. The paper however does hardly reference the economic policies of Mbeki in a positive discourse (1 node count). This suggests that there is limited correlation between the readership of the paper, Avusa, and the paper being informed by a neo-liberal sympathetic ideology as a result of its political economic standing.

The overall impression given from the results of the content analysis is that there is no indication of overt support or bias towards either Zuma or Mbeki. Both elites received similar amounts of negative criticism towards their leadership styles and characters or personalities. Zuma however received much more positive and balanced discourse around his character and personality than Mbeki. Little was made about policy in the newspapers, indicating that the battle for power was more about personality and leadership style than substantive policy debate or sway.

These findings show a limited connection between the political economy of the newspaper publisher and the content output of each individual newspaper. The examination of discourse trends in the press may provide more accurate results if taken over a longer period. Rather what the findings do emphasis is that the industry is greatly transformed since the 1980s, and that even individual publishers have undertaken significant internal transformation. The findings show a diverse selection of publishers producing diverse publications with diverse content output, much in line with their social-responsibility and democratic duty. This is a far cry from how Zuma perceives the press, implying that his misgivings about the press are founded more on personal grievance with his personal coverage, for example during his rape and corruption trials.
Chapter 6: Conclusion: Future state media relations

The central thrust of research on media and democracy in South Africa, as alluded to in the above discussion, has been a political economy perspective. Transformation from apartheid to democracy is a common theme running through political economy research in South Africa. The democratic processes of policy formulation and the implementation of regulatory standards, managed by semi-autonomous bodies, have largely prevented political elites from meddling in the running and control of media institutions. Other than being an active player in the formulation of policy and implementation of regulatory bodies, the state has been relatively tolerant of the commercial media, which is largely self-regulated.

The transformation of the press in South Africa has been a slow process. Transforming institutions born into apartheid style racial-capitalism is a challenging process involving economic, policy, culture and ideological issues. In the early 1990s the ANC identified the media as being a public and private institution that needed to undergo change. However, aside from BEE policies and oversight bodies (created by the press itself), it was largely left to self-transform within a free-market, non-racial and democratic context. The case studies in this research indicate that the press is transformed both in terms of ownership and control, as well as, within the context of the Polokwane sample, transformed in terms of the diversity of content produced. However this is not to say that the gains made almost two decades into ANC rule should be taken for granted and considered complete. The press market is still saturated and made up of few players, albeit offering a diverse range of publications. The addition of new players such as The New Age can only be good for the transformation of the industry.

The ruling ANC should be mindful of the inclusive human rights and freedoms it preached and indeed practiced during the late 1980s and into its rule though the 1990s. This as the statements issuing forth from government since the early 2000s, including the establishment of a Media Appeals Tribunal and the proposed Protection of Information Bill are unprecedented in their attack on media freedom under the discourse of ‘developmental media’. The implementation of any Act aimed at information censorship can be manipulated for narrow political ends, and a state run or managed media will pose a threat to democratic rule. The ANC has unfortunately crossed the free-press / state-press line in its and certain elite members (Zuma and Mbeki) quest to ‘transform’ the media in line with the ‘national interest’. It appears as if the predictions made by de Beer (1989) may have come full circle and that the ANC is reverting back to the media management and exclusive rule seen in the NP during apartheid. The Protection of Information Bill speaks to the
future of state media relations in the country and implies that the ANC has developed a discourse of censorship and secrecy. This will limit the flow of information from state / government to the citizens. This has knock on effects for the agenda setting and informative function of a public media. The proposed SABC ‘developmental media’ bill further entrenches this position.

The challenge going forward, under a banner of democracy will be for the now greatly transformed corporate media to, continue the trends of independence, freedom and plurality as established during the early years of transition. This is likely, as a result of the above-mentioned political developments, to be a challenging task, but one that is not new in the recent history of the country and the media’s quest for a more democratic society. The discourse of freedom of speech and expression of a plurality of viewpoints must be maintained by the press, even if it has been lost in ANC discourse.
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**Appendices**

**Appendix 1**: Ethics Clearance Form – Approval Letter
14 NOVEMBER 2008

MR. DA NOTHING (204513442)
LITERARY STUDIES, MEDIA & CREATIVE ARTS

Dear Mr. Nothing,

ETHICAL CLEARANCE APPROVAL NUMBER: HSS/0698/08M

I wish to confirm that ethical clearance has been approved for the following project:

"A media out of synch. Representation of ideology in the South African print media"

PLEASE NOTE: Research data should be securely stored in the school/department for a period of 5 years

Yours faithfully,

MS. PHUMELELE XIMBA

cc. Supervisor (Prof. G Tomaselii)
cc. Marc Caldwell
cc. Post-Graduate Office