IDEOLOGY AND CULTURAL PRODUCTION IN SOUTH AFRICAN CINEMA

Keyan Gray Tomaselli

A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Arts, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Johannesburg 1983
I declare that this dissertation is my own unaided work. It is being submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at the University of Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. It has not been submitted before for any degree or examination in any other university

[Signature] 1-8-1973
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am indebted to the many people and institutions that made information and facilities available to me in the course of this study. The most important of these was the National Film Archive and its Director, Johan de Lange, who placed both films and the library at my disposal. My numerous discussions with Heins du Preez on the subjects of VOBi, UTOLO and KARFO proved invaluable, as did the many original and unique documents he allowed me to photocopy. Chapter 3 is the richer for his criticism on it, though he is in no way responsible for its outcome. Thanks also to Pieter Fourie for his comments on Chapter 6 and his endorsement of its 'non-functionalist' position. Similarly, he is not responsible for the stance taken. I am also indebted to Andre Brink for his enthusiastic assessment of an earlier draft of Chapter 10 and his suggestions for further research. Both Satbel and CIC-Warner generously granted me access to view South African made films released in their respective cinemas, and Satbel furthermore allowed me to photocopy synopses and other material on South African cinema housed in their library.

Proofreading was assisted by Debbie Boshoff and invaluable discussion from which this study has benefitted has come from my wife, Ruth, John van Zyl, Harriet Gavshon, Joe Muller and my colleagues in the film industry, and Lionel Friedberg in particular. Their support, encouragement and enthusiasm for my ongoing interest in the South African film industry is gratefully acknowledged.

Finally, my sincere thanks to my supervisor, Dr John van Zyl, for his valuable criticism and encouragement.
A NOTE ON STYLE

Much of the original documentation consulted for this study is written in Afrikaans. Where possible, the text includes only the English translation, but in some cases, due to the unique connotation of certain Afrikaans words, phrases and idiomatic expressions, the English translation is supplemented with the original Afrikaans to ensure absolute clarity.

The English language's inability to cope with gender in a general sense is a more complex problem. Where necessary, I have used the system first devised by John Hartley: "s/he" stands for 'she and he' and "wo/man" for 'men and women'. Elsewhere I have used either of the two categories in a specific sense. If I am talking about a specific practice, for example, producers in general, I have used the male gender since the study period did not indentify any females in that practice. This approach is also applicable to other categories under discussion.

Following the practice adopted by many Anglo-Saxon social scientists, considerable use has been made of single quotation marks to emphasise certain words and phrases. The American convention is to continue to employ double quotation marks. The use of single quotation marks is, I believe, more efficient as it clearly marks the distinction between quotations and the use of words and phrases in a more general sense. Briefly, this device fulfills three basic functions as far as this study is concerned. First, it may indicate to the reader that such words are not being used in their literal sense, but have metaphorical overtones. More often, however, it is used to distance the present author from words which do not form part of his ideological vocabulary, but are borrowed from other writers and commentators, and the social lexicon they imply. Used in this way, these words echo their sources and imply a rich background of imagery and connotation. Finally, the accentuating of words and phrases is a shorthand way of high-lighting attitudes, ideologies, and holding them up to critical scrutiny.
ABSTRACT

The social and economic history of the South African film industry is analysed against the background of theories of ideology and culture. This study is concerned not only with the South African industry per se, but also with its relationship to international monopoly capitalism. The development of the local industry is inexorably tied to the production and distribution cycle of the metropolitan states of America; and, to a lesser extent, Britain. This macro-analysis explains the relationship between periods of investment and under-investment in the production sector, and accounts for cultural responses in terms of ideologically sensitive material.

This study charts the structures of ownership and control between 1895 and 1980 as the industry shifted between English-dominated South African capital represented by the multinational Schlesinger Organization, then to the American-owned 20th Century Fox, eventually being bought out by Afrikaner-dominated capital in the form of SANLAM. The analysis of film texts is located within an economic and cultural context and it will be shown how South African film makers have either reproduced Hollywood values, or alternatively, how they have tried, unsuccessfully, to mobilise cinema for cultural and political objectives. Whichever path was followed, the study interlocks a comprehensive analysis of South African cinema with the social history of the nation that produced it.

Far from cinema being an unimportant component of the South African media scene, this study takes the view that film was a pivotal element in the socialization of South Africans to their changing social circumstances as the balance of political power shifted towards the National Party. Where before 1956, the cinema largely served the interests of English South African and imperial capital, and American capital during the decade of the sixties, it was after 1969 to offer a crucial channel for the dissemination of new ideas and the capitalist ethic to Afrikaners who longed for a return to a pastoral harmony. As
such, Afrikaans cinema in particular, substituted for tele-
vision as it shaped and culturally naturalised a vast
Afrikaner urbanization process which had begun at the turn
of the century.
ABBREVIATIONS

ACF  -- African Consolidated Films Ltd
ACT  -- African Consolidated Theatres Ltd
AF   -- African Films Ltd
AFT  -- African Films Trust
ATT  -- African Theatres Trust

BONUSKOR  -- Bonus Investment Corporation
BIFD  -- British International Film Distributors
BIP   -- British International Pictures
BTI   -- Board of Trade and Industries
BOSS  -- Bureau of State Security

CARFO  -- Christian Afrikaans Film and Photographic Organization

DP    -- Directorate of Publications
DRC   -- Dutch Reformed Church

FAK   -- Federation of Afrikaner Cultural Societies
FFPA  -- Feature Film Producers Association
Fox   -- 20th Century Fox-Film
FVB   -- Federal Peoples Savings Ltd

IVTA  -- International Variety and Theatrical Agency

KARFO -- Afrikaans Churches Film and Photographic Organization
MGM   -- Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer
MGM   -- Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer
MPPA  -- Motion Picture Producers Association of South Africa

OVB   -- Ox wagon Sentinel (Ossewabrandwag)

PCB   -- Publications Control Board
PHEC  -- Parade Home Entertainments Service

RARO  -- Reddingsdaadbond Amateur Film Organization
RDB   -- Reddingsdaadbond
RKO -- Radio-Keith-Orpheum
SABC-TV -- South African Broadcasting Corporation Television Service
SADF -- South African Defence Force
SAFTTA -- South African Film and Television Technicians Association
SANSO -- SANLAM-Schlesinger Ltd
SARM -- South African Film Company
SANLAM -- South African National Life Assurance Company
SANTAM -- South African National Trust and Insurance Company
Satbel -- South African Theatre Investments
SO -- Schlesinger Organization

UA -- United Artists
UTOLO -- UTOLO Films of Africa

VOBI -- Peoples Bioscope
VOLSKAS -- Peoples Bank
INTRODUCTION

Despite a long tradition of serious film discussion in South Africa, this country has produced remarkably few informed critics whose analysis indicates an adequate understanding of the nature of the medium, the structure of the audience and the social origin of images encoded in locally produced cinema. Stage and Cinema columnists made a prominent start during the teens of the century, but faded in the early twenties\(^1\) as the production industry went into dormancy. Huiggenoot and Outspan followed uncritically\(^2\), while greater in-depth discussion was supplied by the more specialised journals such as Forum\(^3\), Independent (later Trek)\(^4\) and South African Opinion\(^5\). While some attempt was made by the authors published in these journals to enunciate a contextual and theoretical framework within which to assess a South African cinema, it remained for New Nation, which appeared in the late 1960s and early 1970s to establish relevant critical frameworks which drew on a more rigorous theoretical base\(^6\). Glimpses of a growing academic, if eclectic, discussion followed in Communicatio and Standpunte. The move away from the study of exclusively elitist artforms to a consideration of the images of popular culture, however, was consolidated by Critical Arts, a journal which "seeks to establish relevant frameworks for the study of media in apartheid society". This journal proceeds on the assumption that reflections in the media are a consequence of underlying material practices occurring in the social formation?\(^7\)

Other than the contributions of John van Zyl published in New Nation and Standpunte, Robert Greig in The Star, and those of the present author, criticism of South African cinema has been couched in predominantly aesthetic, personal or literary terms. Local offerings are generally compared with cinema emanating from the commercial circuits of Europe and Hollywood, and more recently, Australia. Consequently, little attempt has been made to study them in terms of indigenous images, their own inner dynamics or as an expression of South African social history. More typically, South African cinema continues to be regarded
by press critics as disreputable rubbish being put out by con-
men who owe little allegiance to aesthetics or other generally
accepted cinematic criteria.

A study of South African cinema in terms of culture and resis-
tance has not occurred other than the elitist Broederbond in-
spired propositions of Dr Hans Rompel, editor of Die Reddings-
daadbond-Amateur-Rolprentorganisasie Journal (The RARO Journal)
and author of two booklets, Die Bioskoop in Diens van die Volk,
Deel I and Deel II, published in 1942. In contrast to the dis-
cussion offered in the journals mentioned above, he offered a
normative theory of cultural production and outlined a blue-
print for a pure, ideologically-protected amateur Afrikaans
cinema. The present study will attempt to identify the effect
of this movement on later South African cinema after the National
Party had come to power and will examine how and why the film
industry was penetrated by Afrikaner capital only after 1962.

Although Thelma Gutsche's exhaustive historical chronology, The
History and Social Significance of Motion Pictures in South
Africa 1895-1940, claims to encompass "social significance", this
concept remains vague and non-sociological in her treatise. She
does, however, provide a rich density of information and a com-
prehensive discussion of the entertainment industry, its impact,
growth and audience response. However, because of the lack of
a theoretical base in her work, the analysis is confined mainly
to description. The present study, while drawing on much of the
historical detail provided by Gutsche, aims rather at explana-
tion and the identification of trends: financial, cultural and
themetic. The emphasis of this analysis perforce leads the
writer to different conclusions to many of those offered by
Gutsche.

A third book, published in 1982 entitled Filmverlede: Geskiedie-
nis van die Suid-Afrikaanse speelfilm, is of little use to the
present analysis as it is primarily a checklist of film titles,
actors, directors, key personnel and so on. Its choice of
material, aimed at eliciting a nostalgic response, tells the
reader little about either the films or their context.
My own book, *The South African Film Industry*, offers some insights into how the current industry works in a capitalist economy and how this mode of production affects what is offered in aesthetic and thematic terms. It is concerned with a neo-classical economic analysis of the film industry as an industry, rather than with content *per se*. The present study in contrast, bases its analysis on an explicit historical materialist framework and argues that the social structure of production, exhibition, and distribution is a consequence of the workings of international capital which, in turn, results in particular forms of content and styles of treatment. It aims to examine the relationship between capital, culture and ideology, and the state and to trace the mediations between the various agents and interests involved. Despite the hold that the state has had over the feature film production industry since the early 1960s, and the close links between the state and those sectors of capital traditionally dominated by the Afrikaner bourgeoisie which presently owns most of the distribution and exhibition outlets, many conflicts nevertheless exist within the film industry itself. These differences are relayed as contradictions between the film industry (or more specifically fractions of capital within the industry) and the state. They will be shown to be as much due to the state's administrative inertia and ideology of the dominant classes, as they are to ignorance of the industry and how it works, even to the benefit of capitalism and apartheid.

The cinema sector remains tied to the monopoly capital of international distributors, often to the detriment of local producers. That the South Africa industry is largely in the hands of Afrikaner-dominated capital has not always benefitted the state in its efforts to devise a subsidy system which results in films which are automatically screened on local circuits. In an authoritarian society such as that in South Africa, this failure is of great significance, for the South African media in general are designed to be more than merely discursive ideological sites. They have moved into the realm of cultural production and have thus become instruments in the consolidation of the status quo. While the state-controlled television
service has subsequently assumed much of this function, it remained for cinema to fill this role prior to 1976. Since cinema is less overtly controlled by the state, it will be shown how certain film producers were able to breach state and ideological controls to produce films which, had they been made for television, would not have qualified for broadcast.

Interlocking with a historical analysis of the film industry will be an examination of the South African political economy. Overlayed on this will be a semiotically derived explanation of film texts which trace the relationships between the texts themselves and the social, political and economic context within which they were produced. It should be pointed out that the initial intention of this study was to concentrate on a more recent historical phase of South African cinema. It soon became clear, however, that the content of the cinema of the late 1960s and 1970s derived much of its dramatic and semiotic structure from not only the social history of South Africa, but from the various cultural and financial fractions which have made up the social structure of production since the second decade of this century. The historical analysis therefore had to be expanded accordingly if it was to account adequately for the thematic trends of the 1970s. Since Thelma Gutsche's chronology makes no attempt to interpret the data, it perforce fell to the present author to provide such an analysis.

Before proceeding with a brief outline of the chapters to follow, some definitions are in order. Following Stephen Heath, 'industry' refers to the direct economic system of cinema, the organization of the structure of production, distribution and consumption. 'Cinema' and 'industry' are used interchangeably, though cinema refers only to that product which is screened in buildings designed for the purpose. 'Film' is the product of that industry and is comprised of the celluloid and the images and sounds photographically encoded onto it. Where necessary, the adjectives, 'production', 'distribution' and 'exhibition' will preface the use of 'industry' to clearly
distinguish exactly what division of the industry is being discussed. Unless otherwise indicated, this study refers only to feature films or full-length films. Although this thesis makes extensive use of semiotic concepts, these are not defined here as their derivation is adequately dealt with elsewhere. Suffice it to say that the Peirceian paradigm, and its various syntheses such as that developed by Roland Barthes, are applied, mainly in an implicit manner.

Against this background, the individual chapters which follow will deal with the following topics. The introductory chapter provides a general theoretical overview of the current debates on ideology, culture and hegemony -- all crucial elements of the analytical framework. In the light of this discussion, this chapter will attempt to locate the analysis of South African cinema in terms of the South African social formation. A brief discussion of the class system will offer the basis for an analysis of the relations of production found within the film industry and how these have changed over time.

The second chapter will provide a brief historical resumé of the exhibition and distribution divisions of the industry from the years 1896 to 1956. This is the period from the genesis of the film industry to the introduction of the state subsidy scheme. Discussion will concern ownership structures, patterns of distribution and exhibition, and how these activities have been influenced by both local circumstances and Hollywood imperialism.

Analysis of the social structure of production between 1896 and 1956 is the subject of Chapter 3. It concerns content and how this served the ideological and cultural interests of the dominant classes of the time. Chapter 4 examines distribution and exhibition between 1956 and 1970, that is, from the 20th Century Fox takeover of the Schlesinger Organization's cinema interests to SANLAM's capture of the film industry in 1969.

The role of Afrikaner intellectuals in the production industry between 1956 and 1962 is of crucial importance to the later
development of commercial Afrikaans film production. Chapter 5 shows how these film makers were able to marry cultural concerns with commercial objectives to produce a cinema which had the effect of legitimising the massive urbanisation of Afrikaners during the first forty years of this century.

An in-depth analysis of the historical development of various subsidy schemes follows in Chapter 6. This discussion will trace the connections between the method of subsidy, the state and show how these correlated with the cultural objectives of the Afrikaner individuals agitating for state assistance.

The consolidation of the exhibition and distribution divisions of the industry in the hands of Afrikaner capital between 1970 and 1980 is discussed in Chapter 7, as is the response by international capital to this unexpected circumstance. Of importance here is the growth of related distribution channels such as home movies and audio-visual technologies. Chapter 8 discusses the homogenised cinematic fare produced by 'commercial' directors on the one hand, and contrasts this with cultural interventions and attempts to stimulate a film movement on the other.

The chapter on censorship traces its historical development and isolates the economic interests it serves. A cybernetic analysis explains the social implications of censorship in the South African context.

The final chapter offers a semiotic analysis of Afrikaans genre film between 1965 and 1980. It traces the origin of cultural myths and their manifestation on film and identifies the relationship between signs encoded in a film's text and its socio-political and economic context. This chapter offers a synthesis of the trends and conditions identified in the previous chapters in relation to the texts analysed.
NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. *Stage* and *Cinema* was first published on 15 September 1915. After the early 1920s it diversified its interests and became a more popular journal.


6. See the work of John van Zyl, Barry Ronge and Robin Lee in this journal.


8. Published by Nasionale Pers, Cape Town.

9. Published by Howard Timmins, Cape Town. The concept of "social significance" seems to be measured in purely personal terms.


CHAPTER 1

IDEOLOGY, CULTURE AND HEGEMONY: THEIR SIGNIFICANCE FOR SOUTH AFRICAN CINEMA

The increasing interest shown by radical social scientists in the role of the media and its relationship to class formation and maintenance in South Africa has been identified in a new generation of radical journals — *Critical Arts*, *Perspectives in Education*, *Africa Perspective* and *Work in Progress* — published since the mid-1970s. These journals were primarily responsible for infusing the Althusserian notion of ideology into a discussion of media in South Africa. The limitations of this paradigm, however, have become increasingly evident to those contributing to the debate. This thesis aims to broaden the approach to cinema studies by drawing on theoretical work which has hitherto been under-utilised, not only by South African analysts of cinema, but by the international community of film theorists. Most radical film theory has been couched within a structuralist framework drawing on the ideological notions of Louis Althusser¹ and meshing them with semiology (or semiotics), psychoanalysis or both. While much of this research is valuable, large tracts of it are eclectic, superficial and furthermore, even misunderstand the basic argument proffered by Althusser². The result has been endless debate, mainly in *Screen Education*, moving from total rejection of Althusser³ to exclusive acceptance⁴. Unlike British debates on broadcasting and the press which draw on the contributions made by cultural studies, cinema studies do not seem to have used these other sources to any noticeable degree⁵.

Other areas of media studies appear to have adopted a more accommodating stance with regard to competing problematics. More specifically, the realization that "neither culturalism nor structuralism will do"⁶, has led to the need to rethink the notion of ideology. Although structuralism and culturalism
have different epistemological premises, and it is not possible to fuse the two approaches, some insights provided by culturalist studies offer fruitful extension to the structural approach.

Three major approaches to the study of ideology need to be taken into account:

1. Theories of ideology, science and epistemology associated with French structuralist Marxism as exemplified by Louis Althusser, Etienne Balibar, Nicos Poulantzas, and Ernesto Laclau;

2. Evaluations of the concepts of ideology and culture and their relation to film studies; and

3. The rediscovery, among Anglo-Saxon academics, of the work of second generation Marxist scholars, notably Antonio Gramsci who provides salient insights into questions of ideology, culture and hegemony.

These three schools of thought have been applied by the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies (CCCS) of the University of Birmingham. Their programme has placed divergent emphasis on the various projects under its aegis. While this study will draw on aspects of the Birmingham work, it will simultaneously place greater emphasis on the economic aspects of the medium of cinema than is reflected in the Centre's publications which concentrate overtly on state-media relationships.

Since the present study aims primarily to identify the ideological discourse and its ramifications in South African cinema, it is first necessary to examine briefly the ideology, hegemony and culture debates in greater detail. Out of this analysis will be drawn some propositions which have direct relevance for the present investigation.

IDEOLOGY, CULTURE AND HEGEMONY

Structuralism and Ideology

Most of the work on ideology in the French structuralist school was initiated by Louis Althusser who defines ideology as:
the 'lived' relation between men and their world ...
In ideology men do indeed express, not the relation
between themselves and their conditions of existence,
but the way they live the relation between them and
their conditions of existence.

The pre-eminent question for Althusser was the way in which
class societies reproduce themselves. Although it is clear
that the class structure is secured primarily through the
relations of production within the places of employment, Althus-
ser placed greatest emphasis on the ideological and political
conditions of reproduction. The state intervenes in an attempt
to secure the optimum conditions for the reproduction of the
capitalist relations of production. In addition to the Repres-
sive State Apparatuses (RSA's) -- for instance, the police,
the military and the civil service -- Althusser at one time
also postulated additional state mechanisms: the Ideological
State Apparatuses (ISA's), for example, the church, the institu-
tion of the family, schools, the media and the like. For
Althusser, it was immaterial whether these ISA's juridically
belonged to the state or to private enterprise, since "What
matters is how they function. 'Private' institutions can
perfectly well 'function' as Ideological 'state apparatuses'."
Through ideology these apparatuses function to reproduce submis-
sion to the rules of the established order, to give currency
to the world view of the ruling classes and to make the dominant
ideology the 'common sense' of all the classes within the social
formation.

Expanding the concept of 'functioning by ideology', Althusser
proposed three theses on ideology. In the first of these he
postulated that "ideology represents the imaginary relationship
of individuals to their real conditions of existence". This
imaginary relationship -- the production of images of reality
-- supercedes the Marxist concept of "false consciousness": it
is 'lived', rather than simply thought, and therefore, in as
far as the individual subject experiences it, a real and objec-
tive relationship. His second thesis states that ideology has
a "material existence". Ideology can only exist within a set
of social practices, that is, within a state apparatus. It is
in this sense that each ISA is the realization of an ideology, and that the unity of the ISA's with one another is ensured by their mutual subjection to the same dominant ideology. It follows that each individual, through his/her 'lived relations' represented in his/her ideology, takes part in the practices and rituals which constitute a concrete ideological apparatus -- be it a religious organization, a citizen in a political party, a technician on a film set or a cinema-goer. This introduces the central concept in the functioning of ideology: the subject. Thus, Althusser's third thesis is that "ideology interpellates (or constitutes) individuals as subjects". Interpellation is the chief mechanism through which ideology is propagated. Every concrete ideological apparatus 'hails', that is, identifies individuals as particular subjects. The practice of a film financier, for instance, constitutes this individual as an 'investor' and 'employer'. Conversely, a film technician constitutes him or herself in terms of subordinate relations, for example, as an 'employee'. The subjects who implicitly recognise themselves in these respective roles, act out the ideological responses associated with them. This underlies Althusser's assertion that all ideologies must be class ideologies and that "the State and its Apparatuses only have meaning from the point of view of the class struggle, as an apparatus of class struggle ensuring class oppression and guaranteeing the conditions of exploitation and its reproduction".

As Goran Therborn points out, the interpellation of subjects does not mean that an external ideology is accepted by "a fixed and unified subject". Through the act of interpellation the receiver changes and is (re-)constituted. Ideological interpellations unceasingly constitute and reconstitute who we are. A single human being may act out an unlimited number of subjectivities (roles) throughout his/her life. It is important to note however, that the ideological constitution of subjectivities is a social process. Shifts between acquiescence and revolt are not simply a series of individual changes, but are collective processes "governed by openings and closures in the existing power matrix of affirmations and sanctions".
This recognition of what appears to be a natural fact (or common sense) is, in reality, an ideological recognition of a seemingly self-evident situation imposed by ideology. Thus, paradoxically, when a subject believes him or herself to be free of the determinations of ideology and to be motivated only by what he or she sees as 'common sense', it is precisely at that time that s/he is most powerfully motivated by ideology.

The 'lived' relation is thus:

an objective structure of the social formation which is imposed upon them /people/ by a mechanism they do not understand, a mechanism which determines that structure as the mode of appearance of reality.16

Ideology can only be manifested in material apparatuses and practices situated within classes. These apparatuses are determined and developed as a result of the class struggle and the reproduction of the relations of production.

Critique of Althusser

As pointed out, Althusser's approach to ideology has gained wide currency in film studies, particularly those emanating from Great Britain and Europe. While not denying the importance of Althusser's contribution to our understanding of ideology, numerous problems have been identified by various commentators, of which three are pertinent to the present study. The first apparent difficulty lies in the application of his categories to concrete situations because of his insistence on the pre-eminence of theory and the alleged lack of historical method in his work. It has been argued that Althusserianism renders the 'appropriation of the real in thought' particularly difficult by stressing only the rationalist side of historical materialism. Such a tendency towards over-abstraction tends to confer an idealistic view of ideology which makes it difficult to apply to any concrete practice.17

The difficulties in applying Althusser's theory lie in his level of abstraction which, while clarifying some theoretical
issues, has the oft-noted effect of obscuring the concrete connections between the level of the ideological and the level of the economic within a specific historical conjuncture. At best, it is possible to identify parallel movements within the base and superstructure which occur simultaneously with one another. While crises in the one can be associated with crises in the other, the causal connections are not so easily pinpointed. This criticism of Althusser is not original. In his self-critique appended to his essay he notes that while his "few schematic theses" allow him to

illuminate certain aspects of the functioning of the Superstructure and its mode of intervention in the Infrastructure [base] they are obviously abstract and necessarily leave several important problems unanswered.

One such anomaly pertains to whether the ISA's should be conceptualised as "belong[ing] to the system of the state"\(^\text{19}\), or be conceptualised separately. As previously mentioned, proponents of the former thesis argue that it is immaterial whether the ISA's "are public or private -- the distinction having a purely juridical ... character, which changes nothing fundamental"\(^\text{20}\). This argument tends to obscure the differences between the ideological apparatuses of advanced capitalist societies and those of more monolithic ideological institutions. In the former, as Ralph Miliband has argued, ideological apparatuses are more likely to "conceal the degree to which they belong to the system of power of capitalist society"\(^\text{21}\). The concealment makes these apparatuses more effective in conveying the discourses of 'free enterprise', 'personal choice' and 'non-state intervention', concepts which are fundamental to the reproduction of capitalist relations of production, by collapsing the distinction between the state and the private/public apparatuses. This does not mean to say that the private apparatuses cannot function as state apparatuses. We will show in Chapter 10, for example, how 'private' white-owned film companies functioned as state apparatuses in a remarkably transparent way.\(^\text{22}\)
A second problem in Althusser's exploration of ideology concerns his regression into functionalism. For Althusser, ideology seems to subsume contradictions by all too neatly preparing individuals to take up their places in the hierarchical division of labour. Or, as Richard Johnson observes:

What is correctly understood as a condition or contingency becomes, in the course of the argument, a continuously achieved outcome. Dominant ideology ... works with all the certainty usually ascribed to natural or biological processes.23

Thirdly, a contradictory tendency leads Althusser to produce an account of the reproduction of the relations of production in which the level of the economic is sublimated to the ideological. Ideology thus assumes the mantle of autonomy. Despite his avowed historical materialist assumptions, Althusser neglects the force of economic relations which provide the main impulse of the relations of production. In cinema, where production is prohibitively expensive, the economic relations cannot be underestimated. In a small country such as South Africa, these high costs either prevent the emergence of a local industry and force a total dependency on the overseas majors, or they limit entrée to safe, uncritical genre pictures which do not question the dominant ideology. There is, however, a fourth possibility which although alluded to, is not developed by Althusser. This relates to the importance of conflict, resistance and struggle in any social formation. An example drawn from cinema would involve the breakaway film which manages to escape the homogenising influences of both the RSA's and ISA's.

Discursive Affirmations and Sanctions

A second generation of Althusserian scholars is exemplified by Göran Therborn whose categories of discursive affirmations and sanctions are particularly useful in advancing our understanding of the way in which ideological practices are acted out within concrete institutions such as the film industry.
Iledogies are not fixed and immutable. Rather, they are social processes which operate through material and discursive practices in the social formation. That is, they are discursive in the way in which groups and individuals articulate their ideology through what they say, do and how they act. The generation and organisation of ideologies are two-fold: (1) the construction and maintenance of particular discourses; and (2) the development of discursive and non-discursive affirmations and sanctions. The discursive affirmation of any particular ideological order is asserted through affirmative symbolism or ritual. The screening of De Voortrekkers/Winning a Continent (1916) at the Voortrekker Monument to commemorate Dingaan's Day, for example, is the affirmative symbolism used by Afrikaners to reaffirm their ideological commitment to the discourse of Nationalism. Another example is the respect accorded to the dominee (minister) in the treatment of characters within a film. This character reflects the need for structures of authority which is, as Poulantzas pointed out, a cardinal ideological element of the petty bourgeoisie

The discursive form of sanction acts by redefining the interpellée or subject as an object. This is referred to by Therborn as "excommunication" in which the

victim ... is excluded from further meaningful discourse as being insane, depraved, traitorous, alien and so on. The excommunicated person is condemned temporally or forever, to ideological non-existence: he is not to be listened to, he is the target of ideological objectification; he is someone whose utterances are to be treated as symptoms of something else, of insanity, depravity and the like

An example drawn from South African cinema is the uitlander or outsider who is seen as a threat to the continued cohesion of Afrikanerdom. This individual can take various forms, from an Anglicised urban Afrikaner to a black communist terrorist. These ideological sanctions are often applied in association with other material sanctions such as expulsion, confinement or death. The outsider, for example, is socially ostracised and the subject of vilification by the mainly rural Afrikaans-
speaking bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie who conceive of themselves as being 'insiders'.

In a discussion of the structuring of ideological discourse Therborn identifies three procedural categories through which discourse can be controlled: restriction; shielding; and the delimited appropriation of discourse. The restriction of discourse refers to socially institutionalised restrictions on who may speak, how much may be said, what may be talked about, and on what occasion. These restrictions are not primarily dependent upon state censorship, coercion or repression, but are reinforced by these state mechanisms. They operate mainly through the interpellation of subjects and their place within the discursive order.

The shielding of discourse is designed to protect it from the intrusion and contamination of other discourses. One procedure for achieving this is through 'author-ization' which connotes that only one author, be he the Prime Minister, the chairman of the Directorate of Publications or a film director drawn from a particular consensus, are the only ones allowed to make valid assertions. Related to this is the tactic of repetition of elements within the discourse, such as the conflict-love story, in such a way that they become accepted as the way things are. Thus, the migration to the city of the boeredogter in Afrikaans film is presented as inevitable and natural.

Each discourse has its own appropriate place and time: religion should be confined to churches, politics to parliament, party political campaigns and caucuses, while sport is the concern of sportsmen. These attempts at institutional delimitation are apparent in the rhetoric of 'keeping religion out of politics', and vice versa, and keeping sports on the playing fields and out of the United Nations. In cinema, the hostile reaction of Afrikaner cultural watchdogs to Afrikaans films like Debbie (1965) and Freddie's in Love (1971) was due to their perception that the treatment of sex outside the delimited bounds of marriage was considered unacceptable. As
the Chairman of the Publications Control Board told the
directors of these films, Afrikaans girls simply do not en-
gage in sex outside marriage. Another field of delimited
discourse concerns inter-racial relations. As will be shown
in subsequent discussion of films dealing with white-coloured
relationships, the discourse here is shifted through censorial
edict from one of racial inclusiveness to that of racial
differentiation.

The discussion now turns to the second strand of ideological
thought, theories of culture. As developed by British Marxist
scholars, this ensemble of complementary concepts consciously
seeks to extend the strategic potentialities of ideology
through emphasising the importance of conflict, resistance
and struggle in the social formation.

Theories of Culture and Ideology

"Cultural studies" as enunciated in Britain, have drawn on the
classical anthropological definition of 'culture', that is,
"that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art,
morals, law, custom and other capabilities acquired by man as
a member of society" and invested the term with a much
broader range of concerns which have developed beyond the study
of culture as a body of beliefs and artifacts alone. The
term "culture" was assigned a historical dimension. No longer
was it confined to the mainstream of output from literature
and other humanities, but was seen as expressions of "a con-
stitutive social process, creating specific and different
ways of life".

The literature on the relationship between culture and ideology
is extremely complex and often confusing. Whereas writers
such as Raymond Williams and Edward Thompson are reasonably
clear on conceptions of culture, the Birmingham Centre for
Contemporary Cultural Studies consistently refuse to apply the
term "in a definitive or absolute way". This stance has
resulted in a lack of consensus in the application of the
Centre's ideas. Rather than attempting to offer a descriptive definition or prescription of the field, the Centre viewed its activities as an "intellectual intervention ... which aimed to define and occupy a space"\textsuperscript{34}. Cultural Studies developed out of a number of paradigmatic breaks, the most important of which revolved around Althusser's reformulation of the relationship between ideologies/culture and class formations. Earlier Marxists, for example, Georg Lukacs and Lucienne Goldmann, tended to conduct their analyses of class purely in terms of cultural determinations. They spoke of cultures as lived practices of social groups in specific societies and conceived of them as products or expressions of world views. These ideas were challenged by Althusser who argued that classes could not be reduced to either economic or ideological determinations. He criticised the simple correspondence between class and cultural formations. While Althusser did accept that there was a mutual and reciprocal effect between the two he maintained that the relationship was not a simple transparency\textsuperscript{35}.

Two consequences follow from Althusser's examination. First, all classes should be conceived of as constituted by all three practices -- the political, economic and ideological. Second, classes to not have a pre-constructed ideology which corresponds to them. The significance for cultural studies of this analysis lies in Althusser's attempt to resolve the relationship between ideology/culture and classes in a way which does not reduce the one to the other.

The status of cultural studies, however, continues to be fraught with epistemological difficulties which the CCCS does not appear to have clearly resolved. Differences of opinion exist within the Centre's programmes with Stuart Hall insisting on a materialist, non-reductionist theory while Richard Johnson seems to see culture as a "specifically 'mental'" (as opposed to 'material') character of these relations\textsuperscript{36}. The terms culture and ideology appear at times to be used inter-changeably by him.
The consequence of collapsing these categories "tend[s] either to conceal the fact that a much narrower definition is actually being employed, or if taken seriously, to drown everything in the same water". While this interpretation may be an over-reaction, it does point to the need to offer an operational definition if we are to utilize the concepts of ideology and culture in the study of South African cinema.

The move from the abstract to the concrete is best illustrated by the Centre's own tentative 'definition' of culture as "the active-process of the production of meaning" used by a particular class to construct its social reality:

'Culture' is the practice which realises or objec-
tivates group life in meaningful shape or form ... The 'culture' of a group or class is a particular and distinctive 'way of life' of the group or class, the meanings, values, and ideas embodied in institutions, in social relations, in beliefs, in mores and customs, in the use of objects and material life.

A slightly modified definition synthesised from British studies on working-class culture is provided by Eddie Koch. He defines culture as referring to the meaning that is made of experiences of life and the collective, self-determined efforts by people to change or adapt to the circumstances of their existence. In a similar vein, Michael Brake argues that:

subcultures arise as attempts to resolve collectively experienced problems arising from contradictions in the social structure, and ... they generate a form of collective identity from which an individual identity can be achieved outside that inscribed by class, education and occupation.

In other words, culture differs from ideology in that it implies a response, offering active ways of coping with life and social problems. These responses may incorporate both economic as well as mental or subjective responses either as an intra- or as a trans-class phenomenon. This study, then, defines culture as that ensemble of social practices and 'uniformities
of behaviour\textsuperscript{11} through which defined groups within or across social classes express themselves in a unique way, enabling them to cope with their material circumstances. This concept will be applied in later chapters where it will be demonstrated how the process of urbanization and the desire by Afrikaners to capture the foreign dominated capitalist system and transform it into a \textit{Volkskapitalisme} (Afrikaner People's capitalism) caused a high degree of cultural trauma which was reflected in the conflict-love genre film.

In such a cultural analysis cognizance must be taken of structural and objective factors which affect class response. These would include, for example, types of industry available (advertising, documentary, news, feature film, TV film etc) for what kind of employment (freelance, permanent, seasonal, contract etc). Also of importance would be sources of finance, working conditions, uncertain prospects for employment, advancement, and so on.

In a subordinate class, these factors are beyond simple control, and cultural studies would assess how people cope with their environment and how they make out in general. An example drawn from the study will serve to illustrate these factors here. Chapter 2 identifies a set of adaptive responses by a group of Afrikaners under traditional petty bourgeois leadership (an amateur film group called RARO) who tried to mobilise amateur cinema as a site of struggle and deploy it as a means of cultural resistance against the encroachment of capital which called for a different 'way of life'.\textsuperscript{12} To understand these responses fully we need to locate this cultural group within the overall social formation existing at the time.

A related consequence of this collective attempt to resist the changing circumstances of Afrikaner social existence concerns itself with the way these objective factors are internalised to become subjective factors. In terms of the RARO example, it will be seen that the adaptive responses of this class fraction ran counter to the logic of history, because it was not attached to the mainstream of Nationalist ideological
development, which was the adaptive response of Afrikaner business at the time. This will explain why this group of Afrikaner cultural workers were no more than a moment in the articulation of Afrikaner Nationalist ideology. The analysis will then look at how the adaptive responses changed over time. Where RARO was trying to provide a strategy of cultural resistance during the early 1940s, a later cycle of commercial Afrikaans film, the conflict-love genre (1965-1980), articulated a strategy which drew on the alliance between capital, the state, the public and various state apparatuses (the Police and Defence Forces, and ideological nodes such as the Dutch Reformed Church) in the quest for economic and political dominance. Finally, it becomes obvious that cultural responses cannot be generalised. The RARO phenomenon, for example, will be studied as a specific group, as an out-of-touch sub-culture within the wider culture and alliance of classes of which it formed part.

The discussion will now turn to the seminal work of Antonio Gramsci whose theories are particularly useful in explaining how subordinate classes in specific conjunctures articulate their opposition to capital through specific cultural forms.²⁵

Hegemony: The Negotiation of Consent

Three key terms are used by Gramsci in his analysis of history and culture. The first of these is 'common sense', by which he means "the uncritical and largely unconscious way of perceiving and understanding the world that has become 'common' in any given epoch.⁶⁶"

The second term is 'philosophy/ideology'. Gramsci distinguishes between "historically organic ideologies which are necessary to a given structure and ideologies that are arbitrary, rationalistic or 'willed'".⁶⁷ The first of these has the ability to "'organize' human masses and create the terrain on which men move, acquire consciousness of their position, struggle, etc" while the second "only creates individual
'movements', polemics etc. Thus, for Gramsci, ideology can be thought of as a coherent set of ideas which have a limited ability to transform the ways in which men and women live out 'common sense'. A specific credo of beliefs and assumptions which are structured in a rigorous way, for example, apartheid, can be thought of as being an organic ideology which has been consciously articulated from the beliefs of Calvinism and racial exclusivity into a 'willed' state policy of domination. In other words, a 'willed' ideology is the end result of the strivings of organic intellectuals to mobilise the organic ideologies of the classes or class alliances they serve. In the process, these individuals strive to give the organic ideology currency to a wider range of classes and if they succeed they become the dominant ideas within a particular social formation. This is demonstrated in Chapter 5 where Tommie Meyer, a petty bourgeois organic intellectual working through the Federasie van Afrikaanse Kultuurvereniginge (Federation of Afrikaans Cultural Societies), strove to inculcate a cultural and linguistic national consciousness.

The third key term employed by Gramsci is 'hegemony' which refers to a situation in which a ruling class, or more precisely, an alliance of fractions of the ruling classes is able not only to coerce the subordinate classes to conform to their interests, but to exert "total social authority" over those classes. The composition of hegemony is determined by the interests of the various class fractions represented in the 'hegemonic Bloc'. Of particular importance in this respect is the distinction drawn between the ruling alliance of the bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie fractions which exercise political control, and the dominant, mainly English-speaking bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie which exercise economic control. Within a concrete social formation these two alliances may not necessarily coincide as is the case in South Africa in which the ruling fraction is made up of predominantly Afrikaans-speaking, Nationalist Party supporters. The dominant fraction, in contrast, consists predominantly of English-speaking opposition party supporters. This
distinction is, of course, not watertight as members of the traditionally ruling fraction assume greater economic power while simultaneously members of the dominant fraction may see it as being in their economic interest to change political allegiances.

An important element of hegemony is that the power exerted by the hegemonic bloc over subservient classes cannot rest solely on force and coercion -- it needs to be attained "... without force predominating excessively over consent"67. The granting of legitimacy to the dominant classes must appear not only spontaneous but also natural and inevitable. One method of extracting 'consent' from subordinate classes is through the repetitive articulation of cultural 'solutions' to ideological problems as they occur over time. This study will show, for example, how the ruling fractions of the hegemonic bloc legitimized the urbanisation of the Afrikaner through the medium of commercial cinema, though this was resisted by earlier RARO amateur film makers.

Each class develops, as part of its own reproduction, one or more "strata of intellectuals ... which give it homogeneity and an awareness of its own function, not only in the economic, but also in the social and political fields"67. The function of these intellectuals, organically linked to their class of origin, is to direct the ideas and inspirations of the class to which they belong. The capitalist entrepreneur, for instance, creates "alongside himself" deputies whose function it is to discover and articulate the needs of the capitalist class and then translate these into universal symbolic and political imperatives. The working-class, too, is capable of developing organic intellectuals from within its own ranks who through the organization of work on the one hand, and a conscious political process on the other, are able to direct the working-class away from their defensive stance against incorporation towards a more active formulation of counter-ideological discourses. It is important to note, however, that Gramsci makes a distinction between 'organic intellectuals', defined in
terms of their function in articulating class aspirations, and 'traditional intellectuals' who derive their position through their professional and technical expertise⁸⁸. Generally, argues Gramsci, a member of a subordinate class who attains the status of a traditional intellectual (for example, a lawyer, theatre director, film director, advertising executive etc) ceases to be organically linked to his/her class of origin.

Organic intellectuals of subordinate classes operate by exploiting contradictions in the social arrangement, in other words, by creating culture. The intellectual creates a new discursive site in which the possibilities of alternative social relations are identified. S/he breaches the contradictions exposed by the hiatus and articulates these before the hegemonic bloc is able to identify and close the gap through ideological and coercive means. An application of this concept to the film industry provides immense explanatory power, particularly when applied to the phenomenon of film movements. It is during times of hegemonic crisis that the social formation is vulnerable to intellectual intervention, which may take any number of forms. An analysis of film movements, for example, would show why limited numbers of organic intellectuals working at specific historical conjunctures are able to literally rewrite the economics, structure, organisation and thematic content of cinema in a very short period of time. This study will deal tangentially with the reasons why there has never been an oppositional film movement in South Africa despite the availability of potential organic intellectuals working within the industry and outside of it. The answer to this lies primarily within the extremely coercive nature of the social arrangements within the South African social formation, the political allegiances of identifiable organic intellectuals, together with the very high risk factor and prohibitive costs of film production.

Having sketched the basic premises of the three major approaches that we have identified -- ideology, culture and hegemony --
the following discussion will summarise the position taken by this study.

**IDEOLOGY, CULTURE AND HEGEMONY: TOWARDS A RESOLUTION**

A fundamental problem of the structuralist theories of ideology is that they take insufficient account of change and resistance. Because the primary role they assign ideology is to foster the conditions of production and reproduction, the elements belonging to a particular ideological instance in a concrete situation are theoretically limited and do not explain either how they got there, or how they change. While abstractions of ideology on the theoretical level are invaluable, it is also necessary to be able to apply these analyses empirically. All the theorists mentioned above make the point in various ways that despite the commanding position of the 'ruling ideas' in any social formation, a diversity of cultural elements outside the mainstream of the dominant ideology do exist. Thus, in order to be utilised, any theory of ideology must make allowances for resistance, change and counter-ideologies. It is at this level that culturalist theories come into their own. By stressing the moment of self-creation and of active appropriation they attempted to establish a framework which incorporates the whole spectrum of ideological and cultural expression in a concrete social formation.

The concept of hegemony is similarly a fundamental one. It provides a tool with which to theorise the integration of diverse ideological and cultural strains, and to see the results of breaks and crises within the dominant consensus of society.

The intention of this theoretical section is to highlight the shifting conceptual debate on questions of culture, ideology and hegemony. From this we have attempted to clarify the definitions and applications of these three terms which are more often than not confused with each other. This study thus utilises a definition of ideology which encodes the idea
of 'lived' practices and 'imaginary relationships' derived from Louis Althusser. The concept is further refined by the distinction between organic and 'willed' instances as postulated by Antonio Gramsci. Whereas ideologies are necessarily predicated on class and class struggle, the term 'culture' accounts for both intra- and trans-class behavioural responses residing in social institutions, rituals and resistance. Finally, hegemony describes the alliance of classes or fractions of classes which are dominant through a generalised acceptance of 'the ruling ideas'. Faced with a large-scale failure in the adoption of these ideas, these classes resort to repression and violence in order to secure their dominance.

Before applying these concepts to the South African instance, a brief discussion of ideology and social classes is necessary.

Ideology and Social Classes

Social classes are defined in terms of the relations of production, both economic and ideological. On the economic level they are defined in terms of the ownership or non-ownership of the means of production. In ideological terms they are defined in the way in which classes as a whole fulfill the roles assigned to them in the relations of production.

In order to identify different class ideologies, or what Marta Harnecker refers to as "ideological tendencies"59, it is necessary to proceed from the class specific positions defined by the relations of production. In conjunctures of hegemonic crisis, counter-ideologies as articulated by organic intellectuals of the working-class may form a spearhead of resistance against total incorporation. The ensemble of ideological tendencies in the working class includes an orientation to work, to manual labour with a concomitant stress laid on physical prowess, toughness, endurance and dexterity. The wage contract gives rise to the distinction between work and leisure with the purpose of work being consumption and family reproduction. The organisation of the work process under
capitalism also encourages a collectivist awareness of independence and the possibilities of industrial action.

For the bourgeoisie, the dominant ideology, which is itself a class ideology, serves to reassure its members that their place within the structure of society has been 'appointed by nature', or that it is the 'will of God', and that they have a 'moral duty' in the domination they exercise over the workers. For this class the emphasis is on juridical equality, the unequal rewards for unequal competitive performance, the virtues of practical, enriching mental labour and the consciousness of the prices of objects and men. Thus it is part of their task to persuade, or more usually coerce, the working class to accept their conditions of exploitation as if they were the natural order of things. As is shown in Chapter 10, this is very clear, for example, in films aimed at black audiences made between 1974 and 1979, as well as the objectives of the Information Department with regard to so-called 'Bantu' cinema.

The petty bourgeoisie see themselves in cultural terms, and as being outside the class structure, in an essentially neutral position. A dominant element of their ideology is that they should do their duty both towards their employer and their country. Their primarily classless conception of themselves reconciles them to the task of supervising the workers on behalf of the bourgeoisie and keeping the necessary administrative functions running smoothly. Most film technicians fall into this category and rarely identify the contradiction which exists between capital and labour, which is at the heart of the class division. This failure was exploited by employers who, for a long time, were able to impose working-class conditions on otherwise petty bourgeois individuals. Just as "Capitalist production develops a working class, which, by education, tradition, habit, looks upon the conditions of that mode of production as self-evident laws of nature", so are the exploitative relations of production mystified for the petty bourgeois film technician who tends to see them as
'free', 'unfettered' and as equal, or at least, fair exchange for his/her labour.\footnote{53}

Capitalism, and in the South African instance, racial capitalism, is understood in this study as a social discourse which, by radically dividing social classes, sustains and reproduces the social formation which best suits the needs of the capitalist relations of production. This productive and reproductive process has historically operated to serve the interests of the white bourgeoisie at the expense of the black working-class. The mechanism though which this has occurred will be briefly examined in the next section.

**IDEOLOGY AND THE SOUTH AFRICAN SOCIAL FORMATION**

Ideology, it has been argued, is not a system of ideas imposed from the outside. Our use of the term also does not imply the idea commonly held by liberal opponents of apartheid who see it as a system of ideas which is separate from, and superimposed on, the economic realities of Southern Africa. A classic statement of this position is provided by Ellen Hellman when she writes: "... it is essentially \(\text{the}\) conflict between economic ... and government policy ... \(\text{of which}\) is responsible for the anomalies of urban native administration". More recently, in the same vein, David Welsh comments that "Critics \(\text{of apartheid}\) argue that the policy was a mere facade, designed to give an ethical embellishment to the continuation of an unequal society". These statements illustrate the liberal view that apartheid is an irrational and illogical system of semi-truths which are imposed on South African society by politicians. They contend further that this system is economically inefficient as it limits the freedom of the market and prevents economic growth and expansion. Indeed, this argument is functional for dominant bourgeois ideology whose operation in South Africa depends on making a sharp distinction between apartheid and capitalism. This view, for example, is repetitively reinforced by the English and white-owned black presses in their reporting on South Africa.
Apartheid ideology, as a 'willed' (in Gramsci's sense) systematic credo, is articulated by Nationalist politicians and the Afrikaans press. The latter two groups from whom apartheid's organic intellectuals are primarily drawn are both situated within the petty bourgeoisie. They articulate apartheid ideology in various guises for the bourgeoisie and the white working-class. The former's vital concern is the reproduction of the relations of production which in the South African context means a rationalization of the racial division of labour. The white working-class on the other hand fears an ultimate proletarianization and depends on state protection from encroachment in the spheres of both employment and social organization. The petty bourgeoisie itself, from which the main intellectual exponents of the 'willed' system of apartheid ideology emanate is, as Poulantzas has pointed out, an intermediate class between the bourgeoisie and the working-class. Their ideological practice is made up of elements which are 'borrowed' from both the working-class and the bourgeoisie, together with elements originating from their own class position within a specific conjuncture. All these elements are moulded into a "sub-ensemble of petty bourgeois ideology formed by the influence of the dominant bourgeois ideology on the petty bourgeoisie's own aspirations, relative to its specific class situation". For all these classes, then, apartheid ideology provides an organic system of ensuring the continued reproduction of the relations of production.

On the surface, apartheid is rationalised in terms of ethnicity, arguing that racial separation is a natural, moral and inevitable condition predicated on cultural and racial differences and moral attitudes. Around this rationale has evolved the entire system of apartheid with its myriad laws which ensure racial segregation. On the other hand, petty bourgeois theoreticians themselves saw separate development as an ideology which was not to be implemented literally, but rather as the basis of an organic system which could adapt to varying circumstances. According to Hoodie and Venter:
the basic elements of the 'apartheid' idea do not have a detailed series of the practical equivalents in the form of concrete apartheid measures ... The idea represents the common synthesis of the Afrikaner's attitude toward colour. This synthesis is not a rigid structure which crystallized at a given moment and is incapable of further growth and movement.

Rhooide and Venter and other exponents of anartheid thus fulfilled Gramsci's criteria of the organic intellectual, articulating the needs of the classes they represent. Their position is, paradoxically, similar to that taken by Wolpe and Johnstone, among others, who, arguing from a radical standpoint, postulate that apartheid is not a literal ideology to be literally implemented, but rather a pragmatic system of organization for the maintenance of white prosperity and supremacy. Its key features are labour, educational and income differentials rather than only job and movement colour bars. In 1970, for example, Johnstone stated that "Capitalist business, far from being incompatible with the system secures high profits through very cheap, unorganised and rightless labour".

The resulting legislation overtly claimed to contribute to cultural, social and racial survival, not only of the white classes outlined above, but also of the various other subordinate tribal communities who make up the social formation. This ideology explains to those who hold it that each cultural/ethnic group has a divine right to self-determination and cultural advancement in its historically assigned geographical area. The media as a whole play a vital role in articulating this 'willed' ideology and, as content analyses have shown, movies aimed at black audiences rarely portray whites, while films made for white audiences either pretend that blacks do not exist at all, or they are cast in subordinate labour roles and, more recently, as 'terrorists'.

Despite the rhetoric of 'self-determination', it is the ruling fraction which assumes the right to determine which geographic area and what social structure is morally and inevitably
suitable for particular subservient groups. This contradiction is partially resolved through the workings of an extremely narrow Calvinist religion which confers upon Afrikaners a God-given task to civilise the savage, Christianise him/her and put him/her to productive work, while denying him/her the fruits of full integration into white society because of his/her racial and cultural differences. This forms an intrinsic part of the hidden agenda of the South African press. As far as broadcasting is concerned, it is deliberate and conscious. In contrast, the ideological work of cinema occurs mainly at an unconscious level whereby images of different groups are provided to each other in such a way that they communicate an ideologically coherent view of the world as it should be naturally understood. As will be shown later in terms of cinema aimed at both black and white audiences, the dominant ideology is articulated in such a way that it reinforces racial capitalism and the prevailing system of social relations.

Those scholars who argue that apartheid is an attempt to return blacks to tribalism have clearly misunderstood the nature of the class system which allowed the architect of Grand Apartheid, Hendrik Verwoerd, to repeatedly claim that its purpose was to encourage full industrial development in the homeland areas, but not at the expense of "Bantu National principles". Similarly, some white film producers have misunderstood both the class system and the prevailing ideology in their movies which articulate this theme. As is discussed elsewhere, such films have a low credibility among urban blacks and only marginally more so among less sophisticated rural black audiences. Those films which have moved away from tribal themes are far more acceptable to the subordinate black classes.

The dominant Afrikaner ideology is institutionally managed by the Afrikaans reformed churches which, through their literal and selective reading of the Scriptures, have convinced themselves and their adherents that apartheid ideology is a
rational, moral and Christian system which is God-ordained. Using a Weberian analysis, T Dunbar Moodie has described the rise of Afrikanerdom in terms of a civil religion where "God imbues all history with ultimate meaning." Writing from the 'inside', de Klerk concurs, claiming that the Afrikaner does not perceive apartheid in terms of an oppressive tyranny but rather as the result of a divine task "to restructure the world according to a vision of justice" by means of a "separate nation called by God to create a new humanity." The Minister of Bantu Administration and Development, for example, made the following statement to Parliament in May 1959:

The philosophy of life ... in regard to colour or racial problem ... rests on three main basic principles ... The first is that God has given a divine task and calling to every People in the world, which dare not be destroyed or denied by anyone. The second is that every People in the world, of whatever race or colour, just like every individual, has an inherent right to live and develop. Every People is entitled to the right of self-preservation. In the third place, it is our deep conviction that the personal and national ideals of every individual and every ethnic group can best be developed within its own national community. Only then will the other national groups feel that they are not being endangered ... This is the philosophic basis of the policy of apartheid ... To our people this is not a mere abstraction which hangs in the air. It is a divine task which has to be implemented and fulfilled systematically.

In recent years the discourse of apartheid ideology has centred more on the rational self-development of 'nation-states' and less publically on the theological dimension. The latter, however, remains an important underpinning of the 'willed' ideology of apartheid as it is expressed through the state apparatuses, including educational institutions, the family, the church and not least, the media.

A different approach is adopted by Adam and Giliomee who espouse the classical sociological identity of race with class. They reject the argument that what appears to be a racial/
ethnic conflict may, at a deeper level of analysis, very well be a manifestation of the class struggle. Developing Glazer and Moynihan's thesis that ethnicity is "a new social category as significant for the understanding of the present day world as that of social class itself" they agree that racial and ethnic antagonism should be seen in terms of "group competition for scarce resources". The emphasis on ethnicity, however, misunderstands the objective nature of the economic system. The essence of the radical position, in contrast, is that the existing social system in South Africa serves the interests of the hegemonic alliance -- the white and black bourgeoisies and petty bourgeoisies -- and that racism and ethnicity offer capital two highly effective instruments for class rule. The media classify class images and process external reality in such a way that they are continually brought into line with the perspectives of the ideology of racial capitalism emanating from the bourgeois and petty bourgeois classes. As will be discussed in Chapter 10, the films aimed at black audiences, the rendition of class conditions of existence have changed over time and increasingly express and reflect dynamic shifts in the South African political economy bringing with them a modified set of social relations. This shift has not occurred within the work of particular (white) directors, but because of the entry of new practitioners who have a greater intuitive understanding of the shifting composition and concomitant aspirations of their audiences.

Apartheid, Subjects and 'Common-sense'

For those who hold them, apartheid ideology and liberal perceptions of apartheid ideology, both as 'willed' and organic systems, are objective in character. They are the individual's world view from the inside looking out: they are the sum of people's feelings about themselves and their day-to-day activities. Ideologies are ongoing social activities. They are always produced, conveyed and received in particular, materially circumscribed social situations. They govern the subject's relations with other people and their environment
and operate through discursive practices. Ideology prescribes who we shall meet under what circumstances and those we may not meet, who we shall work with, play with and those with whom we may not. The ways in which we act and react to one another, the ways in which we work with one another, and the kinds of work we do are all governed by ideology. The kinds of plots and images portrayed in cinema thus coincide very strongly with these imagined images of reality.

In other words, while ideology suggests social practices it is in turn formed and constituted by these practices. Ideology may be argued to have succeeded when it has produced a 'natural attitude', when, for example, the existing hegemonic relations are not only accepted, but perceived precisely as the way things ought to be and will be. Paradoxically, therefore, when the subject believes him or herself to be free of the determinations of ideology, and to be motivated only by what he or she sees as 'common sense', it is at that precise moment that ideology is working most effectively. Thus film producers, by giving the public 'what it wants' are merely reproducing the existing set of social relations which are encoded into images which are naturally understood as the way things are and should be. Where a more critical director breaches this ideological coherence, he is accused of being 'political' and of enforcing his ideology onto the unwilling viewer. As in the case of Ross Devenish, for example, individual subjects within the industry warned that *The Guest/Die Besoeker* (1977), if not banned, would certainly fail at the box office. The background to Devenish's experience as a dissident, whose values called for a specific response within the hegemonic structure of the industry is dealt with elsewhere. The issue is introduced here to illustrate how film directors are allocated an ideological position within the dominant South African discourse. Such strictures are usually reserved for film makers attempting to offer a more authentic reflection of actual experiences and conditions of existence. As in all capitalist societies, they do not apply to the director who is uncritical of the dominant
ideology and the hegemonic bloc, and who supports the existing social relations by mystifying actual conditions of existence behind technique and slickly executed, well-worn conventions and plot structures.

Paradoxically, it is the director given to the conventional use of genres who, in reflecting apparently contentious political issues, such as urban terrorism, is praised by press critics for "mirroring the situation exceptionally well" and of "confronting serious issues which face the country".

One such film was *April '80* (1980) which, far from exploring new territory, was in fact a vindication of the status quo and the spying methods used by the Security Police. These press critics, themselves part of the dominant ideology, remain unaware that they are advancing their own ideological discourse in their critiques. Their critical responses to film evaluation are shaped not only by their ideology and class position, but by the way the news environment within which they work is structured. The audience is thus further reassured through the ideological work of the press critic, as will be shown in Chapter 10.

A central function of ideology is to define the participant or individual as *subject*. This individual lives and moves his/her life within a particular system of attitudes, behaviour, beliefs, values, class and geographical area. This world view is consistently reinforced by the media.

This does not mean that cinema-goers are not exposed to contrary views, it simply implies that the emphasis of the media is firmly on the side of the hegemonic bloc. With the British experience in mind, Ralph Miliband observes:

> the agencies of communication and notably the mass media are, in reality, and the expression of dissenting views notwithstanding, a crucial element in the legitimization of capitalist society. Freedom of expression is not thereby rendered meaningless. But that freedom has to be set in the real economic and political context of these societies; and in that context the free expression of ideas and opinions
mainly means the free expression of ideas and opinions which are helpful to the prevailing system of power and privilege.76

It is in this context that the films of Ross Devenish and Athol Fugard are allowed to exist by the state. They do not criticise the structure of apartheid, they just offer a statement on its effects. By being prevented through censorship from exposure to dialectical viewpoints, the viewer is unaware or intolerant of opposing ideologies or views of the world. Censorship is one Repressive State Apparatus which ensures that the individual reinforces his/her recognition of the 'natural' state, of what is moral and immoral, and of what is right and wrong. Genre movies are the ideological vehicle which perform a socially reassuring function through the control of what Marx calls the 'means of mental production'. This discussion will be developed in the section on genres in Chapter 10.

When cinema provides an interpretation which is at variance with this 'taken for granted' attitude, it comes into conflict with the dominant bourgeois ideology. Where it questions an ideological practice and the role of the subject within the practice associated with it, the film escapes the chains of the hegemonic ideas and by so doing challenges the allocation of subjects in the division of labour. This was the case with the portrayal of coloureds in films like Katrina (1969), Die Kandidaat (1968) and Springbok (1976) which offer modified viewpoints of the role of coloureds in South African society. If this revised conceptualisation endangers hegemonic control, the state will be forced to respond through repression in the form of censorship, the police and the civil service. This has occurred on numerous occasions, in other contexts as well, and is the subject of Chapter 9.

The South African Class Structure

To understand how the film industry operates in South Africa, it is necessary to briefly outline the class structure within
which it operates and which it reflects in the content of cinema.

Although the South African class system had been developing since the 17th Century, it was the discovery of gold on the Witwatersrand during the late 1880s which stimulated processes that were to have an indelible effect on the structure of the present social formation. Pre-industrial South Africa was served mainly by coastal cities and subsistence farming. No cities existed in the interior. The discovery, first of diamonds in the 1880s and later, gold, heralded an industrial revolution which, together with other influences such as the Anglo-Boer War, transformed the country's economy from an agricultural base to an industrialised and capitalist society. The dominance of the gold mining industry at the turn of the century, owned and controlled by British capital, "wrought transformations in every corner of the region, in every sphere of the economy, in the nature and scope of the state, and in the form and content of ideology". The labour needs of gold mining were the basis on which emerged new social practices and structures, a re-alignment of classes and the consolidation of various class fractions into the hegemonic bloc which forged a form of racial capitalism which continues to this day. The composition of the social formation at this time will be examined later in the analysis of the outsider or uitlander as s/he is portrayed in Afrikaans cinema. This section is concerned primarily with an overview of the South African class structure.

The rate of capital accumulation in the early period of capitalist development from 1870 until the 1930s, depended on "the maintenance of the pre-capitalist relations of production in the Reserve economy which provided a portion of the means of reproduction of the migrant labour force". Capital was able to pay the worker below the cost of his reproduction:

capital's ideologists set out to ensure that the large majority of the labour force was ultra-cheap, and was prevented from realising some of its primary
class interests through the insertion of 'pre-capitalist' forms of control into the relations of production themselves."

This was primarily effected through the mechanisms of migrant labour, geographical and job segregation. During times when hegemonic control slackened, the state used repression and violence to suppress any resistance by the labour force.

Whereas the early periods of capitalist development in South Africa depended on accumulation primarily in the agricultural and mining sectors of the economy, during the latter third of this century the emphasis has shifted to manufacturing as well. Until recently, skilled employment in this sector provided jobs mainly for whites displaced from agriculture and those making the transition from protected positions in the public sector. In order to ensure protected employment for whites the job colour bar operated to restrict the entry of blacks into artisanal positions within the industry. The continued expansion of manufacturing, taken together with the constraints of the job colour bar, has resulted in a shortage of skilled labour which inhibited the growth of manufacturing. Successive drives for 'suitable' while immigrants has only partially relieved this need. Propelled by the imperatives of capital the state has therefore been forced to relax some of its racial legislation in order to allow for the development of a relatively small, stable and skilled workforce. It must, however, be stressed that this collaboration is based on the relatively advantaged position of these sectors of the black community, with respect to the broad mass of the black population, who are still kept geographically segregated and economically repressed and controlled.

This analysis accords with the recommendations of the Riekert and Wiehahn Commissions, which in essence make skilled employment easier for established black urban employees. At the same time, they prescribe that increased control be exerted over rural dwellers for whom urban employment will become increasingly difficult. Thus, the fundamental context of
accumulation within the system of labour control, which is the very core of apartheid, is one in which the large mass of proletarian and proto proletarian black South Africans are excluded from meaningful economic and political rights, while a relatively small urban-based petty bourgeoisie and proletariat proper are subject to co-option by white capital, albeit on unequal terms and without political representation. In cinematic terms, images of this modified class system are reflected in films aimed at black audiences. In Chapter 10 three overlapping categories of this cinema are identified, each offering a reflection of specific classes and labour roles ranging from the utilization of pre-capitalist forms of labour through petty bourgeois forms of management to bourgeois ownership and control. In cinematic representations, the black classes remain geographically and socially separate while the economic relations within the hegemonic arrangement are mystified and displaced through structured absences or what Althusser calls "internal shadows of exclusion". In the discussion of cinema aimed at black audiences, this thesis will examine how these absences are mediated through points of ideological tension and in relation to historical context.

It is such a contextual analysis which is able to uncover actual conditions of existence, for the text does not directly reflect the mode of economic production and the attendant political and ideological systems within which it operates. Cinema displaces reality through a complex mediated relationship with its context. It is the exploration of this relationship which forms the basis of the present enquiry as far as cinema aimed at mainly white audiences is concerned.

The discussion now turns to an examination of the political economy of the South African film industry from 1896 to 1956.
NOTES AND REFERENCES


2. See, eg., Petley, J. 1979: *Capital and Culture*. BFI, London. Petley has misused Althusser's propositions by quoting secondary sources, mainly Ellis and Cohen, who themselves have largely misunderstood Althusser's basic theory


7. See note 5

8. Althusser *op. cit.* 1971a, p. 233

9. Ibid. p. 138

10. Ibid. p. 153

11. Ibid. p. 155

12. Ibid. p. 160
13. Althusser, op. cit. 1971b, p. 184


15. Ibid. p. 79


17. See Johnson, op. cit.; Clarke et al, op. cit.

18. Althusser, op. cit. 1971b, p. 183


20. Ibid.


24. Althusser, op. cit. p. 185


26. Therborn, op. cit. p. 84

27. Ibid

28. Ibid. p. 84


30. Johnson, op. cit. 1979b, p. 218


32. See, eg., Thompson, E.P. 1968: *The Making of the English Working Class.* Penguin, London. See also his seminal review of Williams' work in *New Left Review,* Nos. 9, 10 and 19
33. See Hall, *op. cit.*, particularly his essay "Cultural Studies and the Centre: Some Problematics and Problems", p. 15

34. Ibid

35. Ibid. pp. 15-24

36. Johnson, *op. cit.* 1979a, p. 231

37. Therborn, *op. cit.* pp. 4-5


42. A second example, the response of a technicians association, formed in 1974, to regularise labour relations needs to be analysed in terms of their place within the social formation. This was not done in Tomaselli, K.G. 1980: "The Role and Function of SAFTTA in the South African Feature Film Industry", *The SAFTTA Journal*, Vol. 1 No. 1, pp. 1 - 11 which merely prepares the way for a structural analysis. Unless this is done, the significance of the Association's actions, their successes and failures cannot be adequately assessed


44. Ibid. p. 322

45. Ibid. pp. 376 - 377

46. Ibid

47. Ibid. p. 80 note 49

48. Ibid. p. 5

49. Poulantzas refers to this stratum as 'technical intellectuals'. In this study the term is employed to locate specific individuals within the industry who operate at a mainly technical level and who have little or no idea of the organic nature of their practice, Jamie Uys, for example.
50. Harnecker, M. 1971: *The Elementary Concepts of Historical Materialism*. Translated by Sadler, E. and Suchtung, W., University of Sydney

51. Therborne, *op. cit.* p. 57. Two further terms are used in the study. The first, coined by Poulantzas is 'interior bourgeoisie' which is the national bourgeoisie or ownership class of the neo-colonial state. The second is 'comprador bourgeoisie' who are subjects who are directly employed by international capital to do its work in a neo-colonial state

52. Miliband, *op. cit.*

53. As far as SAFTTA, the Technicians Association is concerned, internalisation of the dominant ideology caused it for its first 5 or 6 years of existence to mistakenly identify its interests with capital. Although the Association did realise that there was a conflict between employer and technician, because many of its members occupied positions both as producer/employer as well as technician, it tended to ignore or not realise the implications of the conflict, whether overt or latent. As an ally of capital, the Association articulates a liberal and, at times, extremely conservative political attitude.

Little work has been done in South Africa on how technicians internalise the cultural responses and ideological discourse of the dominant classes and uncritically encode these into the texts of cinema. A reading of Tomaselli, K.G. 1981: *The South African Film Industry*, African Studies Institute, University of Witwatersrand, pp. 52 - 70, and Tomaselli, *op. cit.* 1980, will give some idea of how technicians become 'subjects' of their practice.


56. Poulantzas, *op. cit.* 1972


59. Johnstone, ibid., p. 130


63. See, eg., Hellman, E. 1957: "Tribalism in a Modern Society", *Race Relations Journal*, No. 24, pp. 1-11; Welsh, op. cit. uses this argument to a lesser extent

64. See *Post* (Transvaal) 1979: Survey into the Attitudes of Black Men and Women Towards Existing Movie Centres. Prepared by the Research Department for SA Film Centre

65. See, eg., de Gruchy, J. and Villa-Vicenas, C. 1983: *Apartheid is a Heresy*. David Phillip, Cape Town. See also *Rand Daily Mail*, 24 October 1981 which reports PW Botha's refutation of the charge that the Dutch Reformed Church is un-Christian. Botha clearly sees the DRC and National Party as inter-dependent in terms of policies and practices


68. De Wet Nel, M.D.C. in *Hansard May 18, 1959*, cols. 6001 - 6002


70. Quoted in ibid. p. 34

71. Ibid

72. See Tomaselli, op. cit. 1981, pp. 84 - 89

73. *The Star*, 24 September 1980


CHAPTER 2


Like most countries outside the United States, the South African film industry has largely been reliant on the American media monopolies for the supply of product. This commercial cooperation has partly resulted in an economic structure which lubricates Hollywood imperialism through the reproduction of its ideological discourse and cultural images, creating in the process a pliable audience which will uncritically accept what is offered. The intensity and form of Hollywood control has varied between different sectors of the industry at different times depending on the cultural preferences of the audience and the intensity of competition emanating from Britain and Germany. Nevertheless, in South Africa as elsewhere, the Hollywood-based American industry has indelibly stamped its values, themes, ideology and production methods on the local scene.

Since the first kinetoscope was opened in a specially rented shop on Johannesburg on 19 April 1895, over 500 feature films and a far greater number of documentaries and newsreels have been produced and exhibited in South Africa. The growth in local production and importation from overseas has been paralleled by a more than commensurate increase in cinema audience (amongst whites) leading to one of the highest cinema-going populations in the world. In 1939 the Johannesburg proportion of cinema seats to European population exceeded that of any other town in the British Commonwealth1. Generally, since then, South Africa has been included in the United States film industry's top fifteen foreign markets, averaging ten or eleven in ranking2.

The dependence of South Africa on America during the teens of the century, particularly with regard to distribution, was of
crucial significance in terms of the stage of capitalism through which South Africa was passing at the time. Chapters 2, 4 and 7 will show that the growth of the distribution and exhibition sectors of the South African film industry can clearly be traced to stages of capitalist growth occurring not only in South Africa, but in relation to the laws of motion which governed the capitalist mode of production on a global level during the last eighty-seven years. This particular Chapter will deal with the period 1896 to 1956 and examine the first four cycles of extended reproduction which involves a cyclical renewal of fixed capital in the exhibition sector.

The case of the South African film industry is simply one manifestation occurring within a series of 'long-waves' of worldwide capitalist expansion and contraction and, as such, is totally tied to the structure of imperial and international capital. The growth of the local industry is totally encompassed by processes working in global capital as a whole -- its mobility or immobility, its origin and its destination -- as well as the methods by which it exploits foreign markets such as South Africa, locking these economies into a debt bondage with the hegemonic fraction of international capital.

In South Africa, this process has been aided by the uncritical acceptance of Hollywood production methods, genres, values and ideology, which together with extremely lax anti-monopoly statutes, have led to a succession of single-parent companies (Schlesinger, 20th Century Fox, SANLAM) simultaneously owning the three divisions of the industry (production, distribution and exhibition) at specific historical conjunctures. In varying degrees, these companies have owed their allegiance to the American majors who have demanded preferential treatment, often relegating South African made product to second place.

*Monopoly and Monopoly Capitalism*

At this point we need to take a short detour to discuss the terms 'monopoly' and 'monopoly capitalism' to establish some
basic definitions which will be applied in the course of this study. The economic elements of a definition of 'monopoly' would refer to the "power ... to raise prices or to exclude competition when it is desired to do so". In other words, monopolies both restrict entry into the market and narrow consumer choice. Schumpeter remarks that "In the Anglo-American world monopoly has been cursed and associated with functionless exploitation". This definition is thus drawn from the terminology of classical economic theory and applies to individual firms or trusts operating as a single seller in a capitalist market.

Of a different order is the notion of 'monopoly capitalism' or 'imperialism'. This is described by Ernst Mandel as that phase in the development of the capitalist mode of production in which a qualitative increase in the concentration and centralization of capital leads to the elimination of price competition from a series of key branches in industry. As monopolistic agreements are formed a few firms successively dominate successive markets, banking capital increasingly merges with industrial capital into finance capital and a few very large financial groups dominate the economy of each capitalist country. These giant monopolies divide the world markets of key commodities between themselves, and the imperialist powers divide the globe into colonial empires or semi-colonial spheres of interest. In other words, the practice of monopoly capitalism describes the process of capital accumulation whereas the term monopoly refers only to the behaviour of individual firms.

**HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT 1895-1913: PRE-CONDITIONS TO CENTRALISATION OF CAPITAL**

First Cycle of Extended Reproduction: Fragmentation and Financial Instability

Prior to the turn of this century the visual entertainment industry in South Africa was characterised by technological confusion and consequent financial instability as many different apparatuses and inventions competed for audiences.
During this time little was invested in fixed capital and film shows were generally taken on tour. This mobile competition was fierce and by 1909, most of the larger towns were well supplied with itinerant bioscopes, with sometimes two or three operating simultaneously.

While both the production (mainly newsreels) and the exhibition sectors in South Africa date back as early as 1896, it was only after 1909 that a systematic attempt was made by capital to exploit the popularity of cinema. The first of these emanated, not from South Africa, but from England, in the form of a local subsidiary of Electric Theatres Ltd. This company established a permanent theatre in Durban and organised national tours in Natal and the Orange Free State. By 1910, additional theatres had been established in the Cape Province and the Transvaal. In 1911, however, competition from the more successful Wolfram's Bioscope forced Electric Theatres to cease business. According to Thelma Gutsche, the limited duration of Electric Theatres was due to its being "founded on the short-term principle of small but rapid turnovers". The British parent company regarded South Africa as a "dumping ground" for films worn out on its English circuit and those that reached South Africa were not only in poor condition, but also dated. Thus the Electric Theatre Company's activities should not be seen as international capital investment in South Africa, but rather as the internationalization of the realization of surplus value (the sale of commodities) which in general reached an international peak up to the eve of the First World War.

Electric Theatres' major competition, Wolfram, was supplied by the British Warwick Trading Company, the largest producer of films in that country. Their 1902 catalogue listed no fewer than 111 films pertaining to the "Transvaal War". By 1903 it was "publishing some 500 or 600 films a year". Access to this output gave Wolfram an obvious advantage over his rival competitors, particularly in terms of material which had a direct relevance to South African audiences.
Other important enterprises were the Union Bioscope Company and the Bijou, both formed in 1909. These firms pioneered the construction of cinema buildings and according to Gutsche, were "the first to exploit the 'bioscope' in an organised manner". Another speculator was an Australian, Rufe Naylor, who formed the Tivoli Theatres Company in 1910 which was to form a third arm in the future development of the South African exhibition industry. Of the many competing organizations, these three endured, whereas many others operated for only a short time. Their survival is largely attributable to their attempts "to exploit moving pictures on an organised basis of building up 'circuits'". Bijou was unable to survive the fierce competition and sold out in 1913. This withdrawal left the Union Company and Tivoli to lay the foundation for the later South African cinema.

At that time, the industry was rife with speculators and "During 1910 an incalculable number of 'picture palaces' were opened throughout South Africa but few survived six months". Many lasted for only a few weeks due to the "unsound basis" and "unbusinesslike methods" of the early industry. Only the "few solidly-founded companies with 'circuits' survived".

It is Gutsche's contention that the "deplorable" social, health, physical and psychological conditions under which viewers patronised badly renovated 'picture palaces', "inevitably retarded the development of the cinema as a widely accepted form of entertainment". Cinema thus became "the poor man's pleasure" and the "children's special joy" and the "target for obloquy of well-intentioned social workers". Unfortunately, Gutsche does not develop these observations or place them into historical context. As will be discussed in more detail later with regard to the dominant theme of Afrikaans cinema, this was the period of the 'poor white', mainly Afrikaans-speaking South African who, forced off his land by the British after the Anglo-Boer War, had no option but to seek work in the towns. This culturally uprooted Afrikaner had to contend with a class system which worked against him since he had neither the right colour skin for manual labour nor the skills re-
quired by the growing gold mining industry in places like Johannesburg. It is probably from this time that the inherent Afrikaner suspicion of the cinema dates and which continues to influence decisions on censorship.

Whether the "deplorable" conditions which characterised film shows retarded the development of cinema is a debatable point, particularly in the light of the impending concentration of capital on a national level in the film industry as a whole. Despite the fragmentation and disorganization of the exhibition sector before 1913, Gutsche's statement that the "survival of the popularity of moving pictures after the first fanatical phase which secured the institution of permanent cinemas, was almost entirely due to the quality of the films themselves" is only partly true. This early capitalist period of free competition in the film industry was characterised by a relative international immobility of capital. The links of some local cinema entrepreneurs to overseas supply and sometimes parent companies notwithstanding, actual investment in production was restricted to the film's country of origin. During this time, capital was being progressively centralised in the hands of the three longest surviving companies, Tivoli, Bijou and Union Theatres. This economic process of centralization and concentration was a necessary pre-condition for the later consolidation of the industry under the control of IW Schlesinger. What Gutsche considers an effect is therefore merely a moment in the process of capitalist development. The improvement in the quality of imported films was a reflection of the earlier growth and consolidation of the film industry in their respective countries of origin.

One of the consequences of this period of free competition, particularly between 1909 and 1911, was a "bewildering heterogeneity of fiction films from Europe and America", a variety which was soon to be diminished with the consolidation of national capitals and markets under the aegis of the burgeoning Schlesinger Organisation. The resulting homogeneity was largely maintained for the following seventy years except for two periods of crisis. The first was due to fierce
competition in the form of a rival cinema circuit, Kinemas, which considerably expanded the variety and quality of cinema seen between 1927 and 1931, while the second occurred in the mid-1970s when a crisis in the distribution and exhibition sectors was brought about by the introduction of broadcast television in 1976. As will be demonstrated in Chapter 7, at this time a number of small, independent distributors were able to gain entry into the market and reintroduce some of the variety which had been missing for most of the previous sixty years.

In 1911, the Union Bioscope Company and the Tivoli distribution and cinema circuits amalgamated. This resulted in an immediate increase in capital, while the combining of these circuits reduced costs since one programme could now suffice in the place of two\(^2\). Yet the competition remained fierce between the many competing companies and managements. The introduction of bio-vaudeville introduced a new competitive intensity, and despite its popularity, excessively high costs damaged the viability of both theatre and cinema which its programmes straddled. Well established cinemas were continually forced to close while

Internecine competition between independent exhibitors had made the 'bioscope' a hopeless commercial proposition but the assurance of a payable return on expensive artists and films which a circuit of several houses promised, gave a certain financial stability\(^6\).

This move into bio-vaudeville brought cinema into conflict with theatre. The larger of the latter companies, the Empire Company, responded by taking over the Grand Theatre Company in July 1912 (established in 1910) to become the Empire Theatres Company (SA) Ltd. This new firm immediately entered into a contract with Bijou to supply it with product. The ensuing competition between the remaining protagonists led to the liquidation of Empire Theatres less than a year later. Gutsche comments that "Suicidal competition had surfeited the public with the very best artists and films", but that with "the collapse of the Empire and Grand circuits, the very structure
of South African entertainment was shaken. Again, this instability should be seen as indicative of underlying structural processes occurring within the industry. Gutsche's observation that, "Independent enterprise with the inevitable internecine competition had finally proved impracticable and a cooperative rather than a competitive basis was therefore indicated" implies the first stage of monopoly capitalism whereby the security of domestic capital investment must precede later penetration by international capital which becomes mobile once the critical limits to the expansion of capital accumulation on the home market have been reached.

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT 1913-1926: CONCENTRATION OF CAPITAL

The crisis in the growth of capital outlined above set the stage for the entry of I W Schlesinger, a Johannesburg financier, who brought the centralization of capital into its final stage. As Mandel argues about the late capitalist period in general, this meant a radical reduction in the number of 'different capitals' (i.e. cinemas and distributors) competing with one another, until entire branches of the industry (i.e. production, distribution and exhibition) were dominated by a handful of trusts, companies and monopolies (e.g. African Film Productions, African Theatres Trust, African Films Trust and others). Schlesinger was the catalyst to this process and duly welded together under one aegis numerous independent cinemas into a single circuit. This monopoly led to price agreements (admissions, salaries for artists etc) which caused a change in the economic behaviour of the industry. African Theatres Trust Ltd (ATT) was formed for this purpose on 16 May 1913 with a share capital of £12 500. It immediately secured control of the Empire Theatre, Africa Amalgamated Theatres as well as many other smaller companies operating at the time. Of this centralization, Gutsche comments:

The Trust therefore controlled almost every cinema of importance in Johannesburg and a substantial circuit throughout the country consisting of the Empire-Grand bio-vaudevilletheatre circuit and the bio-vaudeville theatres and bioscopes belonging to Africa's Amalgamated Theatres. This extraordinary feat had been
accomplished within a few weeks.\textsuperscript{29}

While Schlesinger had obtained an almost immediate horizontal monopoly of exhibition, a number of independent exhibitors remained outside the Trust, as did the seven main film supplying organizations. The consolidation of the cinema circuit had implications for these distributors who no longer found it necessary to import the variety and number of films which previous competition had demanded. Schlesinger persuaded the distributors to merge under his aegis forming African Films Trust, with a share capital of £45 000. This firm was to act as a film importing and distribution agency. Comments Gutsche:

Within a few weeks, the entire organization of the variety and bioscope industry had been placed on a new basis. Cooperative exploitation of films replaced the internecine competition of independent organizations and both exhibition and distribution were controlled by solidly-founded administrations operating on an assured market. A new era in South African entertainment had been started.\textsuperscript{30}

Not all contemporary commentators were as sanguine as Gutsche. One particular detractor commented that

one may remind the public how Mr Isidore W. Schlesinger jumped into the theatrical market of South Africa, when its bottom had been knocked out, how he acquired fine properties at breaking up prices, how many were forced to sell their businesses against their will, with the alternative of being closed down, how he corralled almost everything that relates to the business of entertainment in this country, theatres, music-halls, bioscopes and café-bioscopes, until he held the practical monopoly of the whole industry, and a more powerful monopoly indeed than exists anywhere else in the whole world.\textsuperscript{31}

Commenting on the fortunes of Johannesburg's Royal Bioscope built in 1923, a third observer offers this classic of understatement:

As with all cinemas in competition with Schlesinger, the Royal suffered from a shortage of suitable films and had other problems in addition. After a short while it was forced to close its doors.\textsuperscript{32}
More recently, in an article entitled "Horse Trader or Horse Thief?" Pat Dickson writes:

Almost from the beginning Schlesinger was the target of abuse on account of his methods of selling first property and then insurance. Later, as his fortunes grew and his influence increased, the abuse was generalised and concentrated upon his business methods in general rather than any specifics. But during his time he was accused of both petty and grand larceny, chicanery, the misappropriation of investor's funds, and of deliberately misleading the public. This, it was claimed, was done both by means of carefully worded annual reports and by reports he forced newspapers which he owned to print.

Stories about Schlesinger's sharp practices, in all the fields in which he operated abound. There were a few occasions on which he took rumour-mongers to court, when he had a disconcerting habit of winning. Going over the evidence in most of these cases, it is difficult to decide whether he was simply a clever and hard-working opportunist or whether he was actually a master of the over-sell who was liable to leave investors in the lurch when a scheme misfired. It is clear that few of his enterprises failed to make money for him, even if the manner of the money-making sometimes underwent quick changes during the progress of a scheme.

One particular case which went to court in the latter half of 1920 concerned a "bioscope proprietor" who was prevented by African Films Ltd from breaking a contract which stipulated that he may not accept for purchase or hire any films from other parties. The presiding judge ruled in favour of the Trust but nevertheless described the contract as "somewhat drastic". Censuring the judge, *Stage and Cinema*, a Schlesinger-owned publication, responded that because of vast distances and a sparse and scattered population, "the only possible way to cater for film exhibitors and the picture-going public ... is through one big central organization". The "drastic" contract, therefore, was argued by African Films to be "just as much a protection to the exhibitor as it is to the distributors". Because these contracts are "unbreakable" this allows the distributors to command the pick of the world's markets by investing in the business large sums of money which, without an assured circuit from the Cape to the Zambezi, they
could never hope to see any adequate return"³⁶. What the Trust fails to acknowledge, of course, is that this form of monopoly which, while securing better product, also has the spin-off of aiding the centralization of capital in the hands of the national bourgeoisie and is part of the stage of capital accumulation which ultimately leads to monopoly capitalism.

The injection of what Gutsche calls "business methods" and African Theatres' "curious methods of extinguishing all opposition"³⁵ led to "a growing volume of suspicion and distrust" among the remaining independent exhibitors who were being badgered by the Films Trust to sign two year exclusive contracts with them³⁶. Supported by sections of the press, a number of new independent distribution firms tried to secure the custom of these non-affiliated exhibitors. However, their existence was short-lived, proving competition with the Trust impossible. Here again, Gutsche tends to misunderstand the economic processes at work. Consider the implications of the following statement:

despite the obvious public benefit from consolidation of resources in the industry which had already collapsed when 'independently' exploited, an atmosphere of suspicion was easily engendered and the 'monopolistic activities' of Mr Schlesinger's entertainment companies became a favourite hobby-horse of certain newspapers, their comments increasing in acrimony as time went on and the Trusts inevitably increased their sphere of operation³⁷.

This experience is described by Gutsche as an "unhappy atmosphere" and "an unfortunate feature of their initial operations"³⁸. While she does acknowledge that the process of consolidation is "inevitable", she does so for the wrong reasons. Assigning the benefits of the monopoly to "the public", she misunderstands the economic behaviour of monopolies which, as Mandel points out for the entire capitalist industrial cycle, is a consequence of accelerated capital accumulation, over-accumulation, decelerated capital accumulation and under-investment³⁹.
Second Cycle of Extended Reproduction: Cinema Chains

The early period in the South African cinema industry illustrates Karl Marx's theory of cycles and crises which involves the cyclical renewal of fixed capital. That is to say, the length of an industrial cycle, in our case, cinema, is measured by the duration of the turnover time necessary for the reconstruction of all fixed capital. The new cycle of extended reproduction in the South African entertainment industry began with its seizure by Schlesinger in 1913 through a consolidation of production and exhibition at a higher level of technology -- the large scale production of epic films and improvements of cinemas, for example. The concentration of capital facilitated by centralization led to a profit of £500 000 within the company's first eight years of operation. Whereas African Theatres profit for its first financial year in 1913/1914 was but £6 490, by 1920 this had risen to £136 766. The theme of cyclical reproduction will be expanded as this thesis plots the ebb and flow of capital accumulation in the film industry against the broader national economy.

The Schlesinger era (1913-1956) corresponds to the extensive period of accelerated accumulation in the film industry where national concentration and monopolistic centralization characterised growth. Commenting on Schlesinger's "protective plan against competitive overseas invasion", Jack Stodel outlines how the Organisation:

lost no time in building the finest and most up-to-date cinemas with all modern innovations in each of the big centres as well as the up-and-coming towns and villages in the hinterland. This, in fact, meant that any of the major producing and distributing companies in America and Great Britain would have to consider putting at least £150 000 to £200 000 into a cinema in each of the big towns in order to plant a flag in this country.

By 1956, with the onset of the classical era of imperialism which is coincident with the concentration of international capital, the stage is set for the penetration by 20th Century Fox of the South African film industry. This new cycle
started as a result of a new competing technology, television, which was seriously threatening the American home market. The industry then entered into a period of over-accumulation in the early 1970s with the formation of Satbel, a subsidiary of SANLAM, and its headlong rush into the film industry, taking over 20th Century Fox in the process. The period of decelerated capital accumulation coincided with the years 1976-1978, brought about by the effects of the competition of television only introduced to South Africa in 1976. The final stage of under-investment has yet to occur.

Thus, far from being an "unfortunate feature" of Schlesinger's initial operations in the film industry, his entertainment monopoly was merely the first stage of capitalist growth during the era of free competition. During this period, over accumulation was avoided, unlike the later Satbel intervention, since the African Theatres Trust "was designed purely as an administrative organization". Despite Stodel's comments to the contrary, the Trust never intended owning cinemas, indeed, initially it forced many of them to close. Its main objective was to obtain leases of the establishments it desired to control. Of the Trust's first three years of operation Gutsche concludes:

> The Films Trust, assured of this constant and co-ordinated circuit, was therefore enabled to import good and expensive film programmes; but the development of both organizations depended on extension of control and their policy was adapted to that end. By the end of 1915, African Theatres Trust controlled about 50 cinemas in South Africa and the Films Trust supplied programmes to the majority of the remainder.

With the pre-eminence of the full length feature film over short films and documentaries, South African circuits developed an almost total reliance on American produced movies. This dependency occurred because of financial links with Hollywood which was gearing up to secure the world market. The producers in that part of the world managed to outmanouvre the previously dominant General Film Company, a ruthless Trust made up of Edison, Biograph, Kalem and Méliès, who resisted the star
system and longer pictures -- "at first two and three reels, then the feature length story - and then extended runs in luxury theatres; one night stands had previously been the rule"." Hollywood, however, prospered even in the face of considerable competition from Continental producers who initially pioneered the longer film. Indeed, as Gutsche points out, the 12 000 foot Les Misérables shown separately in "four epochs" in South Africa in early 1913, performed well and is "invariably remembered as 'the first feature film'". During the first decade of this century, production flourished on a similar scale in both America and the Continent. Trans-Atlantic trade was minimal. The Great War, however, disrupted the structure of existing industries in Britain and Europe and producers were forced out of business. The American industry was exempt this turmoil: "Hollywood continued to produce, and giants emerged to dominate it. The return of peace brought with it a numerical vacuum in Europe and an opportunity for the American industry to fill it." By 1918, therefore, few Continental or British films continued to be screened on South African circuits.

During the Great War, other economic processes and actions were taking place which were to have an equally conforming effect on the future structure of the industry. The most important of these were the efforts of African Theatres to gain complete control of entertainment. Gutsche seems to argue that any enterprise outside its control represented a "menace" to the success of the whole organization and therefore they unrelentingly sought to "freeze out" independent opposition. Although the Theatres Trust controlled only about one third of the total number of cinemas in South Africa, by the end of the War, nearly all were contracted to Films Trust for the supply of product.

Still, some exhibitors managed to operate independently, drawing their fare from overseas on the open market. Fisher's was one example, while the Charlie Chaplin (S.A.) Film Co. screened their films through Fisher's outlets. It was not long before the Chaplin Company sold out to African Film Syndicate, an
allied interest of Fisher's"). Theatres Trust responded to the
unwanted competition provided by Fisher by screening similar
material. On other occasions Fisher alleged that at times
they met with inexplicable accidents causing damage to films.
On 25 July 1917, however, it was announced that Schlesinger
had acquired Fisher's and that it would cease operating as an
independent.

Competition was not only confined to Fisher during the War
years. In 1917, African Theatres Trust attempted to safeguard
its interests from encroachment of the Union Government acting
as an independent exhibitor. The Trust circularised theatres
under its control threatening a cessation of supplies if they
assisted in screening films whose proceeds were intended for
charitable purposes. This incident related to an approach by
the Imperial Government where it requested that South Africa
screen a number of War Office films for propaganda purposes
with the proceeds being donated to the Governor-General's
Fund. Negotiations with African Films Trust were not success-
ful and distribution was entrusted to the Union Defence Force
Institute. Rather than viewing this move by the Government
as part of the War effort, they interpreted it as an unwarranted
attack on their closely guarded market. In a letter to
exhibitors, the Trust stated:

For reasons best known to themselves, the Government
have recently gone into 'show business' in a manner
which is not only likely to affect your interests
seriously but also ours. This company pays a huge
amount annually in Customs dues on films, posters
and other items incidental to the business we are
controlling and it is an extremely difficult matter
for us to understand why they would wish to ex-
plot this particular trade especially as we made
a generous offer to handle The Battle of Ancre and
The Advance of the Tanks for them.

This circular which had been exposed by Fisher caused a furore
in the Cape and Natal press but was studiously ignored by the
Johannesburg press where, according to Gutsche, "the inculca-
tion of hostile feeling would have seriously menaced the Trust's
interests". Despite the outcry, the Trust made no attempt
to defend its position, and Stodel nevertheless claims that
Schlesinger "supported" the Hertzog Government to the hilt" as it did the later Smuts government\textsuperscript{52}, giving "his cinemas and theatres freely for all forms of fund raising and made it a practice to pay for the advertising for the function and the theatre staff, and ensure that the entire proceeds without any deduction whatsoever were handed over to the war funds"\textsuperscript{53}. Clearly, the matter was more financially centred than Stodel cares to admit. While Gutsche describes the result as "a very unpleasant impression", she makes no attempt to explain either the action of African Theatres or the state or suggest why the Johannesburg press ignored the issue. It should be borne in mind that the state in capitalist society serves capital in general and provides the conditions for the reproduction of the relations of production. In the quarrel between the state and African Theatres, it is clear that it was in the interests of capital in general that the funds go entirely to the Governor-General's Fund. The question that needs to be asked is which fraction of capital was being favoured and why. The state will act against certain arms of capital if it considers that other branches of capital are more important at the time. In a war situation, favour obviously fell on capital serving the war effort.

A more recent, but oblique example of this type of conflict of interests occurred in the late 1970s. Two border war movies, \textit{40 Days} (1979) and \textit{Terrorist} (1976), although clearly articulating the hegemonic ideology of the time, both experienced extreme difficulty in obtaining national distribution. At that conjuncture the dominant cinema chain, although owned largely by Afrikaner capital, resisted screening these movies, arguing that they were commercially suspect. These two examples serve to remind us of the dialectic nature of society where the relationship between sections of the industry and the state continues to be subject to ideological contradictions which revolve around the immediate economic interests of individual companies in comparison to the longer term objectives of the state.

During and after the Great War, American films continued to
dominate local cinema screens although many were dated, having been released years before in their country of origin. In 1920 the number of independent exhibitors increased and provided considerable competition to Schlesinger. Others announced their intention of entering the cinema market, for example, Citizens Amusement Ltd and Paramount Theatres Ltd. These two companies were never floated, but this intensified activity and interest indicated renewed prospects in the entertainment industry.

The year 1921 saw a rise in the number of British films bought for distribution, but the British industry itself was collapsing under the weight of American competition. At this time it became clear that African Theatres and Films Trusts could no longer cope with demand and decided to go public to maintain their expanding fields of operation, particularly with regard to the building of cinemas. The re-floatation of the parent company, African Theatres, had a capital of 500,000 £1 shares, of which 100,000 were offered to the public. This new company took over the business of African Theatres Trust and was renamed African Theatres Ltd. Three months later, the vendor company, African Films Trust, was re-floated under the name, African Films Ltd. This company had a share capital of £200,000 and took over the assets, film distributing and bioscope machinery business of African Films Trust. A total of 200,000 £1 shares were allotted with 100,000 offered to the public. Explaining this business move, the Schlesinger Organization pointed to the advantages in the centralization of administration.

The dropping of 'Trust' from the company titles and substituting them with "Ltd" provided Captain John Nemo with the impetus to tackle Schlesinger in print through his Plain Dealer Pamphlet. The word 'Trust' had taken on a pejorative connotation and Nemo argued that a change in name would not affect Schlesinger's business methods nor conceal them. The two new companies were aimed at developing both theatrical and cinema entertainment and the death of a major theatrical competitor, Leonard Rayne in 1925, put the Schlesinger
Organization in complete control of theatre. Sporadic competition, however, continued to irritate the cinema division.

Schlesinger's grip on the industry remained as powerful as ever and during 1925 less than a dozen films were screened by independents. Still, outside firms announced their intentions of competing, the most serious of these being MGM who announced in December 1925 that they would be opening independent renting offices to distribute MGM fare. The move on the part of MGM was an attempt to deprive the comprador or interior bourgeoisie, that is, the owners of the cinema industry in South Africa, of their monopolistic control over the indigenous industry. This action is part of a global strategy whereby predominant multinational firms signal an interest in dominating the small, but gradually expanding external markets of dependent countries. Initially, their plan may be directed only at securing a future control of these markets, but later the national bourgeoisie will be forced into a joint venture which combines indigenous, foreign, private and public capital, a process which coincides with the phase of late capitalism or neo-imperialism.

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT 1926-1930:
PROTECTION OF NATIONAL CAPITAL

To understand how this process of late capitalism affected the South African film industry, we first need to investigate the situation of the world cinema market and particularly the competition between the imperial or metropolitan states themselves. In terms of the film industry, the two major protagonists were the United States and Britain. The Imperial Conference held in October 1926 mapped out various campaigns to combat American dominance over Commonwealth countries. The deliberations resulted in the Cinematograph Films Act of 1927 which restricted blind and advance booking, introduced a quota for British films screened in England and defined as "British Companies" those production houses which encompassed foreign controlled firms wanting to take advantage of the Imperial legislation. Never one to lose a chance, Schlesinger participated on the Economic Sub-Committee of the Conference. He
proposed that "with financial assistance from governments, all the Dominions and colonies should produce films for showing within the Commonwealth, such exhibitions providing a payable return on production costs". Although this suggestion was submitted to the Federation of British Industries, little came of it not only because it required legislative approval on the part of every country within the Commonwealth, as Gutsche suggests, but also because of the smaller size of even this market in the face of the power of the American domestic market and the infiltration of American companies into Commonwealth circuits.

Schlesinger's proposal highlighted a number of problems which were facing his domestic South African cinema operations. On the one hand was the dormancy of the local features production industry due to inaccessibility of overseas markets, while on the other was the structural limitation of the local audience for either locally made or imported product. Because of the limited possibilities for valorization and capital accumulation in South Africa, it became necessary for Schlesinger to dis-invest in this country and relocate surplus profits in an economy such as in Britain where there was a greater level of technical expertise which manifested itself in a higher organic composition of capital. This type of capital describes the ratio between constant (i.e. fixed costs) and variable (i.e. wages/salaries) capital, which in the film industry manifested itself as the technical or physical relationship between the mass of machinery (cameras, and equipment in general), raw materials (film stock, take etc) and labour (technicians) necessary to produce commodities (finished films) at a given level of productivity. While the prospects for proportional valorization are thus lowered in stages of a high organic composition of capital such as existed in the British film industry, the profit produced by skilled labour in absolute terms more than compensated for the loss in relative terms. This presupposes a large domestic market such as existed in England at the time.

Two points need to be considered here, both of which remain
applicable today. First, the internal market was the single most confining factor for the possibility of recouping capital investment in South Africa because (a) numerically it was small; and (b) an artificial limitation in the market restricted the bulk of cinema to white audiences. Finally, (c), even if this limitation did not apply, the market would remain constricted due to the low wage levels paid to the bulk of the working class, and the large mass of unemployed people which is a structural rather than a cyclical phenomenon. It is unlikely, therefore, that the cinema-going population would substantially increase in times of boom but would, in fact, remain more or less stable.

The second point concerns the technological level of the productive capacity within a particular social formation. This raises an inherent contradiction. Obviously as a semi-underdeveloped country, South Africa has a fairly low organic composition of capital in the film industry. That is to say, the technical sophistication of the industry is inferior in comparison with economically more advanced countries such as Britain or the United States. For example, many producers continue to rely on the greater expertise of overseas laboratories in preference to the local firm which they consider unable to match either quality or service. This lower organic composition of capital does have the advantage of reduced production costs, but at the same time we have the contradictory situation which limits the labour supply through the consequent low levels of technical skills. It was only after the advent of television that skilled labour became more ubiquitous when the Television Service of the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC-TV) trained technicians on an unprecedented scale during the 1970s. While it still remains cheaper to make films in South Africa, this country does not always have the skills or technology to meet the demands of technical quality required by the international market. Once production is catapulted into the high budgets demanded by this quality it is less likely that the film will recoup its costs of production in the domestic market alone.
This is the situation that confronted Schlesinger at the time of the Imperial Conference. He was faced with two possibilities, both of which were followed. No longer able to accumulate capital on the scale he required, it became necessary to invest at least part of his surplus profit either in the same industry but in a different country with a different composition of organic capital, technological expertise and domestic market, or to relocate surplus profits in South Africa, but in a different industry which was characterised by a different organic composition of capital, expertise and market. In this way Schlesinger found it necessary to move capital through a variety of enterprises including property, insurance, cinema, theatre, radio, retailing and newspapers.

In addition to his South African cinema holdings, Schlesinger also invested considerable amounts in the British film industry. By this he hoped to achieve a dual objective: first, to move his capital into an economy where it was subject to greater prospects of valorization, and second, to stave off the threatened infiltration of American capital into the distribution and exhibition divisions of the South African film industry. After 1928, the British investment was also mobilised to secure the Schlesinger Organization's local market against a determined domestic competitor, Kinemas, by securing the source of their film supply. Apart from Schlesinger's International Variety and Theatrical Agency (IVTA) which had been operating in London since the year 1916, he was appointed to the board of directors of a huge new public company, British International Pictures (BIP), which was established in early 1927 "to acquire and enlarge the recent British National producing set-up with its studio at Elstree". This company was able to take advantage of a market secured by the quota legislation. Apart from his production interests, Schlesinger had also acquired ten cinema and music halls in London itself. By the end of the 1920s, BIP was the largest and most successful production company in England and "easily secured its capital before investors became wary". British International Film Distributors (BIFD) was formed by Schlesinger in December 1926, and itself had at least one production company under its
aegis. The production arm of BIP aimed merely to emulate Hollywood values, aiming at sophistication, glossy and opulent productions invested with talent which had proved itself elsewhere. BIP obviously planned their productions according to Hollywood themes and treatments, arguing that this was the only way to fight off the threat of the more powerful American industry. While Hollywood's hold on the British market was extremely pronounced, quotas being the only way its grip could be lessened, Hollywood operated from a less strong position in South Africa. Its attack on the local market was forestalled by Schlesinger's command of the South African exhibition and distribution networks and was unable to break his close economic links with the British industry. This complex interpenetration of capitals partially stimulated by proposals emanating from the Imperial conference, simply does not form part of Gutsche's explanation as to why British films began to be consistently shown during 1927. Dismissing the Imperial Conference as "ineffectual"66, she attributes the increase of British product seen on South African screens during this period to public protest and "intensifying prejudice against American films"67.

It is against this background that we must now return to chart MGM's intended intervention into the South African market. This was the first time that international capital had signalled its interest in the distribution and exhibition divisions of the South African film industry directly, and heralded the beginnings of international monopoly capitalism as far as South African cinema was concerned. It also suggested that critical limits to the expansion of the film industry in the American home market were being reached. Simultaneously, the stability of the South African market guaranteed the security of overseas investments, the previous conditions of uncertainty having been eliminated. MGM's initial foray was a tentative one, for it could not afford massive capital investment due to the restricted nature and fractured structure of the South African domestic market. Initially, MGM had been duped by Schlesinger as Dickson explains:

It was not only the British who found themselves
misled by IW, as can be seen from the record of his brush with American movie tycoon Sam Goldwyn while in the US negotiating the purchase of some films for showing in SA. IW had a meeting with Goldwyn in Hollywood arranged to be charged at a very low rate. Goldwyn later recalled: "He told me that only Africans came to his shows and most of them didn't pay admission". That was why the chairman of African Theatres simply couldn't afford Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer's normal prices. Goldwyn listened sympathetically, "I reckoned he was doing some kinda missionary work with films, so I let him have them at 8 cents a foot, which was practically giving them away".

Alas for IW, it was not long before Mr Goldwyn learned something of the scope of IW's operations in SA. "After that, I made him pay plenty".

Despite this realization on the part of the American industry, and MGM in particular, they realised that investment in South Africa would have to be limited because of the size of the market, black patronisation notwithstanding. MGM, however, backed down within a short time and contracted African Films to distribute their product. This withdrawal indicates how:

The colonial bourgeoisies have attempted, not unsuccessfully, to increase the proportion of surplus-value ... which accrues to themselves rather than the imperialist companies and states. The transition effected by imperialism from direct to indirect rule in the underdeveloped countries, with the generalization of political independence, has made it possible for the indigenous ruling classes to finance at least part of the indirect costs of the production of surplus-value, which previously had to be met from the non-capitalist surplus appropriated by them, out of surplus-value itself — in other words, some of these costs have been transferred to imperialist capital.

However, processes were at work which were ultimately to open the gates to the penetration of the American majors. A second, more concerted effort to oppose Schlesinger was made by United Artists Corporation (UA) in 1926. This company indicated that it might establish a cinema circuit for the screening of its films. On arriving in South Africa, UA's agent initially tried to persuade African Films to enter into a hiring agreement on sharing terms as obtained elsewhere. African Films
refused and UA were forced to roadshow their movies. Like MGM, UA announced their intention of instituting a local agency on 28 July 1926. Screenings commenced in town halls and other venues throughout the whole country. African Theatres responded by announcing the inauguration of a vast cinema building programme covering all the major centres in South Africa. Schlesinger's directorship of BIP, BIFD and other production and distribution companies, together with his participation in the Imperial Conference, created financial and ideological links with British capital which suited the economy at the time. The press, which serves the interests of capital in general, viewed the UA intervention as an "unjustified incursion" into African Theatres' territory and it was described as a 'menace' to local interests. Local resistance was such that by mid-December UA withdrew, selling its films to African Theatres. The press announced that "American Opposition in South Africa" had been withdrawn. The reason for this unexpected retreat, according to UA, was "the limited population of South Africa and the few towns of any importance". A second opinion was that "United Artists has over-estimated the value of the non-coloured market for films in South Africa".

A third reason, not mentioned by Gutsche, but which would partly explain the unexpected turn-about by some newspapers previously hostile to Schlesinger, was that outside of the mining industry, he was at the time the largest employer of labour in the sub-continent. As Bozolli remarks, he was "head of business interests which were intimately linked not only with the new middle classes, but with consumerism and the media of popular ideology itself".

Schlesinger's financial interests gave him considerable influence which he did not hesitate to deploy against UA. Clearly, he was able to rally the South African press, not to mention radio in which he had a considerable interest, to mobilise popular resentment against UA's attempts at competition.

The thrust of monopoly capitalism, however, was only just beginning to make itself felt in the South African entertainment
industry. Despite Schlesinger's victory over both MGM and UA, this period marked the last time in the history of South African cinema in which a locally owned firm enjoyed unopposed control.

Third Cycle of Extended Reproduction: Sound

It will be remembered that each new cycle of extended reproduction begins with different machines than the previous one and that this renewal of fixed capital implies a reinvestment at a higher level of technology. The new machines referred to here relate, of course, to sound reproduction equipment which was marketed for the first time in 1926. Through the application of Marx's theory of cycles and crises, we can date the end of the cycle begun with the development of Schlesinger's Trusts in 1913, with the entry of a new distribution and exhibition company, Kinemas SA (Pty) Ltd, in 1927. We are thus able not only to determine the duration of the business cycle, but also plot the actual date from which extended reproduction proceeds as well as the upswing and acceleration of capital accumulation. Kinemas took advantage of the technological innovation of sound and was formed to finance the establishment of cinemas to screen Lee de Forrest's "Talk Film" or "Phonofilm", for which they had acquired the Southern African rights. Their initial programmes, screened in town halls, consisted of phonofilm shorts and a silent feature. Having obtained a good stock of British and American feature films, "the company intended entering the entertainment field on an equal footing with African Theatres and competing with it, cinema for cinema". The basic change in the productive technology of the sound film brought with it a period of rapid technological renewal and significant additional expenditure on fixed capital. This additional investment was injected into two main areas. First was the investment in sound equipment needed for the screening of the phonofilm. In England, conversion to phonofilm cost £300 per cinema. The sound quality, however, was poor and considerable improvements in the acoustic design of cinemas had to be effected.
The second increase in fixed capital applied to African Theatres, which countered with plans announcing increased building activity. The magnitude of Kinemas projections left no doubt that this company could not be compared to previous attempts at independent exhibition. Public shares were offered in July 1927. The Schlesinger monopoly had been broken and "both organizations now entered a phase of competitive development which was to provide South Africa with some of the best cinema entertainment ever presented." The struggle lasted for four years and "The outstanding feature of this fierce competition was the countering of one company of every development announced by the other." Both companies tried to enlist public support for their cause. Kinemas presented themselves as though they were on an altruistic crusade designed to break a pernicious monopoly for the public benefit. African Theatres, on the other hand, claimed that they were fighting to save an industry which they alone had founded, consolidated and brought to prosperity. While African Theatres held the rights for the best American films, it widened its catalogue to include a number of renowned UFA German films and some better British productions. On the other hand, Kinemas deliberately exploited "the prevalent aspersion on American films and the publicity given to the British industry," by importing films mainly of British origin.

Schlesinger tried to circumvent Kinemas' franchise of the Phonofilm by going to its source. In September 1927 he joined the board of British Talking Pictures which controlled de Forrest's Phonofilms. A subsidiary, British Sound Films, was formed as a production arm and a sound stage at Wembley came into operation in June 1928. Production facilities, however, remained inadequate and in 1929, the large Wembley studio was burned down after the production of just one film. Furthermore, although de Forrest was a "brilliant individualistic inventor, he was ill-equipped to handle the intricacies of the modern world of finance" and between 1923 and 1925, only 34 theatres in the East Coast of America, Canada, South America, the United Kingdom, South Africa and Japan showed Phonofilm programmes." It would appear that South Africa boasted no
less than ten phonofilm cinemas located in the larger houses in Johannesburg, Cape Town and Durban, of which African Theatres owned three. Schlesinger's membership of the board of British Talking Pictures did not seem to alleviate his problems with Kinemas and in 1930 the company was liquidated, but not before he had divested himself of his shares. Nevertheless, in January 1930, Kinemas had to apply for an interdict against African Theatres and African Talking Pictures to restrain them from using the Phonofilm apparatus and any of the films covered by de Forrest's inventions.

By mid-1928 Kinemas had forty-four cinemas, African Theatres many more, and both were still expanding. In viewer terms, the consequence of this competition led to a much wider variety of films being imported, a diversity not seen since the 1909-1913 period. This in turn led to the development of a discriminating audience whose more sophisticated needs had to be met. Both companies embarked upon a spending spree, African Films buying the entire 1928-29 year's output of BTP, although Schlesinger was no longer a shareholder, while Kinemas secured all the 1928 titles of UFA, Gaumont-British, Gainsborough, over 100 American films, 37 British features and one Indian film, *Shiraz*. Kinemas library was further extended with titles from British and Dominion Films, and the American RKO. By 1929, Kinemas had acquired 106 cinemas and had extended their circuit to include Rhodesia and Uganda. African Theatres had already established extensive interests in the sub-continent and both companies were used by international capital to absorb the costs of forging markets in countries to the north of South Africa.

The Great Depression was now beginning to bite at a time when both organizations were involved in extensive cinema development programmes. Even though African Theatres were able to draw on accumulated financial reserves and other vested interests, Schlesinger was forced to curtail the activities of his various companies. Kinemas, on the other hand, made a further appeal for public funds. However, the financial exigencies forced on the economy as a whole by the depression
slowed the growth of both companies.

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT 1930 - 1931:
PENETRATION BY INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL

The end of 1930 saw the reappearance of MGM as a competitor to both South African companies. Neither African Theatres nor Kinemas were prepared to meet the demands of MGM, which decided to establish a cinema chain of its own in addition to the establishment of a film distribution agency. It was, however, in Schlesinger's interest to try to retain MGM under his aegis since the American company offered a stock of talkie films which had not yet been screened in South Africa. To service their need for talkie films which would provide legally uncontested opposition to Kinemas, Schlesinger formed Union Theatre Ltd on 13 October 1931 to screen MGM talkie films in theatres other than those controlled by African Theatres, although later MGM films were shown in African Consolidated Theatre outlets as well, the latter being the result of a merger to be discussed shortly. Despite this cooperation with Schlesinger, MGM went ahead with their building programme. Their first luxury cinema in Johannesburg, the Metro, opened during the height of the depression in 1932.

The reasons for the expansion by MGM on two fronts through ACT and Union Theatres on the one hand and their own independent operation on the other, may be traced to the sudden increase in the organic composition of capital brought about by the renewal of fixed capital at a higher rate of technology, that is, the talkie film. This technological innovation considerably increased costs of production in terms of machines (cameras, tape recorders, editing consoles, sound studios etc), raw stock and auxiliary materials (disc, photographic track etc), as well as labour (sound recordists, editors) and so on. The proportions of this cost increase in production depended not only on the value of the machinery, but on the technical nature of the apparatus. This in turn affected industry organization and raised the organic composition of capital (i.e. investment in technology) to critical levels. If MGM
was to continue valorizing its capital during this period of renewal of fixed capital, it had to secure markets previously held by national or interior bourgeoisies such as the Schlesinger Organization, so that a greater amount of surplus value could be earned and imported back to the imperial state, America.

In the face of this competition both African Theatres and Kinemas survived to the end of 1931, but with some difficulty. Nevertheless, the combined effects of the Depression, over-capitalisation, uneven audience attendance, particularly in the smaller towns (affecting Kinemas more than African Theatres) and the sustained competition for the same audience, created the conditions whereby only an amalgamation between the two competitors could safely ensure the future of the industry. For once, Gutsche is clear in her assessment:

The parallel development of the two organizations was in fact commercially impracticable. The fact that either organization would go to great lengths to thwart the other was known overseas and exploited to the advantage of the production and distribution firms. Bidding against each other, African Films and Kinemas would raise the price of outstanding films to a point where payable returns were practically impossible. Secondly, competition in erecting cinemas was exhausting the resources of both organizations. Thirdly, competition had resulted in the opening of cinemas by both interests in cities whose population could barely support one. Fourthly, under circumstances of economic stress, the importation of six distinct cinema programmes by both organizations for their competitive circuits was an unnecessary extravagance, three being sufficient for the total requirements. Fifthly, the financial situation had become increasingly precarious and there was no immediate sign of amelioration.

The merger between Kinemas and Schlesinger was announced on 2 December 1931 and the resulting companies were called African Consolidated Theatres (ACT) and African Consolidated Films Ltd (ACF). The former corporation was of a purely administrative nature and did not acquire either the theatres or the properties of the two companies whose joint interests it controlled. It was granted leases of all the cinemas and

66
theatres belonging to both circuits while Kinemas contributed not only its circuit and distribution agency, but a small production house as well. This merger was apparently one of the biggest business deals ever transacted in South Africa.

The following assessment of the period is offered by Gutsche:

The close of the depression found the South African cinema established in the hands of three organizations - African Consolidated Theatres and Films Ltd with their associated companies which controlled the maximum part of the exhibition and distribution of films in the Union; Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer (S.A.) (Pty) Ltd which had built one cinema of great capacity for the exhibition of M-G-M films and intended building more to form a circuit for first-class theatres; and the Union Theatres Ltd which, acting in liaison between the other two exhibiting interests, arranged the exhibition of M-G-M films in a circuit of cinemas other than those controlled by African Consolidated Theatres. On this basis, the South African cinema continued to develop. In previous years, the field had been over-developed by competition, an effect emphasised by depression conditions. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer made no immediate move to build another large theatre and African Theatres proceeded with long established plans. Meanwhile the already established position of cinema entertainment was enhanced by a new and unprecedented popularity which nascent prosperity engendered.

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT 1932 - 1938: CO-EXISTENCE BETWEEN NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL

The years 1932 to 1937 marked a settling down period and in 1934, MGM consolidated its incursion by distributing not only its own product, but that of UA, British and Dominion Films, and London Films on South African screens:

The stabilization of the South African cinema industry, the habituation of the public to going to established cinemas and, in addition, the difficulties of adequate sound-projection in rented and often unequipped halls, militated strongly against occasional independent enterprise.

Thus, the advent of talkies entrenched the encumbent organizations because of the improved quality of their cinemas which alone could adequately transmit sound. The level of
investment required for this technological revolution effectively restricted entry into the market of smaller, independent and less capitalised firms. One of the results of this stabilization was the reduction in the supply of variety and unusual films. This occurred as efforts were made to reduce costs in the face of the greater investment in fixed capital required by sound. According to Gutsche, the public were willing partners in this process and it "no longer had a discriminating interest in films and had become the acquiescent victims of the habit of 'going to the cinema', regardless of its programmes". This habit continued well into the 1970s and formed the basis of contemporary film marketing strategy. It will be shown later how this habit suited the ideological aims of the hegemonic bloc in its mediation of the need for a shifting set of social relations consequent upon changes in the economic base of the South African social formation.

The investment activity of MGM and Schlesinger proved to be the main stimulus for the upward swing of the third cycle of extended reproduction. The renewal of fixed capital by both MGM and ACT and the latter's affiliates was a pre-requisite for the "cinema boom" which ensued after 1934. This movement marked a midway point in the growth of ACT dividends, which increased from £20 000 in 1932 to £174 000 in 1936. Ernst Mandel comments that a general transformation of productive technology also generates a significant rise in the organic composition of capital and, depending on concrete conditions, this will lead sooner or later to a fall in the average rate of profit. While a rise was attributable to the technological complexities of sound, the concrete conditions of importance to this analysis manifested themselves in two ways. The first had its origins in the technological revolution itself: where previously silent films could be shown anywhere to anyone, now sound divided the market in terms of language. This innovation not only reduced markets, but significantly raised the costs of production relative to the markets now confined to the English speaking world. Dubbing procedures further raised production costs if the film was to be translated into other languages as well. Further barriers, according to Guback,
were the protective measures enacted in Germany in 1925, soon followed by Britain and France.

The second problem facing the American film industry was the emergence of Nazi Germany and European fascism. The global market, already constricted by technological advance, now faced further restrictions since Germany, Italy and Abyssinia rarely imported American films anymore, and instability in other countries such as Spain portended the loss of the entire Continental market. One avenue of exploitation remained, that of securing markets where cinema had not reached saturation point — for instance, colonies of the British Commonwealth, and more specifically, South Africa.

This period also identifies a stage between early capitalism and late capitalism when it was possible for the American majors to recoup their production costs within the domestic market but at the same time they depended for surplus profit on overseas earned income. Hence the concern with which the reduction of markets was viewed in Europe. The remaining markets — those of the British Commonwealth — and specifically South Africa, were not considered sufficiently profitable to warrant a massive injection of capital. The strategy adopted, therefore, was to establish a rival distribution network through the incorporation of already existing outlets and the harnessing of local capital. 20th Century-Fox Film (S.A.) Pty Ltd had been formed in May 1938. The scale of their operations was restricted to distribution only and they had no intention of either owning or leasing cinemas except at the outset of their attack on the South African market. Thus, 20th Century Fox initiated a centralization of capital in their favour and:

Profit was made of the fact that the institution of a new circuit would give employment to South Africans and that, owing to the cinemas themselves being built by local enterprise, its financial success would benefit the country.

Relegated to a footnote by Gutsche is an even more important
observation, for the process described is merely an incidental offspin in the process of centralization:

It was never mentioned, even by members of the local entertainment industry, that the existing structure improved on Fox proposals insofar as the directors of cinema companies were almost all South Africans and had invested their own capital in enterprises. Fox, on the other hand, had no stake in the country.

This state of affairs pertained until the mid-1950s when production costs of films had increased to such an extent that American companies found that it was no longer possible to recoup their investment in the country of origin. The then President of the Motion Picture Association of America, Eric Johnstone, stated in 1953 that

no other major United States industry is perhaps so heavily dependent upon exports for its economic health and well being ... It's a little known fact that 9 out of 10 United States films cannot pay their way in the domestic market alone. It is only because of revenue from abroad that Hollywood is able to turn out pictures of high artistry and technical excellence.

This dependency on foreign markets brought on mainly by technological innovations, demanded more than the mere control of a rival circuit: total ownership and control had to be effected through both centralization and concentration within the industry.

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT 1938 - 1950:
CO-OPTATION OF NATIONAL CAPITAL

Between the years 1938 and 1956, Fox was content to operate on a distribution basis only and paralleled Kinemas debut eleven years earlier but grew much more rapidly. This competition set in motion a new phase of rivalry which marked another period of heavy investment by local capital. In December 1938 further centralization occurred with UA exhibiting through Fox controlled outlets. This cooperation was the result of
complex financial manoeuvrings between UA, 20th Century and Fox in the United States where the newly merged company, 20th Century-Fox Film Corp. had in 1935 acquired through Sam Goldwyn 20th Century stock in the UA studio while the real estate was retained by Fairbanks and Pickford of UA. UA in South Africa maintained a separate distribution office having moved from MGM still partially tied to ACT. In July 1939 UA consolidated its position by opening a distribution office in Johannesberg. Nevertheless the two firms continued to distribute their films on a cooperative basis providing serious opposition to ACT, surpassing that offered earlier by MGM. Working through local capital in the form of Cinema Theatre Investments (Pty) Ltd, cinemas serving Fox were built at a fast pace, totaling 50 by 1939. Concurrently, ACT and ACF were equally active and by 1939 South Africa boasted the highest cinema per capita ratio in the world, that is, one cinema for every 4000 whites (in Johannesburg).

With the outbreak of the Second World War, the South African market assumed an even greater importance as the Hollywood market had been halved. This local market, however, remained fociused on whites since few blacks were able to afford the expense of cinema-going. ACT still held the upper hand in terms of quality and its access to the MGM catalogue. They also had a more sophisticated marketing policy and actively exploited sub-cultures of taste which the more dated product and formula 'B' films were unable to match. The only advantage Fox had over ACT was in the form of their more luxurious theatres.

Afrikaans Cinema of Cultural Resistance

The entry of Fox and UA finally squeezed out what independent ventures remained. However, the growth of Nationalist sentiments which were considerably heightenened during the Second World War, together with an increasing anti-British and anti-American attitude among Afrikaners, began to make itself felt with regard to cinema. The penetration of international cinema chains in South Africa, in conjunction with the
already established production monopoly held by African Film Productions (AFP) since 1915, stimulated culturally oriented Afrikaans film makers who acknowledged their inability to compete with large scale centralized and concentrated capital, into creating an alternative cinema. This movement gelled towards the end of 1938 under the leadership of a Nationalist fanatic, Dr Hans Rompel. The origins, development and ideological discourse of this cultural group will be dealt with in Chapter 3 on film production, but what concerns us here is how these film makers organized distribution and exhibition of their films. Their first film, *Nasie Hou Koers* (1939), dealing with the Voortrekker Centenary Celebrations, was exhibited in places other than cinemas. Its viewers consisted primarily of the suburban and rural sections of the Afrikaans community which "was passionately addicted to everything indigenous to the country provided it was expressed in Afrikaans and bore no trace of 'jingo influence'". Such was the size of this popular audience that by 1940 the film had been screened on 285 occasions in 144 venues to about 50 000 viewers. This support was an indication of the anti-government pro-Nationalist movement which was soon to seize political power in 1948.

The cooperative effort which led to the production of *Nasie Hou Koers* led to the founding in January of the Volksprentbond, an Afrikaner organization aimed at filming occasions of cultural and social importance to Afrikaners. Nourished by the ideological and cultural conflicts of the time, English-Afrikaner antipathy flared and, in conjunction with the nationalist sentiment spawned by the Voortrekker Centenary Celebrations, resulted in the formation of the Reddingsdaadbond, an organization pledged to the 'salvation' or rise of Afrikanerdem in every one of its aspects and particularly the economic. Arising out of the cultural traumas generated by the Afrikaner trek to the city, Dr Malan, an Afrikaner organic intellectual and later, prime minister, spoke of the need for "a mighty salvation-deed" (reddingsdaad) to secure the future of Afrikanerdem and the white population. The spark of this
"deed" was a re-enactment in 1938 of the Great Trek, which had occurred a hundred years earlier, in the form of the Ossewa Trek (ox wagon trek). Ox wagons set out from the Cape and collected donations on the way from sympathetic Afrikaners. Fifty percent of the Reddingsdaad fund was to be invested in a new Afrikaner finance house, Federale Volksbeleggings, and the remainder was placed under the control of the Economic Institute of the Federation of Afrikaner Cultural Organizations (FAK). The FAK is a front organization of the Broederbond established in 1929 and controls more than 2 500 cultural bodies. The Federation had direct lines of control with the Ossewabrandwag (Ox Wagon Sentinel), Reddingsdaadbond, public service, Afrikaans churches and the Herenigde Nasionale Party (the forerunner of the National Party). The FAK also had indirect lines of influence with Education Departments, School Boards and committees, Afrikaans parents and pupils and so on. Twenty percent of the sum raised by the Reddingsdaadbond was lodged with Afrikaner insurance companies, SANLAM and SANTAM. The former is of crucial significance to this analysis for SANLAM was to buy out Fox's South African cinema investments in 1969. Until that time it was to be increasingly badgered by Afrikaner cultural film making organizations who felt that SANLAM, because of its genesis 'out of the Volk' and its success as employers of Afrikaners displaced from farming, that it could be appealed to on cultural grounds. As will be shown in Chapter 4, these appeals were unsuccessful since investors were sceptical of this type of film's profit making potential.

The aim of the production arm, called the Reddingsdaadbond-Amateur-Rolprent Organisasisie (RARO) was for amateurs to make, not feature length films, but news-clips and 'interest shorts' which would be undertaken wherever amateur film makers were to be found, with RARO making available technical equipment. Titles of their silent films 'of interest to Afrikaners' included Meetings of the Ossewabrandwag, The Gathering at Majuba, The Celebration of President Kruger's Birthday, The Funeral of General Manie Maritz, The Dingaan's Day Celebrations, The Liberation of Elsebe Nel From Pretoria Goal and so on. Rompel was under no illusion as to the difficulties of countering
the attempts of the American industry to kill off indigenous cultural efforts:

Waar die bioskoopwees in Suid-Afrika vandag byna uit- sluitend in vreemde hande is en die rolprente wat ingevoer word, sonder uitsondering volksvreemd en dik- weels selfs volkenadelig, kan dit onmoontlik h' opbou- ende invloed uitoefen en moet die hele bioskoopwees dus as volkenadelig beskou word. Wanneer ons hier- teen gaan optree deur h' eie, volksvolke, volksvoor- delige bioskooporganisasie langs die volksvreemde op te bou, moet daar van die laasgenoemde h' ewige reaksie verwag word wat van al die minder metodes van "Big Business" gebruik sal maak.

Where the film industry in South Africa is today almost totally in the hands of foreigners, and the films that are imported are without exception alien, and often even detrimental to the nation, it is impossible to exercise a constructive influence, and the whole film industry should be regarded as dangerous to the nation. When we build up our own, a people's own, people-promoting film organization, along side, a violent reaction should be expected from the latter, who will make use of all the despicable methods of 'Big Business'.

Distribution of RARO films was thus placed on a more systematic footing with the founding of Volksbioskope Maatskappy (VOBI - the Peoples Bioscope Co) in 1940. This organization advertised a circuit which included 300 schools, Reddingsdaadbond branches, commercial cinemas and cultural organizations. VOBI was constituted to distribute RARO and other 'pure' Afrikaans films which, it was hoped, would build up high moral and cultural standards. RARO, however, was unable to provide sufficient films of a reasonable standard and VOBI was ironically forced to include in its programme the very films it was constituted to oppose: American 'B' pictures, sub-standard and sensational material, Continental and other more 'suitable' fare being in short supply due to the war. VOBI's slogan, designed to elicit cultural allegiance, "Support You Own Undertakings", neatly concealed the financial need to screen American films deemed to have an insidious influence on Afrikaans audiences. This uneasy marriage kept VOBI solvent during the war years and for a short time after. Their audiences remained relatively small given the superior quality and attraction of
overseas made material which was disseminated countrywide in luxury cinemas by ACT, Fox and UA. Exhibition began in August 1940 at Reddingsdaadbond Bioskope on the Reef. The programme consisted of Afrikaanse Voorprogramme (Afrikaans Supporting Programmes) made by RARO followed by a VOB1 feature film from America.

RARO enthusiasm reached its height in March 1940 when a press report under the headline "Culture bans Cinemas" announced that an Afrikaans society had decided that true Afrikaners did not patronize cinemas. Its members objected to the playing of God Save the King and maintained that until Afrikaners built a cinema for themselves, they should not support existing ones. This rejection was fuelled by the increasing propaganda content of British newsreels screened in South African cinemas. Resentment centred primarily around the amount of exposure given to the British Royal family. Nevertheless, as Gutsche comments, the cultural intervention of both RARO and VOB1 had little effect on commercial cinema since cinema-going had become a "deeply-ingrained habit". This in turn resulted in an undiscriminating audience which was less critical than those of earlier periods.

In July 1943, the Report of the government-appointed Cilliers Committee was published. This document marked the first moves on the part of the hegemonic alliance to investigate how its intervention might bring about the possibility of the production in South Africa of films with a South African background and more especially films in the Afrikaans language and their exhibition in the licenced cinema theatres in the Union. The idea was that a National Film Board would undertake to produce a number of short films "for exhibition at every cinema performance in every cinema in the Union all the year round". Of significance here is the fact that Cilliers was "a lifelong Nationalist" who had close links with Afrikaner cultural organizations. While a National Film Board, apparently modelled partially along these lines, did not come about until 1964, this Report is an indication of the increasing political influence and vocalization of Afrikaner Nationalists in
political circles. (The Cilliers proposals are dealt with in greater depth in Chapter 6).

How these stated aims were to be realised was not clear, for the Commission stipulated that only the four already existing film production companies were to be contracted by the Board for a period of ten years. Such a provision would certainly stifle talent and growth, particularly as the Board "will not even have the power to purchase a film which anyone outside the magic circle might care to take the financial risk [for], or have the pleasure of making, however brilliant he might be". The Union Review commentator is much more caustic and sees in this suggestion a sinister ideological plot on the part of the gathering momentum of Afrikanerdom:

Take the film producers. There are only four in the country, and one, VOBi (of which most people have never heard) is the creature of Nationalist Afrikanerdom. It was avowedly formed for the purpose of making their kind of films for their kind of people. If now, instead of collecting the pennies of the faithful for their laborious and not very profitable purpose, they are to be paid for it with hard government cash, naturally they will rejoice ... A hundred little Nationalist Afrikaner enterprises are struggling against the competition of highly efficient, non-political private enterprise. One of them, at least, sees the dizzy promise of being succoured by government money ... Against this threat, what can the other three film producing companies do but acquiesce and conform? Either they produce the films Professor Cilliers and his friends want, or someone else will - with government money - and they are pushed out of business.

According to the Union Review's argument, the next in line would obviously be the cinemas themselves which would be imposed upon to screen Film Board shorts and other state sponsored features such as the "incredibly dull" Die Bou van 'n Nasie (They Built a Nation) made with public money which "clearly suggested that South Africa is the product of one race ... and it emptied cinemas almost as rapidly as a cylinder of chlorine gas".

The subsequent Report of the Interdepartmental Committee
published on 19 December 1944, however, proposed that "legislation should not be introduced at this stage to compel the exhibition of the Board's films in commercial cinemas. It considers that the question is one for negotiation between the Board and the industry." The strong state interference advocated by the Cilliers Committee did not come about, even after the Nationalists assumed power in 1948. The later Film Board did engage in much propaganda activity but cinemas were not forced to screen their films. Ironically, by the time the Film Board had produced material for screening, it had already alienated the then predominantly Afrikaner owned industry because the Board was competing with private capital in the production sphere. It was only with the introduction of television in 1976 that the underlying fears of the Union Review were materialised. Independent film makers contracted by the SABC have been locked into a debt bondage by the Corporation and are forced to produce material which conforms with the dominant ideology of Afrikaner Nationalism. The disbanding of the National Film Board in 1980 was not unpredictable, for SABC-TV had superceded the Board's purpose and role in the dissemination of apartheid ideology.

Although the recommendations of the Cilliers Committee were not accepted by the Smuts government, Afrikaner production houses battled on. VOCI established UTLOLO Bpk, a production company, to produce films which would feed its outlets, and efforts were made to obtain further financial support from the Reddingsdaadbond and one of its commercial offspring, Federale Volksbeleggings. These met with little success for VOCI could not offer profitable returns.

After the war, Schlesinger purchased an interest in the British based J. Arthur Rank Organization. The motivation for this transaction is attributed by Gutsche to Schlesinger's "high regard for Rank and his spiritual work (Rank was a Methodist lay preacher), and pledged himself to establish a 16mm religious film distribution service in South Africa." The company was named Religious Films of Africa Ltd. It served the growing religious film market and was not unlikely designed
to forestall competition by KARFO, a Dutch Reformed Church operation, and VOB. Both of these firms ceased operations soon after the war while Schlesinger's company expanded.

**HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT 1950 - 1956: STABILIZATION**

To return to the discussion of the commercial cinema, the period following Fox's entry eventually stabilized, extending well into the 1950s. By 1954 there were over 500 cinemas in existence and Herbert Kretzmer comments that cinema-going remained a habit: "Most people still go to the movies simply because movies exist, like people who go to a lending library and merely ask for a mystery story"122. The significance of this habit will be enlarged in Chapter 8 which shows how the financial success of Afrikaans film was largely determinant upon this habit. Here too, will be discussed the ideological implications of this undiscriminating behaviour pattern.

The early 1950s was a period when cinema was being faced with the unprecedented threat of television on an international scale. This is the begining in cinema and television of what Mandel calls the long wave of the third technological revolution, "characterised by the generalised control of machines by means of electronic apparatuses"123. During this phase, in contrast to dire predictions, cinema did not become obsolescent but branched into television itself and continued to produce films for feature release in parallel with television. Neither medium overtook the other, but together created opportunities for the new means of production124. Television developed out of broadcasting and may be viewed as a linear extension of it. It was the result of highly sophisticated technological advances in the electronic age, the classic case of a technological revolution. However, despite television's separate derivation, it impinged on the traditional market of cinema which caused a crisis in the film industry. Since the 1920s, cinema had operated in a sellers' market where the supply grew more slowly than the demand. By 1950, however, such was the impact of television that it was feared that cinema would be swamped in much the same way that bio-vaudeville's demise had been
hastened by sound. This crisis was manifested in a fall-off in audiences and a radical reduction in the cinema market. The combined net profits of the ten leading motion picture firms declined continuously from $122 million in 1946 to $30 million in 1949. Between 1946 and 1956 the industry lost 42% of its customers during a period of rising expenditures in the consumer price index with the result that the industry's total consumer purchases were reduced from 1.15% to .49% in ten years. At the same time, cinema companies were faced with the United States Supreme Court anti-trust suits which "prohibited the five majors from combining the functions of producer and distributor with the function of exhibition." This led to dissolution into many smaller more specialist companies, a break-up which suited television which was now able to invest its idle capital into cinema. The American Broadcasting Corporation, for example, bought the 400 cinemas of United Paramount Theatres, previously part of Paramount. The film industry, although threatened, was not facing disaster and fought back on two fronts.

Fourth Cycle of Extended Reproduction: Technological Innovation

On the one hand the industry tried to compete with television by increasing the technological input of its movies, for example, through the use of costly innovation developed from older inventions, such as 3-D, cinemascope, Todd AO, VistaVision and other anamorphic and wide screen formats, cinerama, stereophonic sound and a greater use of colour. These systems were introduced between 1952 and 1960. The RKO company disappeared from the scene due to Howard Hughes' poor management, while 20th Century Fox, Paramount and MGM relied on technological innovation to secure their markets. Some, like Columbia, UA and Warner Brothers concentrated more on independent producers and started selling off their studio lots. The low point was reached in 1952, profits of the seven majors having been reduced by 80% since 1946. The anti-trust suits had the effect of stimulating independent production companies since the majors were no longer able to foist inferior grade films through block booking practices on cinemas. The results of
this restructuring were significant: "It is the time of the independent. Long ailing United Artists, unhampered by studio overhead now becomes a giant"\(^{130}\).

On the other hand, sections of the industry tried to hedge their bets by investing its surplus capital in its competitor, television. Columbia, for example, was the first to establish a television division in 1951\(^{131}\). 20th Century Fox bought a half share in National Television Associates and sold it 390 features in 1956. By 1956, eight of the largest studios had floated subsidiaries to produce films for television\(^{132}\).

Despite the reduction in audience, Hollywood did not consider the alternative of narrowing a film's appeal -- it seemed afraid of testing a minority audience or sub-cultures of taste\(^{133}\). Part of this reluctance could be attributed to the dual factors of high investment in fixed capital and the organizational structure needed to manage this highly capitalised industry in the most efficient and cost-effective way\(^{134}\). Where before 1953, for example, only 100 films had grossed more than $5 million worldwide, in 1953 and 1954, no less than 30 films earned this distinction\(^{135}\).

The conditions in the international arena were of significance to the structure of ownership and control of the South African film industry. Not faced with the domestic threat of television, this country offered prospects of high valorization for international capital stemming from the distribution and exhibition divisions of the film industry. The American domestic industry was characterised by falling production and the closure of cinemas\(^{136}\). The difficulties of expanding internal markets because of the siphoning off of audiences by television forced the process of capital accumulation to follow an international course. In South Africa, the American majors had few competitors, for although an intense competitive struggle was occurring between the large imperialist powers as far as other industries were concerned, the American majors had already forced their dominance on the South African market either through tie-ups with ACT and ACF or by means of
their deployment of local capital as was the case with Kinemas and the more recent chain instituted by Fox. In line with Mandel's theory, then, the international concentration of capital did not mainly take the form of an international centralization of capital\(^{137}\) but pitted the two South African companies against each other. As already mentioned, this period was characterised by increasing international interest in capitalist enterprises external to the home market, but this concern did not extend to any notable infusion of capital.

The threat of television ultimately led to a higher standard of cinema and a production industry that remained commercially viable throughout the world. The significance of these processes for South Africa lies in its untampered with market and hence its potential susceptibility to the international, predominantly American expansion (i.e. centralization) of capital. This normally coincides with the period of late capitalism where the multi-national company becomes the determinant organizational form of large scale or big capital. In South Africa, this took the form of 20th Century Fox which bought out Schlesinger's interests in 1956. The R20 million package gave Fox ACT, ACF, Filmlets, Boswell's Circus, African Caterers and many smaller companies.

This new phase in the accumulation of capital marks a rise in the intensity of cultural imperialism which proceeds 'apace with a wave of 'cultural nationalism', even in countries where the development model is entirely adapted to the needs of the multi-nationals'\(^{138}\). To understand the concept of cultural imperialism it is necessary to delimit the notion of 'national culture' by considering the relation of the national or interior bourgeoisies to the groupings of the North American empire:

National culture, in the era of the multinationals, has to guarantee the reproduction of the dependence of these bourgeoisies on the United States at the same time as that of their own hegemony as the ruling class in a particular nation; that is to say, it has to continue to sanctify their position as an 'interior bourgeoisie'\(^{139}\). Such a perspec-
tive would have the merit of removing discussions on cultural imperialism from a 'culturalist' sphere. It would re-establish its historical and class character, relating it to modifications in the respective roles of these bourgeoisies. On the one hand, cultural imperialism changes form and content according to the phases of the political, economic and military expansion of the Empire, and on the other, it adapts itself to diverse realities and dominant contexts. It is by infiltration through the most porous elements of these so-called national cultures that North American imperialism reproduces the super-structural conditions that allow it to prosper.

These points, offered by Armand Mattelart, will be developed more fully later where the analysis will show how the co-option of national cultures has in the South African case led to an uncritical and highly superficial reliance among producers on the Hollywood model. This dependence is obviously influenced by historical processes such as those described in this chapter.

Having briefly sketched the history of the South African distribution and exhibition sectors of the film industry, it is now necessary to turn our attention to an analysis of production. The next chapter will examine how the social structure of production between 1896 and 1956 affected content and how this served the ideological and cultural interests of the prevailing dominant ideology. Concern will primarily be with questions of ownership and control, ideological content, markets and audience responses. The year 1956 marks a convenient benchmark on which to end the periodization of the analysis dealt with in this chapter for not only did it mark the entry of large scale international capital into all sections of the industry, but also the advent of a state subsidy scheme to assist local film makers in the face of foreign competition.

In many respects production is as important as a discussion of distribution since it is through this activity that cultural production in the service of the dominant ideology, the interior bourgeoisie and international capital is effected. The following chapter will trace the ideology of specific periods of cultural production and show how the different
sources of capital have affected content. A later chapter will plot content against the direction and performance of the national economy as a whole. This analysis will take us through an examination of the initial industry dominated by English capital through Schlesinger, through a considerable period of stagnation until the beginnings of a revival channeled via Jamie Uys' peculiarly Afrikaans cinema in 1956.

NOTES AND REFERENCES


4. Before the Second World War there were five major companies and three in second rank. The five majors were Paramount, 20th Century Fox, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Warner Brothers and RKO. The other three were Columbia, Universal and United Artists. For further information see Matterart, A. 1979: Multinational Corporations and the Control of Culture. Harvester Press, Sussex, p. 195. Today, the majors are Paramount, United Artists, Columbia, 20th Century Fox and Warner Brothers


7. Mandel, op. cit. p. 594

8. Gutsche, op. cit. p. 96


10. See Mandel, op. cit. pp. 323-324


83
14. Ibid. p. 100
15. Ibid. p. 101
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid. p. 105
19. Ibid.
20. See Mandel, *op. cit.* p. 312
23. Ibid. p. 113
24. Ibid. p. 114
25. Ibid. p. 117
26. Ibid.
27. Mandel, *op. cit.* p. 313
28. Late Capitalism: while monopoly capitalism is a synthetic category describing the laws of motion of the mature capitalist epoch, late capitalism, on the other hand, "is not a new epoch of capitalist development. It is merely a further development of an imperialist, monopoly capitalist epoch". Late capitalism is a chronological category which defines an era rather than an epoch. See Mandel, ibid.
30. Ibid
31. Nemo, J. + 1925: "The Truth About Theatres Trust", *Plain Dealer Pamphlets*, No. 1. Attempts to gather further information on this individual have proved unsuccessful
32. Rosenthal, E. 1974: *You have been listening ...* Purnell, Cape Town, p. 116

34. Stage and Cinema, 6 November 1920, p. 14

35. See Gutsche, op. cit. 1972, p. 203 n 14

36. Ibid. p. 135

37. Ibid

38. Ibid


41. Stodel, J. 1962: The Audience is Waiting. Howard Timmins, Cape Town, p. 29. Stodel's over-generalised interpretation suggests Schlesinger's philosophy but misconstrues his actual process of cinema acquisition. Schlesinger did not at this stage build cinemas, he controlled them through lease agreements

42. Gutsche, op. cit. 1972, p. 137

43. Ibid.


45. Gutsche, op. cit. p. 122, n 6


47. Gutsche, op. cit. p. 151

48. Ibid. p. 155

49. In comparison to the American experience, measures taken by controlling syndicates in South Africa against their competition were relatively mild. Rhode, op. cit. p. 44 reports that when legal sanctions were applied against independents to force them to concede to the Trust's demands proved ineffective, they resorted to violence: "Anticipating the gangsterism of Prohibition days, thugs smashed cameras and raided illicit laboratories and machine shops".

50. Gutsche, op. cit. p. 156. Despite this evidence to the contrary, Stodel op. cit. p. 149 blandly insists that "where his [Schlesinger's] generosity exceeded all bounds ... was in never refusing to grant the use of his theatres or cinemas for fund raising projects ... in World War I, African Theatres bore all expenses so that
the entire proceeds were handed over to the cause"

51. Gutsche, *op. cit.* p. 156

52. Stodel, *op. cit.* p. 149

53. Ibid.

54. *Stage and Cinema*, 2 April 1921, pp. 4, 14

55. *Stage and Cinema*, 9 July 1921, p. 4

56. See Nemo, *op. cit.*

57. Gutsche, *op. cit.* pp. 190-191

58. Neo-imperialism depends on economic exploitation rather than political presence

59. Low, *op. cit.* pp. 95-98; also see Gutsche, *op. cit.* pp. 179-180

60. Gutsche, *op. cit.* p. 180 n 40

61. Low, *op. cit.* p. 95 quotes the 1934 Moyne Committee as evidence which stated "that there were some 14,500 cinemas in the U.S.A. with ten million seats, and 4,300 cinema in Great Britain with 3,872,000 seats, whereas the Empire as a whole including Great Britain had 7000 cinemas and 5,595,000 seats. Although these figures relate to a few years later on, they give some idea of the proportions involved, and suggest that even if British films had secured a stranglehold on those Empire cinemas normally showing English-language films, it would still only have given them a market a little over half the size of the American home market. Nor was it likely that Britain could have secured such a stranglehold, with American films already firmly entrenched as they were. In 1925, for example, American films had captured 95% of the British market. See Political and Economic Planning, 1952: *The British Film Industry*. London, p. 242


63. Schlesinger owned more than 100 companies at this time and in many cases only bought into firms that were on the brink of financial disaster. He was thus often seen as a 'saviour', for example in broadcasting, cinema and theatre. See, eg., Gutsche *op. cit.* and Rosenthal, *op. cit.*

64. Low, *op. cit.* p. 43

65. Ibid. p. 186


67. Ibid
68. Dickson, *op. cit.* p. 34. While the events described by Dickson might well have taken place, she has incorrectly connected Goldwyn with MGM. In fact, Goldwyn was never part of the triumvirate that bears his name. He was forced out of his own company, Goldwyn Pictures, in 1922 and this latter company merged with Marcus Loew's Metro Pictures Corp and Louis B Mayer Production. See Marx, A. 1976: *Goldwyn.* Bodely Head, London, pp. 107-116. Dickson's anecdote is included here to illustrate how Schlesinger protected his business interests.


70. Gutsche, *op. cit.* p. 193

71. Ibid. p. 194

72. Ibid


74. Mandel, *op. cit.* pp. 110-111

75. Ibid. See also Marx, *op. cit.* Vol. 2, p. 186 and Vol. 1, pp. 632-633

76. Gutsche, *op. cit.* p. 200

77. Low, *op. cit.* p. 203

78. Gutsche, *op. cit.* p. 200

79. Ibid, p. 201

80. Ibid

81. Ibid, p. 217


83. Gutsche, *op. cit.* pp. 209-210 n 31; 218

84. Gomery, *op. cit.* states that de Forrest sold out to a South African exhibition chain in September 1928. This information conflicts with data provided by Gutsche and Low. Certainly, Kinemas bought the South African franchise while Schlesinger had an interest in the British
parent company, but it is doubtful that either Kinemas or Schlesinger bought out Forrest per se.

85. Gutsche, op. cit. p. 211
86. Ibid. p. 205
87. Ibid. p. 209
88. Ibid. p. 213
89. Ibid. p. 233
90. See Marx, op. cit. Vol. 1, p. 612
91. Gutsche, op. cit. p. 214
92. Ibid. p. 215
93. Ibid. p. 235
94. Ibid. p. 237
95. Ibid.
96. Ibid. p. 243 n 40
97. Guback, op. cit. p. 10
98. Like late capitalism, early capitalism is a chronological category which defines an era rather than an epoch. An epoch is when you have different laws of motion in the development of the capitalist mode of production. It should also be borne in mind that capital is not a thing. It describes the relationship between the generation of wealth, labour and the means of production.
99. Gutsche, op. cit. p. 256
100. Ibid. p. 256 n 4
103. Gutsche, op. cit. p. 260 n 13. Toronto with a population of 500 000 had 112 cinemas, while Johannesburg with 250 000 had more than 60 cinemas.
104. Ibid. p. 261
105. Ibid. p. 263
106. *Die Transvaler*, 8 August 1940

107. Serfontein, H.


111. Gutsche, *op. cit.* p. 272. In 1950 *Die Burger* complained that "Every town and dorp in our country is placarded with the same 'Royals', 'Imperials' and 'Masonics', and these names are also represented in the theatres and cinemas ... We believe that the time will soon come when South African theatres too will bear Afrikaans names"

112. Ibid. p. 271

113. Union of South Africa. 1943: *Cilliers Film Committee Report*

114. The *Union Review*. 1944: "Let's Go to the Cinema ... and See a Government Film (in Afrikaans)", Vol. VII, No. 85, pp. 38-41


117. Ibid

118. Union of South Africa. 1944: *Report of the Inter-Departmental Committee Appointed to Consider the Reports of the Committee on State Publicity and the Film Committee and Other Relevant Matters*. Government Printer

119. It is significant that the National Film Board's opulent premises in Silverton were taken over by the SABC in 1981

120. Du Preez, *op. cit.* pp. 41-42

121. Gutsche, *op. cit.* 1971, p. 494


123. Mandel, *op. cit.* p. 121

124. Eric Smoodin Challenges the conventional wisdom that television caught the motion picture industry by sur-
prise. See Smoodin, E. 1982: "Motion Pictures and Television, 1930-1945: A Pre-History of the Relations Between the Two Media", The Journal of the University Film and Video Association, Vol. 34, No. 3, pp. 3-8

125. See Berry, B.J.L. 1970: "The United States in the Year 2000", Institute of British Geographers, No. 51, pp. 42-51. Berry traces the innovation diffusion pattern of TV cities between 1940 and 1968. Diffusion proceeded with the large cities succumbing first with only three cities prior to World War Two. Growth of TV stations burgeoned between 1948 and 1951 with a two year break during the Korean War. By 1958 total geographic coverage had been achieved and by 1962 at least half the United States boasted a 80%-100% market penetration by TV. By 1965, the figure was a little over three-quarters with no areas not served. See also also Berry, B.J.L. 1970: "Hierarchical Diffusion: the Basis of Developmental Filtering and Spread in a System of Growth Centres" in Hansen, N. (ed.): Growth Centres in Regional Development. New York. A statistical study done by Stuart, F. 1982: "The Effects of Television on the Motion Picture Industry: 1948-1960" in Kindem, op. cit. pp. 265-275 complements Berry's data with the finding that TV was a major cause of the overall decline in motion picture receipts between 1948 and 1954. He surmises that in the absence of TV competition there might have been a substantial increase in cinema revenue during this period

126. Stuart, op cit. p. 293

127. Ibid. p. 257

128. Mattelart, op cit. p. 195

129. Stuart, op cit. p. 260


132. See Stuart, op cit. p. 261


135. Stuart, op cit. p. 295

136. Ibid

90
137. Mandel. *op. cit.* p. 313

138. Mattelart, *op. cit.* p. 231

139. Mattelart ibid points out that he has borrowed this term from Nicos Poulantzas. Elsewhere in this study the term 'national bourgeoisie' is used in a similar sense. Whereas the interior or national bourgeoisie has a relative autonomy from imperial capital, the 'comprador bourgeoisie' act on behalf of this capital.

140. Ibid. p. 231
CHAPTER 3

FILM PRODUCTION 1896-1956: IDEOLOGICAL COHESION TO IDEOLOGICAL FRAGMENTATION

THE ENGLISH-AFRIKANER IDEOLOGICAL ALLIANCE

Since ownership and control has largely been tied up with the supply of product from overseas, it is not surprising that most locally made films reflect a conscious, culturally borrowed character. While feature film production in South Africa has always lacked the level of capitalisation of the distribution and exhibition sectors of the industry, it remains ideologically significant in terms of its role as a vehicle for cultural production.

This chapter will attempt to assess whose financial interests were served through production and outline what social, cultural, ideological and political objectives were articulated by whom and with what success. As with the history of all film industries, production, distribution and exhibition were almost totally integrated through the monopolistic structure of the Trusts which operated in the Western World until the early 1950s. What follows therefore should be seen against the background sketched in the previous chapter and will include a discussion of the main ideological themes present in the major productions of the time.

Early Development 1896 - 1915

The turn of the century saw the Transvaal at war with Great Britain. This event provided the backdrop for the development of the embryonic newsfilm form. Although wartime films had been made of the earlier Spanish-American War, depicting the landing of the troops in Cuba in 1897, the camera did not actually record the action at the front. The South African
War was therefore the first to be systematically covered by cameramen. The three companies which dispatched journalists to this country were The Mutoscope and Biograph Company (which sent out a former assistant of Thomas Edison, WKL Dickson), the Warwick Trading Company and RW Paul. This period of the South African film industry is unusually well documented, and Elizabeth Strebel comments that

The films which resulted, shot exclusively from the British point of view, since the Boers had photographers but no cinematographers, are remarkable documents of the times, undoubtedly more revealing of Victorian England than of South Africa, full of the myths and symbols of British imperialist iconography.

Two types of Boer War films co-existed. One consisted of raw documentaries which served as propaganda through "selection, omission and emphasis". No footage, for example, exists of the concentration camps into which Afrikaner women and children were herded and where they died in their thousands. In the second category fall the faked war films, made by companies such as American Vitagraph, Animated Photograph Films and RW Paul. These films were instruments of blatant propaganda and were screened in Britain, the United States and other foreign countries.

Fulfilling the ideological role and projecting the imperialist interests of international capital, the British Tommy is generally portrayed in these staged propaganda films as "fighting for a trinity of God, Motherhood and country". While the British are ever heroic and duty bound, the Boers are characterised as complete villains. For example, "Paul Kruger ... is the embodiment of evil ... completely lacking in morals or a sense of justice". Other films show Boers Shelling a Red Cross Outpost and poisoning a water well. Typical of many of the British made anti-Boer propaganda films was the "all-encompassing, mystical power of the Union Jack, symbol of the all powerful British Empire". The jingoistic images which characterised the British victory in the Transvaal in 1901 were revived with the advent of Union in 1910.
and were to become an intrinsic part of South African made features produced in the teens of the century.

Subsequent to 1906 a number of short films and documentaries were made by various producers, including the evocatively titled Warwick Trading Company's *From Cape to Cairo* (1906). To a large extent, production by South Africans after 1909 was financed by cinema owning groups such as Electric Theatres Ltd who made topical shorts for their circuit. These "local views" terminated with the collapse of the company in mid-1911. The first fiction film was made in 1910, apparently by a British production firm, appropriately called the Springbok Production Company. Entitled *The Great Kimberley Diamond Robbery*, or alternatively, *The Star of the South*, it was shown locally without much fanfare, although *The Star* comments that it was "the first attempt to bring South African drama acted on the veld within the range of the bioscope and the attempt has proved more than successful". Little more is known about this film.

The sporadic production of shorts was placed on a more systematic footing with the amalgamation of the Union Bioscope Company's vaudeville cinemas and Rufe Naylor's Tivoli outlets. Topical shorts were included in the programmes of this combined circuit and with "the establishment of Africa's Amalgamated Theatres, local film production was established as a concomitant of the organized exhibition of films". Competing news shorts included the *Springbok Gazette* (1912) and the *South African Animated Gazette* (1912 — also known as the *Alambra Gazette*) in Cape Town, both of which failed after only one or two issues. Towards the end of 1912 a series of publicity films inspired by the editor of the publication, *African World*, were designed "to attract attention to South Africa as a field for British capital and enterprise".

**Consolidation of Production 1913-1915**

By 1913, African Amalgamated Theatres were providing national coverage, and on 5 May that year *African Mirror*, destined to be
the world's longest running cinema newsreel was born. Shortly thereafter, *African Mirror* was subsumed by Schlesinger as he spread his control over the film and entertainment industries.

Classical Capitalist Development in the Film Production Industry 1916 - 1922

The production arm of the Schlesinger Organization was called The African Film Trust's Production Unit and continued as a subsidiary of African Films Trust (AFT) until 1915 when African Film Productions Ltd (AFP) was floated to manage production on a much larger scale than had previously been the case. During this initial period "production progressed both in quality and scope to an astonishing degree". Apart from *African Mirror*, screened in AFT outlets, subjects included scenic and industrial shorts for educational and publicity purposes. It was 1916-1922, however, which saw a spurt of production of local feature films, a result of war conditions which affected the regular supply of imported fare and, more importantly, the fact that American fiction movies, which formed the bulk of programmes, commanded high market prices.

The significance of this short, but highly productive period can best be explained with reference to Gundar Frank's notions of development and under-development. Within his theory South Africa could be classified as a satellite economy whose economic relationship with a metropolitan or central economy such as the United States or England is a peripheral one. Frank postulates a chain of exploitation between metropoles and satellites. On a national level, satellites experience their greatest economic development, and particularly their most classically capitalist industrial development, during times when their ties with the metropoles are weakest. This happens most often during temporary isolation caused by the crises of war and depression in the world metropoles. That AFP were able to take advantage of the unsettled conditions caused by the First World War and make "South African films for South African audiences" which could also be sold overseas accords with Frank's postulate that national development is primarily a response to weakened ties with central or imperialist
states. A large, comprehensive and sophisticated film production studio was set up by AFP on the outskirts of Johannesburg, in Killarney and Lorrimar Johnston, a well known American producer was engaged in 1915. Johnstone was joined by Harold Shaw who had worked for Edison before being engaged as a producer by London Films in England. Shaw was accompanied by his wife, Edna Flugrath, London Films' chief woman star who subsequently acted in some of AFP's productions. Between 1916 and 1922, thirty-seven features were made with a staff of about eighty permanent employees. Subject matter was rooted in the historical, cultural and ideological outlook of the period, with Boer and Britain standing together under the flame of unity and civilization against the barbaric black tribes of the sub-continent. Fiction was interwoven with actuality and the social, racial and historical contradictions were smoothed over in the interests of capital and ideology.

In 1916, fifteen films were made, mostly directed by Johnston and Shaw. Titles like A Zulu's Devotion, The Liquor Seller and A Story of the Rand pioneered the short featurette in South Africa and were but an indication of the heights that the emerging South African industry was to attain with almost immediate effect. Most notable amongst the 1916 list was De Voortrekkers/Winning a Continent scripted by Voortrekker descendent and historian, Gustav Preller, and directed by Harold Shaw. This historical epic which dramatically reflected the dominant ideology through an interlock of fiction, history and myth, is imbued with a powerful sense of place, environment and locale. Hailed abroad as the most notable film of the year, this epic set initial cinematic standards which have rarely been matched during the subsequent unfolding of South African cinema. In comparison, the 1965 version of Die Voortrekkers, completely lacks the convincing imagery, the epic quality and the dramatic richness of Shaw's 1916 edition.

"De Voortrekkers/Winning a Continent": Reflections of Ideological and Cultural Cohesion

The importance of De Voortrekker/Winning a Continent lies more
in its ideological and cultural significance than in its financial returns. Despite the fact that it was underwritten and produced by an English-speaking company, AFP, the film was first screened at the Voortrekker Monument and was consistently revived in later years for Dingaan's Day (later known as Day of the Covenant and since 1981, the Day of the Vow) Celebrations and became one of the rallying events during the 1938 Afrikaner Centenary Celebrations. A perusal of early references to the film, from publicity through to the comments by Afrikaans politicians and DRC ministers, confirms the generalised belief in the film's historical accuracy and its ideological acceptability to both English and Afrikaans speaking communities. Prime Minister, General Louis Botha, stated for example:

a film of intense dramatic interest and fine historical accuracy, which few of the children of the Voortrekkers will ever view without a tear. To the world it will give a better conception of our stirring story, and the youth of our country it ought to inspire with greater reverence for that historic past.\(^{18}\)

Cabinet Minister HC van Heerden commented that "The film is perfect from every point of view ... All who see it will now be able to follow the exact history of the Voortrekkers"\(^{19}\). A pastor of the DRC, the Rev HS Bosman observed, "It depicts the history of the period in a very realistic manner, and there is nothing in it to offend the susceptibilities of any section of the community"\(^{20}\). Even as late as 1974 film producer/director Tommie Meyer described it as the "first Afrikaans film ... even though it was silent and made by I.W. Schlesinger's English speaking company"\(^{21}\). These statements are a response to the smoothing over of ideological contradictions through a clever manipulation of the conventions of the epic genre. The film is far from an accurate rendering of historical fact or social processes. The British journal, the Kinematograph Weekly, was more accurate: "The details of the story, we understand do not pretend to be absolutely realistic"\(^{22}\). That the treatment was accepted at face value by South African viewers was because it coincided very closely with the dominant
ideology and hegemonic relations of the time which had replaced the earlier Boer-Britain conflict with an economic and cultural alliance which extended to the support of Britain during World War I. The underlying ideological, cultural and economic conflicts, however, were never fully eradicated and were to increasingly externalise themselves from the 1930s onwards as the Afrikaner progressively accumulated economic and political power. For the moment though, these contradictions remained submerged, despite the bitterness and sense of loss experienced by Afrikaners as a consequence of their defeat by the British less than fifteen years earlier.

In a pioneering article on *De Voortrekkers/Winning a Continent* Hannes van Zyl attempts to explain away these contradictions by claiming that the narrative conventions used in the film have become dated and that the present viewer is aware that s/he is looking "not at history, but a story-shaped historical interpretation". Avoiding the influence of ideological discourse on the shaping of the narrative, van Zyl takes refuge in a more superficial explanation, claiming that the film is:

> an epic story form which has been well-known at least since Old Testament times: a persecuted group, confronted by a powerful tyrant, is supported by God and gains a victory that will have substantial historical significance. As such it is a story about the birth of a society. The society finds its identity in opposing the powerful villain, who almost by definition is a force outside that society.

The critical analysis of the epic as expounded by Northrop Frye is enlisted by van Zyl in support of his argument. For example, the epic contains a number of different narrative styles and pays specific attention to realistic detail. As manifested in *De Voortrekker/Winning a Continent*, an epic deals with a view of history, purporting to explain the Afrikaner's social contract with God. The origin of the social structure, norms, values, motivations and other elements which are of central importance to a community's faith in its identity, are all evident in the film. As van Zyl points out:
With the inclusion of the treaty between Retief and Dingaan and the text of the Covenant, the film attempts to place both God and justice on the side of the Trekkers, and so to explain— in so far as black and white are concerned—the contemporary social structure and division of land.\(^{25}\)

The blame for the Voortrekkers' predicament and the massacre of Piet Retief and his party by the Zulu Chief, Dingaan, is shifted away from the British Colonial Government from whom the Trekkers were trying to escape and onto "two conventional melodramatic villains and Dingaan."\(^{26}\) Van Zyl appositely reminds us that *De Voortrekkers/Winning a Continent* was produced by AFP, "a company controlled with English money, and directed by Harold Shaw, a British director."\(^{27}\) Shaw, it will be recalled, was an American although he had previously worked for a British company.\(^{28}\) Of more significance is Van Zyl's observation that AFP "was not anti-colonial" and Shaw's remark that "The Colonial always appeals to me."\(^{29}\) This ideological orientation resulted in the glossing over in the film of the part played by Britain in causing the Trekkers to emigrate from the Cape Colony after 1836 in the first place. Although van Zyl consistently alludes to the relationship between capital and ideology, he refuses to proceed to a deeper level of enquiry which this connection demands. It is primarily at the structuralist/culturalist levels of analysis that we are able to explain the spurious evaluations by contemporary Afrikaner commentators who, it might be argued, should have known better. Certainly, the values implied by narrative conventions are able to obscure historical exactness, but the process by which this occurs is mediated through the ideological orientation of the film's text. *De Voortrekkers* seemed "accurate", "faithfully detailed", "realistic" and "perfect" because it reinforced the ideological discourse and cultural striving of the time and operated within the current orbit of hegemonic relations. To discover what that world view was we need to understand the relationship of the Union's economy to that of the British Empire. It is these politico-economic relations which circumscribed the content, treatment and structured absences of *De Voortrekkers* and which displaces
the blame for the battle of Blood River onto savage hordes who were at the time of the film's release competing with Afrikaner poor whites for jobs on the mines. This is the level of analysis which van Zyl neglects, seeking his explanation within the isolation of a textual examination. While accepting some outside influences, he neglects a more contextual investigation which would semiotically link signs on the screen to underlying material and social processes reflected beneath the observed surface text.

De Voortrekkers, concludes van Zyl, "helped to establish a pattern for the interpretation and manipulation of history in later epics". Here again we need to point out that the cultural imagery and ideological discourse seen in De Voortrekkers/Winning a Continent was already endemic to South African society and simply found externalization on the screen. Later historical epics such as Die Bou van 'n Nasie/They Built a Nation (1939) and 'n Nasie Hou Koers (1939 - A Nation Maintains its Direction) did alter interpretations of conflicts in terms of shifting social relations within the political economy. The myths encoded in any one of these pictures at specific historical conjunctures were mainly to confirm and preserve the prevailing order of things. However, myths do change and new interpretations emerge to 'explain', rationalize and legitimize economic and political adaptations which have occurred in the wider society. As will be shown in the analysis of later historical epics, an important progenator of content rests with the relations of production, its ownership and control and the politico-economic relation of the economy to the global capitalist system.

In De Voortrekkers/Winning a Continent, for example, the influence of the dominant capitalist relations in South Africa or what van Zyl identifies as "English money", is more important than the ideology or attitudes of the 'British' though, in fact, American director who made the film. It was aimed at an international, primarily British market, and might have elicited a negative audience response had it been an accurate historical reflection. Such a treatment would almost certainly alienate
British audiences, not to mention English speakers in South Africa who contributed to the film's profitability. As the *Stage and Cinema* commentator put it: "[the film] has probably done more to bring Dutchmen and Englishmen together and to help each to a better understanding of the other's point of view, than anything that has ever previously happened". Shaw and Preller's plot structure thus had the effect of displacing the conflict from one between Boer and Briton onto savage natives and traders of Portuguese East Africa. The latter took on the guise of folk devils and were characterised as the confidants of Dingaan. The Portuguese traders were seen as oily, dirty, catholic idolators who had the cheek to pre-empt trade with the Zulu nation. These stereotypes intercepted both British and Boer prejudice of the period, both nations disliking the Portuguese intensely. By these means, the sentiments expressed in the film contained "nothing to offend the susceptibilities of any section of the community," the community in this regard being defined as purely Afrikaner and English South African. The magnitude of *De Voortrekkers/Winning a Continent*, was, according to Gutsche, totally out of proportion to the reputation of South Africa's nascent film industry. The film was conceived on a grand scale and successfully completed despite not having at its disposal the technical and financial resources of the best equipped Hollywood studio of the day. *Kine Year Book* ranked the film as one of the most important after Griffith's *Intolerance* (1916), an American epic of more than three times the length of *De Voortrekkers/Winning a Continent*.

*De Voortrekkers* at £20 000 was the first of six expensive film epics produced by AFP between 1916 and 1922. The other four were *Symbol of Sacrifice* (1918) at £30 000, *King Solomon's Mines* (1918) which cost £14 000, *Alan Quartermain* (1919) at £17 000, *Prester John* (1920) and *Swallow* (1922) made on a budget of £23 000. These, together with a number of less costly productions were designed to spearhead an attack on the international cinema market. This penetration was to have been assisted by overseas agents and offices in London, New York, Sydney, Calcutta, Egypt, China, the Straits Settlement
and Bombay. While *De Voortrekkers* was shown abroad, apparently with some financial success, earning about £50 000 in rights and royalties\(^{37}\), few of the other shorter productions earned a profit locally\(^{38}\).

"Symbol of Sacrifice": Images of Hegemonic Consent

In 1917, AFP's output dropped by half, concentrating mainly on short featurettes of a local flavour such as *The Mielie Kids, A Border Scourge* and *Zulu Town: Funny Photoplays*\(^{39}\). However, the enthusiasm stimulated by both the local and overseas reception of *De Voortrekkers*\(^{40}\), led to the production of an even more ambitious film entitled *Symbol of Sacrifice* in 1918. This project was to cost a third more than *De Voortrekkers*. The scenario was written by Harold Shaw and Horace Rose, editor of *The Natal Witness*. It was directed by Schlesinger himself with the help of a recently engaged British cameraman, Joseph Albrecht. Shaw did not participate in the actual production since he had left the employ of AFP. A Colonel J.W. Colenbrander, a participant in the Zulu wars, was employed as an advisor. Fired with the ideology of battle with its elements of 'honour', 'thrilling incidents' and 'glory', Colenbrander claimed to have obtained much of his information about the British defeat at Isan'dhlwana from the Zulu Chief Usibepu who commanded an impi in the battle. There can be no doubt that Colenbrander's advice to the director of the film was underlined by the assumptions of 'civilization' versus 'barbarism'\(^{41}\). Since little remains of the original footage we must rely on the notes of a contemporary *Stage and Cinema* reviewer whose descriptions of the battle scenes suggest that *Symbol of Sacrifice* was indeed a greater spectacle than *De Voortrekkers*:

Over 25 000 people, White and Black, took part in the *Symbol of Sacrifice*, and the three big battle scenes – Isandhlwana, Rorke's Drift and Ulundi – leave nothing to the imagination. They are probably the most faithful reconstructions of historical battles ever depicted ... The mass of fighting, struggling, killing humanity seen in these battles is almost inconceivable\(^{42}\).
The *Cinema* described this film as a "document of inestimable value to contemporary history ... a picture which must still further enhance the reputation of the cinema and disarm the critic"\(^4\). Whereas earlier films had erected an acceptable stereotype of blacks in film, *Symbol of Sacrifice* appears to have questioned that construct, viewing the black as an unspoiled noble savage. Writing on this film, a second reviewer criticised this apparent elevation of blacks from folk devils in a raw state to noble folk heroes higher on the hierarchy of civilization. The following critique raises issues which have vexed South African film makers and distributors ever since:

the author and producer have managed cleverly to avoid giving offence to any section of the community. On the contrary, they have indicated the points of union and have shown that the symbol of sacrifice is the Flag of the Empire, which stands for the betterment of the human race. Englishmen and Dutchmen are shown standing together for the suppression of barbarism, and while all the better characteristics of the whites are necessarily emphasised, the bravery and faithfulness of the native is brought into prominence. Probably the real ruthlessness of the campaign, on one side at least, has not been more than suggested, and the men who were then savages have been endowed with sentiments far beyond their stage of development, but generally, the treatment of the subject was sound and careful. Obviously, the best expert advice has been used and no small, technical flaws can detract from the impression that it is a great historical romance\(^5\).

This illogical and highly contradictory statement raises a number of contemporary issues which continue to bedevil film making in this country. Again, like *De Voortrekkers*, the conflict has been displaced, again Boer and Briton stand together, again against savage hordes who this time appear to have been granted some cultural integrity\(^5\). In fact, the Boers never really participated in these wars, waiting rather on the sidelines to profit from the exhaustion of the two protagonists\(^6\). However, in the interests of capital and ideology, cinemetic reflections obscured these earlier conflicts through transference and endorsed the trends occurring
within the social formation of the time. From 1914 to 1918, for example, South Africa experienced a tremendous influx of blacks from the rural areas into urban employment. With demobilisation, whites returned home to find blacks doing jobs they had previously held. Consequently, the white working class agitated for a job colour bar which mining initially resisted because this industry was determined to retain its cheaper black labour. This is the conflict highlighted by the above review of Symbol of Sacrifice where capital was playing off black labour against white labour at the time of the film's release. The conflict was not a racial one but a class one with the bourgeoisie (English capital), the labour aristocracy (both English and Afrikaner) and the proleteriat proper (black labour) with the lumpen proleteriat (black unemployed) as the principle actors. It is this division which is fogged over in the text and interaction of roles in the film.

The above review highlights this conflict in the use of phrases like "avoid giving offence" which has become the slogan of the Directorate of Publications which interprets social roles in terms of hegemonic perceptions and social classes. What is offensive to the subordinate classes is 'natural' and 'inevitable' in terms of the ideology of the hegemonic bloc. Hence "the better characteristics of the whites are necessarily emphasised" to legitimise the contemporary social relations where the white English and Afrikaans labour aristocracies forced capital to displace blacks into subordinate worker positions through the job colour bar. As Frederick Johnstone comments, the origin of this labour control was not an irrational response to some deep-seated ideological beliefs or prejudices, but rather "a response to a specific class problem, produced by the system of production and the class structure from which the problem itself was derived". Thus, "men who were then savages" have been granted some of the fruits of civilization and put to productive work on a level determined by God, the bourgeoisie and the efforts of the white labour aristocracy.
Despite the undeniable epic quality of these two productions, AFP was unable to secure an adequate foothold on world circuits. *Symbol of Sacrifice* did attract a number of overseas buyers and was distributed in England by the Stoll Company, but "lack-intrinsic national appeal, the film was never revived in the manner of *De Voortrekkers* and within a few years, completely fell out of the general public's memory"\(^{50}\). Costing more than £30 000, it is unlikely that it earned its expected £65 000 from world rights\(^{50}\). The film's lesser public appeal may have been caused to some extent by changing ideological attitudes within the British Empire itself. Its limited audience was due to it being aimed primarily at the white bourgeoisie in South Africa which at that time was mainly English speaking. This contention is supported by the lack of an Afrikaans title or sub-titles, as well as the *Stage and Cinema* critics's contention that "What *De Voortrekkers* is to Dutch South Africans, the *Symbol of Sacrifice* will be to British South Africans\(^{51}\). Clearly, AFP did not consider the Afrikaans working class as an indispensable segment of the film's audience. Furthermore, the First World War had caused a disillusionment with the jingoistic values of 'God and Empire' which would have contributed to the premature dating of the film and its "Lacking intrinsic national appeal". During the world conflict there had been a need to boost these ideological themes and cultural responses on an international scale. However, once the appalling toll of the war had become realised, these themes began to be questioned and the whole ideology of 'Empire', 'glory', 'England forever' and so on were submerged under the realities of reconstruction and the pressures of the ensuing depression.

Also produced in 1918 was *King Solomon's Mines*. Its budget was considerably less than its two major predecessors, tailing off at £14 000. Released in 1919, this film had a successful distribution\(^{52}\). Six films were produced in 1919, including *Allan Quatermaine*, also from the Rider Haggard novel, on a budget of £16 000. The following year only four films were made, the most notable being *Prester John*\(^{53}\). The year 1921 saw only two titles, while 1923 marked the last of AFP's big productions in the form of *The Blue Lagoon* based on H de Vere
Stacpoole's novel. During the next fifteen years AFP produced only six features, although additional income was forthcoming from the continuous production of African Mirror, numerous documentaries and state sponsored shorts.

The Aftermath of World War I: South Africa's Inability to Compete on an International Scale

Of the 1916 to 1922 production phase, Gutsche comments that:

Despite its brave showing, African Film Productions was facing a growing number of difficulties. Outstanding among them was the predominance of the American industry which the war had made possible. By the end of the war, the overseas market was completely flooded with American productions which, since they were assured a steady demand were produced at break-neck speed at the minimum of cost and retailed at an extremely low figure. No expensively produced film stood a chance of competing with these shoddy productions whose cheapness was in fact their only virtue. The financial success of African Film Productions was largely contingent on the overseas market. South Africa itself offered far too small a cinema-going public to guarantee anything but the costs of production at best - all profits had perforce to be derived from the overseas market. In the face of American competition, South African films stood little chance and to be shown at all, many of them had to be sold at a loss.

In other words, the South African production industry was unable to lower the costs of production and cheapen the value of its product or films by means of technical improvements or mass production. Because of its larger domestic market, the American production line was able to raise the productivity of its labour through a renewal of fixed capital and sustain profits notwithstanding the resulting higher composition of organic capital. Despite the fact that the South African film production industry had been protected through weakened economic ties with the American metropole, it was still not able to compete internationally, because the American industry, at a period when the rest of the world was embroiled in hostility, was able to supply its own domestic market as well as those foreign territories which remained open to it. At the
termination of the war, the American industry rapidly penetrated the now receptive European market since production in these countries had largely ceased during the war. That cinema had not yet moved out of the silent stage meant a universal acceptance in these countries of American film. In contrast, the South African industry was unable to reap the benefits of economies of scale because it did not have easy access to large domestic or international markets. Higher costs and consequently AFP's inability to reduce its product below the prevailing social average (calculated on an international basis) curbed the growth of the local industry. Also at issue is quantity, for it is through continuous production that the American majors were able to force their films on the market through the mechanisms of block booking and blind selling whereby exhibitors are compelled to screen a specified number of films over a particular period for stipulated lengths of time. The small output of AFP was no match for the American industry whose volume overwhelmed world markets.

It appears that Schlesinger sought to counter his disadvantaged position by establishing a British based company, International Variety and Theatrical Agency (IVTA) in 1916. This firm acted as the London agent for the various South African entertainment companies under the Schlesinger umbrella, while also engaging in film production. This kind of economic expansion, known as "the internationalization of the forces of production" is characterised by an "increasing proportion of international trade movements which take place within the same international company". The vertically integrated South African cinema industry already controlled by Schlesinger, together with his interests in North America, India, Australia, Britain and so on, provided the pre-condition for the use of production sites located in different countries. It seems that Schlesinger wished to distribute his production stages to correspond with the most economically efficient supply of raw materials, labour, technology and sources of capital. This would have given him greater access to the British, and possibly Commonwealth markets, than he had been able to command in the past, while taking advantage of lower production costs in South Africa.
The two films co-produced with AFP on this basis were *Swallow* and *The Vultures' Prey* both made in 1922. The lack of more recent co-productions with IVTA suggests that these two films were not all that successful and IVTA subsequently concentrated on exporting theatrical stars to Schlesinger's stage activities in South Africa.

Stagnation in the Feature Film Production Industry 1923 - 1934

The myth that Johannesburg was considered a rival to Hollywood and that South Africa was to become the focus of international attention in the production sphere dates from the mid-1920s. Similar claims have been made for industries in other countries suitably endowed with clement weather, beautiful scenery and cheap labour, notably Australia. While Ken Hall dismisses the Australian connection without question, it seems that South Africa did indeed figure in the minds of both Hollywood and the British film industry. United Artists, Hal Roach Studios (in America) and Australian Film Ltd visited South Africa in December 1925 after having spent a year studying filming conditions in Australia. The idea was that American firms would produce scenic backdrops in South Africa which would then be photographically married with dramatic action enacted in the Hollywood studios. Despite the UA representative's enthusiasm, the South African connection was not exploited. Films set in South Africa continued to be made against American backgrounds. Exceptions were *The Washer Man* and *We're Going to be Rich*, both products of 20th Century Fox made in 1937. Backgrounds of early Johannesburg were obtained from constructed sets in the studio's California backlots.

In January 1926 "Jack Zinneman representing British interests ... propounded an almost identical scheme which was to make South Africa 'the Hollywood of the Empire'". Again, nothing came of this intention although AFP supplied personnel, equipment and footage for a number of overseas films shot in Africa. Despite the tenuousness of these investigations, the myth that South Africa once rivalled Hollywood continues in the minds of starry-eyed contemporary film makers.
What did occur, as will be recalled from the previous chapter, was that Schlesinger invested extensively on a short term basis in the British film industry towards the end of the decade stretching through the 1930s. This involvement was partially stimulated through the advent of Kinemas in 1929 which competed with Schlesinger not only in terms of cinemas, but in production as well.

Kinemas established a silent film production unit to produce topical shorts for their growing cinema chain and provided considerable competition for African Mirror. In September 1929 Schlesinger responded by founding African Talking Pictures which imported the apparatus required for the production and exhibition of sound films. Joseph Albrecht, AFP's veteran director, was sent to study talkie techniques with British Sound Films in which Schlesinger had a financial interest. On his return, in March 1930, Albrecht produced two sponsored talkie shorts: *In the Land of the Zulus* was the "first sound film of native life made by African Film Productions"\(^{62}\), the other was entitled *Durban - Lovers' Paradise*. It was not until 1939, however, that "African Mirror was issued with a spoken commentary (but without sound effects)"\(^{63}\).

The advent of sound prompted AFP to attempt their first dramatic production since Albrecht's *The Reef of Stars* made in 1924. The result was a short 5 minute featurette, *Sarie Marais*, which dealt with the song of the same title supporting a simple plot. The film was described by Hans Rompel as:

>a shocking piece of trash ... It was simply terrible - flatly banal, unimportant; just a reason to sing a song. And what is more, it annoyed so many Afrikaners that they simply refused to go and see *Moedertjie*, thinking it was something like that (i.e. *Sarie Marais*)\(^{64}\).

In contrast, Gutsche comments that "Its success encouraged African Film Productions to embark on a history-making production - the first Afrikaans talkie film"\(^{65}\). Entitled *Moedertjie*, this dramatic short was produced by Joseph Albrecht from Dr JFW Grosskopf's one act play, *In die Wagkamer*. The
response of the Afrikaans speaking section of the public was enthusiastic and in March 1933, Die Suid-Afrikaanse Akademie Vir Taal, Lettere en Kuns (the SA Academy of Language, Literature and Art) presented Albrecht with its gold medal:

in recognition of his work in adapting for the screen and directing the first talkie made in Afrikaans. The film Moedertjie was shown with great success in every town and village in South Africa where talking picture equipment was operating. In contradistinction to the report, Willier's maintains that these two films were not followed with bolder projects because they did not reap the financial benefits expected. As Rompel had predicted, neither was the anticipated cultural recognition forthcoming, as is indicated by the editor of the Huisgenoot who emphasised that the advance of Afrikaans to the inside of the cinema should be matched with Afrikaners being served in Afrikaans at the box office, a situation which did not come about until the next decade. Nevertheless, both Sarie Marais and Moedertjie were screened as part of the supporting programme of the annual revival of De Voortrekkers on Dingaan's Day at the Voortrekker Monument. As with previous pioneering films made by AFP, Schlesinger had managed to correctly assess and intercept the cultural and ideological themes which this time appealed to the growing Afrikaans audience, if not the purists represented by Rompel and commentators like the editor of Huisgenoot. Perhaps at the root of their disquiet was the fact that these Afrikaans films were made by a director who was of British origin and unable to speak Afrikaans. Die Brandwag, for example, alleged that Albrecht did not have the requisite Afrikaans literature or drama knowledge to choose a story himself: "A peculiar accident that the first lengthy Afrikaans sound film should have been made by someone not in command of Afrikaans".

The motivations behind the production of Moedertjie were certainly not cultural, but rather those of profit. The film capitalised on the sentiments spawned by Afrikaner Nationalism. The play had to be translated into English so that Albrecht
could write the scenario which was then translated back into Afrikaans. The early Afrikaner cultural euphoria notwithstanding, *Moedertjie* is what Rompel would call a "South African film made by a foreign, nationally dangerous organization 'in Afrikaans'". The stodgy stereotyping and superficial characterisations are hidden behind the novelty of the Afrikaans language on the soundtrack and the exposure of "some very well-known and beloved stage actors (who) starred in it". On this particular film, Rompel cynically comments that:

> It does not help to include a single short Afrikaans film such as *Moedertjie* in a programme full of foreign films, often dangerous to the nation (*volkswyninge*); it is too similar to the way in which one throws a bone to a dog because there is nothing left on which to chew. The few films which are made are simply exceptions that prove the rule because they exemplify no tact and one of the many reasons for this is a financial one.

This 'racial' debate marked the beginnings in film texts of a cultural fragmentation between English and Afrikaner which had its origins in the wider political economy. The fracturing of values, attitudes and ideologies manifested itself in the desire by the Afrikaner to follow his inherited culture or 'way of life'. This change of attitude was largely stimulated by the success of Afrikaner cultural organizations and the Broederbond which aimed to transform the 'foreign' capitalist system imposed on South Africa by the British and adapt it to the Afrikaner national character. As things stood at this time, "the Afrikaner [had] to adapt himself to this capitalist and English economic system ... beco*m/ing/* an English worker with an English outlook on life". The consequence was argued to lead to a "spiritual deterioration" which in turn leads to "economic retrogression". These remarks referred to the second massive Afrikaner migration to the cities, the first being the time immediately after the Anglo-Boer War. It was a period of cultural trauma, social uprooting, and extreme poverty. The 'enemy' was capitalism, particularly an English dominated capitalism which repressed the Afrikaner in all spheres of life. Not only had the
Afrikaner been humiliated in schools and shops, but:

it was more oppressive in our daily existence as members of an all-embracing socio-economic whole, of an impoverished platteland and British-Jewish-dominated growing urban complexes. We were the poor and the Poor Whites, the Boers without markets and without capital; the lowly-paid unskilled workers in the mines and the factories; we were the civil servants in the inferior jobs, on the railways, in the post office, in the police.

When the great drought came, we were the first who had to toil merely to live; and when the Great Depression came, we were the first unemploy-ed. Brotherhood did not escape this at all; it was in it and struggled with it.75

THE FRACTURING OF THE ENGLISH-AFRIKANER ALLIANCE

The Rise of Afrikaner Cultural Resistance in Cinema

In 1934 production began on Gaumont-British's *Rhodes of Africa* assisted by AFP personnel and equipment. Unlike previous epics of this nature, the film was subject to South African government interference. In July of that year, Gaumont-British had received a letter from the Prime Minister's (General Hertzog) office requesting that care be taken to avoid incidents likely to excite "racial prejudice". Scenario writer, Sarah Gertrude Millin, responded that she saw nothing in the script to arouse racial feeling.76 After a discussion with South African officials, it was decided that if contentious issues could not be avoided, the production would be cancelled:

The scenario however, achieved such evasion and on 13th November 1934, Mr Lee, vice-president of the Gaumont-British Corporation met General Smuts, Minister of Justice, and obtained his sanction, the original objection against the treatment of the Jameson Raid being withdrawn.77

These negotiations should be seen against the background of the Great Depression. In a measure to counteract its debili-tating effects, South Africa re-inflated its economy by going off the gold standard. This was a time of deep
structural and financial crisis when the ruling political party was no longer able to maintain hegemonic control. The two leading parties, the Nationalist and South African Parties formed a coalition as the United Party. The threat to this very shaky coalition culminated in a polarization on the one hand of ardent English-speaking voters in the guise of the Dominion Party, which demanded closer links between the South African government and the British Empire, and Afrikaans extremists on the other who, under the leadership of Dr Malan, formed the Purified (Herenigte) National Party which aimed to lead South Africa to a republican status. This political conjuncture obviously has strong parallels with the Transvaal Republic at the time of the Jameson raid when conflict in the political arena had also revolved around issues of imperialism versus republicanism and the protagonists had similarly been English versus Afrikaner groupings. Smuts and Hertzog's distrust of the film should therefore be seen as a reaction to a situation which they felt would encourage further polarization and increasingly threaten the hegemonic position of the government in power. Not unexpectedly, when released on 18 May 1936 in Johannesburg, the film satisfied no-one:

Suddenly there was a storm of protest, the English and Afrikaans press uniting in condemnation of a production which was neither a truthful representation of Rhodes himself nor the events with which he was concerned. Outstanding among its jarring features were the complete inappositeness of Walter Huston in the title rôle; the fictitious events by which Rhodes was made personally to bargain with Kruger over a railway line and later to plead for the life of Jameson, as well as his meeting with Lobengula; the maladroitness of the scenes featuring Kruger and Mrs Kruger (who appeared as caricatures to some spectators while real offence was caused to others by the sight of Kruger reading the Bible and smoking at the same time, dipping his bread into his coffee and eating it noisily, and refusing to offer Rhodes a cup of coffee despite the suggestion of his wife); and the thorough-misrepresentation of authentic historical material as supplied by Mrs Millin's biography. The 'location shots' taken by the production unit in Southern Rhodesia were unanimously acclaimed; but no word of praise could be found for the film as a whole. At best, certain of its episodes were commended. Public protests were made by Afrikaner
bodies throughout the country and appeals were addressed to the Minister of the Interior to prohibit the exhibition of the film owing to its farcical representation of Paul Kruger and its offence to those who venerated his memory. The Board of Censors was severely stigmatized for having permitted its exhibition. The Afrikaanse Studentebond entered a vigorous protest at its congress in Bloemfontein in June and similar sentiments were voiced elsewhere, frequently with appreciative mention of the support spontaneously accorded by the English speaking section.

Another major cinematic controversy was to plague the Fusion government before the end of the decade. Far more serious in its implications was the film *Die Bou van 'n Nasie/They Built a Nation*, sponsored by the Publicity and Travel Department of the South African Railways and Harbours Administration. This state body had been continually active in the sponsoring of scenic, industrial and ethnic documentaries since 1910. An office located in London in 1920 disseminated these films overseas, most of which were made by AFP. Concerned not only with attracting tourists and presenting a positive industrial image of South Africa, it operated as an ideological node which ensured that the dominant ideological discourse and cultural perception was maintained for visitors, both potential and actual, as well as South African citizens.

Impressed by the way film was being used by Germany to project its national image, the Cabinet Minister of the SA Railways and Harbours, Oswald Pirow, motivated the government sponsorship of *Die Bou van 'n Nasie/They Built a Nation* which was produced by AFP during 1937-38. The film was to cover "the entire history of South Africa from the rounding of the cape by Bartholomew Diaz in 1486 to the Act of Union in 1910 ... [and] ... made unprecedented demands of an industry which for many years had been confined to straightforward documentary work". Pirow took a personal interest in the film and granted permission prior to its completion for its screening at the Voortrekker Centenary Celebrations to be held in Pretoria at the Monument in December 1938. The production of this film should therefore be seen against the background of Pirow's political views. As Dunbar Moodie observes:
As early as 1934, he had declared himself for a republic and dictatorship. At the same time, he eschewed in Hertzogite fashion any ethnic classification of the Afrikaner people, declaring that "Our People" included "all of those who make South Africa their home, regardless of their European origins or their home language" (*Die Republikein*, October 19, 1934). In 1940, Pirow announced himself in favour of a "New Order" which would consist of a strongly centralised white South African state in which home language would be unimportant. Its appeal was explicitly white, middle class, anti-communist, and racist - rather than ethnic.

Against this portrait it is possible to explain why the Afrikaans version was only considered as an afterthought and why AFP was subjected to attack from the Afrikaans press which alleged that the Afrikaans version was receiving less attention than the English edition. Nevertheless, at its first invited screening on 12 December 1938 the film was "accorded rapturous praise" by the Afrikaner press. The English press was much more critical and pointed up the obvious ideological contradictions. Where, in previous historical dramas such as *De Voortrekkers* and *Symbol of Sacrifice*, Britain and Boer had stood together, now complained the editor of the *Sunday Times* of *Die Bou van 'n Nasie/They Built a Nation*:

> it has very few bouquets to throw in the direction of Great Britain. England, in a nebulous sort of way, is the 'villain of the peace' and although there may be some historical authority for British shortcomings, it is scarcely meet that a Fusionist Government, asking for English-speaking support, should dig so industriously in the graveyard of the past, particularly in the face of all that British enterprise and British magnanimity have done to make the Union of South Africa a concrete fact.

The film was not released until May 1939, five months after its preview, having also missed the Centenary Celebrations for which it had been promised by Pirow. While the English press complained about the omission of blacks in the evolution of South African history and its overly Afrikaner slant, the Afrikaans press considered it to have accurately portrayed the
the historical processes which would ultimately lead to the "the free republic of South Africa". One commentator defended its "spiritual cooperation", its avoidance of "partisan sentiment" and how "the English colonists and Afrikaners suffered and toiled together on the frontiers in the task of opening up the country". The Cape Times, on the other hand, noted the "one-sidedness of the film ... in its handling of some of the historical passages, its perfunctory treatment of Rhodes and Milner and its silence about the part played by South Africans of British descent in the building up of the nation".

The escalation of the film's budget from £35 000 to £68 000 was further cause for discontent on the part of English speakers, but:

By now it had become apparent that the Afrikaans version of Die Bou van 'n Nasie had become a powerful propaganda instrument with which to whip the Afrikaner community (already emotionalised by the Voortrekker Centenary Celebrations) into further stages of intense nationalism inimical to Fusionist ideal.

The cultural and ideological divisions which Die Bou van 'n Nasie/They Built a Nation identified were further exacerbated by 'n Nasie Hou Koers (A Nation Maintains Direction), the amateur film on the Centenary Celebrations made under the direction of Hans Rompel, a psychiatrist and intellectual. It was shown a month before the outbreak of the Second World War and "continued the emotionalising effect which Die Bou van 'n Nasie had begun", for many influential Afrikaners supported Nazi Germany, not the Allied forces.

Amateur Film Making and Afrikaner Cultural Practices

Again, we must look to the Voortrekker Centenary Celebrations of 1938 which fuelled the already apparent social, cultural, and political movement which was to direct the course of Afrikaner and South African history. Ivor Wilkins and Hans Strydom comment that:
It is difficult to find another single event which stirred Afrikaner emotion more between the Anglo-Boer War and the Second World War than the symbolic oxwagon trek of 1938. Not even the people who planned and organized it, the Afrikaner Broederbond, had the faintest idea it would be such an overwhelming success. It served to reunite Afrikaners in one nationalism and played a most significant role in the 1948 election victory.

It was this event and the enthusiasm for an amateur film production unit it engendered which enabled Rompel to create RARO under the auspices of the Reddingsdaadbond. The cultural fervour stimulated by this symbolic trek rubbed off on the large body of amateur cameramen who filmed the Celebrations beginning with the ox wagon treks from various parts of the country. The ambience of the event was an important contributor to their later, more formal operations where membership was restricted to Afrikaner cinematographers:

What started out as a fairly inconspicuous attempt to celebrate the centenary of the Great Trek by sending a team of oxwagons from Cape Town to Pretoria became a rousing national movement. At the final celebrations 200 000 Afrikaners camped for days at Monument Koppie, the site chosen for the Voortrekker Monument to be completed 10 years later. Along the route to Pretoria thousands of Afrikaners - some travelling hundreds of miles - came to see the oxwagons, to touch them, to pray for them.

*Nasie Hou Koers* is the title of the film which recorded this event. Owned by the Voortrekkerbeweeging (the Afrikaner Scout Movement), it was completed a year later in 1939. Five hours in duration, it was usually shown in two sections with interval taking the form of a "braaivleisaand" (cooking of meat over an open fire). This film, according to Gutsche, "was accorded the most rapturous and sustained enthusiasm that had ever been accorded a film shown in South Africa with the possible exception of De Voortrekkers."

The genesis of RARO was dealt with in Chapter 2 and so this section will deal with RARO's ideological discourse and its effect on the content of their films. While RARO's significance is of minimal importance in the history of Afrikanerdom
in its bid to capture power from English capital, the influence of its parent body, the Reddingsdaadbond cannot be underestimated. This controlling organization was staffed with organic intellectuals who clearly understood their role as political functionaries leading an attack on the English dominated capitalist hegemony. The battleground for this attack was to be in the cities where "protected jobs and higher wages for skilled- non-whites equal with whites" and "free competition between white and coloured and black" reduced wages overall\textsuperscript{95}. One of the economic effects of this capitalist system where Afrikaners were subordinate with blacks was the 'poor white', mainly Afrikaans-speaking individual. Where the Reddingsdaadbond, like the Broederbond which administered it, sought to mobilise the demoralised urban Afrikaner in the onslaught on English capitalist hegemony, RARO in contrast was still following Dr Malan's 1923 strictures where he urged urban Afrikaners to be resettled on the platteland (country areas)\textsuperscript{96}. As an organic intellectual then, Rompel did not qualify, but as the initial spark of the Afrikaans film movement which was to smoulder on and off for the next 20 years, his contribution is important and warrants detailed discussion.

Rompel was assisted in the organization and administration of RARO by a number of important Afrikaner leaders, many of whom later spent the duration of the Second World War in detention due to their overt Nazi sympathies. In an attempt to derive an 'authentic' Afrikaans cinema, Rompel fervently but eclectically studied aspects of world cinema history. He and his colleagues lectured on Afrikaans cinema and film theory at every possible opportunity, wrote books and published Die RARO Joumaal\textsuperscript{97}. One journalist with an interest in film history claimed that "this group of amateurs can justly be called the 'fathers' of the Afrikaans film"\textsuperscript{98}

The American industry was dismissed by Rompel as a "dream factory" in the service of "large magnates" whose interests included many strategic sectors of the economy\textsuperscript{99}. Its apparent directionless nature "conceals a conscious goal"\textsuperscript{100}, one that propagates a particular lifestyle which it attempts to
persuade viewers to emulate. The maintenance of the capitalist system underlies the deliberate ploy of American cinema to keep the public satisfied under all circumstances, both with business conditions and their own personal lives.\textsuperscript{102}

Rompel obviously understands how the capitalist system, aided by the "dream factory" mystifies the relations of production:

The dream factory must deliver the kind of material that the dreamers want, but at the same time it must be presented in such a way that the dreamer does not see the rich American millionaire with who knows how many motor cars, horses and mistresses in his worldly house, suddenly wake up and think: 'Why can I not live such a life?'. Thus the dreamers must be kept within the dream - happy and satisfied.\textsuperscript{102}

Any attempt by the scriptwriter in Hollywood to cut through this dream is itself subverted in production, maintains Rompel. The blame for not having achieved opulence is shifted onto the individual him/herself. The capitalist ideological discourse of American cinema correlated closely with the Afrikaner perception of the workings of capital in South Africa at the time. The economy was predominantly owned by English speakers who often acted as comprador and interior bourgeoisies for imperial and international capital. On the sidelines and relegated to positions of subservience were the defeated Afrikaners who felt that their wealth was being systematically stripped away and exported, mainly to England. The materialistically inspired dream propagated by commercial cinema had therefore to be combatted. RARO saw it as its duty to make those Afrikaners facing proletarianisation aware of how Hollywood films legitimised the existing capitalist relations of production which in the South African context worked counter to the Afrikaner and his economic interests.

According to Rompel, this alien American influence spread throughout Europe and enlisted the aid of film capitalists in those countries. Opposition, we are informed, stemmed mainly from artists and intellectuals who fought American capitalist
influence on the grounds of aesthetics and the cultural maxim: "Volke van Europa, beskerm jy heilige geestesgoedere" (People of Europe, protect your holy spiritual values)\textsuperscript{105}. This conflict was seen in terms of a volksgevoel (national emotion)\textsuperscript{106} which resisted the alien insidious cultural and financial domination of American infiltration into volks (the volks own) European film production. The German industry, for example, was by 1932 "leeg, dood en volksvreemd" (empty, dead and alienated)\textsuperscript{105}. The Nazi government took steps to rectify this undesirable situation, one of them being to subject "wisselparasiete maatskappye" (parasitical debt-bonded companies) to financial examination by the "Reyksbank" (apparently the Film Credit Bank). Many of these companies which refused to "sanify" themselves were owned by Jews, but this problem was overcome by forcing the small weak companies to affiliate with the larger more healthy culturally controlled organizations\textsuperscript{106}. This action, argued Rompel, led to the formation of three major cinema groupings which were co-opted in the service of National Socialism. In fact, the actual processes and apparatuses devised by the Nazi government were far more complex than described by Rompel. The entire industry was infiltrated by the state which bought up shares through a front company called Cautio which was directly responsible to Goebbels' Reich Ministry for Popular Enlightenment and Propaganda\textsuperscript{107}. The strategy followed by the Nazi government bears a remarkable resemblance to the course adopted by the now defunct Department of Information in acquiring film companies during the 1970s as fronts to disseminate apartheid ideological discourse.

A close supervision by the Nazi state from content through to registration and training of film critics brought about considerable improvements in German cinema by 1939 concludes Rompel. Not least a contributor to this improvement was the eradication of the Jewish element from the industry. The fault, states Rompel, did not lie so much with the Jewish contribution itself, as it did with the inevitable cultural dilution which comes about when films are made for both local and foreign markets. The result was the inclusion of alien
and questionable influences which detracted from the purity of a volkszie portrayal.\textsuperscript{108}

While the Nazi restructuring of the German industry gave Rompel some pointers as to how a South African industry should be managed and controlled, most of his ideas on content were gleaned from the experience of early Russian cinema propelled by the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917. Rompel was particularly impressed with Lenin's use of the cinema in spreading ideas for a new socialist society: "Here are few dreams, but hard, stark reality; here are also no attempts to disguise the situation."\textsuperscript{109} Of particular importance to Rompel was the fact that Bolshevik film making started with the activity of a promising amateur named Sergei Eisenstein\textsuperscript{110} who meshed both established and amateur film makers into a vibrant propaganda machine. Not overly interested in the Soviet cinema theories, Rompel described them as being "far from logical", even Eisenstein's work being "full of contradictions and generalization"\textsuperscript{111}. Rompel was more interested in the methods of production which had been devised by the Soviet directors under the circumstances of revolution. He often quotes Leonatjarski, the Bolshevik Commissaris for Proletariat Culture, who was asked by Lenin to set up a film industry for the dissemination of Bolshevik ideology, for example, "The cinema is a building tool of reality and its striving."\textsuperscript{112} In many respects the Russian experience was similar to the problems that Rompel was faced with in South Africa: insufficient capital for studios, sets and backlots meant that use had to be made of newsclips shot in the open; in the absence of experienced actors, ordinary people had to suffice\textsuperscript{113}; and most important, young, enthusiastic directors with a "relatively limited experience of film work were drawn from the ranks of the people and thereby both understood and were part of the volkszie (the people's soul) and the volksgeseeel (the people's emotions).\textsuperscript{114}

Four major areas of importance in the production of early Soviet film were considered crucial by Rompel for a culturally coherent cinema imbued with an Afrikaner national identity. The first concerned the choice of performers. Other than
major roles calling for a trained actor, participants were to be selected from the masses: soldiers, farmers, work men etc. These people were not asked to interpret strange roles but simply to be themselves and behave as they would naturally under the different circumstances the film explored. A second characteristic was the use of rows and the isolation, in close up, of one of its members to metonymically symbolise the emotions of the larger group. This leads to the third point which relates to the problem of realism. No make-up or ageing techniques were to be used. Players should be chosen on the basis of their real age, appearance, occupation and so on. Finally, the manner in which the subject matter was approached was recognised as being more important than the subject itself, for it is this which makes the film culture-specific and nationally pure.

One of the few Afrikaans film makers to publish his thoughts, Rompel, like Eisenstein, saw film as subservient to the interests of cultural identity. But contrary to Eisenstein who set out to create and manipulate an ideological perspective, Rompel claimed that the Afrikaner reflects his true God-given orientation in film. It is possibly this difference which led Rompel to remark on the 'contradictory' nature of the Soviet theories. Thus the link between Russian cinema and the blueprint proposed by Rompel must be approached through an examination of Rompel's statement where he says, "The Russians used a totally new technique, the aesthetic-theoretical movements of which are of no relevance." By blithely ignoring the socio-economic and theoretical postulates of the Russian directors and concentrating purely on their solution to certain technical problems, Rompel totally misinterpreted what the Russians set out to do and what motivated them. By emphasising the qualities of "absolute realism" and "faithfulness to nature" and the "natural" status of the actor found in Soviet Cinema, while at the same time ignoring the theoretical derivation and discursive base, Rompel missed their connection between theory and practice. He was unaware of how dialectically derived film theory mediated ideological experiences in a culturally specific way through the principle of montage.
It was this editing technique which obliterated the distinction between performer and the setting in which s/he performs by ideologically guiding the viewer's reaction along a closed chain of pre-determined responses. Where Eisenstein acknowledged that 'reality' could be filmed in any number of different ways, but only one interpretation being valid, Rompel seems to argue that there is only one reality -- a God given set of conditions, a pre-existent state of being, uncluttered by ideological interpretations. Furthermore, he argues that only true sons of the Afrikaner nation are able to authentically document their cultural truths.

Having assessed the American, German, Russian and briefly discussed the industries of other European countries, Rompel then detailed a strategy whereby the "Soul of South African Film" could be captured. Neither De Voortrekkers nor Die Bou van 'n Nasie qualify. Moedertjie was dismissed as "a small effort". Rompel implied that because these were not filmed by Afrikaners they lacked a credible Afrikaner spirit. Suitable subjects had to be recorded by Afrikaners: "because only when they have breathed the genuine, inherent spirit, can they be sincere and works of art".

Commercial "bioscope organizations", pointed out Rompel, avoided the cultural task because they saw no profit in such a national objective. Film making is expensive and Rompel argued that an unhealthy situation had arisen where an industry based on an artform came under the control of business. This led to increased costs where a high degree of technical organization resulted in a loss of artistic input as technicians were reduced to mere workers.

The film, 'n Nasie Hou Koers, showed what amateurs can do and Rompel observed that amateurs always played an important role in the development of film industries: "It was the amateurs who gave the film industry its impetus and it was the amateurs who at every turn gave it a new push". Rompel pointed to the involvement of intellectuals in the search for new directions. These intellectuals were also the amateurs who eventually
moved into the film industry. Once they had done so, however, they became subject to the constraints of commercialism. On the other hand, as amateurs, they were forced to work alone because of a lack of socially and culturally committed organizations.

The Afrikaans cinema envisaged by Rompel was to act as a catalyst for cultural cohesion ensuring that Afrikaners play their designated roles and act out their functions as members of the same exclusive class within the web of social relations. The main thrust of his thesis called for the genesis of an Afrikaans cinema developed in narrow contact with the Afrikaner soil (bodem) from whence will come their inspiration. The Afrikaner was located by Rompel in an unspoiled rural setting, unthreatened by alien influences:

What form the typical Afrikaans film art will take is difficult to forecast, though one can immediately see that a broad tranquility of pace, a delicate, sometimes light-hearted humour and a love of nature as only those who are truly in contact with nature can have, can be qualities thereof. The fact that these qualities are not always typical of the city Afrikaner changes nothing, because at the root of the matter the city Afrikaner is not radically different from his rural counterparts; the (not always attractive) special qualities of the city Afrikaner form but a very thin veneer on the solid inherited Boere-character.

In the attainment of a pure idealistic Volks-film, one should be wary of the evils of the city, warned Rompel. The very creation of cities and the consequent capitalist structure they serve was an anathema to the Afrikaner cultural worker of the 1940s. Dr P Meyer, then Secretary-General of the FAK, describes the society that could have been were it not for British imperialism:

The Afrikaner created for himself a specific economic system which was given expression in the agricultural life on the farms. But the full development of this system was stopped by the British conquest of the country and replaced by a foreign imported system. The people of South Africa as a result had no opportunity to develop its own South African system on a Calvinist basis. If that had been the case,
it would not have been a capitalistic system.

It is this 'what might have been' philosophy which underlies the cultural objectives of Rompel's proposed Afrikaans cinema. Cities had no place in this type of society. It is not surprising therefore that the recurring image of the evil city is endemic to nearly all Afrikaans cinema until the mid-1970s. This representation will be examined more fully in the discussion of the Eden film in Chapter 10. The essence of the Eden film as espoused by Rompel was that Afrikaners must be kept culturally pure and must be cleansed of any alien influences that might have infected them in their learning of the film craft from the foreigners who necessarily will have taught them. Furthermore, there was no place in an Afrikaans cinema at any stage of the production process for the star system, dialogue, Hollywood methods, Jews or non-Afrikaners of any kind. A unity between the state and the people in conjunction with the above attributes were intrinsic components in the attainment of the ideal Volks-film.

The two exigences published by Rompel and his copios writing in Die RARO Journaal were clearly intended to suggest how the deployment of film could be used as an ideological weapon to fend off volksvreemde (alien) and volksegaarlike (dangerous to the nation) influences. Fundamental to his goal of protecting the Afrikaans national heritage was the need for film makers in their role as organic intellectuals to remain amateurs free of the business constraints imposed by a professional status. The extent of Rompel's influence on content in subsequent Afrikaans film will be dealt with in forthcoming chapters. Suffice it to say at this point that RARO did not survive the War for, primarily an organization of amateurs, it initially owed its existence to funding from the Reddingsdaadbond and later its commercial activities through VOFI, which decreased substantially during the War. A lack of supplies due to the hostilities exacerbated RARO's difficulties and forced it into dormancy. More important, however, it appears that Rompel's philosophy did not coincide with the aims and objectives of the Reddingsdaadbond which
were primarily economic in character and made pragmatic use of all the material phenomena that Rompel saw as evils threatening the Afrikaner's national identity and cultural cohesion. Because Rompel did not intercept the objective material requirements of Afrikanerdom at that conjuncture, many of his ideas were stillborn and did not find wider currency.

The strategy that Rompel proposed for the creation of a Volks-eie Afrikaanse Rolprentwese (the Nation's Own Afrikaans Film Character) can be obtained from a reading of his booklets, but it is necessary here to discuss the impact of sister Afrikaner cultural organizations which made use of film to propagate Afrikaner values and endorse its self-perceptions. As mentioned in Chapter 2, one of these concerned VObI. Rompel reports that preparations for the establishment of VObI were made as early as 1937-38 when it was realised that a distribution organization should precede production. Registered in 1941, it took over SA Commercial and Educational Services Ltd, a firm which had supplied films, projectors and electrical apparatus to schools and other bodies. It acquired soon thereafter an existing production company, UTOLo, which was to produce films to supplement VObI's imported programme. The aim was to service "the implacable call of the volk to build up an own Afrikaans film industry" and to produce "indigenous pictures which breathe the Afrikaner spirit and country, pictures which are entirely our own." Costs should be kept to a minimum and the temptation of expensive commercial productions should be suppressed, warned Rompel, because such large-scale production requires studios, diversification and the use of outside organizations, all of which would vitiate the cultural identity which was the rationale behind the setting up of purely Afrikaner companies. Again, he offered the assistance of RARO amateurs and experience:

Where commercial production will soon be forced to keep within narrow limits, and to stay on the beaten track, because the available scope is so narrow, RARO is in a position to experiment with new directions - since not only are production costs unbelievably low, but the love that RARO's enthusiastic group of film amateurs have for their hobby, lends itself to a healthy quest for experimentation.
At this stage, however, Rompel's influence was already on the wane. With only 200 members in 1945 and not a member of the Reddingsdaadband, his participation was perforce secured through the Voortrekkerbeweeging's film on the 1938 Centenary Celebrations and ox wagon trek. His plea for continued contacts with RARO indicated a disenchantment by his colleagues of the RARO philosophy which, other than its externalization in 'Nasie Hou Koers', gained little support from the proletarian Afrikaner who preferred the commercial fare offered in luxurious cinemas. RARO's refusal to use sound did not help matters, and it became suspicious of VOBI when Donker Spore (1944) was made, apparently because VOBI interfered with their own plans for a RARO distribution network. A VOBI representative, Heins du Preez, comments on the experience of trying to compose a supporting programme for Donker Spore:

When we made Donker Spore we went to RARO and said "Can you give us a programme?" But they were hostile. They said, "No, we want to show it ourselves". By then Rompel was out and there were other people in control and they only had the beautiful Ons Staan 'n Dag Oor and Nieuws Oor Montane Sources which had nice photography in Kodachrome, spliced together. But what can you do if you have five units going over the country and you only have one original? Colour copies could not be made at the time. So the whole idea of RARO supplying films to a circuit established by VOBI was nonsense - they couldn't do it, RARO never got into production.

The operations of VOBI were made possible through the technological advancements of the 16mm film gauge resulting from the need by war cinemaphotographers to be equipped with light, durable cameras which used non-flammable stock. VOBI were quick to assess the advantage of this gauge for their cultural purposes: cheaper than 35mm, it could be used more easily in outlets other than theatres with a wider distribution in smaller towns presently not served with the more cumbersome 35mm equipped cinemas. At this time, VOBI's production arm, UTOLO, was claimed to be the only 16mm crew using synchronised sound in South Africa. Particularly impressed with the propagandistic success of the 16mm recruitment films used in the United States and its use in schools for educational purposes
and Churches for evangelical work, VOBI argues that the most effective use of film should be assessed in terms of its service to the Volk. This required a move away from the use of film merely for entertainment purposes to its development in more healthy and purer national objectives.

VOBI mapped out plans for action in areas of the Church, agriculture, education and culture. It is the last of these that holds particular interest for this study. The alien influences introduced with imported films, most of which were in English, had little value for Afrikaner culture, argued a VOBI spokesman. He charged that more is known by Afrikaans cinema-goers about New York and the Grand Canyon than they know of Cape Town or Knysna, not to mention the penchant for American dances over their own Afrikaans folk dances. Cinema therefore had to be mobilized, not only to rescue Afrikaner culture from strange influences, but to actively engage in a strategy of cultural production. In order to accomplish this urgent task, VOBI pronounced a four-tiered programme:

1. The use of sound was imperative and proposed films should make use of "absolutely pure" Afrikaans so that the youth would refrain from parroting foreign phrases like "Buddy", "Baby" and "Okay". An Afrikaans cinema would teach them to come to trust their own language in its ability to express the most sacred of Afrikaner emotions. The silent cinema postulated by Rompel was incapable of this goal which touched on one of the most culturally revered aspects of Afrikanerdom;

2. Films must be made on the South African soil (bosem), reflecting Afrikaner morals, habits and life views which rest on a Christian foundation. Scenes should project the rich Afrikaans past in such a way that everyone would be proud of their forefathers and draw confidence in their history and national heroes;

3. Afrikaans film should reflect literature and poetry and encourage a love of reading of indigenous literature. This cinema should identify volksmonumente (national monuments) and teach Afrikaners to protect what is theirs
through a burgeoning national consciousness. It should unify Afrikaner patriots of all the provinces. Most important:

4. Afrikaans film must teach that patriots speak one language, have the same culture, are descendant from the same ancestors and are inspired by the same ideals and aspirations.

While Rompel would certainly not quarrel with the latter three objectives, RARO and VOBI diverted in their plans in how to achieve these aims. Rompel, it will be remembered, was against extravagant operations. VOBI, on the other hand, intended producing on a large scale with the increased availability of material and apparatus after the War. Distribution would reach all areas of South Africa previously isolated from Afrikaner cultural projects. Where suitable halls were absent or were contracted to "alien companies" (i.e. ACT), they were to be built with the help of cultural organizations and were to become the focal point for cultural activities. The ideas expounded by Rompel in his books:

probably had an influence on the people behind the Reddingsdaadbond to get them to form VOBI and eventually UTOLO, but not much else suggests Heins du Preez who joined VOBI as a sound recordist in 1944. He went on to say, "When we made Donker Spore we didn't even look at Rompel. I only read Rompel after I had to compile a chapter for a book in 1977". Despite the lack of cooperation or consensus as far as Rompel was concerned, specific ideas gleaned from the Russian directors lived on:

According to du Preez:

Eisenstein's The Film Sense was our Bible. My impression is that the young chaps today just have a camera and fire away. I don't know if they even read. The Film Sense opened up a whole new world to me.

Thus, RARO and VOBI differed not only in production techniques but in theoretical emphasis as well. Where Rompel had dismissed the Soviet theories (but not the conditions of
production), the film makers in VOBi tried to adapt them in a non-Marxist manner to South African conditions, with the added complication of sound.

The high cost of production, according to the managing director of VOBi, E Kohl, demanded admission prices as high as those paid for imported movies and representations were made to the Provincial governments to waive the entertainment tax charged on the sale of cinema tickets where indigenous productions were concerned. Such a relaxation, it was argued, would give Afrikaans films a competitive edge over rival commercial fare screened by established cinema chains. This course of action by far exceeded the bounds of an Afrikaans cinema submitted by Rompel. A production and distribution operation of this scale would have to be commercially supported, a path which horrified RARO which seemed more and more to be out of step with actual conditions occurring in the political economy. The economic trends which they resisted were actively intercepted and used to advantage by the Afrikaner Broederbond whose aims were primarily economic, with culture assuming a secondary importance and being co-opted only in so far as it assisted with the capture of the English dominated capitalist system. VOBi, in contrast, was sensitive to these processes¹⁹⁶, and sought to deploy cinema in the economic class struggle as well. Where Rompel's ideal film was rurally oriented in God, family and Church, VOBi planned a political onslaught to lubricate the increasing Afrikaner infiltration of the economy:

Where today in South Africa we have to contend with large political questions such as, for example, the communist danger and the Indian-question, etc – all serious questions that threaten to undermine our Christian civilization, the cinema is the ideal medium with which to fight them. Our striving is to have a white South Africa with a Christian culture. But it is through the medium of film that it is possible to present propaganda to the people which will have the result of thwarting such evils as communism in our land¹⁹⁶.

The deployment of film in this cultural task was considered of crucial importance by the officials of VOBi in the attainment of a united, economically strong, Christian, civilized
people who wanted to protect their mother language. In this regard Kohl reminds us of Thomas Edison's supposed maxim: "He who controls the cinema also controls the people". By the end of 1944, however, UTOLO had made little headway in attracting capital despite the sympathy and support of the Afrikaans press. At their third AGM in that year, UTOLO complained that the attitude 'first show us what you can do before we invest' placed the company in an impossible position because it was unable to 'show what it could do' until it had the necessary capital.

Afrikaner business was appealed to for support so that VOBH/UTOLO would be able to expand their previously intermittent war-time activity into a powerful officially recognised people's organization by 1947 which would provide leadership and truly serve the people in every area of its endeavour. It is no wonder then that English speaking commentators reacted with the cynicism and hostility that they did once these kinds of sentiments appeared to have been given official sanction in the Cilliers Film Committee Report (discussed in Chapter 2).

VOBH published a monograph outlining their philosophy and plans for future expansion in 1946. They had, however, been producing cinematic material since 1941, a fact which they meticulously neglect to mention. It is to these productions that we now turn. Their first film was *Lug van 'n Eeu* made in 1942 documenting the history of the Afrikaans churches in the Transvaal. It was apparently never completed and shown only a few times in rough form. *Donker Spore*, based on Langenhoven's novel followed in 1944. It was made over weekends and evenings with roles being filled by friends of the producer, Louis Wiesner, an ex-Koffiefontein internee, and took more than a year to complete. During the shooting, Wiesner proudly reported that Afrikaans equivalents were found to replace English words for controlling production procedures: "Gereed vir aandag", for example, substituted for "stand by". Given the excitement of Afrikaans being accepted as a 'film language', this parallel development of a production language
in Afrikaans was seen as an important cultural advance, one that would assist in building up a pure Afrikaans film industry. The roles were played by a number of highly influential Afrikaner organic intellectuals, three of whom were later to head the South African Broadcasting Corporation under a Nationalist government. These were Gideon Roos, Douglas Fuchs and Jan Schutte. Piet Meiring was to join the Department of Information and the director, Kowie Marais, had also been an internee during the early part of the war.241

Despite optimistic predictions concerning the film's earning potential,242 it barely covered its production costs and incurred tremendous expense in distribution which spread to the most remote corners of the country. Little support was forthcoming from the cities since use had to be made of little-known halls in the suburbs. The problems of distribution and exhibition are outlined by Heins du Preez:

VOBI showed it with great difficulty. I did some of the shows in the Free State and that made me realise that we can't go on like this. You couldn't get people to do that sort of work, and the grade of men - we had so many problems with them - stealing money and not turning up at the time. The organisation in Johannesburg was fairly good but there was no guarantee in a place like Upington, for instance. On arrival I would go to the garage (or the dominee) which was our agent and find that all our posters are still rolled up somewhere. When you put them over the car fitted with a loudspeaker and tell all the people to come tonight to the show they heard for the first time. Under those circumstances we made £13 000 and we said alright, we can go along with it - it isn't so bad, but we did not have any city outlets. You see, by then the Afrikaner was then mostly in the city.

Despite Donker Spore breaking even, UTOLO's accrued loss since 1942 was not alleviated by income from the film and led to VOBI's unsuccessful plea for capital investment by Afrikaans firms and the publication of its prospectus and intentions in Kohl's monograph.

The lack of cultural, moral and financial support notwithstanding, VOBI and UTOLO battled on and scraped together
sufficient capital to embark on their last project in 1946 entitled *Pinkie se Erfna*. It was made on the same basis by Pierre de Wet, a well known and charismatic Afrikaans actor who it was hoped would attract a viable audience. This was not to be and the VOBi-UTOLO partnership went into liquidation causing considerable financial loss to Sasbank (in which SANLAM had an interest) who had underwritten the project.

Technically, UTOLO's films lacked polish and a combination of poor sound, confused acting styles, stodgy camerawork and insufficient detail to the *mise en scène* vitiated whatever cultural sincerity had been encoded in the films. Such productions stood no chance in competition with the imported commercial fare which continued to hold the audience's attention. Summing up VOBi's failure, du Preez states:

The *Afrikaner* public was enthusiastic about the idea and subscribed £50 000 in shares. Unfortunately, the venture was tackled by persons who did not have the faintest notion of what they were doing. Most of the capital was lost on a 16mm road show concern which was caught in the clutches of wartime circumstances. But what was infinitely more harmful was that they formed a subsidiary with £10 000 capital which attempted to produce a feature length picture on 16mm with amateur equipment and lay technicians. After the first flop which was an epic on the history of the church they repeated the performance twice with the same appalling results ending up in a complete financial fiasco. So complete was the failure that practically nothing was left over by which future film movements could benefit.

All they did was to create a disbelief in South Africa that Afrikaans pictures were at all possible.

Du Preez, who had worked with VOBi as a technician, concluded from this debacle that "It was now accepted that any new attempts to set up a film movement can only succeed if use is made of commercial theatres". The year 1947 saw a flurry of activity as memoranda passed from film makers to Afrikaans business in their attempts to find investment for an Afrikaans film industry. The situation at that stage is described by du Preez:

*Would we get the capital?* Thomas Blok, a foremost
leader in educational circles in the OFS gave us £5000 out of his pocket to keep us going. We were still under the auspices of UTOLO. There were talks with Federale Volksbeleggings, a subsidiary of SANLAM. W.B. Coertze came out to look at the place, but nothing came of it because SANLAM at the time realised that the only way for the Afrikaner movement to make progress in the cities was on pure bedrock business grounds. They had capital available. When they formed Federale Volksbeleggings, that is, from their insurance funds and so on, they made this capital available, but they were indebted to their own policy holders. If they had a big drain on their capital they would not be able to meet their commitments and of course the public trust would go for a loop. So they were very conservative and Coertze said, 'No. There is no way to make money in Afrikaans pictures unless you go to the big theatres!' Afrikaans business interests were now growing rapidly. As they approached the threshold of political power they saw little point in such investment unless it brought in a profit. Notes du Preez, "After the poor performance of many Afrikaans business ventures which were formed after 1938, it was realised that Afrikaans economic interests could only backed by financially sound ventures. VOB was looking for endowments but SANLAM was interested in investments". Afrikaans films were not likely to be released in commercial cinemas which were tied up by the Schlesinger Organization and 20th Century Fox. This severely limited the earning power of any Afrikaans film. To gain access to the commercial circuits, Afrikaans film would have to be of a comparable standard to the imported films which were the staple of the cinema networks. Even if entry was obtained to these circuits, the market would not be significantly enlarged since they were attended by a large percentage of English speakers. Inevitably, whatever Afrikaans films were screened in such outlets would have to sublimate their cultural objectives to commercial considerations.

The Co-option of Afrikaner Cultural Production

Despite the earlier protestations of Afrikaner film makers about the insidious influences of big business and English capital in particular, it was not long before the wily
Schlesinger had coopted not only Afrikaans film film makers into his monopoly, but very nearly their capital as well. Always conscious of ideological and cultural shifts in audience tastes as well as the consequences of the urban trek which had resulted in an unprecedented urbanization of Afrikaners between 1910 tailing off during the early 1940s, Schlesinger realised that despite the poor performance of the VOBI titles, that a new untapped market was waiting to be exploited. In 1945, Joseph Albrecht, general manager of AFP wrote in a Schlesinger-owned journal, Outspan, that

The firm I represent is the only company that has seriously handled professional Afrikaans production, and it is our intention to develop such production, with shorts of an entertainment nature. This does not mean that the subjects will be flippant; many an excellent entertainment picture based on cultural matter is made today and will continue to be made in Afrikaans. It is realised that there is a demand for Afrikaans films, and that demand will be catered for.

Discussions now occurred between Pierre de Wet, who had previously worked as a journalist for Schlesinger-owned newspapers, and former VOBI directors and Schlesinger. Pierre de Wet reminisces on his first meeting with Schlesinger:

I said, Mr Schlesinger, an Afrikaans film, Pīnkīe se Erfnie is showing on Saturday in the Germiston Town Hall - come and see it. You can sit with your back to the film, you can face the audience and see the reaction of the audience (because he did not understand Afrikaans). Well, he didn't go, but he sent Albrecht (who couldn't speak Afrikaans either) with me. And that was the beginning of the Afrikaans film industry. He saw the reaction of the public which nearly went mad because it was in their language, the story etc. That film was used to persuade Schlesinger to start Afrikaans pictures.

A new production company was floated with little delay -- the Suid-Afrikaanse Rolprent Maatskappy (SARM) which was to be under-written by AFP and Afrikaner cultural and financial interests. The latter, according to Michael Venables, suggested that since 'that wicked old man' Mr Schlesinger with

135
all the money was making all the profits out of South African
films, he should contribute something and they proposed the
formation of [SARM] which was to have a capital of £2 million"\textsuperscript{152}. Of this total, £1 million was to be provided by Schlesinger
and £1 million to be supplied by all the "cultural bodies who
thought it so terribly important that there should be an
Afrikaans film industry"\textsuperscript{153}. Schlesinger's pecuniary intentions
seem to have been overlooked by some contemporary commentators
on this apparently emerging Afrikaans film industry. Erasmus
and Pelser report, for example:

The concern of Afrikaans speakers in the industry
took another foreward step with this film [Simon
Beyer's] because the Schlesinger Group did not dis-
tribute it itself ... but a new firm in which
prominent Afrikaans people took the lead - the firm
of SARM. This means that the Schlesinger film
people paired technical skills with the knowledge
of Afrikaans and the needs of the Afrikaner public
as these prominent Afrikaners interpret it\textsuperscript{154}.

This co-option proved Rompel's contention that incorporation
by big business would inevitably result in the foresaking of
cultural objectives. Where Rompel was motivated by a con-
cious and deliberate attempt to break through the monopoli-
ation of cultural production owned by English-speakers through
the means of production, the Afrikaans collaborators with
SARM realised that RARO's lack of technical expertise had
mitigated against their survival. Proficiency could thus
only be imported in the form of English-speakers who had
monopolised the technical knowledge needed for film production.
This point is made clear in UTOLO's 1943 company report that
"In the technical area there was no strong Afrikaans practical
knowledge available, therefore your directors had to look for
young Afrikaners with the necessary theoretical knowledge and
love for the matter"\textsuperscript{155}. The exclusion of Afrikaners from the
economic system in the past had led to their seeking cultural,
social and economic development through taking on jobs and
activities which were shunned by English speakers: teaching,
academia, religious and cultural work. Very often then, the
Afrikaner had a theoretical knowledge and a cultural commit-
ment to offer, but little technical expertise. They
were thus at a disadvantage relative to their English-speaking counterparts. The technological application of film making under the auspices of the English-dominated capitalist system thus occurred through the discourse of the dominant capitalist ideology of the hegemonic bloc.

In order to fully understand the ideological implications of this new English-Afrikaner cooperation we need to deviate slightly into Nicos Poulantzas' discussion of the division between mental and manual labour, that is the "question of the ideological relations in the social division of labour within material production, and of their articulation with the dominant relations"\textsuperscript{156}.

\textit{Alienation of Afrikaner Cultural Production}

Two crucial questions are answered by Poulantzas from an examination of Karl Marx's work. First, what gives rise to the productive collective worker is the socialization or extended cooperation of the labour process under capitalism. Second, this very socialization at the same time deepens the division between mental and manual labour. Marx has this to say on the relationship:

So far as the labour process is purely individual, one and the same labourer unites in himself all the functions, that later on become separated ... As in the natural body head and hand wait upon each other, so the labour-process unites the labour of the hand with that of the head. Later on they part company and even become deadly foes. The product ceases to be the direct product of the individual, and becomes a social product, produced in common by a collective labourer, i.e. by a combination of workmen, each of whom takes only a part, greater or less, in the manipulation of the subject of their labour. As the cooperative character of the labour process becomes more and more marked, so, as a necessary consequence, does our notion of productive labour, and of its agent the productive labourer, become extended. In order to labour productively, it is no longer necessary for you to do manual work yourself; enough of you are an organ of the collective labourer, and perform one of its subordinate functions\textsuperscript{157}.
The homogenising influences of capital through the production process where mental and manual labour are united can only be resisted through working outside the system as Rompel continually suggested. The amateur's product remains his because his labour has not been alienated through a commercial labour process or production line. Conversely, Afrikaans film makers, by joining up with the Schlesinger Organization, assisted the reproduction of the dominant English controlled ideological discourse already encoded into the process of film production. Afrikaans film spokesmen were thus naive to believe that AFP's technical expertise could be paired with the needs of Afrikaners in their quest for national identity and cultural integrity. These Afrikaans film makers who involved themselves with Schlesinger nullified their potential as latent organic intellectuals, and became what Gramsci calls technical intellectuals. They were 'ideological functionaries' in the sense that they had a specific relationship to knowledge, technology and technical education in the capitalist relations of production and through being involved in the capitalist 'division' of mental and manual labour. The relationship between mental and manual labour is discussed by Poulantzas as follows:

Not only is this division between mental and manual labour not simply a technical division of labour, but it actually forms, in every mode of production divided into classes, the concentrated expression of the relationship between political and ideological relations (politico-ideological in this sense) in their articulation to the relations of production; that is to say, as these exist and reproduce themselves, in the particular form of their relationship (politico-ideological), both within the production process itself, and beyond this, in the social formation as a whole. This division between mental and manual labour assumes specific forms in the capitalist mode of production, which is characterised by a quite particular 'separation' of the two.

The division of technical labour (done primarily by English speakers) from mental or cultural labour (provided by Afrikaans scriptwriters/directors) is a consequence of the monopolization of knowledge where capital appropriates
technological discoveries such as the cinema apparatus through the reproduction of ideological relations of domination/subordination by permanently excluding the subordinated but potential Afrikaans film makers who do not have the 'know how' to make movies. The only way Afrikaners could obtain a technical education was to follow a profession which supported the dominant fraction of the hegemonic bloc. The collaboration of film makers like de Wet and others who followed him with English capital in the form of Schlesinger should be seen against this background.

Such was the commercial success of SARM that Afrikaans films were produced by this company well into the 1960s, most under the direction of Pierre de Wet. After the production of the first four films, however, the company's name was altered to SA Screen Productions and many subsequent films were again made under the AFP banner. This occurred because the £1 million from the Afrikaner cultural bodies originally pledged to SARM was not forthcoming. The company had in the meantime been capitalised by Schlesinger himself, but he had successfully drawn on the sentiments and 'moral support' gained through an association with Afrikaner cultural institutions.

In this way, English dominated capital countered the possible threat from Afrikaans film makers and co-opted them in the process. The change to an English name, however, did not go unnoticed, as Jones reports:

From the extreme elements in Nationalist circles, cries of foul play went up. A scribe of the times referred to SARM as a krypto-Schlesinger Organization and it was implied that he was using an Afrikaans company name to bamboozle Afrikaners into supporting films made under that label.

The Afrikaans film industry remained small and erratic, even under the aegis of the Schlesinger Organization. Average budgets were as low as £5000 and production took up to six months. De Wet observes that the "Afrikaans film industry was built on Sundays" since there were few full-time Afrikaans film makers or actors available:
The only person who worked full time was Al Debbo. The others were all typists, school teachers, magistrates etc who would work for me during weekends only ... I used to pray for the Easter Weekend - three or four days I could have people at my disposal to go out and do exterior scenes.

The crew consisted only of six people: director, cameraman and his assistant, sound recordist and his assistant, and make-up. De Wet was the director, scriptwriter, producer and often the main actor working on a salary of about £100 per film.

The late 1940s also saw the entrée of a new independent feature film production house, Union Film Productions. This company had cut its teeth on post-production work done for the Union Defence Force from negatives supplied by the British War Office during World War II. It had also produced a number of documentaries and had put out a newsreel called Unifilm News. Although all of its feature films were in Afrikaans, the company was managed by a Captain Coley, a British immigrant who had grandiose plans for the future expansion of his company. He commissioned an architect to design large production premises which were to compete with AFP. Coley, however, had little long-term foresight and tended to alienate his staff and associates. (The architect realising that he would never be paid for his plans, abandoned the project at an early stage). In addition to Unifilms, other itinerant independents were beginning to make low budget feature films. None of these companies, however, challenged AFP in any way.

The films of both SARM and the independents tended to explore Afrikaner myths through the genre of historical narrative. Idealistic and sentimental, they generally emphasised the heroism of the early Dutch settlers and the barbarism of the black tribes. Simon Beyers (1947), for example, is set in the 17th Century in the time of Governor Simon van der Stel and is based on a true story adapted from the play, Die Goete Ou Tyd. Geboortegrond (1946), co-directed by Joseph Albrecht and de Wet deals with a young man who escapes his stern slave-driving farmer father by seeking his fortune in the Golden City. He eventually returns 'to the soil where he always
belonged'. It is partially based on de Wet's own experiences. This and others such as Pantoffelregering (1947), Die Skerpion (1946), Oom Piet se Plaas (1949), Sarie Marais (1949) and Kaskenades van Dr Kwak (1948) all herald elements of what was later to become the conflict-love type genre which was pre-
dicated upon the second trek and the urban-rural value clash.

The independently produced films did not fare too well, having no access to commercial cinemas, and being inferior in production values. Other than those made by AFP, they tended to be amateurish, over-acted and traded on the novelty of Afrikaans on the soundtrack to attract an audience.

Resurgence in Afrikaner Cultural Production

The spurt of Afrikaans film production in the latter half of the 1940s notwithstanding, Afrikaner cultural organizations continued to explore the possibilities of funding a volks-
cinema. The spirit of the 1938 Celebrations lived on.
Initially captured by RARO, kept aflame cinematically by VOBI, it died momentarily under the co-option of Afrikaans cinema by English capital, only to reappear in the form of the Kerklke Afrikaanse Rolprent en Fotografiese Organisasie (KARFO - the Afrikaans Churches Film and Photographic Organ-
ization), in 1947. This group, which attracted some of the remnants of RARO, was at the outset under the guidance of Heins du Preez, who was later to become the director of the National Film Board. He was highly critical of both RARO and VOBI, considering them both to be amateurs way out of their depth. KARFO was run by a Board of Directors of which one was appointed by the DRC. While the other directors were mostly DRC ministers, KARFO "is nevertheless an independent institution which is neither financially nor constitutionally under direct control of the church institution as such". Other Protestant churches were invited to appoint representatives to serve on the Advisory Council. Of these, the Anglican and Presbyterian Churches, the Church of England and the Salvation Army expressed an interest in KARFO objectives. At a conference held in Pretoria on 3 December 1948 attended mainly
by Afrikaner cultural, political and religious leaders, only two English speakers from the Presbyterian Church were present. Various motions with regard to fund raising were passed, ranging from street collections to the call by WB Coertze, managing director of Federale Volksbeleggings, that the Union government offer a substantial subsidy to KARFO under the auspices of the Union Education Department. Once it became apparent that KARFO was inextricably tied to the DRC which supported the National Party and Christian National Education, the English churches apparently withdrew their support.

Many of the founder members of KARFO had been active in RARO. Dominee RJ Raath, who became the full time director at the beginning of 1949, agreed that the organization had little future as an amateur movement. With a zealous enthusiasm he managed to raise £50 000 from the DRC and well-to-do farmers. A further campaign aimed to raise an additional £250 000 from the state and other bodies to finance production facilities. A KARFO representative was sent overseas to study film production with particular reference to "the status of the religious film abroad". By 1951 the organization had built a simple studio, offices and laboratory facilities in Pretoria. KARFO's philosophy was to make low budget films of a morally regenerative nature in documentary form:

We know that we will never be able to stage realistic earthquakes. But we are not interested in shaking up city blocks, we want to stir up souls. We know we will be able to do it. We also know that the people will like it, for we know them and we know what they lack in their daily lives.

KARFO was primarily concerned with the effect of urbanization on Afrikaners. This dislocation from a quiet, peaceful pastoral life left them ill-equipped to cope "in the bustle of the city" which gave "rise to mental and emotional conflicts ... especially when they had to identify themselves with an underprivileged and inferior status in life". These migrants, according to du Preez, "did not realise that they were taking part in an essential movement ... which had yet to come. They did not prepare themselves mentally and emotionally to be
South Africa's future urban citizens. The Dutch Reformed Church too, was "principally a rural church" attaining "a strong urban element" in a single decade. KARFO set itself the objective of assisting in the socialization of these new urban Afrikaners in a way which would protect their cultural and spiritual heritage. This task required a reevaluation of the role of cinema on the part of the Church which had traditionally denounced it "as part of the sin of this world". It was necessary to re-evaluate the cinema as "a force of creative expression and probable means of enlightenment and inspiration", particularly since "the cinema is a greater factor in the lives of the Afrikaans-speaking urban youth and adolescents than even the church and the parental home". Cinema was to be harnessed as a "source of information", but one which accepted the changed conditions of existence, that is, urban industrial life:

The types of problems and situations dramatized must be more or less the same type of problem and situation for which modes of conduct and behaviour are sought. The nature of solutions and attitudes adopted in these situations must be of such a nature that they are applicable to the circumstances which the patron has to face in real life; otherwise we can only expect the cinema to add to the confusion and bewilderment which we have to face in life today.

Where RARO's orientation was definately rural in character, VOBIs concerned with folk heroes and martyrs, KARFO was far more pragmatic in its objectives: it was not concerned with mythical interpretations but with concrete action. Like RARO and VOBIs before it, KARFO intended to "start a movement to win back the confidence of the public by demonstrating what could be done". More successful than its predecessors, KARFO aimed to challenge not only the escapist entertainment which was distracting the newly urbanised Afrikaner, but also to redress the image of the Afrikaner as he had hitherto been portrayed in film. Of the three organizations which had concerned themselves with cultural production, KARFO endured the longest, but not, paradoxically without some resistance from the DRC which had helped set it up.
Although it made its first dramatic feature, *Ek Sal Opstaan*, only in 1958, the company was to produce thirteen full length narrative films during the next twenty years. Drawing on the infrastructure of the institutional church, it simultaneously maintained an autonomy which initially proved to be its strength, and later its demise. Comments du Preez:

It is only an organisation like Karfo who has the moral backing of the strongest organisation of any kind in the country, namely, the Dutch Reformed church without being tied to the cautious machinery of the church as such, that will be able to take the bold step of creating the necessary implements which no commercial enterprise can undertake. It is only an organisation like Karfo that can hope to raise the necessary interestfree money with which to lay the cornerstone of a structural wing which we lack in Afrikaans culture.

The most important fact of all is that we are going to erect a full production channel without any restrictive ties of any kind, financially, ecclesiastically and politically. We will be free to produce any type of genre of film the choice of the material and treatment to be sponsored alone by our aims to make our films a guiding factor in the spiritual and intellectual lives of our people.\(^{276}\)

KARFO considered itself "a boon to the future of film art in this country"\(^{275}\) and would make its facilities available to any organization "provided no theme or treatment totally alien to the protestant faith is depicted"\(^{276}\).

During its first ten years of existence, KARFO concentrated on making documentaries on mission work and on the three arms of the Afrikaans church. However, state aid did not materialise and KARFO was forced to sell off its production facilities. Opposition to KARFO's charter was now voiced from two powerful sources. The first was the DRC itself which complained that KARFO was infringing on the same areas of Christian endeavour but independently of its control. The second negative factor arose from *The Grierson Report*, submitted in 1954. The history of this forgotten document will be dealt with later, but Grierson apparently advised that KARFO, which had been instrumental in bringing him to South Africa, should remain a distribution rather than a production organization.
Grierson suggested that state aid should be channeled through a National Film Board rather than individual, private operations like KARFO. Du Preez reports that this was the death-knell of KARFO\textsuperscript{177}. The remaining proceeds of KARFO were placed in a fund which would finance the annual production of dramatic films. These were to be supported by the DRC and screened in church halls.

With this change in structure came a change in the name of KARFO. "Christelikke" (Christian) was substituted for "Kerk-like" and CARFO became the new title. All the subsequent feature films were produced under this name.

Preconditions to the Consolidation of the Commercial Afrikaans Film Production Industry

The year 1951 saw the beginnings of Irene Film Studios. Its rather infamous birth has been somewhat obscured by the later success of this firm which was to become the only enduring professional film processing laboratory in the country. The saga started with a Mr Roger Bray who was made chief of productions of KARFO on the basis of impeccable references from government officials. KARFO had hoped that his appointment would be a precursor to state funding. When this financial assistance did not materialise, Bray set up his own production company and persuaded that long suffering reservoir of capital for Afrikaner cultural endeavours, the Afrikaans farmer, to part with yet more money to finance a film on one of Afrikanerdom's most revered heroes, Paul Kruger. Production facilities were built at Irene and film equipment ordered from Germany. In September 1954, Bray and his secretary left for England, ostensibly to begin production. They have never been seen since. By 1955, creditors realised that Bray did not intend returning and in order to recoup their losses they appointed Werner Grunbauer to complete the film. Irene Films was born out of the facilities assembled originally by Bray. Other than KARFO and Boxer Films, which made advertising commercials, Irene Films was now the only production facility which existed independently of AFP. In due course it was taken over by
SANLAM which bought out 20th Century Fox in 1969.

In the meantime other things were happening which were to determine the course of commercial Afrikaans cinema. Yet another amateur was trying to make his mark. Jamie Uys, an ex-school teacher turned farmer, acquired a 16mm Bolex camera in 1949. Assisted by family, friends and a piccanin, he made a home movie entitled *Daar Doer in die Bosveld* (1951). It lacked sound and remained un-exploited until Herbert Kretzmer, a scriptwriter for Filmlets at Killarney Studios saw it. "Here I see the touch of Rene Clair", Kretzmer is reported to have said. Encouraged, Uys found a backer, a Mr Raath, who agreed to pay for a sound track to be made with equipment taken over from the recently liquidated Swan Films. Uys recorded his own sound, dubbing the five voices from his own repertoire. As with all independents, however, Uys was unable to find a distributor or put it on at a commercial cinema. Like RARO, Vobi, Karfo and Unifilms before him, he set out on the well-worn paths of mobile distribution "with a little black boy to operate the projector ... he shone it onto sheets and blankets in town halls, village halls and church halls all over the country". The critics, even the dreaded Oliver Walker of *The Star*, responded with excitement and the film which had cost £4000 to make earned over £25 000.

Unlike previous Afrikaans film which was either aimed at a particular type of cultural production or traded in ideologi-cal stereotypes and unidimensional folk hero characterisations, Uys was able to invest his film with a refreshing, spontaneous quality not previously seen. *Daar Doer in die Bosveld* not only captured 'the land' but also a depth of character and social experience which differed from the stodgy 'vel-skoen and beard' treatments which had preceded it. Playing up the cultural quirks which separated the naïveté and ham-handedness of the rural Afrikaner and the sophisticated urbanite, usually a woman, Uys called on themes, plots and dramatic structures which were drawn from the personal insecurities of everyday life. This unique and charismatic style distinguished Uys from his fellow culturally oriented
Afrikaans producers and earned him critical acclaim at which he was later to express his bewilderment:

I do not trade in messages but entertainment. If I had to bring forth a message, all other possibilities of the film would be ruled out. I have found that while my films do not contain a deliberate message, many people manage to read messages into them. I am amazed at the messages some academics and critics have read into my films - and I make films merely for entertainment. That has been, and is, my aim.

Possibly this lack of cultural pretension brought Uys the financial success which had eluded the many production houses previously established with cultural objectives in mind. In his usually cryptic manner, Harry Jones reports that Uys' very presence represented the kind of fragmentation the FAK wished to avoid, for this body was still trying to set up an Afrikaans film industry. According to one of Jones' weekly exposés, the FAK's masterplan presented to the government showed:

a pyramid of control extending from a base embracing Pers, Skrywers, Regisseurs, Publitsiteitsman (Press, Writers, Directors, Publicity Man) ascending to control by Kultuurkommittee, P.A.K. of RDB, Kunstenaars, Kerke, Pers (Cultural Committee, FAK or Reddingsdaad-bond, Artists, Churches Press). This group of satellites were to become subordinated to a Beoordelingsraad (Judication Council) sharing authority with a Finansieraad (Financial Council) supported by F.V.B. and F.A.K. of RDB, with a Produksieraad (Production Council) whose influence spread to the lower levels.

Astride the top of the pyramid was F.A.K. itself assuring allegiance to its plan with recognition of its right to nominate Voorsitters (Chairmen) of Die Rolprent Afdeling, Finansieraad, Produksieraad, Beoordelingsraad, Persraad.

This plan was never put into operation as the financial backing was not forthcoming. Jones' remark about Uys' presence fragmenting cultural endeavours of the type envisaged by the FAK is only partly valid for structural economic forces were the real conditions which were fracturing non-material cultural efforts. Jamie Uys was merely an indication of these underlying economic shifts. What carried him through,
irrespective of the FAK or Schlesinger, was a combination of cultural perception on his part in portraying Afrikaners on the screen together with the later investment by Afrikaner financial capital into the commercial film industry per se. Uys did not operate on his own for long; he was to be bank-rolled by the FAK in 1960/1 in the making of Doodkry is Min and his distribution thereafter was completely handled by a fast growing Afrikaans exhibition company, Ster Films.

Uys' second film, Fifty-Vyftig (1953), a comedy on the Boer-Brit situation, was equally as successful as Daar Doer in die Bosveld, and established a formula which Uys was to exploit with repetitive and continually unprecedented financial success in his later productions. As Uys toured the country, his popularity began to preceed him, his spontaneity and rapport with Afrikaner culture drawing audiences away from established cinemas owned by ACT. It was not long before Schlesinger was able to correlate poor ACT houses with the simultaneous screening of Uys' film in the same town. Uys was persuaded to join AFP.

Despite this new found capital, Uys made only one film under the AFP aegis, entitled Daar Doer in die Stad (1954). Ever a loner and unable to work within the disciplines imposed by studio production lines and the pressures of big business, Uys resigned and continued independently as Jamie Uys Films, established in 1954. He was the first independent film maker to successfully challenge the monopoly held by the Schlesinger Group and the first to defy co-option and survive. Again, the Afrikaner farming community were badgered for finance, this time by Uys' brother who sold them shares in the new independent company. A sum of £35 000 was raised, of which £7000 was spent on a film called Geld Soos Bossies (1955) which was released in England as Money to Burn in 1954, making a small profit.

Working at the same time during the early 1950s was a British director, Bladon Peake, Formerly of the Abbey Theatre in Dublin, who directed Hans die Skipper in 1953 for AFP.
Against the background of the various approaches to government for state financial assistance, an appeal by Peake proved moderately successful and the Motion Picture Producer's Association (MPPA) was formed as an intermediary between the industry and the government. While this body dealt with the government in a formal manner, other influential individuals continued putting informal pressure on the state. Jamie Uys, for example, complained that his film *Geld Soos Bossies* would have made a realistic profit if he had been paid back the sum taken by the Provinces for Entertainment Tax.

The pressure was mounting and the government realised that it could no longer ignore the pleas of local film makers. Twentieth Century Fox had bought out Schlesinger in 1956 and, apart from a few struggling independent studios, the industry was now owned and controlled by international capital which was more interested in capital accumulation and growth through the exploitation of world markets than it was with the health and long term prospects of the local industry, particularly a production sector which would compete for screen time with their own titles.

The history and effect of the subsidy scheme will be covered in Chapter 6. Suffice it to say at this stage that it was not merely on industrial aid but was also aimed at stimulating and controlling a particular materially-based strain of cultural production.

That Afrikaans film makers had been co-opted by English capital was not necessarily to the detriment of the Afrikaner economic movement. The growing economic power of Afrikaner capital saw little need to foster an Afrikaans film industry which insisted in rooting its images in an isolated Garden of Eden where its inhabitants communed only with Nature and God as RARO demanded. Neither did it require the VOB1 prototype for by then the Afrikaner ascendance to political power was inevitable. The volk had been mobilised by means other than cinema. Afrikaans interest groups engaged in cultural production through their ownership of newspapers, book and magazine.
publishers, radio and so on. Afrikaner businesses had captured the overwhelming support of Afrikaans speakers who invested and thus contributed to the spectacular growth of firms such as SANLAM, VOLSKAS, Federale Volksbeleggings, SANTAM and their myriad subsidiaries and affiliate companies.

By working with English dominated capital, Afrikaans film makers found themselves unwittingly cast in the role of technical intellectuals. Consciously or unconsciously, they assimilated the values of capitalism and came to accept uncritically that the only way that films could be made was through the capitalist relations of production. Thus the mental and manual divisions of labour which they had intended integrating during production in order to protect Afrikaner cultural integrity were instead fused into a form of capitalist production which best suited the needs of Afrikaner capital at the time. That this is so is supported by the fact that many of the Afrikaans film makers who worked in the commercial industry since the late 1940s remain unclear as to the origins, significance and differences between RARO, VOB, UTOLO and even KARFO. They are certainly sceptical of their non-business basis.

It was only later, from the early 1960s onwards, that technical intellectuals in the form of experienced technicians, directors, producers, scriptwriters and so on were needed to guide cultural production in the direction of an urban-based imagery, a set of symbolic practices which unconditionally accepted the urban trek (or the second trek) as a necessary and indispensable means to the attainment of economic power. The films of these intellectuals functioned to draw out, confront and resolve the extensive cultural guilt which resulted from urbanization and the move away from the tightly knit rural and small town communities. The urban individual was largely alienated from cultural ties, culture and social practices of the God-fearing, family-oriented, group-based rural Afrikaner. To survive the city, the Afrikaner as subject was forced to adopt a whole new set of social and cultural practices which were predicated upon a material, consumer based set of cultural and ideological
motivations. These are the signs which are encoded in the conflict-love type genre which ran its cycle from 1965 to 1980. It was only during the 1960s that Afrikaans film making began to be funded on a large scale by Afrikaner capital. By this time the urban trek had diminished, but a high degree of cultural trauma remained. This trauma externalised itself in other areas of cultural production as well as film. Theatre and literature are prime examples. However, film being the most popular form of mass communication available at the time, was thus the most important medium in the dissemination of new cultural responses and ideological guidelines which would assist the newly urbanised Afrikaner to cope with and come to terms with his/her new material, urban, industrial and footloose reality. This is the subject of Chapter 10. To understand the full significance of the signs encoded in the conflict-love genre it is necessary to have a comprehensive understanding of not only the history of the South African film industry but of the political economy as well.

The next chapter takes us further along this path and examines distribution and exhibition from 1956 to 1970, that is from the 20th Century Fox takeover to the Schlesinger Group's film interest to SANLAM's capture of the film industry in 1969.

NOTES AND REFERENCES


2. Ibid


4. Ibid


6. Bensusan, op. cit. p. 56

7. Strebel, op. cit. p. 47


12. Ibid. pp. 309-310 n 13

13. Ibid. p. 311


15. *Stage and Cinema*, 21 July 1917, p. 18; and 1 September 1917, p. 2


17. Du Toit, *op. cit.* Gutche, *op. cit.* p. 316 n 30 comments that this film inspired the American counterpart, *The Covered Wagon*. The latter film, however, certainly does not compare in terms of depth of plot structure or development of characters. It is not a social epic in terms of Frye's criteria, though it can be classified as a melodrama

18. Quoted in *Stage and Cinema*, 23 December 1916


20. Ibid. In all, eighteen opinions of prominent people were solicited, not a single one being negative or questioning the historical accuracy of the film


22. *The Kinematograph Weekly*, 8 February 1917, p. 94. The journal reports: "The Prime Minister several times personally congratulated Mr. Harold Shaw, the producer, and told him that he had depicted "the history of my people in a manner at the realism of which I can only marvel"


24. Ibid. p. 25

25. Ibid.
27. Ibid
28. This is a common error. See, eg., du Toit, op. cit. It should be pointed out that Schlesinger himself was an American having emigrated to South Africa in 1894 at the age of 24. For more information see Stodel, J. 1962: *The Audience is Waiting*. Howard Timmins, Cape Town, pp. 27-28
29. Shaw, H. 1916: "Filming The Voortrekkers", *Stage and Cinema*, 30 December, p. 2
30. For more information on the class structure during this early period of mining see Johnstone, F.A. 1970: *Race, Class and Gold*. Oxford University Press, London
31. Van Zyl, op. cit. p. 30
32. *Stage and Cinema*, 1 September 1917, p. 3
34. Gutsche, op. cit. p. 313 n 22. For information on its production see *Stage and Cinema*, 2 December 1916, p. 11; 16 December 1916, pp. 9-10; and 30 December, 1916, p. 2
35. Quoted by de Lange, J. in an unpublished essay: "The History of the Film in South Africa". Mimeo, National Film Archives, Pretoria
36. This film was ranked by the London *Daily Mail* "with the best film productions". A British trade journal commented: "It is the best picture yet to have been made by African Films, and as a Colonial production, is doubly welcome to the screen". See *Stage and Cinema*, 24 July 1920, p. 7. For an in-depth discussion of the ideology, class and social relations reflected in the novels of H Rider Haggard on which *King Solomon's Mines*, *Allan Quartermain* and John Buchan's *Prester John* are based, see Rich, P. 1981: "Milnerism and the Ripping Good Yarn: Transvaal 'Land Settlement and Buchan's novel, *Prester John* 1901-10". Paper presented at the History Workshop, University of Witwatersrand: "Town and Countryside in the Transvaal: Capitalist Penetration and Popular Response". Both Buchan and Haggard were lawyers, British and jingoistic. Buchan became Lord Milner's private secretary in 1903. Milner had been appointed British High Commissioner of the Transvaal after the British defeat of the Boers. His administration as far as the Boers was concerned was extremely harsh as he tried to Anglicize the Boers.
37. See *Stage and Cinema*, 1 September 1917, p. 2
38. Van Zyl, _op. cit._ pp. 24 & 30

39. For descriptions of these two films see _Stage and Cinema_ 5 May 1977, p. 6 and 7 April 1917, p. 6 respectively

40. See Gutsche, _op. cit._ p. 318; du Toit, _op. cit._; _Kinetograph Weekly_, 8 February 1917, p. 94; and _Stage and Cinema_, 1 September 1917, p. 3

41. _Stage and Cinema_, 4 August 1917, p. 6. Colenbrander was later drowned on location

42. _Stage and Cinema_, 16 April 1918, p. 12. It should be pointed out that this magazine was owned by the Schlesinger Group and thus served its need to disseminate favourable comment on film, theatre and the other entertainment interests

43. Quoted in Germishuys, _op. cit._ p. 6

44. _Stage and Cinema_, 30 March 1918, p. 4

45. In the "Foreword" to the booklet issued on the film, Rose points out that _Symbol of Sacrifice_ does not pretend to follow the sequences of historical events absolutely accurately. His comments, however, relate to detail, rather than content. See _Stage and Cinema_, 27 April 1918, p. 13. A review of the film in _Stage and Cinema_ of 6 April 1918, pp. 11-12 observes that Rose "has woven historical fact and romantic fiction together into a most fascinating and enthralling story"

46. See, eg., the exhaustive historical analysis offered by Morris, A. 1966: _The Washing of the Spears_. Cape, London


48. Johnstone, _op. cit._ p. 74

49. Gutsche, _op. cit._ p. 318

50. _Stage and Cinema_, September 1917, p. 2

51. Ibid. p. 3

52. Gutsche, _op. cit._ p. 318. The British journal, _The Kinetograph Weekly_, praised the film: "The photography of the picture in the brilliant South African sunshine is as good as can be, and indicates future rivalry with
the famed Hollywood studios". Quoted in Germishuys, *op. cit.* p. 6

53. See note 36

54. Gutsche, *op. cit.* p. 320


56. IVTA were the sole agents for African Theatres Trust Ltd, African Films Trust, African Film Productions, and also represented Rickards Australian Tour and the Bandman circuit of India and the East. For more information see *Stage and Cinema*, 15 April 1916, p. 11 and 6 May 1916, p. 4


58. Ibid


60. See Gutsche, *op. cit.* pp. 341-342

61. Ibid. pp. 337 & 341

62. Ibid. p. 324


64. Quoted in *Die Afrikaanse Rolprent Amateur* (December) 1942 and in Erasmus, P.F. and Pelser, J.J. 1973: *Die Rolprent as Massakommunikasiemedium.* HSRC No Komm4, Pretoria, p. 47


66. *The Star*, 8 March 1933


68. Ibid

69. Gutsche, *op. cit.* p. 324 n 62

70. *Die Brandwag*, 27 September 1946, p. 17

71. Die Algemene Organiseerde 1945: "Die Kultuurtaka van die Afrikaanse Rolprent", *Die BARO Journaal*, No. 4, p. 10. It appears that the author was Rompel


76. Gutsche, op. cit. pp. 338 n 101. When these writers refer to "racial prejudice" they are not referring to black/white relationships but to a polarisation between Afrikaans and English-speaking whites. Sarah Gertrude Millin used "racial" in the same way. For example, when discussing the conflicts between Tielman Roos, General Smuts and General Hertzog, Millin describes these as "endless racial wrangling". See Millin, S.G. 1936: General Smuts: The Second Volume. Faber and Faber, London, p. 432. The film script was based on Millin's book published in 1933: Rhodes. CNA, South Africa and Rhodesia


78. Gutsche, op. cit. p. 340

79. Ibid. pp. 345 & 347

80. Sunday Express, 8 May 1938


82. See The Star, 25 February 1938

83. Gutsche, op. cit. p. 348

84. Sunday Times, 25 December 1938. The author/editor is J. Langely Levy

85. Die Transvaler, 26 May 1939

86. Haarhof, T.J. 1939: in The Forum (May)

87. The Cape Times, 29 May 1939
88. Gutsche, op. cit. p. 350
89. Ibid. p. 351
91. Ibid.
92. See de V Heese, J. 26 April 1940: "Triomftog van die Voortrekker-rolprent", Huissgenoot, p. 47
93. Gutsche, op. cit. p. 345
94. Ibid. p. 344
95. See Moodie, op. cit. p. 199
96. See Die Burger, 12 & 13 July 1923
97. Rompel was the editor of this mimeographed journal. Its first issue is dated 3 June 1941
98. Germishuys, op. cit. p. 7
99. Rompel, op. cit. p. 8
100. Ibid. p. 13
101. Ibid. p. 14
102. Ibid. pp. 8-9. See also Powdermaker, H. 1950: Hollywood: The Dream Factory. Little, Brown & Co, Boston, p. 59. Powdermaker states: "Hollywood is engaged in the mass production of prefabricated dreams. It tries to adapt the American dream, that all men are created equal, to the view that all men's dreams should be made equal"
103. Rompel, op. cit. Deel I, p. 104
104. Ibid
105. Ibid. Deel II, p. 24
106. Ibid. pp. 25-26
107. For a highly detailed description of the methods used by the Nazi state to infiltrate the German cinema see Petley, J. 1979: Capital and Culture: German Cinema 1933-45. British Film Institute, London, especially pp. 47-94
108. Rompel, op. cit. Deel II, p. 33
109. Ibid. p. 15
110. Ibid. p. 17
111. Ibid. Deel II, p. 97. Rompel does not develop his criticisms or defend his position in any way
112. Ibid. pp. 15-18
113. Ibid. Deel I, p. 97
114. Ibid. p. 103
115. Ibid. Deel II, p. 19
116. Ibid. p. 20
117. Ibid. p. 35
118. Ibid. p. 41
119. Ibid. pp. 37-38
120. Ibid. pp. 45-46
121. Ibid. p. 60
122. Quoted from Die Volksblad in Beukes, op. cit. p. 15.
123. Rompel, op. cit. Deel II, p. 59
124. See UTOLO 3rd AGM Report in Kultuurfilma, December 1944, p. 25
125. Rompel, op. cit. Deel II, pp. 47-48
126. The Forum, 12 July 1924: "Film Propaganda on the Plateland", p. 24
127. Heins du Preez reports that because of the war, the government had forbidden the flotation of new companies. To get around this restriction VOBI bought an already existing company, UTOLO Films of Africa. Paradoxically, this company was attached to the British Government's Tea Marketing Board: "It was one of the strong documentary movements which got a lot of writing up from Rotha and Grierson. The Board sent a unit to the Transkei under Graham Young. When the war broke out they were stranded here. VOBI bought out this company, its bits and pieces and equipment". Interviewed in April 1981.
128. 3rd UTOLO AGM, op. cit. p. 25
129. Rompel, op. cit. Deel II, p. 48
130. Ibid. p. 50
131. Du Preez reports that by the time Rompel got RARO together, the Reddingsdaadbond was already on the wane. Promised funds were not forthcoming to RARO which
had to consequently curtail its operations. After the heights reached by Rompel with *Nasie Hou Koers* at the 1938 Centenary Celebrations, RARO was unable to follow though. The film was shown all over the country with mobile units "and they had all types of problems because they had synchronised sound on gramophone records". This and all forthcoming interviews with du Preez were conducted during April 1971.

132. Kohl, E.E. 1946: *Stel die Rolprent in Diens van die Volk*. Volksbioskope, Johannesburg, p. 5

133. *Kultuurfilma*, (December) 1944, p. 11

134. Kohl, *op. cit.* p. 21

135. Ibid. pp. 21-22

136. Ibid. p. 22

137. 3rd UTOLO AGM, *op. cit.* p. 25


139. Du Preez outlined some of the problems facing the production crew in an interview: "You could get hold of people like Jan Schutte and Roos because they could break away from work. There wasn't anyone else to be had and then we realised that we couldn't go on like this because we had to wait for weekends -- and most of the time it rained. Our equipment was horrible -- a Cinespecial camera in a wooden blimp. The sound camera was built by Louis Wiesner and I made the electronic bits. When VOB1 took over UTOLO they got a galvanometer which had been used in a newsreel camera. Weisner used it to build the sound recorder."

140. *Kultuurfilma*, *op. cit.* p. 14

141. These idealistically committed organic intellectuals were later to part company on political and ideological grounds. Kowie Marais, a member of the *Osewabrandwag* and a Broederbonder, was later to renounce his membership of the Bond, resign from the National Party and stand for the Progressive Federal Party in the 1974 General Election. Gideon Roos was a broadcaster with the SABC. He contributed to popularising "the symbolic trek in 1938 on radio to such an extent that it became an emotional mass movement reuniting the Afrikaners, and contributing substantially to the election victory 10 years later ... Roos was only supposed to accompany the trek to its first stop outside Cape Town. The rest of the journey to Pretoria would have gone almost unnoticed if his broadcasts had not been so outstanding. They gripped the imagination and emotions of the Afrikaner nation to such an extent that the demands for Roos to accompany the trek to Pretoria became irresistible."
Unbeknown to him, Roos ensured with his broadcasts exactly what the Broederbond had hoped the trek would achieve. See Wilkins and Strydom, *op. cit.* pp. 122-123.

In 1949 the new Nationalist government appointed Roos Director-General of the SABC. However, he resisted government pressure to turn the station into a propaganda medium. The government responded by appointing Dr Piet Meyer to succeed the incumbant Chairman, Dr Pellisier. But this post did not have the necessary power to over-rule Roos. The post Chairman was then given more power and eventually Roos found his position so untenable that he was forced to resign on 12 April 1961. Both Fuchs and Schutte were also appointed to very high positions over the heads of more deserving people. Both were to become Directors-General of the SABC and Fuchs presently serves on the Directorate of Publications. Meyer was appointed Chairman of the Broederbond in 1960

142. See 3rd UTOLO AGM, *op. cit.*


144. Du Preez claims that in view of the many equipment problems they had that the sound on *Donker Spore* and *Pinkie se Erfnis* was "quite good". In contrast, de Wet describes the sound on *Pinkie* as "not so hot".


147. "the place" refers to KARFO's new production studio.

They had been evicted from their previous premises in African Arms Trust Building by the Pretoria City Council


149. Albrecht, J. 20 July 1948: "What is the Future of Motion Picture Production in South Africa?" *The Outspan*, Vol. 37, No. 967, p. 41

150. Not all commentators agreed with de Wet about the merits of this film. The *Trek* critic stated on 3 May 1946 that "It is doubtful whether any person including those responsible for the production of this film can in any way feel in their element over what has been achieved in this undertaking. After the presentation of *Donker Spore* the hope was openly cherished that the following Vobi-Utolo project would show a great advancement. The high expectations were not reached. Even the most well disposed person can find little to be enthusiastic
about in *Pinkie se Erfmis*.

151. From interview with de Wet taped on 15 April 1981. All further unreferenced interviews with de Wet were obtained on this date.


153. Ibid

154. Erasmus and Pelser, *op. cit.* p. 43

155. 3rd UTOLO AGM, *op. cit.* p. 25


157. Ibid. p. 233

158. Poulantzas, ibid, attributes the term to Gramsci

159. Ibid. p. 234

160. For a more detailed discussion on the nature of the division between mental and manual labour see ibid pp. 230ff


163. The Salvation Army, Church of England and Anglican Churches were unable to trace any record of their interest in KARFO. The Presbyterian Church recorded the following resolution in their *Year Book* in Clause 14 of the "Church and Nation Report to the General Assembly" in September 1948: "The Assembly having had a request of the CARFO (sic) film company for denomination cooperation in the production of religious films records its willingness to cooperate but desires further enquiry". The Rev D Phillips of St James Presbyterian Church, on attending the KARFO conference two months later is reported to have stated that he "foresees an acceptable working together of Karfo and his Church". *KARFO Pamphlet* (7/8/1949). No reference to KARFO, however, appears in any subsequent reports of the Presbyterian Church but the 1950 "Report" carries a slashing attack on Christian National Education which suggests that KARFO's close relationship to the DRC worked against it. None of the current church managements had ever heard of KARFO, or its successor, CARFO

164. See *KARFO Pamphlet*, 7 August 1949, p. 4

166. Ibid. p. 3
167. Ibid. p. 7
168. Ibid. p. 11
169. Ibid. p. 14
170. Ibid
171. Ibid. p. 24
172. Ibid. p. 24
173. Ibid. p. 4
174. Ibid
175. Ibid. p. 5
176. Ibid. p. 6
177. From a lecture given by du Preez at the 1979 Cape Town International Film Festival. The title of the talk was "South African Films: A Historical Analysis and Critique"
178. *SA Film Weekly*, 29 January, p. 3. Kretzmer later became the film critic of the *Sunday Express* in London. He was also a filmad writer and supplied the basic idea for Marty Feldman's first film
179. Venables, *op. cit.*
180. Oliver Walker was one of the few, if not only press critic, who was able to affect box office income through the way he wrote up his critiques. His influence on the cinema public was unequalled and a negative review usually had serious implications for the performance of the film in question
181. Interview in *To the Point*, 17 January 1980
182. *SA Film Weekly*, 5 February 1970, p. 2
CHAPTER 4

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE DISTRIBUTION AND EXHIBITION
SECTORS OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN FILM INDUSTRY 1956 - 1970

It will be recalled from Chapter 2 that 1956 marked the large scale entry of American capital into the South African film industry. Twentieth Century Fox were the principal investors having bought out the Schlesinger cinema interests. Fox owned 75% of the share capital with J Arthur Rank and Universal International Films Inc controlling the remaining 25%. Other firms operating under the aegis of Fox were MGM which had been established since 1930, United Artists which opened up in 1939, Empire Films set up in 1942 but mainly concerned with commercials (they were also known as Boxer Films), Warner Bros First National Pictures (S.A.) (Pty) Ltd, floated in 1945, plus a few small itinerant distributors who mainly served the South African Indian market.

This section of the study will put foreward an explanation of why it was 20th Century Fox specifically which invested in South Africa to the extent that it did at a time when other American majors were reducing their scale of operations and reluctantly investing in television. Fox was not alone in having to spread its production costs over more and more markets, with foreign-earned income now contributing just more than half of the American industry's income. It will also be demonstrated how these business manoeuvrings affected cultural production and ideological perspectives.

PRE-CONDITIONS TO ENTRY BY FOX IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN MARKET

Although 20th Century Fox had made a $8 million profit before tax on thirty-two films in 1953, and $16 million on thirteen pictures produced in 1954¹, by 1956 the company was no longer in a very healthy financial position and in that year Darryl Zanuck, vice-president in charge of production, resigned from the American firm. He was replaced by Spyros Skouros, a
Greek theatre owner and the company president of Fox. Skouros neither reduced production nor cut down on the scale of Fox's studio operations. He "pushed through dud after dud". With the foreign market accounting for half of Fox's returns South Africa, assumed an added importance for its domestic market was unlikely to be reduced by television for many years to come. Between 1959 and 1962 the American-based Fox had lost $88.3 million on feature production alone. Worse was yet to come with *Cleopatra* which started production in Rome in 1962 with a budget of $5 million but was eventually to cost $40 million. Skouros was removed from production and Zanuck brought back as president. By 1966, the loss had been turned around with an after tax profit of $12.5 million.

With productions of the volume and magnitude put out by Fox, they had found it no longer feasible to produce at a profit on a national scale. As mentioned, this was not only because of the decreasing size of the American domestic market, but also due to the greater amount of capital needed for production. It will be recalled that the organic composition of capital had risen considerably, not only through increased technological innovation, but also because of the studio's insistence in meeting the television threat with highly expensive productions and costly technological gimmickry. To meet the costs of these, let alone earn a profit, international markets were required which were wholly owned by Fox, as they could no longer afford to have their returns shared with a local distributor or exhibitor. South Africa with its relatively high frequency cinema-going population which remained without television offered an ideal market. Furthermore, the absence of anti-monopoly statutes of the type which had forced the dissolution of the powerful American trusts, meant that both horizontal and vertical monopolies could easily be perpetuated and entrenched.

By 1959, despite Fox's overwhelming control of the local industry, five small distributors and numerous one-off concerns had managed to enter the market and were supplying independent cinemas and drive-ins. The most important of these was Wonderboom Inry-Beleggings set up in 1957. This company
supplied films to drive-in theatres, some of which it owned. Wonderboom performed well for a few months, but then takings fell rapidly. This decline was staved off by the purchase of better quality films from overseas. Accordingly, the company changed its name to Film Import Kooperatief Bpk in 1958 and became known as Ster Film Import (Edms) Bpk in 1959. No profits were earned in 1961 and by 1962 the company had acquired a R700 000 unsecured debt and insolvency seemed imminent. A new managing director, Andre Pieterse, was appointed in that year. He immediately capitalised all shareholders loans and persuaded SANLAM to make an investment of R250 000 in shares through an investment subsidiary. Apart from this equity investment, SANLAM assisted Ster with the expansion of its theatre circuit by granting loans against first mortgage bonds. Between January 1964 and August 1966, SANLAM financed more than R1 million worth of theatre properties. This was no ideological investment for the value of the properties alone would have compensated for the collapse of the theatre side. Supported by SANLAM, Pieterse was able to expand Ster's market share to such a degree that SANLAM was persuaded to take over Fox in 1969. A prominent organic intellectual, Tommie Meyer, later described SANLAM's participation in terms of its benefit for the Afrikaans language. Seeing it in cultural rather than economic terms, Meyer injected this comments with a cultural fervour which had little to do with SANLAM's decision, made on purely economic grounds.

In the meantime, on 12 March 1959, the Minister of Economic Affairs, responding to complaints from independent South African exhibitors, announced that the industry would be investigated by the Board of Trade and Industry. This unexpected state interest should be seen against the above conditions of competition where Ster as a primarily Afrikaner-backed company was desperately trying to drive a wedge into the Fox dominance.

THE ALLIANCE OF NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL: STATE SUPPORT FOR TWENTIETH CENTURY FOX

Fox's strength can be gauged from the following market break-
down which is supplied by the Board’s Report. Although controlling only 30.7% of the total number of cinema seats in South Africa as a whole, it owned 43.4% of those located in the lucrative urban areas. A total of 46.1% was held by independent exhibitors and 10.5% by other distributors. When the calculation includes the daily number of shows and type of accommodation often used by independents (café bioscopes, town halls, recreation halls, social clubs etc), the relative penetration of Fox is considerably enhanced. The independent cinemas were mainly located in the rural areas (93.9%) where patronage was limited to one show a day, sometimes only two or three days a week.

Of considerable importance to the structure of the exhibition sectors was the emergence of drive-in theatres after 1950. Blessed with suitable weather and a pleasant open-air atmosphere, these outlets gained popularity extraordinarily quickly, particularly as far as the family market was concerned. By 1960, forty-eight drive-in theatres offering an average capacity of 74 700 accounted for 5.6% of the total cinema-going population. Only seven of these belonged to Fox, seven to the companies associated with Film Import Koop Group and the remaining thirty-four to independents. It was this circuit, spearheaded by the later Ster Film-Import Company which was to be the nemesis of the Fox holdings in South Africa. The Board of Trade and Industry argued that these drive-in theatres operated to the detriment of the Fox Group since they competed with existing indoor cinemas under the multi-national’s control. Fox, concurred with the Board’s finding, contending that the drive-in did not meet a new need, but led merely to a change in cinema-going habits. Total demand, they argued, remained the same.

Nevertheless, the Fox Group maintained a tight grip on the industry and of the 400 independent cinemas existing during the latter part of the 1950s, 37% procured their product exclusively from the Fox Group, 58% from Fox and other distributors, while only 5% indicated that they did not exhibit Fox films at all. Fox distributed more than three-quarters of the
films released between 1957 and 1959. Independent distributors were generally unable to obtain American films. Fox also forced contractual commitment tying exhibitors to their catalogue. The legal mechanisms applied included block-booking and blind-selling (where the exhibitor has no say in the choice of film to be screened or control over the period of release), up-front cash guarantees and lengthy contractual periods of up to ten years. The expiry dates of these agreements were staggered so that at no stage were a number of exhibitors independent of Fox able to band together in opposition. In this way independent distributors were prevented from gaining a foothold in the market.

The division of cinemas into hierarchically organised 'circuits' was another control mechanism which determined what cinemas were to be supplied with first releases, and in what order the film would then be released onto the wider network of suburban and rural-based outlets. The latter two circuits were mainly owned by independents. This method of release was used to the detriment of the drive-ins and the Board reported that:

the distributors have even gone so far as to supply the independent drive-in theatres mainly with re-issues of old films and in some cases with films censored as unsuitable for children and adolescents... the screening of new releases and the popular type of motion picture have as far as possible restricted to the distributor's conventional indoor theatres.

It was this situation that led to the formation of Film Import Koop which managed to conclude deals with European companies not represented by Fox, as well as American International Pictures, reputedly the eighth largest producer in the United States. However, it was some time before all the drive-ins were able to avail themselves of the alternative provided by Film-Import Koop because of their initial long term contracts with Fox.

Other than SA Screen Productions (previously AFP) which Fox had acquired in 1959, local producers had some difficulty in obtaining "reasonable" distribution deals. The independents
in the rural areas, which served the major market for Afrikaans films, were tied to Fox which had a backlog of its own product to screen, while Film-Import Koop offered mainly urban drive-ins, but was sympathetic to the screening of local films.

The investigation by the Board was prompted by complaints from independent exhibitors who were confronted by the unassailable position of Fox. It appears that the Board was expected to rule in favour of local companies on ideological grounds. Comments Harry Jones on the business practice of Ster Film Import in this regard:

Ster's approach to its problems at that time, was that economic factors and the public interest would be totally disregarded, in favour of some hare-brained stroke of regulation, which on ideological grounds alone would ensure for South African nationals a greater control of the South African film industry than the resources so represented warranted.

The Board's brief was situated within the terms of Section 3(1)(a) of the Regulation of Monopolistic Conditions Act, No. 24 of 1955. Despite the fact that the Board's investigations accepted that the exhibition and distribution activities of Fox were "tantamount to a de facto monopolistic condition", the statute itself is not directed "against the existence of a monopolistic market structure". Rather, the Act is concerned concerned with the way in which such power is applied.

Throughout the Report is an apparent concern for "the general public's requirements". Rejecting allegations of the pernicious nature of block-booking, blind-selling and fixed circuits, and counter arguing that these particular methods of distributing motion pictures are the most practical ... in that motion pictures are made available at the earliest possible opportunity for exhibition on the lowest possible terms to the greatest number of cinemas in the country, the Board simply legitimised the superstructural conditions.
which allowed North American cultural and financial imperialism to prosper. This exploitation was allowed to work on a dual level. On the one hand, the comprador bourgeoisie was aiding economic exploitation as capital flowed out of the country into the hands of the multi-national owners, while on the other they simultaneously created the conditions for the reproduction of 'national culture' which ensured a continued audience for American films.

This response on the part of the Board is highly significant because it coincided with the post-war efforts of the American government to combat the rise of communism and inculcate "the democratic creed" on an international basis. The belief that film could be used as an instrument of propaganda evolved during the war and matured in the early 1950s. This attitude suited the American film industry which seized this chance to make greater profits by allying their financial interests with political motives. As Thomas Guback points out:

If the government actively pursued a wider disposal of American films throughout the world, the industry was likely to gain in a business sense from the additional revenue such dispersal brings. The dual advantages were recognised by the industry, for it realised that a push from the government could be useful in developing new markets and for making old ones yield attractive revenue.

Although Hollywood as a whole maintained a circumscribed independence from being associated too closely with the overt political objectives of the American hegemonic interests -- "Hollywood is in the entertainment business ... and that's why our films are loved and believed by people abroad". Spyros Skouros of 20th Century Fox urged the industry to "work harder and harder to create [a] missionary spirit":

it is a solemn responsibility of our industry to increase motion picture outlets throughout the free world because it has been shown that no medium can play a greater part than the motion picture in indoctrinating people into the free way of life and instilling in them a compelling desire for freedom.
and hope for a brighter future. Therefore, we as an industry can play an infinitely important part in the worldwide ideological struggle for the minds of men and confound the Communist propagandists.20

This kind of attitude provides a convenient smokescreen to legitimise the spread of American culture through cinema which would have the effect of providing greater profits for the multi-national companies. As the man who had negotiated the Schlesinger deal, this 'financial zeal' and 'missionary spirit' was tacitly supported by the Board of Trade and Industry's recommendations and support for 20th Century Fox's operations in South Africa.

While allying itself totally with the requirements for capital accumulation as far as Fox was concerned, the Board was unable to ignore certain of the methods by which Fox maintained its dominant position. The first concerned Fox's requirement that considerable cash amounts be lodged with them as security by exhibitors who were contracted to their distribution company. In this way Fox sought to finance the expansion of its South African operations by mobilising local capital. This would enable Fox to free the South African operation from further investment by the American parent company which itself was facing considerable cash shortages. Fox was able to enhance its capital accumulation in South Africa without having to re-invest in the territory, while the local exhibitors security could be used as an interest-free loan. The Board considered this "an undesirable practice" and directed that approved bank and insurance guarantees should suffice.

The second issue concerned the determination of admission prices which were set by Fox and not the exhibitor. The Board argued that such a practice put the cinema owner at a disadvantage vis-a-vis competing entertainment, or a cinema owned by a distributor who could alter its seat prices at will. Concluding, the Board stated that "This restriction of competition has, or is calculated to have, the effect of increasing or maintaining prices" and contravened the Act.21
Thirdly, the enforcement of long-term contracts with different expiry dates "is the most important obstacle to the development of healthy competitive conditions in the industry"\textsuperscript{22}. Through this mechanism, Fox established a stranglehold over distribution and discouraged the entry of competitors. The Board sought a one year contract in which expiry occurred simultaneously for all cinemas. This would increase the chances of entry by new distributors, widen the "disposal of motion pictures" and force established distributors to deal more reasonably with exhibitors who "in turn will be able to render a better service to the cinema-going public"\textsuperscript{23}. Again, these modifications were not aimed at cultural integrity but merely to reinforce the capitalist relations of production of a competitive economy. This aim is summed up in the Board's conclusion:

the way will in future be open to any new entrants in the field of motion-picture distribution with adequate capital to build up a distribution organization and to conclude agreements with a sufficient number of exhibitors to enable them to obtain overseas productions for distribution. The exhibitors, on the other hand, will be less dependent on the few existing distributors and will be in a position to place their screening time at the disposal of distributors who render the best possible service on the most reasonable terms\textsuperscript{24}.

Thus 'public interest' was identified with 'choice', not the long-term economic interests of the country as a whole or the shorter-term interests of locally capitalised companies, like for example, Ster Film-Import. Afrikaner Nationalist concern was no longer with content \textit{per se}, but with the reproduction of capital on an expanded scale. That is to say, cultural imperialism went hand in hand with the penetration of international capital and content, and for that precise reason, was no longer an issue since the local economy was becoming more and more responsive to the needs of Afrikaner Nationalism in terms of its economic growth. Cinema was no longer important in Afrikaner cultural production of the type envisaged by Rompel, VOCI or even KARFO, but in terms of persuading local audiences, particularly Afrikaners, to accept the capitalist relations of production (or the images of the
Hollywood 'dream Factory') as natural and inevitable. Indeed, what Rompel and RARO once fought against in the name of Afrikanerdom was now accepted without question.

Fox's voluntary acquiescence to the Board's proposals without it having to resort to legislative coercion, especially in the face of the Report's confidence in the future development of a more competitive industry, can be seen as an indication of the buoyant economic conditions of the time. The period 1961 to 1963 coincided with a sharp upswing in the economy averaging 5.6% over the three years. The subsequent four years showed a much higher mean of 7.4% which extended through 1969 (see Fig. 1) The Board's Report was published on 12 December 1961 and it could afford, therefore, to be optimistic. This was a time of boom for the small investor. In parallel with this cyclical upswing was an increased level of stable urbanisation and more particularly, suburbanisation, with the latter areas being well served by independent cinemas and drive-ins. These processes had two main implications as far as cinema was concerned. The first was a decreased level of political opposition and the incorporation of the white working class and petty bourgeoisie into supporting the hegemonic alliance. As will be shown in the analysis of Afrikaans cinema from 1965 onwards, these trends in the political economy were reflected as a shift from culturalism to capitalism in plot, character, setting, content and dramatic structure. The second implication was a marked increase in the level of consumerism, a consequence of the extra funds in circulation which in turn boosted secondary manufacturing (consumer goods). Higher standards of living for the hegemonic white classes went hand in hand with an ideological co-option which identified a concern for 'the man in the street' and 'the public interest'. Hence the Board's sympathy with "the general public's requirements" and its confidence in the ability of new distributors to breach gaps in the market. In the meantime, Fox continued expanding its South African operation and took over the Empire circuit owned by Bill Boxer in 1965.
South Africa: Growth Rate of Real GDP.
Source: SA Reserve Bank Quarterly Bulletin

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>1960</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>1961</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>1971</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>1962</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>1972</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>1963</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>1973</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>1964</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>1974</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>1965</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>1966</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>1976</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>1967</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>1977</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>1968</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>1978</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>1969</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Source: South African Reserve Bank Quarterly Bulletin
Between 1952 and 1965 the number of cinema seats available increased by 47.76% and white attendance by 27.32%, while black patronage rose by 60.94%\textsuperscript{25}. During the period July 1964 to June 1965 over sixty million people paid an estimated R16 030 000 at box offices throughout the country. (Of this total non whites accounted for less than 12 million tickets sold). Total attendance from July 1969 to June 1970 was 67 158 845 of which non whites and mixed cinemas together accounted for only 14 332 626. Box office receipts were R28 084 000, a seventy-five percent increase over the 1964-65 figures. Although attendance only increased by 7 million, the new level of disposable income cushioned an increase in prices which was primarily responsible for the greater gross income. Between 1965 and 1970, the number of four-waller seats dropped by 8 359 from 242 633 to 234 274, a decrease of four percent. The drop only affected white cinemas (a 7% drop), whereas for non white cinemas there was a corresponding rise of seven percent. Drive-in parking spaces (whites) rose by forty percent from 39 000 in 1965 to 66 943 in 1970. Black spaces rose from 499 to 560 during this time, an eleven percent increase. Pavilion seats were only provided for whites, rising from 1 258 to 2 764\textsuperscript{26}.

The 1960s was also a period of increased property values which worked to the benefit of Fox who owned many central city cinemas. Total fixed assets on property measured in terms of munipucle rateable values rose from R3 299 000 in 1965 to R5 518 000 in 1970, a rise of 67%. Buildings rose as sharply from R5 734 000 to R9 571 000, an increase of R3 837 000, again 67%. The fixed assets in equipment rose from R3 072 000 to R5 443 000, an increase of 68%.

Debits rose from R25 903 000 to R45 013 000, a 74% increase. Simultaneously, however, net profits rose from R1 924 000 in 1965 to R2 960 000 in 1970. This represented a growth of only 53% although total receipts expanded by 114%. The total receipts for the whole industry in 1970 were R52 563 000 which had risen substantially from R24 580 000 in 1965. Of this, the highest rise was in the category of "other" which sub-
sumes catering and refreshments, screen advertising, rent of theatres and showcases. This category was the fastest growing aspect of the cinema industry. It accounted for only 7.1% of total receipts in 1965 but a remarkable 40.5% in 1970. The actual incomes were R3 445 000 in 1965 and R21 105 000 in 1970. Again, this increase reflects the new level of prosperity that white South Africans experienced during the 1960s and points up the vital need for companies like Fox to own vertical monopolies which include the sectors of catering and refreshment, screen advertising and so on. Exhibition received a further boost in a reduction of entertainment tax. This decreased from R5 105 000 in 1965 to R3 100 000 in 1970, a drop of 41% due to tax being lifted in the Transvaal and Natal. Tax continued to be charged in the Cape and Orange Free State, an imposition which led to their being less well catered for in terms of cinemas per capital population.

THE ASCENDANCE OF NATIONAL CAPITAL: PENETRATION BY SANLAM

The above paragraphs describe the positive conditions which Fox managed to intercept through their purchase of the Schlesinger film interests in 1956. Although Fox continued comfortably in a seller's market for over ten years, by the end of the decade they were to be outflanked on two fronts, with national capital once again becoming ascendant. The first of these concerned the question of cinema location. Despite Fox's commanding position in the South African market, its remote-controlled operation managed primarily from America had become cumbersome and unwieldy. Consequently, it was unable to respond to the more subtle shifts in the market and changing locational, demographic and consumer preference circumstances. Most of Fox's cinemas were situated in the central business districts of the big cities. These cinemas were extremely large, the Johannesburg Colisseum, for example, seating 2 227 patrons. The overall prosperity of the decade had led to a jump in land values and Fox found itself owning a property portfolio of highly rated and therefore expensive to maintain properties which it was reluctant to develop. The Financial Mail estimated that the market value of Fox's 149
properties to be worth R100 million in 1969\textsuperscript{27}. The 1960s was also a period of increased suburbanisation. Fox failed to follow this migration with the location of new, smaller and more intimate cinemas to intercept these more mobile audiences.

The second cause of Fox's sellout, and possibly the deciding factor, was the sudden and unexpected growth of Ster under the dynamic leadership of Andre Pieterse, and the stabilization of the company's property investments guided by the more sober SANLAM contribution. Ster assailed Fox from two directions. First, through the establishment of an independent circuit comprising both drive-ins and four wallers and serviced by their own distribution organization. Ster built smaller theatres designed to reflect the \textit{nouveau riche} penchant for intimate garishness. The experience is described by \textit{News/Check}:

\begin{quote}
Mirrors to infinity ... Travelling up an escalator one enters a labyrinth of halls and velvet tunnels, soft and curved in yielding violet. Actually entering a theatre is rather like being born. And then the seats themselves engulf the viewer. there he waits, plugged in and sedated\textsuperscript{28}.
\end{quote}

These emporiums are the physical extensions of the celluloid dream factories offering a mythical alternative to the mundaness of ordinary life. Seductively lit, sumptuously decorated with carpets even on the toilet walls, these architecto-social constructions seduce the cinema-goer into turning the cinema-going habit into a ritual. Architecturally, these mazes of escalators, triple-tiered levels and so on induct the viewer into the physical and material ambience which cinema turns into myth through linking the affirmative symbolism of architectural design to the capitalist symbolism encoded in the film's text. Ster also introduced "Fun Palaces", entertainment centres such as Ocean City in Durban and the Ster City complexes in Johannesburg and Pretoria which host multiple cinemas and an array of restaurants, cocktail bars, ice-rinks, shops and discotheques. This marketing strategy capitalised on the South African public's penchant of 'going to the cinema' with Ster offering a one-stop facility for a night's entertainment.

176
It will be recalled that Ster began with the Wonderboom Drive-In and that Fox had initially fought off the drive-in threat through monopolistic practices. Prior to the intervention of the Board of Trade and Industry in 1962, however, the only way that an independent could survive was through the drive-in. This hostile strategy on the part of Fox towards independent distributors and drive-in owners as well as to the establishment of their own outdoor circuit, was eventually to prove Fox's downfall. Ster Films exposed and drove a wedge into the gap in the Fox dominance using drive-ins to spearhead the attack. The South African company's position was greatly enhanced by the changes insisted on by the Board in conjunction with the improved economic climate. The growth in consumerism in turn led to a growth in the advertising industry and Ster forayed into "the most lucrative preserve of the Fox subsidiaries"\(^{29}\), Alexander Films and SA Filmlets. Ster negotiated a merger between Ster Adfilms, Filmads and Independent Film Services to organize and arrange screen time at independent cinemas and Ster controlled theatres numbering more than 400.

Ster earned an estimated after-tax profit of R400 000 for 1967-68\(^{30}\), and Pieterse himself became the largest minority shareholder. Furthermore, SANLAM backing was sure and dependable. By mid 1969, Ster Films had the following portfolio in comparison to 20th Century Fox:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Fox</th>
<th>Ster</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Outlets</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Four-Wallers</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drive-ins</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Employees</td>
<td>3 500</td>
<td>1 500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Admin. Staff</td>
<td>799</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical Staff</td>
<td>1 508</td>
<td>1 000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The value of Ster's smaller contracts with companies like Avco-Embassy, secured in 1962, should not be underestimated. Comments Pieterse, "You might say Zulu and Boecocie 70 put us on the map"\(^{32}\). In addition, Ster had inexplicably managed to entice the distribution and exhibition rights of first
Paramount (in 1964), and then Columbia (in 1965) away from Fox. Industry sources report that Ster had offered these American companies considerably more (estimated at R3 or R4 million together) than they had been earning through Fox which was not prepared to match Pieterse's offer. The result was that Ster now found itself in the undesirable position of having been contractually bound to screen more films than it had facilities for, at a higher price than Fox would have had to pay under its previous agreement. Ster was therefore forced to embark on an unprecedented construction programme in the shortest possible time to meet its contractual commitments to Paramount and Columbia. In September 1966, Ster announced a SANLAM backed R4.5 million expansion programme to facilitate these contracts. Projects included the Ster City and Ocean City complexes in Johannesburg and Durban respectively, and the development of cinemas and drive-ins in Cape Town, Durban, East London, bringing its total of cinemas to 38 compared to Fox's 107 at the end of 1966. Even with these newly commissioned outlets, however, Ster was still faced with insufficient premises. Ster was already highly indebted to the parent company, SANLAM, which now owned 90% of its equity. The only option available therefore was the purchase of Fox itself. This it did in April 1969.

It appears that SANLAM had never intended getting involved in the film industry to the extent that it has but the acquisition of Fox, in terms of the real estate obtained, was attractive to the company in which insurance remained a prime interest. The Financial Mail, revising its earlier R100 million estimate, guessed that Fox would realise R75 million from the deal, but it later transpired that the total pay-off was only $34 million, of which Schlesinger-SANLAM, in two separate deals, paid $17.6 million in cash to Fox and $6.4 million to the J Arthur Rank Organization. The remainder was offset against Fox's outstanding liabilities to Schlesinger after the 1956 takeover. Since R16 million was already owed to the Schlesinger Group on bonds and debentures, only R18 million in foreign exchange was needed to pay out 20th Century Fox, and Britain's Rank Organization which held a
20% interest. 

The Financial Mail comments that "without Ster's fantastic progress, Fox would probably never have been prepared to sell to South African interests". It is not clear exactly why Fox did sell out in the way it did. Back home in the United States the parent company had totally reversed its decline with the reappointment of Darryl Zanuck, and by 1956 gross earnings reached an all-time high of $227,259,000 with after-tax profits of $12,504,000. It seems that with the sudden expansion of the domestic market in America, Fox had no need for troublesome and suddenly competitive markets in a country where total film revenues amounted to just over R28 million in 1969, with an overall profit of only R2,960,000. Ironically, in this same year, United States Fox revenues declined markedly resulting in a $37 million loss, increasing to $77 million in 1970.

The deal with Fox was negotiated jointly by Mandy Moross of the Schlesinger Organization and Andries Wassenaar of SANLAM. It seems that Pieterse was only minimally involved in the transaction. Pieterse announced his resignation from Ster four months later, on 15 August 1969. This action was totally unexpected and was apparently forced by the SANLAM Board on that very day. It coincided with the opening of the Johannesburg Ster City complex, one of Pieterse's spectacular projects. The circumstances surrounding his resignation remain hazy but News/Check speculates that the "resignation was well planned in advance - a film which he made partly in secret and which was to have been shown to 60,000 viewers on Friday night (it reviewed the growth of Sanlam, the giant insurance company which controls Ster) was to climax with his resignation". A tip-off to SANLAM directors spiked the plan and "The grand - but dubious - gesture failed by a few hours as orders went out to Ster theatres, including Ster City, not to show the film."

As this incident suggests, Pieterse was a showman par excellence, a wheeler-dealer and a maverick who would have been much more
at ease in the Hollywood of the 1940s where the likes of Harry Cohn, Sam Goldwyn, Darryl Zanuck, Louis Meyer and David Selznick, negotiated their way to fortunes as they led the nation down Sunset Boulevard into a dream machine never since matched. Pieterse tried to emulate these moguls, but did so in a manner which consistently backfired on him and which generally led to financial difficulties of the company with which he was associated at the time. Not only did Pieterse have an indelible effect on the South African film industry but he was later to become involved in the Information Scandal (also known as Muldergate), where a power-hungry clique within the National Party government master-minded "a bizarre propaganda war" which aimed at co-opting the entire mass media into supporting the policies of the Nationalist government. The complexity and unlimited funding which was sunk into this project was beyond the wildest dreams of the earlier Afrikaner cultural bodies such as RARO, VOBi and KARFO. This time, however, there were different actors, different methods and different goals. It is against this background that we now return to a discussion of SANLAM's acquisition of Fox, for within a short while Pieterse was to reappear, this time in competition with Ster, and indeed, the whole SANLAM controlled Group.

THE CONSOLIDATION OF NATIONAL CAPITAL

With the SANLAM takeover, four companies now found themselves as partners: Fox, the Schlesinger Organization, SANLAM and Ster. These companies offered a stable of six American majors plus numerous smaller producers: Fox, Warner Bros, Paramount, Columbia, United Artists and MGM, as well as Seven Arts, Avco Embassy, Cinerama Leasing, Rank, National General, and so on. The Financial Mail reported that the American studios are "far" from happy to see the two major competitive operations, Fox and Ster, to all intents and purposes united under one umbrella. These companies had stood to benefit from Fox-Ster rivalry since it was through these antagonists that South African capital could be co-opted into expanding the penetration of the local market. Only Fox was secure,
having received a 30 year franchise to exhibit its films in all 128 cinemas transferred to the SANLAM-Schlesinger partnership. At a meeting in early May of 1969, the Motion Picture Producers of America in New York agreed that:

individual studios would go it alone, so far as possible, once their contracts with Fox run out (which for several is quite soon). This means agreeing to compete among themselves for screen time in a cut-throat free market situation in SA.

The worst fears of the American companies were realised when SANLAM announced the new structure of the four-company combine. The Suid-Afrikaanse Teaterbelange Beperk (Satbel) was floated as the holding company of 20th Century Fox, now called Kinekor, and the Ster Group. Certain of the Fox properties which offered redevelopment potential were incorporated into SANSO, made up from the SANLAM and Schlesinger Organization who each had equal shares. SANLAM assumed a controlling interest in Satbel:

Assuming that the relative values of the Fox and Ster contributions to Satbel to be around 75:25 (and that is no more than FM's guesstimate), and remembering that Fox itself is equally owned by Sanlam and SO, the line-up would be:

25% - Sanlam (ex-Ster)
37½% - Sanlam (ex-Fox)
62½% - Sanlam
37½% - Schlesinger
100% - Satbel

Adjusting for the minority holdings in Ster... Sanlam will probably end up with around 60% of Satbel plus 50% of SANSO.

This time round the Schlesinger Organization was less interested in the film industry than it was in the property on which the cinemas themselves were located. Having moved almost entirely out of the film industry, this group of companies had concentrated on its finance, banking, insurance and property development activities both in South Africa and Britain. The former Fox central cities properties which were greatly undercapitalised and other sites ripe for development went to SANSO.
to be managed by the Schlesinger Organization.

The final structure of SANSO following the parcelling out of shares is given in Fig. 2 below:

![Diagram showing the structure of SANSO](image)

**Figure 2:** SANSO-Satbel Shareholding  
(Source: Financial Mail, 5 June 1970, p. 893)

Only properties with developmental potential within five years were taken into SANSO. A R37 million cinema development programme was planned for 1971, while the overall redevelopment of all SANSO properties was estimated at R100 million. Part of the rationale behind this expansion was to modernise the exhibition industry and reduce its vulnerability to the introduction of broadcast television which was imminent. On completion of redevelopment the Financial Mail estimated that SANSO would be in control of prime city properties worth over R200 million⁷.
The ownership structure of Satbel is given below:

![Diagram](image)

Fig. 3: Satbel Structure of Ownership and Control
(Source: Financial Mail, 5 June 1970, p. 895)

Figure 3 shows that SANLAM's holding in Satbel was 68%, the Schlesinger Organization held 30% and minority interests owned only 2%. The reduction in Schlesinger's stake from the original Financial Mail estimates, reflects SANLAM's decision to integrate Ster into Satbel which caused a dilution of the Schlesinger share. Satbel thus assumed the spectre of a monopoly even greater than that of the previous Fox empire. The Satbel management were, however, at pains to emphasise that "On the operating side, the two companies will remain independent and will compete with one another; this should maintain a competitive situation on the film exhibition and distribution side".

The cinema count at this point is Kinekor, 128 cinemas and Ster, 18, out of a total of more than 400 countrywide, the remainder being owned by independents. Ster had 23 drive-ins and Kinekor 24 out of 114 throughout the country.

It will be recalled that until the formation of Ster-Film Import in 1959 the penetration of Afrikaner capital into the film industry was almost non-existent. The spectacular growth of Ster culminating in the SANLAM takeover of Fox tended to conceal other investments obtained by SANLAM as a by-
product of this transaction. SANLAM had entered into the information and 'culture' industries on a wider basis than just cinema through the acquisition of Fox. This broad based portfolio constituted a strong defence against rival American companies which might try to break the SANLAM stranglehold in much the same way as Ster did Fox under Andre Piccerse. The Financial Mail observed that "With TV as a counter-attraction, and Satbel's own diversification into TV-related activities, [any competitor] would have a tougher struggle than even Ster did in its early days when it was David battling it out with the Twentieth Century Goliath".

In October 1968, Fox had linked with Gallo, the largest record company in South Africa, to form Gallo-Fox, each having equal shares. This company dealt with audio-visual hardware and the first year's turnover topped R1 million in the custom design of auditoriums, lecture halls and sales of Super 8 and 16mm movie projectors, 35mm slide projectors, and public address systems. Gallo-Fox subsequently established Oudiovista Produkties in conjunction with a large Afrikaans publishing house, Nasionale Boekhandel. Oudiovista was set up to produce programmes for the Gallo-Fox projectors primarily in the field of education for schools, universities and industry. Production facilities were to be made available through Gallo's recording studios, Fox's Killarney (which was in the process of acquiring Irene Film Studios), and Nasionale Boekhandel which would supply the written scripts. Other plans included audio and video cassette libraries containing educational material and a visualisation of Nasionale Boekhandel's Standard Encyclopedia. The Financial Mail pointed out a few months after the Fox takeover that

Its relationship with Sanlam gives Gallo an enviable entrée to the screen world. With Sanlam controlling the film side, and Gallo the recording industry, the overall market (both before and after the advent of TV) seems almost a closed shop.

These maneuverings in education technology, closed-circuit television, commercial, industrial and educational franchises of
Super 8 and 16mm projectors with their concomitant software were partly a response to the anticipated government decision on the imminent introduction of broadcast television. A commission of inquiry had been appointed on 15 December 1969. Its Report was submitted in November 1970, and the establishment of a colour television service was approved by the government in 1971. To service this new video market, Gallo acquired a number of television franchises such as Ampex, JVC and a local television camera manufacturing concern. Other negotiations concerned a Gallo-CNA hookup on the hiring out of TV sets through CNA outlets. Of these moves in the audiovisual market, Financial Mail commented that "the most interesting of the associations remains the Gallo-Sanlam connection. If one is looking for the future TV giant, one of the most likely places could be somewhere between these two groups".

Figure 4, below, traces out the structures of ownership and control and shows how SANLAM has penetrated the video, record, educational, music, theatrical (Hugo Keleti) and communications (Decca Navigator) industries through the original acquisition of 20th Century Fox:

Source: *Financial Mail*, 9 October 1969, p. 147
What the Financial Mail neglects to mention, of course, were the ideological implications of the sudden extensions of SANLAM's tentacles into the information and entertainment industries. These relate to the individual as subject and how s/he is persuaded to enact a set of social practices which endorse and legitimate the process of capital accumulation. SANLAM's investment in education via Fox is no less important ideologically than is its control of the film industry as a whole. While the cinema circuit would remain culturally dependent primarily on American product or superficial Hollywood clones in the case of most locally made films, in terms of education SANLAM would be able to engage in national cultural production on a large scale. Of such an opportunity Armand Mattelart comments that

In the course of industrial concentration, the owners of high technology have increasingly become the ones who determine not only the manufacture of hardware and the installation of systems, but also the development of programmes, the content of messages.

The Gallo-Fox link provided SANLAM with an entrée into education which had not previously been subject to large scale commodity relations in South Africa. The provision of hardware and production facilities by Gallo-Fox and SANLAM with software provided by Nasionale Boekhandel, a subsidiary of a major Afrikaner Nationalist press empire in which SANLAM has a minority interest, provided support mechanisms for the ideological and cultural conditioning of the subject. Thus SANLAM's infusion of capital into the entertainment, education and information industries is of crucial importance when discussing questions of ideological and cultural production in the the South African film industry of this period.

Gallo-Fox and SANLAM's penetration, although not all that successful at first, should be seen as evidence of a tendency to invest surplus profits into reproductive as opposed to productive spheres which, as Mandel notes, is a basic hallmark of late capitalism. In a previous period when capital per se
had been relatively scarce it was concentrated in the direct
direct production of surplus value in the traditional spheres of com-
modity manufacture. When, however, the quantity of investible
capital became too large to be absorbed in this manner, part
of this capital found its way into areas which were not directly
productive but which contributed to the reproduction of the
commodity of labour power, specifically through investment
into education and training.

Although basically an insurance company, SANLAM was apparently
not unhappy with its investment in the film, education and in-
formation industries. A rapid accumulation of idle capital
demanded reinvestment at a higher rate than the average in-
terest. Coinciding with the 1960s, SANLAM experienced a
greater increase in premium income than any other South African
insurance company, and by 1970 investment income showed a
record growth with total income of over R100 million. In 1971
about 21% of all South African life insurance premiums were
paid to SANLAM. While the conglomerate ascribed much of this
success to its marketing methods and intensively trained sales-
force, of equal importance was the changing demographics and
life expectancy of its initial, primarily rural, policyholders. During
the first ten years of its existence, that is from 1918
to 1928, SANLAM's income emanated mainly from the platteiand
or country-side. Only in the 1930s did it move into the cities.
This increasing emphasis on city dwellers was to benefit
SANLAM in two important ways. First, the lifting of the gold
standard in 1932 brought increased prosperity which identified
itself mostly in the cities, and second, this increased pros-
perity, together with the greater access to health and other
social services provided in the cities in comparison to the
rural areas, brought with it a lengthier life-span and hence
reduced pay-out by SANLAM on life insurance. The economic
boom of the 1960s provided the opportunity for SANLAM to ex-
pand its market from its initially Afrikaans dominated policy-
holders to include more English-speakers than it had previously
been able to reach. All of these factors resulted in a
steadily expanding mass of idle capital which had to find out-
lets for its valorization. The cinema industry provided one
such outlet. In this way SANLAM behaved as a conglomerate which indiscriminately combined insurance, property, banking, personnel consulting and data collation, both manganese and gold mining, entertainment, education, media (press, books etc), electronics, tobacco, industrial and retail development, tourism, car rental, hotels, shipping, airfreight and stevedoring. Figure 3, below, offers a diagramatic representation of SANLAM's interests:

**Figure 3: SANLAM, VOLSKKAS and Federale Volksbeleggings Group of Companies**

The kind of concentration and centralization of capital as found in conglomerates like SANLAM, functions
to secure the average rate of profit for the largest possible volume of capital, to minimise the risks of specialised investment, and even, by exploiting the growing possibilities of rationalised administration and marginal speculation, to bag surplus profits for the whole of this conglomerated capital.

That much of this interpenetration of capital has occurred in the service sectors of the economy rather than in production *per se*, should be seen not only as Mandel indicates in the general case (where large quantities of capital can no longer be adequately valorised in industry proper), but also as a response by Afrikaans capital's initial exclusion from the means of production by British imperialist and English South African capital at the turn of the century. SANLAM did not start life as a producer but as a service industry which was bankrolled by Afrikaner-based agriculture and cultural organizations like the *Raddingsdaadbond*. Thus, as primarily a service organization, SANLAM, as a prime example of late capitalism functioned ideologically and culturally in the reproduction of the commodity of labour power and the persuasion of its policy holders in the benefits of the capitalist relations of production. The ideological implications and possibilities of this step are clear, though should not be seen in conspiratorial terms since SANLAM could behave in no other way and survive. At the same time we should not lose sight of the fact that on a fiscal level this represented a sound financial investment, for as Mandel points out in the period of late capitalism:

Television mechanises the school ... Television films and documentaries take the place of books and newspapers. 'Profitability' of universities, music academies and museums starts to be calculated in the same way as that of brickworks and screw factories.

As examples, Mandel cites the phenomena of companies which began by producing photostat machines, then took over publishing houses and are presently engaged in the production of educational material: Rank Xerox, Bell, 3M and Bell and
Howell. General Electric through its subsidiary, General Learning, produces 'educational goods' and Leasco-Pergamon intend setting up a huge data bank to sell 'systematised scientific information'. To this list we might add, particularly in the South African context, IBM with its science and mathematics video project in 'blac' schools, Control Data with its PLATO system, the largest outside the United States and which provides consistent tuition in the face of student boycotts, strikes, and the shortage of lecturers, and the Technicolor Super 8 Cassette loop projectors with a catalogue of 10 000 educational filmlets. All these companies found it profitable to extend their data processing, information and training activities into the education market at school, vocational and university level. Most of these multi-national companies either have subsidiaries or are represented through various (if changing) agency agreements in South Africa. At different times 20th Century Fox and Gallo had franchise agreements with some of these companies.

The division of capital into different company names tends to mystify the intricacies and inter-related connections within capitalist production. This fracturing of capital should be seen as a form of delimited appropriation of discourse in which different activities and commodities associated with them are relegated to different spheres of enterprise, each with their own corporate identity: education, entertainment, industrial training, business management and so on.

Similarly, the reproduction of the commodity of labour power is lubricated by the educational system in general, and educational technology in two ways. On the one hand, it conditions film makers who do their best to shield the dominant discourse through the repetitive use of genre, convention, formula in an unquestioning manner, while on the other, it solidifies audience expectation into an uncritical acceptance of what it is offered. This is what lies behind the film industry's marketing strategy: 'Give the public what it wants'. What the public wants depends on what the producer thinks it should have, and is tied in with the existence of the consumer.
society made possible through the extension of money wages to all classes making up the social formation. This process has affected the distribution of films by extending the boundaries of commodity production. Through its acquisition of Gallo-Fox, for example, SANLAM attempted to intercept and guide the pressures exercised by new technologies (Super 8 an 16mm film, film strips, slide-tape projectors, video etc) which ultimately helped in the creation of a home movie hiring company, Cine 16 in 1971. However, this kind of investment in the services sector "reduces the average rate of profit because an increased mass of surplus value has to be shared out amongst a mass of invested social capital that has increased yet more than it". Such capital is, however, "no more productive than circulation capital". As will be shown in Chapter 7, Cine 16 also had the function of protecting productive capital which was being seriously threatened by the illegal circulation of pirate film prints in the home movie market. Although the capital invested in the service enterprises is more difficult to valorize, Mandel comments:

From the standpoint of the overall interests of the capitalist class, the extension of the services sector in late capitalism is at best a lesser evil. It is preferable to the existence of idle surplus capitals, but remains an evil to the extent that it does nothing whatever directly to increase the total mass of surplus-value and indirectly contributes to it in only a modest degree, by shortening of the turnover-time of capital. The logic of late capitalism is therefore necessary to convert idle capital into service capital and simultaneously to replace service capital with productive capital, in other words, services with commodities: transport services with private cars, theatre and film services with private television sets; tomorrow, television programmes and educational instruction with video-cassettes.

This was the logic followed by SANLAM when it acquired Gallo-Fox as part of the 20th Century Fox package. Not only did it acquire a distribution and exhibition network but it set up its own film production facilities to service this new productive capital through Killarney Films, Irene Film Studios and Audiovista Produksies.
SANLAM did not restrict its investments to the film and audiovisual industries only. On 1 May 1977, for example, further service capital of R1 million was put into an effort to infiltrate the music recording industry then parcelled out mainly between Gallo (Africa), EMI and RPM. The holding company was named Communique and its two subsidiaries, Record and Tape Company and Impact Music Publishing. Entry into the market and subsequent survival depended on acquiring foreign labels under which the best-selling artists are recorded. The Record and Tape Company clearly intended trading on Satbel's domination of the film industry by making a bid for labels owned by the major film companies: WEA (owned by Warner Bros), CBS and United Artists. It seems, however, that Satbel Records, as it came to be called, over-extended itself and suffered lean times, though still in business.

It is through these highly complex inter-relationships of capital and ownership mediated via the capitalist system and lubricated by ideology which determines cultural responses which ultimately decide 'what the public wants'. The film producer as subject interacts with the public as subjects and they symbolically feed each other's expectations. What the public wants is thus determined by capital's needs or the objectives of fractions of that capital as in the case of Afrikanerdom. As was shown in the previous chapter, Afrikaner capital had little need of cinema to mobilise cultural responses in the ideological and economic battle against the English dominated capitalist system. These cultural needs were provided by other means. However, as Afrikaner capital began to grow idle it latched onto cinema as one potential valorization opportunity. Simultaneously it had to service and meet the material wants of the rapidly growing consumer society which was increasingly embracing Afrikaners who had made good in the cities. Where Afrikaans capital had been scarce as far as film production prior to the 1960s was concerned, cinema now offered a fertile investment, mainly because of its property value. In terms of cultural production, Afrikaans cinema was poised to come into its own in order to help socialise Afrikaners into this consumer society. At the same
time, such cultural production intercepted the *nouveau riche* material wants of the now almost fully urbanised Afrikaner, who needed a cathartic experience to exorcise his/her previous cultural guilt which was a response to the foresaking of 'the farm' and being inexorably drawn to the city with its attendant evils, sin and ungodly ways.

The next chapter returns to a discussion of Afrikaans cinema production and shows how the whole Afrikaner movement received an impetus from film production, mediated by organic and technical intellectuals who had obtained their training and knowledge through working for English capital in the form of the Schlesinger Organization. By taking this initially culturally alienating path, as Hans Rompel would say, these intellectuals were later to articulate the needs of capital through the process of interest-translation whereby their films identified, portrayed and, by the mid 1970s, were able to resolve the conflicts which arose between culture and materialism. These film makers bridged the gap between Afrikanerdom's abstract economic needs and the social and cultural implications and traumas to which imperialism gave rise.

NOTES AND REFERENCES


5. Fox, for example, obtained control of Todd AO and developed Cinemascope from technology developed in the 1920s by Henri Chrétien. For more information see Stanley, R. 1978: *The Celluloid Empire: A History of the American Motion Picture Industry*. Hastings House, New York, pp. 156-168
6. Other than those already mentioned, the three middle-sized companies were Hollywood Distributors, founded in 1959, International Films, formed in 1956 but went into liquidation in 1960, and Magna Film Distributors set up in 1960. A number of smaller firms also existed at the time: Avalon Theatres, Hylo Film Distributors, Indo African Films, Phirox Randiera as well as a number in Durban which imported Indian films.


8. At this stage the Pieterse family owned 12% of the company. Amongst the other shareholders were Prof Naas Coertze, Pieterse's father-in-law. See *News/Check*, 22 August 1969, p. 41


11. This figure was worked out by the Board (see p. 16) on the basis of 2.5 persons per car. This is a conservative figure since it acknowledges that figures supplied by the industry indicate that the average number of persons per car on week nights is 2.6, rising to between 2.8 and 3 on weekends


13. *SA Film Weekly*, 15 September 1916, p. 2


15. Ibid. See, eg., pp. 25, 26 and 28


18. Guback, *op. cit.* p. 125

20. Quoted in Guback, *op. cit.* p. 125. On p. 127, Guback quotes Eric Johnston in a statement made to a Senate Committee in 1953: "Pictures give an idea of America which it is difficult to portray in any other way, and the reason, the main reason, we think, is because our pictures are not obvious propaganda".

21. Board of Trade and Industry, *op. cit.* p. 27

22. Ibid

23. Ibid. p. 28

24. Ibid. p. 30

25. See Erasmus, P.F. and Pelser, J.J. 1973: *Die Rolprent as Massakommunikasjëmedium*. HSRC Verslag Nr. Komm. 4, pp. 49-50. The relative increase in black patronage is not high. Because attendance figures are very low to start with the percentage suggests a dramatic increase which is not the case.


29. *Financial Mail*, 16 September 1966, p. 784


31. *News/Check*, 22 August 1969, p. 42. *News/Check* goes on to comment that "A look at the staff structures of the two companies is also instructive. Ster, with less than half the outlets has only a third less technical personnel. This indicates optimism rather than efficiency. No cinéaste in his right mind would suffer the hazardous projection in the first Ster houses; the tried old Fox hands still had the edge. In administration the ratio is comparable to Fox, but the way the Ster people work in comparison! - as any pressman, who has been subjected to the elaborate and often confusing junketting by Ster public relations personnel, can testify. Fox ran smoothly with single telephone calls and single drinks. Ster often appeared to be falling over itself, imbued with an embarrassing enthusiasm. Gauche at the edge maybe, and always insistent; but it put the company where it is now. In the R1.95 seats".

195
32. Ibid. p. 41

33. News/Check, ibid, accepted Pieterse's bland explanation on how he solicited Columbia and Paramount without question: "Piss and vinegar. Enthusiasm. No-one like a monopoly" (p. 22). Financial Mail of 2 May 1969, p. 356 put Ster's coup down to "dint of talent, hard labour and timely Sanlam assistance"

34. See SA Film Weekly, 15 September 1966, p. 2

35. Financial Mail, 23 May 1969, p. 644


37. Financial Mail, 2 May 1969, p. 356

38. Dunne, op. cit. p. 5. Of this gross total, $100 million originated from the earnings of Sound of Music alone

39. News/Check, 22 August, 1969, p. 40 comments: "The events took place in a context fully representative of what has become recognizable as the Pieterse/Ster style. The Pretoria opening was graced by the State President (cabinet members were present in both Pretoria and Johannesburg), as well as a host of charismatic figures who collectively represent 'society', particularly Afrikaans society as it has defined itself over the past few years. Harsh lights and cameras, closed-circuit television, caught the jewels and the immaculately consorted ladies at their best. There was a see-through dress (planted, naturally, by Ster), very plush, and if the openings themselves were see-through in a nouveau riche style ... few could have escaped the visceral immediacy of being present at places where for a few brief hours the elusive social it was at. But this was only achieved at a cost equal to that of making a feature length film".

40. Ibid. p. 40

41. Ibid. Also see Financial Mail, 22 August 1969, p. 682. The Mail offers the following speculations on Pieterse's resignation: "Perhaps the decision to resign dates back to the Sanlam-Schlesinger acquisition of Fox and Andre Pieterse's disappointment over Ster - and himself - not being given the dominant role in the reorganization and rationalization of South Africa's film industry ... One thing is certain. Major policy decisions apart, Pieterse, the self-willed showman, chafes under the more sober-sided approach of Sanlam appointed directors, concentrating as they must on such mundane considerations as budgets, cash flow, operating costs and return on capital, and ill at ease as they were with the extravaganzas that are part of the showman's art. Sanlam is also concerned, understandably with its own public image; one of the biggest life assurance companies in South Africa, it could never afford to put at risk a reputation for the careful husbanding of the savings put in its trust by hundreds of thousands
of policy holders, for financial conservatism, for the utmost integrity. But increasingly, it had found itself hitched to a charming, talented but headstrong executive, determined that Ster's own star, and his own, should shine ever more brightly and move across the silver screen ever more swiftly, if necessary with scant regard to accepted business procedures and for the tedious but necessary practice of dotting "i's" and crossing "t's". Harry Jones in SA Film Weekly, 8 July 1971 reports that the film was made by Jans Rautenbach and questions Pieterse's "expensive method" of resignation, that is, the making of a documentary film "setting out his achievements", "no sheet of notepaper for him".


43. Financial Mail, 16 May 1969, p. 564

44. Management, July 1974: "Facing up to the Small Screen", p. 31

45. Financial Mail, 16 May 1969, p. 564


47. Financial Mail, 5 June 1970, p. 893

48. Dr Wim de Villiers, Satbel managing director, quoted in ibid

49. Ibid, p. 895

50. On 3 March 1972, Gallo placed an advertisement in a Financial Mail Special Report on the University of the Witwatersrand which illustrates how capital has subjected education and training to commodity exchange relations. Part of the advertisement reads:

Instruct your sales force on records or cassettes.
Educate your market.
Teach your workers, teach them in their own language.
Everybody can play a record.
Most people have equipment to play cassettes and cartridges.
Consult GALLO for music, education, industrial training.
Consult GALLO for Public Address.
Consult GALLO-FOX for Bell & Howell 16 mm Projectors and audio-visual devices.

51. Financial Mail, 9 September 1969


53. The local TV camera manufacturer was Alan Doyle who was
in charge of the SABC's prototype department

54. *Financial Mail*, 9 October 1969, p. 147. This predicted alignment does not seem to have taken place. In fact, both Gallo-Fox and Gallo-Electronics have struggled to establish themselves. One of the problems afflicting Gallo-Fox seems to have been questionable management. See *Financial Mail*, 23 January 1970, p. 194


57. The information for this section was gleaned from two *Financial Mail* special supplements on SANLAM, dated 9 March 1962 and 26 November 1971


59. Ibid. p. 387

60. In 1975 Gallo-Fox had the following agencies: Bell and Howell projectors and software; Bell and Howell Language Master which was administered through Gallo-Fox's Reading Skills Division; Video Arts management and sales training films; Rank Audio-visual management and sales training films; Encyclopedia Britannica Educational Corporation's films for colleges and schools; as well as slide projectors, copiers, overhead projectors and software, public address systems and reading laboratory equipment


63. Ibid. p. 406

64. Ibid

65. See *Financial Mail*, 19 April, 1973
CHAPTER 5

FILM PRODUCTION 1956 - 1962: CONSOLIDATION OF THE AFRIKAANS FILM PRODUCTION INDUSTRY

In contrast to earlier periods of Afrikaans film production, it was the period 1956-1962 that provided the foundation for the Afrikaans film industry which was to prosper during the next two decades. Commenting on the earlier period of Afrikaans film production, News/Check observes:

In the beginning, due to the bilingual situation, Afrikaans films were the obvious local product, because English-medium vehicles could be so easily imported. They were made in black-and-white to a well worn-comedy formula at a cost of never more than R30 000 with a certain profit of at least R10 000. This was neat business, but again, no "industry".

A perusal of the filmography will show a large influx of new producers and film makers into the industry during the period under discussion. Most of the films made were in Afrikaans from original scripts, as opposed to the previously popular small-time Afrikaans plays and Al Debbo knockabout comedies inspired by The Three Stooges, Abbot and Costello and Laurel and Hardy. Much of this activity was stimulated by a subsidy scheme instituted in 1956 (see next chapter) and aided by the growing competition of South African concerns in opposition to 20th Century Fox. Ster Films, for example, distributed the bulk of South African-made films. The most successful of these were Lord Oom Piet (1962) and Kimberley Jim (1963), both made by Jamie Uys Films. African Film Productions, operating under the banner of SA Screen Productions, made twelve Afrikaans features, Jamie Uys eight (one in English), Irene Film Studios five, and CARFO, three. Twenty-seven other features were made by individual companies. Of this total of fifty-eight, forty-one were solely in Afrikaans, four were bilingual and the remaining thirteen in English. Where previously only a few large companies had existed, the above total were made by no less than twenty-five smaller companies. Four of these
were overseas-based (Rank, Warwick, Avon and Centropol), and a few were international partnership productions (see, eg. The Hellions). It is therefore of little wonder that Tommie Meyer was able to describe this period of the South African film industry as having returned to "eie hande" (own hands)\textsuperscript{3}. His enthusiasm was tied to the Afrikaans language itself and the potential that he saw the Afrikaans film and Afrikaner dominated industry having on the growth and spread of a purer Afrikaans language. With a pride reminiscent of Louis Wiesner's description of the discovery of Afrikaans words for English technical terms while working on Donker Spore\textsuperscript{6}, Meyer states:

> Our language also became enriched as a result of numerous new words and expressions which came out of the film industry. Some such as veldflick (field flick) for 'drive-in' are lovely epithets out of the language of the people. The name rolprent (rolling picture) is as directly descriptive as you would expect from a young and lively language. Others are descriptive of technical concepts needed by a growing number of Afrikaans technicians\textsuperscript{5}.

As an official of the Federation of Afrikaans Cultural Societies (FAK), first as Organizing Secretary and later General Secretary, Meyer was heavily involved in the management and coordination of Afrikaans language festivals and other cultural activities designed to stimulate a pride in this language. He was later to become an important figure in the Afrikaans film industry. It is therefore necessary to assess his role as an organic intellectual while working for the FAK. Originally a mechanical engineer working on an Anglo-American gold mine, Meyer showed a flair for management and organization which, together with a certain Nationalist spirit, adequately suited him for his subsequent role in the FAK. This body, it will be remembered, was the cultural arm of the Broederbond, one which maintained an eye on joint and, where necessary, simultaneous action regarding the maintenance and promotion of the Afrikaans language\textsuperscript{6}. Its function was to shape a particular conception of the world, a conscious line of moral conduct and to generate a new stratum of intellectuals who would lubricate the path of Afrikaner cultural and economic advancement.
Meyer immediately set about placing the FAK on an economic footing and simultaneously extending its influence. His reading of the FAK's yearly reports indicated to him that Afrikaners had rarely attended cultural functions in the past and that the FAK had always found it necessary to plead for money. Like the Reddingsdaadbond before him, Meyer travelled the length and breadth of the sub-continent, from Cape Town to Rhodesia and from Natal to the West Coast (but not South West Africa), visiting Afrikaner cultural organizations, establishing them where they did not exist, and persuading people to contribute to an FAK subscription scheme for £1 a year or £20 for life membership.

Amongst the many activities organised were Taal Feeste or Language Festivals. A major series was organised during 1959 with the theme being "The Wonder of Afrikaans". This title was considered appropriate by Meyer since Afrikaans, he argues, was the last, white, Western language to be born. No new languages are ever likely to appear again because of the effect of modern mass communications: "Afrikaans is the most scientific language because it is the youngest"?

All South African schools -- black, white, coloured and Asiatic -- were invited to participate in group Festivals leap-frogging from the smaller towns to larger cities, ending in the amphitheatre of the Voortrekker Monument on 31 May 1959 (Union Day). The FAK sought a means of recording these events and Meyer comments that "We decided that in place of a monument we would make a film on the Afrikaans language's growth". This was to be the genesis of Meyer's later film career. Jamie Uys was engaged to make the film. His brief was to create a feature-length docu-drama about the trials, growth and history of the Afrikaans language, incorporating the Language Festivals. Although Uys was given carte blanche on the making of the film, the FAK stipulated the condition that it had to be a film which the people would 'want to see'. In this way, the FAK obviously hoped to successfully marry a cultural objective with a popular, or more specifically, commercial appeal. Although this point was never articulated, it did show up the
ideological differences which existed between the FAK and previous Afrikaans film makers such as Hans Rompel.

The film was made on a spectacular scale dealing with the history of the Afrikaner since the rounding of the Cape by Bartolamew Diaz in 1486 through to the present (1960). The final scene was shot in the amphitheatre. Commenting on this finalé, Meyer indicates the extent to which Afrikaners coalesce as a group in the generation of symbols, placing great store on unity and the maintenance of cultural identity:

There were about 50 000 people there [in the Voortrekker amphitheatre]. In the stadium it was a pitch dark night and a little plane flew overhead towing a message in lights: "The Wonder of Afrikaans". Everyone had to light matches to show the flame of the growth of Afrikaans. It was an unbelievable experience to see 50 000 people with little lights.

This was the ultimate time that the Voortrekker Monument hosted a cultural activity where cinema played such an important role. It had seen the screening of De Voortrekkers /Winning a Continent, Sarie Marais, Moedertjie and had provided significant scenes for 'Nasie Hou Koers, Die Bou van 'n Nasie/They Built a Nation and the present film entitled Doodkry is Min. The film was released at the Monument on 29 April 1961. Again, the date of release is significant for 1961 was the year that South Africa became a republic. Tickets were sold through schools and families paid only for the first three children. An entire evening's entertainment was organised. Of the 50 000 people present at the screening, many were English speakers.

The title Doodkry is Min translates as Impossible to Suppress or They Can't Keep us Down, a not so oblique reference to the discriminatory efforts of the British Imperial Government's successive Governors to stamp out the Afrikaans language before Union in 1910. The title is derived from a poem by Totius called Die Besemboes. Two lines of this poem appear at the start of the film:

Ek leef en sal lewe
My doodkry is min
I live and shall live
They cannot keep me down
The film is primarily concerned with the presenting of Afrikaans as a mature language which, rooted in the pastoral experience of the Afrikaner, is nevertheless fully at home in the technical, industrial modern business world: "The language in which you can say everything from the highest to the lowest, from the most squalid to the expansive, the exquisite to the most beautiful" (n Taal waarin jy alles kan sê van die hoogste tot die laagste, van die vuile tot die ruimte, die lekkerste tot die skoonste). The film continuously cuts to vignettes of South African history returning always to current events or imagery which lauds in a forthright solemnity the Afrikaner as subject of Afrikaner Nationalism: "I am an Afrikaner. My story is the story of a new people with a new language on new soil" (bodem) reads an individual from a scroll, dressed in a flowing gown, standing at the Monument. Despite the ravages of black savages, the arrival of the British, the 1820 settlers and the ascendance of English as the National language, the Afrikaans language began to develop, according to the film's narrative. After the defeat of Dingaan, claims the film, civilization spread throughout the whole land. In the Cape, Natal, Orange Free State and Transvaal there now lived one nation under different flags, united by one language. As Afrikaans began to coalesce it nevertheless met with resistance by some Boers. The language was still primitive and many felt that it was not yet ready for cultural functions like debates. In one such scene the chairman stumbles over Nederlands tenses and words. The audience tells him to speak "Boere-Hollands" if he wants them to understand what he is saying. The chairman refuses to speak a "kitchen language", then acquiesces.

The conflict between Britain and Boer grew. The film shows how the emergent Afrikaner was forced to speak English to the British rulers in the towns and when Britons were in earshot. Afrikaans was more freely spoken in the rural areas. However, British influences were seen there too. In one scene, for example, the film shows a Boer who, returned to his destroyed farm house, mourns his loss. The film then cuts to a British toff sporting a handlebar moustache. His role is symbolic of
of Lord Milner's Afrikaner prejudice. The toff is conversing with an army officer, "We have a golden opportunity now to make the children of the two republics English-speaking within one year. What we require now are teachers willing to teach these children our language and our great imperial ideas". Shots of the grieving farmer are intercut with the two British characters. The narrator concludes "But they were too late. The Boere-language was anchored too deeply in the Boer soul". This is said over shots of pupils entering a class room in single file while the stern male English speaking teacher shouts out "Left, right, left ...". The teacher severely watching over the class entering, the commentary continues "And they can't keep us down".

William, the telltale, goes straight to the teacher who is standing at the front of the class and informs on Pieter. The teacher speaks, "William avers that you committed an infringement of the rules. He says you spoke Dutch". Pieter tries, in faltering English, to defend himself in front of the class: "He hitted me in the face". Switching to Afrikaans Pieter says, "He hit me ... and I responded, 'You bloody redneck' (You blerry rooinek). As a result of this incident, Pieter is told to fetch the "Dutch mark" and stand on a chair with the word "Donkey" hung on a card around his neck. Pieter stands in the corner and is ridiculed by the class. The narrator continues, "But the punishment did not help. 'Small Pietie' was born in a concentration camp and grew older under the English flag".

The Dutch mark is a recurring sign in the film and at national gatherings. Earlier in the film, Prime Minister Verwoerd speaks to the people gathered at the Monument. Clearly visible in the frame is a large sign, "I am a Donkey. I speak Dutch", while the same words are carried on the backs of children in school uniform. These and other phrases were the discursive mechanisms used by Afrikaners in their efforts to rally the volk towards political and economic supremacy. They are contrasted with the arrogance and oppression of English capitalism. In one scene, for example, an English speaking indus-
trialist and employer is shown as an overweight, confident, and arrogant person standing cross-armed, wearing an expensive suit. The Afrikaner worker, an old partly bald man dressed in tatters, has to address his boss in English with hat in hand.

The initial shots of Afrikaans farmers tilling the land by hand are substituted by scenes of numerous tractors ploughing the fields. No longer is the plough pulled by donkeys and guided by the farmer. During the machine age one Afrikaans business after another is established. With new technology and economic upliftment came new Afrikaans words to describe 'radiator', 'accelerator', 'carburettor' and so on.

That the Afrikaner has succeeded against all odds is finally symbolized by the scene at the Monument with the lighted candles held high. The stereotyping in the film is quite blatant, English employers are condescending and overbearing, always dressed well or in British army uniform. Blacks are uncivilized. They are only shown as peaceful, happy and laughing when they are working on Afrikaans farms. The Boers are the folk heroes generally shown on a farm -- a lone individual working the land -- a patient, confident, if repressed symbol of the inherent strength of Afrikanerdrom. He is a quiet spoken and humble man of few words, dutifully served by his wife as he forges the future of Afrikanerdrom in the South African soil. Great awe is attributed to Afrikaner intellectuals who have made a cultural contribution through newspapers, poetry, novels and writing in general. These people are the ones who, like the film makers of the 1960s, helped legitimise the Afrikaans language to Afrikaners and English alike during the 19th century.

The film was screened in the open air at the Monument on a screen 60 feet wide and 15 feet high especially made for the occasion. Thus, the Monument and film production were once again the focal points of Afrikaner cultural cohesion.

Meyer reports that until the film's screening on 29 April when he saw the audience response to the film and the glowing
pro-Afrikaans review in the next day's *Sunday Times*, he had resisted Uys' overtures to join his film company:

The fact that the film as medium could exercise such great influence on the barren ground of the English language newspaper, overcame my scepticism about its great power and value, and decided me to accept Jamie's invitation to join his company.

It is against this background that Meyer describes his entry into the film industry via Jamie Uys Films in 1961. Although having been with the FAK since 1946, Meyer's knowledge of Rompel who had earlier established RARO under the overall auspices of the FAK, was almost negligible. Indeed, Meyer claimed of *Doodkry is Min* that this film represented "the first time that a cultural organization in South Africa /had/ made use of a full length film to further its work". This statement entirely neglects the previous efforts of RARO, VOB and UTOLO, and despite the commitment and achievements of these previous bodies, it was Jamie Uys who was awarded a special 'Oscar' by the FAK for his work in "promoting the Afrikaans motion picture industry". Despite Meyer's put-down of these earlier cultural efforts, his devotion to the Afrikaner Nationalist and language causes is no less fervent. They differed, however, in terms of both culture and ideology. Rompel's world view was circumscribed by his understanding of Afrikanerdom as a rural nation located nation unspoiled by urban influences, whereas Meyer may be described as an 'intellectual of the urban type' or an organic intellectual who has grown up alongside and is linked to the fortunes of his class. This may partially explain why Rompel was so ineffectual as an organic intellectual since he was unable to appreciate the changing economic base of the vast majority of Afrikaners and the way in which this affected their perception of their present opportunities and past heritage. As such, he was unaware of the underlying structural causes of the urban trek and how the processes were related to the very economic goals of Afrikanerdom. The hegemonic crisis was pre-existent, but was being played out in other fields of endeavour.
While Meyer's enthusiasm for film paralleled that of Rompel and his colleagues, his assessment of its value was more encompassing and more expedient in his acceptance of its capitalist base and how it could be deployed in directing the ideas and aspirations of the petty bourgeois Afrikaner class to which he belonged. In many of the films that Meyer subsequently made in his capacities as managing director of Jamie Uys Films, Kavalier Films and as an independent, he tried to translate the interests of his culture through cinema. In contrast to Rompel, he not only identified the new discursive site which had resulted in a cultural crisis caused by the urban trek, but obtained a firm economic footing through the growing support of large Afrikaner business. Looking at some of his later films such as 'A Seder val in Waterkloof' (1978) and 'Birds of Paradise' (1981), however, it becomes more difficult to reconcile his earlier cultural values with his (profitable) exploration of sex and sedition -- a hallmark of the Afrikaans film during the late 1970s and early 1980s. This shift, however, should not be seen in isolation from the underlying economic processes operative in the political economy and will be shown later to be a different kind of response, a new way of coping with a much more mature apartheid economy, but one which was facing crises both domestically and externally.

The significance of Meyer to this chapter lies in the role that he played in the South African film industry during his period with the FAK, and thereafter as a producer in the commercial industry. It is to his association with Jamie Uys films that we now turn.

It was because of his functional capacity as manager-producer, rather than flamboyant director, that Meyer's contribution has tended to be overlooked by commentators reporting on the industry. Uys was a pioneer, a folk hero and the South African industry and public's one hope for international recognition. He remains respected by both English and Afrikaner alike, and his sense of cinematic humour which light-heartedly exploits the many cultural tensions between the two language groups, endeared him to local audiences. However, this humour, its
form, the way it is enacted and his plot structures tend to repeat themselves in film after film, although in a progressively more sophisticated manner. It was Meyer who introduced the diversity of themes into the Jamie Uys Films repertoire and who, unlike Uys, was always conscious of his role as an organic intellectual. Whereas Uys claims "I don't make social statements"\textsuperscript{12}, Meyer claims that his films are more than just entertainment. His objectives range from "sheer entertainment" to the use of cinema to show the outside world the South African social milieu -- "what goes on". Meyer continues:

Even Jamie's comedies have this function. I have seen many TV programmes where the South African, and especially the Afrikaner, is shown as a 'dour Boer'. This backvelder is always shown with a long beard who does not laugh and who only wants to kill everybody. No other image exists. If Jamie makes a comedy and people out there (overseas) laugh then they must realise that something is wrong. These films bring a little more balance in the images that the world sees of South Africa. We do things that are wrong in South Africa, America does things that are wrong, Russia does things that are wrong ... and so on. The impression is that South Africa does just one thing and that it is continually in the wrong. A film can show that there are ordinary people in South Africa, just as there are overseas.

At the time Meyer joined Jamie Uys Films the company was facing considerable losses on its first international co-production, \textit{The Hellions} (1961), involving Columbia and Warwick Films. The South African studio was not geared to manage production of an international scale and complexity and consequently was heading for serious financial difficulties.\textsuperscript{13} Additional capital was not easily found as 1961 was also the year of the Sharpeville massacre and nationwide unrest which led to the declaration of a state of emergency. These events seriously disrupted both local and international investor confidence in South Africa. The national growth rate dropped from 8.5% in 1951 and 6.7% in 1954 to an average of only 3.45% between 1959 and 1961. Further capital had to be obtained if Uys Films was to survive this cyclical downswing exacerbated by losses incurred on \textit{The Hellions}. As newly appointed managing director, Tommie Meyer took up the challenge. Like
many film producers before him, Meyer toured the country to search out investors. This method of raising capital, however, had seen its day and was not successful. Again, like his colleagues before him, Meyer approached Afrikaner industrialists. This time the bid was successful and capitalised on the economic upswing which began i.e. 1962. SANLAM, which was to bankroll Ster Films the following year, BONUSKOR (in which SANLAM has a minority shareholding) and Anton Rupert were major investors numbered among the 130 solicited by the studio. These companies appointed directors to the board and Jamie Uys Films was revitalised and brought under a much stricter management, a control which also brought about a realignment of content.

Even as managing director of Uys Films, subjected to the capitalist pressures of profit-seeking conglomerates and alienated labour, Meyer was not totally persuaded that film should exorcise messages or that entertainment and messages (or "social statement") were mutually exclusive. Uys regarded himself purely as an entertaining film maker. In contradiction, Meyer describes the social and economic role of this company in far more organic terms:

After 1961 Jamie Uys Films Ltd was built up into a large production company. The objective was to provide a base where experienced directors could improve the quality of their films, but also where young directors could have the opportunity to gain the necessary experience.

Of prime importance as a by-product of Jamie Uys Films was the wider dissemination of the Afrikaans language. Meyer points out that there are no language boundaries in the film industry with English directors making Afrikaans films and vice-versa. Film crews were increasingly made up of both language groups. He points out that while Afrikaans films accounted for only 2% of all releases in South Africa they pulled in 7% of the gross box office in the decade prior to 1974. Throughout his chapter in the commemorative book sponsored by the FAK, Meyer's pride in the contribution of film to the growth of the Afrikaans language film shines through:
The overall image of the South African film industry presents a picture of which the Afrikaner can understandably be proud. The Afrikaner's capture of the business and his present overwhelming influence in it could scarcely be predicted a decade ago. Nevertheless, it is today (i.e. 1974) a reality having taken place so fast that thousands of Afrikaners have not yet realised it.\(^{17}\)

Meyer is quite clear on the relationship between the production sector staffed by Afrikaans producers and the support given these producers by Afrikaner-owned distributors and exhibitors such as Ster, Kinekor and Films Trust. However, Meyer is also adamant that the Afrikaners "full objective" where

\[
\text{the nations of the world must realise that the milieu of the film story in South Africa is where a highly developed Western civilization is busy in awakening and developing a whole continent to pull itself out of a condition of poverty.}^{18}
\]

has not yet been achieved.

As a consequence of Meyer's strategy, Jamie Uys Films became the major rival to SA Screen Productions owned by 20th Century Fox since 1959. Serving both economic and social goals, Jamie Uys Films consciously identified and developed new technical intellectuals who were expected to entrench Afrikaans film making and bring their social statements and entertainment to the wider community. The studio's success was such that Meyer was able to state that "We were almost a training school for technicians". Many notable film makers passed through this stable, most of whom were to have a significant impact on the content and treatment of later Afrikaans films: Elmo de Witt, Sias Odendaal, Emil Nofal, Koos Roets and Jans Rautenbach. These film makers eventually all left the company and branched out on their own.

Again, despite the astonishment professed by Uys and many of his proteges that they were also in the business of 'social statements', the over-arching guidance and conscious social and cultural objectives articulated by Tommie Meyer must be kept in mind:
There must be a place for every sort of film in South Africa. For the absolute art film there must be a place and opportunity, and an opportunity made. But there must be a place for absolute entertainment where there is no need for a message.

Thus Meyer guided the Afrikaans film in a manner which bridged the gap between the more abstract economic needs of Afrikaner business and social processes under way as a result of increasing Afrikaner infiltration into the economy. As mentioned in Chapter 3, to a large extent, it was, paradoxically, the English-dominated Schlesinger Organization which had imparted the technical knowledge to film makers which Meyer was able to harness and expand through the growth of Jamie Uys Films in collaboration with Ster Films, both largely backed by influential Afrikaner capital. Uys himself had worked with African Film Productions, having made his first 35mm feature there. Emil Nofal too, had moved from AFP. Many technicians such as Koos Roets worked in both camps, while others like Al Debbo and Pierre de Wet worked either with Schlesinger or independently.

Other than KARFO, Meyer was the first commercial film maker to realise that new urban themes were needed by a now largely urbanised Afrikaans population. These themes could be produced by a new generation of technical intellectuals trained at AFP, SA Screen Productions and those already learning with Jamie Uys Films. While Uys himself churned out Boer-Brit comedies with bumbling heroes literally falling over themselves trying to impress the sophisticated urban heroine, it was Meyer who introduced a far more culturally imbued and serious imagery and content into Afrikaans films made at this studio. As an organic intellectual, Meyer's significance accrued through his ability to convey to cinema audiences pre-existent facts and attitudes about their conditions of existence and worldview, and legitimize them. He was able to effectively perform this task over a long period of time ranging from Debbie in 1965 through to Springbok (1976) and Die Winter 14 Julie (1977). His audience was primarily the Afrikaner youth of the petty bourgeois class both in the rural and urban areas. The conflict-love type story which had its roots in Afrikaans
literature, provided the spark whereby film makers, as technical intellectuals, were able to translate the cultural traumas caused by the urban trek into a positive cultural response through which Afrikaners were persuaded to accept the inevitable modification in life style which awaited them: an adoption of material urban symbols, a truncated family life, looser sexual mores and the urgent need for parents and the older generation to understand the social, economic and cultural pressures which estranged them from their children. The description offered by Belinda Bozzoli of the organic intellectual in other sectors of the South African economy seems to have direct relevance to the current discussion:

the unique feature of these 'organic intellectuals' lay in the fact that they were not mere propagandists for the bourgeoisie (i.e. SANLAM, BONUSKOR or Rupert), nor even simply the creators of its symbols and ideologies (as reflected in cinema) ... They emerged as being an essential part of its existence, consciousness and realization as a class ... The organic intellectual was an ideological and political craftsman (or film maker) whose skills lay in his ability to assess the balance of economic and political forces with which capital had to cope, to discover the nature of its consciousness as a class or a section of a class, and to translate its objective problems and needs into symbolic and political terms (through cinema)\(^13\).

Jamie Uys Films provided the ideal vehicle for this task. Uys had proved the commercial potential of Afrikaans film and Meyer consolidated investment from the Afrikaner bourgeoisie represented primarily by SANLAM, BONUSKOR and Rupert. The films produced by this studio, from comedies to love dramas, all helped to break down an over-reliance on images and lifestyles of the past and suggested new means of coping with the traumas of urban living in a manner which best suited the needs of the burgeoning Afrikaner petty bourgeois class. Although the 1960s was a period of tremendous economic growth and relative industrial stability, it was also a period when the Afrikaner was beginning to reassess his way of life, the stoical cultural heritage and the excessive dependence on folk heroes and battle-grounds of history. Viewers had to be re-oriented
to cope with the problems of the present and the future. The Afrikaner was no longer a rurally based, culturally pure and socially isolated individual. He had moved to the city. This migration called for a cultural response which was able to cope with a modified class structure, changed ideologies and economic conditions. These were the themes of the Afrikaans films of the late 1960s. Embodied in the conflict-love type genre, Tommie Meyer was the first Afrikaans film producer to correctly assess the nature of Afrikaner consciousness of the period and to draw on the symbolic imagery already prevalent in Afrikaans literature and translate this into economic terms28. The second trek had been physically completed. Afrikaners were in the cities working in urban industry but they had yet to come to terms with the cultural traumas which resulted from this geographical, social and emotional dislocation.

In summary, Meyer and to a lesser extent, Uys, were located in the appropriate nexus of time and place to mobilize Afrikaner capital into the production industry in a manner which their forerunners had not been able to emulate barely fifteen years earlier. In the post 1960s, Afrikaner capital now had a need for a film industry, for that industry to function as a means of interest-translation to express bourgeois interests to a wider audience than just its own narrow membership. This period also marked the beginnings of a massive inflow of Afrikaner capital into cultural production in addition to the manufacture of goods in the primary and secondary sectors of the economy. Afrikaner intellectuals had succeeded in acquiring political power as a pre-condition to economic power. With the tremendous growth of Afrikaner business during the 1960s a cultural and ideological reassessment was necessary if it was to continue expanding. It was also necessary to sustain and entrench the alliance between the politically powerful rural sections of the Afrikaans population and its urban counterpart.

The next chapter shows how private capital inter-relates with state capital through the workings of the subsidy scheme. It
will discuss the ideological underpinnings of the various schemes put forward and trace the connections between the method of subsidy, the politico-economic goals of the state and how these correlate with the cultural objectives of technical and organic intellectuals agitating for state assistance. The major concern of the subsidy will be shown to be primarily economic and through the penetration of such logic, ideological and cultural reflections would thereby be controlled. The subsidy was designed to limit the production of non-commercial films. Instead, it aimed to establish an industry, though has not been successful in this objective. The subsidy is not concerned with 'art', quality or technical competence other than what elements of these are required to sustain an economically viable production for local film makers, with the added possibility of the earning of foreign exchange and the projecting of a favourable national image to the external world.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. News/Check, 12 April 1963, p. 71
2. See back of the thesis
4. See Kultuur Filma, December 1944, pp. 13-14
5. Meyer, op. cit. p. 230
7. Interview with Meyer in April 1981. All further unreferenced interviews were conducted between the author and Meyer at this meeting
8. Rooïne is a pejorative term applied originally to British soldiers who came to South Africa during the two Anglo-Boer Wars. The term came about because of the susceptibility of Englishmen with pale skins to sunburn on those parts of their anatomy not protected from the harsh South African sun.

The sign of the "Dutch mark" is a recurring discursive mechanism used by Afrikaners in the first half of the century to remind themselves of English prejudice.
Five years after the film had been released, for example, in 1966 at a Festival held in the amphitheatre of the Voortrekker Monument to celebrate the coming of age of the Afrikaans language which had been officially recognised by the South African government in 1925, the then Prime Minister, Dr Hendrik Verwoerd, arrived in a horse drawn coach. In the background was a large sign, "I am a Donkey - I speak Dutch". For more information see Harrison, D. 1981: The White Tribe of Africa: South Africa in Perspective. Macmillan, Johannesburg, pp. 48-56


10. Sunday Times, 30 April 1961

11. For more information on the urban intellectual see Gramsci, A. 1978: Selections From Prison Notebooks. Lawrence and Wisehart, London. (Translated by Quinton Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith), pp. 14ff

12. Interviewed in To the Point, 17 October 1980, p. 11. The author of the "Cover Story" on Jamie Uys, however, is not so easily misled: "One can see the trace of irony in the fact that the harder he tries not to make social statements, the more he succeeds in doing so" (p. 11)

13. To the Point, ibid, p. 12 reports that even on The Gods Must Be Crazy, Uys only used 6 technicians and "not the army of cameramen, lighting technicians so often seen on overseas sets"

14. BONUSKOR has the reputation of being an adventurous investor, and one which places the development of the South African economy higher than its own profits. At this time, after Sharpeville, when other companies were marking time, BONUSKOR invested capital in local concerns

15. Meyer, op. cit. p. 238

16. Ibid. p. 239

17. Ibid

18. Ibid

19. Bozzoli, B. 1981: The Political Nature of a Ruling Class: Capital and Ideology in South Africa 1890-1933. Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, p. 11. Note that the film makers as organic intellectuals differed from their journalist counterparts as described by Bozzoli in that they did not "create ideologies" and they were not "policy makers" but functioned in the process of interest-translation. They expressed bourgeois interests to the wider community, not merely to the class to which they belonged

20. For a brief but succinct evaluation of images in Afrikaans literature see Hofmeyer, I. 1981: "The Political Dimension of South African Literature: An Analysis of Images of Town and Country in the Turn of the Century Writing".

215
CHAPTER 6

CONSOLIDATION OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN FILM PRODUCTION INDUSTRY: THE IDEOLOGY AND ECONOMICS OF THE STATE SUBSIDY SYSTEM

Given the extent and nature of Afrikaner agitation for state assistance and industrial support prior to the Nationalists assumption of power in 1948, the questions of why it was only in 1956 that a state subsidy scheme was introduced or a state co-ordinating body even later, in 1964, are important ones.

This chapter will attempt to navigate the complex interconnections which exist between the state and private capital, cultural production and ideology in relation to shifts in the South African political economy. A full understanding of this chapter requires that the preceding pages are kept in mind during this discussion and that the definitions outlined in the first chapter are consistently recalled as we proceed with the analysis through the highly intricate inter-relationships which must be examined if we are to understand the raison d'être of the state subsidy scheme. This section will try to deduce the motivations underlying the various reports submitted to the government; most notably the Cilliers Film Committee, the Grierson Report and those of the Board of Trade and Industry (BTI), and dissect their ideological frame of reference in terms of their distinctions, if any, between the state, the government and the hegemonic bloc. Against this, the present chapter sets out to detect whose interests these reports and subsidies serve and how they interlock with the requirements of the dominant classes.

The analysis which follows will trace, in chronological order, the various investigations conducted for the government on the questions of a state film policy and methods of financial assistance to both state bodies and the private sector.
CULTURE VERSUS THE WAR EFFORT: INITIAL DISCUSSIONS

In addition to the wide ranging and highly comprehensive structure modeled on the Nazi Germany film propaganda methods suggested by Rompel in 1942, two further articles appeared in 1943 and 1944 on the subject of a film programme for South Africa. The first, in Afrikaans, places great emphasis on film as a social document, as a medium which should be co-ordinated under the auspices of a National Film Institute to counter the alienating effects of an industry controlled by British and American interests. The Schlesinger monopoly was accused of cultural imperialism and preventing the emergence of a South African art film. Repeating many of the grievances articulated by Rompel before him (and Kohl after him), this author demanded nothing less than complete authoritarian control over all aspects of the film industry. The second article was in English, written by an English speaking film director, Leon Schauder. Far more pragmatic in outlook, this article discusses the difficulties of producing and distributing documentary films in the face of the "complicated situation of cinema control in South Africa", an oblique reference, no doubt, to the Schlesinger monopoly. In 1954, John Grierson also addressed this problem when he outlined methods by which the state and private industry could cooperate. Schauder's suggestions, however, were specific to the war situation and need not be pursued here. Of greater relevance is the content of the Cilliers Film Committee appointed in 1943 and its successor, the Smith Committee to which the two shorter articles were presumably addressed.

THE CILLIERS FILM COMMITTEE: AFRIKANER MOBILISATION OF CINEMA

It will be remembered from Chapter 2 that even under the United Party government the proposals put forward by the Cilliers Committee caused a furore amongst English speaking critics. They saw a sinister Afrikaner plot lurking beneath its recommendations. One critic described the proposed Films Board in the following terms:

217
A government Films Board is to be established with a full time chairman (Professor Cilliers?) and £10 000 a year on salaries, etc. The other members would include representatives of the notorious F.A.K. and of "all government departments as far as their film requirements are concerned" (what departments?, what requirements?) but none of the cinema-going public. If this body is given anything between £50 000 and £100 000 a year of public money, it will undertake to produce a number of short films 'for exhibition at every cinema performance in every cinema centre in the Union all the year round'.

The Union Review describes the chairman of the Committee, Professor AC Cilliers as "a lifelong Nationalist" educated in Germany who, after initially siding with the anti-war Nationalists, later changed his allegiances. What stimulated these accusations was the ideological discourse adopted by the Committee which based its analysis on gobbets of common sense derived from the growing momentum of Afrikaner Nationalism: 'rich national life' (p. 4), 'spread of national culture' (p. 12), 'spiritual content' (p. 19), 'making our society bilingual' 'cultural protection' (p. 13) and so on. These repetitively articulated affirmations found exposure in a new site of cultural struggle, the state machinery per se. Previously, discursive affirmations had been restricted to non-official Afrikaner cultural groups such as RARO and VOF, as well as national bodies such as the FAK, Broederbond and Reddingsdaad bond. Although no practical consequences flowed from this report, it is highly significant in that it legitimised these affirmations and suggested the use of cinema as an ideological apparatus through which to direct the interpellation of subjects. The Committee, for example, argued that in view of our "peculiar racial and economic circumstances, any case for the protection of the South African film industry should be based more on cultural than on directly economic grounds". This conclusion was supported by the Committee which argued that "the economic life of a nation is closely linked up with its cultural life". Realising that 'culture' had a reciprocal effect in a market economy, the Committee concluded: "Judged by modern standards, the higher the standard of culture, the greater the demand for the various products of agriculture and industry". This Committee then, immediately set itself apart from the 'purer',
non-material objectives of RARO which was operating at the same time. According to the Committee, individual subjects formed the "foundation" of culture, while the emergence and maintenance of "a high standard of culture" is conditional upon "the supplementation and augmentation of individual effort by the organized and organizing power of the whole - ... the state". The state, in turn, is responsible for "cultural functions" which are "beyond the powers of private initiative, whether individual or collective". In other words, what the Committee argued for is that the state should manage the social organization of discourse through the shielding of both the material and spiritual elements of 'culture'. Part of this protection from alien discourses concerned the oft-repeated Afrikaner criticism of cinema as "an escape from reality into a dream world of make-believe and fancy", becoming in the process "the cultural eldorado of the masses". The effects of this cinematic displacement of reality,

Unless carefully watched and correctly guided ... can indeed play havoc with the moral, mental, and cultural make-up of the nation. It's demoralising and denationalising potentialities are incalculable.

The Committee argued that cinema could be used as a "healing and formative influence" to a better understanding between the various sections of the South African political and racial milieu, most notably, the cultural and language barriers that divide English and Afrikaans speakers. While aware that the private industry would resist state attempts at intervention, the Committee framed its argument in terms of the ideological discourse of the capitalist relations of production, hoping by this means to persuade the film industry "to agree in the national interests". The issue concerned the increased production of films in Afrikaans and since "the essence of good showmanship is to give the audience what they want", it was felt that the industry would not resist the call. At this time, 100% of cinema programmes, apart from local newsreels, were in English.

The Committee recommended the establishment of a National
Film Board with a full-time chairman, a member of Parliament with a knowledge of finance, a representative for government departments and four ordinary members who were to be appointed in consultation with public bodies of an educational and cultural nature, for example, the Suid-Afrikaanse Akademie vir Taal, Lettere, Kuns en Wetenskap (SA Academy for Language, Literature, Art and Science), the FAK, the South African Association for the Advancement of Science and the Joint Matriculation Board.

There should be, recommended the Committee, a concentration on short films because they are cheaper to make than features, provide a training ground for more ambitious production, allow for experiment and attain a cultural value of their own. Furthermore, the documentary "aims at presenting essential industries, ways of living and environment of normal people in such a way that the appeal is no less dramatic than that of fiction film, in which life is often reconstructed in an exaggerated and artificial way."  

From these statements it would appear that the Board was envisaged by the Cilliers Film Committee as an ideological apparatus par excellence. The National Film Board was to provide an opaque and objective portrayal of life in terms of the reciprocal relationship between 'national culture' and the economy in a way which would legitimise racial capitalism. This mediated cinematic reality was viewed as a particularly important discursive task, since white documentary film makers were seen as "trustees of the native and other non-European races", who needed to make the public aware of the world it lives in, to show up the romance and dramatic quality of reality, and thus make the real experience of one the imaginary experience of all (emphasis added).  

Or, as Althusser would express it, these film makers are 'functioning by ideology' and represent through their films 'the imaginary relationship of individuals to their real conditions of existence.

In the controversy that ensured, quotas, state film corpora-
tions, import and customs duties and other contentious topics surfaced in Parliament and other government bodies with disquieting regularity. Against the background of the Voortrekker Centenary Celebrations held just five years earlier, the controversies surrounding the spate of 'historical' films such as *Rhodes of Afric* (1936), *Die Bou van 'n Nasie/They Built a Nation* (1939) and *'n Nasie Hou Koerse* (1939), the internment of many leading Afrikaaner Nationalists during the Second World War (some of whom were aspiring film makers), the report of the Cilliers Film Committee was explosive. In a biting criticism which sums up the mood of English speakers at the time, *The Union Review* argued that "The objection is against the government presuming to dictate to producers, cinema proprietors and the cinema-going public what kind of films they should see". Continuing, this magazine stated:

there are two languages in this country for official purposes, but that while bilingualism is, therefore, correctly enforceable in the public service, the schools (government schools, that is), Parliament and the courts, etc. it is not enforceable in private life - i.e. in the home, the club, the office and the cinema. "But", say the mugwumps, "it will enable the English speaking section to improve their knowledge of Afrikaans". What is cinema - a place of entertainment or a night school? Professor Cilliers puts it more elegantly - having had a lot of practice in political persuasiveness - thus: "The theatre going public will have the additional pleasure of seeing the various aspects of our rich national life portrayed on the screen through the medium of one or both of our two national languages". But many of us do not want to see our "rich national life" portrayed in our leisure time and at our expense. We want to see Rita Hayworth. Anyway, this is a dangerous argument. If accepted, we should be shown District Six and Johannesburg's 'Shanty Town' and the ruined reserves and the Indian slums of Durban and the post offices and telephone wires wrecked by the Ossewa Brandwag and the Rev. Vorster studying in goal for his divinity degree and Mr Oswald Pirow speaking to lucrative government briefs and ruffians attacking R.A.F. men from behind in dark streets.²⁰

Realising that the Cilliers recommendations had antagonised the industry, most sections of the English press and informed opinion offered in magazines like *The Union Review* and *Trek*, the government sought to ameliorate the problem by appointing
yet another committee to consider the report of the original Cilliers Committee. This body was appointed in July 1944 and published its response on 19 December 1944\textsuperscript{21}. Its proposals differed markedly from the previous report it was supposed to have considered. The later investigation suggested a consolidation of the various government film units such as the Defence Film Unit, the Unit for the Division of Soil and Veld Conservation etc into a National Film Board which would be subsidized to the extent of £40 000 per annum for a period of five years, after which the Board would have to become self-supporting. The Board would confine itself to "production, distribution and exhibition of educational, instructional, informative and publicity films which were not normally intended for exhibition in commercial cinemas"\textsuperscript{22}. The Committee stipulated that films "of a commercial character" remain the province of the industry and that no legislation be introduced "at this stage to compel the exhibition of the Board's films in commercial cinemas"\textsuperscript{23}. The composition of the Board was to be far wider than that suggested by the Cilliers Committee, with an advisory committee made up of organised commerce, organised industry, educational interests, publicity and cultural bodies.

The recommendations of this second Committee were clearly of a less sectional nature than the Cilliers report and served the perceived needs of the national economy rather than merely one fraction of it. The government, however, did not respond to these recommendations and the Schlesinger Organization, amongst others, remained safe from the interference of the state. Curiously, there was not much public reaction from Schlesinger on the matter, in contrast to their earlier vociferous opposition to the Union Government's attempts at co-option during the First World War when it wanted African Theatres to screen War Office Films\textsuperscript{24}.

Cinematic Tax Resisted by Capital's Mobilisation of 'Culture'

One of the observations of the Cilliers Committee was that the state derived about £600 000 from Entertainment Tax in the financial year 1942-43, more than 90\% of this sum being
earned from the sale of cinema tickets. The Committee held that despite this contribution, the film industry received very little in return. In order to partially redress this imbalance, the Committee suggested that an annual state grant of £50 000 - £100 000 be invested in the production of short films. The private industry would be the main recipients of the grant since its skills would be called upon for the production of such state sponsored shorts. In this way, the industry could be co-opted in making films facilitating the 'spread of national culture' while the state would still earn £500 000 in Entertainment Tax from the cinema. Such an arrangement obviously suited the industry which offered no criticism of the second report.

During the War, Entertainments Tax rose from 20% in 1939 to 33% in 1944. In 1947, the Administrator of the Cape Province proposed to increase the percentage to 50%. Not only did cinema-goers complain, 250 000 people signing a petition, but the Schlesinger Organization communicated its annoyance in no uncertain terms. Claiming that although the world "is sometimes painted in too rosy a colour", "realism is becoming more and more important" and that

the world is brought to the filmgoer, and invaluable studies of life, of yesterday and today, are presented to him in the form of screened versions of the best novels. The cinema is certainly necessary to modern life. It brings education, information and culture.

It is ironical that the Cape should present its outrageous tax demand at a time when public men are loud in their advocacy of Culture (with a capital C) and when the dreams of welfare workers and advocates of Culture are beginning to come true. The cinemas today are not occupied for the most part in screening cowboy stories and yarns about gang warfare. Classics of literature are coming in ever-increasing volume ... These films cost a great deal of money to hire and if that money is not recouped there will have to be no more, or considerably fewer, of them. In their place, to conform to the public capacity to pay, it seems obvious that cheaper (and therefore worse) pictures will have to be hired. Then we shall have more cries from the Apostles of Culture that the cinema has broken its promise to be of cultural value.
The Schlesinger Organization managed to resist this increase in Entertainment Tax while at the same time pretending to be concerned with 'Culture', but on the material assumption that the cinema has become indispensable to the 'civilized public', would take "young people off the streets and older people out of the public-houses", and keep "death off the roads". Without cinema, argued the company through its *Stage and Cinema* publication, the streets would again become "the playground of the masses". Thus the Schlesinger Organization sought to protect its interests through the repetition of this kind of common sense which conjures up images of an idle, unemployed working-class, considered detrimental to the orderly development of civilized society.

**THE GRIERSON REPORT: CINEMA AS A DISCURSIVE SITE IN THE LEGITIMATION OF APARTHEID**

Even after the Nationalists came to power in 1948, the idea of a National Film Board remained dormant. Discussions were resuscitated by KARPO which was instrumental in the government bringing out John Grierson to advise on the establishment of a Board. The choice of Grierson manifested certain contradictions which will become clear during the following discussion. Founder of the British documentary film movement of the 1930s, of the Canadian National Film Board (1939-45), Film Advisor to the Imperial Relations Trust and the Canadian, New Zealand and Australian governments (1937-40), Co-Ordinator of Mass Media at UNESCO in 1947 and Controller, Films Division of the Central Office of Information (1948-1954), his influence on film making, film theory and on the administration of national film boards and committees was unsurpassed.

Furthermore, Grierson's theoretical standpoint was close to the hearts of the Afrikaners who supported his tour of South Africa. His objectives were to open up "the screen on the real world" where "Documentary would photograph the living scene and the living story". Indeed, as the following passage shows, many of his tenets superficially parallel those of Rompel who made no mention of the British cinema tradition or
Grierson in his anti-imperialist onslaughts. It will be recalled that Rompel gained many of his ideas from Sergei Eisenstein, as was the case with UTOLO and KARFO. Paradoxically, it was the misreading of Eisenstein which brought the film makers of these Afrikaner cultural bodies closer to the theoretical postulates enunciated by Grierson:

First principles. (1) We believe that the Cinema's capacity for getting around, for observing and selecting from life itself, can be exploited in a new and vital art form. The studio films largely ignore this possibility ... They photograph acted stories against artificial backgrounds. Document-ary would photograph the living scene and the living story. (2) We believe that the original (or native) actor, and the original (or native) scene, are better guides to screen interpretation of the modern world ... (3) We believe that the materials and stories thus taken from the raw can be finer (more real in the philosophic sense) than the acted article 30.

Against this quotation we can juxtapose the following which outlines KARFO's position with regard to the role and function of the cinema:

we can deduct that the cinema is a source of substitute experience to real life which could serve as a source of cogniseable experience into which the patron can project himself and from which he can derive a 'meaning' in the Bartlett sense (All cognitive actions and reactions - imaging, perceiving, remembering, thinking and reasoning, are an effort after meaning).

It does not demand advanced logic to see that if the cinema will have to be of any value in this respect that it should adhere to the conditions of real life. If the 'variety of situations' which it depicts digresses from reality to any extent it will become clear that it may be more confusing than helpful to who ever may look upon the cinema as a source of information through which he can come to a better understanding of his own environment. The types of problems and situations dramatized must be more or less the same type of problem and situation for which modes of conduct and behaviour is sought. The nature of solutions and attitudes adopted in these situations must be of such a nature that they are applicable to the circumstances which the patron has to face in real life; otherwise we can only expect the cinema to add to the confusion and bewilderment which we face in life today 31.

225
The logical conclusion is that the average popular motion picture is failing completely in achieving any useful function in so far that it depicts a world of situations and events from which meaningful experience may be obtained. In fact it has a detrimental influence on its patrons - who are most emotionally immature whatever their chronological ages may be - by holding up a dream world so remote from reality that it can only confuse and bewilder. Instead of helping the filmgoer to accept the tragic nature of life they keep on showing them a sham-heaven stocked with worldly goods making them believe that such a state is indeed obtainable.

A comparison of these two extracts will show up both similarities and differences. Both Grierson and KARFO, for example, claimed that cinema, as it was popularly shown, substituted fantasy for reality. This over-emphasis on the world of make-believe was felt to work to the detriment of the viewer as a subject participating in social practice. Both wanted to see in the concrete their respective versions of what they regarded as reality on film. However, neither were aware that the realities they wished to depict were constituted of very specific ideological contents. Grierson's idea of realism was to provide the individual with information whereby s/he could more effectively participate in democratic social processes. This view implies the notion of choice but it should be pointed out that questions of choice are relative to the state which limits the parameters to within an ideologically pre-determined range. Thus, both KARFO and Grierson wanted to use film which, by definition, was already ideologically-laden in terms of a particular discourse. KARFO's more literal interpretation, however, although appearing to offer choice, does not in fact do so. For it, realism is a simple correspondence between prescription -- a sort of 'what ought to be' -- an attempt at socializing the newly urbanised Afrikaner into a Christian urban society. KARFO seems to have offered itself to the state as an Ideological State Apparatus in an almost transparent sort of way. Through the medium of the Church, mainly the Dutch Reformed denomination, they took it upon themselves to guide cultural responses to urbanisation and suggested ways of coping with the not too pleasant and socially alienating circumstances of city life. In other words, KARFO was not concerned with choice but with articulating a strategy of
adaption and of providing support to those members of the volk who were in danger of succumbing to the ravages of cultural imperialism and alien ideological discourses. That is to say, KARFO intended to provide a means of interest-translation whereby those Afrikaners who were unaware that they "were taking part in an essential movement in South Africa which had to come ... [and who] ... did not prepare themselves mentally and emotionally to be South Africa's future urban citizens" \(^{33}\), were guided in terms of their new urban life and helped to adjust in terms of traditional group values and social experience of Afrikaner Nationalism: an emphasis on Christianity, family life and language. In this way KARFO mediated the interests of Afrikaner capital as it sought to prepare the recently rural Afrikaner for his new role in the city, a role which was to be mobilised by the Broederbond in its onslaught on English capital.

It seems not to have occurred to KARFO that Grierson's ideas and propositions were very different to Eisenstein's dialectical notions. The crux of the difference lies in Grierson's later remark that "Cinema has a sensational capacity for enhancing movement which tradition has formed or time worn smooth" \(^{34}\). In contrast, Eisenstein never "enhanced", he displaced and manipulated in the name of realism. Eisenstein's "nature" \(^{35}\), corresponded to Grierson's "real world". Technical resources, particularly the process of editing, fundamental to Eisenstein's theories of montage, removed from the real world, re-ordering it through combination and cutting.

Grierson, amongst other realists, criticised Eisenstein for this tendency. However, the Marxist base of Eisenstein's theoretical approach demanded a displacement of the real world, itself a construction of bourgeois ideology. \(^{36}\) It was, of course, the bourgeois class to which Afrikaners film makers of this period were aspiring: ownership and control of not only land, economy and the country's wealth, but also of the cultural heritage of the Afrikaner people, and by implication -- though not articulated at the time -- of the communities that would have to be further subordinated to meet these objectives. It seems that this was the essence of KARFO's realism.
Christopher Williams remarks that "It is not clear whether [Grierson's] notion of 'reality in the philosophic sense' is best understood in relation to the social purposes he saw as the cinema's proper sphere of operation, to the aesthetic questions he was concerned with, or to a combination of both". This question seems at least partially resolved in the Report that Grierson handed to the South African government in 1954. He seems to have been remarkably easily duped into accepting Nationalist discourse on apartheid at face value and of proposing a National Film Board structure which was designed to counter international criticism of South Africa's racial policies. The following extract from the Report reveals the extreme naïveté of his observations on South Africa:

Its problems, seen in close up, may seem frustrating, are the best earnest of dramas in the making and a destiny to be revealed. Its vistas, both technological and human, are not only national-wide, but also Africa-wide and, in many respects, world-wide. South Africa, moreover, has the eyes of the world upon it. It has, therefore, everything to gain by giving them reality to look upon.

I do not propose to separate the foreign problem from the National one. I have been told by some that South Africa's greatest immediate concern is the misunderstanding of it on the part of other nations. I appreciate this point but no one in his senses will expect, by simple formula, to liquidate the host of misunderstandings and prejudices which, coming from the deeps of 19th Century political formulae, now surround the considerations of South African problems. Much can, of course, be done by direct attack; for the major facets of South African development in all the spheres of technical and sociological achievement have not yet been commandingly presented.

Grierson asserted that the high political profile commanded by South Africa needed to be complemented by more than "one of the poorest places in the distribution channels of the world". Furthermore, film was only one component in the media mix with which to convey information to the outside world. This medium needed to be integrated with other channels and co-ordinated under a single Ministry of Information. However, the use of film remained Grierson's chief concern. The strategy that Grierson suggested for South Africa was as follows:
(a) conviction in high quarters that the film can and ought to be developed as an instrument of national policy; (b) an objective appreciation - free from mere film interest and film enthusiasm - of the relationship of the film to the larger and deeper processes of public information; (c) a plan of action which will, (i) serve departments in an orderly and long-term fashion, (ii) serve to inculcate patriotism, unity and drive in the Nation as a whole, (iii) present South Africa abroad in the most powerful and penetrating way and on all valuable levels of interest; and provide a direct service to the officers of External Affairs, (iv) bring into the service of the Union and co-ordinate in common interest, all possible forces, other than governmental, which can contribute to the articulate presentation of the national image; not least the forces in the film industry, of the churches, and of the public relations departments of industry and commerce, with, of course, all due regard for the preservation of their free and independent initiation and development, (v) mobilize and encourage creative, technical and administrative talents to these ends. ⁶⁰

This plan of attack clearly plays no role in uncovering the ideology or economic processes which "contribute to the articulate presentation of the national image", of the apartheid base of the South African "Nation" in which "patriotism", "unity" and "drive" need to be inculcated, and misunderstands the nature of South African capitalism since Grierson has no understanding of the real structure of the South African political economy. As Lovell points out, Grierson never considered the state as part of the class system. He referred rather to the state as "the machinery by which the best interests of the people are secured" ⁶⁰. Grierson saw the political and economic situation as being dependent upon the policies of the party in power, rather than as a structural process which was condoned by the entire hegemonic bloc. He therefore makes the entirely false distinction between the state and the government in power. Full weight is not given to the consideration that the party in power is, in fact, part of the mechanism of the state. The strategy offered by Grierson works on the benign assumption that the state is non-partisan in the constitution and execution of its policies. In this way Grierson reflected the commonly held liberal view of the state as an essentially neutral institution outside the class structure.

Against this idealistic background, Grierson proposed a strategy which could not have served Afrikaner Nationalist interests
better. From his Report it is difficult to see how Grierson was able to separate the "real world" from state propaganda. The latter, or in Grierson's words, the "sweeping powers as (sic) the media possesses" were apparently to be tempered by a "progressively knowledgeable review on Ministerial level, and subject to Parliamentary discussion". This faith in the Westminster parliamentary system is at the core of Grierson's acceptance of surface reality in South Africa. The starting point in Grierson's career in film stemmed from Walter Lippman's pessimism about the workings of democracy and the disbelief that the ordinary voter could make informed judgements or political choices because of his/her lack of relevant information and time for consideration. In contrast to Lippman, however, Grierson was not content to leave the citizen in blissful ignorance. Neither was he offering a strategy of cultural adaptation, like KARFO. The basis of Grierson's film strategy was to involve the citizen in social processes:

We do want to see them given what they [the citizens] are not getting now: a service of information on the immediate needs and services of the state. We do want to see them given what they are not given now: a living sense of what is going on. If we do not want to see their rational minds set impossible tasks we do want to see their sentiments and loyalties crystallised in forms which are useful to the people and the State alike. Above all we want to see our society emancipated from its confusion and bewilderment, and given some imaginative leadership in the articulation of a faith.

The South African Report clears up Williams' indecision on Grierson's perception of the relationship between "social purposes" and "aesthetic questions". Of the South African context, Grierson argues: "Effective distribution results are the proper measure of justified production; and no double talk - aesthetic or other - should be allowed to confuse the issue." At another level, however, Grierson shows unsubstantiated confidence in the mobilization of imaginative talent and the encouragement of experimentation. It seems that the latter were expected to act as checks and balances in helping South African film makers under the auspices of the Board to destroy, as in the case of Canada, a culture "rotted with spiritual colonialism:
measuring itself at every turn against the examples of Europe and the United States". The angry and heated political and racial arguments which were rife in South Africa with English and Afrikaner pitted as antagonists, each with a different cultural heritage, again deluded Grierson into believing that an intrinsic social value of benefit to all in South Africa would emerge from these conflicts:

The deflated and deflational atmosphere of many countries today is not only lacking in the spirit of 'audace' (Latin - boldness); and it is the presence of this quality in South African political discussion which is so striking and refreshing to the observer. South Africa can lose nothing and can only gain if it comes to invest the wider field of national expression. If South Africa has a message, this is probably it.

One has only to recall Jones' vilification of the Cilliers Film Committee as an example of the 'audace' in the field of cinema discussion, while other examples may be gained from the press reviews of Rhodes of Africa and Die Bou van 'n Nasie/They Built a Nation. For Grierson, film was one means of actively tackling a situation such as this and translating intellectual conviction into practice. Some of these ideas were to be picked up again in 1981 by Pieter Fourie in his report commissioned by the Department of Industries, Commerce and Tourism. It differed, however, in terms of its conception of the state. Where Grierson saw the state as above politics and as an overarching institution which mediates the interests of individuals in mass society, Fourie envisages the state as mediating the interests of the various 'population groups', but in an asymmetrical manner which is designed to reduce the strained relations which exist between the hegemonic bloc and the subordinate classes in such a way that the status quo is not radically altered. Grierson's approach was more prescriptive, expecting democratic growth through the resolution of conflicts.

The remainder of Grierson's Report is devoted to "Shaping a South African Film Instrument" which was to be used to stimulate and assist informed public participation in the process of the democratic state. The administrative recommendations of the
Report need not be discussed here. Of relevance, however, are two immediate consequences of Grierson's visit. The first was that he was highly sceptical of "self-appointed experts"\(^9\) and "medium enthusiasts"\(^5\), whether amateur or professional. Grierson noted that this attitude may "hurt the enthusiasts"\(^6\) but argued that "no forces have hurt and frustrated the national use of films as much as those who have brought it into discredit by irresponsibility in the use of public funds"\(^5\) and furthermore, these individuals "are apt to get in the way of the purpose of the Information Service"\(^5\).

It will be remembered that Grierson's visit had originally been strongly motivated by KARFO which had hoped thereby to secure state assistance for their film making activities. Ironically, it seems that the medium enthusiasts to which Grierson was referring were KARFO members themselves, Heins du Preez having submitted a lengthy document to Grierson dealing with the cultural, spiritual and social experiences, values and objectives of the Afrikaners he represented. Although overtures were made to English churches, these advances were resisted and, in any case, du Preez's report is written from the point of view of an Afrikaner organic intellectual. Grierson was adamant that all funds be administered by the Board and that care be taken not to compete with the trade\(^5\), for the hallmark of his programme was that documentary film encoded the ideas of intellectuals which coincided with the interests of some state and large scale private organizations, a convergence which sprang from the common belief in the need for some form of rationalised mass society\(^5\). That is to say, the industry should not be alienated but persuaded through \textit{quid pro quo} and co-operation to work towards common social goals\(^5\). Grierson devoted some space in his \textit{Report} to KARFO. He was particularly impressed with its potential audience of eight million and its cultural and social objectives. Pointing out that KARFO had access to the considerable financial resources of £200 000, as well as the opportunity for ongoing income, Grierson argued that a government subsidy should be conditional on the money being used to equip halls and create a national distribution service: not in the investment of the subsidy or its covering sum.
in the acquisition of technical facilities for production and processing.\textsuperscript{57}

In other words, Grierson was saying that KARFO should be dissuaded from production and encouraged to cooperate "with the trade though not, of course, in a manner to prejudice its basic and different purpose."\textsuperscript{58} KARFO's response was to terminate its production unit, re-constituting itself into CARFO which was to make one feature a year from the monies that it had placed into a trust fund.

The second consequence was that the government did not react immediately to the Grierson Report in any way at all. KARFO did not get its anticipated subsidy and the National Film Board was not set up until ten years later, in 1964. The cultural and ideological functions of that Board will be dealt with below, but it needs to be remembered here that Afrikaner capital and the government apparently had little use for a propagandistic cinema at this stage. It was able to enforce its hegemony through other agencies including radio broadcasting and the press, not to mention the host of economic, repressive and political agencies now at its command. The promulgation of the National Film Board Act, No. 73 of 1963, coincided with the awakening interest by Afrikaans capital in the film industry in the 1960s, as well as the tremendous cultural and economic strains placed on Afrikaners as subjects as a result of a burgeoning economy which precipitated serious inter-racial and inter-group crises. The films to be made by the Board were also aimed at convincing the English speaking and black sectors of the South African population of the benefits and desirability of apartheid.

**THE 1956 SUBSIDY SCHEME FOR FEATURE FILMS: PROTECTION FROM INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL**

Although the government did not react immediately on the Grierson Report, it was subsequently persuaded to establish a subsidy on feature film production in 1956. No other area of the South African film industry has received more attention from the press,
students, consultants to the state and not least, the film industry itself. Just who was responsible for persuading the government to support the feature industry is difficult to ascertain since representations seem to have been made by all and sundry, individuals and associations. Discussions were both of a formal and informal nature but whatever sources the government responded to, the sale of the Schlesinger film interests to 20th Century Fox in that year may well have been the deciding factor.

The subsidy was initially motivated by Bladon Peake who had directed Hans die Skipper for SA Screen Productions in 1953. He approached the government with a proposal for a feature film subsidy based on the Eady Levy in Britain where one penny was taxed on the price of every ticket sold for an imported film. The income derived was then made available for local film production. At that time, the state was already investigating the situation under the aegis of the Department of Commerce and Industries. The investigating official was Dr Francois de Villiers who was later to become the chairman of the National Film Board. Peake was told that a suitably constituted producer's association should be formed with which the government could do business. The Motion Picture Producer's Association (MPPA) was duly established on 16 July 1956 with Jamie Uys as its first chairman. Its subsequent representations to the state for a subsidy were successful.

The 1956 formula paid back to the producer the Entertainment Tax levied by the provinces on the sale of cinema seats collected on the screening of domestic films. The maximum payable to the producer was R20 000 or 50% of the cost, whichever was the lower. Only R6 379 was paid out during the first year (see Table 1). Certain modifications were brought about in 1962, apparently stimulated by Tommie Meyer. Under the new dispensation the maximum reimbursement of R20 000 was amended to equal the production cost of the film, less R22 500. Payment was measured against the box office. No subsidy was paid on the first R10 000 collected from Entertainment Tax. Between R10-12 000, payment was equal to 100%, and above that, 200%.
### Table 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>20</th>
<th>22</th>
<th>29</th>
<th>31</th>
<th>23</th>
<th>24</th>
<th>27</th>
<th>28</th>
<th>31</th>
<th>29</th>
<th>30</th>
<th>32</th>
<th>37</th>
<th>39</th>
<th>42</th>
<th>47</th>
<th>50</th>
<th>52</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Department of Industries

---

### Table 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Financial Year</th>
<th>Subsidies Paid in Rupees</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>1977</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>1978</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>1979</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>1980</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>1981</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>1982</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>1983</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>1984</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>1985</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>1986</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>1987</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Subsidies Paid Since 1977

---

Table 2. Number of Films Produced Between 1956 and 1976.
According to Meyer, this revised formula was based on four major premises: (1) to root out inferior films; (2) to increase the number of films by reducing the risk for talented people; (3) to improve the quality so that local films could compete with the average overseas product; and (4) to improve the quality to the extent that some domestically produced films could be distributed overseas. The Board of Trade and Industry adds the further premise that the formula introduced in 1962 "will, on the one hand, discourage pictures of a limited appeal to the public and on the other, be a great stimulent to those that are box office successes." As becomes evident in subsequent BTI reports, this formula was partially designed as an instrument to ameliorate the negative international image acquired by the state due to its repressive apartheid policies while at the same time to encourage a content and treatment which would suit the needs of Afrikaner capital and the hegemonic bloc in general. That is to say, the revisions underlay a twin objective which embraced an inter-relationship between ideology and economics. The Board's 1963 report provides a hint of how it expected the cinema industry to be used in the service of the state:

It has been claimed with justification, that from a national point of view a motion picture industry is an asset in a way in which no other industry can claim to be one: in view of the vivid and graphic qualities of the motion picture as a means of expression and its wide accessibility in view of the low cost of exhibition, it can be a valuable means to presenting a country's image and its way of life to the outside world. The influence of films in shaping the world's attitude toward a country and its people is very well exemplified by the favourable picture of America so forcefully conveyed by a continuous flow of film from that country over the last fifty years. There could have been no better medium for this purpose and the United States must have benefitted in many ways, including the promotion of its foreign trade in the wares made familiar to the world by its pictures. It has been pointed out to the board that even if one or two South African films could be successful in gaining access to the world's screens, they could be of inestimable value in projecting abroad an unbiased picture of conditions in the country and its way of life.
The above mentioned 'benefits' are recurring elements in the Board's report and are consistently repeated in other submissions through the years. Clearly, Hollywood is to be the model, but the subsidy would work best with local scripts, for "non-South African themes" would not "portray our way of life to the outside world". Elsewhere, the report is not so subtle: "In times of peace it can be a means of presenting a country to the world, and serve to 'sell' it and its products. In times of war it can be a means of propaganda and of psychological warfare". The basis of the sale was to be encoded in "box office successes" rather than films of a "limited appeal". Such a strategy would provide "employment", earn or save foreign exchange, but also "promote social harmony" and "other desirable ends". Again, the implied 'national image' is the one determined by a state apparatus, in this case the BTI, and is mediated through the way the film industry is commercially structured. Implicit in their recommendations is the fear that films of "limited appeal" tend to communicate unorthodox views, suggesting alternatives which do not always coincide with the ideological discourse propagated by the ruling hegemony.

The Board put forward a comprehensive set of proposals to achieve its recommendations. In some respects they were similar to the procedures adopted by the Australian government in the 1970s. The BTI suggested that the Industrial Development Corporation administer the subsidy, that working capital up to a maximum of 40% of the estimated cost of a film be provided in advance, and since the Corporation shared in the risk it should be entitled to a proportion of the profits. A sum of R1 million was to be set aside as starting capital and an additional R500 000 made available for documentaries, short films and the acquisition of equipment and facilities. The Board further proposed the encouragement and cooperation with overseas producers in co-productions or otherwise. These proposals, however, were not put into effect.

The inclusion of the film's budget in the workings of the formula was deemed inadvisable by Meyer who argued that it would bring about a false inflation in production budgets. He also pointed out that not too many films qualified under the 1962
system and the formulation had to be modified again in 1964. Before going on to discuss this adjustment, it is first necessary to briefly sketch the aims and objectives of the National Film Board (NFB) which came into being at about this time.

The National Film Board: The Production of 'Willed' Ideology

The National Film Board Act was promulgated in 1963 as a cultural institution. It seems largely to have followed the minor recommendations of the Grierson Report both in terms of scope of activities and of officials appointed to monitor and regulate its progress. The members of the Board were all drawn from government departments, except the chairman who was appointed by the Minister of National Education. Other members were the Secretary for Cultural Affairs, the Secretary for Industries, the Secretary for Information, the Secretary for Tourism and the Chairman of the SABC and five persons appointed by the Minister, each with a specific knowledge of, inter alia, commerce and industry, science and technology, religion and social welfare, art and culture and a person connected with the public press.

This structure differed in two important ways from the original Grierson proposals. The first was that he suggested that the Minister of the Interior be the chairman, not the Minister of Education. He argued that the vice-chairman should be ex-officio the Minister of Education. Grierson offers the following rationale for his choice of chairman:

There is no good case for attaching it [the NFB] to the Ministries of Education or Health or of the Fine Arts or of Tourism ... In particular, it is the strong view of those closer to the development of Public Information that the logical portfolio in a modern State is not the Ministry of Education, because of its lack of functional contact with the larger processes of technological, economic and public development outside the sphere of formal education. With this view I concur. It may even be that the scholastic or schoolman's point of view is an obstacle to the larger development of the mass media in the highly complex and informal worlds in which they are bound to operate. The key to the matter is that the film in the service
of the Nation is something more than an instrument of instruction and something more than an instrument of culture and art. It is not just a mirror held up to nature; it is a hammer helping to shape the future; we are dealing, to be plain, with a process which reaches out beyond the schools and the academics to the whole life of the nation and neither the pedagogic nor the aesthetic aspect of its work presents the more effective reaches of its influence.

The logical portfolio to carry out these tasks of the NFB would, according to Grierson, be the Department of the Interior. This agency, however, was not suitable to the task as the government saw it. Mainly of an administrative function, its job is to regulate and register people: their race classifications, movements, births, deaths -- a sort of human bookkeeping function. While an integral part in the administration of apartheid, this department did not offer a suitable vehicle for the Board. The rationale offered by Grierson above is ideally suited to the objectives of the Department of National Education, and more specifically, its policy of Christian National Education. The tenets of this controversial Nationalist policy were hammered out by the FAK in 1939. Since it was put into practice soon after the Nationalists assumption of power in 1948, Grierson should have been fully aware of the purposes and nature of the direction that education was taking in South Africa at the time of his consultation. From the state's point of view, this Department offered a more viable alternative to the Department of the Interior as it realised that the educational institution is the foremost apparatus through which ideological discourse can be inculcated. This agency was not interested in the underlying liberal assumptions which permeate Grierson's thesis but of socialising the individual into accepting as natural and desirable a particular social practice. Where Grierson wanted to enhance the democratic process through increasing the amount of information made available to the individual so that s/he could make informed choices as a participant in a social process, the Department of Education was not concerned with individuals \textit{per se}, or of their capacity for democratic participation, but with the subject's social and economic roles within the political economy. Indeed, HF Verwoerd's landmark statement that "There is no place for [the Bantu] in the European community above the
level of certain forms of labour" was made in the same year that Grierson submitted his Report to the government. The final structure of the NFB, though similar to Grierson's proposals in many respects, was significantly different because of this one fundamental change, which in the South African context was of crucial ideological significance.

The second important recommendation not put into practice by the Act concerned the proposal for an "Experimental Production Fund" which was to constitute between 10% and 15% of the total for national and international productions. In respect of experimentation, Grierson argued that

In the case of other countries, no expenditure has been more effective. It has stirred initiative over the whole undertaking and greatly increased the general morale to have a small adventurous operation in its midst. In the case of a young country, this special measure of latitude encourages the discovery of new talent in a medium which is not yet highly developed from a professional point of view."

As will be shown, despite constant representations to the government on this issue, the state remains unyielding for experimentation tends to explore contentious territory, propound unorthodox views and offer what Pieter Fourie terms "local" or "regional reflections" which encode ideas counter those held by the hegemonic alliance. Such films have a tenuous economic base and rarely generate sufficient financial returns to enable it to become self-supporting.

A perusal of some of the objects of the NFB will further illustrate the implicit frame of reference behind the envisaged function of the Board. Apart from coordinated state activities in film making, the NFB is entrusted with the "acquisition, production, exhibition, distribution" of films and photographs "intended for dissemination, in the Republic or elsewhere, of information regarding Southern Africa, its peoples, their way of life, culture, traditions, economic conditions and problems" and of "depicting Southern Africa's scenic beauty, natural attractions and travelling facilities". It was also to give
"information regarding the problems of and social evils present in the Republic and the services available and developments taking place in the Republic". Clearly framed within an apartheid discourse, the NFB's function was primarily ideological and its role was to legitimise the government's racial policies through its coordination of state film making activities. Its connection with the SABC was also significant, for, in the absence of television, the NFB had to assume a direct responsibility for cultural production as far as the short and documentary films were concerned. The Board was eventually to enter production on a large scale, purchase R500 000 worth of technical equipment and construct a large, highly sophisticated complex near Pretoria costing R3.5 million. As it expanded, the NFB was forced to compete with the private sector or the "trade" as Grierson called it and thus earned the wrath of commercial producers, including the Satbel production arm. Where until 1966 about 60% of the private documentary market consisted of government commissioned films, by 1972 the proportion had dropped to 30%. The facilities offered by the NFB were precisely what Fourie called for in his 1981 report as being a necessary pre-condition for "a better visual product". Instead of calling for further investment, Fourie might have rather asked why things did not improve when such a facility was available. The introduction of television in 1976, however, heralded the dissolution of the Board in 1978 for many of its propaganda tasks could now be carried out much more efficiently and effectively by the national broadcast television service. The SABC took over its premises in 1980 and the National Film Archives was moved and brought under the direct control of the Department of National Education.

We may now return to our discussion of the feature subsidy system and examine the changes which were applied to the scheme from 1964 onwards.

THE FEATURE FILM SUBSIDY SCHEME 1964-1981

The reader will recall that the BTI submitted extensive proposals in 1963 on the questions of state policy on the provision
and administration of the subsidy scheme. Although the formula was again modified in 1964, none of the proposals put forward by the Board were applied. Instead a box office threshold of R50 000 earned within four years of the release date ensured the producer a 44% subsidy. The upper limit remained at the production cost less R22 500. In 1968, this restriction was recuced and the subsidy now payable was unlimited.

The advance of Afrikaans film both financially and in terms of quality between 1962 and 1968 was undoubted. Commenting in 1974, Tommie Meyer announced with pride that apart from a number of films gaining overseas distribution:

New talent has come to the fore which will surely make a large contribution in the future. It was a glorious feeling for Afrikaners and surely their English speaking fellow citizens to be able to listen to Afrikaans films and through them, the Wonder of Afrikaans, while the actors presented us with experiences of comedy, human drama, happiness and other emotions.

Between 1962 and 1968 twenty-nine English features were made in comparison to thirty-five in Afrikaans, with one bilingual. However, the FAK and certain remnants of the RARO and UTOLO days were still not satisfied, notably Louis Wiesner, who had previously produced Donker Spore (1944) and was for a time in charge of UTOLO. In a letter to Die Vaderland published on 27 November 1967, Weisner, referring to "a few pretentious exhibitionists with a lust for sabotage and unrestrained say in newspapers; a clique of so-called film critics" influenced by communism and "integration propaganda" emanating from "New York and London houses of publicity", despained for the survival of Afrikaans film. As immediate experience he cited the negative critical reaction to his film In die Lente van Ons Liefde (1967). His letter continued:

South Africa is crying out for films! Our newspapers are begging for it. Our leaders in charge know that unless it comes, our youth is lost and our people disrupted ... As one of the few who was willing to contribute with the necessary piety to the prestige of the Afrikaans film - not the bilingual mixture where-in the Afrikaans bit is less than nothing - and help
it to win deserved place in the sun, I am sorry to say that if Afrikaans films have now finally died, our Afrikaans newspapers will have to carry the full load of responsibility.\(^6\)

Wiesner demanded a "judicial commission of enquiry into the film industry ... in view of the fact that government securities are used for subsidies". "That", he said, "was the last strip of hope left for the Afrikaans film". This refrain surfaced in parliament six months later from the mouth of a Nationalist Party MP. Questioning the desirability of bilingual films, he claimed that

Afrikaans is being presented alongside English, as being subservient to English, as being the language of ridiculous 'backvelders'. Such films earn a great deal more in state subsidies, while purely uni-lingual Afrikaans films, with a cultural value, such as the outstanding *In die Lente van Ons Liefde* by Louis Wiesner will receive little or no subsidy, with disastrous results for the manufacturers. Just as it is the duty of the individual it is the duty of the state to protect and promote Afrikaans in the South African film industry. Deficiencies in the subsidy must be rectified without delay ... if this is not done, Afrikaans as a motion picture language is doomed.\(^6\)

With strong support from conservative Afrikaner elements of the industry, the government amended the Act the following year without further published investigation on the part of the Board of Trade and Industry. An attempt was made to stimulate Afrikaans language films by increasing the subsidy on such fare from 44\% to 55\%, while retaining the 44\% limit for English language films. To qualify, 95\% of the dialogue had to be in either English or Afrikaans. This heralded the end of the bilingual English-Afrikaans movie and simultaneously demanded a much greater degree of language purity than had previously been the case. In a later report, the BTI observed that this move "was welcomed" by the industry\(^7\), which shows the degree to which the interests of business and the state coincide.\(^6\)

Subsidy payments had been rising substantially during this period (Table 1) and the Board again reported in 1970 on "the feasibility of encouraging the development of the
South African cinematograph film making industry by the levying of a suitable customs duty on imported cinematograph films". Furthermore, the Board was also asked to "make proposals calculated to prevent the raising of the prices of cinema admission tickets as a result of the levying of the duty". The volatile editor of *SA Film Weekly*, Harry Jones, after claiming not to "take sides in the forthcoming representations to the Board of Trade and Industries", struck two weeks later, painting the proposed customs levy as

a subterfuge which Nationalist extremists hope to use to bridge the gap between the reality that commercial cinema and film-making is a profit-making enterprise, although an art form, and the economic inability of a small race group, whose leaders wish to preserve its isolationist character, to pay for this entertainment form in their own language.

Jones further pointed out that with the exception of MGM outlets, the remainder of "Film enterprises in the Republic are now wholly owned" and called on producers and cinema managements "to resist the efforts of ideological leaders wishing to transplant their doctrines into a sphere of honest film making". The following week Jones suggested that "the duty problem" was "fomented" by a "pressure group" of Afrikaner origin:

I have yet to hear of any person or organization claiming to represent the English-speaking of South Africa's population advocating assistance or support for a local feature film-making industry.

He then sketched the ideological intentions and anti-English efforts of "extreme Nationalist Afrikaners" who depicted their "arch-enemy ... as an exploiter usually presented in caricature with a Semitic cast of countenance grasping hold of his money bags". Because of Jones' tendency to see life in terms of conspiracies, he over-estimated the influence of this group of extremist Afrikaners typified by Albert Hertzog. As has been constantly stressed throughout this study, the efforts of these cultural purists to direct the course of history were doomed from the start since they ignored economic factors. As Jones reminds us, the film industry was now in the hands of SANLAM
which had taken over Fox in April of that year. There can be little doubt that financial logic would have prevailed at this conjuncture and it was not in the interest of capital-in-general to affect the potential earnings of the new Satbel company.

In any event, the Board or Trade and Industry advised against the levy since no sector of the industry agreed on the merits of this system in terms of its potential for stimulating local production. The Board also reported that a mitigating factor was the increasing difficulty being experienced by distributors and exhibitors to compile "suitable programmes"\(^86\), since fewer were being produced overseas and "many ... are of such a nature that they are not approved by the Publications Control Board"\(^87\). The BTI felt that the imposition of an import duty would aggravate the current shortage and adversely affect art films or films of merit "popular in a limited circle only"\(^88\). The Board communicated the general dissatisfaction of the industry regarding the non-subsidy of documentaries and short films and again emphasised the need to overtly encourage foreign participation. Producers themselves, in their roles as subjects, tended to assess the use by foreign capital of local facilities, scenery and so on in ideological rather than economic terms. At least, they couched their arguments to the BTI in terms of Nationalist discourse, no doubt to promote their own individual business interests in the process. These sentiments are not unexpected, for business has always allied itself with dominant parties, propagating a conservative ideology which would best serve its own short term financial objectives. Local participation in foreign feature films made in South Africa would, they argued, be "in the national interest". They complained that under the current situation foreign producers contributed little financially to the South African economy and that their "motion pictures are often distorted overseas, so that they could harm rather than benefit South Africa". Mandatory collaboration with a South African producer would prevent "the production of a film that might harm (this) country" and the government was urged to take action against local producers who allowed films of "that nature" to be made\(^89\). This affirmation was again repeated at the 1972 AGM of the MPPA which
attempted to trade off a request for a R5 million film subsidy while simultaneously suggesting that an embargo be applied to all films entering South Africa which "make no contribution to our culture and way of life". Thus, in the context of racial capitalism, sections of the film industry confirmed their role alongside the state-owned medium in its affirmation of the prevailing hegemony and openly offered itself as a vehicle whereby dissenting views could be eliminated.

The protective reaction on the part of the producers clearly locates these subjects at the intersection of ideology and the political economy. The dominant ideological outlook was to be maintained as an economic necessity. It remained part of the set of social practices which governed the industry even though the government took no legislative steps to enforce such control. Ideology, not legislation, was the filter, for any producer wanting to raise capital for films made by, for example, Athol Fugard, usually had to rely on overseas funding while facing up to severe criticism from the local industry. The government did, however, react to the suggestion of thematic control by only granting permission to foreign producers wanting to use South African locations and facilities after the submission and approval of the script to the government. The problem of foreign television crews was a far more vexed issue and the government tried to control their entry through the Department of the Interior. Those who were allowed through were usually monitored by the Department of Information and permitted to proceed with their shooting only after an agreement had been extracted from them that they would present a "balanced" view of South Africa to their audience. A number of crews, however, have over the years managed to evade surveillance and produced material which some producers would certainly label as 'harmful to the country'.

As with its response to previous reports, the government did not react to many of the grievances contained in the 1970 investigation, though it did not impose an import duty on films brought into the country. Neither did it increase the subsidy for feature films or set aside a fund for documentaries and
short films. It should be pointed out that by this time the NFB had begun producing its own material and was seriously affecting the growth of the private sector since documentaries, not feature films, were the staple of the commercial industry. Although the BTI communicated the dissatisfaction of the industry on the matter, nothing was done to reduce the scope or activities of the NFB.  

A further memorandum submitted by the BTI on 23 March 1972 argued for the continuation of the subsidy, particularly as some films were beginning to break into the overseas market. In the period 1970-1974, only four films would have shown a profit without the help of the subsidy. Eighty-four would not have been profitable. Ironically, two of the four successful films were made by a religious organization, presumably CARFO, which ran its own distribution network.  

Following the Board's 1972 recommendations, the subsidy scheme was further modified in 1973. Where up to this time, calculations were based on gross box office receipts, henceforth pay-outs were to be awarded on the basis of net box office earnings. Despite an effective decrease in 10% in the subsidy, payments rose in absolute terms during the next two years. The unexpected earning power of Jamie Uys' two films, *Beautiful People* (1974) and *Funny People* (1976), however, was the precursor to further changes since these two films reaped by far the greatest percentage of the subsidy available. It is estimated that *Funny People* alone was paid out nearly R770 000.  

On 30 April 1975, the BTI was commissioned to compile a further survey by the Minister of Economic Affairs to investigate the progress of the industry thus far and to determine the future potential of the industry in the light of the introduction of broadcast television. The Board was also to assess whether the formula should be modified to take short films into account and to work out the most economic distribution of available funds. A further instruction was received from the Minister on 19 March 1976 who was reacting to representations in connection with "Bantu-language films".
Again, cultural and national image considerations figure prominently in the rationale for a modified system. Whereas Meyer felt that the prime goal of international distribution had yet to be fully attained, the Board suggests that the existing scheme was successful, both in terms of domestic earnings, and attempts at gaining a foothold in the world market. According to the Feature Film Producers Association (FFPA), an offshoot of the original MPPA, a commensurate increase in quality occurred and it was now not unlikely that a local film would earn more than an average overseas film in the same market. The Board suggested an increase in the subsidy from 55%-66% for Afrikaans films and a rise of 8% from 44% to 52% in the case of English language films. A limit to the payout was proposed since the Board argued that the subsidy should not be used to support film makers who have returned their costs. The subsidy was no longer to be regarded as a prop through which profits could be earned, but merely as a means of covering losses. The Board felt that this new approach would lead to the production of fewer but better quality films requiring less subsidy than previously. The implication of the Board's proposals is that the modified formula would work against the kind of light family entertainment that used to be made for the drive-ins.

With the introduction of broadcast television in 1976, the Board expected that this type of entertainment would be supplied by the SABC. The industry took no note of these changed market circumstances and the same criticism is again voiced by Fourie in 1981 who charges that the film industry has itself taken slight notice of the necessity to change the content and direction of their movies in the post-television era. He notes that:

The film industry in South Africa is out of touch with the requirements that the introduction of television has made on the film medium, namely, to adapt in form, but more particularly in content ... the local industry goes ahead with the production of family entertainment, a function which has been completely replaced by television. There is no talk of a differentiation between sub-cultures of taste.
Where attempts have been made to explore new content, it remains tied to other media and continues to be aimed at the family and mass market. Television soap operas are beginning to replace Springbok Radio drama as film scripts, for example, *Nommer Asseblief* (1981), *Bosveld Hotel* (1982) and *Verkeerde Nommer* (1983). A shift into sex has also occurred, resulting in ludicrous comedies 'for the whole family' such as *Birds of Paradise* (1982), adapted from a long-running stage play, advertised as a "saucy, sexy comedy about an English lady who buys a house of ill-repute". This latter film was directed and produced by the former General Secretary of the FAK, Tommie Meyer.

Again, the documentary and short film sector was ignored. Producers of these films continued to battle against the NFB which, under the management of Heins du Preez, earned 44% of its income from production, while the SABC with its own production arm was expected to service its own needs. The BTI did respond that the NFB not be seen to compete with the private sector in an unseemly manner. This contradiction was then cemented in the BTI's plea that it would be in the public interest if greater use were made by the private sector of the outstanding facilities owned by the NFB. As was discussed under the section on the NFB, though some key recommendations put forward by Grierson were ignored, most of the goals that he suggested in terms of the propaganda value of film were adhered to.

Government response to the BTI's 1976 report was to sanction a major restructuring of the formula. The minimum qualification of R50 000 was raised to R100 000 retrospective to zero rand. The fixed language differential percentages were dropped and a sliding scale based on net box office receipts substituted. The subsidy paid thus declined from 70% in the case of Afrikaans films (60% in the case of English) for earnings up to R200 000 to 30% (English 20%) where income was more than R500 000. A R300 000 subsidy limit per film was introduced and only box office income earned within two years of the release date would be eligible.

The Board also investigated the possibility of stimulating "
"Eie Bantu Rolprentbedryf" (a Bantu's Own Film Industry). Up to 1976, producers of films in African vernaculars qualified for subsidy under the existing scheme, although one particular producer had obtained a large loan from the Bantu Investment Corporation (BIC), apparently in 1974. A committee under the chairmanship of this body had been established as early as 1971 in response to a directive from the Minister of Bantu Administration and Development and the Minister of Economic Affairs. The committee's findings were as follows:

1. A "Bantu film industry of their own" is justified and greater help is needed than is presently available through the subsidy scheme;

2. It will be some time before the "Bantu" will acquire the necessary artistic and technical skills to make films of good standard. Therefore use should be made of studios and laboratories in the white areas which were not being utilised to their full capacity, given the high capital costs of establishing such facilities in the homelands. This would be a temporary solution, since measures would be taken to "give" facilities to the homelands in due course;

3. A film bank under the control of the BIC would provide a great percentage of the capital needed on a risk-profit-loss basis which would ensure "good films". An amount of R500,000 would be required for the first three years. Special funds were to be made available for this purpose;

4. Subsidy would be paid out on the basis of 18 cents a seat up to a maximum of R45,000 per film. The method of calculation is therefore totally different to that employed in working out payments in respect of English and Afrikaans films. The main actor and 75% of other players were to be blacks and the production companies to be owned by South Africans with a minimum shareholding of 51%; and

5. All local film makers would have access to the distribution network. The BIC would loan capital for the erection of cinemas in the larger black towns. Initially, twelve outlets were considered while use would also be made of mobile units.

In 1974, the Minister of Information, Connie Mulder, in a "Top Secret" memo to the Minister of Finance described this scheme as a means "to promote the Government's policy of separate development". At this point it becomes necessary to speculate on the participants of this scheme. The BTI established in 1976 that the committee's proposals had already been carried out to a large extent. The initial R500,000 was available.
and the Board reports that "Only one producer has made use of the funds thus far". Although the BTI did not identify the company involved, it later became evident that the recipient was Heyns Films, later to come under the control of J van Zyl Alberts who used this firm as a front company for the notorious Department of Information. The Board also observed that five cinemas had already been built while others were still in the planning stage. The BIC had also promised the largest manufacturer of African language films, again, presumably Heyns Films, that a further 20 cinemas were to be opened by 1979. Apparently, the BIC programme was not successful because of an inordinate amount of 'red tape' which tended to slow down the administrative process.

The other actor in this scenario which was soon to assume the proportions of a national scandal and result in the eventual and unprecedented resignation of BJ Vorster as State President, Mulder's banishment from the National Party, and the firing of the Chief of the Bureau of State Security, was the indomitable Andre Pieterse. It is not intended to investigate the Information Scandal here, but to outline the extent of funds and plans involving cinema which were to be used by the Department in its propaganda war both locally and overseas.

After Pieterse's ignominious departure from Ster in 1969, he immediately regrouped his resources under a new company, Film Trust, and began working on a plan to make inexpensive films for the African market in both the homelands and the cities. He also envisaged an export market to the North. His target was 100 films a year with a group capitalisation of between R1.5 and R2.5 million. Given the extent of these projected operations, the Financial Mail concluded that this scheme "would presumably have to be heavily subsidised by the government". Ster Films, on the other hand, was unimpressed with this venture. Reported in the Financial Mail, Sandro Pierotti, managing director of the company, argued that the black market was notoriously fickle and somewhat aggressive toward the 'home product', and provided a scant 2% of Ster's exhibition revenue. Pieterse is reported to have submitted to the Minister of Bantu
Administration and Development a study on "The Development of a Bantu Film Industry in Southern Africa", which had cost R60 000 to prepare. By mid-1970, Pieterse's new company had floated two subsidiaries for the exploitation of African language films. The production arm was Bantu Film Trust and the distributor, African Films Trust which was concerned primarily with the penetration of the external market. The appointment of Pieterse in 1971 as vice-president of MGM International assisted him to negotiate tie-ups with three major United States film companies which would screen Bantu Film Trust product in North Africa, South America and the United States. The subsidy scheme for African language films was initiated in 1973 and despite Pieterse's grand projections, according to the BTI, only one film (which was not made by Pieterse's company) qualified for the financial year of 1974-75 and was paid out R37 323. This was Bayeta Films' Ngomopho which eventually qualified for the full R45 000. Three films qualified in 1975-76 with a payout of R95 975, while an amount of R150 000 was budgeted for 1976-77.

Representations from makers of African language films in 1976 resulted in an increase in the upper limit to R70 000 and the payment of subsidy where the film was shown in venues where individual tickets were not issued, like mine and other compounds which housed large numbers of blacks, mainly males. The fund was now to be administered by the Department of Industries, Commerce and Tourism and the films shown in the 'independent' homelands no longer qualified for assistance. As is shown in Table 1, the subsidy led to the exponential growth of movies in African vernaculars by the end of the decade, although none were made by Bantu Film Trust.

THE INFORMATION DEPARTMENT PROPAGANDA WAR: COVERT IDEOLOGICAL DISCOURSE

Before proceeding to a discussion of subsequent events in the industry in relation to the subsidy scheme, it is necessary to digress here to study the source of additional covert finance.
made available to selected producers by the Department of Information. These funds were never reflected in the official subsidy accounts kept by the Department of Industries, Commerce and Tourism, but were drawn from "secret" monies, the so-called 'G' fund surreptitiously fed to the Department by a clique of power-hungry politicians which included the Prime Minister, BJ Vorster, and various members of his Cabinet, including Dr Connie Mulder, Minister of Information and, for a while, the Interior as well. The other important figure in this conspiracy was General H van den Berg, head of the Bureau for State Security (BOSS). The complexity and covert nature of these dealings underlies Miliband's point that hegemony is not an axiomatic result of economic and social predominance. Rather, hegemony is the result of a permanent and pervasive effort, conducted through a multitude of agencies and state apparatuses which deliberately set out to create a national consensus.\(^{108}\)

Subsequent commissions of inquiry have established that a figure of over R60 million was spent on grandiose and ill-conceived schemes.\(^{109}\) Over R1 million seems to have entered the film industry in one way or another, with additional loans totalling R1,594,731 between 26 March 1974 and the exposure of the Department's activities by the press in 1979. In some cases, the state infiltration of the film industry resembled that of the methods used by Cautio, the Nazi front company which bought up shares in the German film industry in the 1930s. In other situations, monies supplied for particular propaganda exercises were used on projects which had nothing to do with the Department's brief, or they were appropriated by the trustees to "line their pockets.\(^{110}\)

The initial infiltration of covert state capital into the industry occurred on 26 March 1974 when an amount of R50,000 was passed onto J van Zyl Alberts under the project heading "Bantu Films". This money was paid into his personal banking account.\(^{111}\)
On 28 April he bought 20 000 shares for R26 000 from Thys Heyns, managing director of Heyns Films. By 21 November, van Zyl Alberts had acquired a further 103 500 shares on behalf of the state. Of this total, 3000 shares were in the name of CD Fuchs, a recurring actor in the South African Nationalist scenario. According to the Commission, Alberts already owned 2000 shares issued to him on 4 December 1973. In a bid to go public in November 1973, only 43 000 shares were sold and in March 1974 Alberts informed Heyns that he had obtained "considerable funds from an overseas source" which would become available on condition that it was able to take up 51% of the shares in Heyns' company. Heyns acceded to this since his film company had idle capacity and the public share issue had been largely unsuccessful.

Alberts, who between March 1974 and 30 November 1978 was to channel R16 026 220.23 of state funds into private companies, was one of the two front men picked by Dr Eschel Rhoodie, Secretary of the Department of Information, to spearhead the Bantu Films project. The other was André Pieterse. This enterprise had a dual aim: (1) censorship, and (2) indoctrination. The Department had planned to build cinemas in black areas and would maintain strict control of the types of films shown to blacks through these outlets. It would also govern the manufacture of films. Rhoodie argued that South African blacks tended to identify with both the heroes and anti-heroes of American films, mainly of the 'B' variety. This Americanising of urban blacks in South Africa was considered undesirable and the scheme was aimed at counter-acting this trend through the creation of local black superheroes who would be portrayed against an ethnic background. The result, according to Rhoodie, would be an improvement in the quality of films shown to blacks while simultaneously putting across the government's separate development message. While over 14 films for black audiences were made by Heyns Films between 1974 and 1979, the R825 000 given to Pieterse for the building of black cinemas in which to show these films, was misappropriated and used to cover some of the losses incurred on his costly Alastair McClean flop, Golden Rondesvouz (1977). An amount of R33 316.80 of the total assigned to Alberts found its way into his wife's pocket for
"consultation fees" on the black film programme. She was, according to one of the joint managing directors "an anthropologist who did contribute some constructive ideas ..."\textsuperscript{115}

Obviously, Rhodie's covert propaganda through the use of film should not be divorced from mention of other aspects of the strategy which included a massive worldwide publishing empire, the attempted buy-out of American television stations, newspapers and European magazines. Of relevance to the discussion on film were the complex and unclear inter-connections between many of Alberts' front companies, through which large amounts of capital were shifted. Alberts' Craft Press, for example, printed comic books which were later made into films such as \textit{Mighty Man I} and \textit{Mighty Man II} (1980). The two reporters who broke the scandal report that this comic venture may have cost as much as R500 000 and was illustrated in New York\textsuperscript{116}. In her evidence to the Erasmus Commission, Mrs Alberts is quite clear of her perceptions on the ideological purpose of these films and comics:

\textit{Tiger Ingwe (Comic)}

Compose, research and plan comic strips from Bantu legends and stories. The creation of the title of the comic strip must be understandable to all ethnic groups.

Before the drawing of the comics the physical and ethnological elements of the black man must be explained to the illustrators. On completion of the work, it must be checked thoroughly and repetitively to ensure that there are no physical or ethnological errors. In order to inform and teach the illustrators I had to go to New York three times to take them literature to teach them the physical differences between our black people and their negroes. Furthermore, they had to be constantly shown that the correct ethnological aspects were necessary and this only occurred through personal contact with the illustrators for whom the black man's culture and lifestyle was unknown.

\textit{Mighty Man (Comic and films)}

The stories were mostly compiled by them and here both the theme as well as the correct physical and ethnological characteristics absorbed much time\textsuperscript{117}.

In a letter dated May 1974 written by Mulder to the Minister of Finance, Owen Horwood, a further attempt was made to secure funds over and above the legitimate subsidy allocation.
Lengthy extracts are reprinted here since this letter conveys in no uncertain terms how the government intended using cinema as a means of covert cultural production to obtain consent for its apartheid policies. It also provides an insight into the raison d'être of the subsidy scheme in the first place. The document is entitled "Creation and Control of a Bantu Film Industry" and CD Fuchs, the retiring Director-General of the SABC was earmarked for an important role in it. The project was to be undertaken in consultation with the SABC "because the new film industry can play a valuable role in the eventual Bantu television service". "Ideological control" of the project would be exercised by the Department:

To carry out the policy of separate development, the idea of multi-nationalism must be conveyed to the different Bantu population groups. Therefore not only mass communication channels must be created to these groups, but the channels must be placed under proper control.

Mulder noted the success of radio and television and pointed out that it was now necessary to intercept "the concrete signs that the private sector realises more and more what a mighty potential lies locked in such (i.e. a Bantu) film industry". What was needed then were funds whereby the state could 'engineer the consent' of the private sector. This was a plan for indoctrination whereby counter-ideological discourse and alternatives to apartheid could be shielded and ultimately eliminated from films screened to black audiences. As Mulder himself puts it: "The creation and control of a Bantu film industry will thus be of fundamental advantage for the national interest and for the export of the policy of separate development". In a request to the Minister of Bantu Administration and Development, Mulder explained how the industry could be dissuaded from communicating counter-ideological views:

While it is impossible to obtain a monopoly in the area of manufacture (production), it is of utmost importance to exercise behind the scenes full control over the distribution (screening) of all Bantu films (this applies also to the films which come from overseas and are dubbed into a Bantu language).
In this manner a greater degree of control can be exercised over the type of film that is manufactured - a company will soon discover that it will pay it to manufacture films which stand a chance of being distributed (screened).

... It would be appreciated if the Minister can give the necessary instructions that no recreation or film project (production, distribution, building of theatres, financing of facilities, screening rights etc) may be granted or considered without prior consultation with the Secretary of Information (Dr EM Hoodie)\(^{19}\).

The description and purpose of authoritarian control over culture as provided by Raymond Williams is perhaps more applicable to South Africa than the majority of accounts. He describes such a system of culture as a monopoly of the means of communication by a ruling hegemony which is a necessary part of the whole political system, so as to "protect, maintain or advance a social order based on a minority"\(^{20}\). As far as the 'Bantu film industry' in South Africa was concerned, knowledge of this control was to be withheld from all but the "highest level" of civil servants who were simply to be told "that all amusement and film occasions must be referred to a specific high official of the Department of Bantu Administration and Development". Even these trusted officials were not to be told the "real reasons". Rather, the government's motivations should be explained, and thereby obscured, as part of an 'efficient' administrative process. As Gramsci reminds us, the reproduction of ideological hegemony is the task of the dominant classes and of all the cultural institutions they control. Normally, the state functions to provide a balance between coercion and consent. Hence Mulder's requirement of secrecy, for if coercion were seen to be predominant, the state might lose, as it eventually did, the support of some sectors of private industry through a partial rupturing of the hegemonic alliance. Such an exposé would also frighten off those intellectuals the government wished to co-opt in the service of the state. In fact, this did happen in the case of Ross Devenish who was unsuccessfully approached by Heyns Films to make films for black audiences.

Reminding Horwood of the ideological purpose of the project, Mulder was apparently unable to convince him of the need for
funds other than those already available through the normal channels\textsuperscript{122}. The purpose of the entertainment industry is profit, but as is proved by the producer representations to the BTI in terms of preventing material 'harmful to the country', the content of even commercial cinema is not at all free from political connotations or the dominant ideological discourse. Mulder, however, was not satisfied and demanded specific ideological controls whereby films seen by black South Africans would be filtered at each stage of the production, distribution and exhibition process. To this end he secretly spent R1.2 million on productions prior to 1978 and had earmarked a further R1 million for 1979. In this case, coercion was to be relied on, at the expense of consent. It should be pointed out that in the social formation as a whole there is no question that coercion through violence is the major form of control used by the hegemonic bloc to maintain its dominance. Clearly, the extent to which the Department of Information was prepared to go suggests that it thought that consent could be engineered, but only under conditions of total covert control as far as both the industry and audiences were concerned.

The kind of propaganda which was largely successful in the 'black' productions of Heyns Films, when compared to other Department of Information projects, did not work quite so well amongst white audiences who were used to their daily doses of ideological discourse being more subtly encoded in the texture of 'taken for granted' assumptions which form part of the content and character motivations which make up the dramatic structure of 'entertainment' films\textsuperscript{122}. Two examples can be cited here. The first concerned the R1 million production, \textit{Tigers Don't Cry} (1976) which the Department had to subsidise to the tune of R160 000. A Heyns Films product, this company had been loaned over R1 594 731 to produce this and two other propaganda films. Despite the drawcard of Anthony Quinn \textit{Tigers} grossed less than half its production cost and the company's loss was partly balanced by the Department. This sum was in addition to the R178 000 paid out by the government as its legitimate subsidy allocation. The second film, \textit{Escape From Angola} (1977), costing R320 000 was made in conjunction with an American syndicate. It was withdrawn after a short run at the
drive-ins. This film earned no subsidy at all. A third project planned was apparently never started.

Once the Department's cover had been blown, the government, which obviously sympathised with the broader political objectives of the Department's strategy, but not its means, divested itself of these front companies, not by putting them on the open market, but by selling the shares acquired by the state to those individuals who had been involved with them. The morning daily, The Citizen, for example, was sold to PERSKOR, a major Afrikaner Nationalist publishing house which had printed the newspaper, for less than half the value of the concern's capital assets. The 52% state shareholding in Heyns Films which represented an investment of R1.6 million was sold to Thys Heyns in October 1979 for only R138 171. Although this action on the part of the government incensed the English press, it made ideological sense for, as Miliband points out, business, and in this case, Afrikaner business, makes an effort:

to persuade society not merely to accept the policies it advocates but also the ethos, the values and the goals which are its own, the economic system of which it forms part (i.e. in the South African context, racial capitalism), the 'way of life' which is at the core of its being.

Although passing from covert state hands to overt private control, the right of ownership remains vested in Afrikaner Nationalist ideological discourse. As Miliband argues with reference to the press in general, "The right of ownership confers the right of making propaganda, and where the right is exercised, it is most likely to be exercised in the service of strongly conservative prejudices, either by positive assertion or by ... exclusion." Heyns Films are no longer making feature films for cinema, but video films for the two 'black' television channels, TV2 and TV3. The company has merely shifted its market but not its ideology. It could not afford the risks of open competition in a market safeguarded merely by the legitimate subsidy.
It is difficult to assess what was really accomplished by the Department of Information's incursion into the film industry. The 'willed' ideology and hegemonic control of the dominant classes were not strengthened any more than was the case already and as mentioned previously, led to the downfall of a number of prominent Nationalist politicians and civil servants. Where films made by whites for black audiences were concerned, the private sector far outstripped the relatively sophisticated ideological discourse encoded in the Heyns Films output, substituting a incredibly crude organicideological content which weaved into its assumptions and structured absences the myth of the homelands in a manner which was not even contemplated by what the press dubbed "the Rhoodie Roadshow". On the other hand, it is precisely this difference which captures the nature of the class re-alignment which was consequent upon changes occurring in the national economy. The way these shifting social relations were reflected in cinema aimed at blacks is dealt with in the final chapter.

The discussion now returns to the state subsidy scheme between the years 1977 to 1981.


Against the background of the Department of Information's incredible wastage and misuse of public funds, with R2 425 000 covertly injected into just two companies, a much larger number of legitimate film makers had been experiencing difficulty since May 1978 in obtaining subsidies for which they had qualified. By October the situation had become critical and R330 000 remained unpaid due to a technical dispute between the Treasury and the Department of Industries, Commerce and Tourism. The Treasury complained that the Department should not have begun paying the promised higher subsidy in September 1977, but in fact from May 1978. The issue was solved after Ministerial intervention in October but the six month delay had seriously affected production schedules and company cash flows. The final amount allocated for this year was R2.5
million, a similar sum as that spent by the Department of Information on the production of its two front companies.

Barely a month later, in November 1978, the government announced a 20% or R500 000 reduction in the 1979 allocation. The industry was in a state of disarray and even in terms of the BTI’s limited objectives, South African films made in 1978 had little or no success on the overseas market. The language profile of films being made altered considerably with very low budget (R10-20 000) African language films accounting for almost half the annual output for 1978 and 1979. In the latter year, three English language features were made, nine Afrikaans and eleven in African languages. The industry was weathering the effects of television badly and government indecision seriously affected the industry’s ability to plan ahead.

As in previous instances, when faced with subsidy reductions, the FFPA resurrected itself, unexpectedly electing a young go-ahead MBA graduate to the chairmanship. Andre Scholtz, who had previously worked on the marketing side of Satbel and who possessed a rare combination of both responsible business acumen and academic business education, elevated the FFPA discussion from a concern with short-term ad hoc arrangements and called on the government to commit itself to longer-term projections of not less than five years duration. By this means, Scholtz hoped to alleviate the uncertainty facing the industry and encourage producers to plan ahead in the confidence that they would not suddenly be faced with unanticipated modifications in the subsidy scheme or untimely reductions in the funds available. The objectives of the FFPA were thus geared to creating a climate of stability and confidence which would, in turn stimulate the export sector by encouraging more investment in individual films. After informal consultation with SAFTTA, the South African Film and Television Technician's Association, the FFPA proposed a three-tiered structure for a future scheme:

1. Films earning overseas income should also become eligible for subsidy and not be subject to the upper limit of R300 000. This, argued the FFPA, would encourage producers to
work to higher budgets which would in turn enable them to compete more easily in outside markets;

2. Films made for the local market only should continue to receive subsidy; and

3. The spectre of Grierson again loomed its head in that the FFPA requested that non-commercial or art movies be subsidised provided they are able to obtain a distribution of some kind, for example, through the Federation of Film Societies.

Despite early government assurances that these proposals would be sympathetically received, positive reaction was not forthcoming and the industry continued along its path of uncertainty until late 1981. In the meantime, producers like Scholtz, impatient of government stalling and despairing of continuous Cabinet reshuffles which always seemed to affect the Department of Industries leading to a disruption in negotiations, left the film industry and applied their talents elsewhere.

Changes were announced by the Department only on 1 October 1981 although its provisions were retrospective from 1 April. Although claiming to have studied the producers' proposals, the formulation was not changed much from its previous structure. As far as Afrikaans and English language films were concerned subsidy was now payable at a rate of 70% on the first R1 million nett box office income and thereafter at 50% on the next R1 million whereas thereafter no further subsidy is payable. The maximum is therefore R1.2 million per film, an increase of R900 000 over the earlier formula. The qualifying R100 000 nett box office income was retained. For the first time, screenings in member countries of the Customs Union Agreement also qualify for subsidy. Participants of this scheme are Lesotho, Swaziland, and Botswana, as well as those 'independent' homelands such as Transkei, Venda, Bophuthatswana and Ciskei which were previously outside of the subsidy qualification area.

On films produced for black viewers, the subsidy was increased from 18 cents per ticket sold to 21 cents, with a maximum subsidy of R80 000 per film. Qualification also extends to the Customs Union Agreement area and such films may now be made
in either of the official languages or an acknowledged South African black language.

THE SUBSIDY: INTER-CULTURAL COMMUNICATION VERSUS FINANCIAL CONSIDERATIONS

Although 1981 really falls outside the scope of this study, further important insights into the ideological motivations of the state will be identified through the government's reaction to a study it commissioned from Pieter Fourie, a UNISA Communications lecturer whose Ph.D deals with the construction of a model by means of which the subsidy scheme could be reformulated.129 The essence of Fourie's arguments and proposals, which reflect many of the issues debated since 1943, were published in Rapport on 21 June 1981. In many ways, this report is an unconscious distillation of the inestimable problems facing commentators wishing to bring about changes in an industry which itself cannot change in the absence of a corresponding and pre-emptive shift in the political economy.

Fourie's report is framed within a functionalist framework and reflects many of the contradictions to which this paradigm is subject. The report, for example, identifies a tension between the "older Afrikaner" who wants to see his principles visualised in film, that is, an "'idealistic' conservatism, distinguished through an historical context, an ideal of racial purity, language purity, religion and moral norms" on the one hand, and the artist who wants to offer a mirror and interpretation of reality on the other. Whenever film has tried to purposefully reflect the South African and his way of life, it is countered by those Afrikaners who find such imagery an affront to their self-conceptions. In this manner the Afrikaner is argued to be alienating himself from his art and his artists, to the detriment of his own cultural advancement. The arts, Fourie pointed out, should not belong to small groups of culture-lovers and intellectuals, but should go hand in hand with a "cultural policy" geared to educating the wider population to appreciate the value of art. The state is accused of not taking the medium seriously and of subsidising the industry without any
clear communication goals. Fourie is led by his overly functionalist approach into decrying the state's non-formulation of an all-embracing cultural policy. Because 'culture' is seen by the state as an isolated entity rather than as an integral part of existence, he charges that film as 'a means of communications' (kommunikasiemedium) is not fully appreciated. The value of film as a socialising and orientation medium in the community is stressed as is its value as a means of projecting an image of South African life internationally. Despite his protestations to the contrary, these themes recur constantly in BTI reports, as well as the Gilliers, Smith and Grierson submissions. Unlike previous investigations, however, Fourie does point to film's unique scientific value for blacks and thereby the advancement of inter-cultural communication, and the value of film as a cultural institution. In this set of propositions Fourie encapsulates a bourgeois notion of 'art': he sees it as 'free' of the constraints of capital or the market, but simultaneously dependent upon the help of a subsidy which itself derives from the market economy or capitalist relations of production. His arguments display little awareness of how capital in general works through apparently isolated "cultural components". A clearly stated, over-arching state cultural policy overtly taught in schools is not necessary as he implies. It is already there. Cultural production works much more subtly than that. It is ever-present in social discourse and is continuously disseminated by ideological apparatuses such as the media, schools and churches assisting economic and political agencies in their efforts to legitimise capitalist society or a not too different variant of its present structure.

The conception of art held by Fourie implies an amalgam of a medium which both exposes a (superficial) humanist interpretation of 'conditions' while imposing cultural values which somehow in a utopian or idealistic manner bring about cultural growth in the community. This leads him to a series of implicit contradictions similar to those encoded in the BTI reports. For example, on the one hand he wants film to reflect life as it is, but on the other he wants to see black film makers producing
films for their own population groups, following an inward, that is apartheid, refraction. From this "purer" and consequently more isolated cultural base will apparently emerge a greater potential for inter-cultural communication. A second example concerns his desire to see regional or indigenous reflections of social reality in South Africa. Later on, however, Fourie places great emphasis on the need for studios, technical facilities and the development of a 'star system'. One must assume from his argument that sufficient suitable facilities do not exist at present to service the needs of this hypothetical cinema geared to reflecting local realities. With this greater investment in technology will invariably flow a greater dependence on proven formulas and safe treatments. The cinema that Fourie is talking about is necessarily low budget, requiring a low organic composition of capital, and has no need of this sort of capital intensive industry upon which it would, inevitably, very quickly become dependent. Facilities of the order that Fourie implies require extensive investment, and capital as we have seen, has a habit of homogenising content, of obscuring the conditions that Fourie wants to expose, and of replacing local interpretations with national, ideologically accepted universalizations. The relationship between cost and content is of fundamental importance and must be kept in perspective. Very often, film movements have spurned the sort of facilities Fourie is talking about, seeking rather to combine content with a viable cheapness of production, "to explore the freedom of our poverty", as Ross Devenish expresses it. The extent of subsidy envisaged by Fourie will inevitably alter this relationship as occurred in Australia when the more "regional reflections" were almost swamped by massive government funding, of which producer Ken Hall observes: "When the budget gets up into the higher bracket, making a good return from overseas essential the parochial aspects of the film become a menace, the policy of pursuing that type of production suicidal". Any system, as Andre Scholtz points out, which encourages producers to work to higher budgets is forced to include the world market in its calculations.

The above two examples show how Fourie operates from a functionalist level of analysis which itself obscures underlying conditions
and processes. It intuitively in subsidy formulation that Fourie uses in so far as it perceives relations of production in the United States, to control communication. Political means necessary as far as provided by the mental agencies, administered by the state ideologue, be aware that be unravelled.

What is making much headway in this Post-Vicarous movement of himself to himself go much the same ideas are taken to be.
and processes. It would seem that this is precisely what the BTI intuitively intended in its own reports and is what the subsidy formulation geared itself towards. Art, in the sense that Fourie uses it, does have a value in capitalism but only in so far as it perpetuates or mystifies the relations of production where ideological competition is heavily weighted to one side, as it is in the United States, the hegemonic bloc has no need of authoritarian control over cultural production or a monopoly of the means of communication. Hegemony is maintained through economic and political means. In South Africa, some control remains necessary as far as the private sector is concerned and this is provided by the subsidy acting in concert with other governmental agencies such as the Directorate of Publications, the police, administration boards and a host of legislation enforced by these state apparatuses. While Fourie has peeled off one more layer in the carpet of obscurities covered by capitalist ideological discourse in South Africa, he does not seem to be aware that there are many more below him waiting to be unravelled.

What is significant about Fourie's report is the fact that in making much of it public he so annoyed the Department of Industries, that it immediately embargoed all remaining copies in his possession. He was furthermore reprimanded by both his Head of Department and the University Principal who had obviously themselves been rebuked by the government. Fourie himself feels that the state's response was because it is not interested in "theoretical formulations". However, the reasons go much deeper than merely a prejudice against theory. The theoretical base assumed by Fourie is, in fact, not that dissimilar to the practice followed by the more verligteapartheid ideologists. It is certainly couched within the dominant apartheid discourse: witness the necessity for internal group communication before across-group communication can be effected, the need for blacks to be trained to make films for their own population groups, and so on. What is at issue here is the implicit assumption in Fourie's argument: the coming to terms with actual (possibly negative in terms of cultural stereotypes)
lifestyle (albeit in superficial terms) must precede the transmission and enhancement of (positive) cultural values. The state is, by nature, suspicious of "art", or more specifically, that strain of art which articulates resistance to the to the dominant ideology. Ever since John Grierson came to South Africa in 1954, the BTI and government have been playing down those proposals which are aimed at encouraging experimentation and the use of cinema as a means of resolving social and political conflicts. It seems also that Fourie's overarching cultural programme was similarly designed to facilitate inter-group and inter-cultural communication through the projection of 'regional images' reflecting social reality. But this strategy can be argued to be counter the interests of capital which resists inter-cultural communication where, as in South Africa, race or culture largely coincides with the class structure. Exceptions occur only where such communication can increase the productivity of labour. In South Africa, this applies mainly to the emerging black petty bourgeoisie and the more stable elements of the working-class. Ethnicity is still needed to rationalise the homeland system and the dumping of surplus people who are economically idle.

The report submitted by Pieter Fourie does not directly mention the need for freedom of expression, but it does imply that a modicum of choice will have to be allowed to film makers offering regional or local images. He does acknowledge that such expression might infuriate the "older Afrikaner". However, Fourie's implied freedom does not go so far to suggest that dissenting political views should be allowed. It is not in the state's interest to allow too wide a range of choice, and since Fourie sees the state as mediating the interests between the various 'population groups' we have to infer that choice is limited to the expression of images and contents which are helpful to the dominant system of power and privilege. State subsidies function to regulate the range of choice, whether in Holland, Belgium, Cuba, Brazil or South Africa. Subsidies are not applied on the basis of altruistic goodwill by governments or the desire to stimulate an art which questions the status quo. The response by the Department of Industries to the publication of Fourie's report in Rapport is surely an indication
of the restricted choices that will be allowed in South Africa. Fourie's report unwittingly identified a fissure in the hegemonic alliance and had therefore to be suppressed. While considering the government as dominant, and its arrangement of society as the way things should be, he also sees that there is a lack of harmony between the various "population groups". His report is really trying to offer a strategy whereby that fissure in hegemonic relations which has caused a strained relationship with the subordinate classes can be patched up. The notion of inter-cultural communication followed by Fourie is geared, therefore, to averting a crisis between the hegemonic bloc and the dominated classes, or large groups as he calls them. Film would offer one means of smoothing over this strained relationship.

Both Fourie and the Board would agree that film is a medium of communication. Both argue that it should be used in the service of the state. However, only the government and the BTI argue that it is and has been working in the service of the state. This is where Fourie's analysis collapses for he attributes state vacillation on a cultural policy as far as film is concerned to a lack of communication objectives. What constitutes the state is not clear for he tends to inter-change this term with "government", and neither is the relationship between the "older Afrikaner" and the state explained. Not discussed is the way the ideas of the older Afrikaner predominate and how they are articulated in the content of film. There is, however, no need for the state to articulate its policy on culture or its communications objectives. Indeed, as we have seen, the dissemination of such knowledge could work to the detriment of the hegemonic bloc, and was one of the reasons why Mulder insisted on absolute secrecy on Department of Information projects, and specifically the programme designed to stimulate a "Bantu film industry". Capital circumscribes its own policy in hidden ways in its efforts to bring about a national consensus which Fourie simplistically ascribes to the influence of the "older Afrikaner".

These issues are intuitively understood by the government as evidenced in the way it has formulated the existing subsidy structure. That it has paid scant attention to the proposals
of the producers or technicians either in recent years does not invalidate this argument, for the well-being of capital in general is considered more important than the needs or whims of fractions of capital, as evidenced in the film industry. When the state as an instrument of the hegemonic bloc requires short films, art movies or experimentation, and like those before him, Fourie calls for such funding, it will make money available, just as the Soviet state did in the case of Eisenstein and his colleagues. If and when a system such as that proposed by Fourie comes about, it will be because the scheme is considered of benefit to the state under a new set of political and economic circumstances. Fourie has thus over-emphasised the need for inter-cultural communication and has assumed the neutrality of the state and thus underplayed politico-economic influences.

Summary

Fourie's proposals, the state response and the non-resolution of the intellectual controversy surrounding the social worth of the subsidy scheme provide a significant insight into the issues which have surfaced in report after report through the years since the publication of the Cilliers Film Committee investigations in 1943. All are concerned with social goals which hardly ever transcend the ideological perceptions of the dominant bloc. The result was that suggestions for reform were ideologically limited. None seem to be aware of the ideological limitations of the changes suggested since most of the reports have been put forward as some kind of panacea for the ills of the industry, the art that is supposed to derive from it and the cultural benefits that a modification of the system might bring a wider South African society. As Richard Harvey notes, only a radical change will do, but he does not suggest how this can be made to happen. Indeed, it will take a new society, a new social formation and a new political economy to bring about the changes he envisages, but he does not suggest how that can be done either. In short, changes are not incumbent upon reports, theoretical discussion, wishful thinking or naïve representations on how the government can control erring
film makers who associate themselves with material 'harmful to the country'. Rather, changes are consequent upon shifts in the development of capitalist relations and what stage the economy has advanced to, revolutions in technology, the organic composition of capital, the direction and flow of international capital and the degree to which the relations of production need to be mystified through cultural production. Film, whether publicly or privately financed, is a utility in the service of the state. With an ideology as pervasive, amongst whites, and so strictly enforced as it is in South Africa, it is difficult to see anyone escaping the constraints of capital and dealing with a content which cuts through, as Lukacs would say, "the inner active forces of capitalist society ... and all the factors which determine the complex content of life"[137], that is to say, those treatments which reflect "regional images". Subsidy schemes tend to work against such exposure, from Eisenstein's Soviet Russia, through Grierson's documentary movement of the 1930s to the South African cinema of the present, all of which depended on a state subsidy for their financial solvency. Of all the personalities discussed in this chapter, only Eisenstein realised that reality could be interpreted in many diverse ways. Only he realised that only one of these represented 'Truth'. For Eisenstein, the content of that 'Truth' is provided by ideology and this was understood by few of those participating in the South African debate.

We have already alluded to the reasons why the subsidy was first introduced only in 1956. The explanation is to be found in the complex inter-relations between local and international capital. The subsidy was both a defence mechanism to protect the local production industry from the incursion of international capital, and an offensive weapon, particularly after 1962, through which Afrikaner dominated capital was able to assist the cathartic working out of cultural and ideological traumas stimulated by change in the economic status of the Afrikaner. Subsidy on films made for blacks has been shown in this chapter to have been concerned with cultural production geared to reflecting a very specific class structure. The subsidy affected
the content of film in such a way as to legitimise in cinema a new consensus required by the emergence of a consumer society in the 1960s. The subsidy has never been concerned with 'high culture', but with guiding cultural responses, suggesting and legitimising new ways of coping with altering, not static lifestyles. In sum, the subsidy is part of the state's effort to maintain the ruling hegemony.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. These distinctions need to be kept in mind for the problem of defining the capitalist state is a vexed one and until recently largely ignored by Marxist theorists other than Gramsci. Miliband offers the following discussion which helps to clarify the term, 'state' as used in this study: the state is not a thing. It does not, as such, exist. It rather stands for a number of particular institutions which, together, constitute its reality, and which interact as parts of what may be called the state system. Many of the commentators referred to in this chapter tend to confuse the state with merely one part of the state, the government. As Miliband points out, the semantic substitution of the state for the government introduces a major element of confusion in the discussion of the nature and incidence of state power. If it is believed that the government is in fact the state, it may also be believed that the assumption of governmental power is equivalent to the acquisition of state power. This stance is fraught with conceptual difficulties. The government speaks on behalf of the state. The government is formally invested with state power but this does not mean that it effectively controls that power. A second element is the administrative one where government departments, corporations, boards etc enforce the political process. The third element is concerned with the 'management of violence' -- the military, security and police forces of the state. Fourthly, the judiciary in most Western-type political systems is not formally bound to serve the government of the day. They are constitutionally independent of the political executive and it is their active duty to protect the citizen against the political executive or its agents. Miliband thus sees the state as an autonomous entity and in theory democracy may be measured in terms of the sanctity of this autonomy. In South Africa, the situation is much more complex with many of the citizens rights having been eroded by the political executive. Sub-central government units (i.e. local authorities) are channels of communication from the centre to the periphery and constitute a fifth element. Finally, in the parliamentary assemblies, the opposition parties, by taking part in the work of the legislature, help the government's business. It is the interrelationship of these institutions which shape the form of the state system. This is not synonymous with the political system. The economically dominant class is involved in a relationship with the state. The hegemonic bloc is that alliance of classes which cooperate with the economically
dominant class in using the state to exert pressure on the subordinate classes.


2. See Trek 17 December 1943: "Ons Film - Waarheen?" Vol. VII, No. 13, p. 15


4. The Union Review, August 1944: "Let's Go to the Cinema... and see a Government Film (in Afrikaans)", Vol. VII, No. 85, p. 38

5. Union of South Africa. The Cilliers Film Committee. July 1943. This is an approximate reference as this report seems not to be listed in the usual government publications lists. A copy was obtained from the National Film Archives. See p. 13 for the text reference

6. Ibid

7. Ibid. p. 14

8. Ibid. p. 15

9. Ibid. p. 16

10. Ibid. p. 20

11. Ibid. p. 21

12. Ibid

13. Ibid. p. 67

14. Ibid. p. 68

15. Ibid. p. 81

16. Ibid. p. 65

17. Ibid. p. 84

18. Ibid. p. 72

19. Ibid. p. 84

20. The Union Review, op. cit. p. 39
21. Union of South Africa. 14 December 1944: Report of the Inter-Departmental Committee Appointed to Consider the Reports of the Committee on State Publicity and the Film Committee and Other Relevant Matters. Government Printer, Chairman: E.P. Smith, 3pp

22. Ibid. p. 2

23. Ibid


25. Cilliers Film Committee, op. cit. p. 53

26. Ibid. p. 77

27. Ibid. p. 84


29. Ibid. p. 2


32. Ibid. p. 27

33. Ibid. p. 7

34. See Williams, op. cit. p. 17

35. Ibid. p. 21

36. Ibid

37. Ibid. pp. 17-18

38. Union of South Africa. The Grierson Report. 2nd Draft, "Introduction", p. 4. Although a 3rd draft was written, it appears to be no longer in existence. The second draft on which this study draws is housed in the National Film Archives in Pretoria

Grierson always maintained that the ideological element was dominant in his work and which determined a relationship in which aesthetic means were put at the service of ideological ends. For more information see Lovell, A. and Hillier, J. 1972: Studies in Documentary. Secker and Warburg in association with the British Film Institute, p. 29

273
39. Ibid. p. 2
40. Ibid. pp. 2-3
41. Quoted in Lovell and Hillier, op. cit. p. 19
42. Grierson, op. cit. p. 7
43. See Lovell and Hillier, op. cit. pp. 11 and 17
44. Ibid. pp. 17-18
45. Grierson, op. cit. p. 5
46. Ibid. p. 6
47. Ibid. pp. 7-8
48. The essence of Fourie's report was published in the Afrikaans Sunday newspaper, Rapport, 21 June 1981. It was entitled "How Can the South African Film Industry be Rescued from its Flight?"
49. Grierson, op. cit. p. 3
50. Ibid. p. 3
51. Ibid
52. Ibid
53. Ibid. "Argument" p. 2. Commenting on the first administration of the NFB inaugurated on 1 April 1964, an ex-employee tells of how the Board bankrupted itself "because of extreme ignorance of management". He alleges that the top positions had never been advertised and that the "old staff of the Government Film Services drifted in to form a tea club, while the new members, truly motion-picture professionals, unsuccessfully tried to talk 'shop'". A new general manager was appointed in 1973 but inherited "a great white elephant studio complex" Letter to SA Film Weekly, 11/18 October 1973, p. 2. Author was Hans Wagner
54. Ibid. pp. 34 and 39
55. Lovell and Hillier, op. cit. p. 31
56. Grierson, op. cit. p. 43
57. Ibid. p. 61
58. Ibid
59. See Republic of South Africa. Board of Trade and Industries, 1963: Investigation into Motion Picture Production. Report No. 1034, paragraph 86, pp. 40-41 which largely corroborates this statement: "... the Board is conscious of the monopolistic conditions obtaining in
in distribution as well as in exhibition, and the fact that the Twentieth Century-Fox Group has its parent companies' interests to look after; the company is also concerned with production in the country, however, and whether any action on the part of the state will be necessary or not in the future will depend on the extent to which it co-operates in the future in dealing with local procedures, and its following a policy that is not contrary to the development of local film production, both by its subsidiaries and by other concerns with which it is not associated. The board suggests that the Government keep its position under review and if necessary at a later stage, when local production has expanded, direct the Board to re-examine the progress made and also the desirability of imposing a quota system.

60. SA Film Weekly, 10 July 1969, p. 2
62. Ibid. p. 238
63. Board of Trade and Industries, op. cit. 1963, paragraph 59, p. 29
64. Ibid. paragraph 6, p. 3
65. Ibid. paragraph 29, p. 12
66. Ibid. paragraph 43, p. 20
67. Ibid
68. Grierson, op. cit. "Argument" p.p. 16-17
72. Statutes of the Republic of South Africa - Cultural Institutions. National Film Board Act, No. 73 of 1963, paragraph 9, p. 117
73. See Harry Jones' scathing attack on the NFB in SA Film Weekly, 10 June 1971, pp. 1-3. He states that the "NFB has no economic function, its purpose and circulation of its product only ideological".

74. Meyer, op. cit. p. 238

75. This letter was translated and reprinted in SA Film Weekly on 7 December 1967. It was introduced by Harry Jones in his usual sarcastic manner and a reply is also reprinted by a J Blignaut also published originally in Die Vaderland. Jones in SA Film Weekly, 29 January 1970, p. 2 also reports that the PAK "had no scruples in functioning as a pressure group to secure advantages for the race it claims to represent"


78. During the five years that the present author worked in the film industry on a full-time basis, very few producers, English speaking or otherwise expressed dissatisfaction with the favourable discrimination towards Afrikaans film

79. Board of Trade and Industry, op. cit. paragraph 1, p. 1

80. Government Gazette, No. 2556, 7 November 1969

81. SA Film Weekly, 27 November 1962, p. 2

82. SA Film Weekly, 11 December 1969, p. 2

83. SA Film Weekly, 18 December 1969

84. Ibid

85. It was Hertzog's influence which had held up the introduction of television to South Africa. He periodically ranted and raved about the insidious influence that the film industry had on Afrikaans culture and was forever attacking 20th Century Fox from a political standpoint. See, eg., SA Film Weekly of the following dates: 4 August 1966, 11 August 1966, 21 July 1966, 23 June 1966, 15 September 1966

86. Board of Trade and Industry, op. cit. 1970, paragraph 89, p. 23

87. Ibid. paragraph 63, p. 17. At this point an estimated 60% of films submitted were not approved. Financial Mail, 8 December 1972, p. 972
88. This category of film should not be confused with the Board's reference in Report No. 1034 to "pictures of limited appeal". The latter refer to films made inside South Africa, while the BTI is, in the present context, referring to films made overseas and which, while presenting unorthodox views, are not immediately of danger to the state.

89. Board of Trade and Industries, op. cit. 1970, paragraph 31, p. 8

90. SA Film Weekly, 13 June 1972, p. 6

91. This arrangement, however, was not always satisfactory. The film, Wild Geese (1977) which was given immense assistance by the Department of Information and the SA Defence Force, apparently inserted the word "kaffir" which had not been mentioned in the original script submitted to the government. No action was taken against the producer and the word remained in the release prints distributed in South Africa. There was, however, an ironic sequel to this incident. The credits at the end of the film thanked, amongst other government officials and departments, Mr Sybrand van Niekerk, Administrator of the Transvaal. Van Niekerk, who is not known for his liberalism or tolerance but rather his intense prejudice against blacks, apparently made representations to the government about the use of "kaffir" since he felt that the use of this pejorative term seriously affected his political integrity. The source of this information must, unfortunately, remain confidential.

92. For a discussion of the experience of Anthony Thomas' The South African Experience series and the kind of naive demands made by the Department of Information regarding 'fair' and 'balanced' presentation of information see Tomaselli, K.G. 1981: "Six Days in Soweto: Can Propaganda be Truth?" Equid Novi, Vol. 2, No. 1, pp. 49-57. Other films which have been made clandestinely include Nana Mahomo's The Dumping Grounds and Last Grave at Dimbaza. A feature film was made by Lionel Rogosin in 1959-60 called Come Back Africa.

93. See Board of Trade and Industries, op. cit. 1970, paragraph 55, p. 15

94. Ibid


96. Meyer, op. cit.

97. Board of Trade and Industries, op. cit. 1976, paragraphs 13 and 56, pp. 5 and 11
98. Ibid. paragraph 50, p. 16
99. Fourie, op. cit.
100. Board of Trade and Industries, op. cit. paragraph 78, p. 27
101. Ibid. paragraphs 65-71, pp. 22-25
102. A translated version of this letter was published in The Star, 10 April 1981
103. This was told to me by Thys Heyns. Another high official of the company remarked that the programme never "got off the ground because the film world confuses people in Pretoria"
105. Financial Mail, 28 December 1975, p. 1260
106. Ibid
107. Financial Mail, 9 October 1970, p. 131
110. This is the phraseology used by Erasmus in the Supplementary Report of the Erasmus Commission. The title of Chapter VII is "J. van Zyl Alberts—Trusted Associate who lined his pockets", p. 24
111. Ibid. p. 25
112. Ibid. In October 1973, SA Film Weekly 11/18 October 1973, p. 1 predicted a lack of interest by investors to this share issue: "The issue looks to me to be too small and too risky and the rewards too far away to appeal to the average investor"
113. Ibid. p. 24. Pieterse is not mentioned in this section of the report
114. Quoted in Rees and Day, op. cit. p. 190
115. Personal communication
116. Rees and Day, op. cit. p. 142
117. Supplementary Report of the Erasmus Commission, Appendix
118. Mulder letter quoted in *The Star*, *op. cit.*

119. Ibid

120. Williams, R. 1962: *Britain in the Sixties: Communications.* p. 125

121. See Horwood reply to Mulder published in *The Star*, 10 April 1981

122. Miliband, *op. cit.* 1973 comments that despite the justified criticism on the cultural poverty of the media, their debased commercialism, their systematic triviality, their addiction to brutality and violence etc., this indictment tends to understate or to ignore the specific ideological content of these productions and the degree to which they are used as propaganda vehicles for a particular view of the world (see p. 202). Quoting Lowenthal, L. 1957: "Historical Perspective of Popular Culture" in Rosenberg, B and White, D.M. (eds.): *Mass Culture. The Popular Arts in America*, p. 50, he points out that a superficial inventory of the contents and motivation in the products of the entertainment and publishing worlds of Western civilization will include themes such as nation, the family, religion, free enterprise, individual initiative etc.

123. See *Sunday Express*, 17 February 1980

124. Ibid. It should be pointed out that all further income derived from *Tigers* was to be paid to the state. This would account for very little as the film had already run its course.

125. Miliband, *op. cit.* p. 190

126. For a most useful and pioneering discussion of this point in relation to cinema aimed at black audiences, see Harriet Gavshon's discussion of structured absences in her Final Year Thesis, School of Dramatic Art, University of the Witwatersrand: "Ideology and Film: An Examination of Films made for Black Audiences", 1980, 73pp


128. This was the first time that the FFPA and SAFTTA had agreed on anything. Discussions were of an informal nature between the chairman and and vice-chairman of the FFPA and the chairman and some members of the SAFTTA Executive Council. The content of this meeting was communicated to the FFPA Executive who were generally a much more conservative group highly suspicious of SAFTTA, its motives and its actions. These observations also apply to the MFFPA from which the FFPA was born
129. At the time of writing this thesis was not available. The critique of Fourie's proposals are therefore based solely on the publication of parts of the report in Rapport, op. cit.

Fourie is not alone in his lonely reformist stance. The present author also published a series of proposals in the first, that is 1979 edition of The South African Film Industry, published by the African Studies Institute, University of Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, pp. 120-124. These were given an astonishing amount of publicity in both the English and Afrikaans presses. They also formed part of the proposals eventually submitted by the FFPA to the government. Academic critiques were more polemic placing greater emphasis on the notion of ideology than on the structure of the industry. The most vociferous attack came from Richard Harvey's review, "On Reading The South African Film Industry", Critical Arts, Vol. 1, No. 1, pp. 57-61. While this author concedes some of Harvey's criticisms, which also apply to Fourie, many others were taken to task in the second edition of the book published in 1980 and reprinted in 1981.

In reading the present critique of Fourie it should be borne in mind that certain fundamental differences exist between the two sets of proposals. The first concerns the concept of art. In Tomasselli's terms, art is a tool for the investigation of reality. But this art, unlike Fourie's conception, is self-conscious and aware of the social relations embedded in it and aims, as Althusser puts it, to make "us 'see' conclusions without premises", to reveal ideology from the inside and to widen the viewer's awareness of the world around him. It is to a stimulation of this kind of cinema that the proposals were directed.

A second major difference lies in the degree to which the proposals would have encouraged private sector cooperation. Fourie is not at all concerned with the underlying economic base of the industry and how this can be modified from within to stimulate a more adventurous production. Where these proposals sought, albeit in a necessarily limited way, to reduce financial dependence on the state, Fourie's approach seems to be advocating increased dependence, and thus he does not see the contradiction in calling for overt state control of a cultural policy which will prevent the emergence of the very local images he wants to see stimulated.

Thirdly, because the present author's proposals are aware of the epistemological principles which underlie cinema in South Africa; they are not concerned with a determinist vision of 'models of communication' but with a refusal to submit to the inevitable conforming influences of capital which would bring about the kind of cinema which already exists for the most part and which would also be an unavoidable effect of Fourie's 'model'.
Ultimately, however, any attempt to re-direct the course of history without taking cognisance of the economic structure of the country in question is doomed, as was Fourie's report. On the other hand, attempts to work from the interior of economic processes already on their way, also raise serious difficulties. The latter approach, however, has more chance of success as is evidenced by the experience of the major film movements which have occurred throughout the world.


134. Approaches by the author to the Department of Industries for a copy of the report were unsuccessful. It was regarded as an internal matter and would not be published. A second contributor to the report was John van Zyl whose document was not mentioned in the *Rapport* article.

135. The Minister in charge of the Department of Industries, Commerce and Tourism at the time was a well known verligte (enlightened nationalist), Dr Dawie de Villiers

136. Harvey, *op. cit.*

CHAPTER 7

FILM PRODUCTION 1962 - 1980: HOMOGENISING CULTURAL PRODUCTION

This chapter is divided into two sections. The first section will deal briefly with the effects of the subsidy allocation on the broad mass of production in the making of feature films. The second part will concentrate on a specific moment of cultural production during the period under review and show why the seeds of a possible movement never germinated.

PART 1: THE HOLLYWOOD CHIMERA

The eternally recurring Hollywood sign appeared again in 1962-3 with the report of the Board of Trade and Industries submitted to the government on the question of a film subsidy. The News/Check correspondent, with caution, put it this way: "No leaves this autumn have whistled more vigorously than new aspirations, plans, hopes and beliefs about a film industry for South Africa". Pointing out that there really was no industry in South Africa, the magazine concluded:

When it comes to the glitter of the screen, a misunderstanding of basic requirements and an apparent bait of easy-to-get profits has clouded judgement. The talk in recent months of South Africa's own Hollywood, the arrival of great film makers from overseas with big star names has sent businessmen into their boardrooms to huddle over their chances of getting onto the new 'industry' bandwagon. They forget they are sliding into one of the world's trickiest give-and-(possibly)-lose all businesses.

The structure of the subsidy soon created an industry dependence and most producers "set out to make films for subsidy's sake". By 1961, total chaos reigned and less than half of the fifty films begun reached the screen. Quality was atrocious, and large numbers of producers survived for only a short while. Comments Lionel Friedberg:
Almost overnight, butchers, bakers, and candlestick-makers were becoming film-makers. There were many cases where farmers and bottle-store owners suddenly became 'film producers'. Anybody who could raise up R50 000 went into the production of low budget features, simply to cash in on the lucrative domestic drive-in market, with the added benefits of the subsidy to ensure him a return on his investment. Anybody who could read a basic "Photographic How to " book, or who managed to thumb through the pages of an Arriflex Instruction Manual became a 'lighting cameraman' and so on.

Despite this confusion, by 1962, all the established and legitimate producers had settled in and the spurt of initial production sparked in 1961 tail off to half that year's output. During the 1960s and early 1970s, production boomed and box office receipts were on average higher than those for imported product. In contrast to other ex-colonial countries such as Australia where producers battled against imported films for screen time owned by mainly American interests, South African distributors and exhibitors competed vigorously for local product. This competition reflected the peculiarities of the South African cinema market which was split into an urban sector which concentrated on imported Hollywood type films and the small town, rural, predominantly Afrikaans-speaking sector, who were the major patrons of drive-ins which concentrated on American 'B' pictures and South African productions rejected by the more sophisticated urban audiences. Finance was readily available to producers who wanted to make genre movies. Even the more contentious productions such as Wild Season (1967), Die Kandidaat (1968) and Katrīna (1969) had little difficulty in securing investment.

A comparison with Australia for the 1960s and 1970s will prove illuminating. Total subsidy in Australia during the decade of the 1970s was $30 million with 150 films produced. The South African payout during the same period was comparable, R20 million, but on 246 titles for an audience less than a quarter the size in Australia. Small wonder that producers clung to their formulaic treatments, radio soap opera plots and inane copies of overseas genres. The more authentic cinematic treatments
of South African experience such as those made by Jans Rautenbach, Ross Devenish and Athol Fugard, are an embarrassment to the majority of South African producers since they question many of the contradictions of bourgeois and petty bourgeois ideologies despite the class membership of these directors. Since the director derives his identity through ideological practice he assumes that the 'mass' market found outside South Africa will relate to the same themes as he does. This belief is partly a response to American media imperialism which has stamped Hollywood themes on the international market, universalised them and integrated them into the world view of local inhabitants. This discourse is further strengthened not only by the demands of the American companies who are contracted to distribute the product, but by the unexpected performance of local formula films in external markets. Sleepers like *The Winners* (1972) and *Karate Olympia* (1976) which deliberately subordinated content to marketability earned tens of millions of dollars in Japan and America respectively. These conditions and effects explain why local producers insist on 'internationalising' their plots to make them saleable, even in the face of sympathetic overseas reception to more authentic portrayals of South Africa. The result is usually an uneasy amalgam of traditional and liberal values superimposed onto different discourses and social experiences perceived to exist in overseas audiences. Anything local is therefore exorcised and replaced with a bland non-specific atmosphere in a seemingly culture-free vacuum.

Other than a few notable exceptions, some of which are dealt with in the second part of this chapter, South African producers have avoided contentious local themes, tending to internationalise their stories, and willingly 'cringing' to cultural imperialism: the overseas version of the local picture nearly always contains a sex scene, nudity or a depiction of violence not permissible at home (eg. *Glenda* (1976), *Billy Boy* (1978), *Tigers Don't Cry* (1976) and *Night of the Puppets* (1980). which is justified by the producer as a necessary part of his 'art' even though he is hostile to the concept in a local context. Thus, sexuality, for example, is introduced not in terms of its relation to a wider set of processes as in, for example,
Australian cinema, but rather as a sop to the perceived demands of the international audience. This very manipulation or structured absence in the text of the South African version is indicative of a society still rent with sexual taboos where the act itself assumes precedence over the relationships -- social, racial, class, culture -- which are drawn from the very nature and values of South African society. This attitude, enforced by the censors, is not only a hang-over from Victorian morality but more significantly, the discursive affirmations of apartheid ideological discourse legitimised through Afrikaner Calvinism. This discourse uses race and sex to perpetuate the existing class structure of the South African social formation where Afrikaner Nationalism, Christianity and Afrikaner cultural integrity remain powerful means for the maintenance of Afrikaner political dominance. Some films like *Katrina* (1969), *n Beeld vir Jeannie* (1976), *Weerstand die Nag* (1976) and an earlier film, *Debbie* (1965), managed to break out of these constraints and criticise the motivations of the *volk*. They rarely follow through, however. The ties of the dominant culture are too strong and what starts out as an exploration of genre, themes and ideology is reduced to caricature which reinforces social stability during the final stages of the film, and even the initial criticisms are played down. The significance of sexual relationships is more discernable at deeper levels of signification, the treatment of the *boeregodter*, the pure archetypal daughter of the earth, and her changing role in the conflict-love type genre. This is the subject of the last chapter.

This brings the discussion to the second section which is concerned with deliberate attempts by specific film makers to stimulate a film movement which rejects the above discussed cinema.

**PART II: THE 'SPIRIT' OF CULTURAL PRODUCTION**

In Chapter 5 we discussed how the influence of organic intellectuals such as Tommie Meyer and technical intellectuals such as Jamie Uys laid the groundwork for cinema to function as a
means of interest-translation in the general expression of bourgeois and petty bourgeois interests. The Jamie Uys studio was the locus for on-the-job technicians training during the early 1960s and it was at this studio that the formula which was to permeate the conflict-love type genre was generated. As these technicians graduated to the positions of producer, director, scriptwriter and so on, they took with them the seeds of this formula. They in turn generated other related themes and the established industry coalesced fifteen years of production around a dynamically developing genre which encapsulated the changing social, cultural and economic conditions under which Afrikaners had laboured since the turn of the century.

The films made by Jamie Uys himself, however, bore little of this influence and his contribution must be explained in terms of a unique cinematic flair which developed its own momentum and independence of 'cultural' themes. Uys' influence on that aspect of South African cinema which is being investigated in this study then, must be limited to his escaping the Schlesinger monopoly and his role as a technical intellectual. His importance lies in the vehicle that his production company provided for the catalysing of other Afrikaner organic and technical intellectuals. The thematic implications of these conditions will be discussed in detail in Chapter 10.

The above introduction provides the background against which a second strand of more sophisticated, innovative and socially critical type of cinematic cultural production was being explored. While some of the technicians, directors and producers might have owed their film training to Jamie Uys Films, their themes and aesthetic direction were entirely different.

Some of these film makers deliberately set out to breach the contradictions of capital and to explore cultural issues, question the stereotypes, particularly of Afrikaners, and forge aesthetic departures which would unravel previously hidden layers of cultural myth. This chapter will concentrate on this small and rather fragmented and fractured group of
practitioners and show why their innovative attempts fell foul of capital, the state and in certain cases, audiences as well. To some extent the following explanation will draw on the author's previous work in this area, but will offer a much more rigorous structuralist account. Six factors have been identified by Andrew Tudor which need to be met for a movement to gel, some of which were present in the South African industry between 1966 and 1974:

1. A movement originates in a specific society.

2. Some form of socio-cultural trauma is experienced immediately prior to the rise of the movement. In South Africa that trauma was of a dual nature. There was a certain incipient cultural trauma which had developed during the period of the urban trek between 1901 and 1940. The other more visible one was the racial hostility which remained after the Sharpeville massacre which occurred in 1961. Both of these, however, had been blunted by the new prosperity experienced by whites during the 1960s.

3. A movement consists of a sub-culture, the members of which are conscious of their position and goals. This coherence should permeate all stages of production with financiers, producers and directors all participating. Where one stage is lacking, the movement might be stalled. The structure of the subsidy scheme reserved payment for box office performance, nothing being made available up-front. Although capital was forthcoming for a number of films, differences of opinion within the sub-culture doomed it to a split.

4. The resultant films are respected as art and the articulation of important themes by intellectuals. Such art needs to question and reveal, not endorse the status quo. Such an intellectual component was present in the films of a number of directors: Jans Rautenbach, Emil Nofal, Ross Devenish and Sven Persson.

5. A movement embodies the development of innovation as a continuous process, not simply in piecemeal fashion. While considerable thematic innovation was present in some South African films between 1966 and 1974, it was not linked by a viable sub-culture.

6. The phenomenon of a movement occurs in distinct temporal clusters. The South African experience was spread over a period of eight years which lacked the intensity and energy of the shorter periods experienced elsewhere, for example, Russia, France and Italy. There were also too few films of a progressive nature made during this period.

Film movements constitute an aesthetic departure brought about
by organic intellectuals who are conscious of their roles in their attempts to redirect the perceptions and discourse of their class or culture. Cooperation between these individuals is based on a sense of solidarity and unity of purpose. New forms of organisation and new ways of doing things replace existing norms and values and what was previously taken for granted. Where genre movies rarely question the status quo, a movement exists by virtue of its deviation.

During the period under discussion, considerable innovation in Afrikaans literature was being forged by a literary movement known as the Sestigers (Those of the Sixties). This group of Afrikaans writers had totally rejected conventions, accepted styles of writing, plots, structure and grammatical norms. In their place they introduced a literary anarchy and social criticism which resulted in their writings being heavily suppressed by the state. The film makers who arrived on the scene a few years after the emergence of the Sestigers, notably Jans Rautenbach, Emil Nofal and the technicians who worked for them, encoded numerous Sestiger elements in their films, also resulting in condemnation by cultural 'watchdogs' and in some instances, state censorship and intimidation. The films of these practitioners differ entirely from those of their peers and showed little allegiance to Hollywood values or international universalisations.

Whereas the majority of South African film makers paid lip-service to Hollywood -- but on a very superficial plane -- Rautenbach and his cohorts tried to develop more sophisticated forms of expression. Despite looking to Hollywood for their model, however, the average South African film maker has rarely emulated either its production methods, themes or standards. Whereas the French New Wave adulation of Hollywood movies, for example, transcended a superficial interpretation and sought to uncover basic and recurrent thematic elements in films made by the same director, the South African directors appear, in the main, to be trapped within a superficial framework of interpretation. Analysis seldom goes further than a cursory glance at style and content. Recurring gobbets of
common sense are cited which obscure deeper issues: 'Hollywood type', 'blockbuster', 'large budget', 'we can't compete', 'formula', 'major American product', and so on. South African directors and producers, while claiming that they 'can't compete' with the Hollywood model, nevertheless try to. The opaqueness of this contradiction is sealed through the lack of comprehension of the multiple layers of meaning -- the iconic, indexical and symbolic -- which are encoded consciously or unconsciously in any film text. The lack of a critical cinematic heritage prevents South African film makers from understanding the significance of theoretical or even critical discussion. A conscious manipulation of the film's signs is synonymous with a deeper understanding of text in relation to context: political, social, cultural or economic. This in turn delineates a director who is self-conscious about his goals, intentions and social relations. The consequence is that he is accused of contravening accepted social practice by wanting 'to make films for himself'. Because conventional social practice is rooted in a technocist ideology located within the capitalist relations of production, this deviant behaviour is considered, by most of those constituting the inter-acting practices which make up the industry at large, as irresponsible and lacking in business integrity. To inject a film with a personal signature or an overt political content is frowned upon since this contravenes that prime element of common sense which lubricates industry practice: 'give the public what it wants'. This audience has been conditioned through the symbiosis of organic and 'willed' ideology to want what the producer thinks it should have, which is in turn conditional upon the way the producer has himself internalised the 'willed' ideology of the state. Such an interpellation relates, of course, to the discussion in Chapter 6 where producers considered it part of their social practice that they should help the state to protect itself from film makers and film material 'harmful to the country'. Thus attempts by organic intellectuals to breach this engineering of consent which is made to appear 'natural' or common sensical, is bound to polarise fractions within the industry. The established practitioners who resist innovation tend to trivialise these oppositions and displace structural conditions by attributing
the cause of change to the behaviour of aberrant individuals: 'he makes films for himself'. To some extent, this superficial 'selfish' interpretation is reinforced by critics who, while sympathising with the director, themselves fail to fully appreciate the organic significance of this 'deviant' production practice:

Jans Rautenbach is the only director in South Africa with enough integrity to make HIS film, not the film the public wants. This sets him apart from the heart-transplant songsters and banana-beachers³.

Having outlined the ideological discourse which governs conventional film making practice and the assumptions which underlie its shielding, we may now turn our attention to the means by which ideological and repressive apparatuses restrict, shield and delimit the appropriation of cinematic discourse.

It will be recalled that both Emil Nofal and Jans Rautenbach were proteges of the Jamie Uys studio which was the training ground for many organic and technical intellectuals using cinema as a medium of expression. These two individuals teamed up independently of the Uys Film Company and produced their first film, Wild Season, in 1967. This film marked a complete departure from the sentimental, melodramatic and puritanical stereotype of the culturally besieged Afrikaner identified by RARO, UTOLO and Jamie Uys in Doodkry is Mia. For the first time the Afrikaner was represented as a complex, multi-dimensional and less than perfect subject. Critic Barry Ronge comments that the film recognises:

the Afrikaner as an individual and not merely an idealised cardboard figure ... The dour solid forcefulness so often associated with the Afrikaner is shown to be as much perverse pigheadedness as what it is admirable determination. The point is that the Afrikaner is being portrayed, almost for the first time, as an individual human being, rather than as the cloutish victim of heavy handed satire or the long suffering, noble hero of some volk epic¹⁰.

The release of Wild Season generated an Afrikaner cultural backlash, the like of which had never previously been witnessed in South Africa as far as cinema was concerned. At the
heart of the matter was the bilingual nature of the film, the fact that some of the main characters are played by blacks and the a-stereotypical representation of Afrikaners. The film was snubbed by the central committee of the Suid-Afrikaanse Akademie vir Wetenskap en Kuns which rejected a recommendation from its film section that it be given an award. Nofal, an English speaker, retorted that their response was similar to their treatment of a renowned Sestiger writer, Breyten Breytenbach, who worked in exile. Commented Nofal, "Just as it it felt that Mr Breytenbach was not awarded the 1968 Hertzog Prize for 'other reasons', so I believe my film suffered the same fate". The film which had been sold to International Pictures for external distribution was, ironically, being used by the state Information Office as a typical example of South African "culture". Nofal claimed that "in the sphere of 'pure art' there is only one set of standards" -- aesthetic ones. This response on the part of the influential Akademie is an example of how cultural watchdogs attempt to create a restricted discourse by claiming to be the primary interpreters for the volk. That the film was being used by the state for propaganda purposes on the one hand, suggests that the Akademie was out of step with the political and social conditions of which the film was representative at the time.

The storm of controversy generated by Wild Season unleashed its unbridled fury on Die Kandidaat (1968). It was felt that the director, Jans Rautenbach, had exceeded the accepted discursive order and questioned the discursive affirmations and sanctions which structured the social discourse of Afrikaner cultural organizations by introducing volksgevaarlike (dangerous to the nation) elements into the film. Die Kandidaat begins with a prayer during which members of an Afrikaans Foundation fidget, doodle and glance around while the voice-over, which is superimposed on the prayer, introduces them. The Publications Control Board complained that this scene mixed the sacred and the profane. The prayer therefore had to be cut and the characters introduced later. The second excision removed a scene of a raging argument in which the question of whether coloureds were, or could be Afrikaners, was raised. The censors felt that
as they might one day become Afrikaners the scene could give offense and must be dropped. The third and fourth cuts removed anti-English comment by verkrampte (conservative) members of the Foundation, snide asides on immigrants, and a derogatory reference on reform-school-boys. The film unrelentingly exposes the deceit and prejudice of the wealthy urban Afrikaner. Extramarital affairs are disclosed, the parentage of an orphan is meticulously revealed, political pasts are ripped apart and the verligte-verkrampte political divisions of Afrikanerdom reflected. Far more penetrating than Wild Season, this film tears apart the carefully nurtured volk-stereotype and shows powerful and ambitious men and women beset with human weaknesses and failings. Consider the government official who is trying to explain separate development to the English-speaking fiancé of the Afrikaner candidate for the Foundation by simply affirming party-line clichés

It is the official policy of the government of this country that the Bantu people will have their own homelands where they will develop their own way of life, their own culture, and er ... their own way of life.

In another sense, a professional volksmoeder33 challenges a Sestiger member of the Foundation, "You Sestigers. You write all these things ... these things about sex ... you can tell us nothing about life. We do a lot of foreign travelling". In other words, the determinate ecological setting for discursive practices like the writing about sex is reserved not for local consumption, but is appropriate in the delimited setting of 'overseas'. The candidate indicates that he is located well within the procedures internal to the Afrikaner discourse in his reply to a question about his politics, "I belong to the National Party". By this admission, which elicits the response, "Well then, his politics are right", he affirms his position as a subject of Afrikaner Nationalism and tries to avoid the sanctions which would limit his interpellation because of his wish to marry an English-speaking South African woman.

The Sestiger on the Board of the Foundation, who is the character
through which the contradictions of Afrikanerdom are articulated by the film's director, when called upon to vote, accepts the candidate within the limits of the ideological discourse: that recurring common sense which pervades all aspects of Afrikaner cultural endeavour: "vir alles wat mooi is in die Volk" (for all that is noble in the People). That common sense prevails over the contradictions of Afrikanerdom is essential to the film in terms of its social context. As News/Check puts it:

it has all been functional, an attempt to establish something that exists beyond cant and the old weary mouthings that have lost meaning. On this synthesis working - and being felt to work by the audience - Nofal and Rautenbach have risked the integrity of their film. And risk was required, for if the pained affirmation did not coherently emerge, then indeed the film would be much of what its detractors believe it to be: the burden of the accusations amounting to a charge of un-Southafricanism. The film had to succeed aesthetically, to provide something very different than a brand of political pornography. This it has done. It is thus a patriotic film - in a certain sense - but what matters profoundly is the type, the quality of patriotism that it both reflects, examines and endorses. 'Alles wat mooi is' may not seem precise enough, yet in the context (sic) of the film it is - what is meant has been established and only those who react rather than think will believe otherwise."

Despite the not-so-subtle affirmations by the individual characters of the best they have discovered in themselves as Afrikaners, the film was rent by a cultural storm. The Akademie, not surprisingly, refused to see it. The Publications Control Board was unable to come to a decision for two weeks. Several professors were brought in to scrutinise the script. The Prime Minister and the Minister of the Interior saw it. The Secretary for the National Council to Combat Communism claimed that the film glorifies "an anti-hero" and makes "a caricature" of the Afrikaner, confirming the worst suspicions of "our enemies". Mindful of Afrikaner Nationalist affirmative symbolism, he complained that the heroic martial strains were missing.

Eventually, the film was screened with the four cuts described above. The release, however, was fraught with further inter-
ference. In October 1968 the film was siezed by the police after a screening in the Orange Free State town of Excelsior. A complaint had been lodged by a policeman who objected to "bad language" in the dialogue (the use of "hell"). This reaction was considered to be the result of agitation by Transvaal verkrampte. The implications for its continued distribution could have been severe as numerous cinema managements consequently refused to show the film. Nevertheless the film went on to earn R250 000 at the box office and only after 1 300 000 South African cinema-goers had seen the film did the Akademie belatedly award Die Kandidaat a gold medal of honour.

The third film made by the Nofal/Rautenbach partnership was to see yet more controversy and the parting of ways between these two pioneers. Katrina, made in 1969, deals with inter-racial relations between a coloured woman and a white Anglican priest. It is based on a much more biting play, Try For White. In an interview with Pieter Wilhelm, Nofal clearly placed himself on the side of the dominant consensus, though showing up the contradictions inherent in coloured-white relations. The film falls clearly on the side of 'group identity', with the priest rejecting his coloured girlfriend by falling back on thinly disguised racism, "is it wrong to want my children to be like me, to look like me?" What this conclusion legitimates, of course, is the objectification of an 'enemy': 'Do you want your daughter to marry a kaffir?' The film makes it seem natural, for example, that Adam, the coloured leader believes in the identity of his people: "One day I can stand tall, my child can stand tall, and say 'I am a Coloured'". He thereby accepts his position as subject within the apartheid social formation while the white priest's interpellation is limited in terms of his practice as lover of a coloured girl passing for white. He eventually succumbs to the expected discursive sanctions which would befall him in the case of following through and, unlike the play where they emigrate to London, the film reaffirms the ideological discourse of apartheid. Although the resolution of the plot is ambiguous, the film cannot be said to criticise the dominant discourse. As Nofal himself puts it:
Let's face it, South Africa has failed up to now to convince the world to the slightest degree about the merits of our policies of apartheid, separate development, multi-national living - call it what you like. Nobody's listening. The drab State Information Office pamphlets that are distributed are just not worth reading. I believe it's the motion picture that might begin to do the job. Pictures such as Karina, which are dramatic entertainments yet say something about our condition, our way of life. Any viewer must learn about South Africa by seeing such a film. I would allocate R5 million immediately to the making of feature entertainments about our country, our people. 

As became clear in Chapter 6 on the analysis of the subsidy system, and is blatantly apparent from Nofal's remarks above, business is not all that incompatible with politics and is paralleled by the American industry's efforts to extend their markets by allying itself with the proselytising the 'democratic creed'.

Even before the film was released -- having been stalled by the Publications Control Board needing "another opinion" -- the Nofal/Rautenbach team split. Nofal, reported the Rand Daily Mail, has a yen for "a broader, more international scene ... looking beyond our borders, beyond our parochial little jokes". Rautenbach, on the other hand, according to Nofal, was going to "concentrate more on indigenous films, with a strong Afrikaans accent". In his characteristically cynical manner -- but not without its grain of truth -- Harry Jones comments:

Nofal himself is to storm Hollywood converting his Kandidaat (sic - he means Karina) script into 'the US Negro problem - and so on'. Needless to say, the talk is once again in the mythical millions - and that from one of the unemployables until an indulgent government embarked upon handouts.

The advice sought by the Publications Control Board was revealed in Die Transvaler of June 13. Sixteen preferred sources were assembled to make their pronouncement: a female member of the DRC, the wife of a conventional Afrikaans writer, Annette Barnard, the managing director of Voortrekker Pers, a professor of Afrikaans literature, an Afrikaans radio person-
ality, the head of the Afrikaans service of the SABC, a "torch bearer" for the Voortrekker Monument, two ministers of the DRC, the Keeper of the Sound Archives, the deputy leader of the National Party in the Johannesburg City Council, the Chief PRO of the Rand Afrikaans University, a school principal and chairman of the Federal Board of Liaison Committees in Johannesburg, the president of the Afrikaans Women's Federation and the chairman of the Society for the Preservation of Afrikaans. Only one dissented after viewing the film, claiming that the film should not have been made, deploiring the film's partial use of English. In an interview with John van Zyl, Rautenbach described the extent to which he had to go to persuade preferred sources to accept the film:

for Katrina I had a private viewing for the Prime Minister (BJ Vorster). You know he has this bulldog thing about him. "Ek is die leier" (I am the leader) - and he stood there in the foyer and said - 'I like it very much, but', wagging his finger - "the portrayal of the Afrikaner is wrong!" That basically was his attitude. My argument at the time was that I don't want to preach to the converted, and if you can prove that we don't hit kaffirs and kill kaffirs anymore ... as basic as that ... then I will accept it.

The film was released and went on to earn an unprecedented R900 000 in the local market. Nofal never made it to Hollywood, indeed he retrogressed into making formula films which were no different from the genre formats that typified the wider industry. Rautenbach, on the other hand, had articulated a continuing desire to forge new horizons. Having dissociated himself from Katrina only to reassociate himself with the film later on, he set up his own company, Seventig (Seventy) which he in true Seestiger style described as

a spirit. It's people working together. No one person makes a film. Seestiger has to give every possible person the chance to become involved in film making. We have to look to the future. I had to buy this studio recently, and I had to finance it with God knows what capital in 24 hours, because if we didn't get this studio and this property /Lone Hill/, the whole idea of building a film centre where people could come and work and exchange ideas and build onto something
was going to go down the drain. Big business wanted it. I secured it, now I am arranging for big business to finance it, and to have a part, but on the film-makers terms, not theirs. I have arranged finance for people who will not get finance anywhere else because the ideas they have got are too radical, or they are not set in a pattern. I will personally see that any film they make will be worthy of an investment, but not necessarily in the present pattern of film making. If we do not experiment, if we do not find our identity as soon as possible, we are not going to make it.

Sewentig, which is a play on Seetiger, made Jannie Totsiens in that year. It was a film which was to set Rautenbach apart from the more entertainment-oriented Nofal for it delved beneath the surface text in a manner never before attempted by a film maker in this country. Unlike Nofal who is of Lebanese descent, a first generation South African who "never quite belonged anywhere", Rautenbach is an Afrikaner Nationalist who was highly critical of aberrations in public life. His films encoded this social concern and "there can be no doubt that Rautenbach is deeply concerned with the fate of Afrikanerdom and the plight of the Afrikaner intellectual". It was this concern which identified him as an organic intellectual and set him apart from Nofal who functioned as a technical intellectual. The latter considered himself as an "entertainer", the former, an intellectual.

The allegorical implications of Jannie Totsiens which is set in a mental asylum in the Orange Free State are most cogently described by John van Zyl:

The asylum with its dark (if not black) nooks and crannies, set in the magnificent landscape of the Eastern Free State, is obviously South Africa, or more specifically the chequered history of South Africa, a chronology of the grand and the mean, the heroic and the shameful. The doctor in charge is the current leader, be it Vorster or the legend of Verwoerd, who is impotent and ineffectual at the moment. In fact, the insane run the asylum, while he tries to justify his existence. His situation is best shown in the sequence where he desperately assures the caller on the telephone that the situation is under control while the crippled artist calls for help.
The artist is Rautenbach. Crippled by the Establishment (Publications Board?) and only able to shout encouragement at the intellectual, instead of annihilating his political opponents.

Rautenbach tried to use his company Sewentig as a locus of cultural production around which some sort of unity of purpose would coalesce. From this coalescence and thrashing out of basic objectives he hoped that a film movement would emerge:

I am very involved in the social and political structure of this country; and I find myself among a group of people ... people who have a similar perception of the situation, of the problems ... we would like to create the South Africa of the 1980s, but we have not yet achieved the unity among ourselves except to agree on the criticism we level. I have a long term conception of my role as a film maker. My film making is a long-term project, something like building up credit at a bank. So that one day I can use it totally. Very frankly, I would like to be in a position where my integrity would not be doubted. Then we will have reached the stage where we can supply answers ... credible and acceptable answers. But now, we are moving one step ahead ...

Despite this awakening collaborative spirit at Lone Hill where the studio was located, a film movement did not gel. Audiences were not ready for the intellectualty of Jannie Totsiens and neither was "big business" prepared to finance cultural production on any terms other than its own. The industry too, was sceptical of Rautenbach's unconventional way of doing things and the "spirit" which led to the floatation of Sewentig stalled with Pappalap (1971). In this film Rautenbach was forced to alter the original ending which portrayed the rape of an innocent Karoo dorpameisie (town girl) by the local stud in the interests of the financier and an image considered more befitting to the Afrikaner volk.

One of the criteria of a film movement is that innovations in cinematic discourse, production methods and values should be accepted in the film industry and become incorporated into existing cultural patterns. The norms, values and prevailing
organizational structures which governed the behaviour of the South African film industry and the social formation at the time of Rautenbach's attempts to change them, were too stable and too powerful for any change to occur. Despite the close links held by Rautenbach with the Prime Minister and his Cabinet, and their apparently muted excitement at what had been produced under the 'cultural' banner, the organic ideology of those subjects within the industry itself was still tied to the capitalist ethic which emphasised profit over cultural advance, 'professional' stasis over new ways of doing things and 'responsibility' (what does the audience want) over 'irresponsibility' (the making of personal films).

What separated Afrikaans directors like Rautenbach and Tommie Meyer from their English counterparts was their sense of cultural commitment. Although these two organic intellectuals differed in their cultural goals, applying different approaches, developing different styles and organizational methods, they were both engaged in the process of interest-translation of behalf of the bourgeoisie. Where Meyer's objective was to lubricate the cultural traumas caused by urbanisation and city living and to provide a discursive affirmation of racial capitalism, Rautenbach was critical of the bourgeoisie itself, of the structural prisons and historical discourses in which Afrikanerdom had caged itself. Meyer's concern was with the rituals of the present, Rautenbach's with the discursive sites of the future.

Rautenbach was critical of that kind of "boereplaas" (boer-farm) spirit found in the mainstream of Afrikaans film making, as he was of bilingual films like Lord Oom Pies (1962), many of which were made by the Jamie Uys studio. His critical stance within the industry, his clearly articulated ideological motivations and his efforts to deflate the myths behind which the film industry operated brought Rautenbach into conflict with the industry which, while it was prepared to protect the interests of the state because these coincided with its own prosperity, it was unwilling to ally itself with criticism of it. The industry responded with "divisiveness, the rancour of other
directors waiting for him to make a mistake[28]. The attitude assumed by the industry is a discursive form of sanction which results in the victim being condemned to excommunication. He is denied use of the industry infrastructure -- finance, cooperation, employment, distribution -- unless he recants and unconditionally accepts and works within the dominant discourse. While making *Jannie Toteiens*, Rautenbach opened himself to discursive sanctions by stating:

The English film-maker should be ashamed of what he is doing to the English-speaking public in this country. First of all they are not even trying to compete with the English film from overseas. They are not trying to bring their English-speaking countrymen something that is their own. They have no pride in their products, no pride whatsoever. All of them look upon film making as a cheap way of making money, and they expect the English-speaking South African to be thankful and to take whatever they bring them.

When the Afrikaans film maker tries something, they're the first buggers to say: why pull politics into a film, or a mental institution? But they themselves try nothing. In the past they've made money out of Afrikaans films, most of them based on some second-rate English script they bought cheaply elsewhere, acted by English players. Look at the titles of your English film today: *Banana Beach, Petticoat Safari, Satan's Harvest, Strangers at Sunrise* ... It smells of decay, of nothingness[28].

The "spirit of Seventig" was an attempt to navigate the industry out of the restrictions on discourse which governed what may be said, in what kind of film made under what conditions. It failed, however, to negotiate new patterns of subjectivity for film makers self-conscious of their goals and ideological discourse. The dominant discourse managed through the industrial infrastructure effectively negated this new subjectivity by limiting the interpelleation of the film maker as a cultural worker. In an attempt to maintain his position in the industry he capitulated to pressure of financiers and distributors to adopt the dominant discourse and production methods. In his later films he restrictively situates the themes and plots in a particular ecological setting: 'entertainment' which in turn was protected by shielding the cinematic discourse through common sensical
notions of 'what the audience wants' and so on.

The sanctions enacted by the industry were largely successful and out of the 229 feature films produced in South Africa between 1969 and 1979, less than 5% could be considered cinematically innovative within the South African political context. These films, which number about eleven in all, were isolated occurrences which did not fulfill the basic conditions necessary for the growth of a film movement. The directors involved -- no more than six -- did not constitute a sub-culture because there was no degree of unity among them. In fact, they were polarised both in terms of language and politics, Rautenbach on the one side and Devenish and Fugard on the other. Their films were not temporally clustered and did not follow any significantly identifiable socio-cultural trauma. Although these directors received sympathetic appraisals from local film critics and theorists (only one or two in all), no formal interaction bound them together. Reception from distributors was generally muted, a controversial film like Sven Persson's Land Apart (1974), which predicted the social turmoil of 1976 was initially banned, censored and released two years later as The South Africans barely made subsidy because of inadequate distribution and government intimidation.

Where anomalous films like The South Africans have managed to breach the conservativeness of capital and the administration of the state censorship machinery, stability is often ensured through the distributive process. Persson's film, for example, did not obtain Satbel distribution. This company, itself part of national capital, no doubt felt that The South Africans contravened the dominant discourse. Paradoxically, the film obtained MGM support, a company owned by foreign capital, and which was sympathetic to the film purely in terms of market considerations. The state, however, threatened sanctions against the local MGM office via MGM International which placed pressure on its South African office to cancel its distribution agreement with Persson. The film eventually managed to obtain limited exposure at two independent cinemas in Johannesburg and one in Pretoria. Further screenings were arranged on
university campuses around the country in 16mm format, though not without further intimidation from the security police.

Further fragmentation occurred as a result of a flare-up between Emil Nofal and Athol Fugard. Reacting to Fugard's assessment of the South African industry in his statement, "that which is authentic and unique to South Africa has been neglected, by and large, by the local industry which really just turns out rubbish". Nofal responded in terms of the delimited appropriation of discourse which is the stock response by subjects of an industrial film practice: "It may be a dirty word ... but I deal in entertainment". Fugard was accused by Nofal of achieving fame and fortune "... in the easiest form of expression -- by dramatising the underdog, trying to survive in a cruel world, studying man's inhumanity to man. In other words, muck raking in the rubbish heap of life".

This interchange was given tremendous coverage in The Star, and occurred around the making of Fugard and Devenish's second film, The Guest/Die Besoeker (1977). They had previously made Boesman and Lena (1974) which used neo-realist techniques in the filming of the Fugard play. This film was a total departure in the South African film scene and was sceptically received by the industry which refused to believe that it would even gross its production cost. Common sense suggested otherwise, just as it did on The Guest which dealt with a drug-racked episode in the life of an Afrikaner folk hero and cornerstone of the Afrikaans language, Eugene Marais. The common sense dispensed to Devenish in his four year search for capital (much of it supplied by the BBC) was that the film would undoubtedly be banned. That it was not, nor ever in any danger of being banned, suggests the degree to which the established film industry was protecting itself from other co-existing discourses. In the case of The Guest, Devenish and Fugard -- both English speakers and both highly critical of apartheid -- were not considered by the industry to be suitable subjects to deal with this culturally significant topic. The existing order of ideologically constituted subjectivity held that only specific persons were socially permitted to comment on certain institution-
alised themes. Neither Fugard nor Devenish were considered con-
sidered among those 'author-ized' to make valid assertions or statements.

The industry response to the "satisfactory returns" on Boesman
and Lena is still met with disbelief since this information
conflicts with its common sense, while The Guest is equally
objectified as 'art', 'non-commercial' and therefore an aberr-
ation. The complex processes which led to the assigning of
these labels, particularly with regard to The Guest, is dealt
with elsewhere, and were reinforced by the film's extremely
poor box office performance. Vindicated in its criticism, the
industry was not surprised when Fugard and Devenish embarked
on a third film, Marigolds in August (1980), funded entirely
with foreign capital (BBC and Ford Foundation). This film,
however, lacked the incisiveness of their previous movies and
failed dismally at the box office, proving the industry's
scepticism 'correct'.

What is important in the above analysis of socially conscious
attempts at film production by Rautenbach and Nofal on the one
hand, and Fugard and Devenish on the other, is not only indus-
try and audience response, but sources of finance. Where Nofal
and Rautenbach's films were backed exclusively with National
capital -- through placing increasing pressures on those film
makers to shield their discourse in terms of the assumptions
held by racial capitalism -- Fugard and Devenish, with only
one film financed entirely by South African sources, were pro-
gressively forced to secure funds from outside the country
from foreign television stations and philanthropic foundations.
Through this restriction of the availability of national capi-
tal, the hegemonic bloc had the effect of forcing a certain
homogeneity on local content and of ensuring the continuation
of that strain of cultural production initiated by Tommie
Meyer which was more functional in terms of translating the
interests of the bourgeoisie into cultural practice. Indeed,
it was so successful that both Nofal and Rautenbach were easily
co-opted after the demise of Sewentig, and Fugard and Devenish
pushed out of the industry to concentrate on their dramatic
and film making activities in the United States and Britain
respectively. A further restriction on the discussion was caused by the negative effects of broadcast television on the feature film production industry, for profits were less likely than ever before. Of the twenty-five films produced in 1980, no less than nine were partially or fully financed by British companies, while five were made in African vernaculars. Apart from Marigolds in August (1980), the remaining twenty-four affirmed the dominant apartheid or at least capitalist discourse. The spirit unlocked by Rautenbach died in that year and the homogenising influences of capital and the introduction of the third technological revolution to South Africa in the form of television had a depressing effect on the feature film production industry.

Critical film making, however, did not completely die out. It shifted its form, format and distribution to short 'oppositional' films made by recently graduated individuals who had an extensive knowledge of the less expensive technologies in the guise of Super 8 and 3/4 inch video cassette. The relative cheapness of these productions (ranging from R1000 to R10 000) has opened up a whole new vista in cultural production and counter-ideological discourse. Where once RARO filmed the funeral of General Marnie Maritz, now film makers funded by organizations like the South African Council of Churches are producing cultural statements like A Film on the Funeral of Neil Aggett, and so on. Funds have been forthcoming from UNESCO, the SACC, private investment and English language universities. A new area is that of international television production. Ross Devenish, for example, was employed by a local company, Profile Productions, to shoot a couple of adaptations from Nadine Gordimer's short stories. While capital has managed to enforce conformity on the industry and those who practice within it, aided by the very technology which is a result of capitalist advance, oppositional film makers have co-opted it in the pursuance of counter-ideological objectives.
NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. *News/Check*, 12 April 1963, p. 20


4. So successful were these films with *The Winners* outgrowing even *Jaws* in Japan, that sequels were made. *Winners II* (1977) was financed with South African capital, while *Kill and Kill Again* (1980), the sequel to *Karate Olympia*, was largely financed with American investment, but using a local crew and the same director in both cases.

5. The term originates from Australia and is argued to be a major factor in the inability of that country's cinema to break with American cultural imperialism. See, Adams, P. 1980: "Forward" in Murray, S. (ed.): *The New Australian Cinema*. Nelson, Melbourne, p. 7


8. Jarvie, I. C. 1970: *Towards a Sociology of the Cinema*. Routledge and Kegan Paul, p. 42 and Tomaselli, op. cit. pp. 91-92 argue that production decisions are not made according to what the public wants to see. Producers plan films according to what they think the distributors want; the distributors will not buy films they think the public does not want to see. Jarvie calls this circumlocution 'endistancing' of the audience


12. *News/Check*

13. 'Mother of the Nation'. She is thus a loyal citizen, mainly to Afrikaners and their political party. On a superficial level she cares for her family as both wife and mother. At the symbolic level she cares about the larger family, the Afrikaner nation


17. *News/Check*, 27 June 1969, p. 35

18. *SA Film Weekly*, 19 June 1969, p. 1

19. The publicity brosoure for *Katrina* claimed that the film would be screened in 11 languages worldwide.


22. Quoted in *News/Check*, 15 May, 1970, p. 18

23. *News/Check*


25. Ibid


27. Ibid. Rautenbach comments on the response when ten members of the Cabinet were present at a premiere: "this was heart-warming because they came to me, each and every one ... now a bloke like --- didn't really know what it was all about ... you know what I mean ... but at least he said - "This is blerry mooi, jong" (laughter). But guys like Connie Mulder, Schalk van der Merwe, Piet Koornhof ... suddenly there was an excitement amongst them ... they discussed it at length, with a certain amount of pride that the film industry has advanced to this point.


29. Ibid


31. Quoted in *The Star (Tonight)*, 7 September 1976

32. Quoted in *The Star (Tonight)* 16 September 1976

33. Devenish, Fugard and Francis Gerard established Watershed productions in 1974 to make four films during the next two years: *The Steam Pig, Soul of the Ape, People are Living There and Hello and Goodbye*. The financier was Mosenthal's which went insolvent in September 1974.
Although production was started on the first film, it was not completed. The second film was made under a different title as *The Guest*.

34. This evaluation was made by an MGM spokesman to me in 1976.

35. For a more in-depth discussion of the industry's response to *Boesman and Lena* see Tomaselli, *op. cit.* p. 74.

36. Ibid. pp. 84-89.

37. Devenish worked on two of six Gordimer stories which were made in 1982. Funding came from a German television company and the programmes were sold worldwide, although they were granted a restricted release in South Africa through film festivals and university campuses. He is, however, now based in England. Athol Fugard seems to spend most of his time at Yale University in the United States and has produced a number of his plays in Broadway, some of which have been banned in South Africa.

38. For more information on this kind of oppositional film making see, Tomaselli, K.G. 1982: "Oppositional Film-making in South Africa", *FUSE*, Vol. 6, No. 4, pp. 190-194.
Chapter 5 dealt in detail with the penetration of Afrikaner capital into the film industry. The present section will trace the further growth of the distribution and exhibition sectors of the industry and discuss the impact of television on its structure, cinema content and audience profile.

We have seen how the accumulation and concentration of capital in the hands of SANLAM occurred through increasing surplus profits during the 1960s. This period, which averaged a growth rate of 5.6% in contrast to a mere 3.25% for the 1970s with 0% growth in 1977, saw a marked downswing in the fortunes of the distribution and exhibition sectors because of the competition of broadcast television after 1976 which was exacerbated by a high inflation rate and less money available for consumer spending. SANLAM had to face further problems in the form of competition from Andre Pieterse, and later, CIC-Warner. Both served international distributors not held within the Satbel stable.

REASSERTION OF INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL THROUGH CO-OPTION OF NATIONAL CAPITAL

Pieterse's Film Trusts, formed within ten days of his resignation from Ster, was operating fairly extensively by October 1970. The Financial Mail reports that a 10% shareholding was taken by Edglen Finance of the Glen Anil Group which had cost it between R150 000 and R200 000. Glen Anil was a giant property company which overcapitalised itself and collapsed in the mid-1970s. Film Trust formed seven wholly-owned subsidiaries: Trust Films, which was already active distributing locally made product through independent theatres; Bantu Film Trust and African Films Trust; Film Trust Overseas, which was
to distribute South African made films abroad (Uys' *Dirkie* (1969), sold to the United States for R246 000 and renamed *Lost in the Desert* was one of several); Film Trust Promotions was to develop amusement centres and Film Trust Industries which aimed to develop cinemas and entertainment complexes. Finally, Design Trust offered services and advice to theatre owners on theatre design and modernisation. In addition, Film Trusts had a 50% stake in Film Trust Finances which was set up to provide backing for local production and a 25% holding in Communications Trust which planned to concentrate on telecommunications and television programming. Pieterse, in his dual role of shareholder in Film Trusts, managed by his brother, Philo, and in his capacity of vice president of MGM International, forged a close working relationship between the two operations. MGM, partnered by Film Trusts, constantly reaffirmed its policy of supporting South African domestic production on both local and overseas circuits and was the first distribution/exhibition body to organise expensive exhibitor conventions. The MGM-Film Trust partnership courted exhibitors in "the most elaborate no-expense spared convention ever staged by a commercial enterprise in South Africa"? This particular gathering, held in August 1971, was hosted in the face of a growing, apparently ideological rift, between Afrikaner owned Satbel on the one side, and the international partnership, but Afrikaner run Film Trust. The schism was indicated by a Rapport headline: "Boë Nattes moet nou in veld fliek", "KINEKOR BOIKOT AFRIKAANSE FILM". (Influential Nationalists must go to cinema in the veld. Kinekor boycotts Afrikaans film). Kinekor's refusal to distribute *Breakpunt* (1971) was framed by the press in ideological terms, rather than because of a contractual disagreement. The result, according to Harry Jones, was that

Pieterse/Trust Films/MGM had clearly schemed to make Afrikaans as a language of South African cinema a pawn in a political game of exploiting for the profit motive, films in which they had not even invested, by acting as middlemen-distributors supplying films under the threat of ideological pressures for screening on a participation basis in cinemas which they did not own.
A neat scheme to make some easy money - if it worked. The scheme as such was to be a run-up and precedent which would be followed later by imported films, raising the national bill for film entertainment for the benefit of overseas companies. The conspiracy, involving our domestic producers in considerable financial risks, should the main circuits exercise their right not to present the films involved in the scheme, was ruthlessly disregarded by its sponsors.

This ideological-based competitive strategy followed by Pieterse was, as we mentioned in Chapter 6, eventually to lead to his downfall, and that of the entire Film Trust Group. By couching his plans, business projections and management procedures in ideological rather than financial terms, he exposed his company to longer-term economic weaknesses which would not be compensated for by the short-term publicity obtained for his company and its films which were marketed primarily through independent cinemas. Despite his 'patriotic' ideological stance which was supposed to woo government funding on a large scale to finance the production of 100 feature films aimed at the African market, such support was not forthcoming, and in its absence, the elaborate company structure of the Film Trust Group collapsed within eight years.

Ever the 'showman', Andre Pieterse was soon to announce future plans for Film Trust through chairman Theo Roodt. Apart from the activities already mentioned, the following four point programme was to be given priority:

1. To build the biggest film production complex in Africa;
2. To produce features, documentaries and television films for domestic and international distribution;
3. To participate in co-productions with French, Italian, German and Spanish film companies; and
4. To establish a film training school in the production complex for technicians, actors, directors and so on.5

The production complex was to be ready by November 1973. While the Financial Mail described Film Trust's initial investment plans as "comparatively cautious"6, Jones was more realistic: "No tangible security or even reasonable risk supports Film
Trusts proposed venture"? Jones, as he always reminded his readers, was 'always ahead of his time', correctly predicted that

All the evidence tends to show that Film Trust policies can create disruption of the stability of the film industry, that every section of the industry will be detrimentally affected and only Film Trust will benefit from the instability created.

In the event, even that did not occur, Film Trust being the victim of its own grandiose and ill-conceived schemes. When the financial crunch came, its international partners were not interested in 'ideology', but returns.

In November 1971, MGM which had sold its properties to SANSO early in 1970 for R10 million, merged its South African theatre interests with Film Trust on a 50:50 basis. The resulting company was called MGM Film Trust and the further growth of the MGM/Film Trust/CIC/CIC-Warner/UIT-Warner series of partnerships confounded the Financial Mail's precipitous statement that "No longer ... will there be a possibility of the company /MGM/ further developing its own SA network of outlets in healthy competition with Satbel's ... Ster and Kinekor chains."

After the SANLAM takeover of Fox during 1970 MGM had remained in existence but limited itself to exhibiting and distributing MGM and other films, and operating the three Metro cinemas it had sold to SANSO. These theatres were later demolished and the merger with Film Trust gave the new company first call on MGM films in return for an undertaking by Film Trust to develop twenty metropolitan cinemas by the end of 1974. By the end of that year, Film Trust had spent about R2 million on eighteen cinemas in which they planned to release sophisticated films which would run for longer periods in the smaller theatres. Access to product, however, was dwindling, for MGM in the United States had begun to curtail its film making activities and was investing heavily in hotels and casinos in the United States instead. A current offering, That's

312
Entertainment, for example, reflected this shift, being essentially made up of short clips from early musicals. Film Trust was faced with further access problems at the time because in 1972, a basic agreement was reached between MGM and 20th Century Fox which provided for the consolidation of their foreign distribution organizations. Pieterse, in an apparently desperate bid to obtain more product for his growing circuit engaged in a "minor masterpiece ofcircumlocution" whereby he tried to pressurise independents by claiming that exhibitors would only be able to obtain 20th Century Fox films through a contract with MGM, that is Film Trust. In November 1973, however, two years after MGM and Film Trust became partners in South Africa, the United States company sold its foreign assets to the Dutch-based Cinema International Corporation (CIC). CIC had been set up in 1970 by Paramount and Universal who realised that the costs of international distribution by individual companies would seriously offset profits which could be obtained through marketing cooperation. Initially, CIC distributed the films of its two associates together with those of MGM outside the United States and Canada. Each of the two companies owned 49% of the shares, with Paramount ranking first and Universal fourth among the seven largest producers. The sell-out of the South African based MGM operation made CIC a 50% shareholder in Film Trust for $17.5 million. Film Trust, which managed to attain profitability in 1974 stood to gain from this sale, but only after the end of that year for CIC was contracted to Ster until that time. Film Trust offered CIC 100% playing time apart from a 50% shareholding in eighteen cinemas against the nineteen first run houses of Ster in which it had no shareholding. Ster was also committed to Columbia, Avco Embassy and other distributors across the world. Nevertheless, CIC retained the option of cross-playing the Ster-Kinekor circuit in addition to its access to the CIC Metro theatres.

The good working relationship which had been established with the independent cinemas owners by Pieterse when he was managing director of Ster also worked to his advantage. Ster, Kinekor and Film Trust together contributed 55% of the film
rental of the major suppliers, with the remaining 45% coming from the independents. It will be remembered that Pieterse, then with Ster, had engineered the breakaway of Columbia and Paramount from 20th Century Fox. Ster was thus able to make first run films available to the independents and "It was Ster's policy to restrict expansion to city cinemas and selected suburban drive-ins, not to create unnecessary competition with the independents" 16. With the takeover by SANLAM in 1969, the independents again had to face, though to a lesser extent, the sort of competition that they had experienced before 1961. Film Trust calculated that through the supply to these independents and the existing Metro cinemas that CIC would earn as much if not more than they did through Ster.

The move by Paramount and Universal through CIC from Ster to Film Trust was an important breakthrough, for these two majors had together contributed more than half of Ster's revenue. Allegiance to only one distributor gave CIC Film Trust the edge over Satbel for where the latter was obligated to screening films for many different distributors and producers for specific periods, Film Trust was able to be more flexible in its bookings. Films which had a high audience appeal were kept on circuit in the first run houses for as long as demand remained. In contrast, the Satbel operations were forced to change product irrespective of income through contractual commitments.

During the same period, the early 1970s, Satbel was also consolidating its interests. Horizontal rationalization began with the merging of five subsidiary companies involved with screen advertising into a single operation: Alexander Films, Filmlets, Ster Adfilms, Telenews and Radio Drive-In. Two of these companies had previously been kept separate by 20 Century Fox who acquired them with its takeover of the Empire Theatre interests in 1965. The division was maintained ostensibly to maintain a spirit of competition. The Satbel merger, however, was expected to create a greater efficiency of screen access to the advertiser without having to increase manpower.
September 1972 saw the finalisation of the restructuring of the R40 million Satbel Group. Management was decentralised and comprised sixteen divisions and partly owned operations. The two largest, Ster and Kinekor, remained in direct competition with each other in the activities of distribution and exhibition. All divisions were to report directly to Satbel on finance, budgeting, operational policies and objectives. Administrative and service facilities were rationalised and centralised under Satbel. The following are Satbel's main divisions and operations:

KINEKOR: 83 cinemas and 23 drive-ins, as well as 12 tearoom cinemas. Sponsors live shows and provides catering facilities for its cinemas.

STER FILMS: 20 cinemas and 23 drive-ins. Owns in addition 2 ice-rinks, produces live shows and provides catering facilities for its cinemas.

CINEMARK: markets screen space for advertising purposes.

IRENE FILM LABORATORIES: South Africa's largest film processing company.

KILLARNEY FILM STUDIOS: produces documentaries, cinema commercials and a newsreel. The original title of African Mirror was changed to SA Mirror/SA Spiegel.

SA FILM STUDIOS: located at Lone Hill and engages in studio and equipment hire. It later moved to SA Film Centre established by Satbel at Balfour Park.


A.C.F MERCHANDISE: marketing, servicing and installation of cinema, photographic, office and micro-filming equipment.

CINE SIXTEEN: distribution network providing films for professional 16mm and home movie circuits.

GROUP PROPERTIES: controls hundred plus properties of the Group.

COMPUTER SERVICES: an independently managed bureau which provides computer services to the Group and to outside companies.

In addition to these major divisions, Satbel also had interests in:

Cemco, which manufactures cinema screens, theatre equipment and furnishings;
Chemix, a company which prints publicity material and processes publicity artwork;

Computicket, a computerised booking service for cinemas, theatres and sports events;

Gallo-Pox, which markets audio-visual equipment; and

African Entertainments, the owner of the Boswell-Wilkie Circus.

The ideological implications of these business acquisitions by the insurance-based parent company, SANLAM, were dealt with in some detail in Chapter 3. The present analysis is concerned with the relationship of this restructuring in terms of international capital, as well as the impending competition which was to come from the introduction of broadcast television in 1976.

Effects of the Third Technological Revolution on the Film Industry

The business manoeuvring between Satbel and Film Trusts was occurring against the initial tooling-up stages for the introduction of colour television on 1 January 1976. Kinekor, which owned the majority of Satbel's older cinemas, intended meeting the expected intense competition by spending as much as R10 million on refurbishing its cinemas. It will be recalled that the installation of broadcast television in the United States in the 1950s was met by film production companies spending fortunes on technological innovations and big budget productions. This investment, however, tended to be asymmetrical with little being spent on cinemas themselves. As Kinekor's general manager, Robert Howie points out, "No money was being spent on cinemas ... [which] ... were built by nickelodian fairground operators" consisting of "four walls, a screen, a tatty projector and as many seats as possible". Despite these disadvantages these same cinemas were having to charge higher admissions to remain viable.

The South African cinema industry also had the benefit of hindsight. In America, the movie moguls had failed to appreciate that television was here to stay. As a result, argues Howey, the industry developed no new talent, creative or
administrative procedures to deal with the situation and it took about eight years for the industry to re-orient itself to the new circumstances. Not only were the South African distribution and exhibition divisions restructuring themselves during the immediate pre-television period, but further rationalisations were in the pipeline as far as Satbel itself was concerned. At the time, Satbel possessed monopolistic power on two counts. It was vertically integrated in terms of ownership of subsidiary companies marketing cinema equipment and furnishings, production, distribution, screen advertising, exhibition and promotion. Horizontal integration was affected through the consolidation of its theatre chains, screen advertisers and distribution.

Despite their overwhelming control of the market, Satbel operated Ster and Kinekor as two separate companies in direct competition with each other. This competitive spirit was maintained by the luxury of two separate and autonomous head offices with all the duplication in administration, promotion and so on which are the consequence of a dual operation. Despite the anomalies in the administration of what on paper appears to be a monopoly, Business SA warned in 1972 that the SANLAM-Schlesinger merger set an unhealthy precedent in terms of the Monopolies Act and would provide a cause majore for a later merger between Ster and Kinekor themselves. This did occur in 1977 as a response to the commencement of television and is dealt with later in this chapter.

A further advantage which the South African industry held over the situation elsewhere, apart from a well ingrained cinema-going habit, was an easily accessible, convenient computerised advance booking system called Computicket. Although developed and applied in America by the Computer Science Corporation in 1967, its use was discontinued in April 1970 having secured a $13 million loss. The reason for Computicket's failure in the United States was attributed to two conditions, neither of which is a problem in South Africa. The first is that the system only works where there exists a centralised control of the entertainments booking industry. As the managing director of the
local company put it, "the rationalisation of cinema interests in South Africa combined with our own expertise at Show Service, where we catered mainly for live entertainment and sports bookings, gave us a unique starting base". The second problem mitigating against Computicket's acceptance in the United States was its rejection by the trade unions under which box office personnel fall. Introduction of the system would have led to the dismissal of numerous employees and was therefore resisted. In South Africa, no such trade unions exist, and capital had no difficulties in installing the system.

The first terminal went on-line on 16 August 1971 and by 1974 sixty terminals were in operation in the Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vereniging area alone. The benefits to the industry are manifold: full accounting and auditing control; instantaneous and full management information; instantaneous control of prices and inventory allocations; highly efficient public service maximizing sales normally lost under standard booking procedures; higher profits resulting not only from higher sales but also because of significant reductions in box office operating costs; lower accounting and audit costs; it stimulates impulse buying since most terminals are located in shopping centres, and so on. The Computicket system, however, being a Satbel owned operation, serves its cinemas only. The Metro cinemas run by CIC and Film Trust continued to make use of a show service type of operation which was not computerised.

From the above it becomes evident that the third technological revolution has infiltrated into many different facets of the film industry. Notwithstanding the obvious competition of television, this same technology has led to the development of devices which have benefitted the film industry directly. Numerous examples exist in the field of production and, in terms of the present discussion, administrative procedures. The Computicket system, for instance, is a prime example of this phase of late capitalism. The main characteristics of the third technological revolution in relation to the exhibition component of the film industry are:
1. An acceleration of the increase in the organic composition of capital through the partial displacement of salaried personnel by computer-based automation.24

2. The greater realisation of value. Value itself is created in the production of the film and the Computicket system of booking serves to maximise profits through the most efficient realization of the value of the product.

3. Together with technological innovation is a lowering of the cost threshold over time. One can trace the introduction of Computicket to the point where the rising advantage of increased efficiency deriving from the system intercepted with a curve of the falling cost of capital equipment in the field of automation and cybernetics. Once basic capital has been invested it becomes progressively cheaper to add terminals and increase range, both in terms of geographical spread and numbers. This diffusion is intensified by the lowered cost of terminals and the development of advanced technology, notably the micro-chip.25

The artificial postponement of the third technological revolution in the form of the delayed introduction of television to South Africa resulted in an anomalous situation where the home movie business substituted for the lack of television. It is to this component of the film industry that we now turn.

The Home Movie Business: The Contradictions of Capital

At the time that SANLAM took over 20th Century Fox in South Africa, the managing director of the Afrikaans company stated "it had become apparent that there was ... a flaw in the Publications Act. It seemed as if films exhibited in cinemas were subject [to censorship] but that those rented out to be exhibited in private homes were not."26 This loophole, together with the ubiquitousness of 16mm projectors either owned or available for rent, and the lack of television led to an influx of hundreds of small distributors hiring out uncensored films in the early 1970s. This incursion was entrenched by
a Publications Bill published in 1971 which emphasised the distinction between public screening and private showings. Satbel tried to counter this "artificial" business by pointing out that the regular industry, which co-operates with the authorities and from which the state derives a handsome income, would be harmed; that some of the many small distributors (some operating from flats) would even avoid contributing a share of their profits to the Treasury's company tax.

Although representations were made by Satbel to the government to modify the legislation no changes were made. The home movie business flourished, and aided by yet another legislative loophole in the Copyright Act, these companies hired out with impunity, films which were more correctly the property of the 'regular industry' and contracted to Ster, Kinekor, CIC, Film Trust and so on. The situation deteriorated to the point where 16mm copies of major releases yet to be launched were being screened on the home movie circuit. The high profits to be made led to the entry of pirates, operators who obtain copies of films by illegal means. The war between the established industry and the pirates raged for nearly a decade and thousands of police raids were made on home movie outfits.

In October 1974, the United States Congressional Record placed South Africa as the largest pirator after the Carribean countries and South America. Although Wassenaar states that the problem was resolved in "six tedious years," the conflict continues to the present. What has occurred is a tightening up of censorship which places home movies in the same category as cinema. In the meantime, Satbel tried all manner of means to break these 'illicitimate' 16mm traders, but the latter's hold tightened progressively. It is estimated, for example, that Satbel spent R300 000 on legal fees over a four year period and though over 6000 prints were recovered, the pirates' business was not seriously affected. Eventually Satbel decided to meet these traders on their own ground. Cine 16 went into operation in 1971 with two outlets, expanding to nineteen
in 1974, eventually owning thirty. Turnover to June 1972
was R800 000, R990 000 by June 1973, R1.86 million by June 19
1974, with R4 million estimated for the financial year ending
in June 1975. By 1976, the estimated annual turnover of the
legitimate home movie business was R15 million\(^2\), compared to
a R54 million gross for cinema admissions in the June 1974-75
financial year\(^3\). In addition to Cine 16 was Film Fun, half o
owned by Super 8 Promotions. Also started in 1971 with two
outlets growing to thirty two in 1973, turnover was growing
at 20% a month. These two operations were, in turn, surpassed
by the pirates who numbered in excess of 300 by September 1974.

Both Film Fun and Cine 16 hired out 16mm and Super-8 prints.
Only after Film Fun had demonstrated the viability of Super-8
feature film hire, however, did Cine 16 follow suit. It in-
vested R1 million in reel to reel prints, while Film Fun's
700 Technicolor Super-8 cassette projectors and films were
earning in excess of R40 000 a month. Their catalogue,
ironically, came not only from MGM, but United Artists as
well. Although Sables held the 16mm and 35mm rights of UA,
Super 8 Promotions acquired the Super-8 rights\(^4\).

The South African home movie business was about twice the size
of that existing in the United States and constituted a major
channel along which culture and ideological perceptions could
be mediated. Most of the films available were American in
origin, and even where material which had to be censored for
cinema release was legitimately available for home movie con-
sumption, its content hardly ever posed a challenge to the
dominant discourse. The main attraction of these movies was
a sexual theme not permitted in cinema. A further stimulation
of the of the home movie business was the legislation curbing
commercial Sunday cinema. Although Sunday cinema clubs did
exist for a while in the mid-1970s taking advantage of the
legal loophole, they did not last for long and barely dented
home movie viewership where people were able to watch films
at their leisure at times that suited them.

The opportunity to make a quick profit did not escape the
majors themselves and in at least one documented instance, a major negotiated with a home movie outfit for exclusive television features screening rights. The American company was MCA, the parent company of Universal. The local firm was Parade Home Entertainment Centres (PHEC) which had also secured a contract with National Television Associates (NTA) which by 1956 was the largest distributor of feature films to American television. In November of that year 20th Century Fox had sold NTA 390 features and had acquired a 50% stock interest in the company. Despite the fact that Kinekor represented Fox in South Africa, the deal was made with PHEC.

The agreement reached between PHEC and MCA and NTA suggests that the United States majors will ensure their collaboration in the home movie business in the event of potential profit and as a means of combatting the pirates. The legality of home movie hiring in South Africa was thus extended to the 180 PHEC franchise holders as well as the established Film Fun and Cine 16 firms.

The problem of pirating, however, continues, but seems mainly to involve 'acceptable' films which are sometimes uncensored, while a smaller emphasis is placed on pornographic product. By the end of 1981, South Africa was again guilty of the highest per capita incidence of film pirating in the world with the majors losing as much as R20 million in royalties a year. The situation has, no doubt, been exacerbated by the high ownership of video cassette recorders and the shift of the home movie business to include the hiring out of video films.

The strategy adopted by the established industry representing international distributors which moved the majors into the home movie market is indicative of two important structural processes. The first concerned the 'cinema-going' habit which easily adjusted to include a home movie viewership to fill out the time which would normally be taken by television. Despite this 'structured absence' being filled out in 1976, the home movie business continues to flourish, now with video cassettes as well as films, for SABC-TV with its conservative selection
and limited English programming (2½ to 3 hours a day) is clearly not meeting public needs, especially on Sundays.

The second implication of the home movie business is that it stimulated the audio-visual industry, particularly during the first half of the 1970s.

*The Explosion of Audio-Visual Technology: The 'Dumping Grounds'*

Not only did people become more aware of the environments in which film could be used, but the range of hardware available increased enormously during the first half of the 1970s as a result of marketing drives by United States companies through local agents into the South African audio-visual market. The urgency of this expansion was fuelled by a cyclical upswing which began in 1972 reaching a peak of 7.1% in 1974, the need for more efficient marketing methods, the impending switch-on of television in 1976, and a public more highly attuned to visual media, not only in education, but in the market place in particular. The period was marked by a local scramble for agencies representing American principles. Like many feature film production companies in the early 1960s, few of these companies or agents survived long.

While the Fairchild Super-8 cassette projector system had been available in South Africa since 1970 through Falcon Audio-visual, Technicolor was gearing up to capture this market through a Film Trust subsidiary, Super 8 Promotions. Apart from huge sales to Film Fun and vocational education institutions, this company broke into the commercial and industrial market on a massive scale during 1973 and 1974 when it sold R250 000 worth of Technicolor Super-8 cassette projectors to General Motors via a franchised company, Dial Picture Productions. The projectors were to be used for product screenings in the 240 General Motors showrooms countrywide. With this investment in hardware followed a further R40 000 in software production, not to mention print costs estimated at over R180 000. All of this was budgeted for 1974. In the following year, however, the programme went into dormancy.
because of the difficulty of administering this sort of sales promotion on a continuing basis, increasing costs of software production during ensuing years as well as the general recessionary conditions of the South Africa economy which began its downswing in 1975, culminating in a 0% growth rate in 1977.

In the meantime, Fairchild had been adopted by Datsun which bought about 60 projectors (later replaced with video) and Vetsak bought 60 J-Arc machines which were fed by a R200 000 film production programme made by Indaba Films. In addition, there were numerous smaller sales to less highly capitalised companies.

Like the SANLAM-Gallo connection before this time, most of these audio-visual marketing strategies were not carried through. It is not difficult to assess the cultural and ideological implications of this section of the film industry which petered out in 1976 with Super 8 Promotions actually giving away more than 20 projectors (retailed at R800 each) to the South African Defence Force. The financial implications are much clearer though, and will be dealt with first.

In a very short period of time -- no more than four or five years -- American manufacturers had, through the mobilisation of local capital, managed to secure major sales of equipment, though much less in terms of software (content). These sales boomed during a specific conjuncture of South African economic history which was influenced by an average growth rate of 4.5% between 1971 and 1974, a growing consumer awareness of visual presentations in business and the consequent adoption of communications technologies and methods in business practice.

The downward cycle starting in 1975 was evident from a growth rate of 2.1% dropping to zero in 1977. This significant downturn, together with the novelty of video technology, seriously affected sales of celluloid based audio-visual hardware. It is, however, normally expected that during periods of increasing difficulty to realise surplus value that audio-visual aids would offer an attractive proposition to industries.
needing to dispose of their excess product. One of the reasons why audio-visual sales were not followed through by sustained marketing and service programmes can be traced to the opportunist nature of a number of the agents involved, together with the high prices they were charging for the machines. Realising that the industrial market had been saturated or was resisting further purchase of film based audio-visual technologies, at least one major company with unsold stocks tried to dump them on the homeland market and entered into negotiation with the Transkei Development Corporation.

The processes identified above are illustrative of further points identified by Mandel during the phase of late capitalism:

1. Multinational companies, instead of looking to maximize their profits through the exploiting of less developed regions, try rather to maximize profits by developing an under-developed branch of industry with a lower organic composition of capital. South Africa offered an ideal market as it was 'less developed' both in a general economic sense as well as in terms of the specific audio-visual market.

2. The accelerated development of technology occurring in the metropolitan states was not aimed at South Africa specifically, but at the much larger domestic markets. In contrast to the 240 Technicolor projectors bought by General Motors in South Africa, for example, the United States parent company had acquired over 17 000 at an earlier time. The South African market was thus only of secondary importance. What was seen in South Africa was but the tail-end of an international phenomenon whereby over-produced technology was dumped on peripheral markets. The interior bourgeoisie, in turn, attempted to continue the process of dumping by palming off their excess stocks on the homeland regions. When this double articulation failed, companies were forced to get rid of their machines in any way they could. Amongst other applications, they were used to relay retail advertising in hypermarkets,
and in an extreme case, projectors were given to the Defence Force.

3. Because of the need to enter branches of industry characterised by an initially lower organic composition of capital, we find that the audio-visual technologies originated from companies involved in related, or even different areas of production. The Technicolor Super-8 cassette projectors, for example, were a by-product of Technicolor Film Laboratories, while the Fairchild projector was a spinoff of Fairchild Industries which was involved with electronics and defence systems.

4. The use of audio-visual sales techniques in industry often has the effect of accelerating the increase in the organic composition of capital through a substitution of sales personnel with other means of communication, notably the screening of sales promotional films in showrooms, exhibitions and so on.

5. There occurs a shorter life-span of fixed capital, especially in machines. The Super-8 projectors were themselves replaced with video technology within a short period of their being introduced to South Africa, and buyers previously resisting film projection equipment invested rather in video cassette systems.

6. The age of late capitalism is characterised by a massive increase in production and a contradictory difficulty in persuading consumers to buy. Audio-visual selling techniques offer one rather effective means of maximizing sales potential at point of sale.

In a cultural sense, the adoption of audio-visual channels of communication has led to the transplantation of American methods into the South African milieu. One example concerns the marketing of medical film cassettes which clearly base their content and assumptions on capitalist curative medicine rather than 'barefoot' medical practices or the specific
problems found in a country like South Africa. In this way, these medical practices or ways of doing things reinforce the already existent assumptions of medical care which are tied to high technology, highly centralised, elitist forms of medical attention found in South Africa. Mattelart describes this use of technology as the "ideological apparatuses of imperialism ... in the international accumulation of capital". With each phase in the development and marketing of technology there must follow a citizen or subject who adopts the set of social practices which legitimates and presents as 'natural' the application of the new machine in the process of capital accumulation on an international scale. This worked extremely well for a while as South Africans-as-subjects began to anticipate the social practices which would be expected of them once television was introduced in 1976. The origin of the practices, initially stimulated by the home movie business, were reinforced by the sale of film projectors not only to business, but to individual purchasers who put them to domestic use. Once television arrived, however, the market began to diminish (though not the hiring of home movies) as subjects reassessed their commercial practice, particularly in view of the costs of production. On a general level, however, one particular apparatus of cultural production, film, was simply replaced with another, video, while the content, whether made locally or overseas, approximates the ideological discourse of the hegemonic blocs in the various Western countries.

The penetration by American manufacturers of the South African audio-visual market for this brief time is but one element of the economic period where communications technologies open the way for an "ever more intensive technification for which the present phase of accumulation of capital demands the need". This is the period identified by Mandel as 'late capitalism' dealt with in Chapter 4 where it was shown why and how accumulation occurs at the service levels of the economy rather than in production per se. In this way, the manufacturers of audio-visual equipment harnessed the local film industry to assist in the process of converting idle capital into service capital (the selling of projectors) while simultaneously replacing
service capital with productive capital (stimulating the need for software products): in other words, the substitution of home movies for cinema shows or video cassettes for broadcast television, large-scale sales presentations are succeeded by individual screenings in the consumers' home or office, and human (or living labour) is replaced by sounds and images on film/video/slide-tape programmes in point of sale activities.

The belief in the omnipotence of technology is specific to the bourgeois ideology of late capitalism. The reader will recall, for example, the emphasis by Pieter Fourie for better studios and technical facilities when these were already pre-existent and under-utilised. The hidden assumptions of his report bear an uncanny resemblance to Mandel's analysis of ideology in the age of late capitalism in general:

This ideology proclaims the ability of the existing social order gradually to eliminate all chance of crises, to find a 'technical' solution to all its contradictions, to integrate rebellious social classes and to avoid political explosions.41

Fourie might have asked why the existing facilities were not being used 'properly'. That he did not and that he further insisted on a state 'cultural policy' is a clear articulation of the late-capitalist ideology of organization which cannot survive without the regulative function of the state. This ideology is also mediated at a deeper level in the trend towards industrialisation of superstructural activities in which the Afrikaner has become so enmeshed since well before 1948. Where one 'culture' was made for 'survival' (of the Afrikaner heritage and 'way of life'), now the ideology of organization has replaced any 'pure' notion of culture with that of profit and the need for a 'stable economy'. The state is not a 'cure-all' to cultural production as Fourie implies, its direction and guidance of the economy are only expedient efforts to smooth fissures and postpone crises. It cannot, therefore, articulate a 'cultural policy' with clear 'communications objectives' simply because such policies are necessarily static, operating on a level dislocated from base-
superstructure relations.

To return to the discussion of distribution and exhibition per se, the sale of technology is an important element in the film industry and it is in its interest, therefore, to promote a technocist ideology. Like SANLAM which obtained an entrée into education and the audio-visual market through its acquisition of Gallo-Fox, Film Trust secured a more commercially oriented application as described above. The profitability of this section of the Film Trust operation, together with an unprecedented gross income from Jamie Uys' Beautiful People (1974) of over R1.5 million in the local market and R1.7 million from overseas\(^2\), together with profits on property tided Film Trust over during the economic upswing which occurred between 1972 and 1974.

Further Developments in the Distribution and Exhibition Sectors of the Feature Film Industry

In March 1974, the Schlesinger Organization sold its controlling interest in its South African operation to Anglo-American. Through an offer of one share in Rand Selections for nine shares in the Schlesinger Organization, Anglo American found itself a minority partner with SANLAM in the ownership of film trading rights and theatre operations (70:30) and an equal partner in the properties. These were the properties parcelled out between SANLAM and Schlesinger through SANSO in 1969 and which included the 'finest blue-chip' sites in the country. This repenetration of traditional English capital, particularly Anglo American capital so often objectified as the 'enemy' of Afrikanerdom, into Afrikaner enterprise should be seen against the restructuring of South African capitalism as a whole.\(^3\)

The emerging partnership between these traditionally and politically distinct capitals is reflective of a growing cooperation between English and Afrikaans speaking South Africans as the country's economy matures and has to face up to an intensifying economic, political and 'terrorist' attack from external quarters. The rapprochement of the two capitals from their previously differing ideological bases is symbolic-
ally refracted in the Afrikaans genre cinema which was produced between 1965 and 1980, and which will be dealt with in Chapter 10.

Apart from product already committed to Ster for distribution, as from 1 January 1975, CIC and MGM released their films through a new subsidiary, CINTRO (SA). This decision marked a shift of the American majors away from the Satbel fold. CINTRO's access to Universal, Paramount and MGM assured it an estimated 40% of the anticipated major productions from Hollywood. Operating in 47 countries, CIC was fast moving towards the process of consolidation of American cinema capital by maintaining its own distribution arm, and hence profits, which would otherwise be lost to indigenous firms. Warner Bros, which was later to partner CIC in South Africa, remained with Kinekor for the moment.

The fact that CINTRO was independent of Satbel did not preclude it from cross-playing its product on the Ster and Kinekor circuits. This new distribution company was in a strong position because of the very high dependence of South African cinemas on the American majors' catalogue. Like the previous strategy of 20th Century Fox, international capital in the form of CIC was aimed at co-opting local capital, mainly through Satbel and Film Trust, to provide the required cinema outlets for foreign films. This move towards independence and financial centralisation on the part of some of the majors, and which was to later occur with Warner Bros and UA as well, should be seen against the impending introduction of television which provided the impetus for a significant restructuring of the distribution and exhibition divisions of the industry. CIC represented a cost-saving strategy by creating more powerful distributor entities which rebalanced their bargaining power on a global basis. In South Africa, this restructuring manifested itself in the following terms:

All but the insensitive cannot have failed to feel the winds of change stirring in the South African film industry. Amidst an escalating and costly programme of cinema construction, which among such
declared aims of providing the public with amenities, and luxury of surroundings not available hitherto, is another aim carrying less emphasis - that of asserting an influence on foreign producers to select the owners of such premises as the distributors for their films.

With the move by Universal and Paramount to MGM Film Trust in 1975, the latter company had to gear up for expansion of its cinema facilities. Requisite funds were to come from Film Trust itself. The international industry was experiencing a resurgence at this time and where 400 films were imported on average during previous years, by 1975 the figure had risen to 650, topping 800 in 1976. With all these films demanding screen time, there was no doubt that local producers' earnings would be seriously affected as individual playing times per picture were to be reduced and become even more subordinate to overseas product than they had been since 1970.

The pressure on cinemas reinforced the trend away from exclusive contracts with one circuit, although 20th Century Fox remained tied to Kinekor and Columbia to Ster. As from 1976, United Artists, previously hooked to Ster alone, asserted its right to play both the Ster and Kinekor circuits. Cintrust, the holding company of the Metro theatres continued to have access to Paramount, Universal and MGM on an exclusive first-run basis, but the group holding company, CIC did have the right to contract films elsewhere when Cintrust could not deliver.

At about this time, Warner Bros International entered into a distribution arrangement with CIC which sealed its move from the South African company and its product to the Cintrust circuit. For the moment however, Disney remained with Satbel despite Pieterse's attempts to woo it over to Film Trust.

On 30 January 1976, the competitive line-up between CIC and Film Trust on the one hand, and Satbel on the other, assumed the following proportions:
Fig. 1: Ownership and Control of the South African Exhibition Industry
(Source: Financial Mail, 30 January 1976, p. 219)

Broadcast television switched on on 1 January 1976. Four months later, an audit showed a 18% drop in four-waller attendance and a 35.5% fall for drive-ins. The latter decline is of particular significance to South African made films since these venues provided their most lucrative market. This figure was exacerbated by bad weather and, more significantly, an extensive military call-up which affected the cinema's prime viewership profile made up of the 16-30 age group. The duration of the military commitment expected of citizen force soldiers was three months a year, and was extended in 1983 to include all fit South African male citizens up to the age of 55 for at least 12 days a year. The effect of the military situation on content will be dealt with in the next chapter, but its effect on attendance needs to be stressed here.

It appears that by August 1976, Film Trust had exhausted its reserves trying to tide their theatre interests over until the effects of television on audience attendance had diminished. It sold its 50% holding of the Cintrust (Metro) cinema chain to Cinnitercorp, as associate company of CIC-Warner. This acquisition by CIC-Warner was argued to dovetail with the
group's policy since 1973 to buy MGM theatres worldwide for its own exhibition activities.

*Gaps in the Market: The Entrée of Smaller Distributors*

The unexpected dropping out from distribution and exhibition by Film Trust marks a convenient point to introduce a discussion of how this period of restructuring affected the smaller distributors in their relationship with Satbel and CIC. The loss by Satbel of MGM, Paramount, Universal and Warner Bros did not necessarily work to the detriment of the SANLAM owned company. Before 1976, Satbel was operating in a time of abundance having secured both sources of raw material (films) and markets (cinemas). By not controlling or being solely committed to the majors, Satbel was able to obviate the incurring of losses caused by audience fall-off through the compulsory purchase of titles from sources it was contracted to. This flexibility was not found in the partnership between CIC and Film Trust, and was probably a significant factor in the latter's sale to its partner. Free of expensive tie-ups with the majors, Satbel allowed new entrants into the distribution sector. Where previously local audiences were subject to the films contained mainly in the major's catalogue, now other films from alternative sources began to appear on the cinema and drive-in circuit. The new distributor absorbed the costs of distribution since they, not Ster-Kinekor, were liable for the payment of up-front guarantees. CIC-Warner, for example, paid R250 000 for *Wild Geese*, HdB Films (SA) paid the same amount for *The Eagle Has Landed* and R60 000 for *Moses*, while Film Trust, now separate from CIC, re-entered the distribution market paying R1.1 million for the *King Kong* package. Freed from compulsory sources of supply, Satbel was able to force further concessions by refusing to screen product which did not meet with their own terms of contract. The merger of Ster and Kinekor in 1977 placed Satbel in an even stronger position with the company limiting its own purchase of films to R50 000 up front.

By allowing the entrée of independent distributors into the
market, Satbel made an attempt to create business conditions suitable to the position in which it found itself in the mid-1970s. Profit is likely to be higher in times of prosperity and less in times of depression where supplies are controlled. Where supplies are not controlled in periods of recession, profits can, however, be maintained by loosening the vertical monopoly. The consequence is that audience choice is widened as new entrants in the market exploit sub-cultures of taste and gaps in the market as the distribution business lessens its dependence on the American majors. It was this period of variety which saw the inauguration of international film festivals being held in Johannesburg, Cape Town and later Durban. These festivals played a major role in identifying a substantial art movie audience thought by exhibitors not to exist. Many of the films initially imported for these festivals have shown themselves to be financially viable for general release. The festivals have spawned a more demanding audience which is largely being satisfied by smaller distributors such as Romay Films. The Johannesburg Film Festival, in particular, was used by independent distributors as a consumer-check for movies thought by Satbel or CIC to be non-commercial. In the event of successful viewing at the festival, the event was used as a launching pad to lobby the exhibitors to grant the film a wider release. Films like *Sybil*, for example, subsequently ran continuously for over two years.

The intensified competition among distributors, however, did not necessarily work to the benefit of South African producers. Independent cinemas remained contracted to the larger distributors such as CIC-Warner and Ster-Kinekor which between them held nearly all the larger overseas producers. As Phillips points out, despite the existence of British and European companies, none have the stature of the American majors. The latter are thus in a position to decide which pictures will circulate internationally and since they are an important factor in financing through distribution guarantees, they are able to exert considerable influence on content. Because of their market penetration throughout the world, producers in other countries are forced to distribute their films through
American companies if they are to reach the largest number of customers. This has occurred in South Africa as well. *Winner II* (1977), for example, was released through Columbia on the Ster-Kinekor circuit. Because of its strength as a major, Columbia was able to negotiate a better than average deal for the film on the South African circuit. The smaller distributors, subject to this double articulation -- international and national -- have little bargaining power and probably no cinemas. Nevertheless, new entrants who managed to carve a niche for themselves during the 1970s included Romay Films which was to become one of the more adventurous companies in terms of product selection.

By 1978, the industry had recovered from the television induced slump and in December of that year earned greater profits than ever before. This experience was totally at variance with American consumer reaction between 1948 and 1954 when the appearance of television sets in any specific area reduced demand for cinema entertainment, producing the short-run effect of decline in theatre receipts and the long term effect of the reduction in the number of operating theatres. South Africa experienced a temporary decline in box office income, but within eighteen months a renewed confidence led to the building of yet more theatres, even including Cape Town and Bloemfontein where provincial tax reduced income by 33% and 25% respectively. It was no longer necessary to shift the costs of distribution onto independents as profits were again to be found by contracting directly with the majors. Sathel wrested the R100 million ITC Entertainment package from HdH Films in August 1978 and signed a two year exclusive exhibition agreement with UA in September, including their extensive 16mm library. The South African company reaffirmed its commitment to Fox and Columbia in September. Film Trust was no longer a problem, as it had been put into liquidation in 1979 with accrued debts of R3 million.

On the other hand, a newly formed large production house, Orion, signed with CTC-Warner in April 1979. Although Cinintercorp was not suitably geared up to handling Afrikaans films,
it did attempt to test the market with *Elsa se Geheim* (1979) and *Gemini* (1980) with limited success. The bulk of South African-made films remained dependent on the Ster-Kinekor circuit which was more effective in the smaller towns and countryside.

Although the Ster-Kinekor merger was aimed at rationalisation and improved efficiency in the face of an expected financial downturn, it now found itself in a very strong position because CIC-Warner which served four-sevenths of the American majors was reliant on the Satbel cinemas to screen its product since it had only 21 urban cinemas and a couple of drive-ins at its disposal through Cinintercorp. The implications for the local producer of this cooperation between CIC-Warner and Ster-Kinekor are outlined by Andre Scholtz:

Ster-Kinekor is far more powerful as a merger than when they were operated separately. Prior to the merger, local producers had a greater bargaining power than they have now (i.e. 1980). A keen competitive spirit existed between Ster and Kinekor which worked to the producer's advantage. This is no longer the case. CIC is not really a competitor. Both CIC and Ster-Kinekor are very strong; each is entrenched, each has its market share; they don't impede on each other's territory, in fact, they help each other by exhibiting on each other's circuits. The local producer has no option but to play the Ster-Kinekor circuit because of its greater spread of cinemas. Local productions are at a further disadvantage for the overseas majors are in a position to demand the best theatres for even their most mediocre product.

The downturn experienced by the exhibition sector between 1976 and mid-1978 further exacerbated the precarious position of local producers who found themselves increasingly playing second fiddle to imported movies. Since Ster-Kinekor and CIC-Warner are contractually bound to the majors, these companies have first call on local circuits. No South African film, no matter how well it is performing, will be held over at the expense of contracted overseas films. The greater the number of imported films the less is the space available for local films. In 1979, Ster-Kinekor indicated that they would be
able to handle only sixteen local pictures a year -- twelve in Afrikaans and four in English. This was not an unreasonable offer for in 1979 only eleven features aimed at white audiences were made (nine in Afrikaans and two in English). Contrast this with the twenty-eight made in 1972 of which Ster and Kinekor indicated they could absorb twenty\textsuperscript{53}. However, in terms of Satbel’s 1978 resolution to inject R7 million into feature film production, it is not surprising that Ster-Kinekor gave its own films precedence over other local titles\textsuperscript{54}. Those films not taken up by Ster-Kinekor face an uphill battle in reaching their geographically dispersed target audience.

In 1977, a new entrant into the distribution market, Mimosa Films, spearheaded by Philo Pieterse who had previously been managing director of Film Trust, sought to combine local producers and thereby secure better release patterns, particularly at independent cinemas for their films. The impetus for this company no doubt occurred because of the declining influence of Film Trust on the contemporary distribution and exhibition scene, a company which, with MGM, had always touted South African producers. Mimosa Films did, however, experience some resistance from both Ster-Kinekor and CIC-Warner who regarded this newcomer as a competitor to their own distribution networks as far as the handling of local product was concerned. Since the Mimosa stable included Jamie Uys who was considered a 'bankable' director, the cinema chains would have preferred to negotiate directly with the producer for they would stand to earn higher profits than if they had to deal with an intermediary. By 1978, Mimosa had also acquired a number of foreign titles which constituted a further incursion into the distribution market as a whole. Two years later, in May 1980, however, Mimosa entrusted their films directly to Ster-Kinekor and announced its intention of concentrating on production in the future.

Summary

This chapter has attempted to examine the political economy of the exhibition and distribution sectors of the South
African film industry from 1970 to 1980. This period was a crucial decade for the industry as it saw the consolidation of Afrikaans capital's control on the cinema division and its strong position with regard to distribution. Unlike the Afrikaner attitudes of the 1940s through to the early 1960s, which were hostile to English South African capital, let alone international capital, the Afrikaans controlled industry now found itself working in collaboration with the international industry, securing it profits in South Africa while simultaneously exposing local audiences to its homogenised brand of cultural production. This influence worked on two levels: the first was through cinema itself, the second through the technocrit ideology propagated as a result of the conversion of idle capital into service capital which in turn was converted into productive capital in the form of audio-visual hardware. Together with the introduction of broadcast television, the new practices insisted upon by the audio-visual industry led to the adoption of social practices demanded by the electronic communication system which marked the final acceptance of the full implications of the third technological revolution in South Africa.

The introduction to South Africa of television in 1976 led to a renewal of fixed capital by exhibitors as they refurbished their cinemas to meet the expected threat from the box. Having the advantage of hindsight, the industry managed to pull through. The social practice of 'going to the cinema' which had become an ingrained habit of local viewers worked to the industry's advantage and cinema-going reached new heights towards the end of 1978. The implications for cultural production during this period were significant as South African feature film production fell and the onus of ideological discourse and cultural legitimation shifted to SABC-TV. As was discussed in the last chapter, local producers were unable to regroup and find new directions in thematic content and eventually began to copy television soap operas just as they had radio soap operas in the past. The restructuring of the industry in relation to international capital as well as the wider restructuring of South African capital in general, is
reflected in the symbolic and dramatic structure of Afrikaans film during this period. It is to this content that Chapter 10 turns.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. **Financial Mail**, 9 October 1970, p. 131

2. **SA Film Weekly**, 26 August 1971, p. 1. Also see issue of 13 May 1971


4. **SA Film Weekly**, 26 August 1971, p. 2

5. **SA Film Weekly**, 8 July 1971, pp. 1-2

6. **Financial Mail**, 9 July 1971, p. 110

7. **SA Film Weekly**, 8 July, 1971, p. 1

8. Ibid., p. 2

9. **SA Film Weekly**, 22 January, 1970, p. 1 points out that MGM incurred a $30 million loss in the United States in that year


11. **Financial Mail**, 10 January 1975, pp. 91-92

12. **SA Film Weekly**, 3 August 1972, p. 1


14. **SA Film Weekly**, 8 November 1973, p. 2


16. **Management**, July 1974, p. 31

17. **SA Film Weekly**, October 25/November 1, 1973, p. 4. Also see the issue of 2 May 1974; and Pierotti, S. 1974: "S.A. Leads the World in Cinema Entertainment", *Videorama*, Vol. 2, No. 2, pp. 1, 4 & 5 for colour sketches of South Africa's unique, whites only, luxury theatres

week, which the severe depression had reduced to only 60 million, could be appreciably affected by the new competition

19. Howie quoted in *SA Film Weekly*, October 25/November 1, 1973, p. 4


21. Satbel has an interest in this company


23. Ibid. p. 7

24. Olin-Wright, E. 1976: "Class Boundaries in Advanced Capitalist Societies", *New Left Review*, No. 98, amongst others, takes the opposing view that while those who fill managerial and supervisory posts are part of the collective worker, they do not directly produce surplus value but only contribute to the production of surplus value by others. A full discussion of the debate concerning productive labour is beyond the scope of this study which takes Mandel's view that supervisory and managerial workers do produce surplus value. See also Gough, I. 1972: "Marx's theory of Productive and Unproductive Labour", *New Left Review*, No. 76

25. These three points are adapted from Ernest Mandel, 1978: *Late Capitalism*. Verso, London, pp. 195-197


27. *SA Film Weekly*, 5 August 1971, p. 1 comments that "the apathy of the film industry leadership to the encroach- ment upon the liberty of the subject has brought in its wake serious problems for the distribution and exhibition side of commercial cinema ... the pirates say they stepped into a market which had not been fully developed or operated in the public interest. They opened their shops on Saturdays and Sundays to better serve the public"

28. Wassenaar, op. cit. p. 56

29. Ibid. p. 57

30. "Judgement": 14 June 1976. Film Hire (Pty) Ltd v. the State


32. *SA Film Weekly*, 16/23 September, 1977, p. 4


35. See SA Film Weekly, 16/23 September, 1977 which listed the number of pirate prints in circulation on various films as well as identifying the five establishments hiring pornographic material

36. MPAA in The Star, 9 December 1981

37. Unaccountably, Cine 16 revenues actually increased marginally during the immediate period after the introduction of television.

38. This interpretation is adapted from Mandel's, op. cit. pp. 195-198, ten characteristics of the third technological revolution


40. Ibid. p. 3

41. Mandel, op. cit. p. 501

42. Beautiful People earned more (R200 000) in the Hillbrow Metro, more than most South African films earn countrywide

43. See, eg., Clarke, S. 1978: "Capital, 'Fractions' of Capital and the State: 'Neo-Marxist' Analyses of the South African State", Capital and Class, No. 5

44. SA Film Weekly, 13 June 1974, p. 7

45. SA Film Weekly, 22 August 1974, p. 1

46. Other films in this package included Orca and Lipstick

47. Robert Grieg in The Star (Tonight), 9 June 1979

48. This does not imply that Satbel or CIC-Warner did not have 'art' films in their catalogue, they did. They simply never released them.

49. For further information on the role of film festivals in South Africa see Tomaselli, K.G. 1981: "Film Festivals - Which Audience: Punk Rockers, European Immigrants or the 'Mass' Audience?" The SAFTTA Journal, Vol. 2, No. 1, pp. 11-14


51. Stuart, op. cit. p. 282


53. Financial Mail, 14 July 1972, p. 139
54. One notable producer, Andre Scholtz, commented that he would stop making Afrikaans films if he could not get a distribution in South Africa and concentrate on English language films for the international market. As a result of this report which appeared in The Star (Tonight), Satbel actually took off one of their own films in at least one location (Witblitz and Peach Brandy) and put on Scholtz' Skelms in its place. The point of Scholtz's statement to the press was to stimulate this kind of action. In any event, Scholtz only made one more film, April '80, before leaving the industry entirely.

55. The only exception was Jans Rautenbach's comedy, Blink Stefaans which uses a television set as the main character's alter ego. The film earned a fortune at the box office.
CHAPTER 9

SHIELDING, RESTRICTIONS AND ECOLOGICAL SETTINGS: THE IDEOLOGY OF CENSORSHIP

Critics of censorship in South Africa usually base their arguments on morality judgements and libertarian ideals of freedom. Often, the cynical and satirical nature of much 'serious' writing obscures the underlying economic determinants which led to the emergence of a class structure based on racial capitalism. The perpetrators of censorship have been described by DH Lawrence as "The grey ones left over from the nineteenth century". This myth, that censorship is the remnant of Victorian morality, is perpetuated by the English language press in South Africa and writers who believe that censorship is concerned primarily with obscenity and pornography, what Lawrence describes as "the lie of purity and the dirty little secret".

Such explanations detract from underlying processes and tend to objectify censorship by locating it within the actions of individual practice. The Publications Control Board (PCB) is described by Harry Jones, for example, as "an attempt to transplant the ideological rantings of a political clique" or a "clutch of politicians ... planning our future purity of mind". This conspiratorial interpretation supports conventional wisdom which holds that the censors are government appointed 'experts' who are employed to decide for the majority what they may see, read or hear, a point of view which is often perpetuated by the censors themselves. An example is the following statement by Judge Lammie Snyman who was chairman of the Publications Appeal Board from 1974 to 1980:

The duty of the Publications Bodies is, they must ask the question, 'What does the average man in the street with a Standard Seven education think? ... The Publications Bodies, the adjudicators, must decide what the moral standards are of the general community, the bulk of which is not sophisticated."
This statement, like many others issued by the Directorate of Publications (DP) or its predecessor, the Publications Control Board, appear to deliberately confuse cause with effect. This interpretation of the purpose and objectives of the state censorship machinery, supported, in the main, by serious critics\(^6\), is primarily the result of the inadequate understanding of the role and function of this form of state control.

Since the discovery of diamonds in Kimberley in the 1870s and gold on the Witwatersrand a decade later, the class structure has continually modified itself in relation to processes occurring in the political economy. Simultaneously with this dynamic class struggle has been the enactment, amendment and consolidation, initially of provincial film censorship ordinances, and later of acts of Parliament. An analysis of these acts and ordinances over time will show a recurring preoccupation with the treatment of the relationships between capital and labour, as well as race.

The present chapter is divided into two sections. The first offers a brief historical overview of the development and underlying rationale of film censorship since the turn of the century. The second part of the chapter will depart slightly from the previous paradigm employed in this study and will analyse the process of censorship as a cybernetic system of information/social control which is geared to preserving the racial-capitalist relations of production.

**PART I: HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT**

The first public complaint about a film occurred on 14 February 1898 when the Cape press objected to the blasphemous content of *The Temptation of St Anthony*\(^7\). Over the next ten years there were isolated objections, but the first state action on a film occurred on 8 July 1910 when the Union government banned the screening of *The Johnson-Jeffries Fight*, which had sparked race riots in the United States. The South African press, clearly implying racist tendencies to be the response of blacks alone, pointed out that the "sole menace of the film was the
inculcation of racial hatred which could instantly be obviated by prohibiting its exhibition to coloured people". The years immediately after the controversy saw a growing antagonism against the cinema because, as Gutsche put it, "the character of the cinema began to change with the institution of permanent 'picture palaces' and the attendance of audiences of more mature intelligence than the initial devotees". What Gutsche neglects to mention is that these "more mature audiences" were drawn not from the working-class poor whites, but from the petty bourgeoisie who saw it as their task to agitate for state control over cinema to protect 'civilized' values. This social movement gathered momentum primarily in the Cape and resulted in the establishment of a voluntary vigilance body known as the Bioscope Advisory Committee. This watchdog group originated directly from the Social Reform Association established in 1900.

The Committee was not concerned with content but rather the sanitary conditions which pertained in places showing films. By 1911, however, the Committee had assumed a moral guardianship as well. The secretary of the Social Reform Association proposed the formation of a censor board modeled on the American National Board of Censors of Motion Pictures. A number of women's associations demanded censorship as a means to combat the "Black Peril" wave of assaults and rape of white women by blacks. In lieu of this moral panic the Investigating Commission in its report of June 1913 advocated strict censorship of all films exhibited to mixed audiences.

The censorship movement localised in Cape Town as this was the port of entry and first screening of most films imported to South Africa. Growing concern by individuals, teachers' associations and municipalities throughout the country was mobilised by the Social Reform Association to advantage. The public reaction to the "nauseating" From the Manger to the Cross which was banned in the Cape Province provided the final impetus for the establishment of a legally recognised censorship committee, also called the Bioscope Advisory Committee, in the Cape. Exhibitors, however, were not obliged to abide
by the decisions of this body. The industry's compliance, however, was indicated by African Films Trust's donation of an annual grant of ten guineas.

In April 1916, unexpected support for censorship came from *De Volksstem* which published news about a Pathe Film on the siege of Mafeking, based of Richard Dehon's novel, *The Dop Doctor*. The film "wrongly represents the Boers as cheats, immoral and of low character", claimed the Prime Minister, General Louis Botha. The Congress of the Women's Nationalist Party and Afrikaner patriots petitioned the Prime Minister to prohibit its screening in South Africa. The British government was also cabled and requested not to allow the film's release in that country. The request by General Botha was apparently acceded to.

*The Dop Doctor* affair gave rise to a piece of "panic" legislation named the Public Performance Control Ordinance (No. 9 of 1916) effective in the Cape Province. This ordinance was the originator of a gobbet of common sense which continues to form an intrinsic part of censorship discourse. It provided for the prohibition of performances and exhibitions calculated to bring any section of the public into ridicule or contempt.

In an article in *Stage and Cinema* (7.7.1917) on a draft ordinance published by the Cape Provincial Council, the Schlesinger Organization for the first time voiced serious doubts about the fragmented method of censorship administration in South Africa. The chief complaint concerned the cost to the company of a proposed levy to be charged for censorship. The amount of .17 of a penny, if added to the .6 of a penny import duty per foot was, it averred, the thin end of the wedge. If the other three provinces followed suit, this would raise the tax to 2.57d per foot, twice the cost of the film itself. African Films Trust pointed out that though the Cape Town Advisory Board was a voluntary organization, the Trust had invariably carried out its recommendations. The Trust did not object to a centralised South African censorship board or the cooperation of provincial boards on which "the trade" was represented. The prime
concern of AFT was that their programme remain unaltered during its exhibition life.

The Cape nevertheless went ahead with the Bill which was gazetted as the Cinematograph Film Ordinance (No. 21 of 1917) promulgated on 22 August 1917. It repealed the Ordinances of 1913 and 1916 and was designed to "regulate and control places of recreation and amusement and to provide for the granting or refusal of such approval". Of particular importance were the clauses restricting (a) scenes containing references to controversial or international Politics; (b) scenes representing antagonistic relations of Capital and Labour; (c) scenes calculated to bring any section of the public into ridicule or contempt; and (d) Pugilistic encounters between Europeans and non-Europeans. It should be pointed out that most of the films imported into South Africa had already been censored by the British Board of Film Censors. Films shown in the Cape were thus subject to a dual process of approval.

This Ordinance was not applicable in the other provinces and banning in the Cape often provided an inducement to the public in the other provinces to attend a film's screening. Fourteen years were to pass before national legislation was enacted. A censorship Bill which had the approval of both African Theatres and Kinemas was introduced to Parliament on 5 March 1930. The Bill was passed the following year on 3 June 1931 and was known as the Entertainments (Censorship) Act. In addition to the clauses contained in the Cinematograph Film Ordinance of the Cape of 1917, this Act restricted the offensive portrayal of the "intermingling of Europeans and non-Europeans". In 1934, a loophole in the 1931 Act was closed preventing film societies, particularly those with native members from screening Russian films labelled as "communist propaganda". Film societies had previously been exempt from the Act.

The next major legislative incursion occurred in 1963 with the Publications and Entertainments Act. Up to this point only imported material had been censorable. This Act extended the
censor's jurisdiction to locally made films and introduced differential censorship based on race. With the industry's concurrence, mainly 20th Century Fox, appeals were no longer heard in the courts but could now only be made to the Minister of the Interior. Reasons for PCB decisions were not made public and in effect, this Act conferred upon its administrators the power to work arbitrarily and in total secrecy. During the early 1970s the government through Connie Mulder, described by Jones as "a self-acclaimed Chosen of God"\textsuperscript{15}, attempted to toughen up the censorship process. An Interdepartmental Committee of Enquiry was set up by Mulder in 1972 following a sustained series of reversals by the Supreme Court of bans ordered by the PCB on printed material, making it "an object of public ridicule, a situation which was untenable to the political party which created it"\textsuperscript{36}. Representations made by Satbel elicited the governmental response that "The Film Bosses are Happy". The Satbel deputation, concluded Jones "were taken for suckers"\textsuperscript{37}, since they had been outmaneuvered by the state.

Mulder tabled an Amendment to the 1963 Act in 1973. Having dismissed critical members of the film industry as non-members of the electorate he leaned towards the views of "a couple of draftsmen of the Gereformeerde Kerk /DRC/"\textsuperscript{38}. With uncanny predictability, Jones warned Mulder that support from the "Broederbond and Kerk" would avail the Minister nothing. Comparing Mulder to Hertzog who,

While a member of the Cabinet was always vociferous in blasting the film business, on occasions he stumped the country bawling out the moral crime of making a living out of running cinemas ... But as the impossible Albert went his way, covering himself with ridicule which began to reflect on the calibre of the Party, he was axed to enter the wilderness\textsuperscript{39}

It will be recalled from Chapter 6 that by this time Mulder's Information Department was engaged in secret propaganda projects which were later to lead to his, the President and the Chief of the Bureau for State Security's downfall. The censorship Bill must be seen against his desire to totally control the distribution and exhibition aspects of the film industry, both as far as white and black audiences were concerned.
Despite opposition from all sections of the press, including the Afrikaans press and the Akademie vir Taal, Lettere en Kuns\textsuperscript{20} the Bill was passed the following year in 1974.

The implications for capital of the Rhodie-Mulder Roadshow are difficult to assess. It does seem that Jones' disparaging remarks about a "clutch of politicians" did have some validity. One might invoke Richard Johnson's claim that allied to a material conception of ideology is a 'mental' aspect equivalent to Marx's general term 'consciousness'.\textsuperscript{21} It would seem that Mulder's actions (supported by his later exposure in the 'Muldergate' disclosures), were predicated not on the material conditions of the economic, but more on the concealment of those conditions through the design of a static apartheid political system which was able to ignore economic determinants. As with Albert Hertzog before him, and Dr AP Treurnicht after him, Mulder lost touch with material reality and the requirements of capital in general. In each case these individuals split from the National Party and formed right wing oppositions.

Having outlined the historical development of the state censorship machinery, we are now in a position to see how it worked and why, despite its, at times, bewildering and incomprehensible functioning, it works to the benefit of capital in general.

**PART II: CENSORSHIP AND IDEOLOGY IN THE CONTROL OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN FILM INDUSTRY**

The section which follows will recall the discussion in Chapter 1 on concepts of ideology. Over this is superimposed the ideas of Marta Harnecker\textsuperscript{22} who argues that objective reality consists of two kinds of ideological discourses:

1. The system of ideas and social representations (ideology in the strict sense); or 'willed' ideology, and
2. The system of attitudes and social behaviour (customs); or organic ideology.
The System of Ideas and Social Representations

Ideology in the strict sense, or what Gramsci calls 'willed' ideology, includes the political, juridical, moral, religious, aesthetic and philosophical ideas of a given society. The content of this knowledge is expressed in the form of different views of the world and of an individual's perception of his/her role in it. Ideologies are not dispassionate, scientific representations of the world, but interpretations filled with imaginary elements: rather than describe reality, they express desires, hopes and nostalgia. Ideological perceptions are not static, but tend to adapt not only according to economic determinations, but also in terms of advances in scientific knowledge. Perhaps the greatest change in world view followed the acceptance of Galileo's reformulation of astronomic common sense where he argued that the world revolves around the sun and not, as previously thought, where the sun was believed to revolve around the earth. His discovery destroyed the conventional wisdom that the universe was man-centred and resulted in man relocating his ideological perspective of his role in the cosmos. A similar change in the system of ideas and social representations occurred after Charles Darwin, and it can only be left to the imagination to comprehend the sort of change in ideological perception which might result in the South African acceptance of the historical fact that blacks were resident in South Africa long before the arrival of van Riebeeck and his party in 1652. The present ideological orientation stems from the belief that blacks and whites only met at the Fish River during the 1770s. This conviction continues to be mythified in the conservative historical literature\textsuperscript{23}, as well as numerous documentary and propaganda movies which have been made since the turn of the century through to the present. Nearly all locally made films portraying the history and people of South Africa show a neat, grossly simplified migration of northwards moving whites and southward moving blacks through an 'empty' interior eventually meeting \emph{en masse} at the Fish River in the Eastern Cape. Representations of this pattern can be seen in \textit{The Denver African Expedition} made in 1912 and \textit{Swervers van die Sandveld} (+ 1940). Certainly the
most blatant and dishonest distortion of history, statistics, processes and results is seen in the Department of Information's propaganda documentary, *Solution to the Dilemma of a Plural Society*. This film shows the usual black/white collision at the Fish River, then adds into this map the homeland territories and the British Protectorates of Bechuanaland, Swaziland and Basutoland. The visual track then animates these black areas spatially to show that blacks were apportioned fully one-half of the sub-continent, and whites the other half. This ideologically determined logic, which cannot be supported in even the most officially sanctioned history books, serves to deny the more accurate distribution of 13% of the land being given to blacks and 87% taken forcefully by whites. Even if one accepted the film's argument, this rationalisation effectively excludes mention of the quality of land assigned.

A more contentious example of ideological perception is the *verkrampte* (ultra conservative) Afrikaner's attitude toward the origin of the coloured people and their possible integration into 'white' society. This group is the result of miscegenation between early white, predominantly Dutch settlers in the Cape and elements of the indigenous non-white population. The more conservative fraction of Afrikanerdom still denies the role of their descendents in the birth of this ethnic group. Films reflecting the ambiguous class position of the coloured are invariably interfered with by the censors who ensure that the cinematic roles in which they are cast adequately portray their class determinations as assigned by the prevailing ideological discourse. Nevertheless, this ambiguity has, at times, permeated even the censors as evidenced in their reasons for demanding that Jans Rautenbach remove a scene from *Die Kandidaat* (1968) in which the question of whether coloureds were Afrikaners or not was discussed. The adjudicators felt that as coloureds might one day become Afrikaners, this sequence could give offence and should, therefore be exised. Anticipating censorship restrictions on *Katrina* (1969), the producer shot two endings. The first was true to the resolution offered by the play where the characters leave South Africa and get married in England, while the second communicated an ambiguous but unmistakeable official viewpoint where the
white Anglican priest rejects his coloured girlfriend because of their cultural and racial differences. Not surprisingly, the PCB demanded that the second option be cut into the film. Seven years later, Tommie Meyer's *Springbok* (1976) which traces the life of a coloured child, Attie, who passes for white and eventually earns Springbok rugby colours, appealed with success against the ban imposed on it by the Committee. This reversal rested on two misinterpretations by the assessing Committee. The first occurred where a white reporter seeks out the rugby player's brother, James, in a coloured township. James accuses the Afrikaans newsman: "You blokes usually come sniffing around at night". The Committee apparently attributed a sexual connotation to this accusation and ordered it to be cut out. The chairman of the Appeal Board, however, claimed that this could be a reference to anything, for example, smuggling, and therefore overturned the Committee's decision. The second excision concerned a fight in a bar between Attie and another reporter. Although little is shown of the fight itself, Attie takes his frustrations out on the bar furnishings. The Committee determined that this scene brought a section of the population into ridicule and was damaging to race relations for it constituted a confrontation between the coloured and white groups. The Appeal Board, in contrast, held that this was purely a personal altercation, since others in the bar simply looked on in an embarrassed manner. The error on the part of the Committee was further compounded in their wrongful interpretation of the phrase "White Label" which they read as "White lady" and, in the context of the scene, was therefore considered harmful to race relations.

The decisions taken with regard to these three movies, *Die Kandidaat*, *Katrina* and *Springbok*, should be seen against the background of coloured disenfranchisement during the early 1960s brought about by Prime Minister Verwoerd. This action was supported and encouraged by the Broederbond which regarded "This courageous step ... as one of the most important milestones in our struggle for white survival". Having gained total sovereignty for whites in Parliament, the media had to be persuaded to legitimate the lack of coloured representation
through the construction of a discursive order manifested in a modified set of social relations where the coloured group's economic subordination is legislatively entrenched. The PCB constituted one of the mechanisms whereby ideological interpellations could be affirmed in terms of the hegemonic alliance. Thus, censorship operates in terms of all three of Therborn's criteria: shielding, restriction and the delimited appropriation of discourse\textsuperscript{26}. In other words, the PCB acted as a channel through which 'willed' ideology as a consciously articulated discourse intercepted the more fundamental organic experience from which it stemmed.

Having briefly outlined the discourse of 'willed' ideology, we are now in a position to probe into the organic ideology of racial capitalism to discover the discursive mechanisms which govern the practice of the film industry.

The System of Attitudes and Social Behaviour

The study of the effects of 'willed' ideology cannot be separated from an analysis of organic ideology or social behaviour which makes up all the habits, customs and tendencies to act and react in a certain way. Ideological perspectives in their strict sense may be redefined to cope with change in economic or social realities, but less easy to change are the habits, attitudes and customary ways of living by the individual subject. For example, although economic pragmatism in 1980 resulted in the elevation of South African Chinese to "honorary white status", many whites still conceptualise these people as being inferior. In this case, ideology in the strict or 'willed' sense was easily redefined to take advantage of an expected export-based financial gain, but it takes longer for this new content to become generally articulated and be accepted as part of the organic or 'lived' relationship between people. A more pertinent example may be drawn from the film industry itself. Prior to 1974, differential censorship was applied to black, white, coloured and Indian audiences. A movie considered suitable for white children might have been banned for black adults. About 30% of films passed for whites were banned for
black viewers. The 1974 Publications Act, however, waived this provision but covered itself should it want to ban films for blacks only in the future in the clause that it could ban films to "persons in any other category specified by the Committee". This resulted in the same movies being seen by both white and non-white audiences but at different venues. A few multi-racial cinemas did exist but their earning potential prior to 1 April 1975 when the '74 Act came into effect had been greatly curtailed through differential censorship which reduced possible options which could be seen by whites and blacks and even racial sub-divisions within the latter category (such as Asiatics and coloureds). Even in these cinemas and those open to all sections of the non-white community, seating segregation was the norm. This separation is gradually, though by no means completely being eroded. The first sign of integration initially appeared in the form of segregated drive-ins in which black and white audiences simultaneously viewed the same movie from opposite sides of a dividing wall. During 1980 the Department of Community Development granted permission for certain drive-ins to lift all race bars even to the extent of toilets, eating facilities, entrance and exits. Although applications have been made by various chains for multi-racial status for some of their major city cinemas, these have yet to be granted\textsuperscript{27}. It is significant that no resistance has been monitored from white drive-in audiences to the opening up of drive-ins to all races, though some opposition is being experienced in terms of suburban cinemas\textsuperscript{28}.

Influences brought to bear on the dominant ideology are in part propelled by economic considerations and the demands of capital. In the case of cinema, the desire of exhibitors to open their doors to all-comers is not an altruistic move, but rather an attempt to maximise their market potential. Open cinemas no longer restricted by discriminatory censorship will obviously earn greater profits than was the case under the Publications Act of 1963. Furthermore, the growth of white audiences was slowing down and were expected to diminish dramatically with the introduction of television in 1976. For these and other reasons which will be dealt with later, the new Publications Act of 1974 made provision for change and rationalisation,
apparently much to the surprise of the distribution and exhibition sections of the industry. The response of exhibitors to this modification in the Publications Act was delayed, for only in 1980 did they realise the implications for the marketing of cinema. Their subsequent decision to apply for open status for some of their cinemas was possible in view of the religious, moral and philosophical changes in the 'willed' ideology which had occurred since the resignation of BJ Vorster as Prime Minister in 1978. Modifications in ideological content which have taken place since then are both an acknowledgement of the changing class structure of black society as well as representing a strategy to co-opt the rapidly expanding black middle class into an alliance with the hegemonic bloc.

The objective of adapting apartheid ideology to take cognizance of structural changes occurring in South Africa's economic base is planned to bring about an entrenchment of this expanding emergent middle class. The strategy is to structure the class alliance in a way which will effectively contain the working-class, which will continue to provide the cheap labour upon which racial capitalism is based.

Ideological Structure and Economic Determination

We have seen that ideology has its own content, its own laws of operation and development. Any cultural product such as, for example, cinema, is the result to two kinds of ideological determinations, one internal to the ideological structure itself, and the other external (the juridico-political).

The internal determination might be likened to the process of self-censorship. It was highly unlikely, for example, that any exhibitor would have applied for multi-racial permits prior to 1974. The reasons are two-fold: first, the government would not have granted permission at that time since such a request would have contravened the ecological setting of the cinema in that it would have created the impression that it was being 'political'; and second, the publicity generated by such a move might have had an adverse effect on the corporate image.
and hence income of the exhibitor for transcending the social organization of discourse implied in the term 'entertainment'.

It is the external determination, however, which is decisive in the final instance for it represents the web of political constraints and juridical methods of enforcement sanctioned by the state in law.

1. External Determinations: the Juridico-Political Functions of Censorship

In addition to economic and ideological structures, every society possesses a combination of institutional apparatuses and norms designed to regulate the operation of society as a whole. Such devices are called the juridico-political agents of enforcement. This determination is external in nature and performs a double function: firstly, that of technical administration; and secondly, political domination. The administrative function is subordinate to, and is at the service of, the function of political domination. Against this definition of the state there cannot exist administrative tasks that are neutral or non-political. The major function of state apparatuses, censorship included, is to maintain a position of ideological and political dominance over all the other classes which are made dependent on it. The most effective instrument to the hegemonic bloc in the maintenance of its dominant position is racism, which for many years formed the basis of differential censorship. Some examples from Hansard will demonstrate the validity of this observation in unambiguous terms:

In 1963, the Minister of the Interior stated:

the Hon Member for Houghton [Helen Suzman] is simply re-affirming her political faith that no distinction should be drawn on the grounds of race and colour. She has of course been harping on the same string for many years, and the tune is one which does not appeal much to right thinking people ... [We] know what sort of film it would be to show to a race that has not yet reached the level of civilization that we have reached. We know that things which they cannot understand
should not be shown to them and that there are some films which can be exhibited much more safely to a white child of fourteen years of age than to an adult Bantu. There must be good reasons why the film industry does not want this right of appeal to the courts ... the film industry and the Board of Censors have met each other on a certain basis throughout the years and certain standards have been built up.\h

The Minister of Police and Justice, Mr JT Kruger, complained of the insidious influence Sidney Poitier's *In the Heat of the Night* (1968) would undoubtedly have on the morale of the white South African Police Force:

*In the Heat of the Night* was a film telling the story of a stupid white policeman who worked with a particularly clever non-white detective. These two always worked together to the detriment of the whites and to the advantage of the non-whites. If this is not something injurious to race relations in this country, I do not know what is.\h

And again, Mr Kruger on *Africa Addio* (1970), a film banned throughout Africa and condemned as a fake by most Western countries: "*Africa Addio* confirmed to us what we already know about Africa ... we know what would happen in Africa if the Black people were to take over this country."\h These statements and many others like them clearly demarcate the procedures which are internal to apartheid discourse and which are designed to protect it from alternative interpretations. By means of this shielding process in terms of both black and white audiences, albeit from different discursive perspectives, the state has the effect of displacing causation onto the 'cultural' and 'racial' from the economic. The origins of the colour bar, as previously mentioned, were only partly a response to some deep seated ideological beliefs and prejudices, but mainly a response to the threat against the privileges inherent in a specific class structure. In film and other aspects of life, the displacement from the economic to the racial/cultural is manifested in a situation where the practices and functions of each group are determined by the capitalist relations of production and made to appear natural through the shielding of discourse.
The maintenance of racial capitalism depends on the existence of a cheap labour pool and the dominant ideology which reconciles those in control of the means of production to their God given role and 'higher' form of civilization. In other words, the perpetuation of apartheid depends on the degree of control that the hegemonic bloc is able to exert on the social formation as a whole -- that is, on both the dominated and the dominant. Film and cinema form only one component in the media mix (schools, radio, television, press, magazines, churches, etc) which contribute to the spread of the dominant ideology.

In terms of this hypothesis, censorship should not be seen as a monolithic straitjacket which is imposed on the society from the outside, but rather as a manifestation of the values and ideology of the most powerful elements of the society it serves. Censorship is a formal state apparatus engaged in the function of social and ideological control.

The Structure of Censorship: A Cybernetic Analysis

Social manipulation is effected through the control of information transmitted, through the content of a movie, for example (Fig.1). Control may be cybernetically defined as political intervention which restricts deviation from socio-economic goals or objectives to within socio-ideologically defined limits. The control process is based on a feedback loop through which the output of a system or its actual performance (for example, reflections of social experience on film) is linked to its input (laws and legislation) in such a way that variations in output (or content) from some pre-set norm or goal (the portrayal of the Afrikaner as a God-fearing person, for instance) results in compensatory behaviour that tends to restore the system output (or cinematic reflection of social behaviour) to that goal. This self-adaption is known as homeostasis and is brought about by the action of sensory mechanisms (cultural watchdogs, pressure groups, the church) which have a capacity to anticipate and monitor disturbances (such as the introduction of new philosophical material, counter ideologies etc)
which may arise from the system's environment. Information is then fed to the decision-making device which in the present instance is the Directorate of Publications. This body may decide to specify further action (such as additional cuts or banning) which will effectively deal with the disturbances monitored by the sensory mechanism. The outcome is that errant ideological output is returned to within discursively acceptable limits. The whole process is guided and entrenched by the juridico-political system which is able to draw on state machinery (laws, methods of enforcement, sanctions) to ensure the continuance of the prevailing ideological philosophy. If the variety or regulatory capacity of the decision-making device (or Directorate of Publications) is not equal to that of the disturbances, it will cease to function effectively. It will have to modify its structure if it is to successfully contain and meet a variety of new disturbances which may otherwise cause the demise of the existing ideology or the status quo. This occurred, for example, in 1974 when the 1963 Publications and Entertainment Act was replaced with legislation designed to better cope with the disturbances which could not be adequately matched by the increasingly unpredictable, preposterous and arbitrary manner employed by the PCB at the time. Public incredulity, already fuelled by PCB chairman Jannie Kruger's incredible remarks about Afrikaans girls not getting pregnant out of wedlock as is implied in both Debbie and Freddie's in Love, was further goaded by his remarks to film director, Mario Schiess, also reported in Parliament: "How dare you title a film Onwettige Huwelik (Unlawful Wedding) here in South Africa? Here in South Africa there is no such thing as an unlawful wedding". These were three of many similarly and even more ridiculous examples which highlighted Jannie Kruger's reign.

The 1974 Act, having initially gained for itself a new credibility fell prey to the same process and, under the chairmanship of Judge Snyman, became progressively less able to match the variety of disturbances impinging on it from the real world, though never matching the inertia of his predecessor. It is significant that Snyman's successor, Dr Kobus van Rooyen who took office in 1980, will not allow himself to be
drawn into public debate for this policy will reduce the probability of disturbances upsetting the dominant discourse. As The Star points out, "these insights (public statement) into the working of a censor's mind were what helped speed the retirement of his predecessor". Van Rooyen thus had to protect the variety of the decision-making device (or DP) and reduce the probability for disturbances. This he did by altering the norms of censorship and refining the image of the Directorate. He evolved a dual strategy: first, by refusing to publically discuss censorship, let alone defend it, and second, by basing decisions not on Snyman's "average man in the street with a Standard Seven education", but on the "probable reader" or film-goer. This move does not affect the content of what is allowed to be seen or read so much as enhancing the sophistication of the variety or regulative capacity of the decision-making device. Enhancement of the variety enabled the Directorate to match the increasing disturbances which stemmed from PW Botha's 'liberalising' policies which required that whites be socialised into adopting practices better able to cope with the shifting class structure of which a stable, urban, skilled black middle class was a prime component. The identification of the "probable viewer" was a key element in the Directorate's new strategy for social control. On the one hand, the demands of the probable viewer are met for his/her conception of film as art is bourgeois and aesthetic in origin, having little to do with context, and on the other, increased political censorship paralleled by an easing in sexual censorship and the use of expletives, creates the impression of liberalisation while at the same time considerably tightening the socio-political constraints of censorship.

In cinema, control mechanisms work in two ways. At the first level, it may totally prevent the seeping through of new philosophical material considered unsuitable for South African audiences. Such competing discourses are eliminated either through outright banning or censorship cuts. Bertolucci's 1900 (1976) for example, was banned outright in 1978 because the Appeal Board found that the uprising of Italian peasants
was presented in a favourable light, contravening the dominant discourse in South Africa. The film was therefore determined by the Board to promote the aims of communism and banned in terms of the Internal Security Act No. 44 of 1950. The very fact that the Directorate could identify a parallel between Italian conditions of the last century and 'the present South African situation suggests that 1900 must be considered dangerous for the continued supremacy of the ruling classes in this country. Hence the disturbance is removed entirely, the dominant discourse shielded and the potential of cinema being used as a site of ideological struggle eliminated. While censorship has a stabilising function on a macro scale within the social formation, it does create a residue of resentment among film-goers who interpellate their practice in terms of 'art' which they see as "a noun of 'inner' process, specialised to its presumed agencies in 'intellectual life' and the arts". Such an interpellation, grounded as it is on common sensical nations of 'improving the mind', 'social refinement' and 'supporting the arts', has no space for a conception of cinema as a site of ideological struggle. A film like 1900, therefore, poses little danger to the state if seen by subjects who consider this kind of 'intellectual' cinema as art. The category of the "probable viewer" is designed to serve this audience and to eliminate whatever limited disturbance it may cause. This is effected through censorship exemptions for activities which predicate themselves upon elitist social practices identified as film festivals and film societies. The major supporters of these events are drawn from the bourgeois and petty bourgeois white classes whose potential for creating disturbance is matched by the act of viewing. A similar hypothesis may be offered as far as black viewers of these events are concerned. A case in point is 1900 which the Directorate permitted the 1980 Cape Town International Film Festival to screen to an invited audience on three occasions. In this way, the Directorate is able to match and ameliorate a specific sub-culture of the variety existing in the social formation and dissipate the demand that the film be made available to the whole cinema-going public. In other words, the Directorate is trying to co-opt that specific audience which would otherwise be more critical of its censorship function.
On the other hand, a movie like *Terrorist* (1976) succeeded on appeal. In this case the Directorate ordered cuts and additions which had the calculated result of manipulating the theme and re-orienting it in terms of the dominant ideological discourse. An end title had to be cut in stating that the surviving terrorist was later taken into custody by the South African Defence Force. According to the Appeal Board: "The emphasis is thus changed from a successful to an unsuccessful terrorist attack".

Perhaps the classic example of ideological control concerned the discursive sanctions experienced by director Sven Persson on his film *Land Apart* (1974). During the production stage Persson was repeatedly harrassed by government departments and stalled by repressive state machinery. Security Police or Bureau for State Security (BOSS) agents kept the crew under surveillance and scared away some of the people Persson had lined up for interviews. Film rushes airfreighted from England to Jan Smuts Airport disappeared under mysterious circumstances. Another consignment turned up at John Vorster Square where Persson was obliged to screen the rushes to the police. Permission to film scenes in Soweto was refused despite the fact that Persson had made a propaganda documentary of Soweto for the Johannesburg City Council only eighteen months earlier. The Postmaster General refused to allow Persson to take shots of the Post Office Tower Restaurant in Johannesburg notwithstanding the fact that scenes had been filmed in that restaurant both before, and after Persson's request, by other film companies. Permission to attend the Vendaland elections was refused by the Department of Bantu Administration and Development.

On initial submission to the Directorate in March 1974 the film was passed by the Committee. The chairman of the Board, Jannie Kruger, however, demanded a special screening, whereupon he banned it. A personal appeal was made to Kruger who responded that he would make an exception and accept a re-submission with specified changes. The changes were made and the film re-submitted in August 1974. Kruger banned it again.
In October 1974, an appeal was made to Connie Mulder, Minister of the Interior, who upheld the banning. According to stated procedure, two years had to elapse before the film could again be submitted, or it could be re-submitted immediately under a different title with substantially altered content. Persson decided to follow the latter course and, resulting from representations by Dr Jan Marais, a National Party MP, and Mr DP de Villiers, chairman of Nasionale Pers, Dr Eschel Rhodie's assistant, Les de Villiers, was detailed to outline the Department's objection to the film. The film was retitled *The South Africans* and re-submitted in March 1976. On this third attempt the film was again passed by the Committee. The new chairman, a Mr Pretorius, however, demanded further cuts relating to Marais Steyn, who in the film criticises the government from the Opposition Bench, but who had, in the interim, crossed the floor and was now a National Party Cabinet Minister. Pretorius, fortunately for the producer, neglected to lodge his complaint timeously and the company was able to force a compromise with the Board. After two years of conflict with the Directorate the film eventually obtained censorship exemption.

The Department of Information under Eschel Rhodie remained opposed to the film throughout and it is significant that the 1974 appeal made to the Minister of the Interior could not hope to succeed because this position was filled by Connie Mulder who was also the Minister of Information. Rhodie, who described the film as "extremely distorted" expressed dissatisfaction that MGM was to distribute the film in South Africa. Representations were made via the Prime Minister's office to the MGM Head Office in California who were informed that distribution of *The South Africans* was counter to the best interests of South Africa and MGM itself. Apparently, Andre Pieterse, then vice-president of MGM International and frontman for the Information Department's secret project on black cinema, paved the way for such representations. *The South Africans* was finally released in 1976 through a few independent cinemas after the commencement of the riots it had predicted. Most of the prophecies of the original version had already occurred and many of the interviewees were either
in goal, banned, exiled or dead.

In such instances the state and the Directorate behave as a unified decision-making device which sets out to control the discursive content of cinema and specifies action which brings any erring discourse encoded in the text into line with the expectations of the dominant ideology. Ideology in the strict sense, as in the case of The South Africans, eventually penetrated its counter-ideological liberal discourse through the mechanism of capital. Despite the support that the director had from his producer during his three year conflict with the state, the level was not sustained. It is significant that when this author wanted to screen The South Africans on the Witwatersrand University campus in 1980 he was told by a spokesman for the production company, which had diversified into other activities, that permission would not be granted because "that film has been a terrible embarrassment to my company. We have a lot of Defence contracts, you know".

The second control device becomes operative where the Directorate has inadvertently allowed questionable discourse to remain. This creates a disturbance and the audience-as-subjects either make adjustments to accommodate the new influences, or information is fed back by cultural watchdogs such as Akte Morale Standaarde (Action Moral Standards), Die Vrouefederasie (Afrikaans Women's Federation), Members of Parliament or individuals to the Minister of the Interior. On receipt of complaints he may call on the Appeal Board to review the Directorate's original decision. The system, for example, eventually adjusted to and accepted the new information introduced regarding the sexual mores of the boeredogter in films like Debbie (1965) and the genre it spawned. In Debbie, where the boeredogter falls pregnant out of wedlock, the director was constrained to merely showing Debbie and her boyfriend "holding hands" to which he added some rather obvious symbolism to make his point. The financial success of the film, however, led to the development of the conflict-love genre and later movies reflect a liberation of Afrikaner morality where even the suggestion of pre-marital sex is condoned under specific and
discursive circumstances (for example, Die Winter 14 Julie (1977), Fifth Season/Vyfde Seisoen (1978), Elsa se Geheim (19 (1979) and Grennabasis 13 (1979))50 Wild Season (1967) and Die Kandidaat (1968) ran the gauntlet of cultural rejection and at times, PCB wrath, but were eventually accepted in a modified state by the dominant ideology. Numerous examples exist in respect of imported movies. Seven Beauties (1975), Godspell (1973) and The Rocky Horror Picture Show (1976) were all banned subsequent to release, while Tommy (1975) and Mad Max (1980) had post-release cuts imposed. The Omen (1976) continued with pre-release cuts despite a vast 'letters to the Editor' campaign by Aksie Morele Standaarde.

Two further internal mechanisms by which the Directorate is able to appeal to the Publications Appeal Board against a decision of its own Committee before a film goes on circuit need to be examined. The first mechanism may be illustrated with reference to Elmo de Witt's n Beeld vir Jeannie (1976) which deals with a conflict between "Afrikaner and Super-Afrikaner". The Committee ordered that certain references to the Broederbond and Rapportryer organization be deleted to avoid giving offence to certain sections of the community. Surprisingly, the Appeal Board argued that these two bodies did not represent population groups since they could not be "identified by race, nationality, phenotypes, habits, behaviour patterns and so on which is inherited from father to son and which are an inherent part of those people". The appeal was upheld and the cuts reinstated. Clearly, such references did not go counter the prevailing ideological discourse, but the reasons for the Board's failure to support the Committee's decision remain unclear.

A second internal mechanism concerns the Minister of the Interior's relationship with the Appeal Board. Since the Board is also able to hear appeals on his direction, he is theoretically in a position to influence the findings of the Board, since he may or may not react to public complaints. His function is to stabilise internal dissent within the Directorate and ensure that a decision or reconsideration of
a decision coincides with the prevailing discourse or 'willed' ideology.

There are, however, when neither mechanism is activated but where the film is, nevertheless, manipulated into ideological acceptability by the distributor according to how he thinks pre-censorship cuts might affect the adjudicators decision on age restrictions. Although Satbel now deny that they pre-censor their films, in 1973, Pierre Louw, a senior official of Ster Films, wrote:

Initially I attend a private screening of the film together with marketing officials of our company. My colleagues and I then assess the marketing potential of the film, and in accordance with their plans, I sum up the censorship problems. If they want to market it as a family-film then I have to present it to the censorship board in a form expected to render an A-certificate for general release. If there are scenes of unnecessary violence or a bedroom scene with a few offending sections, I then decide to remove them before submission to the Board (emphasis added).

If my colleagues decide that the film should be distributed for adult audiences, then I only remove those parts which could possibly result in the film being rejected outright.

This pre-empting of the Board's function is termed self-censorship and constitutes an informal control mechanism which exists outside the formal juridico-political machinery, but which is, nevertheless consequent upon it. This stabilising behaviour is the result of the feedback process where the system controls itself by re-inserting into itself the results of its past performance: if a certain type of shot has been rejected in the past, it is likely to be rejected again. This experience offers the distributor a discursive guide for action. If he removes the perceived offending shots before submission to the censors, he is reducing, if not eliminating, sources of disturbance by artificially limiting the variety of the real world. Thus the Directorate comes to operate increasingly within an incestuous discursive circle which is progressively diminishing in variety as it becomes unable to cope with the more serious disturbances which impinge upon it.
from the real world, as when, for example, a competing distributor makes no effort to pre-censor its films. Where the Directorate has passed a film, *Seven Beauties*, for example, a minimal disturbance will ensure its subsequent banning. In this way, the Directorate, once a moderator of affirmed ideological discourse, becomes isolated from the objective, ideologically determined real world and may begin to make irrelevant and even counter-productive decisions, as was the case of the PCB under Jannie Kruger before 1974 and to a lesser extent the Directorate during the late 1970s, and the Appeal Board under Judge Snyman.

*Censorship, Blacks and the Class System Post-1975*

The Directorate of Publications is sensitive primarily to those in control of political power, however small their proportion. We have already dealt with the issue of differential censorship under the 1963 Act which, amongst other paradoxical decisions, banned Zulu viewers from seeing the film *Zulu* (1966). In 1980, Snyman stated, "Of blacks I have no knowledge at all" and that it was for Parliament to decide if blacks should be appointed to the censorship committees. Hence, decisions are made in respect of the wishes of whites, irrespective of protests from the more populous but politically weak majority.

Films which might be considered offensive to the black population, such as those made by white producers for indigenous audiences, are rarely restricted. Indeed, an Italian production, *Africa Addio*, re-released after the 1976 riots, which deliberately shows up black people throughout Africa in a savage light, continued to be screened despite vigorous protests from the black community and liberal white elements. Significantly, the film was restricted to white audiences only, although four of the six advertising posters were banned. The passing of *Autobiography of Miss Jane Pitman*, a docudrama dealing with the life of an American civil rights activist, to white audiences only, suggests a move towards a more sympathetic acceptance of social integration as far as the dominant group is concerned. The Directorate's discriminatory decision,
however, also implies a fear that black audiences need to be shielded from civil rights discourse since they may interpret it as definite proof of change, and consequently demand a faster pace of reform than could be adequately managed by the dominant ideology without experiencing extreme stress and strain.

Prior to the 1974 Act, about one in three films passed by the PCB were banned for black viewership. Between 1 April 1975 and 31 December 1980, only three films were restricted to white audiences only: Africa Addio, Autobiography of Miss Jane Pitman and The Klansmen. When released for the first time in 1970, Africa Addio was banned for black audiences. This ban was not revised for its re-release in 1976 nor did the distributor or exhibitor appeal against this original restriction. Autobiography of Miss Jane Pitman was originally banned for black audiences only, although passed for white spectators. Re-submission in 1980 led to the reinstatement of the various cuts previously ordered, but the film remained banned for blacks. The film has yet to be released on the cinema circuit having been turned down by most exhibitors presumably through the fear of alienating their white audiences.

In general, films which the black middle class might find insulting, such as those specifically made for local black audiences, are not removed from the circuits. The reason is that they fulfill a basic discursive function in persuading people, particularly the working-class which constitutes the bulk of their viewers, to act out their designated roles as labour units assigned to them by the economy. Such films perpetuate the myth that the black person is an ignorant creature who needs to be saved from himself, while at the same time reinforcing the prejudices of the dominant classes in their perception of the domination as 'natural' in terms of their God-given superiority and moral duty to civilize indigenous black populations. Hence the fact that the censors allow films like Africa Addio to be seen by whites.

The re-release of Africa Addio in 1976 was a deliberate
marketing decision coinciding with the aftermath of the riots which broke out on June 16 1976. The distributor's intention was to derive income by providing a product which would re-affirm the white audience's belief in the innate savagery of black people and legitimate white dominance on the sub-continent. Indeed, this film does this for the white viewer as it concludes its trip through a ravaged Africa in South Africa where all is harmonious, opulent, ordered, stable and happy. The example of Africa Addio illustrates how cinematic violence provides a discursive site to condition subjects to resist actual or perceived civil disturbances and potential insurrection from suppressed sections of the population. Unlike other countries such as England and Sweden which impose strict censorship controls on the depiction of violence, the South African censors are far more lenient with regard to violence than they are in sexual references. According to the Appeal Board which overturned a decision by a committee to impose a 4-16 age restriction on Spoor (1975), children should gradually be made aware of the realities of life which in Spoor included battlefields littered with the wounded and the dead during the Anglo-Boer War. Reporting on this decision, Bill Sharp, then Satbel censorship advisor, writes:

> With the violence on our borders, riots in other parts of the world and crimes being disseminated daily through the media - we would be doing the child an injustice by keeping these matters from him and lulling him into a sense of false security".

The logic of the Board's reasoning, supported by an industry spokesman, underlies a realisation that racial capitalism is unable to cope with outside disturbances without recourse to violence and physical intimidation. The 'enemy', whether British imperialism, the swart gevaar (black danger) or 'terrorists' on our borders is thereby brutally, though legitimately coerced into submission, while the consent of white South African viewers must be engineered through the naturalization of such repressive measures. The increasing military threat to South Africa's borders had become much more oppressive at the time of Spoor's release. Portugal had divested itself
of both Mozambique and Angola and Rhodesia was disintegrating fast. South Africa was beginning to seriously anticipate the fact of being surrounded by hostile governments. Towards the end of 1975 South Africa invaded Angola and six months later, the Soweto riots broke out. South Africans needed to be reassured of the legitimacy and efficacy of the coercive steps being taken by the state to combat both the internal and external threats to the cohesion of nation and society. To achieve this affirmative aim, censorship became one of the prime mechanisms by which the state tried to smooth over the perception of ideological contradictions and hide the flaw in apartheid ideology.

The Flaw in Apartheid Ideology and the Need for Censorship

Despite the extensive arsenal of state apparatuses incorporated within the politico-juridical system for coercive control, apartheid ideology has not been entirely successful in subsuming differing discourses and counter-ideologies into the social formation as a single harmonious entity. Although it has been argued that the institution of censorship should be seen as a manifestation of the dominant ideology, this does not mean that total homogeneity exists amongst all whites who make up these classes. Even though they may participate in counter-ideological practices (such as oppositional film making), by virtue of their class determinations they remain supportive of the class structure. Within the black population too, one group represented by the homeland leaders are accommodated within the dominant ideology, while another important sector (mainly students and school children) have rejected it, sometimes violently.

The major structural flaw in apartheid is its fragility and its consequent inability to withstand critical disturbances either from within or without the system. In order to minimise the impact of such infringements, the state which can be regarded as the coercive arm of society, has had to increase its mechanisms of control through the increasingly stringent application of state ideological machinery as well as in terms
of brute force within the wider society. Against a background of apparent large scale liberalisation of this country's racially based restrictions, the much vaunted return to a free-enterprise economy, the lifting of bannings of locally written novels, a seeming marked easing of cinema censorship, the opening of theatre and some drive-ins to all races, and the appointment of a verligte head to the SABC, it is the logical conclusion of my thesis that such moves are ideologically based, propelled by adjustment occurring in the national economy as it shifts from a labour intensive industry to a capital intensive and skills based productive process. As such, it is obvious that liberalisation on the fringes of apartheid must be paralleled by a stronger intensification on the part of the state to maintain the dominant position of white Nationalism. This trend has been wilfully overlooked, by even the opposition press which is itself part of the dominant group, by stating that apartheid was 'dead' and that a new 'dispensation' was around the corner. What the press did not seem to realise was that they had been co-opted by the government into extending the boundaries of the delimited appropriation of discourse through the preparation of subjects into the emerging class structure.

It is unfortunate that most criticism of censorship as it is applied in South Africa is offered simply at the level of sex and nudity. This over-emphasis tends to obscure the more vital function of the Directorate, that of the maintenance and reinforcement of the ideological stance of the hegemonic bloc. The recent DP judgements which place less emphasis on nudity, sex or the use of expletives, do not necessarily indicate a more 'enlightened' approach to censorship, but rather an adjusting cybernetic system of social control. This system is able to increasingly take cognizance of liberalised sexual mores and subsume such behaviour into its general workings without experiencing the debilitating disturbances which might have once been the case. This is clearly demonstrated by the expanding capacity of the system to accommodate the otherwise serious disturbances which might have been caused by the screening of hard-core pornography in Swaziland and Lesotho, and soft-core in the 'independent' homelands like Transkei and
Bophuthatswana. Since the dominant ideology holds that these 'national states' are indeed independent, their screening of material banned in South Africa fulfills a double function. On the one hand they provide a vicarious outlet to South African subjects who are denied access to such fare back 'home', and on the other, it 'proves' to both South Africans and the world that these states are 'free'. Little negative reaction has been forthcoming from pressure groups in South Africa even though these films are advertised in major metropolitan newspapers. This complaisance is further indicated by the recent disbanding of Aksie Morele Standaarde, the more pressing problems facing Parliamentary debate and the fact that these films are shown in the appropriate ecological setting: that of a 'foreign' country -- and as the repetitively stated gobbled of common sense goes: 'South Africa does not interfere with the internal policies of other countries'.

The analysis now turns to the question of how the allied state apparatuses of censorship assist in creating a climate of self-censorship and how ideology comes to assume a greater importance on the direct control of images seen in South African films than the fact of censorship itself.

2. Internal Determinations: The Discursive Mechanisms of Self-Censorship

The fear of censorship works at all levels of the production and distribution process. Five basic types of constraint can be identified:

1. Financiers will not invest capital into a venture which they perceive might fall foul of the censors.

2. The structure of the subsidy scheme ensures that it is only the commercially successful films which qualify for aid. The major implications of such financial assistance are (a) that film makers practice self-censorship as a means of economic survival; and (b) that the hegemonic bloc gives itself permission to choose in accordance with its own tastes. As director Marie du Toit puts it,
"Here we are dependent on a handful of Afrikaans people who, if they don't like a film, we've had it and can't go on to our next production". This response typified by du Toit is, according to Robert Greig, a direct result of the Afrikaans film maker's unwillingness to separate him/herself from the "ideology-forming structures of society". The Afrikaans film maker has tended to automatically accept the fact that Afrikaans capital is the only logical source of finance. Added to this is the voluntary anticipation of censorship and the reluctance to break with previously successful genres. An industry based purely on the profit motive is hardly likely to go counter the wishes of the censors.

3. The consequence is that producers will tend to clear questionable aspects of their script with the relevant authorities such as the Police, Security Police, Defence Force, Administration Boards, educational authorities and so on. It has already been pointed out that such administrative bodies perform a political function. It is not therefore surprising that advice given will be in accordance with government policy. One recalls the words of Dr AH Jonker, Member of Parliament for Fort Beaufort and National Party authority on desirable and undesirable literature:

If an author has any doubts he takes his manuscript to the Board and says: Please help me here. And if the Board says to him: You are still a young author; delete this and your work will be better. He will say when he gets older and wiser that the Board had put him on the right road.

This statement made in 1963 still has relevance today. Clearance is generally obtained at the pre-production stage and is thought to provide the producer with insurance against possible embargoes or restrictions being placed on their films by the censors when finally submitted for release. Some producers have even submitted scripts as publications to the Directorate itself, as in the case of Springbok (1976). The script was declared "undesirable" by the Committee. A strong minority
report, however, encouraged the producer to appeal. The plea was successful and the production went ahead. On submission of the film, it was approved subject to a number of cuts. On appeal, all but three of the cuts were replaced.

Screenwriters too, have to brave the interlocking units of legislation -- the Suppression of Communism Act, the Protection of Information Act, the Internal Security Act etc -- all vaguely worded, and linking up with the Publication Control Act Section 47 (e) in their attempts not to bring the police or other government machinery into contempt, or jeopardise the security of the state, the general welfare, or the peace and good order. It has already been mentioned that the Directorate is able to interfere with themes, story-lines and resolutions, and it is not, therefore, surprising that even the dedicated feature film makers in this country find themselves pre-censoring their films and checking them out with administrative bodies which exist by virtue of the state. The existence of any film which contains even a hint of criticism must be interpreted as an aberration, even down to innocuous satires like Kootjie Emmer (1977) and Skolma (1980). The former film makes fun of the state security apparatus and methods of repression by allegorically delineating a small Karoo town and its petty power struggles as South Africa and its inhabitants. Skolma, on the other hand, is more direct in its satire and the people and offices it is criticising, but very vague as to setting and location. Although Skolma was released without interference, the Directorate did give the producer some cause for introspection.

Some industry spokesmen argue that local producers are simply passing the buck and that they are either incapable or afraid of making films which foray beyond the dominant discourse. However, when the costs of feature film making, the past record of the PCB and DP, and the timidity of distributors are considered, it is to be expected that producers take every possible precaution to minimise their risks of restriction or banning.

4. Those films which are able to escape the constraints of capital and which move into ideologically sensitive
territoary or which are at variance with the dominant ideology still have to obtain distribution from companies which not only ally themselves with capital and the dominant discourse, but which are, in fact, themselves an intrinsic contributor to that discourse.

Reception from distributors to *The South Africans* (1976), for example, was hostile. The film was rejected by JJ Marais, chairman of Satbel even before he had seen it. Although the managing director of Ster liked the film and Dr A Wassenaar, managing director of the holding company, SANLAM, was receptive, Marais' reason for rejection was attributed to the poor performance of a previous 'political' film, *Die Sestig Jaar van John Vorster* (1976). Satbel argued that since *The South Africans* was also of a 'political' nature it had little chance of a reasonable box office income in the light of the failure of *John Vorster*. *The South Africans* was eventually screened at independent cinemas and hawked around university campuses in 16mm format despite the occasional presence of security policemen. It will be recalled that the production company was so intimidated by the continuing action of the state that after it had earned its cost the film was removed from the circuit entirely.

The analysis now moves to a discussion of the effects of state action on audience response, and so to the fifth constraint operating on the producer not to go beyond accepted limits:

5. The cumulative effect of the actions of the censors operating in concert with other repressive state machinery is an audience and industry unwilling to support movies which are analytical and introspective of the South African situation.

Cinematic criticism is permissible in imported films, but not local offerings. This occurs because of the incestuous links between Afrikaans film makers, capital and the state. Since producers rarely know 'what the audience wants' they aim their treatments with a view to soliciting capital and obtaining the cooperation of the state. The result, argues Robert Greig, is
a static view of the audience which assumes a coincidence between audience wants and cultural/political reassurance. Any film maker who tries to explore local issues and stories is considered to be acting irresponsibly by an industry conditioned on clichés and slogans. 'Give the public what it wants' is the marketing cry of film executives. What the public wants, as has been previously argued, is to a large extent conditioned by the organic ideology common to the greater proportion of the cinema audience. Organic ideology is reflected in terms of taste, and correspondingly, the attendance of genre films. Once such films are known to be successful they are emulated and distributors back them with high powered marketing campaigns. Thus, organic ideology is fuelled by the limits of what is distributed and what is distributed depends on organic ideology. Changes in organic ideology, which almost invariably results from changing circumstances unrelated to cinematic content, are quickly seized upon by distributors as exploitable new themes which then become vogue in film. The organic ideology consequent upon the urban trek, for example, led to the development of the conflict-love type genre in Afrikaans film discussed in the next chapter.

So indiscernable is the ideology of local film makers from their experience of life that few are even aware of the incestuous circle which governs audience wants. Unlike the conflict-love type genre which successfully intercepted 'audience wants', attempts to illuminate intellectual sub-themes within organic ideology as Rautenbach tried to do with Jannie Totaleis which illustrated the sub-culture best exemplified by the Sestigers are met with scepticism by both the mass audience and the industry. That Rautenbach's films did not spawn a genre tradition indicates the limited currency of Sestiger elements within the organic ideology of the wider society. Similarly, the white liberal attitudes towards race in Fugard and Devenish's Marigolds in August (1980) found decreasing identification within white audiences. The mystical relationship and emotional rapport which develops between a lonely Afrikaans man who is running away from is past and a Bushman in the Kalahari desert seen in Gordon Vorster's Sarah (1975) failed to strike a cord of ideological or cultural recognition as is evidenced by the total
inability of the film to attract audiences.

Although the intellectual treatments of Rautenbach, Devenish and Vorster offer an identifiably authentic reflection of the characters and themes they seek to portray, such cinematic discourse is alien to the average white audience for the characterisations, motivations and reflections offered do not match the racial and ethnic stereotypes or general interpretations shielded by the social organization of discourse. Yet when compared to the critical cinema of other countries, for example, Brazil and Argentina, Senegal and many other Third World countries, these films pale in their conservatism\(^7\). Only the stereotypes are questioned, and although social roles in the critical cinema of South Africa are identifiable within the social formation of apartheid, the social structure itself is not necessarily overtly criticised. Such films can, nevertheless, be categorised as art, since they are statements by their directors on the victims of history, of apartheid, though not a critique on causes or origins. Although these movies are usually granted censorship clearance, the intimidating nature of the social structure of the industry effectively eliminates most of the contenders during the pre-production stage, thus maintaining stability within the system.

*Contradictions within the social formation*

Monopoly capital operating through the politico-juridical system should not be seen as a homogenous monolithic entity. Many conflicts of interest are to be found within the film industry itself. These differences are relayed as contradictions between the film industry (or more specifically, fractions of capital within the industry) and the state, for example, the government's denial of permission to cinema to open their doors to all races. Other examples concern the apparent inability of the Department of Industries, Commerce and Tourism to restructure the subsidy system in a manner which will create the economic pre-conditions for take-off and allow the industry to attain a viable economic footing. Important from an ideological point of view are the difficulties experienced between film producers, distributors and exhibitors. The contradiction between cinema-as-industry

378
and cinema-as-propaganda is identified by Robert Greig:

through censorship and an atmosphere of intimidation, films made here are bound to conform to a Soviet notion of art — that it should serve the interests of the state. Yet the irony is ... that the entertainment industry which is dominated by Satbel's Ster-Kinekor and CIC-Warner, works against the very films that are acceptable to the South African establishment. Prime playing venues go to foreign films; as Andre Scholtz has pointed out, the local film maker must take what he can get from Ster-Kinekor, who control the better urban cinemas.

The same complaint is made more pungently by Alan Girney, who directed for Heyns Films. The irony here is that Heyns Films had strong connections with the Department of Information. If the true-blue film makers aren't getting what they want, what hope is there for the Ross Devenishes? 58

Two points are of relevance to Greig's observations. The first is that where local film makers produce a film perceived by the distributors to have the potential of earning a high income, it will be satisfactorily distributed and marketed irrespective of its content (for example, *Funny People* (1976) and *Blink Stefaans* (1981), not to mention numerous films which distributor's have fought for at Appeal Board level: *1900, Jesus Christ Superstar* and so on). Anticipated returns, of course, relate to the content of organic ideology, which is the second point. The question relates not so much to what is made, but what is distributed. Distribution is not solely affected by censorship but primarily by marketing decisions. If a film is not perceived to intercept the dominant organic ideology, then it is given a very limited circuit of distribution. Empirical proof is difficult to find, but there is strong evidence to suggest that *The Guest* might have fared better had it not been subordinate to contractual commitments which forced Satbel to move it from cinemas just when it was beginning to pick up. 59 Even films like *Blink Stefaans* which fall easily into conventional marketing patterns are subject to the distributor's pre-arranged contractual commitments. Marketing decisions and their concomitant contractual scheduling are themselves subordinate to international capital whose discourse is rarely in opposition to racial capitalism. Thus Greig's observations suggest perhaps that some
of the contradictory tendencies apparent within the local situation are localised anomalies which, since the mid-1970s at least, have become less important since the task of cultural production has been taken over by television. The Television Service of the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC-TV) being a state-controlled operation is not subject to the vicissitudes of the market and have often screened South African made material which would be considered a high risk on the cinema circuit. One notable television film based on a Stuart Cloete novel, *The Honeybird* (1981) is an allegorical criticism of the selfish and destructive virtues of capitalism and its dispossession of an area's age-old inhabitants. The film deals with the ruthless greed of a white prospector in the Kalahari and how he is outsmarted by a single Bushman who takes a terrible revenge on the death of his wife caused by the prospector's refusal to share a waterhole. It is a comment on the complex relations of subordination and dominance between the Bushmen who have always lived there and the encroachment of white 'civilization'. Visually, *The Honeybird* has many similarities with *Sarah* which failed to obtain cinema distribution. The fact that SABC-TV produced and broadcast *The Honeybird* does not mean that it is more willing to handle 'political' material than the industry, simply that the film works well on the iconic and indexical levels of signification, while the symbolic/allegorical are hidden at a deeper level not easily apprehendable by the average viewer.

**SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION**

The study of censorship as evidenced by numerous academic and official studies is largely concerned with the problem of pornography. Almost no attention has been devoted to the relationship of censorship to class structure or its ideological implications. This chapter has attempted to study the phenomenon from a much wider perspective, one which encompasses not only the process of censorship *per se*, but its politico-economic motivation as well. Such an approach necessarily moves the analysis into a consideration of the very structure of the political economy and social formation for censorship is a
vital cog in the maintenance of economic and political stability. It disseminates 'willed' ideology through its actions while simultaneously harnessing organic ideology, both of which have the symbiotic effect of persuading people to uncritically accept the concepts of 'freedom', 'choice', 'responsibility', 'patriotism' and so on. These values are functional for the capitalist system (and racial capitalism), its links with international monopoly capital and the global function of capital. These relationships are succinctly captured by Greig in his assessment of the local instance:

What the excessive dependence on overseas majors - or vice versa - also means is soft-soaping on censorship. In essence, the overseas companies and the local distributors collaborate to work with censorship.

A 'soft' version of Midnight Express will be imported, on the defendible grounds that the 'hard' version would be banned outright. Expand this a little, and you get the situation where the censors themselves are protected from what is censorable: they get a false perspective because of what they don't see.

The industry theory is different: if we play ball with them, they'll play ball with us. In practice, this has meant surprising leniency in many cases. But the buddy-buddy system works in secrecy; cynics would rather know what is being agreed - what films are simply not being submitted; what films are being cut in advance; what films are being cut as a result of what informal conversations.

To some, a 'working relationship' with censors is a contradiction in terms, evidence of industry pusillanimity on matters of principle, and a practice that eventually stunts growth.

But to understand why this takes place, again it is necessary to see the nature of Satbel and its various (local and international links)... in a country with more strictly applied monopoly laws, Satbel might not exist. This ... suits the overseas majors. They run no risk of being zapped by the local authorities though they enjoy the benefits of a monopolistic situation.
NOTES AND REFERENCES


2. Ibid

3. SA Film Weekly, 2 April 1970, p. 1

4. SA Film Weekly, 23 September 1971, p. 4

5. Statement made at the Johannesburg Film Society's presentation of the Neil Smith award for the best film screened in Johannesburg during 1979. Parts of Snyman's speech were reported in SA Film and Entertainment Industry, Vol. 3, No. 4 (April) 1980


8. Ibid. p. 109

9. Ibid. p. 283

10. Cape Argus, 1 September 1911

11. The Star, 10 June 1913

12. Cape Times, 29 March 1913


14. Cape Times, 2 May 1913

15. SA Film Weekly, 19 October 1977, p. 2

16. SA Film Weekly, 25 January 1973, p. 1. Only the cinema industry was forced to appeal directly to the Minister. This arrangement was supposed to speed up the process of appeal and was acceded to by the industry on that basis. All other printed media still had the right of appeal to the courts, from Scope magazine which was always in trouble with pictures of scantily clad females to pantyhose wrappers depicting the lower torso of a model wearing one

17. SA Film Weekly, 26 April 1973, p. 3. The Interdepart-
mental Report totally ignored Satbel representations. Jones challenged Mulder on this and received a letter from Mulder's office which stated that "he is not prepared to enter into correspondence in the columns of your magazine which is designed mainly to promote the interests of the film industry [and that] as a member of the Government [he is] answerable to the electorate". Jones responded as follows:

"Connie now stands the victim of his own contradictions - this Prime Minister designate - by saying at this stage that he will not reply to S.A. Film Weekly because: 'your magazine is designed mainly to promote the interests of the industry', of course it is, and he continues: "he is as a member of the Government, answerable to the electorate of whose views he must take cognisance".

We now have a picture of the Minister doing a political slither to avoid questions aimed at his statements and conduct. He cannot, no matter how he slithers, get away with this.

Let us remind the Minister that when seeking to erect a democrat façade over his future intentions, he sought film industry views through the SATBEL deputation. His latest communication deliberately chooses to imply that he is answerable only to 'the electorate' and for his present ends members of the film industry are not members of the 'electorate'. He has switched"


20. *SA Film Weekly*, 10 May, 1973, p. 4


22. Harnecker, M. 1971: *The Elementary Concepts of Historical Materialism*. (Translated by Sadler, E. and Suchtung, W.), University of Sydney

23. This interpretation is consistently emphasised by school history books in particular

24. Springbok, according to Meyer, was based on the 'Try For White' idea. It was to be located on a university campus. Representations to Pretoria University were hostilely met and the University threatened action against Meyer if he located his plot on their campus. Crucial to the plot was a rugby match being played between the University and Stellenbosch University. The company infiltrated cameramen in the crowds and used a helicopter for areal scenes, though the Defence Force ordered the helicopter to be grounded soon after take-off. Meyer won the court
actions against him. Prior to release the film was shown to the University when they indicated that they did not want the film to give the impression that there were 'Try For White' coloureds at their University because this might affect donations or gifts given the University by individuals and organizations. The source of this information must remain confidential. For further information on the conflict between Meyer and the University see Universität von Pretoria v. Tommie Meyer Films (Edms.) BPK 1977 (4) SA 376 heard in the Transvaal Provincial Division; and Universität von Pretoria v Tommie Meyer Films (Edms) Bpk 1978 SA 441 heard in the Appêlaardeling


27. Applications by Ster-Kinekor included the Golden Acre Complex in Cape Town and Cinerama in Johannesburg. CIC Theatres applied for multi-racial permits for all 22 of their cinemas as early as 1976. Speaking to the Rand Daily Mail, the CIC managing director claimed that open status was not being applied for for financial reasons but rather because CIC represented a number of overseas film companies and received much entertainment made by and featuring multi-racial groups. The contradiction which seems to elude CIC is that pressure he is talking about originates from international capital which wishes to maintain the South African market in the face of lobbying from powerful civil rights sources in America. The application of open status is, in this context, a financial based one.

28. By September 1980 a total of 23 multi-racial applications had been made to the Department of Community Development. Of these, 12 were refused, six under consideration and five granted. The only friction reported concerned an "undesirable white element" at the Baragwaneth Drive-in in mid-1980. See The Star, 17 September 1980. The only reported public opposition to the opening of suburban cinemas during the study period was from a National Party MPC for Bedfordview who objected to the decision of the Town Council to sanction the opening of two Metro cinemas owned by CIC at the Bedford Gardens Shopping Complex to all race groups.

29. See, Sharp, B. 1979: "Reality vs Ideology", Scenaria, No. 11, p. 11

30. SA Film Weekly, 27 May 1971 argues that the need for secrecy in the administration of the South African censorship machinery is due to the fact that "Ideological arguments can find no small support in our Courts" (p.1) and that "Rule by threats and intimidation instead of by
law follows" (p. 5). As Harnecher points out, however, ideology works much more subtly than Jones realises.

31. *Hansard*, 14 February 1963, Col. 1341. The Minister was reacting to a speech by Helen Suzman of the Progressive Party Opposition, *op. cit.* Col. 1339 where she offers the following observations on the reasons for differential censorship:

"The American in Paris is banned for Bantu only. Why, I don't know, unless it is a scene in a nightclub where a black man perhaps performs before a white audience. *Love is a Many Splended Thing* is banned for Coloureds and Bantu, but not for [white] children. Children may see this story of a girl who had Coloured blood and falls in love with an American soldier. It is all-right for children, but presumably because there is a slight touch of colour it is banned for Coloureds and Bantu. *The Roman Spring of Mrs Stone* is banned for Coloureds and Bantu and for children from 4-16. *The Tommy Steele Story* is banned for Coloureds ... *Carry on Cruising* is banned for Bantu only, because, I suppose it might give the Bantu some idea of taking over our Navy. *Gone With the Wind* is banned for Bantu only, I suppose because of the civil war in America. ... Then, interestingly enough, there is a film about African initiation rites which is advertised as 'It will shock you'. This is shown to white and Coloured males over 16 as well as to Bantu, and one wonders why whites should be allowed to see such a film at all. If it were the other way round, I wonder whether Bantu males would be allowed to see such a film".

32. *Hansard*, 1968, Col. 4723

33. *Hansard*, 1970, Col. 3422

34. Further examples are offered by Geldenhuys, *P 1977: Pornografie, Sensuur en die Reg.* Lex Patria, Pretoria

35. *The Star*, 5 April 1980


37. Film Festivals generally obtain multi-racial permits without much difficulty, particularly if held under the auspices of a university. On occasion, the Johannesburg Film Festival simply turned a blind eye to black patrons

38. *Sunday Express*, 4 February 1979

39. Ibid

40. Immature love affairs between male teachers and school girls (or lecturers and students) are shown in *Møre Møre* (1973) and *Bensame Vlug* (1979). Divorces and family breakdown are portrayed in *Dit Was Aand en dit was Møre* (1977), *Iemand Soos Jy/Someone Like You* (1978), Sonya
(1978), Weerskant die Nag (1979) and Eensame Vlug (1979) Films like Die Spaanse Vlieg (1978), Mooimelsiefontein (1977) and Birds of Paradise (1982) offer vicarious sexual gratification, while rape and assault are intrinsic to the plots of Fifth Season/Vyfde Seisoen, Weerskant die Nag and Billy Boy (1978). Weerskant die Nag highlights the hypocrisy of the attitude that rape is acceptable within the ecological setting of 'marriage'.

41. Industry sources suggest that CIC-Warner and the Directorate had negotiated the release of this film on the condition that press critics be asked not to play up the sexual aspects of the film in their reviews.

42. Louw, P. 1973: "How to get a Film Passed", Videorama, Vol. 1, No. 2, 1970, p. 7. This journal, which claimed to be 'independent' was, in fact, put out by Satbel, and later largely funded by Irene Film Laboratories. Only information concerning the Satbel Group was published.

43. Quoted in The Star, 8 April 1980.

44. One exception was Messenger of God. Protests were lodged by the Indian community. The film, however, would have been of little interest to the average white cinema-goer. As far as black audiences are concerned, they tend to show their disapproval of a film by leaving the cinema. Those who patronise South African made films are drawn mainly from the working-class, those facing proletarianization, rural dwellers or children and have little idea of the legal processes which they could mobilise to have a film banned.

45. One of the banned posters had been used for many years to advertise the film. The banned posters carried the slogans: "After the Black Takeover"; "Massacre in Kenya"; "Africans in mass-murder and Africa Addio brings you what the newspapers did not dare print"

46. Sharp, op. cit. offers the example of Zulu (1966): "The words 'Whites only' or 'No Bantu' - and in one ridiculous case 'No Zulu's' for the film Zulu - were a continuous headache for film distributors and exhibitors.


48. It has been argued elsewhere that oppositional film making in South Africa straddles both the liberal-humanist and socialist positions. The films of the former (eg., This We Can Do For Justice and Peace (1981), Awake From Mourning (1981) are unaware of the economic basis of apartheid or racial capitalism, while films falling into the latter category (eg., Fosatu: Building Worker Unity, You Have Struck a Rock, Passing the Message etc), although conscious of the structural determinants of the apartheid political economy, are less aware of how cinematic style can obscure their intention in a way which may lead to their appropriation by capital. See
Tomaselli, K.G. 1982: "Oppositional Film in South Africa", *FUSE*, Vol. 6, No. 4, pp. 190-194

49. The two watershed cases concern Nadine Gordimer's *Burger's Daughter*, Johnathan Cape, published in 1979 and Seetiger Etiene le Roux's *Magersfontein 'O Magersfontein*, Human and Rousseau, Cape Town, 1976

50. For an in-depth discussion of this observation, and how the English press was shown up by a content analysis conducted by the Black Sash, a civil rights lobby group, see Tomaselli, K.G. and Tomaselli, R.E. 1981: "Ideology/Culture/Hegemony and Mass Media in South Africa: A literature survey", *Critical Arts*, Vol. 2, No. 2, pp. 11-13

51. See, e.g., *Sunday Express*, 10 January 1982


55. *Hansaard*, 1 September, 1966, Col. 2053

56. Greig, op. cit. p. 15

57. Other than Persson and Gibson Kente who was arrested while making his film, *How Long* (1974), feature film makers in South Africa get off comparatively lightly in comparison with their counterparts in other Third World countries. Torture, exile and confiscation of material made by feature film directors has not occurred in South Africa. For further details on the relationship between film makers and the state see *Index on Censorship*, Vol. 10, No. 4, 1981 which carries a special issue on the subject, as well as previous issues of this journal.

58. Robert Greig in *The Star (Tonight)*, 2 June 1979. This article was one of a three part review of Tomaselli, K.G. 1979: *The South African Film Industry*. African Studies Institute, University of Witwatersrand, Johannesnburg. The latter information is included because Greig used this review to impart information on the industry which would have found difficulty in finding a suitable context in a review or straight news reporting. This is a technique often used by reporters to publish information which would otherwise be lost in the gatekeeping process

59. Although *The Guest* suffered from a negative word-of-mouth in most parts of the country, the opposite was experienced in Port Elizabeth where postive word-of-mouth resulted in full houses towards the end of its week run. Despite this, the film was replaced the following week with another
contracted film

60. Robert Greig in The Star, 9 June 1979
CHAPTER 10
CAPITALIST PENETRATION - POPULAR RESPONSE
IMAGES IN AFRIKAANS CINEMA

Much of the work that has been done on South African film has emphasised text as opposed to context. While this approach has undoubted merit, it is sometimes prey to certain structural shortcomings\(^1\). Emphasis on text at the expense of context -- which the preceding nine chapters have attempted to outline -- is limited, for such analysis is unable to account for the many inconsistencies, apparent lapses of continuity and seeming breakdown of internal logic evident in the dominant Afrikaans film genre, which is the subject of this chapter. Textual analysis, furthermore, does not concern itself with favourable audience responses to the apparent endless repetition of similar plots, characters, actions, locales, characterization and actors. By ignoring context, such criticism, while able to identify the differences of repeated elements between texts, makes no attempt to explain their social causation or thematic change.

Innovations in critical methods have been responsible for uncovering levels of meaning previously hidden by the personal response and aesthetically-based styles of analysis\(^2\). As Victor Perkins points out, the latter methods of criticism, or what Willemen calls "impressionist dogma", are predicated upon considerations of social status of cinema as Art and the prestige of the journalist-critic\(^3\). The recourse by reviewers to questions of taste locates them within a predominantly petty bourgeois class discourse. Their practice takes the form of an aesthetic criticism which most typically shifts attention from context to issues of 'taste', 'refinement', 'improving the mind' or a 'highbrow conception of 'culture' identified by Raymond Williams as "a noun of 'inner' process, specialised to its presumed agencies in 'intellectual life' and 'the arts'"\(^4\).
For our purpose, a more fruitful analysis would employ the theory of semiotics which involves the study of cinema as a sign-system deriving its significance from the cultural experiences of a particular social formation. Signs reposing in the film text should not be seen purely in their own textual terms independent of an external reality. Their origin and form need to be accounted for. Not only can they be seen as cultural indicators communicating information about the wider society, but their forms are also shaped by productive forces working at specific historical conjunctures. In other words, the film text exhibits a complex mediated relationship with its context. Films are both a reflection and an expression of the classes within the society which produce them.

Analysis of South African cinema as presented in this thesis thus far has assumed a context-based approach, one which is continued in this final chapter.

The present chapter will look at some of the myths externalised in Afrikaans feature films made between 1965 and 1980. These films can be classified within the general category of the insider-outsider plot, and more specifically within that, the conflict-love genre. No attempt has been made to offer a statistical -- or what some scholars label as 'scientific' -- analysis of these films, since statistical methods are only as good as their assumptions. In the context of cinema studies they are structurally inadequate in accounting for elements of connotation, symbolism and indeed, the entire range of secondary meanings encoded in cinema beyond the denotative. To say that 80% of Afrikaans films portray the boeredogter really tells the reader very little, for the statistical category can be measured only in terms of denotatively identifiable criteria. Such functionalist categories cannot take account of indexical and symbolic levels of meaning which lie beyond numerical tabulation reposing in, for example, allegory, symbolism, simile and metaphor. The concern of this chapter is with trends rather than entities, processes rather than form and deductively-based explanation rather than inductive description. Emphasis thus falls on deep structures rather than surface appearances, with
relationships between texts and contexts, and with the interacting signs which make up 'willed' and organic ideology governing the field of significations determining audience experiences and responses.

Encoded in the texts of Afrikaans-language films in particular, are signs which gain their cultural resonance when interpreted against the background of South African social and labour history, the penetration of international capital into Afrikaner society, of rural-urban population movements, of war and peace, of poverty and wealth, and religion. Contained within the plot structures, the characters and the social practices they represent, working unconsciously at deeper levels of signification, are to be found the suppressed traumas, hopes, fears and pre-occupations of Afrikaner culture.

Notwithstanding the fact that the South African feature film industry dates back to 1896 or that over 450 full feature films were made between 1910 and 1980, it is of significance that only from 1965 have the unacknowledged images of Afrikaner popular culture and social history made their presence felt in the sub-texts of local cinema. The encoding of this cultural and ideological information has been an unconscious process with few directors understanding why their films have had such a high appeal for the 'mass' audience other than that they have discovered a 'magical' formula.

Myths: Moulding Reality

The three main cinematic myths to which this chapter addresses itself are: the Eden myth, the urban trek and the dynamic social position of the outsider or uitlander. Although rooted in history, these myths are very often perpetuated and mobilised in an ideal form which may not correspond to actual processes, causes and origins.

The actual experience which forms the basis of these myths is the collective memory of the Afrikaans working-class domiciled in the cities. Denied channels of communication and basic
literacy, these myths were first recorded and subsequently perpetuated by members of the Afrikaans middle-classes. This petty bourgeois perspective, informed by Nationalist political imperatives, mediated a dislocation between the lived experiences and attitudes of the Afrikaans working-class and the imagined account given by these early Afrikaans writers. It is therefore clear that even in their original form, these myths were idealised fictions inspired by historical experiences. Even by the early 1940s when they were set out by Hans Rompel as being the proper content of Afrikaans films, they had become ossified and bore little resemblance to reality. It is over these romanticised myths that the Afrikaans film makers of the 1960s and '70s imposed on their plots the traumas experienced by the working class, those facing proletarianization, or, at the other end of the scale, embourgeoisement, as well as farmers who witnessed the break-up of their families as their sons and daughters were lured to the cities. In doing so, they relied on that genre of literature which acknowledged the difficulties of inevitable urbanization and which has much in common with popular literature all over the world. Many of the signs produced in Afrikaans cinema only gain their full significance when seen against the social history of Afrikaners in terms of the wider political economy.

Objectives

The identification of the 'magical formula' rests on an analysis of the semiotics of Afrikaans cinema in relation to underlying processes which are material or economic in nature. This approach will explain how and why particular signs come about, what they stand for or signify in a specific cultural context, and how they are modified through changing economic conditions. To understand the structure of this audience-responsive formula, the analysis will separate out some of its individual components before synergetically fusing them back together in an attempt to explain the continuity or correlation between the recorded image and the social experiences of the Afrikaner since the turn of the century.
A second section of this chapter will concern itself with a brief analysis of cinema aimed at black audiences. It will discuss the links between racial capitalism, the social division of labour and the portrayal of roles played by blacks on film. More specifically, it will be argued that the ideological discourse encoded into the texts of such films are designed to ensure class domination.

Before moving on to an analysis of the insider-outsider narrative structure, it is first necessary to make some brief comments on the concept of film genres.

Genre Film: The Affirmation of Social Relations

It is not intended to debate the differing strands of genre theory which have developed since the late 1950s, but merely to remind the reader of the materialist position taken by this thesis. In so doing, it draws on the work of sociologically-based scholars such as Andrew Tudor and the radical propositions of Tom Ryall, Colin McArthur, Jean-Louis Leutrat, Paul Willemen and Stephen Neale.

The definition offered by Ryall is our starting point:

The master image for genre criticism is the triangle composed of artist/film/audience. Genres may be defined as patterns/forms/styles/structures which transcend individual films, and which supervise both their construction by the film maker, and their reading by an audience.

The genre thus is analogous with the "agreed code" of a sign-system linking the interpretations of both audience and film maker. The genre is not itself a sign-system, but an analytical category which accounts for the effects of processes of production, structuration, enunciation and the constant process of repetition and difference. Neale's contribution to the study of film genres was to move concern from the form/content opposition to a more dialectical view which contains a theoretical dynamism. He concentrated on process rather than
form; that is to say, production rather than products, structuration rather than structure and derivation rather than formal categorization.

In line with Metz\textsuperscript{16}, Neale sees cinema as a set of social practices involving texts or signifying processes which are underscored by social and economic determinants: "genres are not to be seen as forms of textual codifications, but as systems of orientations, expectations and conventions that circulate between industry, text and subject"\textsuperscript{17}. As such, they "exist within the context of a set of economic relations and practices and are seen as the products of capitalist industry"\textsuperscript{18}. According to this view, genres as "processes of systematization"\textsuperscript{19}, interlock with, and feed audience expectation in a complex interacting relationship which links texts, industry and the economic imperatives which propel it. Genres thus affirm the content of the ideological discourse which spawned them. While the origin of genres cannot be mechanistically attributed solely to industrial economic practice as Ryall would have it\textsuperscript{20}, it can be argued that they are an expression of a particular mode of social organization which is itself consequent upon the relations of production. They reflect the imaginary relationships which cover for underlying processes, building a justification for the prevailing relations of production. As Ed Buscomb points out with regard to the Western, although there are connections between the genre and historical reality, they are not necessarily direct\textsuperscript{21}. Despite the polemical nature of Neale's analysis, he does not himself adequately deal with the question of origin. Although he does acknowledge the need for historical specificity, he talks vaguely about the "determinants and effects" of the structures and practices of the cinematic institution, and makes equally vague references to the social formation. He neglects to situate the analysis of genre within the political economy as a whole. Film genres interact, feed off and feed into the genres of other media: books, radio, television, photo-comics and theatre. Each of these media are couched within industrial practices and discursive ideological orientations which largely work to the benefit of the ruling hegemony. Genres exist
within the complex interactions of the entire social formation whose class structure is determined by the relations of production of the whole economy, not merely one sector of it, such as the film industry.

Genres are a means of cultural production and are one way in which the dominant ideas within a particular social formation are articulated and reaffirmed. It is the reaffirmation of ideas which makes them the 'ruling ideas'. This insight is by no means new. Marx and Engels, for example, noted that:

Each new class is ... compelled ... to represent its interests as the common interest of all the members of society, put in an ideal form; it will give its ideas the form of universality, and represent them as the only rational, universally valid ones.

In the Afrikaans cinema of the period under discussion, the ideas of the emergent urban petty bourgeoisie and bourgeoisie were represented as the interests of all the members of Afrikanerdom, for the criticism encoded by the film maker was usually sympathetic to these 'new classes', notwithstanding the trauma such relocation (both in a social and geographical sense) caused Afrikanerdom as a whole.

Genres may also be analysed in terms of the concept of probability. This involves the cybernetic notion of homeostasis where the content of a genre, whether Westerns, gangster films or love stories, is probable "in that it can be identified and comprehended simply by classification". This popular or 'mass' cinema is described by Andrew Tudor in terms of its consequences for society where film genres are conceived to fulfill a social need for catharsis, for acting out, for diversion and for the affirmation of widely-held values. Genre movies rarely disturb, lack innovation and are never openly deviant. This form of cinema fulfills a stable discursive function since cinema-in-general is a relatively fixed culture pattern which defines the moral and social world as well as its physical, political and historical environment. Illustrative of this point is Spyros Skouros'
use of cinema as a means to spread the 'democratic creed' to forestall communism. Because genre films dramatize, they repeat and provide a basis for an interpretive account of an accepted social order. Through such familiarity, they incline towards reassurance, shielding the viewer from alternative, possibly hostile discourses "such that the only valid enunciations apart from the authorised text itself are exegesis, commentary and reinterpretation". The Afrikaans insider-outsider narrative address, for example, tended to be repeated and reinterpreted by the same 'authors' during its fifteen year cycle between 1965 and 1980.

As "memorial metatexts", genre films embody and indemnify existing or even emergent social relations through affirmative symbolism derived from the dominant ideological discourse. As Neale points out, one of the main functions of genre is the containment and regulation of cinematic meaning, and

because viewers/readers operate with sets of expectations and levels of predictability ... it is possible to perceive instances of variation, repetition, rectification and modification. In this way, genre can be considered as a single continuous text.

In the case of Afrikaans film, the conflict-love genre, a specific instance of the more general category of insider-outsider key plot, is a belated legitimation of the restructuring of the class alliance which occurred during the early part of this century. The 'ruling ideas' encoded in these films -- what Marx refers to as the 'means of mental production' -- are consequent upon the ownership and control over the means of material production. In South Africa, Afrikaans films are predominantly financed, produced, distributed and exhibited by white, mainly Afrikaans-dominated capital, with the discursive incentive of the state subsidy paid out on the film's ability to reaffirm the hegemonic ideas. The mechanism though which this commitment is obtained is through the post hoc payment on box office performance. The systematic and coherent body of film texts which make up the conflict-love genre, "as a framework for production" and "as a form of
production" and "as a form of organization of the product" has a specific relationship to the economic conditions nurtured by the capitalist economy. While not the product of economic factors per se, the structure of the genre is significantly shaped by them.

Afrikaans cinema, like all South African production, is produced under the multifaceted threat of censorship described in the previous chapter and is seen by the most ardent upholders of apartheid ideology, particularly those residing in the rural areas and small country towns. Such movies automatically express and affirm the dominant ideology, though in certain instances, may be critical of its organic elements.

In cinema 'made for blacks', genre films explain to their audiences the God-given position in life which is seen as moral, natural and inevitable. Unlike their Afrikaans counterparts, these films are rarely critical of anything. Genre films, whether aimed at black or white audiences, imply that the maintenance of racial capitalism is a pre-condition for cultural and social survival. This stance, however, is more often indicated through the structured absences of the text rather than what is present: it is taken for granted and therefore need not be mentioned. In the case of Afrikaans cinema, the perspectives offered by texts within the genre may be of either a positive or negative nature. The conflict-love story, for example, often alludes to the negative consequences of aspects of an organic ideology unresponsive to changes in the material base of Afrikaner society. On the other hand, it is also critical of the 'new classes' which have turned themselves into an intolerant wealthy urban elite.

The analysis now turns to a discussion of the content of the insider-outsider narrative, the conflict-love genre which poses within it, its social and cultural origins and its ideological discourse.
DERIVATION OF THE 'MAGICAL' FORMULA

The narrative of the small-town or country girl who 'makes good' in the city is common to the literature of most Western societies. Often, the narrative works merely at an iconic-indexical level such as the typical Mills and Boon plot where the emphasis is almost entirely on the characters with little or no concern for context. The narratives read in serious Afrikaans literature and poetry on the other hand, overlay the concern with characters with the more embracing pre-occupation of 'cultural identity'\textsuperscript{30}. Central to the turn of the century Afrikaans writing is a Babylonian image of Johannesburg whose first and most accessible monument is a hotel, with all the negative connotations it entails\textsuperscript{31}. In contrast, the most important building in rural towns is the church, a recurring symbol in the Eden phase of the conflict-love genre.

The socio-geographical\textsuperscript{32} content of early Afrikaans literature is predicated upon deeper structural conditions which formed the basis of the political economy. The spatial and economic relations which linked town and country are described by Basil Davidson:

the whole ... system occurred within two complementary 'zones'. The first of these were zones of mineral and cash-crop production for export; it was into these that ... European investments ... went. The second were all those other areas, for a long time much larger than the first, which produced little or nothing for export and received no investment, but were indispensible to the whole system ... because they could and did supply the zones of extractable profit, the 'export zones', with cheap labour and cheap food\textsuperscript{33}.

In South Africa, the mining towns attracted investment, particularly as excavation shifted from surface gold mining to deep level excavation. The massive inflow of international capital which was invested in Johannesburg after the Boer War had an indelible effect on the connections within the space economy and the structure of South Africa's political economy.
The significance of this investment is described by Isabel Hofmeyer:

Given the fact that town and country were the two major cogs that impelled the colonial economy, these two areas 'invariably became informing principles in the world views of different social groups living under a colonial dispensation. Town and country stood as two important beacons from which people, and the classes to which they belonged located their sense of history, identity and reality'.

In an attempt to provide an adequate typology of the above themes as far as Afrikaans cinema is concerned, Robert Greig proposes the concept of the 'Eden film'.

The Eden Film: The Never-Never Land of Pastoral Harmony

The derivation of the Eden film is grounded by Greig's reading of George Steiner's observation of the recurrent myth running through Western art, that of the Fall from the Garden of Eden. In its original state, the myth represents people living peacefully with their fellow beings who are at one with the environment. The Eden myth offers an explanation of urban discontent and offers hope of a remedy in return.

Two versions of history co-exist in the Eden film. The first suggests that:

once upon a time, the Afrikaner was the independent master of his own pastoral destiny. He lived, as in common myths, in amity with nature and his surroundings. These included his Coloured servants. Neither Blacks nor the English disturbed the idyll.

Absent too is evidence of the internecine quarrels which characterise Afrikaner history. There is no reference to the need of the Great Trek or the various wars out of which the Afrikaner of today matured. Temporally, the Eden myth exists in the timeless of 'once upon a time', is filtered of social origins, causation and cultural destination, while group identity is elevated to above that of the individual.
The characteristic plot which is found in the Eden component of the conflict-love genre is succinctly described by Greig:

Jan is the rugged-face son of a Western Cape wine farmer. Shots of the farm, with its white gables, agreeable family retainers. Dad looking like carved yellow-wood.

Mum isn't around. Her photo is on the wall, where it asserts a baleful influence, chastening the behaviour of the servants and the son. She died sometime in the past - it's never precisely explained how - and Pa never remarried, the vines and the cattle being good enough for him.

However, Granny is on the scene. She is the real mother-figure; ... She supervises the servants, sternly but fairly: they are children who 'like to know where they stand'.

Back to the son. He is engaged to marry the daughter of the neighbouring farmer. She is blue-eyed, blond, with a slim, feminine body, meaning flat-chested. When the pressures of the flesh get too much for him, he drives his tractor round frenziedly or bashes one of the servants. Sex is not an issue with her, nor emotion with him.38

Thus, the plot of the Eden film in its purest form centres around a loving couple who, with the help and guidance of a matriarch, resolve the problem of suitable marriage partners. Alternatively, the mother is absent and the father mediates. In any event, as is most clearly seen in Dit was Aand en Dit Was Môre (1978), the son of the soil, the boereesen, marries the daughter of the earth. They live happily ever after.

Over this first version is superimposed a second dimension of history which admits the Fall from the Garden of Eden. The idyll of the first version is shattered with the intrusion of the urban Afrikaner or outsider. S/he is threatening and antagonistic to the natural harmony of the pastoral relationships. It accepts the fact of the Great Trek, the dispossession by the English of the Afrikaner and the subsequent Anglicization, the migration from the farm to the town, urbanization and the acceptance of what, at first, seems an alien, but later, natural way of life. The general plot goes something
A Jo'burg girl black- or red-haired, in a sports car loses her way and arrives at the farm. She lures the son away. The blonde fiancée suffers in silence, but she's never angry, just sorry and alone at night, might let a single tear escape her eyelids as she gazes at the Papagaalberg.

The son leaves home. He ends up in Hillbrow, which is Hell in the demonology of the SA film. But eventually he comes back. Granny ... who trekked with Retief and singlehandedly routed Chaka, Dingaan and anyone else you care to mention, including Milner, Rhodes, Kitchener, Smuts and De Villiers Graaf ... dies of shock.

What happens to the redhead? She dies, when her car goes out of control.

The polarities are farm/Hillbrow; blonde/redhead; town living/country living; the old ways and the new ways.

Although the conflict-love genre cycle ran for fifteen years, it is difficult to plot the two distinct phases of the two genres over time. The outsider or villain is an intrinsic part of the genre's conventions and is necessary for the dramatic conflict and its resolution. The genesis of the genre in Debbie (1965), for example, symbolically encodes most of the signs pertaining to both versions of history. On the other hand, Dit Was Aand en Dit Was Måre, made thirteen years later, denies the Fall and acts out its drama in pastoral simplicity. Against this unpolluted form of refracted history which oscillates to a greater or lesser degree in Afrikaans film during the fifteen year cycle, is superimposed the progressively darkening opaqueness of the second version symbolised in the move to the city. This trajectory does not oscillate, it is purposive, determined and unidirectional.

While the concept of the Eden film is potentially productive, it carries with it a number of other difficulties which need to be resolved. The main problem as initially formulated is the difficulty of dating itscinematic origin, its evolution and devolution. The Eden film, implies Greig, is superceded.
by the "War film", but linked by a certain trauma which permeates both. Application of the concept requires that the Eden film is accepted in its polluted cinematic form where the insider-outsider theme is dominant, reflecting an Eden-like nostalgia for things pure. This facilitates both an identification of the genre cycle and allows a certain semiotic dynamism whereby the signs signifying the myth fade in and out in a continuum nourished by organic ideology, cultural imagery and social discourse which is reinforced by other media like poetry, literature, radio, theatre and television. Indeed, the linkages are multiple: many of the recurring signs which contribute to the Eden myth first made their appearance in Afrikaans literature. The insider-outsider genre was soon adopted by radio in the form of soap operas; from there it became the content of films and photo-comics. More recently, this genre has become identifiable in television series. There are backward linkages too, particularly from film and television to radio and literature. The periodization of the genre in its film form, 1965-1980, is thus not an anomaly but the cinematic apex of the ongoing development of the genre cycle as it spans different media.

The purely religious/cultural content of the Eden myth, however, is unable to account for the material and economic processes which structure the genre. As will be shown, during the period which characterises the conflict-love story, which is the dominant narrative address within the insider-outsider category, there occurs a lessening emphasis on a simple rurally-based religious lifestyle. This happened partly because audiences increasingly failed to identify with Eden mythology or pastoral values as is evidenced in Dit Was Aand en Dit Was Môre. Over this pure state, and one supported by the cinema-going audience, is a simultaneous material superimposition and an increasing pre-occupation with the acquisition of consumer goods, conspicuous consumption and bourgeois lifestyles. As the genre developed, exhibiting instances of repetition and difference, the Eden content curve diminished, while the curve of material acquisitiveness and ostentation increased. The genre thus established the variety of the mainstream narrative
(the conflict-love story) across a series of individual films, and organised and systematised the differences in each text, thereby filling the gap between the text and the system. In other words, as the narrative system developed, a more overtly materialist content was substituted for the pastoral values of the Eden content. As will be shown later, this aspiration for materialist values is indicative of the Afrikaner's love-hate relationship with capital.

The Insider- Outsider Conflict: The Traumatic Love Affair With Capital

Whereas the Eden myth desperately tries to reaffirm traditional mythical values, the dominant key plot externalised in the tensions between the insider, who derives his/her origins from Eden, and the outsider, who represents the Fall, is countered by the affirmation and inevitability of urban culture and of its material base. The symbols collected around the new classes include all the trappings of the nouveau riche: ostentatious mansions in large beautiful gardens, fast sports cars or Mercedes Benz's/BMW's, flamboyant clothes and expensive jewelry. The urban Afrikaner as outsider is characterised by the signs which the insider attributes to a foreign way of life. The outsider is distant, socially remote, selfish, self-centred, scheming and arrogant. S/he is met with suspicion and hostility by the insiders. As a visitor to the farm, the outsider is destructive to its harmony, its religious simplicity and mythical reality. Like urban capitalist culture which s/he represents, the outsider sexually attracts and ultimately coopts the insider, transforming him/her into a restless urban animal who foresakes the farm, his/her family and the rural community.

The social practices associated with individualistic urban living initially bring with them a state of limbo, an uneasy cultural inbetweeness, if not a traumatic revised perspective of old, traditional and pastoral values. The genre is structured in such a way that it suggests social acknowledgement of the primacy of urban values. In accepting the cultural
transfer from farm to city, the genre has furthermore adapted to the changing perceptions of the outsider in accordance with the shifting set of social relations occurring within the South African political economy.

The key plot made its first appearance in Debbie (1965), directed by Elmo de Witt, and produced by Tommie Meyer for Jamie Uys Films. The logical working-out of the various themes which made up the genre underwent numerous permutations during the subsequent fifteen years. The cycle was completed with April '80, released in 1980.

It is to an analysis of this narrative system that we now turn.

The Conflict-Love Story: Vehicle for the Key Plot

Genesis of the "uitlander"

During the early phase of the genre, the plot was characterised mainly by an urban-rural value clash manifested in the social roles of insiders versus outsiders. The love relationships usually involve a threesome, two vying for the love of a third. One of these characters is the outsider. The characters and roles vary according to the plot, but recur constantly across the range of texts which constitute the genre. The variation in their roles and genders, the plot and locales provide the essential differences between texts, or what Neale calls "differences in repetition". The range of difference in repetition varies markedly within the genre. Some films exhibit few differences, even having the same actors, while others redefine the outer limits of the genre in new ways which exhibit a high variation of difference and extend the narrative terrain of the genre. This extension usually involves the insertion of a new locale, the city for the farm, for example, or a new site of cultural struggle, the Border for the City.
The year 1903 marked the crystallisation of a number of circumstances resulting in the urban-rural value clash. The Anglo-Boer War had created a large number of penniless Afrikaner refugees pushed off their land and farms and forced to seek work in the towns to ensure a livelihood. This exodus was exacerbated by the rinderpest epidemic of 1902 which destroyed most of the cattle herds left in tact by the British. This state of affairs was even more unaesthetic given the discriminatory behaviour of the British colonists seen, for example, in Doodkry is Mín. O'Meara, for example, states:

Within the imperialist colonial states a clear cultural oppression operated against Afrikaans speakers. Long before the war had ended the independence of the Republics, so generating a fierce cultural response, the language movement of the Cape had inspired a strong cultural nationalism. More importantly, in an essentially peripheral economy dominated by the ideology of imperial interest, for those Afrikaners unprepared to accept cultural assimilation and who possessed a modicum of training rendering them unsuitable for manual labour, employment opportunities were limited. English was the language of the Economy.

The situation is described more bluntly by Wilkins and Strydom: "From the bitterness of military defeat, they were forced to the greater bitterness of economic subjugation by the same foe, British Imperialism". This Afrikaner hostility had been intensified through the change from surface gold mining to deep-level excavation. Whereas in the former case previous to the 1890s, a single prospector aided by only a few 'natives' was able to pan for gold, deep-level mining required large capital commitments and centralised mining rights in the hands of a few, usually British entrepreneurs. Consequently, the power of money became a threat to Afrikanerdom: "the forefathers of Afrikanerdom sat on the sidelines watching how excessive wealth was accumulating in the hands of individuals who were to them, foreigners or 'uitlanders'". Wassenaar also states that gold and the wealthy individuals associated with it were identified as the enemy which had "herded Afrikanerdom ever more closely into a condensed group with their back to the wall". This repatriation of wealth worked at the levels of both capital
and labour. On the latter, General Smuts, for example, before the Anglo-Boer War noted that the majority of Cornwall miners sent all their money 'home'.

The newly urbanised Afrikaner 'poor white' found himself in an invidious position. Initially he had neither the skills for non-manual labour nor the right colour skin for manual labour in the mines. The imported skilled miners whose main aim was to 'make their pile and clear', saw the Afrikaner as a threat to his position and sought to keep him out at all costs. In 1907, however, large numbers of unskilled Afrikaans workers were given the opportunity by mining capital to scab on these foreign skilled strikers, but were not paid at the same rate. This marked the Afrikaner's entry into mining on a large scale. Later, united with imported labour against mining capital they were successful in entrenching the colour bar which functioned to stop the erosion of white wage levels. Although cheap black labour had existed from the earliest days of Dutch settlement in the Cape, it was the increasingly mechanised labour process within the mining industry and consequent deskilling, which resulted in the colour bar. Henceforth, South Africa's history has centred on the legitimised division between black labour on the one hand, and white capital and the quasi-working class on the other.

The urban-rural value clash was compounded by the 1913 mining strikes and brought to a climax by the execution of a rebellious labour leader, Jopie Fourie. Agriculture remained in a depressed state, mining speculators were intensifying the land squeeze and high unemployment on the Rand caused a drop in the remittances Afrikaner migrant workers returned to the rural areas for the support of their families left behind. This in turn stimulated a further urban migration, a period when "politically and economically, the Afrikaner had been reduced to a slave in the land of his birth". These conditions gave rise to the formation of a group calling itself "Jong Suid-Afrika" (Young South Africa) in 1918, soon to become known as the Afrikaner Broederbond. Dan O'Meara has pointed to the urban, petty bourgeois, northern-dominated orientation of the Bond
and has shown how economic opportunities were limited by both class and language. There was little chance of large scale alliances between the Afrikaner petty bourgeoisie and any element of imperialist capital. The urban Afrikaner in the Transvaal found himself politically and economically isolated. Conditions were less traumatic in the Cape than in the North and the long established and prosperous commercial agriculture in the Western Cape and Boland provided a viable basis for a political and economic alliance between petty bourgeois elements and commercial agriculture. This gave rise to the possibilities of accumulation independent of mining capital. The Cape agricultural capital was to lead to the development of the Cape National Party, Die Nasionale Pers, SANLAM and SANTAM. These organizations were to be financed by the rural bourgeoisie, run by the urban petty bourgeoisie and grow through the mobilization of the full spectrum of rural support.

In the Transvaal prior to 1934, Afrikaner nationalism saw the problems of 'poor whitism' in rural terms, requiring a return to the land or 'the farm' as it was referred to colloquially. The petty bourgeoisie, being politically more isolated, was required to confront an economically more hostile world than the majority of Afrikaans speakers who had never experienced the prosperity of the Cape. At this stage, the political struggle of the northern petty bourgeoisie was built on an alliance with poorer farmers (as opposed to the strong fraction of capital in the Cape) as well as Afrikaans workers, a class fraction which grew out of the farming group.

The dissolution of the PACT government in 1934 evidenced, on the political level, the split between the broad base of rural Afrikaner nationalism, and the urban interests of the petty bourgeoisie. As O'Meara remarks:

It is precisely this ideologically isolated position, reflecting the total economic independence of the northern petty bourgeoisie, which gave the Broederbond its significance. From the outset it expressed its concern with urban issues. It saw the problems of poor whitism and the position of Afrikaners generally as an urban rather than rural phenomenon. Its solutions were never to be sought simply at the level.
Clearly, the socio-political and economic bases of Rompel's ideal Afrikaans movie had been superseded by economic growth occurring within Afrikaans capital. The capture of the alien economy, while initially relying on agricultural capital, was later consolidated with urban capital generated by the now large financial houses, supported by an increasingly powerful Afrikaans press. These are the symbolic themes of the conflict-love genre. Given the conditions of its genesis, the growth of Afrikaner capital through companies like SANLAM, it is not surprising that film directors/scriptwriters take a sympathetic stance with regard to the outsider who represents the urban Afrikaner petty bourgeoisie. This interpretation was, furthermore, aided by the capture by Afrikaans capital of the film industry itself and was to contribute to a more responsive climate as far as Afrikaans film was concerned.

Given the poverty of urban living, skills basically agricultural in nature and their cultural anathema to urban living, it is not surprising that the northern Afrikaners preferred life on the veld where they were the masters of their own economic destiny. Numerous historians have dealt with the religious and cultural nature of the bond between the Afrikaner and his agrarian heritage. It is this ideology which is seen in the Eden film where the unspoiled mythical image of the Afrikaner remains paramount as in Dit Was Aand en Dit Was Môre where s/he lives in that "never-never land before gold was discovered, uitlanders intruded and agitators invented the race problem". Other examples in this vein include Boland (1974) and Somer (1975). The Eden film, however, in which rural values -- "no sex, no violence, no cities" -- remain paramount, appeared to have a diminishing attraction for the Afrikaans film-goer. More acceptable is that strain of Eden film which admits the fact of the move to the city, even if it sometimes denies the permancy of urban living. This permutation shows a nostalgic longing for a return to the ancestral farm and articulates the
aim of the migrant Afrikaans worker to accumulate sufficient capital to enable him to return to 'the farm', that state of cultural purity, independence and economic sanctity.

Farming symbolizes the roots of the insider; the opposite of the outcast urban mentality. 'The farm', its soil (bodem) -- a timeless state of being -- is a physical memory of recent origin for Afrikaners, given the short time that they have been urbanised. Thematically, 'the farm' functions as a cultural memory and represents the 'traditions' on which the Afrikaner nation tries to maintain group cohesiveness:

Though within living memory, the relationship between the film farm, Eden, and the surroundings of the urban dweller is indirect. Eden has metaphorical tinges. Thus the function of Eden films for the city-goer is nostalgic. For some viewers, the Eden film will fulfill the functions that pastoral poetry fulfilled for a Restoration court: it provides a stylised set of values, etched with quaintness for the contemplation of the viewer. The function, then, is to provide values which are, as it were, preserved in amber. The viewer can choose whether or not to make the connection between them and his world."

The traditional, unspoiled mythical structure of the rural Afrikaner remains intact in Dit Was Aand en Dit Was Môre. Though unsettled by the red-haired villainess from the city, a divorced boeredogter, and so on, these elements are functional to the conflict identified in the genre. In de Witt's comedy, Kom Tot Rus (Come to Rest), the over-urbanised father settles on his dream farm in the Bushveld. He and his family leave the urban rat-race and try to escape to a peaceful country life, the rustle of the wind in the mopani trees and the jackals howling at night. The sleek Mercedes is replaced by a farm truck. Even in the bushveld there are the symbols of the city: the seductive English widow, a small-time crook and an artist who rides a motorbike. Besides, the father really doesn't know how to farm. In Wild Geese (1977), the Afrikaans mercenary has joined the invading force simply to make enough money to buy a farm. This counter-migration, however, was an ambition which, in reality, was realised by only a few. The image of 'the farm' nonetheless
remains encoded in South African linguistic patterns and the content of other media. Despite the apparent audience disinterest for the purer forms of Eden film, it is this strain of the genre which most closely approaches the original blueprint for an 'authentic' Afrikaans cinema propounded by Rompel.

In opposition to the rural location of the insider is the external threat of the outsider or uitlander who is seen by the group as a shifty, smooth-talking, greedy and destructive character whose presence results in stresses and strains on the cohesion of the in-group.

The "uitlander": the shifting enemy of Afrikanerdom

The uitlander, like the other roles discussed in this study, is analysed in terms of the social role s/he plays, his or her social relations with other participating or absent characters, and his/her position within the class structure of the South African social formation.

At this stage we may draw on Stone's definition of the uitlander, which is often used in a pejorative sense, substituting for 'outsider':

The 'uitlander' is the migrant whose orientations are overwhelmingly economic; who has no wish to settle permanently; who has no affective ties with the host society; who has a desire to preserve his own culture and way of life with a minimum of conformity to that of the host community; and who does not scruple to leave the sinking ship if his treasure is likely to be drowned with it.58

In Afrikaans film, the uitlander stands for a social role which is of a two-tiered order. The first tier concerns the outsider in the widest sense. He is identified with British imperialism, and more latterly, with English-speaking South Africa. When not seen in the film itself, the uitlander is often referred to in conversation on the dialogue track. The uitlander, however, rarely speaks English even though
identified with British imperialism. This may be partly due
to the warping effect of the state subsidy system which demands
language purity within cinema and which rewards purely Afri-
kaans films with a higher payment than English language versions.
The scriptwriter or director may be unaware of the origins of
the role and repeats it without thought. In any event, the
outsider remains an ambiguous figure in the conflict-love
story. As Greig notes, the Afrikaans director will not be so
blatant as to cast an English-speaking actor in the role of
the villain. While this was true at the time of the publica-
tion of Greig's article, in that same year, 1980, the
uitlander in April '80 WAS English speaking. The uitlander
is both character and symbol: as far as the film director is
concerned, the uitlander is simply the third party in the
love conflict; but at a deeper level of significance, one
not necessarily realised by the film makers, the uitlander
does indeed stand for British imperialism and capital's
attraction for the 'new classes' of Afrikaner.

The second tier refers to the urbanised Afrikaner who has cut
his/her ties with what Rompel calls the "solid inherited boere-
karakter". S/he is portrayed as a traitor to the values and
ideals of the Afrikaner nation and has become contaminated
with volksvreemde and volksgevaarlike influences. Rompel's
statement mentioned earlier that "at the root of the matter
the urban Afrikaner is not radically different from his rural
fellow citizens" should be seen as an acknowledgement of the
possibility of these prodigal sons eventually returning to
their soil. This attitude is a consequence, not of the fact,
as Rompel argues, that the Afrikaner is essentially rural in
character, but because the Afrikaner was historically thwarted
in his attempts to wrest economic power away from the British
entrepreneur.

The cultural origins of the "boeredogter"

The cultural indicator of the boeredogter is the chief concern
of this chapter for she plays a pivotal role in determining
the relationship between insiders and outsiders. Semiotically,
the boeredogter stands for the ideological connection between capital and culture. She is a dynamic subject who sets the pace for social adaptation as she is constantly exposed to and interpellates new sets of social practices thrust upon her by adjustments occurring in the political economy. At the start of the genre she is a maimed :eroíne, a status she maintains for nearly three-quarters of the genre cycle; towards the end, she is reaccepted into the fold, but on her terms. In the following pages, the social role of the boeredogter is analysed on three levels of signification: as an icon she stands for the idea of a young girl; indexically, she represents severe cultural trauma; and as a symbol she stands for first alienated, but later repurified, Afrikaans capital.

Before proceeding with the semiotic analysis, we first need to assess her relationship to the boereseun for these two signs together signify both the unity/disunity of the group as well as the popular Afrikaans response to the penetration of English capital from the early days of the mining industry to at least as late as 1980.

The origin of the boeredogter is rooted in the Eden myth and her presence is manifested in 'the farm'. She is marked, from the beginning, as the proper companion of the boereseun, equally enshrined in the mythical values of the Eden-farm. In a film like Dit Was Aand en Dit Was Môre the two signs interact mainly on an indexical level where the conflicts are personal rather than social. Myth, however, is a second order indexical sign and at this level, the roles mythify the cultural purity of the agricultural economy hankered after by Nationalist organic intellectuals like Dr DF Malan in the 1930s. The boeredogter, however, only gains her full significance when she spurns her pre-determined partner and attempts to break out of her culturally inherited way of life.

Typically, the boeredogter matures in time into her ideologically designated role as boerevrou (farmer's wife). Her link with the uitlander is sexual and violent and brings her into contact with the culturally alienating influences of imperial
and international capital. She foreshadows the cultural purity of the Garden of Eden, escapes its protective barrier and adopts a new way of life, one which acknowledges the Fall and which has previously been embraced by the urban Afrikaner petty bourgeoisie. Her shift from one ecological setting to another with its different social organization of discourse symbolises a disintegration of pastoral values, social adaption and individualism. The uitlander to whom she is drawn is seen as a force which threatens group cohesion and identity. Through her new interpellation she becomes an outcast; she is no longer an insider, she has fallen from grace. Her association with the uitlander even if a member of the 'new classes' creates a new challenge, for this alliance threatens the integrity of Afrikaans pastoral culture, posing a threat to the mythical nature of 'the farm'. Her separation from the boere- seun symbolises the breakdown of Afrikaner unity. In order to maintain and re-assert cultural cohesion, the group has to remain closed; the uitlander is rejected and the wandering boeredogter is excommunicated; she is not allowed to remain or return, for her presence will ultimately lead to the destruction of the authority structures and traditional values symbolised by 'the farm'. Although the boeredogter, at her most abstract level, is a recurring element in most Afrikaans film, she is most typically found in the conflict-love genre which is most appropriately able to encode the cultural responses of the threatened in-group. Inevitably, the boeredogter must be punished for her betrayal: she is the communion wine which cleanses the body of the group. The methods by which she is purged include unnatural death, often at the hand of, or because of, the jilted party; alternatively, she may be blind, pregnant out of wedlock, commit suicide, be raped, traded in for cash, rejected because of her colour, or even a leper. The insider-outsider plot is thus a cinematic replay of a recurring theme in Afrikaner history, that is

the tension between the individual and the group. At the same time, this structure seeks to explain existing conflicts by suggesting that the conflict began with the move from the farm. And finally, the structure is allegorical, depicting, as a warning, the danger that outsiders pose to the group identity, and the
continuing value of rural based traditional values

Put in more abstract terms, the films of the insider-outsider category show the demands that are being made by an industrial-based economy locked into the global function of capital. These imperialist impulses cannot be rejected entirely, they can only be co-opted and partially translated into the social objectives of the interior bourgeoisies in the Afrikaans 'new class'. Neither can international capital be captured. The only course of action remaining was the one adopted by the Broederbond which acknowledged that in the battle to establish a volkekaptialisme, cultural changes and social adaption was basic to this objective for it required urbanization by Afrikaners on a massive scale. The boeredogter represented both the trauma of this change as well as the determining capitalist influences of it.

Historical reflections of the "boeredogter"

The genesis of the connotative elements of the boeredogter are rooted in the cohesive role played by the Afrikaner women during the Anglo-Boer War. During this period (1899-1902) it was the Afrikaner women who had to tend the soil, raise the children, run the household and supply food and shelter to commandoes in the area while their men were away fighting. A strongly matriarchal society thus emerged where the women became the dominant supportive element, both in terms of moral and logistical support. As wife of the Boer-soldier, mother and often sole parent of her children, as farmer and behind the lines supplier, she became mythified as a Volkemoeder (Mother of the People). A loyal Afrikaner subject, the Volksmoeder provides spiritual and moral guidance, is unwavering in her ideals but flexible in her actions, pure and determined as she watches over the volk and its efforts to cope with external threats. (It was this image that Rautenbach was criticising in Jannie Toteiens and Die Kandidaat where the Volkemoeder has herself become part of the hypocrisy and the madness of present day Afrikanerdom).
The mythical status of the Volksmoeder was enhanced as she stoically endured the terrible conditions in the British concentration camps into which she and her children were herded during the later part of the War. There, resulting from unsanitary conditions and a lack of fresh food, nearly 26 000 women and children died, ravaged by disease. These women assumed the status of martyrs and symbolised the continuing flame of cultural purity in the midst of a devastating assault by British imperialism against Afrikaners, and what they considered to be their divine heritage and wealth. Even after the British victory on the battlefield she remained on 'the farm', now impoverished and laid waste, while her husband and older children laboured for the enemy in the towns and cities. The consequent hatred by the Afrikaner of the British continues to the present, a sentiment which is questioned in Elmo de Witt's film, \textit{Beeld vir Jeannie} (1976).

The boere dochter is the progeny of the Volksmoeder. It is she who is destined to carry on the task of mothering, both as many babies as possible as well as the Afrikaans nation which has fought back on the economic battlefield, regaining a large measure of its wealth. Where the Volksmoeder resisted the imperialist onslaught, the boere dochter is more expedient as seen in her collaboration with English and, by implication, international capital. She is the sell-out, the traitor, however inevitable her actions in terms of the volk as a whole. In \textit{Beeld vir Jeannie}, the conflict is manifested through the antagonism between the 'new class' of enlightened urban Afrikaner and the old unyielding stalwarts of the nation who, like the Pharisees, are complacent and self-righteous, refusing to concede any morality which clashes with their code. The setting is the dorp (country town) which stands for South Africa. It is called Hoffmansdal. Its inhabitants are the upright God-fearing people of South Africa. The dramatic conflict is generated when the town councillors decide to erect a statue in memory of 2000 Afrikaner women who died in a concentration camp near the present day town during the Anglo Boer War. The statue was to stimulate inspiration for the future and symbolise an eternal tribute to the noble aspects of the Afrikaner, one
which will emphasise the suffering and affliction of the internees. The long-haired Pretoria artist engaged by the town council questions their self-righteousness and arrogance. He is opposed by the town's lawyer who is unapproachable and aggressive and who demands to know the sculptor's attitude towards Afrikaner sentiment. The lawyer is supported by the Town Clerk who attributes the Afrikaners' downfall to artists and writers, but the sculptor gets a more sympathetic though initially uncommitted hearing from the headmaster as well as the dominee (minister of religion), who proposed the original idea of erecting a statue in the town's square. Having questioned the cultural suitability of the sculptor, the council is disgusted and enraged at his choice of model, matric pupil Jeannie Moolman, for she is an unmarried mother censured by the church and considered unfit to epitomise Afrikaner womanhood. The town's ostracism remains despite the fact that she conceived her son from a boereseun who died for his country on 'the Border' or that she put her child up for adoption. The boeredogter is drawn to the sculptor who is married to a critically injured woman.

Against the backdrop of the town conflict Jeannie despairs of winning the sculptor-uitlander and commits suicide just before he is able to declare his love for her. His grief at the death of Jeannie is, however, somewhat balanced by his moral victory over the verkrampte town councillors.

In Beeld vir Jeannie identifies a crucial element of the boeredogter which concerns her ability to adapt to changing circumstances. Though reviled by the 'older Afrikaner' she is symbolically tied to the spatial trajectory of Afrikaner economic power. The direction of this movement was inexorably towards the cities for they were the site of economic struggle, not the rural areas, isolated as they were from international capital. The cities were the battlegrounds where imperial capital engaged with national capital. The boeredogter was prepared to die for her dream and legitimised the striving for a volkškapitalisme just as the Volksmoeder supported it in an agricultural form. But where the Volksmoeder was able to
maintain her cultural integrity and economic purity even at the expense of hypocrisy as in Die Kandidaat and Jannie Totsiens, the boerendogter did not resist cultural contamination and openly declared her new allegiance. The resulting urbanization offered anonymity and a chance to cast off the close restrictions of rural communities, and above all, the opportunity to interpolate different material-based social practices. It is to this urban interpolation that we now turn.

"Debbie" (1965): the case of the 'lost' "boerendogter"

Although the recurring sign of the boerendogter had been evident in popular Afrikaans literature for some time, it was only in 1965 that it appeared in Afrikaans cinema in a clearly discernible form. Its tranference from literature to cinema was direct, occurring through a cinematic adaptation of T. du Toit's novel, Groen Koring on which Debbie is based. It was a bestseller first published in 1948. Comments producer Tommie Meyer:

everywhere we heard that it was a book that had authenticity and which dealt with something that every family experienced ... that at one or another time there is a girl in the family who is expecting a baby out of marriage ... [that platteland (country) parents] send their sons and daughters to university and then they remain in the city.

The film systematically exposes the consequences of the urban-rural value clash, the social dangers of premarital sex and the heartbreaking problems which face the unmarried mother. The setting is the fun and freedom of an Afrikaans university campus versus the diligence, austerity and hard work of 'the farm'; fast cars versus the tractor; individuality versus the group/family/community; the urban claustrophobia of Hillbrow versus the unpolluted spaciousness of the countryside. Debbie's humiliated, stubborn rural parents disown her, while the cynical, pragmatic social-climbing urban parents of the city-reared boyfriend even explore the possibility of aborting the foetus to prevent their son from having to marry Debbie. Tearjerkingly melodramatic, the film continually stresses the dangers of this kind of situation and reveals the unhappiness, the guilt, the
deprivation, social ostracism and loneliness forced on the characters.

Reaction to Debbie was vociferous. State imposed sanctions included a 4-16 age restriction. An appeal to the Minister, supported by the highly conservative Vrouefederasie (Federation of Afrikaans Women), the Transvaal Administrator, Dr I Nicol and Dr AP Treurnicht, resulted, paradoxically, in the extension of the restriction to 4-21. Newspaper reports condemned the PCB decision, Dr Nicol, for example, telling his sons to take their girlfriends to see the film. The extent and influence of the film's supporters had the result of conferring the quality of 'authorization' to the film makers and the restriction was totally lifted within a few days. Not only was the sign of the boeredogter legitimised within the ecological setting of cinema, but even the most conservative sections of Afrikanerdom had indicated acknowledgement of the social problems of urban living. Though the boeredogter had been 'lost' in the theme of the film, her experience was argued to be of didactic significance to those who were not yet lost.

Having established the cultural connection between the boeredogter and the social responses of the audience, we may now examine the semiotic qualities of the sign of the boeredogter in more detail.

The Boeredogter as Multi-faceted Sign

As has already been alluded to, the sign of the boeredogter works on three basic levels of signification: iconic, indexical of cultural trauma and as a symbol of capital.

At the first level the boeredogter represents the idea of a young girl. The image is solely denotative. An icon offers no knowledge about actual relationships, its relation is purely one of likeness: elements of the central idea of a young girl include purity, group ties and respect for traditional values. An icon, however, implies a second level meaning as it cannot be autonomous. It must be compared to something else. The
boeradogter exerts a relative autonomy through her individuality. She attains an identity in the face of others, the villainess, for example. Her identity does not result from the opposition per se, but is manifested in the opposition. At this second indexical level the icon intercepts a whole range of cultural meanings not derived from the sign itself, but from the way society uses and values both the signifier and the signified. At this level, the boeradogter stands for the 'maimed heroine', indicating some sort of trauma about her status in society. This trauma, a consequence of capital, is manifested in her individuality and her attraction to the uitlander since the resulting alliances are seen to threaten group cohesion. It is at this point that the sign activates a second order indexical meaning, known as myth. The boeradogter is not only an individual, but she carries the connotative elements of purity, of cultural and social procreation, of extending the lineage of the Volksmøder. The genre conventions require that in terms of her perceived betrayal she must be seen to be maimed or defiled. She cannot, therefore, carry the torch of Afrikaner purity handed to her by the Volksmøder and so her mythical status has to be denied. As in Debbie, she has become a threat to 'the farm' with its content of 'authority', 'tradition', the 'fine and the noble', and so on. She is ostracised by her own people and cast out by her parents who are totally unable to understand what has happened to her. She is disapproved of by the servants and her other rural acquaintances. Yet, her assimilation into the 'new class', the urban petty bourgeois community, is often equally traumatic. Jeannie, for example, has a politician father who does not take much interest in her; Debbie has difficulty in relating to her urban friends. She becomes estranged from her boyfriend and is very much alone by the end of the movie. Endings are often unresolved and ambiguous, the director not knowing which way he should go, at least during the early phase of the genre. Despite her debilitating trauma she survives, if not in body then in spirit. Her survival is due to her sympathetic treatment by the director: she epitomises for him, profit and financial success -- the boeradogter is an intrinsic component of the magical formula.64 Whether blind, crippled, maimed or a leper, she will
never return to the farm; neither will she be reaccepted into the fold. Her prodigal tendencies (symbolizing the Afrikaner quest for industrial/financial capital) has traumatised the whole of Afrikanerdom and while 'the farm' (standing for cultural stability) existed as the guarantor of cultural integrity within the confines of Eden, this national trauma had yet to resolve itself through time. Initially, this trauma would, in the film itself, only build up during the unfolding of the plot with the maiming, degradation, self-imposed isolation or death of the boeredogter occurring at the end of the film. By 1979, she was dead before the film even started. In Herfsland (1979), for example, the opening scene starts with her funeral. Whereas Debbie and Jeannie Moolman were but country-born unmarried mothers, in Herfsland, the boeredogter not only committed suicide, but was also a drug addict, neurotic and mixed up with hippies. She was estranged from her husband and was an impossible wife. Despite these negative aspects, she was also a poetess and a winner of the Ingrid Jonker Prize. This extreme trauma and early death of the boeredogter indicated an intensified traumatic status needing resolution to be a part of the genre films to follow. This was effected in the War movie to be dealt with later, as well as the intervention of the dominee who was the main character through which the director advocated a change in social attitudes. Before continuing the discussion of the boeredogter, it is useful to locate the social role of the dominee in the conflict-love genre.

"The "dominee": tension management"

Like the sign of the boeredogter, the dominee also communicates on three basic levels. Iconically, he is identified as a man; indexically he stands for social stability; and symbolically, he represents the state, the source of 'willed' ideology. In the conflict-love story, the dominee is initially cast as the stodgy embodiment of 'the fine and the noble' and as the purveyor of the traditional values found in the rural areas. He is one of the volk, an affirmative symbol rather than a leader, a man who has the trust of his flock who turn to him in times of uncertainty and tension. Inexorably drawn into the conflict
between the insiders and the outsider, he is, at first, non-committal: he is torn between the hypocritical reactions of the volk and his sympathy for the boeredogter, her problems and the positive aspects she signifies as the Afrikaner of the future. In 'n Beeld vir Jeannie, the dominee initially sides with the town councillors, but is immediately sympathetic to the ideas of the uitlander notwithstanding his relationship with Jeannie. The dominee in Wat Jy Saai (1979) finds himself powerless against the scandal-mongers who object to a local doctor swimming with the boeredogter school teacher in a river. He is pressurised by events and later reluctantly supports condemnation of the doctor who is spuriously accused of getting his girlfriend pregnant and then aborting the baby. His considered behaviour and clear scepticism of the hypocrisy of the town's people is clearly contrasted against the obscene eagerness of his flock to pass judgement on the couple. In Eename Vlug (1979) the dominee tries to the boeredogter's foster father to treat her more gently, that she could not be held responsible for the death of her step-brother.

The full significance of the dominee is seen in Ter Wille van Christine (1975). In the context of the conservative dorp (allegorically standing for South Africa), this film is as explosive as it would be in Northern Ireland. Here the church itself is the site of struggle. Symbolical of the state, it witnesses the conflict between the Church Council and its two ministers. The dorp, Swartruggens, like Hoffmanskloof, stands for the nation as a whole. The boeresewon is a dominee, Paul. He has fallen in love with a Roman Catholic nurse, Christine. His father is a dominee in the same church. The boeredogter, who is in love with Paul, is the daughter of the antagonistic church elder. The outsider is, of course, Christine. The elder wishes Paul to marry his daughter. Paul has the support of his father and one of the council members. The choices presented by Dominee Paul's love for are radical: they are between following the letter and following the spirit of Christ's teachings; between adapting to change and ossifying; between serving abstractions, whether political or religious and accommodating human beings with unique feelings.
Christine, who escapes back to the city, is fetched by Paul. Following a tirade from the antagonistic church elder on how Christine has caused a split in the community, Paul decides to take up a calling in another congregation. At the last moment, however, Paul and Christine are supported by the more sympathetic elder who addresses the congregation during an evening service.

Forced to make his choice, the dominee usually sets himself apart from the volk by defending the boeredogter -- or the boeresew -- against the hypocrisy of the group. Sometimes his actions are overt, often they are implied. Ultimately, the dominee himself, through his defence of the boeredogter, comes to reassess his own values, convictions and cultural attitudes. He becomes as in Ter Wille van Christine, the moderator between the old and the new. The dominee is both leader and follower: leader because he commands inherent respect as a man of God who represents the chosen People (Volk); follower because he has been awakened to a new set of social relations separate to and away from 'the farm'. Indeed his role in film may be compared to the dilemma facing the various sections of the DRC of today as it agonises over and increasingly questions previously accepted ideologies and cultural attitudes.

The dominee, however, remains sceptical of the nouveau riche urban Afrikaner whose interests are financial, social mobility and self-advancement. If his presence is synonomous with Eden and those films located on the farm or in the dorp, in films acting out their conflicts in the city, he is much less visible. Where he does appear as in Eensame Vlug and Herfsland, he is subdued, ineffectual though understanding. In the latter film he is subject to the domineering personalities around him, in this case a politician father.

The father is against his foster child, Carina, step-sister of the deceased drug addict, marrying his widowed son-in-law. The dominee, the boeresew, had already asked his step-sister for her hand in marriage. She declined but asked him to officiate at her wedding. When his senator father hears of
this he forbids his son to have anything to do with the couple for he holds his son-in-law responsible for his daughter's death. In the ensuing altercation, the senator hits his son. As if gaining new strength from this belligerent action on the part of his father, the dominee becomes his own man, and defies his father by officiating at the marriage. Thus the dominee shows up the hypocrisy of the older generation and adapts to the new tasks set for him in an urban environment.

In the war film, the dominee is in uniform for the problem of resolving social conflicts is no longer only a moral one, but an ideological one as well. Where the civilian dominee was the chief mediator, in the war film he is replaced by the police and the military.

Having outlined the role of the dominee we now return to the discussion of the boeredogter.

The "boeredogter": development and ideological reorientation

While the signs of the boeresewn, boeredogter, Volksmoeder and dominee recur in other genres and more penetrating films as well after 1965, it took a while for the industry to capitalise on the popularity of the conflict-love genre identified by Debbie. The next major example of this genre, Sien Jou Môre (1970) was made by the successor of Jamie Uys Films, Kavaliers, also with Tommie Meyer as managing director. Directed by Elmo de Witt, the film was adapted from WA de Klerk's novel, Die Belydenis van Nelie Bell. It is a much more blatant treatment than that of Debbie and unashamedly sermonises through the idealistic boeresewn who is a medical student. The boeredogter is an art student from the Boland who hovers near the brink of permissiveness as she tries to help the urban villainess who is a drug addict. In line with the genre conventions, the villainess-uitlander has captivated the boeresewn. The villainess recovers from her addiction, but is tempted again and dies. The arch uitlander, even more threatening than the villainess, who is the cause of these personal problems is a wicked liberal professor, the "pitch black villain (blood red communist)."

423
As the publicity brochure states, the youth of previous generations could base their values on their forebears, but today these values have been revised by the exigencies of the technological and scientific era. Into this world the boeredogter enters with her betrothed, the boeresseun. He is, however, drawn to the villainess and he abandons the boeredogter. Mediated through the uitlander professor is the 'enemy': liberalism, student protest marches ('more say for the students'), folk singing, dagga (marijuana) and beat music. All of these activities coalesce into that easily identified insidious influence: communism. The university is thus shown as the site of struggle, the node of 'communist' indoctrination.

In Môre Môre which is located in Hoffmansdal, the same fictitious town which served as the backdrop for 'n Beeld vir Jeannie, the boeresseun loses the boeredogter, a matric schoolgirl, to the outsider school teacher. This film, however, lacks the depth of Debbie, 'n Beeld vir Jeannie or Sien Jou Môre, following the conventions of the genre in a technical and superficial way. The narrow minded-merciless community deprive the couple of their innocent happiness. The film ends with the teacher leaving town after an athletics match in which the boeredogter is accidently killed by the boeresseun in the javelin event. The boeredogter just happened to get in the way, he was actually trying to hit the teacher.

The stage is now set for a reorientation of the role and functions of the boeredogter. The economic and political trends which stabilised during the early 1970s after the high growth rate and age of consumerism heralded by the decade of the sixties found the boeredogter more and more in the cities and less and less on 'the farm' or in the dorp. The second trek (or urban trek) is taken for granted and the tussle is not necessarily hinged on the question of urbanization, but is now located mainly within the characters themselves in their representation of social roles. The urban-rural conflict becomes the struggle between 'good' Afrikaners and 'bad' Afrikaners within the city itself. This shift accepts the Rompel stereotype that the city Afrikaner is not all that different from his
rural counterpart. He has merely relocated himself onto a new farm, the smallholding, and brought his bywoner with him to tend the grounds, as in, for example, Erfgenaam (1971). In this film, the bywoner's daughter is the boeredogter who is drawn to the bourgeois landowner's son, who reminds his violently disapproving money-grabbing tycoon father that "Love is the greatest inheritance". The outsider as 'Afrikaner made good' takes on this role because of his ruthless capitalist outlook, an ideology which is equally criticised in later films like Iemand Soos Jy/Someone Like You (1978) and Rienie (1980). Presented without justification or motivation in these three films, as well as in many others, are people who have transported the ancestral farm to the city. They live on large plots, are housed in ostentatious mansions staffed by a citified bywoner.

The tractor has been replaced by a Mercedes 350SE, the farmyard with a highrise office tower, the voorkamer (sitting room) with a snooker table, while the kitchen and lounge literally bristle with technological gadgets. 'The farm' has become an embarrassment. In Rienie, for example, the farmer is dominant, the bywoner a drunkard, and his daughter, Rienie, without a mother. The bywoner sells his daughter to a childless rich urban Afrikaner couple. This new, younger boeredogter is underage, she is forced into the urban trek against her will though she remains unaware as to the reasons why she is spending her 'holiday' with surrogate parents. She has been spared the traumas of maturation undergone by the older, wiser boeredogter. She is simply a naïve pawn traded for financial gain by the bywoner who is embarrassed by his identity.

Rienie is perhaps one of the most significant examples of this genre, despite the fact that it was released mainly through the drive-in circuit, at least on the Witwatersrand. It shows a depth of plot, an intricacy of dramatic structure and a style of camerawork which is lacking from the more sentimental renditions of the conflict-love genre which preceded it. Where the camera in the films already discussed offers sharp images, is clinical and predictable and is used mainly to get an exposure, in Rienie, the camera is a significant part of the signification process. It encodes historical depth, complex relationships
and social power through low angle, subtly lit and multiple
layered imagery.68

The emphasis in Rienie has moved away from the conflict-love
aspect and concentrates more on the role of the young boere-
dogter. The film provides a unique example not only of the
transition from rural to urban motifs, but because it pro-
vides a parallel evocation of family groups, one, part of the
rural bourgeoisie located on 'the farm', and the other located
on the urban surrogate farm. In the former, the farmer is a
slick, successful, authoritarian and dominant personality who
is not ungenerous to his bywoner who is seen as weak, a drunk-
ard lacking moral fibre prepared to sell his daughter. Once
having sold his daughter, however, his character undergoes a
metamorphosis and the best traditional Afrikaans values come
to the fore -- hard work and courage in the face of tremen-
dous odds, self-sacrifice and quiet nobility.

The urban surrogate farmer, in contrast, is ruthless, harsh
and avaricious. He is a much more extreme characterisation
than his rural counterpart. He has no redeeming features.
He also has a bywoner. This city bywoner is old and wise,
kind and gentle, an avuncular figure who dispenses good sense
and sympathy in equal measure. He is the one who keeps this
urban unit together, whereas it is the farmer himself who holds
the rural unit together on 'the farm'.

Unlike the character in previous movies, the boeredogter in
Rienie is not faced with having to overcome her trauma. Others
do this for her. Her new urban mother assumes the responsib-
ilities of buying her and shielding her from the knowledge of
her father's terminal illness. She is the sifting device who
weans the innocent boeredogter away from the farm and protects
her from the ruthlessness of urban wealth and its questionable
methods of accumulation represented in the behaviour of her
foster father. Rienie-as-boeredogter remains unaware of these
traumas. Her role epitomises and offers a clear indication of
contrasting social derivations which originate from a common
cultural base. Rienie encapsulates both sides of the
rural-urban trek and acts as a bridging film between the two sets of farms in the genre (one rural and one urban) and shows that they are not separate, but parallel.

Symbolically, Rienie shows the interpenetration of urban and rural capitals. Although 'the farm' is not necessarily shown as a poverty-stricken area, the fact of migration by the boeridogter or boereuseun, suggests that it is outshone by the more material attractions of the city. It is rare that the farmhouse matches up to the size and magnificence of the urban dwelling, for example. It will be remembered that the Afrikaner attack on the foreign dominated capitalist system was financed by rural capital but fought in the cities. During the course of this economic struggle it would have been surprising if some benefits of the victory did not rub off on to the rural bourgeoisie itself. Rienie alludes to such effects: the well-to-do, socially remote farmer who lives in a modern urban-style unfarmlike house. Unlike his city counterpart, however, he retains a measure of humanity and compassion; he has not been totally spoiled by capital. Even the drunken bywoner, once he has sold out to capital, changes and tries to get back the daughter he was forced to sell in a moment of necessity. But it is too late, the move is irrevocable. Despite Rienie's desire to go home, she cannot, for her father discovers that he is dying. Accepting that she must now stay with her foster parents, her father visits her to break the news of his condition. Rienie, unaware of the reasons behind her move to the city, meanwhile mounts a horse which bolts. Her father, not yet seen by Rienie, runs after it in an effort to save her. He is critically injured as he runs across a road. The driver of the car is none other than Rienie's nasty foster father who just happens to be coming home in his XJ6 Jaguar. Rienie is not hurt and is eventually taken to see her father in hospital where he dies. Rienie stays with her new parents.

In Rienie the boeridogter is an unwitting, but total slave of capital. Being blonde, however, she remains pure. Although a victim of social degredation, she is no longer a maimed
heroine. She symbolises the inexorable work of capital which by 1980 had integrated both the rural and urban strands, that is to say, the rural and urban bourgeoisies.

*Rienie* was made in 1980 and ties up many of the issues raised by earlier films. This film did not mark the end of the conflict-love genre cycle, it suggested its future. The genre, however, stagnated because of the truncating effect of television. It is now appropriate to return to a discussion of earlier films of the general insider-outsider category to trace the growth and completion of the conflict-love story. As with *Debbie*, most of the films in the general category occur in the city. More specifically, it is the university campus which provides the site of the conflict. If not a campus, university students are nevertheless the film's discursive characters. Examples are *Sien Jou Môre* (1970), *Vergeet My Nêe* (1976), *Liefste Veertjie* (1975), *Springbok* (1976), *Die Winter van 14 Julie* (1977), *Nicoline* (1978), *Eensame Vlug* (1979), *Kiepie en Kandies* (1980) and *April '80* (1980). The university environment is significant because it is often the first time that *boere docters* and *boere seuns* come into close and continuous contact with alternative discourses and competing permissive ways of life. The academic ecological setting, like the church, is a highly influential ideological node which has played a remarkable role in the Afrikaner struggle towards the attainment of a *volkskapitalisme*. At the same time, however, it is also a 'liberalising' agent which fuels the independent conduct of the *boere docter*. The revision of her social role, that of the still saintly *boere seun* and of the *uitlander*, is the result of the restructuring of the key plot which sees social relations in terms of rural versus urban ways of life, but more dialectically in communist versus nationalist terms. This is particularly evident in the content of films like *Sien Jou Môre, Eensame Vlug, Die Winter van 14 Julie, April '80* and the host of war films which potmarked the 1970s, and particularly the last few years of the decade.

The indexical and symbolical modification of these signs are a consequence of changes in the political economy. The idea
of the urban Afrikaner has been accepted in cinematic myth. This advance, however, has taken its toll, for the cultural purity of the boerendogter has been spoiled and polluted with elements previously only found in the 'enemy': imperial capital. Apart from Kienie, she is aware of her degradation. Here, as a second generation boerendogter, fostered by a first generation boerendogter, she is protected from the now submerged cultural trauma.

The uitlander is still there. S/he is either the avaricious, self-centred Afrikaner capitalist who lives on his urban farm, or s/he is a red-haired drug addict, communist student, Roman Catholic or an ex-convict. This character exists in relation to a new psychological state which co-exists with, but has to a certain extent superceded the Garden of Eden, the purity symbols of the farm or "eie bodem" (own soil). At this point of the genre cycle, that state is an urban capitalist one with the 'enemy' in its midst. The uitlander cannot escape his past by settling in a rural valley community as in Ongewensie Vreemdeling (Undesirable Stranger - 1974). The ex-murderer in Vergeet My Nie (Don't Forget Me - 1976) influences the daughter of a professor into taking on a 'revolutionary stance' against the 'establishment'. He is warned off by the university principal and eventually sentenced for a crime he did not commit. Rich domineering mothers, the antithesis of the original connotations attached to the Volksmoeder, try to prevent their children from marrying 'poor' Afrikaners, as in Sonneblom Uit Parys (Sunflower from Parys - 1974) and Snip en Rissiepit (1973).

At its most introspective and defensive, the urban variety of the conflict-love story which is critical of mindless wealth and destructive individualistic striving is found in Flekkie in die Son (A Place in the Sun - 1979) where the insiders have retreated into a leper 'colony'. Those inside talk about the uitlanders, those outside the asylum. The urban born boerendogter, married to a Trust Bank whizz-kid husband, is gradually rejected by her family and the marriage disintegrates. The metaphor of being a leper in the context of a
maimed heroine suggests that she has undergone some degrading contact. Her touch is defiled, affecting not only the present generation, but the next as well. This sense of pollution, of isolation is reinforced when the old husband and wife are rejected by their children and are forced to seek sanctuary in the asylum once more. The role of the boeredogter in Plekkie in die Son is an advanced one: a city slicker, dark-haired and naïve; not only has she lost the innocence of rural purity, but she is rejected at her destination: wealth, opulence and urban living. The mirrors of the genre are turned inward in this film with a terrible vengence suggesting something highly traumatic about the social structure. The conventional patterns are disintegrating and new unsettling, destructive material-oriented practices are replacing them. Group cohesion and identity are being ruthlessly superceded by individualistic, anonymous and selfish capitalist values. Even within the social sanctury of the asylum, there are problems. The estranged boeredogter is drawn to the doctor. This doctor/patient relationship is exposed by a jealous female doctor; added to this is a pregnant mistress and a horrific birth scene with a disposable neonate. Yet, despite all this trauma, the film has a happy ending and the couple come together.

With the location of the key plot in the urban milieu alone, the conflict, often seen in generational terms, has added a new dimension, a conflict, or rather, an embarrassment of classes. This has already been mentioned with regard to the rich upwardly mobile parents trying to prevent their children from marrying lower-middle-class spouses (for example, Sonneblom Uit Parys and Iemand Soos Jy). Of a more serious nature are the ideological tendencies and cultural differences between the elite of Waterkloof Afrikanerdome, and the stagnant petty bourgeoisie who live in Krugersdorp seen in 'n Seder Val in Waterkloof (A Cedar Falls in Waterkloof - 1978). The film does not portray the two groups as discrete classes: "they were branches of the same Baobab which had grown in different directions and were now coming at each other". In the original play on which the film is based, the new Afrikaner speaks
English; the old Afrikaner comes from the *plaas* (farm) with chickens on the back seat and fur on the dashboard. The old Afrikaner is an embarrassment, but it is the new Afrikaner who is criticised for allowing the old Afrikaner to be an embarrassment. The film has made a number of crucial changes. The elite Afrikaner speaks Afrikaans, while the old Afrikaner has been substituted for a lower middle-class-urban family of Krugersdorp *jollers* (revellers). The film has thus shifted the plot to within an urban context alone: BMW's versus a hotted up Ford Cortina with racing stripes and an orange on the aerial and fur on the dashboard; gracious living versus *plaasjapie* (country bumbkin) behaviour; decorum versus mayhem; sexual restraint versus lustiness, and so on. These oppositions are not found in different classes for that would suggest that the Afrikaner group is not a group, but within the same family: *n Seder Val in Waterkloof* "did acknowledge that an Afrikaner did did exist who preferred to not be publically associated with the beer, sunny skies, braai and Chevrolet culture, let alone the meisie [girl] working in the massage parlour". The cedar or pillar of Afrikanerdom, Professor van Vuuren, is driven by an ambition to become the chairman of an influential and prestigious Academy. His accession to this position depends on obtaining the support of two professors from Bloemfontein who are invited to sojourn at his mansion in Waterkloof.

Into the rustic, smart, bourgeois and idyllic Waterkloof environment arrive van Vuuren's noisy, undignified and loquacious family from Krugersdorp, packed like sardines in their souped-up Cortina. Van Vuuren's ambitious wife tries to get rid of them, but they move in anyway. Peeved at their unfriendly welcome, they decide to employ a "sex bomb masseuse" to "fix" the professor and discredit him before his superiors. Two further masseuses work on the two Bloemfontein professors when the family realise what they have done to van Vuuren, to try to redress the balance and blackmail the eminent visitors. The film thus exposes the pretention and hypocrisy of the Afrikaner elite. The group may have divided in terms of ways of life but the resulting conflicts can still be resolved by the elite discarding their pretentions and returning to the
tradition of more simple ways. Although *h Seder Val in Waterkloof* lacks the role of the *boereagter* or *boereesin*, it does fit into the general insider-outsider category. It is significant because it questions the concept of an outsider within the group. Where *Plekkie in die Son* shows distinct group disintegration, *h Seder Val in Waterkloof* suggests that that disintegration is merely the result of the pretension of the 'new classes', the Afrikaner elite. Self-examination can result in a *raprochement* between the two branches, and this is shown in graphic terms in *h Seder Val in Waterkloof* where professor van Vuuren discards his way of life and goes off with one of the masseuses. This resolution in the relationship between the 'insider' and 'outsider' is crucial for the continued development of the key plot. The integration of a different set of social and sexual mores which no longer separate the group heralded the redefinition of the outsider or enemy. The enemy is no longer 'imperial capital', represented in the city and its sinful ways. Capitalism and its corresponding social practices, sexual permissivity under certain circumstances, and looser social ties are now accepted. The enemy has shifted his location: he represents an external threat beyond South Africa's borders and he makes use of the *uitlander* within the border.

The *uitlander*'s new position is the result of a new war, a new set of traumas consequent upon capital and bent on the destruction, not so much of Afrikaner culture, but of the South African 'way of life' (and racial capitalism in particular). The oppositions are capitalism versus communism, or more specifically, *volkskapitalisme* versus communism, and within that black versus white. This conflict is manifested in a new mental state, typified by 'the Border'. 'The Border' stands for the imperialist world onslaught (articulated as the 'total onslaught') which, like the British war on the Boers, seeks to take away what belongs to Afrikanerdum: its wealth, its culture and its God-given privileged position in life. Like 'the farm', 'the Border' is a state of being. Causation is taken for granted, no explanation to account for this state being necessary: it's there, omnipresent and continuous, a
state to be expected, like sleeping or death.

The "Uitlander": Transition to Black Terrorist

The sign of the uitlander becomes more complex as a result of the transition from 'the Farm' to 'the Border'. It should now be analysed not as a two-tiered, but a three-tiered structure. First, though now less important, remains the image of the English-speaking South African who is influenced by international liberalism. The second is a new kind of Afrikaans villain, who is not only defined by his urban geographical location, but by the fact that he is a coward and/or wants to flee the country. The third element of the outsider is a revolutionary one, contingent upon the intensified racial conflict generated out of the smoke, killing and rhetoric of 'the Border war'. This international conflict has led to a widening of the definition of Afrikaner. The outsider is no longer limited to English speakers and the urban petty bourgeois Afrikaner. No more is s/he seen in purely white terms: s/he has become a mortal enemy characterised by his blackness (red communist) and his AK47 automatic rifle.

Although a number of war films had been made since the early 1970s, for example, Zebra (1971), Kaptein Kapriví (1972), Aangsleg op Kariba (1973), Ses Soldate (1975), Die Rebel (1976), Hank, Hennery and Friend (1976), few of these fit easily into the overall insider-outsider category. Perhaps the first to do so was Die Winter van 14 Julie (The Winter of 14 July - 1977) which did not go to war as such, but tried to capitalise on the new ideological theme. The rationale offered by producer Tommie Meyer is reminiscent of his reasons for making Debbie twelve years earlier:

"Every parent in South Africa at the moment has at least a family member or a child or nephew or a friend who is at the Border, or who will go to the Border?"

The film follows the now conventional plot. A national service-man meet a girl. They fall in love, sleep together; she falls
pregnant. He is an orphan and is considered unsuitable as a husband for the boeredogter by the interfering mother. The girl's father suggests that she does not tell her boyfriend about her pregnancy, that she goes away to have the baby and then returns to a normal life at home. The boeredogter, however, decides to have an abortion and makes arrangements with a fifth year medical student. She breaks off her relationship with her boyfriend but tells him her problem in a letter to be given to him by her brother, a fellow national serviceman, once they have reached Grootfontein in South West Africa. The boyfriend goes absent without leave (AWOL) and persuades the boeredogter to marry him even though she is underage, and without her parents’ permission. She borrows her cousin’s birth certificate and the couple are married by a magistrate. On learning of the wedding, her parents take steps to have the marriage annulled. Her brother, also AWOL, opposes this action and a huge family quarrel ensues. The mother, realising that the family would be torn apart if legal steps are taken eventually condones the marriage for the sake of unity. The outsider, now an insider, returns with his brother-in-law to face their punishment from the military for being absent without leave.

Although a sentimental and technical application of the genre conventions, Die Winter van 14 Julie struck a cord with viewers, particularly English-speaking audiences in Natal. Thematically it is important for it marks a fundamental shift in the treatment of the outsider. For the first time he is accepted back into the fold, though he has degraded the boeredogter and brought shame to the group. In previous instances, the group basically remained closed. The boeredogter, if still alive, linked up with the outsider beyond the confines of her close community. Now the outsider is accepted by the group itself, but in a different context: that of a war against the outside. The new alliance demands unity, even if it is of an uneasy nature. In the wider society, the English speaking South African (the outsider) has been accepted by the insiders (Afrikaners) as they combine to resist the 'total onslaught' both economically and on the battlegrounds of 'the Border'.

434
Elements of the war situation have filtered into other films of the conflict-love genre as well, notably Eensame Vlug (1979) and Grensbasis 13 (1979). In the former film, the outsider who was on the inside (Walter) seals his rejection because of his cowardice at a military camp in Angola which resulted in the death of three of his comrades-in-arms. One of his army companions was a university lecturer, Simon, who is also Walter's uncle. Simon falls in love with Walter's girlfriend, Julie. She is an unsuspecting orphan who is blamed for her step-brother's death by her foster father. Her brother was killed while scaling a dangerous cliff at her encouragement. She is attracted to the lecturer who offers a promise of help. Simon divorces his estranged wife. Walter tries to humiliate Simon who is no longer able to protect him. Walter's parents are told of his cowardly deed in Angola. He is rejected by his parents. In a last desperate act he tampers with Simon's skydiving parachute while Simon and Julie sit in the club house. As they prepare to board the plane, Walter helps Julie put on the parachute, the one that will never open .... The boeredogter dies in the fall.

References to 'the Border' are seen in an increasing array of films of all genres, not to mention television, radio soap operas, news and so on. It even appears in films intended for the overseas market where such references are meaningless, for example, Someone Like You (1978) and Fifth Season (1978).

The adopted child is another recurring element of the conflict-love genre, indicating her displaced roots if she is the boeredogter. Originally a symbol of alienated Afrikaner capital represented in her move to the city, in the city itself she stands for miscreation as she marries this capital with international capital. Out of this integration flows a repurified capital, seen most clearly in April '80. An understanding of how this came about requires some discussion of the war film

The War Film: The Boeredogter Becomes Repurified

Stimulated by the continual threat of the border war and the
increasing probability of urban terrorism, Afrikaans films have begun to reflect such conflicts. Whereas the treatment of the boeredogter remained fairly constant during the first thirteen years of her cinematic life, between 1978 and 1980 she underwent a rapid modification, a function of adjustments in the base of the South African economy as Afrikaner and English capital began to merge in their collaborative efforts to thwart the 'total onslaught'.

Unlike the American post-Vietnam films such as Coming Home, The Deer Hunter and Apocalypse Now which are highly critical of America's involvement in South East Asia and the resulting devastating social consequences for that society, South African films using the theme of the border war are totally uncritical. Apart from the pro-Vietnam war film, The Green Berets, made during the war itself, it took the American industry more than ten years to reflect the images of the war. In contrast, the South African film industry followed the troops into action with no qualms at all. This discursive support was helped along by a number of British companies who capitalised on the escalating war situation on the sub-continent with films like Wild Geese (1978) and Game for Vultures (1979).

The war film created the opportunity for a new kind of white male hero. Partly because war is perceived as a male activity, women are usually portrayed 'at home'. The men pair up as twins, one tough and hard, the other sensitive and soft? In Eensame Vlug it was the mature, brave and confident lecturer with the immature, weak and cowardly step brother of the boeredogter; in Die Winter van 14 Julie, the impulsive love-stricken orphan is balanced by the boeredogter's stable, clear-minded and pragmatic brother; Forty Days portrays two demobbed soldiers, one who is rough, tough, hard-living and foolhardy, while his friend is sensible, serious and vulnerable. In Grensbasis 13, the captured boereun is philosophical and soft, while his comrade who rescues him is determined, pragmatic and strong. The conflictual elements initiated by these films develop more fully in the war movie. Here, the drama is couched in the symbolism of a man divided and having to
lose that side of himself that might threaten group membership. To the extent that war involves the individual as a member of society, the personal ties become anti-social. In *Forty Days* the sensitive *troepie* (soldier) defies the institutions of society as he tries to re-orient himself to civilian life. Both literally and symbolically, Afrikaans films with a war theme deal with civil war: war within the body politic and within the individual.

A structuralist analysis of war movies *per se* reveals a society which confronts reality and the complexities of life by a simplistic reduction to binary opposites: good versus bad; war versus peace; black versus white; communism versus capitalism; Marxism versus Christianity and so on. More specifically, the themes found in the sub-texts of these films exhibit the following oppositions: terrorist (black) = bad; soldier/policeman (white) = good; and 'loyal' black (especially those fighting on the side of South Africa) = good + bad (a sort of reformed black).

*Terrorist* (1978), based on the Grootfontein murders encapsulates the above oppositions without questioning. Initially banned, it was granted censorship exemption when the director altered the ending to indicate that terrorists will be apprehended and punished. The subtle photography observes the desert in a way which emphasises the territorial conflict. Although the film contains little overt right-wing propaganda, its offers a disturbingly accurate reflection of white South African attitudes regarding the guerilla conflict: the mindless slaughter, the tacit acceptance that black must kill white, the lack of motivation for such killings, the ubiquitous Kenyan who fled the Mau Mau who talks endearingly about "black bastards". The guerillas do show some individuality, though one of them is directed to laugh for extended periods at odd moments suggesting brutal malevolence rather than humour. *Terrorist*, despite its difficulty in obtaining distribution (being only 70 minutes in length) encapsulates the dominant discourse on 'terrorism' seen in order versus anarchy.
terms. 

*Wild Geese* (1978) is an embarrassing example of racial moralising where black and white solve their differences in terms of the dominant apartheid discourse. Financed by British banks and South African investors, the film glorifies the heroic myth of white mercenaries in Africa come to save the black man from himself. The film enlists the cinematic codes in the service of the mercenaries inverting history in the process. By placing the camera behind the mercenary rifles, the attacking black hordes are made to seem like invaders in their own country. As Robert Stam points out, the film camouflages its racism by means of two plot devices. First, the mercenary force includes one token black (as does the platoon in *Grensbasis 13*), whose presence masks the racial character of the slaughter. Genocide seems more palatable when its perpetrators are 'integrated'. Secondly, the entire operation is performed on behalf of a black leader -- Limbani -- who is repeatedly characterised as "the best there is". But "the best there is" appears as sick, helpless, dying, literally carried on the backs of whites. In a transparent imitation of *The Defiant One's*, Limbani winds up being carried by the 'racist' South African whose racism is presumed to contrast with the 'non-racism' of the other mercenaries. This ex-South African policeman first calls him "Kaffir", then "man", then more endearingly, "bloke". In this white rescue fantasy, the Limbani of the 1970s speaks oddly like the Sidney Poitier of the 1950s: he pleads for love and integration. The blacks, he says, must forgive the white past and whites must forgive the black present: "We need each other white man". Thus centuries of colonialism are cancelled out in the misleading symmetry of an aphorism. *Game For Vultures* is even more crude than *Wild Geese*, making out that all blacks are stupid communist dupes.

Elmo de Witt's *Grensbasis 13* (Border Base 13 - 1979) continues the conflict-love plot in the war film. It portrays action and a remarkably good reflection of battle in the bush. The camera is on the side of the South African forces. The
classic triangular love affair involves a police lieutenant, a female doctor and a stay-at-home girlfriend. The doctor on the border is blonde, fair and Aryan: she is the city boere-dogter-gone-north. The outsider is a smooth, materialist Afrikaner "wat die land wil vlug" (who wants to flee the country). The stay-at-home girlfriend's mother wants her to marry this new villain rather than a police lieutenant. Though the mother, who is clearly a socialite, has a son who is also a policeman, she feels that members of the Police Force are not good enough for her daughter. This situation offers the director the opportunity to make a number of unctuous remarks about the valiant heroes defending South Africa.

The girlfriend remains torn between the outsider and her mortally wounded ex-fiancé. The lieutenant takes it upon himself to rescue his girlfriend's brother who has been captured by the terrorists. This is the surface structure. The hidden unconscious meaning is contained in de Witt's treatment of his subject matter. First, like all other references to 'the Border' no motivations or reasons for this state are offered. Secondly, implicit in this film is the assumption that border duty is voluntary. The South African Police and not the Defence Force is involved. A passing reference to the possible exposé on foreign television, that the captured policeman might be forced to acknowledge that his role was not voluntary, is given as the official reason for a daring raid to secure his rescue. Third, the conflict is not related to the larger politico-economic causes, the battle of opposing ideologies. The reasons for the war and the resulting social dislocations are ignored. The rescue has nothing to do with social remorse or societal guilt. It is a device to satisfy the conventions of melodrama in that the lieutenant considers himself responsible for the safety of his captured friend, simply because he promised the family that he would look after him. On the other hand it also has an affirmative function. As Robert Greig concludes:

I infer from all this that marrying policemen is the patriotic duty of white South African girls. An interesting idea, on a par with making babies for Botha."
In line with the conventions of the conflict-love genre somebody has to die an unnatural death. In *Grensbasis 13* it is not the *boere* nor the outsider: it is the lieutenant. He is shot while trying to rescue his friend, not by his lover or the outsider, but by the enemy. That enemy has a black skin: he is the 'stupid communist dupe' *uitlander*. The film also heralded a number of other significant thematic and symbolic modifications. Having lost her purity and virginity in the city, the *boere* who had become dark-haired is again blonde. She has regained her purity and moved to the bush. The bush on 'the Border' is the site of the armed struggle and she not only heals wounds but heals the soul as well. She falls in love with the lieutenant who is doing his duty both for his country and the family who rejects him. Just as capital-in-general supports the war, so the *boere* supports the policeman who is fighting in the war. He is rewarded for his bravery with a sexual intimacy outside of marriage. Where Debbie was ostracised for her sexual conduct, the doctor in *Grensbasis 13* is venerated. Since the *uitlander* is shown to be the personification of influences originating from outside South Africa, the *boere* cannot be degraded anymore. The outsider who remains within the country is no threat at all and is depicted as a lazy lounge lizard. The *boere* new status and affirmation of her sexual conduct is symbolised in the scene towards the end of the film where she accepts a medal at a ceremony on behalf of her dead lover. This *boere* has no discernable familial ties, though the kinship network is strong. In this film she performs some of the functions of the *volksmoeder*: she is behind the lines dispensing not food and shelter, but healing and sexual support. Like Rienie, she suffers no cultural or social trauma, just a personal loss. She naively acts out her practice unaware of the influences guiding her actions; she is no longer an outcast but like the *volksmoeder*, an intrinsic element in the battle for the security of Afrikanerdom. She has re-established her mythical status under the conditions determined by a new conflict, a new set of social relations and an enemy who can only be defeated militarily. The cinematic *boere* in *Grensbasis 13* has lost the depth of character
of previous generations: "Dr Jane is the stock albino ... - the figure of Aryan purity who is infinitely accomodating, passionless, brave and vacuous".  

Made at the same time, *Forty Days* (1979) takes its title from the Cliff Richards hit song which in the South African context marks the count-down to the end of full time national service. *Forty Days* is frivolous, fast moving and humorous. Made in English, its characters speak in South African-English and the slangish grammar and pronunciation which results from a two year absence from civilian life. Technically, the film is incredibly badly made which perhaps accounts partly for Ster-Kinekor scepticism of its box office potential. Its flawed continuity and erratic surface structure, however, camouflages a deeper ideological tension. The dialectic is quite blatant: police (good) versus disco sub-culture (bad); Defence Force (good) versus personal chaos (bad) which in a broader context can be seen as Institutionalism (good) versus Individualism (bad). The film mainly takes place in the demonic ecological setting of Hillbrow. Drugs, alcohol, prostitution, permissiveness, homosexuality and crime, and family rejection meet the two returning soldiers. Jock, the gentle, less confident extroopie finds that his girlfriend is married and expecting a baby, that his mother has moved without leaving a forwarding address while his sister and brother-in-law are unconcerned and bound up in their own lives. Eventually he moves in with his self-assured fellow serviceman and his girlfriend. His friend, Stevie, is shot during a robbery attempt, his girlfriend fired from a disco where she works and Jock resists appealing to the institutions of society for help. Stevie's girlfriend dies in a fall from her balcony and Jock calls the police.  

The police are portrayed as charming, friendly fellows, always ready to help and paternalistically guide young men in danger of falling into bad ways. Shot from low camera angles they literally beam assurance and benign concern. Contrasted with this institutional benevolence is the anarchic portrayal of civilian life characterised by the Hillbrow disco scene.
The disco culture is hardly a typical experience for a returning troopie or a reflection of civilian life. In *Forty Days* it represents the shady and the sinister activities of the underworld.

The film suggests that the Defence Force and the Police are the only viable agents of stability, law and order. Throughout the film is the insistence and reiteration of the help and guidance offered by the Defence Force which is contrasted with a demonstration of the pitfalls of going it alone: "I don't need the army -- they ran my life for two years" is shown to be wilful and counter-productive. Predictably, it is the police who save the two ex-soldiers from their own determined obstinacy.

A recurring thematic element of the film is the socially condoned submerged violence. The most obvious example of this is where Jock attacks and robs a homosexual who solicits him in a bar. In a later scene he is remorseful only over the fact that he is guilty of robbery. He gives the money to the woman who has taken over his mother's flat, goes back to Mandy and Stevie's apartment where is is consoled by Mandy who makes love to him. While there is a latent homosexual theme in the war film itself -- between the tough and the more sensitive soldier duo -- it is to be violently repressed when confronted overtly. Although the homosexual in *Forty Days* is well dressed and lives in an elegant flat, he is nevertheless part of the internal enemy threatening social stability. He is therefore punished without remorse.

*Forty Days* marks a departure from previous films in that it attempts, albeit in an incomplete way, to account for the difficulties experienced by young men in a war situation and separated from their families for two years. It was described by the majority of press reviews as "South Africa's Coming Home" and lauded as "A cut above the usual"79 and as a film which "restores faith in the local film industry"80. The press reviewers simply confirmed the dominant discourse in their columns for the film was certainly one of the most inept
of the decade on both a technical and a plotting level.

Whereas America's post-Vietnam war films provide an almost painful self-examination of the effects of the war on American society, and particularly on the men involved with it, the South African films are superficial, stereotyped and even glib. In both Grensbasis 13 and Forty Days, the war is there -- a fact of life, not discussed or rationalised -- simply accepted. In both films the police who represent Institutionalised South Africa are lauded and made out to be pillars of society. Both portray the population back home as uncaring, uninterested, bound up in their own petty lives and unable to comprehend the rigours of border life. These issues are best left to those who know -- the Defence and Police Forces. They are the key to social and personal stability. Only they are able to help. These repressive apparatuses have superceded the family as the unifying factor. The social fabric of the group is unable to maintain is cohesjon without Institutional help. The key element of that cohesion, the dominee, has been superceded by repression in the guise of help.

The above section has identified the main themes to be found in films which owe much of their plotting to the war situation. A certain social disorganization is balanced by the absorption of the outsider-within into the group itself while identifying a more clearly discernable uitlander in terms of the colour of his skin, or whether he speaks Chinese or Russian. The boerebuogter is now totally integrated into the new urban society-at-war, with its more liberal sexual values. From suffering the indignities of being a maimed heroine in earlier films, she has graduated and been elevated to a new, higher repurified status within Afrikanerdom. The structures of authority and traditional values of 'the farm' have been transplanted in a modified form to 'the Border'. Group cohesion and loyalty have given way to a more abstract Institutionalism managed not by the dominee but by the Police and Defence Forces.
These cinematic trends and the codes employed to reinforce the dominant discourse were followed through by Jan Scholtz in April '80 which marked the termination of the conflict-love genre in its dominant form.

April '80: The Case of the Reclaimed Boeredogter

Despite universal acclaim from the press which lauded April '80's bold move into 'politics', 'urban terrorism' and so on, this film, more than anything before it, bolsters the dominant discourse. The film does not question or criticise, nor does it sympathise with the outsider. By manipulating the genre conventions the director is able to offer the illusion of contention and controversy while simultaneously vindicating the surveillance and repressive actions of the state repressive machinery.

Again, the role of the boeredogter is crucial to an understanding of the film and the significance of the genre. In April '80 the boeredogter is not only born in the city but she is English-speaking (that is, bilingual) as well. She is dark-haired rather than blonde and defensive rather than naïve. In losing her Aryan status she has gained capital as an ally. Her home life, however, remains difficult, for the clash of cultures has yet to be resolved. Her mother is of Afrikaans origin; paradoxically she is a civil rights lawyer who now speaks English. Her father is a professor of English on an English-language inland university campus. He is accused by his wife of thinking liberally, acting liberally and living liberally but who "votes Prog and says thank God for the Nats". The parents are divorced. The boeredogter, Carol, lives at home with her father.

The boereseun, whose father belonged to the militant Oseewabrandwag (OB) during the Second World War, falls in love with Carol -- a prerequisite of the new set of genre conventions. She, he and her brother are all students at the university. Carol's brother, Alex, is the outsider. He is a student activist who, in setting off some pamphlet bombs inadvertently
kills two innocent bystanders (who just happen to be PFP voters). Against his will, the boere seun who grew up in a fishing village on the west coast, is persuaded by the Security Police to spy on Alex through Alex's sister. The plot is complicated when the boere seun falls in love with Carol and then refuses to inform on her brother. His ties with the volk, however, prove too strong and in the face of graphic evidence shown him by the Security Police on acts of terrorism implicating Alex by association, he backs down and again agrees to inform on his girlfriend's brother. This decision is made in spite of his knowledge of his father's acts of sabotage and terrorism while a member of the OB during World War II. Both the OB and present day student activists, he argues, were fighting for freedom, albeit on different ideological grounds. The boere seun sticks to this interpretation despite a violent reaction from his father who insists that he turn Alex in. In a development non-continuous with the internal logic of the plot, the boere seun, after the visit home with Carol, decides to inform the police of Alex's guilt. Alex lures the boere seun into a deserted building in Vrededorp. In the meantime Alex's father, who has disowned him, his sister, who will no longer protect him, and the police all arrive on the scene. Alex shoots the boere seun and is killed by the police in return. Carol, a witness to the event runs, not to her brother as might be expected, but to the boere seun and professes her love for him. The last shot is of the couple walking along the beach in longshot at sunset. The boere seun walks into the sea and throws his crutch into it. They live happily ever after.

An examination of the film's subtext will show an opposing interpretation to those offered by the press critics. First, Alex plays the stereotyped image of a 'terrorist': he has an unmanageable black beard, long bushy hair, is irrational, aggressive, short-tempered and a racist, continually vilifying Afrikaners. His political motivations are reduced to an unhappy childhood, while the treatment of the subject matter is reminiscent more of the heady days of the late 1960s and early '70s when frenetic student politics conceived of apartheid in
libertarian terms as an irrational ideology premised on racial and cultural differences. The film is titled April '80, yet is unaware that English student concerns have moved away from this liberal-humanist perspective and now see the clash as one between capital and labour where apartheid discourse mobilises racial and cultural differences to rationalise the class structure in terms of racial capitalism. Where students once identified Afrikaners as the source of apartheid, by the mid-1970s, it was realised that the perpetrator of apartheid was capital per se. Whether that capital was of English or Afrikaans origin was considered irrelevant. April '80 then, is an uneasy amalgam of misunderstood outdated liberal values superimposed on supposedly current events. As such, it is a trivialised reflection of English student politics whether in 1980 or a decade previously.

Second, the continuity lapse mentioned earlier is not only a function of the boerebeun's ties to the volk, but also of the genre which calls for a socially reassuring movie, not one that classes the terrorist acts of the OB and student activism in the same category. In present day South Africa the myth of the OB is part of the new moral order as far as Afrikaners are concerned whereas student activism is not. Indeed, student protesters and activists were literally bludgeoned into submission in 1972 while their leaders were all banned or detained in 1973. Thus, where the OB 'terrorist' is now seen as politically legitimated, the student 'terrorist' is regarded as a criminal, a communist dupe who is morally degenerate. He must be punished and dies, as do the two PFP supporters, killed by their own kind. The implication is that the PFP Opposition also stand for moral and social disorder.

Third, when Alex realises that the police net is closing on him he appeals to a foreign agent, presumably a Russian, judging from his typecasting and strange accent, for help. Unaccountably this is denied. Alex's mother tells him to give himself up as no country in the world will give asylum to a "murderer". Alex has nowhere to go. The resolution of the plot is ensured: he will die in the shootout with the
boeresein. By building this assumption into the film, the director has again either misread or ignored the reality of resistance in South Africa. At least five countries ringed South Africa would have given Alex political asylum. It is also highly unlikely that Alex would have been in contact with so improbable a figure as the 'Russian agent' who was shown to be a smooth, suave unconcerned double-talking subversive. By foreclosing Alex's escape route, the director was able to ignore world pressure on South Africa or the fact that tens of thousands of South Africans, black and white, have been granted political asylum, not to mention the few serving life sentences who managed to escape from maximum security prisons.

Unlike earlier examples of the conflict-love genre, criticism is not levelled at the self-righteous volk, and the boeredogter is not denegated in any way. Following her liberated role in the war movie, she becomes the heroine: she is marked for and marries the boeresein. Thus, April '80 is the conduit which provides for the rapprochement between the previously estranged boeresein and boeredogter. The deeper significance of April '80 is that the inter-penetration of English by Afrikaans capital has largely been accomplished. Implied too, is that the 'foreign' capitalist system has been adapted to a Volkskapitalisme reflecting the Afrikaner heritage and lifestyle. Outsiders such as the student activist will die, black South Africans will accept what's deemed good for them and the insiders, both Afrikaans and English speaking, will coalesce into the new group which will remain closed to outsiders or uitlanders such as blacks.

The conflicts in April '80 are offered as a clash of cultures rather than one between capital and labour. The only non-white character, the coloured printer of the pamphlets, rejects Alex's liberalism and takes bitter reassurance in the prevailing political order:

What sort of justice do you expect in this country when the radicals take over? What sort of democracy? Have you forgotten how they kicked the coolies out of Africa, how they treated the whites, the geno-
cide against other tribes?

This compendium of conventional wisdoms, usually uttered by expatriot white settler types such as the Kenyan in *Terrorist*, leads to the alienation of Alex from his fellow activist. By directing the black character to mouth this sort of common sense, the film trivialises and negates the commitment and actions of white 'radicals'. Where earlier films in the genre cycle criticised aspects of an Afrikaner ideology unresponsive to changes in the material base of the political economy, *April '80* reassures the viewer that the consequences of that ideology -- terrorism and subversion -- can be reduced to non-structural elements such as personality foibles and the immaturity of dissidents. Alex's political motivations, for example, are reduced to the fact that he had an unhappy childhood and was rejected by his father. By shifting causation onto the biographical-psychological, the director is able to isolate Alex from both his family and the more sympathetic world beyond South Africa's borders, not to mention black South Africans themselves.

Of importance in *April '80* is the reposturing of the genre conventions. Roles have been switched, the terrorist outsider, Alex, dies, not the *boeredogter*. The trauma originally experienced by the *boeredogter* as she adjusted from rural to urban living has been replaced with a conflict rooted in cultural differences between English and Afrikaner which is, however, resolved in a happy marriage. In other words, the indexical function of the sign of *boeredogter* has altered from indicating cultural trauma to one standing for a state of cultural attainment and social self-confidence through the resolution of the original causes of that trauma. Having initially asserted her difference to the *volk* in *April '80* she has lost much of her relative autonomy and has reverted to a semi-autonomous -- the stock albino -- character whose identity is no longer manifested in the opposition. She has come back into a relocated fold facing a new enemy. She is not drawn to the outsider anymore and the villainess has disappeared from the scene.
As a symbol the boeredogter stands for capital. Her migration to the city stands for the penetration by Afrikaners capital of English capital. This integration brought about a high degree of cultural trauma and cultural pollution. In due course, however, the alien elements represented by the city were adjusted to and adapted to an urban Afrikaans lifestyle. Having initially excommunicated the boeredogter, the boere-seun was deployed to reclaim the second generation English-fathered boeredogter. The conditions for her reintegration were present in the film for although an English-speaker, she always spoke Afrikaans to the boere-seun. The pairing of these two characters symbolises the rapprochement of English and Afrikaans capital standing united in the face of an external foe, despite continuing language and cultural differences.

Whereas the earlier conflict-love movies examined the relations between insiders and the outsider, all of whom were white, the genre restructured itself with the emergence of 'the Border war', placing more emphasis on relations between insiders in the context of a war against the outside. In the war film, the (predominantly black skinned) uitlander too, has switched allegiances. No longer representing British imperialism, he is now cast in the more sinister role of representing communist expansionism. Unlike the earlier uitlander who was white and who we got to know though his/her characterisation on the screen, the black outsider, as Greig observes, is a "dark inscrutable inhuman enemy: to portray the outsider would entail humanising him and this would imply at least a partial denial of the category of enemy".

The major cycle of Afrikaans film characterised by a diminishing Eden content has come and gone. Where the dominee once mediated the Security Police now tread; where 'the farm' enshrined traditional values, 'the Border' condones sexual liberation; where the boeredogter was once degraded she is now heralded; where the boere-seun was drawn to the villainess he is now matched with the boeredogter: the state of Eden has been replaced by a state of materialism, militarism and the Security
FILMS MADE FOR BLACK AUDIENCES

It is not intended that the discussion of cinema made for black viewers should form a major portion of this thesis. It is offered rather as a counterpoint to the Afrikaans cinema discussed above since it largely offers images of oppositional population movements consequent upon racial capitalism. This 'ethnic' industry owned entirely by white capital is very young and during the period 1965 to 1980 only thirty films had been made. Apart from the Heyns Films productions, those whites engaged in the production of films for black audiences work on the peripheries of the established industry and are regarded with bemusement in the light of the poor technical quality of their films. Budgets are low, ranging from an incredible R10 000 to R40 000. Crews are usually made up of the scriptwriter/director/cameraman and his assistant who are helped by an interpreter.

Extensive work has already been conducted on cinema aimed at blacks both in terms of production practice and content. The studies done hypothesised that the ideology encoded into the text of these 'black' films assume the function of ensuring class domination and forces the exploited to accept their conditions of exploitation as natural, moral and inevitable. In the context of this study, this hypothesis may seem at first glance to be functionalist and determinist. However, such is the practice of the film makers concerned and the structure of the genres they have developed, that it is difficult to justify an analysis from a less vulgar standpoint. This will become clear in the brief overview of the three main genres which have emerged in this cinema.

The three types of film do not necessarily occur in a temporal sequence or identifiable clusters, but tend to overlap, a function of the different stages of ideological manifestation of racial capitalism. In general, it would appear that the earlier images offered correspond to the concept of Grand
Apartheid while later refractions acknowledge the accommodation of the emerging black petty bourgeoisie. Before proceeding with the analysis of the different genres, it will prove useful to extract some general observations on this cinema which apply to nearly all the films to be discussed.

The Discourse of Structured Absences

The most striking absence in films aimed at blacks is the non-portrayal of whites. The characters live in a utopian black world which ignores class relations and warps the social formation. As Harriet Cavshon points out, by omitting the source of the social conflict and smoothing over racial tension, the producers of these films are merely signalling the conflict itself. The tension cannot be avoided and the absence of the ruling classes highlights the fact of conflict. The only way to deal with it is to omit it.\(^55\)

Similarly, the narrative structure legitimates the absence of political issues. This is motivated by a desire among the producers to offer 'entertainment', a delimited appropriation of discourse which denies the category of 'politics'. Besides, many of the producers of these films themselves exhibit an organic ideology which leaves no doubt that they support the most conservative and reactionary fraction of the dominant discourse. Censorship is not a problem as far as thematic issues or treatment is concerned, although there have been problems as far as dress is concerned.\(^66\) By omitting 'politics' the dramatic conflict has to be attributed to biographical-psychological factors mediated by plot devices. The absence of structural conditions in the drama means that collective conflict and group solutions as found in Afrikaans films are missing: in films aimed at blacks the source of the problem is the individual him/herself. Individual solutions are therefore required to solve individual problems. Collective activity implies the existence of a wider society and more abstract social struggles and are therefore avoided.

Although these films avoid 'politics', the wider 'society'
and take refuge in 'apolitical' and 'universal' themes, the
fact of their existence suggests a specific response to the
conditions found in a particular historical conjuncture.
Films aimed at black audiences will now be discussed in terms
of three basic categories, the 'back to the homelands' movie, the
co-opted movie and the conditional urban movie.

The 'Back to the Homelands' Movie

At the most extreme end of the spatial trajectory of 'black' films
are the 'back to the homelands' movies which are an explicit
evocation of apartheid policy. This category is similar to
Flora and Flora's "disintegration-integration" category of
South American photonovella which stresses the shift
in values which separates the worker from his primary group
or community. While Flora and Flora's categorisation implies
the adaptation of the individual to an industrial economy and
the acceptance of values which are consistent with capitalism,
it is unable to account for the peculiar South African situ-
ation where blacks are forced back to the homelands once
having adopted a degree of capitalist practice. Gavshon offers
the functional category of 'traditionalism' to account for the
South African process since the films in this category repro-
duce in their narrative structure a return to roots in terms
of the conditions of racial capitalism.

The films in this category are found primarily in the Bayeta
Films catalogue where the imagery is deeply rooted in the
traditional concept of blacks as unsophisticated and raw rural
dwellers. The films usually begin with the hero, a well dres-
sed urbanite carrying a suitcase returning 'home'. He returns
by car, but more usually by bus. Often he is simply walking
through the bush. Once there, he slowly but surely discards
his rural ways and by the end of the film is dressed in skins,
feathers and beads. He never returns to the city. Maloyi
(The Witchdoctor - 1978), for example relates the story of a
sophisticated city-born woman who is bewitched by a tribal
sorcerer. She discards her Western ways for the mysticism of
tribal life. A musical, Vuma (1978) describes the courtship

The representations in these films define a limited and fixed social discourse, one that is technically inept, culturally ignorant and often racist. Although both *Ngomopho* and *Wangeza* both qualified for the maximum subsidy amount (R45 000 and R70 000 respectively), few of the other films in this category even qualified. Black audiences were generally wary of films in the category and did not see them.

The Co-opted Movie

The second type of film is the co-opted movie where black film makers are financed and controlled by Nationalist capital. In addition, attempts were made to co-opt oppositional film makers whose previous work and public statements showed them to be highly critical of apartheid. All the films in this category were made by Heyns Films, the front company for the Department of Information.

Whereas the previous category is identified by the narrative represented, it is more difficult to offer a description of the films under this category. Hence the co-opted film category accounts for the origin of the capital with which they were largely financed. Although they were supposed to substitute for the heroes and villains of American 'B' pictures and adapt cultural myths, the actual content of these films often is much more adventurous and 'accurate' than those of the first category. The co-opted film projects an indigenous identity of sorts which has been ideologically filtered by white anthropological 'advisors' to correspond with the dominant discourse. The black director employed to make these films, Simon Sabela, had little choice in the script or how it would be treated. The whites choose them, "Then I have to
revise them, and bring them into touch with reality". The reality that Sabela is talking about is of course the dominant discourse. As with the above category, the plots and storylines are sealed within a classless black society although one or two whites are seen in unexpected roles such as a secretary to a black businessman. Where the 'traditional' 'back to the homelands' movie was primarily located in the homelands or showed a movement towards those areas, the co-opted movie is largely located in the urban areas of 'white' South Africa, or at least in a small town. Where the average budget of the 'traditional' film was about R50 000, sometimes as low as R10 000, films in this category ranged from R105 000 for *Ikati Elimnyama* (The Black Cat - 1975) to R155 000 for *Inkunzi*. The latter film was financed by the Transkei Development Corporation. Here, a Transkeian man returns to his homeland and becomes a successful shopkeeper. It differs from the 'traditional' category in that although returning 'home', he does not forego his capitalist values and regress into crude tribalism. This film, like *Indelama* (The Orphan - 1975) which traces the fortunes of an orphan Transkeian child from his rural origins to his qualifying as a doctor, fits somewhere between Flora and Flora's "disintegrated-integration" and "consumer-oriented" categories. The latter category functions to reinforce the value of consumerism which by necessity is central to capitalism. Social mobility is made a value in itself and is measured in terms of possessions, and in the South African case, profession. Most of the other examples in this category reflect the confusion of rural and urban values found in black urban societies. *Ngwanaka* (My Child - 1976), for example, is a love story set against a background of feuding taxi owning families and township thugs. A notorious township burglar is the subject of *Ikati Elimnyama* while *Setipana* (The Blanket Story - 1979) carries overtones of the "disintergrated-integration" and consumer oriented categories. In this film, one son of a chief becomes a doctor in London who returns to work among his people, while the other, unambitious but brave, succeeds his father as chief.

The fact that Sabela, though a co-opted petty bourgeois black
director, is invested with a degree of autonomy in direction (Information funds notwithstanding), is significant in terms of audience empathy. His films, although simple, nevertheless incorporate his urban-rural ambivalences, a function of the feeling of temporality which exists amongst black urban dwellers. Despite Sabela's ignorance of the effects of structural violence, these films reflect the confusion and disorientation experienced by township inhabitants. This was to be expected, for until late 1979, black urban areas were simply dormitory towns which housed the labour serving industry in the 'white' areas.

Despite the fact that the films made by Heyns were largely funded by the Information Department they rarely approach the crude and overt racism or propaganda content of films in the previous category. Indeed, one wonders why they were made at all when the private 'industry' was taking an even more conservative line than the state itself. At about the time that the Department was closed down another trend was beginning to emerge which, while one strand did have something in common with the co-opted movie, the other escaped into fantasy.

The Conditional Urban Movie: Impermanence and Escape

The general category of conditional urban movie accounts for two distinct genres which are partly a consequence of the increasing attempts by capital and the National Party to harness the support of the growing black middle classes in terms of racial capitalism. In physical terms this is being done through the granting of municipal status to satellite housing spaces like Soweto and the granting of 99 year home ownership leases. The government has accepted the permanency of urban blacks while capital realised after the 1976 riots that suitable living conditions are a prerequisite if a stable and contented workforce is to be maintained.

The first strand of genre which may be identified under this category is the gangster movie such as Utsotsi (1978), Phindeesela (1979) and Umzingeli (1979). These films show
that 'crime does not pay'. Greed, not need is the motivation. Ignoring the structural causes of poverty, the gangster film suggests that people who are out of work are lazy, indolent and not interested in jobs that are available. The moral of these films is that 'hard work assures success'. This work ethic is presented as common-sensical and the structural conditions militating against social mobility are ignored.

Contraasted with the gangster movie is the disco film. This category coincides directly with Flora and Flora's "total-escape" category where cinema provides a means of escape. They exist on the level of fantasy and ignore real conflicts. Stimulated by the township successes of Saturday Night Fever and other disco titles, black audiences were prepared for films like Isoka (1979), Botsotso (1979), Botsotso Part Two (1980) and Umdlali (1980). Most of these films were made by Ronnie Isaacs assisted by Jimmy Murray, who show a much greater cinematic flair than other producers making films for black audiences. Although drawn out and using shots of extremely long duration, rarely changing camera angles or moving the camera, they are not patronising, racist or humourless. Isaacs admits the fantasy element of his films which are set in 'white' areas. This obviates having to deal with repressive apparatuses such as Administration Boards. In any case, the appropriate visual conditions do not exist in the townships. The narratives are simple, structured around disco dancing. The plot is a fairytale similar to the story of Cinderella. In Luki (1978), for example, the hero who is a dustman wants to go to the "Ball", but like Cinderella, he does not have the appropriate clothes. Miraculously he gets the clothes, wins the 'princess' and the respect of his peers. The basic theme is that all Luki has to do is to change his class position by changing his clothes and learning to dance. By the end of the film his brother is no longer ashamed of him and in his next film, Botsotso Part Two, Luki is no longer a dustman.

Such disco motifs, whether an accurate reflection of an aspect of black city life, or simply a perpetuation of the white
film maker's stereotype of blacks as having an innate 'sense of rhythm', do nevertheless convey an understanding of change in the black worker's conditions of existence. Unlike the above categories, these films do not bombard the viewer with messages telling him/her that s/he is not suited to city life. Although no real work relations are portrayed the conditional urban movie tacitly accepts that urban status of the black, though still separate from the mainstream of urban white culture.

Lying outside the above triple typology are two further categories of cinema which may be identified in terms of their perceived audience and treatment of theme.

Authentic Cinema

Films in the authentic cinema category, although dealing with other than white characters, are designed to appeal to a wider than purely black audience. Such offerings are not intended for a particular population group as either Afrikaans film or cinema aimed at blacks. Because of its theme, treatment, characters and style, such films actively solicit cross-cultural and inter-racial audiences. Examples are Jim Comes to Joburg (1949) and Magic Garden (1961) both made by Donald Swanson. The former film deals with the experiences of a black ruralite as he arrives and tries to cope with the strange life in Johannesburg. It is a highly humorous film and has a number of scenes with the famous Jazz Aces band which developed an African jazz. Of a more serious nature, certainly more traumatically accurate is Zoltan Korda's Cry the Beloved Country (1951) adapted from Alan Paton's novel. Other examples include Jamie Uys' Dingaka (1964) and Fugard and Devenish's Boesman and Lena (1973) and Marigolds in August (1980). These are but the few films made in South Africa which would fit easily in to this category.

Cinema of Popular Culture

Films in the category of popular culture most closely
approximate Third Cinema which has as its aim the decolonization of culture and the liberation of the working class. Only one film, Gibson Kente's black financed *How Long* (1976) would fall into this category. Despite Kente's middle class determination and the absence of structural causation in both his theatre and this film, by virtue of the origin of the finance and its theme, *How Long* qualifies in this category. The film was banned on four counts: obscenity, blasphemy, causing harm to race relations and prejudicing the security of the state.

The other film which might fit into the category of popular culture is Lionel Rogosin's *Come Back Africa* (1959). Though made by an American working under the cover of a commercial film unit making a musical, this film is by far the most incisive to have been made on apartheid. It is perhaps the only film which builds economic causation into its treatment, both in terms of starving workers off the land and forcing them to seek work at near starvation wages in the towns. The central character is Zachariah who is continually at the mercy of the state repressive apparatuses, ruthless employers, gangs of *tsotsis* (township thugs) and so on. He watches his family break up as his children grow up amid the violence and filth of the streets, his wife's desire for social mobility and the eventual rape and murder of his wife by a *tsotsi*. The film climaxes with the devastating effects of the apartheid system on Zachariah's personality when he finds his dead wife. The closing shot is of Zachariah going berserk. He is seated at his kitchen table and beats its fist down on it in mid-shot. The downward motion is intercut with flashbacks -- hundreds of mineworkers proceeding down a staircase in a mine, two trains drawing up on either side of a railway platform disgorging thousands of commuters running as if for their lives towards the exit, an army of black workers striding sullenly and purposefully through the city -- all to the monotonous beat of a drum. This is an ending of utter despair and defeat. Through it is communicated the structural violence of apartheid, not only on the individual, but its workings as a system of exploitation.
Come Back Africa is the very antithesis of cinema aimed at black audiences. What is absent in the latter is present in the former; the population migration is the opposite of that shown in the 'traditional' movie; the utter degradation of the urban dweller is contrasted to the superficial cultural disorientation found in the co-opted movie; and the promise of becoming a prince in the conditional urban movie, whether by hard work or fantasy, is shown to be nothing more than a capitalist myth.
NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. See eg., Puth, G. 1976: Die Inhoud en Gehalte van 'n Steekproef Suid-Afrikaanse Rolprente voor die Instelling van Televisie. Verslag Nr. KOMM-10, HSRC, Pretoria. This factor analysis, while identifying differences between English and Afrikaans films in terms of basic categories such as crime, substance abuse etc., is unable to explain them. Neither did the author follow up his original analysis after the commencement of television to identify any before-after differences.


6. Some theorists talk of film being a "model" of reality as is done by Fourie, P. 1982: "Interkulturele Probleme in Beeldkommunikasie", Communicare, Vol. 3, No. 1, pp. 60-73. To assume that a film is a "model" of reality, however allegorical, symbolic or abstract, is misleading for it implies a functionalist and determinist connotation which leads to a mechanistic and over-simple correspondence between 'reality' and the "image of reality". It furthermore, ignores the complex ideological debate which has revolved around the Metzian concept of the 'impression of reality'.


8. Although the consideration of genre has received extensive attention from literary scholars, Northrop Frye, for example, its analysis with regard to film has been much more sporadic. The few studies that do exist,
however, are marked by a greater degree of semiotic rigour and materialist sophistication

Briefly, as far as cinema is concerned, three phases can be discerned. The first, discussed by Perkins *op. cit.*, equated genre with formula, the result of mass production. The connotation is a pejorative one applied mainly by highbrow critics. The second phase of genre analysis accepted that film production is rule-bound, enveloped in social history. Two approaches to the study of film genres emerged as a result of this acknowledgement. One was a structuralist-based auteurism which search for discursive regularities, and within these, the signature of individual expression. This school was fuelled by Russian formalism and linguistic and anthropological tenets. The other school, modelled on the work of Leavis, was a literary auteurism. This school took as its starting point the uniqueness of the individual artist.

Willemen *op. cit.* points out that these two strands of genre theory -- literary auteurism and structuralist auteurism -- initially developed as opposition theoretical discourses to the dominant orthodoxies. In time, however, the Leavisite variant was absorbed by formal education and journalism. The result was that genre theory became largely redundant.

However, the publication of Colin McArthur's *Underworld USA*, Jim Kitses' *Horizons West* and Andrew Tudor's work marked a return to the consideration of genre in films with the added dimension of film-society relationships. This work, published in the early 1970s, was consolidated by scholars such as Ryall, Buscomb and most recently, Stephen Neale.


12. All quoted in Neale, *op. cit.*
13. Ryall, *op. cit.* p. 28
17. Neale, op. cit. p. 19
18. Ibid., p. 51
20. Ryall, op. cit. see p. 28
24. Quoted in Variety, 7 January 1953
25. Tudor, op. cit. pp. 131-151
27. Leutrat, quoted in Neale, op. cit. p. 51
28. Ibid
30. Examples are Jacob Lub, Totius and Jochem van Bruggen
31. See Hofmeyer, op. cit.
34. Hofmeyer, op. cit. See, eg., Lub's novels: Donker Johannesburg (1910), In en Om die Goudstad (1912), Het Swart Gevaar (1913), Eenuoudige Mense (1908). See also Totius' poem Trekkerswee, Harm Oost's play, Ou Daniel and van Bruggen's Op Veld en Rande, published in 1912.
37. Greig, op. cit. p. 16

38. Greig, R.J. in The Star (Tonight) 4 August 1979

39. Ibid

40. Neale, op. cit. p. 50

41. Ibid


44. Wassenaar, A. 1977: Assault on Free Enterprise: The Freeway to Communism. Tafelberg, Cape Town, p. 114

45. Ibid. p. 112


47. Tilby, A.W. 1914: South Africa 1486-1913. London, p. 446. Many of these migrants, however, settled permanently in South Africa


49. Despite the influence of gold mining on South African society, it forms the subject of very few films. Those that have been made such as Pressureburst (1971) and Gold (1974) structure their plots around inter-personal relationships and disasters. Jopie Fourie was made into a television programme of the same name by Jan Scholtz but was nothing more than a whitewash of Fourie's anarchic Nationalist sentiment

50. O'Meara, op. cit.

51. A significant feature of the villainess concerns her Boland accent. According to Greig, op. cit., p. 17: "The accent of villaineses in Afrikaans films is usually the artificial, precious, slightly Frenchified account of Waterkloof, Pretoria. It is contrasted with the earthy Boland accent. (There is an additional irony here: Afrikaans actresses, born and bred in the Transvaal, frequent travellers abroad and to all intents and purposes detrigenous, have told me that their popularity depends in part on the ability to assume a Boland accent. This apparently says to the audience that although the actress belongs to a slightly disreputable profession, she is nevertheless in tune with the traditional verities of the Afrikaner)"
52. O'Meara, op. cit. p. 160

53. Ibid. p. 163


56. See RJ Greig's review of Dit Was Aand en Dit was Môre in The Star (Tonight), 8 September 1977

57. Greig, op. cit. 1980, p. 18


59. Greig, op. cit. 1980, p. 17

60. Rompel, H. 1942: Die Bioskoop in Diens van die Volk. Deel II, Nasionale Pers, Kaapstad, p. 60

61. Greig, op. cit. 1980

62. Interview with Meyer in April 1981

63. It will be remembered that this is Therborn's, op. cit. p. 84 term

64. Neale, op. cit. p. 52 points out that genres serve as basic units for the calculation and investment of profit

65. See R.J. Greig's review of the film in The Star (Tonight), 7 October 1975

66. Review in Die Volksblad, 2 June 1970

67. A bywoner is a sub-tenant who lives on a farm. The term usually has the connotation of a 'poor white' who has been displaced from his property and forced to subsist on the charity of another. The bywoner shares many similarities with the sharecropper in the American South

68. Other films in the genre tend to use the camera merely to get an exposure. If the camera is moved -- tracked, panned or hoisted -- this is done for the sake of movement, rather than for any significatory effect. Rienne, on the other hand, employs a style of camerawork which clearly marries camera style with content
69. John van Zyl in an unpublished review of the film entitled A Leap of Lepers: Plekkie in die Son comments on the indulgence of this film: "The abysmal quality of the narrative ensures that no tear is left unjerked ... Even soap operas have certain restrictions!"

70. Greig in The Star (Tonight) 4 August 1979.

71. Ibid

72. Meyer interview, op. cit.

73. Greig, op. cit. 1980, p. 21

74. Ibid

75. One of the supporting programmes to Terrorist was a Department of Information documentary about the army. Made in Afrikaans it is "remarkable only for the dogged way it discovers reds, soviet, marxists, socialists and communists under every stone and in every building beyond the borders". See Greig, R.J. in his review of the film published in The Star (Tonight), 6 December 1978. This documentary was later replaced by a film made by Hetherington, the director of Terrorist, made for the Woolboard


77. See Robert Greig's review of Grensbasis 13 in The Star (Tonight), 4 June 1979

78. Ibid

79. Sunday Times, 27 May 1979

80. Rosmary Raphaeley in The Star (Tonight), 1 June 1979

81. The original script clearly locates the action on the campus of the University of the Witwatersrand. Reference is also made to the National Union of South African Students, of which Alex is a member. This Union, or NUSAS, is an ultra-liberal English language student body which has repeatedly come under fire from the state and many of its leaders have been banned. After examination of the script, the producer was denied permission by the University's Vice-Chancellor from using the University as a location. The film was subsequently shot in various locations including Rand Afrikaans University, the Johannesburg College of Education and Goudstad. Although references to Wits were deleted, the implication that the fictional university its Wits is clear. This was reinforced by a pre-publicity release which carried the headline "Politics at Wits"

Prior to the release of the film it was screened to NUSAS who objected to their image in the film. These were also deleted from the final version
82. The vast majority of Afrikaans love story films either start on the beach or they end on it. The sociological implications of this type of shot correlate with the 'Happy Horizon' hypothesis proposed by Carter Colwell who offers a scale of social happiness where "people are satisfied, and/or feel that the problems they face are relatively minor in relation to their capacity to solve them". In April '80, the moral and social order have been restored in the context of the social myth that South Africa is winning the war against terrorism. For further information on the happy horizon hypothesis see Carter Colwell, C. 1981: "Where is Happiness? A Study of Film Closure", Journal of the University Film Association, Vol. 33, No. 1, pp. 39-48

83. Greig, op. cit. 1980, p. 19

84. Not all of this research has been published, but is available from the following sources: Gavshon, H. 1980: Ideology and Film: An Examination of Films Made for Black Audiences in South Africa. Final Year Thesis, School of Dramatic Art, University of the Witwatersrand; Tomasselli, K.G. 1981: The South African Film Industry. African Studies Institute, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, especially pp. 105-105 and 117-120; and Tomasselli, K.G. 1979: Black Films in South Africa. Paper delivered at the 1979 Cape Town International Film Festival, (May)

85. Gavshon, op. cit. p. 47

86. A scene from Utsotsi which showed a man undoing his girlfriend's shirt was cut. Conversely, bare breasts are allowed when the woman is wearing tribal dress


88. Gavshon, op. cit. pp. 49-52

89. Other than box office figures which are fairly dubious indicators, the only market research was conducted in Soweto by Post (Transvaal) at the request of Satbel. The study was conducted in 1977 and entitled A Study into the attitudes of Black Men and Women Towards Existing Movie Centres. The majority of the participants said that they had seen local films. Their main objection was the predictability of the films together with their harping on mundane everyday things. They wanted to look ahead, project their lives a bit further. It is clearly this projection, or fantasy, that Ronnie Issacs has captured in his disco films, explaining their attraction to township audiences

REFERENCES


Albrecht, J. 1945: "What is the Future of the Motion Picture in South Africa?" Outspan (20 July), pp. 13 and 41

Adam, H. and Giliomee, H. 1979: The Rise and Crisis of Afrikaner Power. David Phillip, Cape Town

Althusser, L. 1971: For Marx. Allan Lane, London


Bennet, T. 1980: "The Not-So-Good, the Bad and the Ugly", Screen Education, No. 36, pp. 119-130


Beukes, P. 1938: "Dictatorship in Afrikaans Culture", The Forum, (July), p. 15


Davidson, B. 1978: *Africa in Modern History*. Allan Lane, London


De Lange, J. (undated): The History of the Film in South Africa, Mimeo, National Film Archives, Pretoria

Devenish, R. 1977: "The Guest - A Personal Reminiscence", *Scenaria* (Supplement), No. 2

De V Heese, J. 16 April 1940: "Triomftog van die Voortrekkerrolprent" *Huisgenoot*, p. 47


Gavshon, H. 1980: Ideology and Film: An Examination of Films made for Black Audiences. Final Year Thesis, School of Dramatic Art, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg

Geldenhuys, P. 1977: Pornografie, Senuur en die Reg. Lex Patria

Gernishuys, P. 1963: "Flickering Past", SA Panarama (May), pp. 2-7


Gutsche, T. 1972: *The History and Social Significance of Motion Pictures in South Africa 1895-1940*. Howard Timmins, Cape Town


Hall, K. 1980: *Australian Film: The Inside Story*. Summit Books, Melbourne


Hanneker, M. 1971: *The Elementary Concepts of Historical Materialism*. (Translated by Sadler, E. and Suchtung, W., University of Sydney)


Hellman, E. 1948: *Handbook of Race Relations*. Oxford University Press, Cape Town


Kohl, E.E. 1946: *Stel die Rolprent in diens van die Volk*. Volksbioskope, Johannesburg


471

Mattelart, A. 1979: *Multinational Corporations and the Control of Culture: The Ideological Apparatuses of Imperialism*. Harvester Press, Sussex (Translated by M Chanon)


Millin, S.G. 1933: *Rhodes*. CNA, South Africa and Rhodesia


Neale, S. 1980: *Genre*. British Film Institute, London


Orpen, N. 1946: "What's a Really Good Film?" The Forum (October), pp. 14-18

Perkins, V.F. 1974: Film As Film: Understanding and Judging Movies. Pelican, Harmondsworth


Petley, J. 1979: Capital and Culture: German Cinema 1933-45. British Film Institute, London


Pirow, O. 1941: Nuwe Orde vir Suid-Afrika. Christelike Republiekeinse Suid-Afrikaanse Socioistieses Studiekring, Pretoria


Republic of South Africa. Board of Trade and Industries. 1961: Monopolistic Conditions in the Procurement, Production and Distribution of Motion Pictures in the Republic of South Africa. Report No. 833 (M)

Republic of South Africa. Board of Trade and Industries. 1963: Investigation into Motion Picture Production. Report No. 1034


Rhodde, N. and Venter, H.J. 1959: *Apartheid*. Cape Town

Rompel, H. 1942: *Die Bioskoop in Diens van die Volk. Deel I and Deel II*. Nasionale

Ronge, B. 1970: "Jans Rautenbach in Retrospect", *New Nation* (September), pp. 16-18

Ryall, T. 1975/6: "Teaching Through Genre", *Screen Education* No. 17


Schiess, M. 1970: "Censorship and the Films", *New Nation*, (September), pp. 11 and 20


Sharp, B. 1979: "Reality vs Ideology", *Scenaria*, No. 11, p. 11

Shaw, H. 1916: "Filming De Voortrekkers", *Stage and Cinema*, 30 December, p. 2

Smoedin, E. 1982: "Motion Pictures and Television, 1930-1945: A Pre-History of the Relations Between the Two Media", *Journal of the University Film and Video Association*, Vol. 34, No. 3, pp. 3-8


Stodel, J. 1962: *The Audience is Waiting*. Howard Timmins, Cape Town


474


Tylor, E.B. 1924: *Primitive Culture*. 7th Ed. Brentano


Union of South Africa. 1943: *The Cillier Film Committee*

Union of South Africa. 1944: *Report of the Inter-Departmental Committee Appointed to Consider the Report of the Committee on State Publicity and the Film Committee and other Relevant Matters*. Government Printer
The Union Review, 1944: "Let's Go to the Cinema ... and see a Government Film (in Afrikaans)", Vol. VII, No. 85


Williams, R. 1962: Britain in the Sixtees: Communications.


476
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>As</th>
<th>Ed</th>
<th>Gtr</th>
<th>Dr</th>
<th>Bt</th>
<th>Bt</th>
<th>Dr</th>
<th>Gtr</th>
<th>Ed</th>
<th>As</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lt</td>
<td>Lt</td>
<td>Lt</td>
<td>Lt</td>
<td>Lt</td>
<td>Lt</td>
<td>Lt</td>
<td>Lt</td>
<td>Lt</td>
<td>Lt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lt</td>
<td>Lt</td>
<td>Lt</td>
<td>Lt</td>
<td>Lt</td>
<td>Lt</td>
<td>Lt</td>
<td>Lt</td>
<td>Lt</td>
<td>Lt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lt</td>
<td>Lt</td>
<td>Lt</td>
<td>Lt</td>
<td>Lt</td>
<td>Lt</td>
<td>Lt</td>
<td>Lt</td>
<td>Lt</td>
<td>Lt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lt</td>
<td>Lt</td>
<td>Lt</td>
<td>Lt</td>
<td>Lt</td>
<td>Lt</td>
<td>Lt</td>
<td>Lt</td>
<td>Lt</td>
<td>Lt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lt</td>
<td>Lt</td>
<td>Lt</td>
<td>Lt</td>
<td>Lt</td>
<td>Lt</td>
<td>Lt</td>
<td>Lt</td>
<td>Lt</td>
<td>Lt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lt</td>
<td>Lt</td>
<td>Lt</td>
<td>Lt</td>
<td>Lt</td>
<td>Lt</td>
<td>Lt</td>
<td>Lt</td>
<td>Lt</td>
<td>Lt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lt</td>
<td>Lt</td>
<td>Lt</td>
<td>Lt</td>
<td>Lt</td>
<td>Lt</td>
<td>Lt</td>
<td>Lt</td>
<td>Lt</td>
<td>Lt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lt</td>
<td>Lt</td>
<td>Lt</td>
<td>Lt</td>
<td>Lt</td>
<td>Lt</td>
<td>Lt</td>
<td>Lt</td>
<td>Lt</td>
<td>Lt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lt</td>
<td>Lt</td>
<td>Lt</td>
<td>Lt</td>
<td>Lt</td>
<td>Lt</td>
<td>Lt</td>
<td>Lt</td>
<td>Lt</td>
<td>Lt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lt</td>
<td>Lt</td>
<td>Lt</td>
<td>Lt</td>
<td>Lt</td>
<td>Lt</td>
<td>Lt</td>
<td>Lt</td>
<td>Lt</td>
<td>Lt</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Backup Sample**

- Lt
- Lt
- Lt
- Lt
- Lt
- Lt
- Lt
- Lt
- Lt
- Lt

---

**Backup Sample**

- Lt
- Lt
- Lt
- Lt
- Lt
- Lt
- Lt
- Lt
- Lt
- Lt

---

**Backup Sample**

- Lt
- Lt
- Lt
- Lt
- Lt
- Lt
- Lt
- Lt
- Lt
- Lt

---

**Backup Sample**

- Lt
- Lt
- Lt
- Lt
- Lt
- Lt
- Lt
- Lt
- Lt
- Lt

---

**Backup Sample**

- Lt
- Lt
- Lt
- Lt
- Lt
- Lt
- Lt
- Lt
- Lt
- Lt

---

**Backup Sample**

- Lt
- Lt
- Lt
- Lt
- Lt
- Lt
- Lt
- Lt
- Lt
- Lt

---

**Backup Sample**

- Lt
- Lt
- Lt
- Lt
- Lt
- Lt
- Lt
- Lt
- Lt
- Lt

---