IDEOLOGY AND CULTURAL PRODUCTION IN SOUTH AFRICAN CINEMA

Keyan Gray Tomaselli

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CHAPTER 7

FILM PRODUCTION 1962 - 1980: HOMOGENISING CULTURAL PRODUCTION

This chapter is divided into two sections. The first section will deal briefly with the effects of the subsidy allocation on the broad mass of production in the making of feature films. The second part will concentrate on a specific moment of cultural production during the period under review and show why the seeds of a possible movement never germinated.

PART 1: THE HOLLYWOOD CHIMERA

The eternally recurring Hollywood sign appeared again in 1962-3 with the report of the Board of Trade and Industries submitted to the government on the question of a film subsidy. The News/Check correspondent, with caution, put it this way: "No leaves this autumn have whistled more vigorously than new aspirations, plans, hopes and beliefs about a film industry for South Africa". Pointing out that there really was no industry in South Africa, the magazine concluded:

When it comes to the glitter of the screen, a misunderstanding of basic requirements and an apparent bait of easy-to-get profits has clouded judgement. The talk in recent months of South Africa's own Hollywood, the arrival of great film makers from overseas with big star names has sent businessmen into their boardrooms to huddle over their chances of getting onto the new 'industry' bandwagon. They forget they are sliding into one of the world's trickiest give-and-(possibly)-lose all businesses.

The structure of the subsidy soon created an industry dependence and most producers "set out to make films for subsidy's sake". By 1961, total chaos reigned and less than half of the fifty films begun reached the screen. Quality was atrocious, and large numbers of producers survived for only a short while. Comments Lionel Friedberg:
Almost overnight, butchers, bakers, and candle-stick-makers were becoming film-makers. There were many cases where farmers and bottle-store owners suddenly became ‘film producers’. Anybody who could rake up R50 000 went into the production of low budget features, simply to cash in on the lucrative domestic drive-in market, with the added benefits of the subsidy to ensure him a return on his investment. Anybody who could read a basic "Photographic How to . . ." book, or who managed to thumb through the pages of an Arriflex Instruction Manual became a ‘lighting cameraman’ and so on.

Despite this confusion, by 1962, all the established and legitimate producers had settled in and the spurt of initial production sparked in 1961 tailored off to half that year’s output. During the 1960s and early 1970s, production boomed and box office receipts were on average higher than those for imported product. In contrast to other ex-colonial countries such as Australia where producers battled against imported films for screen time owned by mainly American interests, South African distributors and exhibitors competed vigorously for local product. This competition reflected the peculiarities of the South African cinema market which was split into an urban sector which concentrated on imported Hollywood type films and the small town, rural, predominantly Afrikaans-speaking sector, who were the major patrons of drive-ins which concentrated on American ‘B’ pictures and South African productions rejected by the more sophisticated urban audiences. Finance was readily available to producers who wanted to make genre movies. Even the more contentious productions such as Wild Season (1967), Die Kandidaat (1968) and Katrina (1969) had little difficulty in securing investment.

A comparison with Australia for the 1960s and 1970s will prove illuminating. Total subsidy in Australia during the decade of the 1970s was $30 million with 150 films produced. The South African payout during the same period was comparable, R20 million, but on 246 titles for an audience less than a quarter the size in Australia. Small wonder that producers clung to their formulaic treatments, radio soap opera plots and inane copies of overseas genres. The more authentic cinematic treatments
of South African experience such as those made by Jans Rautenbach, Ross Devenish and Athol Fugard, are an embarrassment to the majority of South African producers since they question many of the contradictions of bourgeois and petty bourgeois ideologies despite the class membership of these directors. Since the director derives his identity through ideological practice he assumes that the 'mass' market found outside South Africa will relate to the same themes as he does. This belief is partly a response to American media imperialism which has stamped Hollywood themes on the international market, universalised them and integrated them into the world view of local inhabitants. This discourse is further strengthened not only by the demands of the American companies who are contracted to distribute the product, but by the unexpected performance of local formula films in external markets. Sleepers like The Winners (1972) and Karate Olympia (1976) which deliberately subordinated content to marketability earned tens of millions of dollars in Japan and America respectively*. These conditions and effects explain why local producers insist on 'internationalising' their plots to make them saleable, even in the face of sympathetic overseas reception to more authentic portrayals of South Africa. The result is usually an uneasy amalgam of traditional and liberal values superimposed onto different discourses and social experiences perceived to exist in overseas audiences. Anything local is therefore exorcised and replaced with a bland non-specific atmosphere in a seemingly culture-free vacuum.

Other than a few notable exceptions, some of which are dealt with in the second part of this chapter, South African producers have avoided contentious local themes, tending to internationalise their stories, and willingly 'cringing' to cultural imperialism: the overseas version of the local picture nearly always contains a sex scene, nudity or a depiction of violence not permissible at home (eg. Glenda (1976), Billy Boy (1978), Tigers Don't Cry (1976) and Night of the Puppets (1980). which is justified by the producer as a necessary part of his 'art' even though he is hostile to the concept in a local context. Thus, sexuality, for example, is introduced not in terms of its relation to a wider set of processes as in, for example,
Australian cinema, but rather as a sop to the perceived demands of the international audience. This very manipulation or structured absence in the text of the South African version is indicative of a society still rent with sexual taboos where the act itself assumes precedence over the relationships -- social, racial, class, culture -- which are drawn from the very nature and values of South African society. This attitude, enforced by the censors, is not only a hang-over from Victorian morality but more significantly, the discursive affirmations of apartheid ideological discourse legitimised through Afrikaner Calvinism. This discourse uses race and sex to perpetuate the existing class structure of the South African social formation where Afrikaner Nationalism, Christianity and Afrikaner cultural integrity remain powerful means for the maintenance of Afrikaner political dominance. Some films like *Katrina* (1969), *Beeld vir Jeannie* (1976), *Weerskant die Nag* (1976) and an earlier film, *Debbie* (1965), managed to break out of these constraints and criticise the motivations of the volk. They rarely follow through, however. The ties of the dominant culture are too strong and what starts out as an exploration of genre, themes and ideology is reduced to caricature which reinforces social stability during the final stages of the film, and even the initial criticisms are played down. The significance of sexual relationships is more discernable at deeper levels of signification, the treatment of the boerendogter, the pure archetypal daughter of the earth, and her changing role in the conflict-love type genre. This is the subject of the last chapter.

This brings the discussion to the second section which is concerned with deliberate attempts by specific film makers to stimulate a film movement which rejects the above discussed cinema.

**PART II: THE 'SPIRIT' OF CULTURAL PRODUCTION**

In Chapter 5 we discussed how the influence of organic intellectuals such as Tommie Meyer and technical intellectuals such as Jamie Uys laid the groundwork for cinema to function as a
means of interest-translation in the general expression of bourgeois and petty bourgeois interests. The Jamie Uys studio was the locus for on-the-job technicians training during the early 1960s and it was at this studio that the formula which was to permeate the conflict-love type genre was generated. As these technicians graduated to the positions of producer, director, scriptwriter and so on, they took with them the seeds of this formula. They in turn generated other related themes and the established industry coalesced fifteen years of production around a dynamically developing genre which encapsulated the changing social, cultural and economic conditions under which Afrikaners had laboured since the turn of the century.

The films made by Jamie Uys himself, however, bore little of this influence and his contribution must be explained in terms of a unique cinematic flair which developed its own momentum and independence of 'cultural' themes. Uys' influence on that aspect of South African cinema which is being investigated in this study then, must be limited to his escaping the Schlesinger monopoly and his role as a technical intellectual. His importance lies in the vehicle that his production company provided for the catalysing of other Afrikaner organic and technical intellectuals. The thematic implications of these conditions will be discussed in detail in Chapter 10.

The above introduction provides the background against which a second strand of more sophisticated, innovative and socially critical type of cinematic cultural production was being explored. While some of the technicians, directors and producers might have owed their film training to Jamie Uys Films, their themes and aesthetic direction were entirely different.

Some of these film makers deliberately set out to breach the contradictions of capital and to explore cultural issues, question the stereotypes, particularly of Afrikaners, and forge aesthetic departures which would unravel previously hidden layers of cultural myth. This chapter will concentrate on this small and rather fragmented and fractured group of
practitioners and show why their innovative attempts fell foul of capital, the state and in certain cases, audiences as well. To some extent the following explanation will draw on the author's previous work in this area, but will offer a much more rigorous structuralist account. Six factors have been identified by Andrew Tudor which need to be met for a movement to gel, some of which were present in the South African industry between 1966 and 1974:

1. A movement originates in a specific society.

2. Some form of socio-cultural trauma is experienced immediately prior to the rise of the movement. In South Africa that trauma was of a dual nature. There was a certain incipient cultural trauma which had developed during the period of the urban trek between 1901 and 1940. The other more visible one was the racial hostility which remained after the Sharpeville massacre which occurred in 1961. Both of these, however, had been blunted by the new prosperity experienced by whites during the 1960s.

3. A movement consists of a sub-culture, the members of which are conscious of their position and goals. This coherence should permeate all stages of production with financiers, producers and directors all participating. Where one stage is lacking, the movement might be stalled. The structure of the subsidy scheme reserved payment for box office performance, nothing being made available up-front. Although capital was forthcoming for a number of films, differences of opinion within the sub-culture doomed it to a split.

4. The resultant films are respected as art and the articulation of important themes by intellectuals. Such art needs to question and reveal, not endorse the status quo. Such an intellectual component was present in the films of a number of directors: Jans Rautenbach, Emil Nofal, Ross Devenish and Sven Persson.

5. A movement embodies the development of innovation as a continuous process, not simply in piecemeal fashion. While considerable thematic innovation was present in some South African films between 1966 and 1974, it was not linked by a viable sub-culture.

6. The phenomenon of a movement occurs in distinct temporal clusters. The South African experience was spread over a period of eight years which lacked the intensity and energy of the shorter periods experienced elsewhere, for example, Russia, France and Italy. There were also too few films of a progressive nature made during this period.

Film movements constitute an aesthetic departure brought about
by organic intellectuals who are conscious of their roles in their attempts to redirect the perceptions and discourse of their class or culture. Cooperation between these individuals is based on a sense of solidarity and unity of purpose. New forms of organisation and new ways of doing things replace existing norms and values and what was previously taken for granted. Where genre movies rarely question the status quo, a movement exists by virtue of its deviation.

During the period under discussion, considerable innovation in Afrikaans literature was being forged by a literary movement known as the Sestigers (Those of the Sixties). This group of Afrikaans writers had totally rejected conventions, accepted styles of writing, plots, structure and grammatical norms. In their place they introduced a literary anarchy and social criticism which resulted in their writings being heavily suppressed by the state. The film makers who arrived on the scene a few years after the emergence of the Sestigers, notably Jans Rautenbach, Emil Nofal and the technicians who worked for them, encoded numerous Sestiger elements in their films, also resulting in condemnation by cultural 'watchdogs' and in some instances, state censorship and intimidation. The films of these practitioners differ entirely from those of their peers and showed little allegiance to Hollywood values or international universalisations.

Whereas the majority of South African film makers paid lip-service to Hollywood -- but on a very superficial plane -- Rautenbach and his cohorts tried to develop more sophisticated forms of expression. Despite looking to Hollywood for their model, however, the average South African film maker has rarely emulated either its production methods, themes or standards. Whereas the French New Wave adulation of Hollywood movies, for example, transcended a superficial interpretation and sought to uncover basic and recurrent thematic elements in films made by the same director, the South African directors appear, in the main, to be trapped within a superficial framework of interpretation. Analysis seldom goes further than a cursory glance at style and content. Recurring gobbets of
common sense are cited which obscure deeper issues: 'Hollywood type', 'blockbuster', 'large budget', 'we can't compete', 'formula', 'major American product', and so on. South African directors and producers, while claiming that they 'can't compete' with the Hollywood model, nevertheless try to. The opaqueness of this contradiction is sealed through the lack of comprehension of the multiple layers of meaning -- the iconic, indexical and symbolic -- which are encoded consciously or unconsciously in any film text. The lack of a critical cinematic heritage prevents South African film makers from understanding the significance of theoretical or even critical discussion. A conscious manipulation of the film's signs is synonomous with a deeper understanding of text in relation to context: political, social, cultural or economic. This in turn delineates a director who is self-conscious about his goals, intentions and social relations. The consequence is that he is accused of contravening accepted social practice by wanting 'to make films for himself'. Because conventional social practice is rooted in a technocist ideology located within the capitalist relations of production, this deviant behaviour is considered, by most of those constituting the inter-acting practices which make up the industry at large, as irresponsible and lacking in business integrity. To inject a film with a personal signature or an overt political content is frowned upon since this contravenes that prime element of common sense which lubricates industry practice: 'give the public what it wants'. This audience has been conditioned through the symbiosis of organic and 'willed' ideology to want what the producer thinks it should have, which is in turn conditional upon the way the producer has himself internalised the 'willed' ideology of the state. Such an interpellation relates, of course, to the discussion in Chapter 6 where producers considered it part of their social practice that they should help the state to protect itself from film makers and film material 'harmful to the country'. Thus attempts by organic intellectuals to breach this engineering of consent which is made to appear 'natural' or common sensical, is bound to polarise factions within the industry. The established practitioners who resist innovation tend to trivialise these oppositions and displace structural conditions by attributing

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the cause of change to the behaviour of aberrant individuals: 'he makes films for himself'. To some extent, this superficial 'selfish' interpretation is reinforced by critics who, while sympathising with the director, themselves fail to fully appreciate the organic significance of this 'deviant' production practice:

Jans Rautenbach is the only director in South Africa with enough integrity to make HIS film, not the film the public wants. This sets him apart from the heart-transplant songsters and banana-beachers.

Having outlined the ideological discourse which governs conventional film making practice and the assumptions which underlie its shielding, we may now turn our attention to the means by which ideological and repressive apparatuses restrict, shield and delimit the appropriation of cinematic discourse.

It will be recalled that both Emil Nofal and Jans Rautenbach were proteges of the Jamie Uys studio which was the training ground for many organic and technical intellectuals using cinema as a medium of expression. These two individuals teamed up independently of the Uys Film Company and produced their first film, Wild Season, in 1967. This film marked a complete departure from the sentimental, melodramatic and puritanical stereotype of the culturally besieged Afrikaner identified by RARO, UTOLO and Jamie Uys in Doodkry is Min. For the first time the Afrikaner was represented as a complex, multi-dimensional and less than perfect subject. Critic Barry Ronge comments that the film recognises:

the Afrikaner as an individual and not merely an idealised cardboard figure ... The dour solid forcefulness so often associated with the Afrikaner is shown to be as much perverse pigheadedness as what it is admirable determination. The point is that the Afrikaner is being portrayed, almost for the first time, as an individual human being, rather than as the cloutish victim of heavy handed satire or the long suffering, noble hero of some volk epic.

The release of Wild Season generated an Afrikaner cultural backlash, the like of which had never previously been witnessed in South Africa as far as cinema was concerned. At the
heart of the matter was the bilingual nature of the film, the
fact that some of the main characters are played by blacks and
the a-stereotypical representation of Afrikaners. The film was
snubbed by the central committee of the *Suid-Afrikaanse Akademie
vir Wetenskap en Kuns* which rejected a recommendation from its
film section that it be given an award. Nofal, an English
speaker, retorted that their response was similar to their
treatment of a renowned *Sestiger* writer, Breyten Breytenbach,
who worked in exile. Commented Nofal, "Just as it it felt that
Mr Breytenbach was not awarded the 1968 Hertzog Prize for 'other
reasons', so I believe my film suffered the same fate". The
film which had been sold to International Pictures for exter-
nal distribution was, ironically, being used by the state
Information Office as a typical example of South African "culture".
Nofal claimed that "in the sphere of 'pure art' there is only
one set of standards" -- aesthetic ones. This response on the
part of the influential Akademie is an example of how cultural
watchdogs attempt to create a restricted discourse by claiming
to be the primary interpreters for the *volk*. That the film was
being used by the state for propaganda purposes on the one hand,
suggests that the Akademie was out of step with the political
and social conditions of which the film was representative at
the time.

The storm of controversy generated by *Wild Season* unleashed its
unbridled fury on *Die Kandidaat* (1968). It was felt that the
director, Jans Rautenbach, had exceeded the accepted discursive
order and questioned the discursive affirmations and sanctions
which structured the social discourse of Afrikaner cultural
organizations by introducing *volkegevaarlike* (dangerous to the
nation) elements into the film. *Die Kandidaat* begins with a
prayer during which members of an Afrikaans Foundation fidget,
doodle and glance around while the voice-over, which is super-
imposed on the prayer, introduces them. The Publications Con-
trol Board complained that this scene mixed the sacred and the
profane. The prayer therefore had to be cut and the characters
introduced later. The second excision removed a scene of a
raging argument in which the question of whether coloureds
were, or could be Afrikaners, was raised. The censors felt that
as they might one day become Afrikaners the scene could give offense and must be dropped. The third and fourth cuts removed anti-English comment by verkrampte (conservative) members of the Foundation, snide asides on immigrants, and a derogatory reference on reform-school-boys. The film unrelentingly exposes the deceit and prejudice of the wealthy urban Afrikaner. Extramarital affairs are disclosed, the parentage of an orphan is meticulously revealed, political pasts are ripped apart and the verligte-verkrampte political divisions of Afrikanerdom reflected. Far more penetrating than Wild Season, this film tears apart the carefully nurtured volk-stereotype and shows powerful and ambitious men and women beset with human weaknesses and failings. Consider the government official who is trying to explain separate development to the English speaking fiancé of the Afrikaner candidate for the Foundation by simply affirming party-line clichés

It is the official policy of the government of this country that the Bantu people will have their own homelands where they will develop their own way of life, their own culture, and er ... their own way of life.

In another sense, a professional volkmoeder challenges a Sestiger member of the Foundation, "You Sestigers. You write all these things ... these things about sex ... you can tell us nothing about life. We do a lot of foreign travelling". In other words, the determinate ecological setting for discursive practices like the writing about sex is reserved not for local consumption, but is appropriate in the delimited setting of 'overseas'. The candidate indicates that he is located well within the procedures internal to the Afrikaner discourse in his reply to a question about his politics, "I belong to the National Party". By this admission, which elicits the response, "Well then, his politics are right", he affirms his position as a subject of Afrikaner Nationalism and tries to avoid the sanctions which would limit his interpellation because of his wish to marry an English-speaking South African woman.

The Sestiger on the Board of the Foundation, who is the character
through which the contradictions of Afrikanerdom are articulated by the film's director, when called upon to vote, accepts the candidate within the limits of the ideological discourse: that recurring common sense which pervades all aspects of Afrikaner cultural endeavour: "vir alles wat mooi is in die Volk" (for all that is noble in the People). That common sense prevails over the contradictions of Afrikanerdom is essential to the film in terms of its social context. As News/Check puts it:

it has all been functional, an attempt to establish something that exists beyond cant and the old weary mouthings that have lost meaning. On this synthesis working - and being felt to work by the audience - Nefal and Rautenbach have risked the integrity of their film. And risk was required, for if the pained affirmation did not coherently emerge, then indeed the film would be much of what its detractors believe it to be: the burden of the accusations amounting to a charge of un-Southafricanism. The film had to succeed aesthetically, to provide something very different than a brand of political pornography. This it has done. It is thus a patriotic film - in a certain sense - but what matters profoundly is the type, the quality of patriotism that it both reflects, examines and endorses. 'Alles wat mooi is' may not seem precise enough, yet in the context (sic) of the film it is - what is meant has been established and only those who react rather than think will believe otherwise."

Despite the not-so-subtle affirmations by the individual characters of the best they have discovered in themselves as Afrikaners, the film was rent by a cultural storm. The Akademie, not surprisingly, refused to see it. The Publications Control Board was unable to come to a decision for two weeks. Several professors were brought in to scrutinise the script. The Prime Minister and the Minister of the Interior saw it. The Secretary for the National Council to Combat Communism claimed that the film glorifies "an anti-hero" and makes "a caricature" of the Afrikaner, confirming the worst suspicions of "our enemies". Mindful of Afrikaner Nationalist affirmative symbolism, he complained that the heroic martial strains were missing:

Eventually, the film was screened with the four cuts described above. The release, however, was fraught with further inter-
ference. In October 1968 the film was siezed by the police after a screening in the Orange Free State town of Excelsior. A complaint had been lodged by a policeman who objected to "bad language" in the dialogue (the use of "hell"). This reaction was considered to be the result of agitation by Transvaal verkramptes. The implications for its continued distribution could have been severe as numerous cinema managements consequently refused to show the film. Nevertheless the film went on to earn R250 000 at the box office and only after 1 300 000 South African cinema-goers had seen the film did the Akademie belatedly award Die Kandidaat a gold medal of honour.

The third film made by the Nofal/Rautenbach partnership was to see yet more controversy and the parting of ways between these two pioneers. Katrina, made in 1969, deals with inter-racial relations between a coloured woman and a white Anglican priest. It is based on a much more biting play, Try For White. In an interview with Pieter Wilhelm, Nofal clearly placed himself on the side of the dominant consensus, though showing up the contradictions inherent in coloured-white relations. The film falls clearly on the side of 'group identity', with the priest rejecting his coloured girlfriend by falling back on thinly disguised racism, "is it wrong to want my children to be like me, to look like me?" What this conclusion legitimates, of course, is the objectification of an 'enemy': 'Do you want your daughter to marry a kaffir?' The film makes it seem natural, for example, that Adam, the coloured leader believes in the identity of his people: "One day I can stand tall, my child can stand tall, and say 'I am a Coloured'". He thereby accepts his position as subject within the apartheid social formation while the white priest's interpellation is limited in terms of his practice as lover of a coloured girl passing for white. He eventually succumbs to the expected discursive sanctions which would befall him in the case of following through and, unlike the play where they emigrate to London, the film reaffirms the ideological discourse of apartheid. Although the resolution of the plot is ambiguous, the film cannot be said to criticise the dominant discourse. As Nofal himself puts it:
Let's face it, South Africa has failed up to now to convince the world to the slightest degree about the merits of our policies of apartheid, separate development, multi-national living - call it what you like. Nobody's listening. The drab State Information Office pamphlets that are distributed are just not worth reading. I believe it's the motion picture that might begin to do the job. Pictures such as *Katrina*, which are dramatic entertainments yet say something about our condition, our way of life. Any viewer must learn about South Africa by seeing such a film. I would allocate R5 million immediately to the making of feature entertainments about our country, our people.\(^{27}\)

As became clear in Chapter 6 on the analysis of the subsidy system, and is blatantly apparent from Nofal's remarks above, business is not all that incompatible with politics and is paralleled by the American industry's efforts to extend their markets by alloying itself with the proselytizing the 'democratic creed'.

Even before the film was released -- having been stalled by the Publications Control Board needing "another opinion" -- the Nofal/Rautenbach team split. Nofal, reported the *Rand Daily Mail*, has a yen for "a broader, more international scene ... looking beyond our borders, beyond our parochial little jokes". Rautenbach, on the other hand, according to Nofal, was going to "concentrate more on indigenous films, with a strong Afrikaans accent".\(^{25}\) In his characteristically cynical manner -- but not without its grain of truth -- Harry Jones comments:

Nofal himself is to storm Hollywood converting his *Kandidaat* (sic - he means *Katrina*) script into 'the US Negro problem - and so on'.\(^{26}\) Needless to say, the talk is once again in the mythical millions -- and that from one of the unemployables until an indulgent government embarked upon handouts\(^{26}\).

The advice sought by the Publications Control Board was revealed in *Die Transvaal* of June 13. Sixteen preferred sources were assembled to make their pronouncement: a female member of the DRC, the wife of a conventional Afrikaans writer, Annette Barnard, the managing director of Voortrekker Pers, a professor of Afrikaans literature, an Afrikaans radio person-
ality, the head of the Afrikaans service of the SABC, a "torch bearer" for the Voortrekker Monument, two ministers of the DRC, the Keeper of the Sound Archives, the deputy leader of the National Party in the Johannesburg City Council, the Chief PRO of the Rand Afrikaans University, a school principal and chairman of the Federal Board of Liaison Committees in Johannesburg, the president of the Afrikaans Women's Federation and the chairman of the Society for the Preservation of Afrikaans. Only one dissented after viewing the film, claiming that the film should not have been made, deploring the film's partial use of English. In an interview with John van Zyl, Rautenbach described the extent to which he had to go to persuade preferred sources to accept the film:

for Katrina I had a private viewing for the Prime Minister (B.J. Vorster). You know he has this bulldog thing about him. "Ek is die leier" (I am the leader) and he stood there in the foyer and said - 'I like it very much, but', wagging his finger - "the portrayal of the Afrikaner is wrong!" That basically was his attitude. My argument at the time was that I don't want to preach to the converted, and if you can prove that we don't hit kaffirs and kill kaffirs anymore ... as basic as that ... then I will accept it."

The film was released and went on to earn an unprecedented R900 000 in the local market. Nofal never made it to Hollywood, indeed he retrogressed into making formula films which were no different from the genre formats that typified the wider industry. Rautenbach, on the other hand, had articulated a continuing desire to forge new horizons. Having dissociated himself from Katrina only to reassociate himself with the film later on, he set up his own company, Seventig (Seventy) which he in true Seventig style described as

a spirit. It's people working together. No one person makes a film. Seventig has to give every possible person the chance to become involved in film making. We have to look to the future. I had to buy this studio recently, and I had to finance it with God knows what capital in 24 hours, because if we didn't get this studio and this property (Lone Hillj), the whole idea of building a film centre where people could come and work and exchange ideas and build onto something
was going to go down the drain. Big business wanted it. I secured it, now I am arranging for big business to finance it, and to have a part, but on the film-makers terms, not theirs. I have arranged finance for people who will not get finance anywhere else because the ideas they have got are too radical, or they are not set in a pattern. I will personally see that any film they make will be worthy of an investment, but not necessarily in the present pattern of film making. If we do not experiment, if we do not find our identity as soon as possible, we are not going to make it²².

Sewentig, which is a play on Sestiger, made Jannie Totsiens in that year. It was a film which was to set Rautenbach apart from the more entertainment-oriented Nofal for it delved beneath the surface text in a manner never before attempted by a film maker in this country. Unlike Nofal who is of Lebanese descent, a first generation South African who "never quite belonged anywhere"²³, Rautenbach is an Afrikaner Nationalist who was highly critical of aberrations in public life. His films encoded this social concern and "there can be no doubt that Rautenbach is deeply concerned with the fate of Afrikanerdom and the plight of the Afrikaner intellectual"²⁴. It was this concern which identified him as an organic intellectual and set him apart from Nofal who functioned as a technical intellectual. The latter considered himself as an "entertainer", the former, an intellectual.

The allegorical implications of Jannie Totsiens which is set in a mental asylum in the Orange Free State are most cogently described by John van Zyl:

The asylum with its dark (if not black) nooks and crannies, set in the magnificent landscape of the Eastern Free State, is obviously South Africa, or more specifically the chequered history of South Africa, a chronology of the grand and the mean, the heroic and the shameful. The doctor in charge is the current leader, be it Vorster or the legend of Verwoerd, who is impotent and ineffectual at the moment. In fact, the insane run the asylum, while he tries to justify his existence. His situation is best shown in the sequence where he desperately assures the caller on the telephone that the situation is under control while the crippled artist calls for help.
The artist is Rautenbach. Crippled by the Establishment (Publications Board?) and only able to shout encouragement at the intellectual, instead of annihilating his political opponents².

Rautenbach tried to use his company Sewentig as a locus of cultural production around which some sort of unity of purpose would coalesce. From this coalescence and thrashing out of basic objectives he hoped that a film movement would emerge:

I am very involved in the social and political structure of this country; and I find myself among a group of people ... people who have a similar perception of the situation, of the problems ... we would like to create the South Africa of the 1980s, but we have not yet achieved the unity among ourselves except to agree on the criticism we level. I have a long term conception of my role as a film maker. My film making is a long-term project, something like building up credit at a bank. So that one day I can use it totally. Very frankly, I would like to be in a position where my integrity would not be doubted. Then we will have reached the stage where we can supply answers ... credible and acceptable answers. But now, we are moving one step ahead ... not ten².

Despite this awakening collaborative spirit at Lone Hill where the studio was located, a film movement did not gel. Audiences were not ready for the intellectuality of Jannie Totsiesms and neither was "big business" prepared to finance cultural production on any terms other than its own. The industry too, was sceptical of Rautenbach's unconventional way of doing things and the "spirit" which led to the flotation of Sewentig stalled with Pappalop (1971). In this film Rautenbach was forced to alter the original ending which portrayed the rape of an innocent Karoo dorpmeisie (town girl) by the local stud in the interests of the financier and an image considered more befitting to the Afrikaner volk.

One of the criteria of a film movement is that innovations in cinematic discourse, production methods and values should be accepted in the film industry and become incorporated into existing cultural patterns. The norms, values and prevailing
organizational structures which governed the behaviour of the South African film industry and the social formation at the time of Rautenbach's attempts to change them, were too stable and too powerful for any change to occur. Despite the close links held by Rautenbach with the Prime Minister and his Cabinet, and their apparently muted excitement at what had been produced under the 'cultural' banner, the organic ideology of those subjects within the industry itself was still tied to the capitalist ethic which emphasised profit over cultural advance, 'professional' stasis over new ways of doing things and 'responsibility' (what does the audience want) over 'irresponsibility' (the making of personal films).

What separated Afrikaans directors like Rautenbach and Tommie Meyer from their English counterparts was their sense of cultural commitment. Although these two organic intellectuals differed in their cultural goals, applying different approaches, developing different styles and organizational methods, they were both engaged in the process of interest-translation of behalf of the bourgeoisie. Where Meyer's objective was to lubricate the cultural traumas caused by urbanisation and city living and to provide a discursive affirmation of racial capitalism, Rautenbach was critical of the bourgeoisie itself, of the structural prisons and historical discourses in which Afrikanerdom had caged itself. Meyer's concern was with the rituals of the present, Rautenbach's with the discursive sites of the future.

Rautenbach was critical of that kind of "boereplaas" (boer-farm) spirit found in the mainstream of Afrikaans film making, as he was of bilingual films like Lord Oom Piet (1962), many of which were made by the Jamie Uys studio. His critical stance within the industry, his clearly articulated ideological motivations and his efforts to deflate the myths behind which the film industry operated brought Rautenbach into conflict with the industry which, while it was prepared to protect the interests of the state because these coincided with its own prosperity, it was unwilling to ally itself with criticism of it. The industry responded with "divisiveness, the rancour of other
directors waiting for him to make a mistake. The attitude assumed by the industry is a discursive form of sanction which results in the victim being condemned to excommunication. He is denied use of the industry infrastructure -- finance, cooperation, employment, distribution -- unless he recants and unconditionally accepts and works within the dominant discourse. While making *Sannie Totsiens*, Rautenbach opened himself to discursive sanctions by stating:

The English film-maker should be ashamed of what he is doing to the English-speaking public in this country. First of all they are not even trying to compete with the English film from overseas. They are not trying to bring their English-speaking countrymen something that is his own. They have no pride in their products, no pride whatsoever. All of them look upon film making as a cheap way of making money, and they expect the English-speaking South African to be thankful and to take whatever they bring them.

When the Afrikaans film maker tries something, they're the first buggers to say: why pull politics into a film, or a mental institution? But they themselves try nothing. In the past they've made money out of Afrikaans films, most of them based on some second-rate English script they bought cheaply elsewhere, acted by English players. Look at the titles of your English film today: *Banana Beach*, *Petticoat Safari*, *Satan's Harvest*, *Strangers at Sunrise* ... It smells of decay, of nothingness.

The "spirit of Seventig" was an attempt to navigate the industry out of the restrictions on discourse which governed what may be said, in what kind of film made under what conditions. It failed, however, to negotiate new patterns of subjectivity for film makers self-conscious of their goals and ideologival discourse. The dominant discourse managed through the industrial infrastructure effectively negated this new subjectivity by limiting the interpellation of the film maker as a cultural worker. In an attempt to maintain his position in the industry he capitulated to pressure of financiers and distributors to adopt the dominant discourse and production methods. In his later films he restrictively situates the themes and plots in a particular ecological setting: 'entertainment' which in turn was protected by shielding the cinematic discourse through common sensical
notions of 'what the audience wants' and so on.  

The sanctions enacted by the industry were largely successful and out of the 229 feature films produced in South Africa between 1969 and 1979, less than 5% could be considered cinematically innovative within the South African political context. These films, which number about eleven in all, were isolated occurrences which did not fulfill the basic conditions necessary for the growth of a film movement. The directors involved -- no more than six -- did not constitute a sub-culture because there was no degree of unity among them. In fact, they were polarised both in terms of language and politics, Rautenbach on the one side and Devenish and Fugard on the other. Their films were not temporally clustered and did not follow any significantly identifiable socio-cultural trauma. Although these directors received sympathetic appraisals from local film critics and theorists (only one or two in all), no formal interaction bound them together. Reception from distributors was generally muted, a controversial film like Sven Persson's Land Apart (1974), which predicted the social turmoil of 1976 was initially banned, censored and released two years later as The South Africans barely made subsidy because of inadequate distribution and government intimidation.

Where anomalous films like The South Africans have managed to breach the conservativeness of capital and the administration of the state censorship machinery, stability is often ensured through the distributive process. Persson's film, for example, did not obtain Satbel distribution. This company, itself part of national capital, no doubt felt that The South Africans contravened the dominant discourse. Paradoxically, the film obtained MGM support, a company owned by foreign capital, and which was sympathetic to the film purely in terms of market considerations. The state, however, threatened sanctions against the local MGM office via MGM International which placed pressure on its South African office to cancel its distribution agreement with Persson. The film eventually managed to obtain limited exposure at two independent cinemas in Johannesburg and one in Pretoria. Further screenings were arranged on
university campuses around the country in 16mm format, though not without further intimidation from the security police.

Further fragmentation occurred as a result of a flare-up between Emil Nofal and Athol Fugard. Reacting to Fugard's assessment of the South African industry in his statement, "that which is authentic and unique to South Africa has been neglected, by and large, by the local industry which really just turns out rubbish". Nofal responded in terms of the delimited appropriation of discourse which is the stock response by subjects of an industrial film practice: "It may be a dirty word ... but I deal in entertainment". Fugard was accused by Nofal of achieving fame and fortune "... in the easiest form of expression -- by dramatising the underdog, trying to survive in a cruel world, studying man's inhumanity to man. In other words, muck raking in the rubbish heap of life".

This interchange was given tremendous coverage in The Star, and occurred around the making of Fugard and Devenish's second film, The Guest/Die Besoeker (1977). They had previously made Boesman and Lena (1974) which used neo-realist techniques in the filming of the Fugard play. This film was a total departure in the South African film scene and was sceptically received by the industry which refused to believe that it would even gross its production cost. Common sense suggested otherwise, just as it did on The Guest which dealt with a drug-racked episode in the life of an Afrikaner folk hero and cornerstone of the Afrikaans language, Eugene Marais. The common sense dispensed to Devenish in his four year search for capital (much of it supplied by the BBC) was that the film would undoubtedly be banned. That it was not, nor ever in any danger of being banned, suggests the degree to which the established film industry was protecting itself from other co-existing discourses. In the case of The Guest, Devenish and Fugard -- both English speakers and both highly critical of apartheid -- were not considered by the industry to be suitable subjects to deal with this culturally significant topic. The existing order of ideologically constituted subjectivity held that only specific persons were socially permitted to comment on certain institution-
alised themes. Neither Fugard nor Devenish were considered considered among those 'author-ized' to make valid assertions or statements.

The industry response to the "satisfactory returns" on Boesman and Lena is still met with disbelief since this information conflicts with its common sense, while The Guest is equally objectified as 'art', 'non-commercial' and therefore an aberration. The complex processes which led to the assigning of these labels, particularly with regard to The Guest, is dealt with elsewhere, and were reinforced by the film's extremely poor box office performance. Vindicated in its criticism, the industry was not surprised when Fugard and Devenish embarked on a third film, Marigolds in August (1980), funded entirely with foreign capital (BBC and Ford Foundation). This film, however, lacked the incisiveness of their previous movies and failed dismally at the box office, proving the industry's scepticism 'correct'.

What is important in the above analysis of socially conscious attempts at film production by Rautenbach and Nofal on the one hand, and Fugard and Devenish on the other, is not only industry and audience response, but sources of finance. Where Nofal and Rautenbach's films were backed exclusively with National capital -- through placing increasing pressures on those film makers to shield their discourse in terms of the assumptions held by racial capitalism -- Fugard and Devenish, with only one film financed entirely by South African sources, were progressively forced to secure funds from outside the country from foreign television stations and philanthropic foundations. Through this restriction of the availability of national capital, the hegemonic bloc had the effect of forcing a certain homogeneity on local content and of ensuring the continuation of that strain of cultural production initiated by Tommie Meyer which was more functional in terms of translating the interests of the bourgeoisie into cultural practice. Indeed, it was so successful that both Nofal and Rautenbach were easily co-opted after the demise of Sewentig, and Fugard and Devenish pushed out of the industry to concentrate on their dramatic and film making activities in the United States and Britain.
respectively. A further restriction on the discussion was caused by the negative effects of broadcast television on the feature film production industry, for profits were less likely than ever before. Of the twenty-five films produced in 1980, no less than nine were partially or fully financed by British companies, while five were made in African vernaculars. Apart from *Marigold* in *August* (1980), the remaining twenty-four affirmed the dominant apartheid or at least capitalist discourse. The spirit unlocked by Rautenbach died in that year and the homogenising influences of capital and the introduction of the third technological revolution to South Africa in the form of television had a depressing effect on the feature film production industry.

Critical film making, however, did not completely die out. It shifted its form, format and distribution to short 'opposition-al' films made by recently graduated individuals who had an extensive knowledge of the less expensive technologies in the guise of Super 8 and 3/4 inch video cassette. The relative cheapness of these productions (ranging from R1000 to R10 000) has opened up a whole new vista in cultural production and counter-ideological discourse. Where once RARO filmed the funeral of General Marnie Maritz, now film makers funded by organizations like the South African Council of Churches are producing cultural statements like *A Film on the Funeral of Neil Aggett*, and so on. Funds have been forthcoming from UNESCO, the SACC, private investment and English language universities. A new area is that of international television production. Ross Devenish, for example, was employed by a local company, Profile Productions, to shoot a couple of adaptations from Nadine Gordimer's short stories. While capital has managed to enforce conformity on the industry and those who practice within it, aided by the very technology which is a result of capitalist advance, oppositional film makers have co-opted it in the pursuance of counter-ideological objectives.
NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. *News/Check*, 12 April 1963, p. 20
4. So successful were these films with *The Winners* outgrossing even *James in Japan*, that sequels were made. *Winners II* (1977) was financed with South African capital, while *Kill and Kill Again* (1980), the sequel to *Karate Olympia*, was largely financed with American investment, but using a local crew and the same director in both cases.
5. The term originates from Australia and is argued to be a major factor in the inability of that country's cinema to break with American cultural imperialism. See, Adams, P. 1980: "Forward" in Murray, S. [ed.]: *The New Australian Cinema*. Nelson, Melbourne, p. 7
8. Jarvie, I. C. 1970: *Towards a Sociology of the Cinema*. Routledge and Kegan Paul, p. 42 and Tomaselli, op. cit. pp. 91-92 argue that production decisions are not made according to what the public wants to see. Producers plan films according to what they think the distributors want; the distributors will not buy films they think the public does not want to see. Jarvie calls this circumlocution 'endancing' of the audience
12. *News/Check*
13. 'Mother of the Nation'. She is thus a loyal citizen, mainly to Afrikaners and their political party. On a superficial level she cares for her family as both wife and mother. At the symbolic level she cares about the larger family, the Afrikaner nation
17. *News/Check*, 27 June 1969, p. 35
18. *SA Film Weekly*, 19 June 1969, p. 1
19. The publicity brochure for *Katrina* claimed that the film would be screened in 11 languages worldwide
22. Quoted in *News/Check*, 15 May, 1970, p. 18
23. *News/Check*
25. Ibid
27. Ibid. Rautenbach comments on the response when ten members of the Cabinet were present at a premiere: "this was heart-warming because they came to me, each and every one ... now a bloke like --- didn't really know what it was all about ... you know what I mean ... but at least he said - "This is blérry mooi, jong" (laughter). But guys like Connie Mulder, Schalk van der Merwe, Piet Koornhof ... suddenly there was an excitement amongst them ... they discussed it at length, with a certain amount of pride that the film industry has advanced to this point
29. Ibid
30. See, eg., *Ongewenste Vreemdeling* (1974), produced by Nofal and directed by Rautenbach; *Eendag of 'n Reëndag* (1975), produced and directed by Rautenbach, his psychophantic *Dit Sestig Jaar van John Vorster* (1976) and Nofal's *Fifth Season/Vyfde Seisoen* (1978), directed by Gordon Vorster
31. Quoted in *The Star (Tonight)*, 7 September 1976
32. Quoted in *The Star (Tonight)* 16 September 1976
33. Devenish, Fugard and Francis Gerard established Watershed productions in 1974 to make four films during the next two years: *The Steam Pig, Soul of the Ape, People are Living There and Hello and Goodbye*. The financier was Mosenthal's which went insolvent in September 1974.
Although production was started on the first film, it was not completed. The second film was made under a different title as The Guest.

34. This evaluation was made by an MGM spokesman to me in 1976.

35. For a more in-depth discussion of the industry’s response to Boesman and Lena see Tomaselli, op. cit. p. 74.

36. Ibid. pp. 84-89.

37. Devenish worked on two of six Gordimer stories which were made in 1982. Funding came from a German television company and the programmes were sold worldwide, although they were granted a restricted release in South Africa through film festivals and university campuses. He is, however, now based in England. Athol Fugard seems to spend most of his time at Yale University in the United States and has produced a number of his plays in Broadway, some of which have been temporarily banned in South Africa.

38. For more information on this kind of oppositional film making see, Tomaselli, K.G. 1982: "Oppositional Film-making in South Africa", FUSE, Vol. 6, No. 4, pp. 190-194.
Chapter 8


Chapter 5 dealt in detail with the penetration of Afrikaner capital into the film industry. The present section will trace the further growth of the distribution and exhibition sectors of the industry and discuss the impact of television on its structure, cinema content and audience profile.

We have seen how the accumulation and concentration of capital in the hands of SANLAM occurred through increasing surplus profits during the 1960s. This period, which averaged a growth rate of 5.6% in contrast to a mere 3.25% for the 1970s with 0% growth in 1977, saw a marked downswing in the fortunes of the distribution and exhibition sectors because of the competition of broadcast television after 1976 which was exacerbated by a high inflation rate and less money available for consumer spending. SANLAM had to face further problems in the form of competition from Andre Pieterse, and later, CIC-Warner. Both served international distributors not held within the Satbel stable.

REASSERTION OF INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL THROUGH CO-OPTION OF NATIONAL CAPITAL

Pieterse's Film Trusts, formed within ten days of his resignation from Ster, was operating fairly extensively by October 1970. The Financial Mail reports that a 10% shareholding was taken by Edglen Finance of the Glen Anil Group which had cost it between R150 000 and R200 000. Glen Anil was a giant property company which overcapitalised itself and collapsed in the mid-1970s. Film Trust formed seven wholly-owned subsidiaries: Trust Films, which was already active distributing locally made product through independent theatres; Bantu Film Trust and African Films Trust; Film Trust Overseas, which was
to distribute South African made films abroad (Uys' *Dirkie* (1969), sold to the United States for R246 000 and renamed *Lost in the Desert* was one of several); Film Trust Promotions was to develop amusement centres and Film Trust Industries which aimed to develop cinemas and entertainment complexes. Finally, Design Trust offered services and advice to theatre owners on theatre design and modernisation. In addition, Film Trusts had a 50% stake in Film Trust Finances which was set up to provide backing for local production and a 25% holding in Communications Trust which planned to concentrate on telecommunications and television programming. Pieterse, in his dual role of shareholder in Film Trusts, managed by his brother, Philo, and in his capacity of vice president of MGM International, forged a close working relationship between the two operations. MGM, partnered by Film Trusts, constantly reaffirmed its policy of supporting South African domestic production on both local and overseas circuits and was the first distribution/exhibition body to organise expensive exhibitor conventions. The MGM-Film Trust partnership courted exhibitors in "the most elaborate no-expense spared convention ever staged by a commercial enterprise in South Africa". This particular gathering, held in August 1971, was hosted in the face of a growing, apparently ideological rift, between Afrikaner owned Satbel on the one side, and the international partnership, but Afrikaner run Film Trust. The schism was indicated by a Rapport headline: "Boë Natties moet nou in veld fliek", "KINEKOR BOIKOT AFRIKAANSE FILM". (Influential Nationalists must go to cinema in the veld. Kinekor boycotts Afrikaans film). Kinekor's refusal to distribute *Breekpunt* (1971) was framed by the press in ideological terms, rather than because of a contractual disagreement. The result, according to Harry Jones, was that

Pieterse/Trust Films/MGM had clearly schemed to make Afrikaans as a language of South African cinema a pawn in a political game of exploiting for the profit motive, films in which they had not even invested, by acting as middlemen-distributors supplying films under the threat of ideological pressures for screening on a participation basis in cinemas which they did not own.
A neat scheme to make some easy money - if it worked. The scheme as such was to be a run-up and precedent which would be followed later by imported films, raising the national bill for film entertainment for the benefit of overseas companies. The conspiracy, involving our domestic producers in considerable financial risks, should the main circuits exercise their right not to present the films involved in the scheme, was ruthlessly disregarded by its sponsors.

This ideological-based competitive strategy followed by Pieterse was, as we mentioned in Chapter 6, eventually to lead to his downfall, and that of the entire Film Trust Group. By couching his plans, business projections and management procedures in ideological rather than financial terms, he exposed his company to longer-term economic weaknesses which would not be compensated for by the short-term publicity obtained for his company and its films which were marketed primarily through independent cinemas. Despite his 'patriotic' ideological stance which was supposed to woo government funding on a large scale to finance the production of 100 feature films aimed at the African market, such support was not forthcoming, and in its absence, the elaborate company structure of the Film Trust Group collapsed within eight years.

Ever the 'showman', Andre Pieterse was soon to announce future plans for Film Trust through chairman Theo Roodt. Apart from the activities already mentioned, the following four point programme was to be given priority:

1. To build the biggest film production complex in Africa;
2. To produce features, documentaries and television films for domestic and international distribution;
3. To participate in co-productions with French, Italian, German and Spanish film companies; and
4. To establish a film training school in the production complex for technicians, actors, directors and so on.

The production complex was to be ready by November 1973. While the Financial Mail described Film Trust's initial investment plans as "comparatively cautious", Jones was more realistic: "No tangible security or even reasonable risk supports Film
Trusts proposed venture? Jones, as he always reminded his readers, was 'always ahead of his time', correctly predicted that

All the evidence tends to show that Film Trust policies can create disruption of the stability of the film industry, that every section of the industry will be detrimentally affected and only Film Trust will benefit from the instability created.  

In the event, even that did not occur, Film Trust being the victim of its own grandiose and ill-conceived schemes. When the financial crunch came, its international partners were not interested in 'ideology', but returns.

In November 1971, MGM which had sold its properties to SANSO early in 1970 for R10 million, merged its South African theatre interests with Film Trust on a 50:50 basis. The resulting company was called MGM Film Trust and the further growth of the MGM/Film Trust/CIC/CIC-Warner/UIP-Warner series of partnerships confounded the Financial Mail's precipitous statement that "No longer ... will there be a possibility of the company [MGM] further developing its own SA network of outlets in healthy competition with Satbel's ... Ster and Kinekor chains".

After the SANLAM takeover of Fox during 1970 MGM had remained in existence but limited itself to exhibiting and distributing MGM and other films, and operating the three Metro cinemas it had sold to SANSO. These theatres were later demolished and the merger with Film Trust gave the new company first call on MGM films in return for an undertaking by Film Trust to develop twenty metropolitan cinemas by the end of 1974. By the end of that year, Film Trust had spent about R2 million on eighteen cinemas in which they planned to release sophisticated films which would run for longer periods in the smaller theatres. Access to product, however, was dwindling, for MGM in the United States had begun to curtail its film making activities and was investing heavily in hotels and casinos in the United States instead. A current offering, That's
*Entertainment*, for example, reflected this shift, being essentially made up of short clips from early musicals. Film Trust was faced with further access problems at the time because in 1972, a basic agreement was reached between MGM and 20th Century Fox which provided for the consolidation of their foreign distribution organizations. Pieterse, in an apparently desperate bid to obtain more product for his growing circuit engaged in a "minor masterpiece of circumlocution" whereby he tried to pressurise independents by claiming that exhibitors would only be able to obtain 20th Century Fox films through a contract with MGM, that is Film Trust. In November 1973, however, two years after MGM and Film Trust became partners in South Africa, the United States company sold its foreign assets to the Dutch-based Cinema International Corporation (CIC). CIC had been set up in 1970 by Paramount and Universal who realised that the costs of international distribution by individual companies would seriously offset profits which could be obtained through marketing cooperation. Initially, CIC distributed the films of its two associates together with those of MGM outside the United States and Canada. Each of the two companies owned 49% of the shares, with Paramount ranking first and Universal fourth among the seven largest producers. The sell-out of the South African based MGM operation made CIC a 50% shareholder in Film Trust for $17.5 million. Film Trust, which managed to attain profitability in 1974 stood to gain from this sale, but only after the end of that year for CIC was contracted to Ster until that time. Film Trust offered CIC 100% playing time apart from a 50% shareholding in eighteen cinemas against the nineteen first run houses of Ster in which it had no shareholding. Ster was also committed to Columbia, Avco Embassy and other distributors across the world. Nevertheless, CIC retained the option of cross-playing the Ster-Kinekor circuit in addition to its access to the CIC Metro theatres.

The good working relationship which had been established with the independent cinemas owners by Pieterse when he was managing director of Ster also worked to his advantage. Ster, Kinekor and Film Trust together contributed 55% of the film
rental of the major suppliers, with the remaining 45% coming from the independents. It will be remembered that Pieterse, then with Ster, had engineered the breakaway of Columbia and Paramount from 20th Century Fox. Ster was thus able to make first run films available to the independents and "It was Ster's policy to restrict expansion to city cinemas and selected suburban drive-ins, not to create unnecessary competition with the independents." With the takeover by SANLAM in 1969, the independents again had to face, though to a lesser extent, the sort of competition that they had experienced before 1961. Film Trust calculated that through the supply to these independents and the existing Metro cinemas that CIC would earn as much if not more than they did through Ster.

The move by Paramount and Universal through CIC from Ster to Film Trust was an important breakthrough, for these two majors had together contributed more than half of Ster's revenue. Allegiance to only one distributor gave CIC Film Trust the edge over Satbel for where the latter was obligated to screening films for many different distributors and producers for specific periods, Film Trust was able to be more flexible in its bookings. Films which had a high audience appeal were kept on circuit in the first run houses for as long as demand remained. In contrast, the Satbel operations were forced to change product irrespective of income through contractual commitments.

During the same period, the early 1970s, Satbel was also consolidating its interests. Horizontal rationalization began with the merging of five subsidiary companies involved with screen advertising into a single operation: Alexander Films, Filmlets, Ster Adfilms, Telenews and Radio Drive-In. Two of these companies had previously been kept separate by 20 Century Fox who acquired them with its takeover of the Empire Theatre interests in 1965. The division was maintained ostensibly to maintain a spirit of competition. The Satbel merger, however, was expected to create a greater efficiency of screen access to the advertiser without having to increase manpower.
September 1972 saw the finalisation of the restructuring of the R40 million Satbel Group. Management was decentralised and comprised sixteen divisions and partly owned operations. The two largest, Ster and Kinekor, remained in direct competition with each other in the activities of distribution and exhibition. All divisions were to report directly to Satbel on finance, budgeting, operational policies and objectives. Administrative and service facilities were rationalised and centralised under Satbel. The following are Satbel's main divisions and operations:

KINEKOR: 83 cinemas and 23 drive-ins, as well as 12 tea-room cinemas. Sponsors live shows and provides catering facilities for its cinemas.

STER FILMS: 20 cinemas and 23 drive-ins. Owns in addition 2 ice-rinks, produces live shows and provides catering facilities for its cinemas.

CINEMARK: markets screen space for advertising purposes.

IRENE FILM LABORATORIES: South Africa's largest film processing company.

KILLARNEY FILM STUDIOS: produces documentaries, cinema commercials and a newsreel. The original title of *Africam Mirror* was changed to *SA Mirror/SA Spiegel*.

SA FILM STUDIOS: located at Lone Hill and engages in studio and equipment hire. It later moved to SA Film Centre established by Satbel at Balfour Park.


A.C.F MERCHANDISE: marketing, servicing and installation of cinema, photographic, office and micro-filming equipment.

CINE SIXTEEN: distribution network providing films for professional 16mm and home movie circuits.

GROUP PROPERTIES: controls hundred plus properties of the Group.

COMPUTER SERVICES: an independently managed bureau which provides computer services to the Group and to outside companies.

In addition to these major divisions, Satbel also had interests in:

*Cemco*, which manufactures cinema screens, theatre equipment and furnishings;
Chemix, a company which prints publicity material and processes publicity artwork;

Computicket, a computerised booking service for cinemas, theatres and sports events;

Gallo-Fox, which markets audio-visual equipment; and

African Entertainments, the owner of the Boswell-Wilkie Circus.

The ideological implications of these business acquisitions by the insurance-based parent company, SANLAM, were dealt with in some detail in Chapter 3. The present analysis is concerned with the relationship of this restructuring in terms of international capital, as well as the impending competition which was to come from the introduction of broadcast television in 1976.

Effects of the Third Technological Revolution on the Film Industry

The business manoeuvring between Satbel and Film Trusts was occurring against the initial tooling-up stages for the introduction of colour television on 1 January 1976. Kinekor, which owned the majority of Satbel's older cinemas, intended meeting the expected intense competition by spending as much as R10 million on refurbishing its cinemas. It will be recalled that the installation of broadcast television in the United States in the 1950s was met by film production companies spending fortunes on technological innovations and big budget productions. This investment, however, tended to be asymmetrical with little being spent on cinemas themselves. As Kinekor's general manager, Robert Howie points out, "No money was being spent on cinemas ... [which] ... were built by nickelodian fairground operators" consisting of "four walls, a screen, a tatty projector and as many seats as possible". Despite these disadvantages these same cinemas were having to charge higher admissions to remain viable.¹⁷

The South African cinema industry also had the benefit of hindsight. In America, the movie moguls had failed to appreciate that television was here to stay.¹⁸ As a result, argues Howey, the industry developed no new talent, creative or
administrative procedures to deal with the situation and it took about eight years for the industry to re-orient itself to the new circumstances\textsuperscript{19}. Not only were the South African distribution and exhibition divisions restructuring themselves during the immediate pre-television period, but further rationalisations were in the pipeline as far as Satbel itself was concerned. At the time, Satbel possessed monopolistic power on two counts. It was \textit{vertically} integrated in terms of ownership of subsidiary companies marketing cinema equipment and furnishings, production, distribution, screen advertising, exhibition and promotion. \textit{Horizontal} integration was affected through the consolidation of its theatre chains, screen advertisers and distribution.

Despite their overwhelming control of the market, Satbel operated Ster and Kinekor as two separate companies in direct competition with each other. This competitive spirit was maintained by the luxury of two separate and autonomous head offices with all the duplication in administration, promotion and so on which are the consequence of a dual operation. Despite the anomalies in the administration of what on paper appears to be a monopoly, \textit{Business SA} warned in 1972 that the SANLAM-Schlesinger merger set an unhealthy precedent in terms of the Monopolies Act and would provide a \textit{causa maiorem} for a later merger between Ster and Kinekor themselves\textsuperscript{20}. This did occur in 1977 as a response to the commencement of television and is dealt with later in this chapter.

A further advantage which the South African industry held over the situation elsewhere, apart from a well ingrained cinema-going habit, was an easily accessible, convenient computerised advance booking system called Computicket\textsuperscript{21}. Although developed and applied in America by the Computer Science Corporation in 1967, its use was discontinued in April 1970 having secured a $13 million loss. The reason for Computicket's failure in the United States was attributed to two conditions, neither of which is a problem in South Africa. The first is that the system only works where there exists a centralised control of the entertainments booking industry. As the managing director of the
local company put it, "the rationalisation of cinema interests in South Africa combined with our own expertise at Show Service, where we catered mainly for live entertainment and sports bookings, gave us a unique starting base". The second problem mitigating against Computicket's acceptance in the United States was its rejection by the trade unions under which box office personnel fell. Introduction of the system would have led to the dismissal of numerous employees and was therefore resisted. In South Africa, no such trade unions exist, and capital had no difficulties in installing the system.

The first terminal went on-line on 16 August 1971 and by 1974 sixty terminals were in operation in the Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vereniging area alone. The benefits to the industry are manifold: full accounting and auditing control; instantaneous and full management information; instantaneous control of prices and inventory allocations; highly efficient public service maximizing sales normally lost under standard booking procedures; higher profits resulting not only from higher sales but also because of significant reductions in box office operating costs; lower accounting and audit costs; it stimulates impulse buying since most terminals are located in shopping centres, and so on. The Computicket system, however, being a Satbel owned operation, serves its cinemas only. The Metro cinemas run by CIC and Film Trust continued to make use of a show service type of operation which was not computerised.

From the above it becomes evident that the third technological revolution has infiltrated into many different facets of the film industry. Notwithstanding the obvious competition of television, this same technology has led to the development of devices which have benefitted the film industry directly. Numerous examples exist in the field of production and, in terms of the present discussion, administrative procedures. The Computicket system, for instance, is a prime example of this phase of late capitalism. The main characteristics of the third technological revolution in relation to the exhibition component of the film industry are:

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1. An acceleration of the increase in the organic composition of capital through the partial displacement of salaried personnel by computer-based automation.26

2. The greater realisation of value. Value itself is created in the production of the film and the Computicket system of booking serves to maximise profits through the most efficient realization of the value of the product.

3. Together with technological innovation is a lowering of the cost threshold over time. One can trace the introduction of Computicket to the point where the rising advantage of increased efficiency deriving from the system intercepted with a curve of the falling cost of capital equipment in the field of automation and cybernetics. Once basic capital has been invested it becomes progressively cheaper to add terminals and increase range, both in terms of geographical spread and numbers. This diffusion is intensified by the lowered cost of terminals and the development of advanced technology, notably the microchip.25

The artificial postponement of the third technological revolution in the form of the delayed introduction of television to South Africa resulted in an anomalous situation where the home movie business substituted for the lack of television. It is to this component of the film industry that we now turn.

The Home Movie Business: The Contradictions of Capital

At the time that SANLAM took over 20th Century Fox in South Africa, the managing director of the Afrikaans company stated "it had become apparent that there was ... a flaw in the Publications Act. It seemed as if films exhibited in cinemas were subject [to censorship] but that those rented out to be exhibited in private homes were not".26 This loophole, together with the ubiquitousness of 16mm projectors either owned or available for rent, and the lack of television led to an influx of hundreds of small distributors hiring out uncensored films in the early 1970s. This incursion was entrenched by
a Publications Bill published in 1971 which emphasised the
distinction between public screening and private showings.
Satbel tried to counter this "artificial"\textsuperscript{27} business by
pointing out that the

regular industry, which co-operates with the
authorities and from which the state derives
a handsome income, would be harmed; that some
of the many small distributors (some operating
from flats) would even avoid contributing a
share of their profits to the Treasury's
company tax\textsuperscript{28}

Although representations were made by Satbel to the govern-
ment to modify the legislation no changes were made. The home
movie business flourished, and aided by yet another legislative
loophole in the Copyright Act, these companies hired out with
impunity, films which were more correctly the property of the
'regular industry' and contracted to Ster, Kinekor, CIC, Film
Trust and so on. The situation deteriorated to the point
where 16mm copies of major releases yet to be launched were
being screened on the home movie circuit. The high profits
to be made led to the entry of pirates, operators who obtain
copies of films by illegal means. The war between the estab-
lished industry and the pirates raged for nearly a decade and
thousands of police raids were made on home movie outfits.

In October 1974, the United States Congressional Record placed
South Africa as the largest pirator after the Carribean coun-
tries and South America. Although Wassenaar states that the
problem was resolved in "six tedious years"\textsuperscript{29}, the conflict con-
tinues to the present. What has occurred is a tightening up
of censorship which places home movies in the same category
as cinema\textsuperscript{30}. In the meantime, Satbel tried all manner of means
to break these 'illicitimate' 16mm traders, but the latter's
hold tightened progressively. It is estimated, for example,
that Satbel spent R500 000 on legal fees over a four year
period and though over 6000 prints were recovered, the pirates' 
business was not seriously affected\textsuperscript{31}. Eventually Satbel de-
cided to meet these traders on their own ground. Cine 16 went
into operation in 1971 with two outlets, expanding to nineteen
in 1974, eventually owning thirty. Turnover to June 1972
was R800 000, R990 000 by June 1973, R1.86 million by June 19
1974, with R4 million estimated for the financial year ending
in June 1975. By 1976, the estimated annual turnover of the
legitimate home movie business was R15 million\textsuperscript{32}, compared to
a R54 million gross for cinema admissions in the June 1974-75
financial year\textsuperscript{33}. In addition to Cine 16 was Film Fun, half o
owned by Super 8 Promotions. Also started in 1971 with two
outlets growing to thirty two in 1973, turnover was growing
at 20\% a month. These two operations were, in turn, surpassed
by the pirates who numbered in excess of 300 by September 1974.

Both Film Fun and Cine 16 hired out 16mm and Super-8 prints.
Only after Film Fun had demonstrated the viability of Super-8
feature film hire, however, did Cine 16 follow suit. It in-
vested R1 million in reel to reel prints, while Film Fun's
700 Technicolor Super-8 cassette projectors and films were
earning in excess of R40 000 a month. Their catalogue,
ironically, came not only from MGM, but United Artists as
well. Although Satbel held the 16mm and 35mm rights of UA,
Super 8 Promotions acquired the Super-8 rights\textsuperscript{34}.

The South African home movie business was about twice the size
of that existing in the United States and constituted a major
channel along which culture and ideological perceptions could
be mediated. Most of the films available were American in
origin, and even where material which had to be censored for
cinema release was legitimately available for home movie con-
sumption, its content hardly ever posed a challenge to the
dominant discourse. The main attraction of these movies was
a sexual theme not permitted in cinema. A further stimulation
of the of the home movie business was the legislation curbing
commercial Sunday cinema. Although Sunday cinema clubs did
exist for a while in the mid-1970s taking advantage of the
legal loophole, they did not last for long and barely dented
home movie viewership where people were able to watch films
at their leisure at times that suited them.

The opportunity to make a quick profit did not escape the
majors themselves and in at least one documented instance, a major negotiated with a home movie outfit for exclusive television features screening rights. The American company was MCA, the parent company of Universal. The local firm was Parade Home Entertainment Centres (PHEC) which had also secured a contract with National Television Associates (NTA) which by 1956 was the largest distributor of feature films to American television. In November of that year 20th Century Fox had sold NTA 390 features and had acquired a 50% stock interest in the company. Despite the fact that Kinekor represented Fox in South Africa, the deal was made with PHEC.

The agreement reached between PHEC and MCA and NTA suggests that the United States majors will ensure their collaboration in the home movie business in the event of potential profit and as a means of combatting the pirates. The legality of home movie hiring in South Africa was thus extended to the 180 PHEC franchise holders as well as the established Film Fun and Cine 16 firms.

The problem of pirating, however, continues, but seems mainly to involve 'acceptable' films which are sometimes uncensored, while a smaller emphasis is placed on pornographic product. By the end of 1981, South Africa was again guilty of the highest per capita incidence of film pirating in the world with the majors losing as much as R20 million in royalties a year. The situation has, no doubt, been exacerbated by the high ownership of video cassette recorders and the shift of the home movie business to include the hiring out of video films.

The strategy adopted by the established industry representing international distributors which moved the majors into the home movie market is indicative of two important structural processes. The first concerned the 'cinema-going' habit which easily adjusted to include a home movie viewership to fill out the time which would normally be taken by television. Despite this 'structured absence' being filled out in 1976, the home movie business continues to flourish, now with video cassettes as well as films, for SABC-TV with its conservative selection
and limited English programming (2½ to 3 hours a day) is clearly not meeting public needs, especially on Sundays.

The second implication of the home movie business is that it stimulated the audio-visual industry, particularly during the first half of the 1970s.

*The Explosion of Audio-Visual Technology: The 'Dumping Grounds'*

Not only did people become more aware of the environments in which film could be used, but the range of hardware available increased enormously during the first half of the 1970s as a result of marketing drives by United States companies through local agents into the South African audio-visual market. The urgency of this expansion was fuelled by a cyclical upswing which began in 1972 reaching a peak of 7.1% in 1974, the need for more efficient marketing methods, the impending switch-on of television in 1976, and a public more highly attuned to visual media, not only in education, but in the market place in particular. The period was marked by a local scramble for agencies representing American principles. Like many feature film production companies in the early 1960s, few of these companies or agents survived long.

While the Fairchild Super-8 cassette projector system had been available in South Africa since 1970 through Falcon Audiovisual, Technicolor was gearing up to capture this market through a Film Trust subsidiary, Super 8 Promotions. Apart from huge sales to Film Fun and vocational education institutions, this company broke into the commercial and industrial market on a massive scale during 1973 and 1974 when it sold R250 000 worth of Technicolor Super-8 cassette projectors to General Motors via a franchised company, Dial Picture Productions. The projectors were to be used for product screenings in the 240 General Motors showrooms countrywide. With this investment in hardware followed a further R40 000 in software production, not to mention print costs estimated at over R180 000. All of this was budgeted for 1974. In the following year, however, the programme went into dormancy.
because of the difficulty of administering this sort of sales promotion on a continuing basis, increasing costs of software production during ensuing years as well as the general recessionary conditions of the South Africa economy which began its downswing in 1975, culminating in a 0% growth rate in 1977.

In the meantime, Fairchild had been adopted by Datsun which bought about 60 projectors (later replaced with video) and Vetsak bought 60 J-Arc machines which were fed by a R200 000 film production programme made by Indaba Films. In addition, there were numerous smaller sales to less highly capitalised companies.

Like the SANLAM-Gallo connection before this time, most of these audio-visual marketing strategies were not carried through. It is not difficult to assess the cultural and ideological implications of this section of the film industry which petered out in 1976 with Super 8 Promotions actually giving away more than 20 projectors (retailed at R800 each) to the South African Defence Force. The financial implications are much clearer though, and will be dealt with first.

In a very short period of time -- no more than four or five years -- American manufacturers had, through the mobilisation of local capital, managed to secure major sales of equipment, though much less in terms of software (content). These sales boomed during a specific conjuncture of South African economic history which was influenced by an average growth rate of 4.5% between 1971 and 1974, a growing consumer awareness of visual presentations in business and the consequent adoption of communications technologies and methods in business practice.

The downward cycle starting in 1975 was evident from a growth rate of 2.1% dropping to zero in 1977. This significant downturn, together with the novelty of video technology, seriously affected sales of celluloid based audio-visual hardware. It is, however, normally expected that during periods of increasing difficulty to realise surplus value that audio-visual aids would offer an attractive proposition to industries.
needing to dispose of their excess product. One of the reasons why audio-visual sales were not followed through by sustained marketing and service programmes can be traced to the opportunist nature of a number of the agents involved, together with the high prices they were charging for the machines. Realising that the industrial market had been saturated or was resisting further purchase of film based audio-visual technologies, at least one major company with unsold stocks tried to dump them on the homeland market and entered into negotiation with the Transkei Development Corporation.

The processes identified above are illustrative of further points identified by Mandel during the phase of late capitalism:

1. Multinational companies, instead of looking to maximize their profits through the exploiting of less developed regions, try rather to maximize profits by developing an under-developed branch of industry with a lower organic composition of capital. South Africa offered an ideal market as it was 'less developed' both in a general economic sense as well as in terms of the specific audio-visual market.

2. The accelerated development of technology occurring in the metropolitan states was not aimed at South Africa specifically, but at the much larger domestic markets. In contrast to the 240 Technicolor projectors bought by General Motors in South Africa, for example, the United States parent company had acquired over 17 000 at an earlier time. The South African market was thus only of secondary importance. What was seen in South Africa was but the tail-end of an international phenomenon whereby over-produced technology was dumped on peripheral markets. The interior bourgeoisie, in turn, attempted to continue the process of dumping by palmimg off their excess stocks on the homeland regions. When this double articulation failed, companies were forced to get rid of their machines in any way they could. Amongst other applications, they were used to relay retail advertising in hypermarkets,
and in an extreme case, projectors were given to the Defence Force.

3. Because of the need to enter branches of industry characterised by an initially lower organic composition of capital, we find that the audio-visual technologies originated from companies involved in related, or even different areas of production. The Technicolor Super-8 cassette projectors, for example, were a by-product of Technicolor Film Laboratories, while the Fairchild projector was a spinoff of Fairchild Industries which was involved with electronics and defence systems.

4. The use of audio-visual sales techniques in industry often has the effect of accelerating the increase in the organic composition of capital through a substitution of sales personnel with other means of communication, notably the screening of sales promotional films in showrooms, exhibitions and so on.

5. There occurs a shorter life-span of fixed capital, especially in machines. The Super-8 projectors were themselves replaced with video technology within a short period of their being introduced to South Africa, and buyers previously resisting film projection equipment invested rather in video cassette systems.

6. The age of late capitalism is characterised by a massive increase in production and a contradictory difficulty in persuading consumers to buy. Audio-visual selling techniques offer one rather effective means of maximizing sales potential at point of sale.

In a cultural sense, the adoption of audio-visual channels of communication has led to the transplantation of American methods into the South African milieu. One example concerns the marketing of medical film cassettes which clearly base their content and assumptions on capitalist curative medicine rather than 'barefoot' medical practices or the specific
problems found in a country like South Africa. In this way, these medical practices or ways of doing things reinforce the already existent assumptions of medical care which are tied to high technology, highly centralised, elitist forms of medical attention found in South Africa. Mattelart describes this use of technology as the "ideological apparatuses of imperialism ... in the international accumulation of capital". With each phase in the development and marketing of technology there must follow a citizen or subject who adopts the set of social practices which legitimates and presents as 'natural' the application of the new machine in the process of capital accumulation on an international scale. This worked extremely well for a while as South Africans-as-subjects began to anticipate the social practices which would be expected of them once television was introduced in 1976. The origin of the practices, initially stimulated by the home movie business, were reinforced by the sale of film projectors not only to business, but to individual purchasers who put them to domestic use. Once television arrived, however, the market began to diminish (though not the hiring of home movies) as subjects reassessed their commercial practice, particularly in view of the costs of production. On a general level, however, one particular apparatus of cultural production, film, was simply replaced with another, video, while the content, whether made locally or overseas, approximates the ideological discourse of the hegemonic blocs in the various Western countries.

The penetration by American manufacturers of the South African audio-visual market for this brief time is but one element of the economic period where communications technologies open the way for an "ever more intensive technification for which the present phase of accumulation of capital demands the need". This is the period identified by Mandel as 'late capitalism' dealt with in Chapter 4 where it was shown why and how accumulation occurs at the service levels of the economy rather than in production per se. In this way, the manufacturers of audio-visual equipment harnessed the local film industry to assist in the process of converting idle capital into service capital (the selling of projectors) while simultaneously replacing
service capital with productive capital (stimulating the need for software products): in other words, the substitution of home movies for cinema shows or video cassettes for broadcast television, large-scale sales presentations are superseded by individual screenings in the consumers home or office, and human (or living labour) is replaced by sounds and images on film/video/slide-tape programmes in point of sale activities.

The belief in the omnipotence of technology is specific to the bourgeois ideology of late capitalism. The reader will recall, for example, the emphasis by Pieter Fourie for better studios and technical facilities when these were already pre-existent and under-utilised. The hidden assumptions of his report bear an uncanny resemblance to Mandel's analysis of ideology in the age of late capitalism in general:

This ideology proclaims the ability of the existing social order gradually to eliminate all chance of crises, to find a 'technical' solution to all its contradictions, to integrate rebellious social classes and to avoid political explosions. Fourie might have asked why the existing facilities were not being used 'properly'. That he did not and that he further insisted on a state 'cultural policy' is a clear articulation of the late capitalist ideology of organization which cannot survive without the regulative function of the state. This ideology is also mediated at a deeper level in the trend towards industrialisation of superstructural activities in which the Afrikaner has become so enmeshed since well before 1948. Where one 'culture' was made for 'survival' (of the Afrikaner heritage and 'way of life'), now the ideology of organization has replaced any 'pure' notion of culture with that of profit and the need for a 'stable economy'. The state is not a 'cure-all' to cultural production as Fourie implies, its direction and guidance of the economy are only expedient efforts to smooth fissures and postpone crises. It cannot, therefore, articulate a 'cultural policy' with clear 'communications objectives' simply because such policies are necessarily static, operating on a level dislocated from base-
superstructure relations.

To return to the discussion of distribution and exhibition per se, the sale of technology is an important element in the film industry and it is in its interest, therefore, to promote a technocist ideology. Like SANLAM which obtained an entrée into education and the audio-visual market through its acquisition of Gallo-Fox, Film Trust secured a more commercially oriented application as described above. The profitability of this section of the Film Trust operation, together with an unprecedented gross income from Jamie Uys' *Beautiful People* (1974) of over R1.5 million in the local market and R1.7 million from overseas, together with profits on property tied Film Trust over during the economic upswing which occurred between 1972 and 1974.

Further Developments in the Distribution and Exhibition Sectors of the Feature Film Industry

In March 1974, the Schlesinger Organization sold its controlling interest in its South African operation to Anglo-American. Through an offer of one share in Rand Selections for nine shares in the Schlesinger Organization, Anglo American found itself a minority partner with SANLAM in the ownership of film trading rights and theatre operations (70:30) and an equal partner in the properties. These were the properties parcelled out between SANLAM and Schlesinger through SANSO in 1969 and which included the 'finest blue-chip' sites in the country. This repenetration of traditional English capital, particularly Anglo American capital so often objectified as the 'enemy' of Afrikanerdom, into Afrikaner enterprise should be seen against the restructuring of South African capitalism as a whole. The emerging partnership between these traditionally and politically distinct capitals is reflective of a growing cooperation between English and Afrikaans speaking South Africans as the country's economy matures and has to face up to an intensifying economic, political and 'terrorist' attack from external quarters. The *rapprochement* of the two capitals from their previously differing ideological bases is symbolic-
ally refracted in the Afrikaans genre cinema which was produced between 1965 and 1980, and which will be dealt with in Chapter 10.

Apart from product already committed to Ster for distribution, as from 1 January 1975, CIC and MGM released their films through a new subsidiary, CINTRO (SA). This decision marked a shift of the American majors away from the Satbel fold. CINTRO's access to Universal, Paramount and MGM assured it an estimated 40% of the anticipated major productions from Hollywood. Operating in 47 countries**, CIC was fast moving towards the process of consolidation of American cinema capital by maintaining its own distribution arm, and hence profits, which would otherwise be lost to indigenous firms. Warner Bros, which was later to partner CIC in South Africa, remained with Kinekor for the moment.

The fact that CINTRO was independent of Satbel did not preclude it from cross-playing its product on the Ster and Kinekor circuits. This new distribution company was in a strong position because of the very high dependence of South African cinemas on the American majors' catalogue. Like the previous strategy of 20th Century Fox, international capital in the form of CIC was aimed at co-opting local capital, mainly through Satbel and Film Trust, to provide the required cinema outlets for foreign films. This move towards independence and financial centralisation on the part of some of the majors, and which was to later occur with Warner Bros and UA as well, should be seen against the impending introduction of television which provided the impetus for a significant restructuring of the distribution and exhibition divisions of the industry. CIC represented a cost-saving strategy by creating more powerful distributor entities which rebalanced their bargaining power on a global basis. In South Africa, this restructuring manifested itself in the following terms:

All but the insensitive cannot have failed to feel the winds of change stirring in the South African film industry. Amidst an escalating and costly programme of cinema construction, which among such
declared aims of providing the public with amenities, and luxury of surroundings not available hitherto, is another aim carrying less emphasis - that of asserting an influence on foreign producers to select the owners of such premises as the distributors for their films."

With the move by Universal and Paramount to MGM Film Trust in 1975, the latter company had to gear up for expansion of its cinema facilities. Requisite funds were to come from Film Trust itself. The international industry was experiencing a resurgence at this time and where 400 films were imported on average during previous years, by 1975 the figure had risen to 650, topping 800 in 1976. With all these films demanding screen time, there was no doubt that local producers earnings would be seriously affected as individual playing times per picture were to be reduced and become even more subordinate to overseas product than they had been since 1970.

The pressure on cinemas reinforced the trend away from exclusive contracts with one circuit, although 20th Century Fox remained tied to Kinekor and Columbia to Ster. As from 1976, United Artists, previously hooked to Ster alone, asserted its right to play both the Ster and Kinekor circuits. Cintrust, the holding company of the Metro theatres continued to have access to Paramount, Universal and MGM on an exclusive first-run basis, but the group holding company, CIC did have the right to contract films elsewhere when Cintrust could not deliver.

At about this time, Warner Bros International entered into a distribution arrangement with CIC which sealed its move from the South African company and its product to the Cintrust circuit. For the moment however, Disney remained with Satbel despite Pieterse's attempts to woo it over to Film Trust.

On 30 January 1976, the competitive line-up between CIC and Film Trust on the one hand, and Satbel on the other, assumed the following proportions:
Fig. 1: Ownership and Control of the South African Exhibition Industry
(Source: Financial Mail, 30 January 1976, p. 219)

Broadcast television switched on on 1 January 1976. Four months later, an audit showed a 18% drop in four-waller attendance and a 35.5% fall for drive-ins. The latter decline is of particular significance to South African made films since these venues provided their most lucrative market. This figure was exacerbated by bad weather and, more significantly, an extensive military call-up which affected the cinema's prime viewership profile made up of the 16-30 age group. The duration of the military commitment expected of citizen force soldiers was three months a year, and was extended in 1983 to include all fit South African male citizens up to the age of 55 for at least 12 days a year. The effect of the military situation on content will be dealt with in the next chapter, but its effect on attendance needs to be stressed here.

It appears that by August 1976, Film Trust had exhausted its reserves trying to tide their theatre interests over until the effects of television on audience attendance had diminished. It sold its 50% holding of the Cintrust (Metro) cinema chain to Cinnitcorp, as associate company of CIC-Warner. This acquisition by CIC-Warner was argued to dovetail with the
group's policy since 1973 to buy MGM theatres worldwide for its own exhibition activities.

Gaps in the Market: The Entrée of Smaller Distributors

The unexpected dropping out from distribution and exhibition by Film Trust marks a convenient point to introduce a discussion of how this period of restructuring affected the smaller distributors in their relationship with Satbel and CIC. The loss by Satbel of MGM, Paramount, Universal and Warner Bros did not necessarily work to the detriment of the SANLAM owned company. Before 1976, Satbel was operating in a time of abundance having secured both sources of raw material (films) and markets (cinemas). By not controlling or being solely committed to the majors, Satbel was able to obviate the incurring of losses caused by audience fall-off through the compulsory purchase of titles from sources it was contracted to. This flexibility was not found in the partnership between CIC and Film Trust, and was probably a significant factor in the latter's sale to its partner. Free of expensive tie-ups with the majors, Satbel allowed new entrants into the distribution sector. Where previously local audiences were subject to the films contained mainly in the major's catalogue, now other films from alternative sources began to appear on the cinema and drive-in circuit. The new distributor absorbed the costs of distribution since they, not Ster-Kinekor, were liable for the payment of up-front guarantees. CIC-Warner, for example, paid R250 000 for Wild Geese, HdB Films(SA) paid the same amount for The Eagle Has Landed and R60 000 for Moses, while Film Trust, now separate from CIC, re-entered the distribution market paying R1.1 million for the King Kong package. Freed from compulsory sources of supply, Satbel was able to force further concessions by refusing to screen product which did not meet with their own terms of contract. The merger of Ster and Kinekor in 1977 placed Satbel in an even stronger position with the company limiting its own purchase of films to R50 000 up front.

By allowing the entrée of independent distributors into the
market, Satbel made an attempt to create business conditions suitable to the position in which it found itself in the mid-1970s. Profit is likely to be higher in times of prosperity and less in times of depression where supplies are controlled. Where supplies are not controlled in periods of recession, profits can, however, be maintained by loosening the vertical monopoly. The consequence is that audience choice is widened as new entrants in the market exploit sub-cultures of taste and gaps in the market as the distribution business lessens its dependence on the American majors. It was this period of variety which saw the inauguration of international film festivals being held in Johannesburg, Cape Town and later Durban. These festivals played a major role in identifying a substantial art movie audience thought by exhibitors not to exist. Many of the films initially imported for these festivals have shown themselves to be financially viable for general release. The festivals have spawned a more demanding audience which is largely being satisfied by smaller distributors such as Romay Films. The Johannesburg Film Festival, in particular, was used by independent distributors as a consumer-check for movies thought by Satbel or CIC to be non-commercial. In the event of successful viewing at the festival, the event was used as a launching pad to lobby the exhibitors to grant the film a wider release. Films like *Sybil*, for example, subsequently ran continuously for over two years.

The intensified competition among distributors, however, did not necessarily work to the benefit of South African producers. Independent cinemas remained contracted to the larger distributors such as CIC-Warner and Ster-Kinekor which between them held nearly all the larger overseas producers. As Phillips points out, despite the existence of British and European companies, none have the stature of the American majors. The latter are thus in a position to decide which pictures will circulate internationally and since they are an important factor in financing through distribution guarantees, they are able to exert considerable influence on content. Because of their market penetration throughout the world, producers in other countries are forced to distribute their films through
American companies if they are to reach the largest number of customers. This has occurred in South Africa as well. *Winners II* (1977), for example, was released through Columbia on the Ster-Kinekor circuit. Because of its strength as a major, Columbia was able to negotiate a better than average deal for the film on the South African circuit. The smaller distributors, subject to this double articulation -- international and national -- have little bargaining power and probably no cinemas. Nevertheless, new entrants who managed to carve a niche for themselves during the 1970s included Romay Films which was to become one of the more adventurous companies in terms of product selection.

By 1978, the industry had recovered from the television induced slump and in December of that year earned greater profits than ever before. This experience was totally at variance with American consumer reaction between 1948 and 1954 when the appearance of television sets in any specific area reduced demand for cinema entertainment, producing the short-run effect of decline in theatre receipts and the long term effect of the reduction in the number of operating theatres\(^1\). South Africa experienced a temporary decline in box office income, but within eighteen months a renewed confidence led to the building of yet more theatres, even including Cape Town and Bloemfontein where provincial tax reduced income by 33% and 25% respectively. It was no longer necessary to shift the costs of distribution onto independents as profits were again to be found by contracting directly with the majors. Satbel wrested the R100 million ITC Entertainment package from HdH Films in August 1978 and signed a two year exclusive exhibition agreement with UA in September, including their extensive 16mm library. The South African company reaffirmed its commitment to Fox and Columbia in September. Film Trust was no longer a problem, as it had been put into liquidation in 1979 with accrued debts of R3 million.

On the other hand, a newly formed large production house, Orion, signed with CIC-Warner in April 1979. Although Cinintercorp was not suitably geared up to handling Afrikaans films,
it did attempt to test the market with *Elsa se Geheim* (1979) and *Gemini* (1980) with limited success. The bulk of South African-made films remained dependent on the Ster-Kinekor circuit which was more effective in the smaller towns and countryside.

Although the Ster-Kinekor merger was aimed at rationalisation and improved efficiency in the face of an expected financial downturn, it now found itself in a very strong position because CIC-Warner which served four-sevenths of the American majors was reliant on the Satbel cinemas to screen its product since it had only 21 urban cinemas and a couple of drive-ins at its disposal through Cinintercorp. The implications for the local producer of this cooperation between CIC-Warner and Ster-Kinekor are outlined by Andre Scholtz:

Ster-Kinekor is far more powerful as a merger than when they were operated separately. Prior to the merger, local producers had a greater bargaining power than they have now /i.e. 1980/. A keen competitive spirit existed between Ster and Kinokor which worked to the producer's advantage. This is no longer the case. CIC is not really a competitor. Both CIC and Ster-Kinekor are very strong; each is entrenched, each has its market share; they don't impede on each other's territory, in fact, they help each other by exhibiting on each other's circuits. The local producer has no option but to play the Ster-Kinekor circuit because of its greater spread of cinemas. Local productions are at a further disadvantage for the overseas majors are in a position to demand the best theatres for even their most mediocre product.

The downturn experienced by the exhibition sector between 1976 and mid-1978 further exacerbated the precarious position of local producers who found themselves increasingly playing second fiddle to imported movies. Since Ster-Kinekor and CIC-Warner are contractually bound to the majors, these companies have first call on local circuits. No South African film, no matter how well it is performing, will be held over at the expense of contracted overseas films. The greater the number of imported films the less is the space available for local films. In 1979, Ster-Kinekor indicated that they would be
able to handle only sixteen local pictures a year -- twelve in Afrikaans and four in English. This was not an unreasonable offer for in 1979 only eleven features aimed at white audiences were made (nine in Afrikaans and two in English). Contrast this with the twenty-eight made in 1972 of which Ster and Kinekor indicated they could absorb twenty\textsuperscript{59}. However, in terms of Satbel's 1978 resolution to inject R7 million into feature film production, it is not surprising that Ster-Kinekor gave its own films precedence over other local titles\textsuperscript{59}. Those films not taken up by Ster-Kinekor face an uphill battle in reaching their geographically dispersed target audience.

In 1977, a new entrant into the distribution market, Mimosa Films, spearheaded by Philo Pieterse who had previously been managing director of Film Trust, sought to combine local producers and thereby secure better release patterns, particularly at independent cinemas for their films. The impetus for this company no doubt occurred because of the declining influence of Film Trust on the contemporary distribution and exhibition scene, a company which, with MGM, had always touted South African producers. Mimosa Films did, however, experience some resistance from both Ster-Kinekor and CIC-Warner who regarded this newcomer as a competitor to their own distribution networks as far as the handling of local product was concerned. Since the Mimosa stable included Jamie Uys who was considered a 'bankable' director, the cinema chains would have preferred to negotiate directly with the producer for they would stand to earn higher profits than if they had to deal with an intermediary. By 1978, Mimosa had also acquired a number of foreign titles which constituted a further incursion into the distribution market as a whole. Two years later, in May 1980, however, Mimosa entrusted their films directly to Ster-Kinekor and announced its intention of concentrating on production in the future.

Summary

This chapter has attempted to examine the political economy of the exhibition and distribution sectors of the South
African film industry from 1970 to 1980. This period was a crucial decade for the industry as it saw the consolidation of Afrikaans capital's control on the cinema division and its strong position with regard to distribution. Unlike the Afrikaner attitudes of the 1940s through to the early 1960s, which were hostile to English South African capital, let alone international capital, the Afrikaans controlled industry now found itself working in collaboration with the international industry, securing its profits in South Africa while simultaneously exposing local audiences to its homogenised brand of cultural production. This influence worked on two levels: the first was through cinema itself, the second through the technocist ideology propagated as a result of the conversion of idle capital into service capital which in turn was converted into productive capital in the form of audio-visual hardware. Together with the introduction of broadcast television, the new practices insisted upon by the audio-visual industry led to the adoption of social practices demanded by the electronic communication system which marked the final acceptance of the full implications of the third technological revolution in South Africa.

The introduction to South Africa of television in 1976 led to a renewal of fixed capital by exhibitors as they refurbished their cinemas to meet the expected threat from the box. Having the advantage of hindsight, the industry managed to pull through. The social practice of 'going to the cinema' which had become an ingrained habit of local viewers worked to the industry's advantage and cinema-going reached new heights towards the end of 1978. The implications for cultural production during this period were significant as South African feature film production fell and the onus of ideological discourse and cultural legitimation shifted to SABC-TV. As was discussed in the last chapter, local producers were unable to regroup and find new directions in thematic content and eventually began to copy television soap operas just as they had radio soap operas in the past. The restructuring of the industry in relation to international capital as well as the wider restructuring of South African capital in general, is
Reflected in the symbolic and dramatic structure of Afrikaans film during this period. It is to this content that Chapter 10 turns.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. Financial Mail, 9 October 1970, p.131
2. SA Film Weekly, 26 August 1971, p. 1. Also see issue of 13 May 1971
3. Rapport, 15 August 1971
4. SA Film Weekly, 26 August 1971, p. 2
5. SA Film Weekly, 8 July 1971, pp. 1-2
6. Financial Mail, 9 July 1971, p. 110
7. SA Film Weekly, 8 July, 1971,p. 1
8. Ibid. p. 2
9. SA Film Weekly, 22 January, 1970, p. 1 points out that MGM incurred a $30 million loss in the United States in that year
11. Financial Mail, 10 January 1975, pp. 91-92
12. SA Film Weekly, 3 August 1972, p. 1
14. SA Film Weekly, 8 November 1973, p. 2
16. Management, July 1974, p. 31
17. SA Film Weekly, October 25/November 1, 1973, p. 4. Also see the issue of 2 May 1974; and Pierotti, S. 1974: "S.A. Leads the World in Cinema Entertainment", Videorama, Vol. 2, No. 2, pp. 1,4 & 5 for colour sketches of South Africa's unique, whites only, luxury theatres
week, which the severe depression had reduced to only 60 million, could be appreciably affected by the new competition

19. Howie quoted in *SA Film Weekly*, October 25/November 1, 1973, p. 4


21. Satbel has an interest in this company


23. Ibid. p. 7

24. Olin-Wright, E. 1976: "Class Boundaries in Advanced Capitalist Societies", *New Left Review*, No. 98, amongst others, takes the opposing view that while those who fill managerial and supervisory posts are part of the collective worker, they do not directly produce surplus value but only contribute to the production of surplus value by others. A fuller discussion of the debate concerning productive labour is beyond the scope of this study which takes Mandel's view that supervisory and managerial workers do produce surplus value. See also Gough, I. 1972: "Marx's theory of Productive and Unproductive Labour", *New Left Review*, No. 76

25. These three points are adapted from Ernest Mandel, 1978: *Late Capitalism*. Verso, London, pp. 195-197


27. *SA Film Weekly*, 5 August 1971, p. 1 comments that "the apathy of the film industry leadership to the encroachment upon the liberty of the subject has brought in its wake serious problems for the distribution and exhibition side of commercial cinema ... the pirates say they stepped into a market which had not been fully developed or operated in the public interest. They opened their shops on Saturdays and Sundays to better serve the public"

28. Wassenaar, op. cit. p. 56

29. Ibid. p. 57

30. "Judgement": 14 June 1976. Film Hire (Pty) Ltd v. the State


32. *SA Film Weekly*, 16/23 September, 1977, p. 4


35. See SA Film Weekly, 16/23 September, 1977 which lists the number of pirate prints in circulation on various films as well as identifying the five establishments hiring pornographic material.


37. Unaccountably, Cine 16 revenues actually increased sharply during the immediate period after the introduction of television.

38. This interpretation is adapted from Mandel's, op. cit., pp. 195-198, ten characteristics of the third technical revolution.


40. Ibid. p. 3.


42. Beautiful People earned more (R200 000) in the Metro, more than most South African films ear-


44. SA Film Weekly, 13 June 1974, p. 7.


46. Other films in this package included Orca and

47. Robert Grieg in The Star (Tonight), 9 June.

48. This does not imply that Satbel or CIC-War have 'art' films in their catalogue, they never released them.

49. For further information on the role of film in South Africa see Tomaselli, K.G. 1981: ‘Fractals - Which Audience: Punk Rockers, Euro-


54. One notable producer, Andre Scholtz, commented that he would stop making Afrikaans films if he could not get a distribution in South Africa and concentrate on English language films for the international market. As a result of this report which appeared in The Star (Tonight), Satbel actually took off one of their own films in at least one location (Witblitz and Peach Brandy) and put on Scholtz' Skelms in its place. The point of Scholtz' statement to the press was to stimulate this kind of action. In any event, Scholtz only made one more film, April '80, before leaving the industry entirely.

55. The only exception was Jans Rautenbach's comedy, Blink Stefaans which uses a television set as the main character's alter ego. The film earned a fortune at the box office.
CHAPTER 9

SHIELDING, RESTRICTIONS AND ECOLOGICAL SETTINGS: THE IDEOLOGY OF CENSORSHIP

Critics of censorship in South Africa usually base their arguments on morality judgements and libertarian ideals of freedom. Often, the cynical and satirical nature of much 'serious' writing obscures the underlying economic determinants which led to the emergence of a class structure based on racial capitalism. The perpetrators of censorship have been described by DH Lawrence as "The grey ones left over from the nineteenth century". This myth, that censorship is the remnant of Victorian morality, is perpetuated by the English language press in South Africa and writers who believe that censorship is concerned primarily with obscenity and pornography, what Lawrence describes as "the lie of purity and the dirty little secret".

Such explanations detract from underlying processes and tend to objectify censorship by locating it within the actions of individual practice. The Publications Control Board (PCB) is described by Harry Jones, for example, as "an attempt to transplant the ideological rantings of a political clique" or a "clutch of politicians ... plan[ning] our future purity of mind". This conspiratorial interpretation supports conventional wisdom which holds that the censors are government appointed 'experts' who are employed to decide for the majority what they may see, read or hear, a point of view which is often perpetuated by the censors themselves. An example is the following statement by Judge Lammie Snyman who was chairman of the Publications Appeal Board from 1974 to 1980:

The duty of the Publications Bodies is, they must ask the question, 'What does the average man in the street with a Standard Seven education think? ... The Publications Bodies, the adjudicators, must decide what the moral standards are of the general community, the bulk of which is not sophisticated.'

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This statement, like many others issued by the Directorate of Publications (DP) or its predecessor, the Publications Control Board, appear to deliberately confuse cause with effect. This interpretation of the purpose and objectives of the state censorship machinery, supported, in the main, by serious critics, is primarily the result of the inadequate understanding of the role and function of this form of state control.

Since the discovery of diamonds in Kimberley in the 1870s and gold on the Witwatersrand a decade later, the class structure has continually modified itself in relation to processes occurring in the political economy. Simultaneously with this dynamic class struggle has been the enactment, amendment and consolidation, initially of provincial film censorship ordinances, and later of acts of Parliament. An analysis of these acts and ordinances over time will show a recurring preoccupation with the treatment of the relationships between capital and labour, as well as race.

The present chapter is divided into two sections. The first offers a brief historical overview of the development and underlying rationale of film censorship since the turn of the century. The second part of the chapter will depart slightly from the previous paradigm employed in this study and will analyse the process of censorship as a cybernetic system of information/social control which is geared to preserving the racial-capitalist relations of production.

PART I: HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT

The first public complaint about a film occurred on 14 February 1898 when the Cape press objected to the blasphemous content of *The Temptation of St Anthony*. Over the next ten years there were isolated objections, but the first state action on a film occurred on 8 July 1910 when the Union government banned the screening of *The Johnson-Jeffries Fight*, which had sparked race riots in the United States. The South African press, clearly implying racist tendencies to be the response of blacks alone, pointed out that the "sole menace of the film was the
inculcation of racial hatred which could instantly be obviated by prohibiting its exhibition to coloured people". The years immediately after the controversy saw a growing antagonism against the cinema because, as Gutsche put it, "the character of the cinema began to change with the institution of permanent 'picture palaces' and the attendance of audiences of more mature intelligence than the initial devotees". What Gutsche neglects to mention is that these "more mature audiences" were drawn not from the working-class poor whites, but from the petty bourgeoisie who saw it as their task to agitate for state control over cinema to protect 'civilized' values. This social movement gathered momentum primarily in the Cape and resulted in the establishment of a voluntary vigilance body known as the Bioscope Advisory Committee. This watchdog group originated directly from the Social Reform Association established in 1900.

The Committee was not concerned with content but rather the sanitary conditions which pertained in places showing films. By 1911, however, the Committee had assumed a moral guardianship as well. The secretary of the Social Reform Association proposed the formation of a censor board modeled on the American National Board of Censors of Motion Pictures. A number of women's associations demanded censorship as a means to combat the "Black Peril" wave of assaults and rape of white women by blacks. In lieu of this moral panic the Investigating Commission in its report of June 1913 advocated strict censorship of all films exhibited to mixed audiences.

The censorship movement localised in Cape Town as this was the port of entry and first screening of most films imported to South Africa. Growing concern by individuals, teachers' associations and municipalities throughout the country was mobilised by the Social Reform Association to advantage. The public reaction to the "nauseating" From the Manger to the Cross which was banned in the Cape Province provided the final impetus for the establishment of a legally recognised censorship committee, also called the Bioscope Advisory Committee, in the Cape. Exhibitors, however, were not obliged to abide
by the decisions of this body. The industry's compliance, however, was indicated by African Films Trust's donation of an annual grant of ten guineas.

In April 1916, unexpected support for censorship came from *De Volkstem* which published news about a Pathe Film on the siege of Mafeking, based on Richard Dehon's novel, *The Dop Doctor*. The film "wrongly represents the Boers as cheats, immoral and of low character", claimed the Prime Minister, General Louis Botha. The Congress of the Women's Nationalist Party and Afrikaner patriots petitioned the Prime Minister to prohibit its screening in South Africa. The British government was also cabled and requested not to allow the film's release in that country. The request by General Botha was apparently acceded to.

*The Dop Doctor* affair gave rise to a piece of "panic" legislation named the Public Performance Control Ordinance (No. 9 of 1916) effective in the Cape Province. This ordinance was the originator of a gobbet of common sense which continues to form an intrinsic part of censorship discourse. It provided for the prohibition of performances and exhibitions calculated to bring any section of the public into ridicule or contempt.

In an article in *Stage and Cinema* (7.7.1917) on a draft ordinance published by the Cape Provincial Council, the Schlesinger Organization for the first time voiced serious doubts about the fragmented method of censorship administration in South Africa. The chief complaint concerned the cost to the company of a proposed levy to be charged for censorship. The amount of .17 of a penny, if added to the .6 of a penny import duty per foot was, it averred, the thin end of the wedge. If the other three provinces followed suit, this would raise the tax to 2.57d per foot, twice the cost of the film itself. African Films Trust pointed out that though the Cape Town Advisory Board was a voluntary organization, the Trust had invariably carried out its recommendations. The Trust did not object to a centralised South African censorship board or the cooperation of provincial boards on which "the trade" was represented. The prime
concern of AFT was that their programme remain unaltered during its exhibition life.

The Cape nevertheless went ahead with the Bill which was gazetted as the Cinematograph Film Ordinance (No. 21 of 1917) promulgated on 22 August 1917. It repealed the Ordinances of 1913 and 1916 and was designed to "regulate and control places of recreation and amusement and to provide for the granting or refusal of such approval". Of particular importance were the clauses restricting (a) scenes containing references to controversial or international Politics; (b) scenes representing antagonistic relations of Capital and Labour; (c) scenes calculated to bring any section of the public into ridicule or contempt; and (d) Pugilistic encounters between Europeans and non-Europeans. It should be pointed out that most of the films imported into South Africa had already been censored by the British Board of Film Censors. Films shown in the Cape were thus subject to a dual process of approval.

This Ordinance was not applicable in the other provinces and banning in the Cape often provided an inducement to the public in the other provinces to attend a film's screening. Fourteen years were to pass before national legislation was enacted. A censorship Bill which had the approval of both African Theatres and Kinemas was introduced to Parliament on 5 March 1930. The Bill was passed the following year on 3 June 1931 and was known as the Entertainments (Censorship) Act. In addition to the clauses contained in the Cinematograph Film Ordinance of the Cape of 1917, this Act restricted the offensive portrayal of the "intermingling of Europeans and non-Europeans". In 1934, a loophole in the 1931 Act was closed preventing film societies, particularly those with native members from screening Russian films labelled as "communist propaganda". Film societies had previously been exempt from the Act.

The next major legislative incursion occurred in 1963 with the Publications and Entertainments Act. Up to this point only imported material had been censorable. This Act extended the
censor's jurisdiction to locally made films and introduced differential censorship based on race. With the industry's concurrence, mainly 20th Century Fox, appeals were no longer heard in the courts but could now only be made to the Minister of the Interior. Reasons for PCB decisions were not made public and in effect, this Act conferred upon its administrators the power to work arbitrarily and in total secrecy. During the early 1970s the government through Connie Mulder, described by Jones as "a self-acclaimed Chosen of God"\textsuperscript{15}, attempted to toughen up the censorship process. An Interdepartmental Committee of Enquiry was set up by Mulder in 1972 following a sustained series of reversals by the Supreme Court of bans ordered by the PCB on printed material, making it "an object of public ridicule, a situation which was untenable to the political party which created it"\textsuperscript{16}. Representations made by Satbel elicited the governmental response that "The Film Bosses are Happy". The Satbel deputation, concluded Jones "were taken for suckers"\textsuperscript{17}, since they had been outmaneuvered by the state.

Mulder tabled an Amendment to the 1963 Act in 1973. Having dismissed critical members of the film industry as non-members of the electorate he leaned towards the views of "a couple of draftsmen of the Gereformeerde Kerk (DRC)"\textsuperscript{18}. With uncanny predictability, Jones warned Mulder that support from the "Broederbond and Kerk" would avail the Minister nothing. Comparing Mulder to Hertzog who,

> While a member of the Cabinet was always vociferous in blasting the film business, on occasions he stumped the country bawling out the moral crime of making a living out of running cinemas ... But as the impossible Albert went his way, covering himself with ridicule which began to reflect on the calibre of the Party, he was axed to enter the wilderness\textsuperscript{19}

It will be recalled from Chapter 6 that by this time Mulder's Information Department was engaged in secret propaganda projects which were later to lead to his, the President and the Chief of the Bureau for State Security's downfall. The censorship Bill must be seen against his desire to totally control the distribution and exhibition aspects of the film industry, both as far as white and black audiences were concerned.
Despite opposition from all sections of the press, including the Afrikaans press and the Akademie vir Taal, Lettere en Kuns,\textsuperscript{20} the Bill was passed the following year in 1974.

The implications for capital of the Rhoodie-Mulder Roadshow are difficult to assess. It does seem that Jones' disparaging remarks about a "clutch of politicians" did have some validity. One might invoke Richard Johnson's claim that allied to a material conception of ideology is a 'mental' aspect equivalent to Marx's general term 'consciousness.'\textsuperscript{21} It would seem that Mulder's actions (supported by his later exposure in the 'Muldergate' disclosures), were predicated not on the material conditions of the economic, but more on the concealment of those conditions through the design of a static apartheid political system which was able to ignore economic determinants. As with Albert Hertzog before him, and Dr AP Treurnicht after him, Mulder lost touch with material reality and the requirements of capital in general. In each case these individuals split from the National Party and formed right wing oppositions.

Having outlined the historical development of the state censorship machinery, we are now in a position to see how it worked and why, despite its, at times, bewildering and incomprehensible functioning, it works to the benefit of capital in general.

**PART II: CENSORSHIP AND IDEOLOGY IN THE CONTROL OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN FILM INDUSTRY**

The section which follows will recall the discussion in Chapter 1 on concepts of ideology. Over this is superimposed the ideas of Marta Harnecker\textsuperscript{22} who argues that objective reality consists of two kinds of ideological discourses:

1. The system of ideas and social representations (ideology in the strict sense); or 'willed' ideology, and
2. The system of attitudes and social behaviour (customs); or organic ideology.
The System of Ideas and Social Representations

Ideology in the strict sense, or what Gramsci calls 'willed' ideology, includes the political, juridical, moral, religious, aesthetic and philosophical ideas of a given society. The content of this knowledge is expressed in the form of different views of the world and of an individual's perception of his/her role in it. Ideologies are not dispassionate, scientific representations of the world, but interpretations filled with imaginary elements: rather than describe reality, they express desires, hopes and nostalgia. Ideological perceptions are not static, but tend to adapt not only according to economic determinations, but also in terms of advances in scientific knowledge. Perhaps the greatest change in world view followed the acceptance of Gallileo's reformulation of astronomic common sense where he argued that the world revolves around the sun and not, as previously thought, where the sun was believed to revolve around the earth. His discovery destroyed the conventional wisdom that the universe was man-centred and resulted in man relocating his ideological perspective of his role in the cosmos. A similar change in the system of ideas and social representations occurred after Charles Darwin, and it can only be left to the imagination to comprehend the sort of change in ideological perception which might result in the South African acceptance of the historical fact that blacks were resident in South Africa long before the arrival of van Riebeeck and his party in 1652. The present ideological orientation stems from the belief that blacks and whites only met at the Fish River during the 1770s. This conviction continues to be mythified in the conservative historical literature, as well as numerous documentary and propaganda movies which have been made since the turn of the century through to the present. Nearly all locally made films portraying the history and people of South Africa show a neat, grossly simplified migration of northwards moving whites and southward moving blacks through an 'empty' interior eventually meeting *en masse* at the Fish River in the Eastern Cape. Representations of this pattern can be seen in *The Denver African Expedition* made in 1912 and *Swervers van die Sandveld* (+1940). Certainly the
most blatant and dishonest distortion of history, statistics, processes and results is seen in the Department of Information's propaganda documentary, *Solution to the Dilemma of a Plural Society*. This film shows the usual black/white collision at the Fish River, then adds into this map the homeland territories and the British Protectorates of Bechuanaland, Swaziland and Basutoland. The visual track then animates these black areas spatially to show that blacks were apportioned fully one-half of the sub-continent, and whites the other half. This ideologically determined logic, which cannot be supported in even the most officially sanctioned history books, serves to deny the more accurate distribution of 13% of the land being given to blacks and 87% taken forcefully by whites. Even if one accepted the film's argument, this rationalisation effectively excludes mention of the quality of land assigned.

A more contentious example of ideological perception is the *verkrampte* (ultra conservative) Afrikaner's attitude toward the origin of the coloured people and their possible integration into 'white' society. This group is the result of miscegenation between early white, predominantly Dutch settlers in the Cape and elements of the indigenous non-white population. The more conservative fraction of Afrikanerdom still denies the role of their descendents in the birth of this ethnic group. Films reflecting the ambiguous class position of the coloured are invariably interfered with by the censors who ensure that the cinematic roles in which they are cast adequately portray their class determinations as assigned by the prevailing ideological discourse. Nevertheless, this ambiguity has, at times, permeated even the censors as evidenced in their reasons for demanding that Jans Rautenbach remove a scene from *Die Kandidaat* (1968) in which the question of whether coloureds were Afrikaners or not was discussed. The adjudicators felt that as coloureds might one day become Afrikaners, this sequence could give offence and should, therefore be excised. Anticipating censorship restrictions on *Katrina* (1969), the producer shot two endings. The first was true to the resolution offered by the play where the characters leave South Africa and get married in England, while the second communicated an ambiguous but unmistakeable official viewpoint where the
white Anglican priest rejects his coloured girlfriend because of their cultural and racial differences. Not surprisingly, the PCB demanded that the second option be cut into the film. Seven years later, Tommie Meyer's *Springbok* (1976) which traces the life of a coloured child, Attie, who passes for white and eventually earns Springbok rugby colours, appealed with success against the ban imposed on it by the Committee. This reversal rested on two misinterpretations by the assessing Committee. The first occurred where a white reporter seeks out the rugby player's brother, James, in a coloured township. James accuses the Afrikaans newsman: "You blokes usually come sniffing around at night". The Committee apparently attributed a sexual connotation to this accusation and ordered it to be cut out. The chairman of the Appeal Board, however, claimed that this could be a reference to anything, for example, smuggling, and therefore overturned the Committee's decision. The second excision concerned a fight in a bar between Attie and another reporter. Although little is shown of the fight itself, Attie takes his frustrations out on the bar furnishings. The Committee determined that this scene brought a section of the population into ridicule and was damaging to race relations for it constituted a confrontation between the coloured and white groups. The Appeal Board, in contrast, held that this was purely a personal altercation, since others in the bar simply looked on in an embarrassed manner. The error on the part of the Committee was further compounded in their wrongful interpretation of the phrase "White Label" which they read as "White lady" and, in the context of the scene, was therefore considered harmful to race relations.

The decisions taken with regard to these three movies, *Die Kandidaat*, *Katrina* and *Springbok*, should be seen against the background of coloured disenfranchisement during the early 1960s brought about by Prime Minister Verwoerd. This action was supported and encouraged by the Broederbond which regarded "This courageous step ... as one of the most important milestones in our struggle for white survival". Having gained total sovereignty for whites in Parliament, the media had to be persuaded to legitimate the lack of coloured representation.
through the construction of a discursive order manifested in a modified set of social relations where the coloured group's economic subordination is legislatively entrenched. The PCB constituted one of the mechanisms whereby ideological interpellations could be affirmed in terms of the hegemonic alliance. Thus, censorship operates in terms of all three of Therborn's criteria: shielding, restriction and the delimited appropriation of discourse. In other words, the PCB acted as a channel through which 'willed' ideology as a consciously articulated discourse intercepted the more fundamental organic experience from which it stemmed.

Having briefly outlined the discourse of 'willed' ideology, we are now in a position to probe into the organic ideology of racial capitalism to discover the discursive mechanisms which govern the practice of the film industry.

The System of Attitudes and Social Behaviour

The study of the effects of 'willed' ideology cannot be separated from an analysis of organic ideology or social behaviour which makes up all the habits, customs and tendencies to act and react in a certain way. Ideological perspectives in their strict sense may be redefined to cope with change in economic or social realities, but less easy to change are the habits, attitudes and customary ways of living by the individual subject. For example, although economic pragmatism in 1980 resulted in the elevation of South African Chinese to "honorary white status", many whites still conceptualise these people as being inferior. In this case, ideology in the strict or 'willed' sense was easily redefined to take advantage of an expected export-based financial gain, but it takes longer for this new content to become generally articulated and be accepted as part of the organic or 'lived' relationship between people. A more pertinent example may be drawn from the film industry itself. Prior to 1974, differential censorship was applied to black, white, coloured and Indian audiences. A movie considered suitable for white children might have been banned for black adults. About 30% of films passed for whites were banned for
black viewers. The 1974 Publications Act, however, waived this provision but covered itself should it want to ban films for blacks only in the future in the clause that it could ban films to "persons in any other category specified by the Committee". This resulted in the same movies being seen by both white and non-white audiences but at different venues. A few multi-racial cinemas did exist but their earning potential prior to 1 April 1975 when the '74 Act came into effect had been greatly curtailed through differential censorship which reduced possible options which could be seen by whites and blacks and even racial sub-divisions within the latter category (such as Asiatics and coloureds). Even in these cinemas and those open to all sections of the non-white community, seating segregation was the norm. This separation is gradually, though by no means completely being eroded. The first sign of integration initially appeared in the form of segregated drive-ins in which black and white audiences simultaneously viewed the same movie from opposite sides of a dividing wall. During 1980 the Department of Community Development granted permission for certain drive-ins to lift all race bars even to the extent of toilets, eating facilities, entrance and exits. Although applications have been made by various chains for multi-racial status for some of their major city cinemas, these have yet to be granted. It is significant that no resistance has been monitored from white drive-in audiences to the opening up of drive-ins to all races, though some opposition is being experienced in terms of suburban cinemas.

Influences brought to bear on the dominant ideology are in part propelled by economic considerations and the demands of capital. In the case of cinema, the desire of exhibitors to open their doors to all-comers is not an altruistic move, but rather an attempt to maximise their market potential. Open cinemas no longer restricted by discriminatory censorship will obviously earn greater profits than was the case under the Publications Act of 1963. Furthermore, the growth of white audiences was slowing down and were expected to diminish dramatically with the introduction of television in 1976. For these and other reasons which will be dealt with later, the new Publications Act of 1974 made provision for change and rationalisation,
apparently much to the surprise of the distribution and exhibition sections of the industry. The response of exhibitors to this modification in the Publications Act was delayed, for only in 1980 did they realise the implications for the marketing of cinema. Their subsequent decision to apply for open status for some of their cinemas was possible in view of the religious, moral and philosophical changes in the 'willed' ideology which had occurred since the resignation of BJ Vorster as Prime Minister in 1978. Modifications in ideological content which have taken place since then are both an acknowledgement of the changing class structure of black society as well as representing a strategy to co-opt the rapidly expanding black middle class into an alliance with the hegemonic bloc.

The objective of adapting apartheid ideology to take cognizance of structural changes occurring in South Africa's economic base is planned to bring about an entrenchment of this expanding emergent middle class. The strategy is to structure the class alliance in a way which will effectively contain the working-class, which will continue to provide the cheap labour upon which racial capitalism is based.

Ideological Structure and Economic Determination

We have seen that ideology has its own content, its own laws of operation and development. Any cultural product such as, for example, cinema, is the result to two kinds of ideological determinations, one internal to the ideological structure itself, and the other external (the juridico-political).

The internal determination might be likened to the process of self-censorship. It was highly unlikely, for example, that any exhibitor would have applied for multi-racial permits prior to 1974. The reasons are two-fold: first, the government would not have granted permission at that time since such a request would have contravened the ecological setting of the cinema in that it would have created the impression that it was being 'political'; and second, the publicity generated by such a move might have had an adverse effect on the corporate image
and hence income of the exhibitor for transcending the social organization of discourse implied in the term 'entertainment'.

It is the external determination, however, which is decisive in the final instance for it represents the web of political constraints and juridical methods of enforcement sanctioned by the state in law.

1. **External Determinations: the Juridico-Political Functions of Censorship**

In addition to economic and ideological structures, every society possesses a combination of institutional apparatuses and norms designed to regulate the operation of society as a whole. Such devices are called the *juridico-political* agents of enforcement. This determination is external in nature and performs a double function: firstly, that of technical administration; and secondly, political domination. The *administrative* function is subordinate to, and is at the service of, the function of *political* domination. Against this definition of the state there cannot exist administrative tasks that are neutral or non-political. The major function of state apparatuses, censorship included, is to maintain a position of ideological and political dominance over all the other classes which are made dependent on it. The most effective instrument to the hegemonic bloc in the maintenance of its dominant position is *racism*, which for many years formed the basis of differential censorship. Some examples from *Hansard* will demonstrate the validity of this observation in unambiguous terms:

In 1963, the Minister of the Interior stated:

> the Hon Member for Houghton [Helen Suzman] is simply re-affirming her political faith that no distinction should be drawn on the grounds of race and colour. She has of course been harping on the same string for many years, and the tune is one which does not appeal much to right thinking people ... [we] know what sort of film it would be to show to a race that has not yet reached the level of civilization that we have reached. We know that things which they cannot understand
should not be shown to them and that there are some films which can be exhibited much more safely to a white child of fourteen years of age than to an adult Bantu. There must be good reasons why the film industry does not want this right of appeal to the courts ... the film industry and the Board of Censors have met each other on a certain basis throughout the years and certain standards have been built up.

The Minister of Police and Justice, Mr JT Kruger, complained of the insidious influence Sidney Poitier's *In the Heat of the Night* (1968) would undoubtedly have on the morale of the white South African Police Force:

*In the Heat of the Night* was a film telling the story of a stupid white policeman who worked with a particularly clever non-white detective. These two always worked together to the detriment of the whites and to the advantage of the non-whites. If this is not something injurious to race relations in this country, I do not know what is.

And again, Mr Kruger on *Africa Addio* (1970), a film banned throughout Africa and condemned as a fake by most Western countries: "*Africa Addio* confirmed to us what we already know about Africa ... we know what would happen in Africa if the Black people were to take over this country." These statements and many others like them clearly demarcate the procedures which are internal to apartheid discourse and which are designed to protect it from alternative interpretations. By means of this shielding process in terms of both black and white audiences, albeit from different discursive perspectives, the state has the effect of displacing causation onto the 'cultural' and 'racial' from the economic. The origins of the colour bar, as previously mentioned, were only partly a response to some deep seated ideological beliefs and prejudices, but mainly a response to the threat against the privileges inherent in a specific class structure. In film and other aspects of life, the displacement from the economic to the racial/cultural is manifested in a situation where the practices and functions of each group are determined by the capitalist relations of production and made to appear natural through the shielding of discourse.
The maintenance of racial capitalism depends on the existence of a cheap labour pool and the dominant ideology which reconciles those in control of the means of production to their God given role and 'higher' form of civilization. In other words, the perpetuation of apartheid depends on the degree of control that the hegemonic bloc is able to exert on the social formation as a whole -- that is, on both the dominated and the dominant. Film and cinema form only one component in the media mix (schools, radio, television, press, magazines, churches, etc) which contribute to the spread of the dominant ideology.

In terms of this hypothesis, censorship should not be seen as a monolithic straitjacket which is imposed on the society from the outside, but rather as a manifestation of the values and ideology of the most powerful elements of the society it serves. Censorship is a formal state apparatus engaged in the function of social and ideological control.

The Structure of Censorship: A Cybernetic Analysis

Social manipulation is effected through the control of information transmitted, through the content of a movie, for example (Fig.1) Control may be cybernetically defined as political intervention which restricts deviation from socio-economic goals or objectives to within socio-ideologically defined limits. The control process is based on a feedback loop through which the output of a system or its actual performance (for example, reflections of social experience on film) is linked to its input (laws and legislation) in such a way that variations in output (or content) from some pre-set norm or goal (the portrayal of the Afrikaner as a God-fearing person, for instance) results in compensatory behaviour that tends to restore the system output (or cinematic reflection of social behaviour) to that goal. This self-adaptation is known as homeostasis and is brought about by the action of sensory mechanisms (cultural watchdogs, pressure groups, the church) which have a capacity to anticipate and monitor disturbances (such as the introduction of new philosophical material, counter ideologies etc)
which may arise from the system's environment. Information is then fed to the decision-making device which in the present instance is the Directorate of Publications. This body may decide to specify further action (such as additional cuts or banning) which will effectively deal with the disturbances monitored by the sensory mechanism. The outcome is that errant ideological output is returned to within discursively acceptable limits. The whole process is guided and entrenched by the juridico-political system which is able to draw on state machinery (laws, methods of enforcement, sanctions) to ensure the continuance of the prevailing ideological philosophy. If the variety or regulatory capacity of the decision-making device (or Directorate of Publications) is not equal to that of the disturbances, it will cease to function effectively. It will have to modify its structure if it is to successfully contain and meet a variety of new disturbances which may otherwise cause the demise of the existing ideology or the status quo. This occurred, for example, in 1974 when the 1963 Publications and Entertainment Act was replaced with legislation designed to better cope with the disturbances which could not be adequately matched by the increasingly unpredictable, preposterous and arbitrary manner employed by the PCB at the time. Public incredulity, already fuelled by PCB chairman Jannie Kruger's incredible remarks about Afrikaans girls not getting pregnant out of wedlock as is implied in both Debbie and Freddie's in Love, was further goaded by his remarks to film director, Mario Schiess, also reported in Parliament: "How dare you title a film Onwettige Huwelik (Unlawful Wedding) here in South Africa? Here in South Africa there is no such thing as an unlawful wedding". These were three of many similarly and even more ridiculous examples which highlighted Jannie Kruger's reign."

The 1974 Act, having initially gained for itself a new credibility fell prey to the same process and, under the chairmanship of Judge Slyman, became progressively less able to match the variety of disturbances impinging on it from the real world, though never matching the inertia of his predecessor. It is significant that Slyman's successor, Dr Kobus van Rooyen who took office in 1980, will not allow himself to be
drawn into public debate for this policy will reduce the probability of disturbances upsetting the dominant discourse. As The Star points out, "these insights (public statement) into the working of a censor's mind were what helped speed the retirement of his predecessor"35. Van Rooyen thus had to protect the variety of the decision-making device (or DP) and reduce the probability for disturbances. This he did by altering the norms of censorship and refining the image of the Directorate. He evolved a dual strategy: first, by refusing to publically discuss censorship, let alone defend it, and second, by basing decisions not on Snyman's "average man in the street with a Standard Seven education", but on the "probable reader" or film-goer. This move does not affect the content of what is allowed to be seen or read so much as enhancing the sophistication of the variety or regulative capacity of the decision-making device. Enhancement of the variety enabled the Directorate to match the increasing disturbances which stemmed from PW Botha's 'liberalising' policies which required that whites be socialised into adopting practices better able to cope with the shifting class structure of which a stable, urban, skilled black middle class was a prime component. The identification of the "probable viewer" was a key element in the Directorate's new strategy for social control. On the one hand, the demands of the probable viewer are met for his/her conception of film as art is bourgeois and aesthetic in origin, having little to do with context, and on the other, increased political censorship paralleled by an easing in sexual censorship and the use of expletives, creates the impression of liberalisation while at the same time considerably tightening the socio-political constraints of censorship.

In cinema, control mechanisms work in two ways. At the first level, it may totally prevent the seeping through of new philosophical material considered unsuitable for South African audiences. Such competing discourses are eliminated either through outright banning or censorship cuts. Bertolucci's 1900 (1976) for example, was banned outright in 1978 because the Appeal Board found that the uprising of Italian peasants
was presented in a favourable light, contravening the dominant discourse in South Africa. The film was therefore determined by the Board to promote the aims of communism and banned in terms of the Internal Security Act No. 44 of 1950. The very fact that the Directorate could identify a parallel between Italian conditions of the last century and the present South African situation suggests that 1900 must be considered dangerous for the continued supremacy of the ruling classes in this country. Hence the disturbance is removed entirely, the dominant discourse shielded and the potential of cinema being used as a site of ideological struggle eliminated. While censorship has a stabilising function on a macro scale within the social formation, it does create a residue of resentment among film-goers who interpellate their practice in terms of 'art' which they see as "a noun of 'inner' process, specialised to its presumed agencies in 'intellectual life' and the arts". Such an interpellation, grounded as it is on common sensical nations of 'improving the mind', 'social refinement' and 'supporting the arts', has no space for a conception of cinema as a site of ideological struggle. A film like 1900, therefore, poses little danger to the state if seen by subjects who consider this kind of 'intellectual' cinema as art. The category of the "probable viewer" is designed to serve this audience and to eliminate whatever limited disturbance it may cause. This is effected through censorship exemptions for activities which predicate themselves upon elitist social practices identified as film festivals and film societies. The major supporters of these events are drawn from the bourgeois and petty bourgeois white classes whose potential for creating disturbance is matched by the act of viewing. A similar hypothesis may be offered as far as black viewers of these events are concerned.

A case in point is 1900 which the Directorate permitted the 1980 Cape Town International Film Festival to screen to an invited audience on three occasions. In this way, the Directorate is able to match and ameliorate a specific sub-culture of the variety existing in the social formation and dissipate the demand that the film be made available to the whole cinema-going public. In other words, the Directorate is trying to co-opt that specific audience which would otherwise be more critical of its censorship function.
On the other hand, a movie like *Terrorist* (1976) succeeded on appeal. In this case the Directorate ordered cuts and additions which had the calculated result of manipulating the theme and re-orienting it in terms of the dominant ideological discourse. An end title had to be cut in stating that the surviving terrorist was later taken into custody by the South African Defence Force. According to the Appeal Board: "The emphasis is thus changed from a successful to an unsuccessful terrorist attack".

Perhaps the classic example of ideological control concerned the discursive sanctions experienced by director Sven Persson on his film *Land Apart* (1974). During the production stage Persson was repeatedly harrassed by government departments and stalled by repressive state machinery. Security Police or Bureau for State Security (BOSS) agents kept the crew under surveillance and scared away some of the people Persson had lined up for interviews. Film rushes airfreighted from England to Jan Smuts Airport disappeared under mysterious circumstances. Another consignment turned up at John Vorster Square where Persson was obliged to screen the rushes to the police. Permission to film scenes in Soweto was refused despite the fact that Persson had made a propaganda documentary of Soweto for the Johannesburg City Council only eighteen months earlier. The Postmaster General refused to allow Persson to take shots of the Post Office Tower Restaurant in Johannesburg notwithstanding the fact that scenes had been filmed in that restaurant both before, and after Persson's request, by other film companies. Permission to attend the Vendaland elections was refused by the Department of Bantu Administration and Development.

On initial submission to the Directorate in March 1974 the film was passed by the Committee. The chairman of the Board, Jannie Kruger, however, demanded a special screening, whereupon he banned it. A personal appeal was made to Kruger who responded that he would make an exception and accept a re-submission with specified changes. The changes were made and the film re-submitted in August 1974. Kruger banned it again.
In October 1974, an appeal was made to Connie Mulder, Minister of the Interior, who upheld the banning. According to stated procedure, two years had to elapse before the film could again be submitted, or it could be re-submitted immediately under a different title with substantially altered content. Persson decided to follow the latter course and, resulting from representations by Dr Jan Marais, a National Party MP, and Mr DP de Villiers, chairman of Nasionale Pers, Dr Eschel Rhodie's assistant, Les de Villiers, was detailed to outline the Department's objection to the film. The film was retitled The South Africans and re-submitted in March 1976. On this third attempt the film was again passed by the Committee. The new chairman, a Mr Pretorius, however, demanded further cuts relating to Marais Steyn, who in the film criticises the government from the Opposition Bench, but who had, in the interim, crossed the floor and was now a National Party Cabinet Minister. Pretorius, fortunately for the producer, neglected to lodge his complaint timeously and the company was able to force a compromise with the Board. After two years of conflict with the Directorate the film eventually obtained censorship exemption.

The Department of Information under Eschel Rhodie remained opposed to the film throughout and it is significant that the 1974 appeal made to the Minister of the Interior could not hope to succeed because this position was filled by Connie Mulder who was also the Minister of Information. Rhodie, who described the film as "extremely distorted" expressed dissatisfaction that MGM was to distribute the film in South Africa. Representations were made via the Prime Minister's office to the MGM Head Office in California who were informed that distribution of The South Africans was counter to the best interests of South Africa and MGM itself. Apparently, Andre Pieterse, then vice-president of MGM International and frontman for the Information Department's secret project on black cinema, paved the way for such representations. The South Africans was finally released in 1976 through a few independent cinemas after the commencement of the riots it had predicted. Most of the prophecies of the original version had already occurred and many of the interviewees were either
in goal, banned, exiled or dead.

In such instances the state and the Directorate behave as a unified decision-making device which sets out to control the discursive content of cinema and specifies action which brings any erring discourse encoded in the text into line with the expectations of the dominant ideology. Ideology in the strict sense, as in the case of *The South Africans*, eventually penetrated its counter-ideological liberal discourse through the mechanism of capital. Despite the support that the director had from his producer during his three year conflict with the state, the level was not sustained. It is significant that when this author wanted to screen *The South Africans* on the Witwatersrand University campus in 1980 he was told by a spokesman for the production company, which had diversified into other activities, that permission would not be granted because "that film has been a terrible embarrassment to my company. We have a lot of Defence contracts, you know".

The second control device becomes operative where the Directorate has inadvertently allowed questionable discourse to remain. This creates a disturbance and the audience-as-subjects either make adjustments to accommodate the new influences, or information is fed back by cultural watchdogs such as *Aksie Morele Standaarde* (Action Moral Standards), *Die Vrouefederasie* (Afrikaans Women's Federation), Members of Parliament or individuals to the Minister of the Interior. On receipt of complaints he may call on the Appeal Board to review the Directorate's original decision. The system, for example, eventually adjusted to and accepted the new information introduced regarding the sexual mores of the *boeredogter* in films like *Debbie* (1965) and the genre it spawned. In *Debbie*, where the *boeredogter* falls pregnant out of wedlock, the director was constrained to merely showing Debbie and her boyfriend "holding hands" to which he added some rather obvious symbolism to make his point. The financial success of the film, however, led to the development of the conflict-love genre and later movies reflect a liberation of Afrikaner morality where even the suggestion of pre-marital sex is condoned under specific and
discursive circumstances (for example, *Die Winter 14 Julie* (1977), *Fifth Season/Vyfde Seisoen* (1978), *Elsie se Geheim* (1979) and *Greensbasis 13* (1979)) Wild Season (1967) and *Die Kandidaat* (1968) ran the gauntlet of cultural rejection and at times, PCB wrath, but were eventually accepted in a modified state by the dominant ideology. Numerous examples exist in respect of imported movies. *Seven Beauties* (1975), *Godspell* (1973) and *The Rocky Horror Picture Show* (1976) were all banned subsequent to release, while *Tommy* (1975) and *Mad Max* (1980) had post-release cuts imposed. *The Omen* (1976) continued with pre-release cuts despite a vast 'letters to the Editor' campaign by *Aksie Morele Standaarde*.

Two further internal mechanisms by which the Directorate is able to appeal to the Publications Appeal Board against a decision of its own Committee before a film goes on circuit need to be examined. The first mechanism may be illustrated with reference to Elmo de Witt's *n Beeld vir Jeannie* (1976) which deals with a conflict between "Afrikaner and Super-Afrikaner". The Committee ordered that certain references to the Broederbond and Rapportryer organization be deleted to avoid giving offence to certain sections of the community. Surprisingly, the Appeal Board argued that these two bodies did not represent population groups since they could not be "identified by race, nationality, phenotypes, habits, behaviour patterns and so on which is inherited from father to son and which are an inherent part of those people". The appeal was upheld and the cuts reinstated. Clearly, such references did not go counter the prevailing ideological discourse, but the reasons for the Board's failure to support the Committee's decision remain unclear.

A second internal mechanism concerns the Minister of the Interior's relationship with the Appeal Board. Since the Board is also able to hear appeals on his direction, he is theoretically in a position to influence the findings of the Board, since he may or may not react to public complaints. His function is to stabilise internal dissention within the Directorate and ensure that a decision or reconsideration of

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a decision coincides with the prevailing discourse or 'willed' ideology.

There are times, however, when neither mechanism is activated but where the film is, nevertheless, manipulated into ideological acceptability by the distributor according to how he thinks pre-censorship cuts might affect the adjudicators decision on age restrictions. Although Satbel now deny that they pre-censor their films, in 1973, Pierre Louw, a senior official of Ster Films, wrote:

Initially I attend a private screening of the film together with marketing officials of our company. My colleagues and I then assess the marketing potential of the film, and in accordance with their plans, I sum up the censorship problems. If they want to market it as a family-film then I have to present it to the censorship board in a form expected to render an A-certificate for general release. If there are scenes of unnecessary violence or a bedroom scene with a few offending sections, I then decide to remove them before submission to the Board (emphasis added).

If my colleagues decide that the film should be distributed for adult audiences, then I only remove those parts which could possibly result in the film being rejected outright².

This pre-empting of the Board's function is termed self-censorship and constitutes an informal control mechanism which exists outside the formal juridico-political machinery, but which is, nevertheless consequent upon it. This stabilising behaviour is the result of the feedback process where the system controls itself by re-inserting into itself the results of its past performance: if a certain type of shot has been rejected in the past, it is likely to be rejected again. This experience offers the distributor a discursive guide for action. If he removes the perceived offending shots before submission to the censors, he is reducing, if not eliminating, sources of disturbance by artificially limiting the variety of the real world. Thus the Directorate comes to operate increasingly within an incestuous discursive circle which is progressively diminishing in variety as it becomes unable to cope with the more serious disturbances which impinge upon it.
from the real world, as when, for example, a competing distributor makes no effort to pre-censor its films. Where the Directorate has passed a film, *Seven Beauties*, for example, a minimal disturbance will ensure its subsequent banning. In this way, the Directorate, once a moderator of affirmed ideological discourse, becomes isolated from the objective, ideologically determined real world and may begin to make irrelevant and even counter-productive decisions, as was the case of the PCB under Jannie Kruger before 1974 and to a lesser extent the Directorate during the late 1970s, and the Appeal Board under Judge Snyman.

*Censorship, Blacks and the Class System Post-1975*

The Directorate of Publications is sensitive primarily to those in control of political power, however small their proportion. We have already dealt with the issue of differential censorship under the 1963 Act which, amongst other paradoxical decisions, banned Zulu viewers from seeing the film *Zulu* (1966). In 1980, Snyman stated, "Of blacks I have no knowledge at all" and that it was for Parliament to decide if blacks should be appointed to the censorship committees. Hence, decisions are made in respect of the wishes of whites, irrespective of protests from the more populous but politically weak majority.

Films which might be considered offensive to the black population, such as those made by white producers for indigenous audiences, are rarely restricted. Indeed, an Italian production, *Africa Addio*, re-released after the 1976 riots, which deliberately shows up black people throughout Africa in a savage light, continued to be screened despite vigorous protests from the black community and liberal white elements. Significantly, the film was restricted to white audiences only, although four of the six advertising posters were banned. The passing of *Autobiography of Miss Jane Pitman*, a docudrama dealing with the life of an American civil rights activist, to white audiences only, suggests a move towards a more sympathetic acceptance of social integration as far as the dominant group is concerned. The Directorate's discriminatory decision,
however, also implies a fear that black audiences need to be shielded from civil rights discourse since they may interpret it as definite proof of change, and consequently demand a faster pace of reform than could be adequately managed by the dominant ideology without experiencing extreme stress and strain.

Prior to the 1974 Act, about one in three films passed by the PCB were banned for black viewership. Between 1 April 1975 and 31 December 1980, only three films were restricted to white audiences only: *Africa Addio*, *Autobiography of Miss Jane Pitman* and *The Klansmen*. When released for the first time in 1970, *Africa Addio* was banned for black audiences. This ban was not revised for its re-release in 1976 nor did the distributor or exhibitor appeal against this original restriction. *Autobiography of Miss Jane Pitman* was originally banned for black audiences only, although passed for white spectators. Re-submission in 1980 led to the reinstatement of the various cuts previously ordered, but the film remained banned for blacks. The film has yet to be released on the cinema circuit having been turned down by most exhibitors presumably through the fear of alienating their white audiences.

In general, films which the black middle class might find insulting, such as those specifically made for local black audiences, are not removed from the circuits. The reason is that they fulfill a basic discursive function in persuading people, particularly the working-class which constitutes the bulk of their viewers, to act out their designated roles as labour units assigned to them by the economy. Such films perpetuate the myth that the black person is an ignorant creature who needs to be saved from himself, while at the same time reinforcing the prejudices of the dominant classes in their perception of the domination as 'natural' in terms of their God-given superiority and moral duty to civilize indigenous black populations. Hence the fact that the censors allow films like *Africa Addio* to be seen by whites.

The re-release of *Africa Addio* in 1976 was a deliberate
marketing decision coinciding with the aftermath of the riots which broke out on June 16 1976. The distributor's intention was to derive income by providing a product which would reaffirm the white audience's belief in the innate savagery of black people and legitimate white dominance on the sub-continent. Indeed, this film does this for the white viewer as it concludes its trip through a ravaged Africa in South Africa where all is harmonious, opulent, ordered, stable and happy. The example of Africa Addio illustrates how cinematic violence provides a discursive site to condition subjects to resist actual or perceived civil disturbances and potential insurrection from suppressed sections of the population. Unlike other countries such as England and Sweden which impose strict censorship controls on the depiction of violence, the South African censors are far more lenient with regard to violence than they are in sexual references. According to the Appeal Board which overturned a decision by a committee to impose a 4-16 age restriction on Spoor (1975), children should gradually be made aware of the realities of life which in Spoor included battlefields littered with the wounded and the dead during the Anglo-Boer War. Reporting on this decision, Bill Sharp, then Satbel censorship advisor, writes:

With the violence on our borders, riots in other parts of the world and crimes being disseminated daily through the media - we would be doing the child an injustice by keeping these matters from him and lulling him into a sense of false security.45

The logic of the Board's reasoning, supported by an industry spokesman, underlies a realisation that racial capitalism is unable to cope with outside disturbances without recourse to violence and physical intimidation. The 'enemy', whether British imperialism, the swart gevaar (black danger) or 'terrorists' on our borders is thereby brutally, though legitimately coerced into submission, while the consent of white South African viewers must be engineered through the naturalization of such repressive measures. The increasing military threat to South Africa's borders had become much more oppressive at the time of Spoor's release. Portugal had divested itself
of both Mozambique and Angola and Rhodesia was disintegrating fast. South Africa was beginning to seriously anticipate the fact of being surrounded by hostile governments. Towards the end of 1975 South Africa invaded Angola and six months later, the Soweto riots broke out. South Africans needed to be reassured of the legitimacy and efficacy of the coercive steps being taken by the state to combat both the internal and external threats to the cohesion of nation and society. To achieve this affirmative aim, censorship became one of the prime mechanisms by which the state tried to smooth over the perception of ideological contradictions and hide the flaw in apartheid ideology.

The Flaw in Apartheid Ideology and the Need for Censorship

Despite the extensive arsenal of state apparatuses incorporated within the politico-juridical system for coercive control, apartheid ideology has not been entirely successful in subsuming differing discourses and counter-ideologies into the social formation as a single harmonious entity. Although it has been argued that the institution of censorship should be seen as a manifestation of the dominant ideology, this does not mean that total homogeneity exists amongst all whites who make up these classes. Even though they may participate in counter-ideological practices (such as oppositional film making), by virtue of their class determinations they remain supportive of the class structure. Within the black population too, one group represented by the homeland leaders are accommodated within the dominant ideology, while another important sector (mainly students and school children) have rejected it, sometimes violently.

The major structural flaw in apartheid is its fragility and its consequent inability to withstand critical disturbances either from within or without the system. In order to minimise the impact of such infringements, the state which can be regarded as the coercive arm of society, has had to increase its mechanisms of control through the increasingly stringent application of state ideological machinery as well as in terms
of brute force within the wider society. Against a background of apparent large scale liberalisation of this country's racially based restrictions, the much vaunted return to a free-enterprise economy, the lifting of bannings of locally written novels\textsuperscript{10}, a seeming marked easing of cinema censorship, the opening of theatre and some drive-ins to all races, and the appointment of a verligtes head to the SABC, it is the logical conclusion of my thesis that such moves are ideologically based, propelled by adjustment occurring in the national economy as it shifts from a labour intensive industry to a capital intensive and skills based productive process. As such, it is obvious that liberalisation on the fringes of apartheid must be paralleled by a stronger intensification on the part of the state to maintain the dominant position of white Nationalism. This trend has been wilfully overlooked, by even the opposition press which is itself part of the dominant group, by stating that apartheid was "dead" and that a new "dispensation" was around the corner\textsuperscript{11}. What the press did not seem to realise was that they had been co-opted by the government into extending the boundaries of the delimited appropriation of discourse through the preparation of subjects into the emerging class structure.

It is unfortunate that most criticism of censorship as it is applied in South Africa is offered simply at the level of sex and nudity\textsuperscript{12}. This over-emphasis tends to obscure the more vital function of the Directorate, that of the maintenance and reinforcement of the ideological stance of the hegemonic bloc. The recent DP judgements which place less emphasis on nudity, sex or the use of expletives, do not necessarily indicate a more 'enlightened' approach to censorship, but rather an adjusting cybernetic system of social control. This system is able to increasingly take cognizance of liberalised sexual mores and subsume such behaviour into its general workings without experiencing the debilitating disturbances which might have once been the case. This is clearly demonstrated by the expanding capacity of the system to accommodate the otherwise serious disturbances which might have been caused by the screening of hard-core pornography in Swaziland and Lesotho, and soft-core in the 'independent' homelands like Transkei and

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Bophuthatswana. Since the dominant ideology holds that these 'national states' are indeed independent, their screening of material banned in South Africa fulfills a double function. On the one hand they provide a vicarious outlet to South African subjects who are denied access to such fare back 'home', and on the other, it 'proves' to both South Africans and the world that these states are 'free'. Little negative reaction has been forthcoming from pressure groups in South Africa even though these films are advertised in major metropolitan newspapers. This complaisance is further indicated by the recent disbanding of Aksie Morele Standaarde, the more pressing problems facing Parliamentary debate and the fact that these films are shown in the appropriate ecological setting: that of a 'foreign' country -- and as the repetitively stated gobbet of common sense goes: 'South Africa does not interfere with the internal policies of other countries'.

The analysis now turns to the question of how the allied state apparatuses of censorship assist in creating a climate of self-censorship and how ideology comes to assume a greater importance on the direct control of images seen in South African films than the fact of censorship itself.

2. Internal Determinations: The Discursive Mechanisms of Self-Censorship

The fear of censorship works at all levels of the production and distribution process. Five basic types of constraint can be identified:

1. Financiers will not invest capital into a venture which they perceive might fall foul of the censors.

2. The structure of the subsidy scheme ensures that it is only the commercially successful films which qualify for aid. The major implications of such financial assistance are (a) that film makers practice self-censorship as a means of economic survival; and (b) that the hegemonic bloc gives itself permission to choose in accordance with its own tastes. As director Marie du Toit puts it,
"Here we are dependent on a handful of Afrikaans people who, if they don't like a film, we've had it and can't go on to our next production." This response typified by du Toit is, according to Robert Greig, a direct result of the Afrikaans film maker's unwillingness to separate him/herself from the "ideology-forming structures of society." The Afrikaans film maker has tended to automatically accept the fact that Afrikaans capital is the only logical source of finance. Added to this is the voluntary anticipation of censorship and the reluctance to break with previously successful genres. An industry based purely on the profit motive is hardly likely to go counter the wishes of the censors.

3. The consequence is that producers will tend to clear questionable aspects of their script with the relevant authorities such as the Police, Security Police, Defence Force, Administration Boards, educational authorities and so on. It has already been pointed out that such administrative bodies perform a political function. It is not therefore surprising that advice given will be in accordance with government policy. One recalls the words of Dr AH Jonker, Member of Parliament for Fort Beaufort and National Party authority on desirable and undesirable literature:

If an author has any doubts he takes his manuscript to the Board and says: Please help me here. And if the Board says to him: You are still a young author; delete this and your work will be better. He will say when he gets older and wiser that the Board had put him on the right road.

This statement made in 1963 still has relevance today. Clearance is generally obtained at the pre-production stage and is thought to provide the producer with insurance against possible embargoes or restrictions being placed on their films by the censors when finally submitted for release. Some producers have even submitted scripts as publications to the Directorate itself, as in the case of *Springbok* (1976). The script was declared "undesirable" by the Committee. A strong minority
report, however, encouraged the producer to appeal. The plea was successful and the production went ahead. On submission of the film, it was approved subject to a number of cuts. On appeal, all but three of the cuts were replaced.

Screenwriters too, have to brave the interlocking units of legislation -- the Suppression of Communism Act, the Protection of Information Act, the Internal Security Act etc -- all vaguely worded, and linking up with the Publication Control Act Section 47 (e) in their attempts not to bring the police or other government machinery into contempt, or jeopardise the security of the state, the general welfare, or the peace and good order. It has already been mentioned that the Directorate is able to interfere with themes, story-lines and resolutions, and it is not, therefore, surprising that even the dedicated feature film makers in this country find themselves pre-censoring their films and checking them out with administrative bodies which exist by virtue of the state. The existence of any film which contains even a hint of criticism must be interpreted as an aberration, even down to innocuous satires like Kootjie Emmer (1977) and Skelms (1980). The former film makes fun of the state security apparatus and methods of repression by allegorically delineating a small Karoo town and its petty power struggles as South Africa and its inhabitants. Skelms, on the other hand, is more direct in its satire and the people and offices it is criticising, but very vague as to setting and location. Although Skelms was released without interference, the Directorate did give the producer some cause for introspection.

Some industry spokesmen argue that local producers are simply passing the buck and that they are either incapable or afraid of making films which foray beyond the dominant discourse. However, when the costs of feature film making, the past record of the PCB and DP, and the timidity of distributors are considered, it is to be expected that producers take every possible precaution to minimise their risks of restriction or banning.

4. Those films which are able to escape the constraints of capital and which move into ideologically sensitive
territory or which are at variance with the dominant ideology still have to obtain distribution from companies which not only ally themselves with capital and the dominant discourse, but which are, in fact, themselves an intrinsic contributor to that discourse.

Reception from distributors to *The South Africans* (1976), for example, was hostile. The film was rejected by JJ Marais, chairman of Satbel even before he had seen it. Although the managing director of Ster liked the film and Dr A Wassenaar, managing director of the holding company, SANLAM, was receptive, Marais' reason for rejection was attributed to the poor performance of a previous 'political' film, *Die Sestig Jaar van John Vorster* (1976). Satbel argued that since *The South Africans* was also of a 'political' nature it had little chance of a reasonable box office income in the light of the failure of *John Vorster*. *The South Africans* was eventually screened at independent cinemas and hawked around university campuses in 16mm format despite the occasional presence of security policemen.

It will be recalled that the production company was so intimidated by the continuing action of the state that after it had earned its cost the film was removed from the circuit entirely.

The analysis now moves to a discussion of the effects of state action on audience response, and so to the fifth constraint operating on the producer not to go beyond accepted limits:

5. The cumulative effect of the actions of the censors operating in concert with other repressive state machinery is an audience and industry unwilling to support movies which are analytical and introspective of the South African situation.

Cinematic criticism is permissible in imported films, but not local offerings. This occurs because of the incestuous links between Afrikaans film makers, capital and the state. Since producers rarely know 'what the audience wants' they aim their treatments with a view to soliciting capital and obtaining the cooperation of the state. The result, argues Robert Greig, is
a static view of the audience which assumes a coincidence between audience wants and cultural/political reassurance. Any film maker who tries to explore local issues and stories is considered to be acting irresponsibly by an industry conditioned on clichés and slogans. 'Give the public what it wants' is the marketing cry of film executives. What the public wants, as has been previously argued, is to a large extent conditioned by the organic ideology common to the greater proportion of the cinema audience. Organic ideology is reflected in terms of taste, and correspondingly, the attendance of genre films. Once such films are known to be successful they are emulated and distributors back them with high powered marketing campaigns. Thus, organic ideology is fuelled by the limits of what is distributed and what is distributed depends on organic ideology. Changes in organic ideology, which almost invariably results from changing circumstances unrelated to cinematic content, are quickly seized upon by distributors as exploitable new themes which then become vogue in film. The organic ideology consequent upon the urban Trek, for example, led to the development of the conflict-love type genre in Afrikaans film discussed in the next chapter.

So indiscernable is the ideology of local film makers from their experience of life that few are even aware of the incestuous circle which governs audience wants. Unlike the conflict-love type genre which successfully intercepted 'audience wants', attempts to illuminate intellectual sub-themes within organic ideology as Rautenbach tried to do with Jannie totsien which illustrated the sub-culture best exemplified by the Sestigers are met with scepticism by both the mass audience and the industry. That Rautenbach's films did not spawn a genre tradition indicates the limited currency of Sestiger elements within the organic ideology of the wider society. Similarly, the white liberal attitudes towards race in Fugard and Devenish's Marigolds in August (1980) found decreasing identification within white audiences. The mystical relationship and emotional rapport which develops between a lonely Afrikaans man who is running away from is past and a Bushman in the Kalahari desert seen in Gordon Vorster's Sarah (1975) failed to strike a cord of ideological or cultural recognition as is evidenced by the total
inability of the film to attract audiences.

Although the intellectual treatments of Rautenbach, Devenish and Vorster offer an identifiably authentic reflection of the characters and themes they seek to portray, such cinematic discourse is alien to the average white audience for the characterisations, motivations and reflections offered do not match the racial and ethnic stereotypes or general interpretations shielded by the social organization of discourse. Yet when compared to the critical cinema of other countries, for example, Brazil and Argentina, Senegal and many other Third World countries, these films pale in their conservatism. Only the stereotypes are questioned, and although social roles in the critical cinema of South Africa are identifiable within the social formation of apartheid, the social structure itself is not necessarily overtly criticised. Such films can, nevertheless, be categorised as art, since they are statements by their directors on the victims of history, of apartheid, though not a critique on causes or origins. Although these movies are usually granted censorship clearance, the intimidatory nature of the social structure of the industry effectively eliminates most of the contenders during the pre-production stage, thus maintaining stability within the system.

Contradictions within the social formation

Monopoly capital operating through the politico-juridical system should not be seen as a homogenous monolithic entity. Many conflicts of interest are to be found within the film industry itself. These differences are relayed as contradictions between the film industry (or more specifically, fractions of capital within the industry) and the state, for example, the government's denial of permission to cinema to open their doors to all races. Other examples concern the apparent inability of the Department of Industries, Commerce and Tourism to restructure the subsidy system in a manner which will create the economic pre-conditions for take-off and allow the industry to attain a viable economic footing. Important from an ideological point of view are the difficulties experienced between film producers, distributors and exhibitors. The contradiction between cinema-as-industry
and cinema-as-propaganda is identified by Robert Greig:

through censorship and an atmosphere of intimidation, films made here are bound to conform to a Soviet notion of art - that it should serve the interests of the state. Yet the irony is ... that the entertainment industry which is dominated by Satbel's Ster-Kinekor and CIC-Warner, works against the very films that are acceptable to the South African establishment. Prime playing venues go to foreign films; as Andre Scholtz has pointed out, the local film maker must take what he can get from Ster-Kinekor, who control the better urban cinemas.

The same complaint is made more pungently by Alan Girney, who directed for Heyns Films. The irony here is that Heyns Films had strong connections with the Department of Information. If the true-blue film makers aren't getting what they want, what hope is there for the Ross Devenishes? 58

Two points are of relevance to Greig's observations. The first is that where local film makers produce a film perceived by the distributors to have the potential of earning a high income, it will be satisfactorily distributed and marketed irrespective of its content (for example, *Funny People* (1976) and *Blink Stefaans* (1981), not to mention numerous films which distributor's have fought for at Appeal Board level: *1900, Jesus Christ Superstar* and so on). Anticipated returns, of course, relate to the content of organic ideology, which is the second point. The question relates not so much to what is made, but what is distributed. Distribution is not solely affected by censorship but primarily by marketing decisions. If a film is not perceived to intercept the dominant organic ideology, then it is given a very limited circuit of distribution. Empirical proof is difficult to find, but there is strong evidence to suggest that *The Guest* might have fared better had it not been subordinate to contractual commitments which forced Satbel to move it from cinemas just when it was beginning to pick up59. Even films like *Blink Stefaans* which fall easily into conventional marketing patterns are subject to the distributor's pre-arranged contractual commitments. Marketing decisions and their concomitant contractual scheduling are themselves subordinate to international capital whose discourse is rarely in opposition to racial capitalism. Thus Greig's observations suggest perhaps that some
of the contradictory tendencies apparent within the local situation are localized anomalies which, since the mid-1970s at least, have become less important since the task of cultural production has been taken over by television. The Television Service of the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC-TV) being a state-controlled operation is not subject to the vicissitudes of the market and have often screened South African made material which would be considered a high risk on the cinema circuit. One notable television film based on a Stuart Cloete novel, The Honeybird (1981) is an allegorical criticism of the selfish and destructive virtues of capitalism and its dispossession of an area's age-old inhabitants. The film deals with the ruthless greed of a white prospector in the Kalahari and how he is outsmarted by a single Bushman who takes a terrible revenge on the death of his wife caused by the prospector's refusal to share a waterhole. It is a comment on the complex relations of subordination and dominance between the Bushmen who have always lived there and the encroachment of white 'civilization'. Visually, The Honeybird has many similarities with Sarah which failed to obtain cinema distribution. The fact that SABC-TV produced and broadcast The Honeybird does not mean that it is more willing to handle 'political' material than the industry, simply that the film works well on the iconic and indexical levels of signification, while the symbolic/allegorical are hidden at a deeper level not easily apprehendable by the average viewer.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

The study of censorship as evidenced by numerous academic and official studies is largely concerned with the problem of pornography. Almost no attention has been devoted to the relationship of censorship to class structure or its ideological implications. This chapter has attempted to study the phenomenon from a much wider perspective, one which encompasses not only the process of censorship per se, but its politico-economic motivation as well. Such an approach necessarily moves the analysis into a consideration of the very structure of the political economy and social formation for censorship is a
vital cog in the maintenance of economic and political stability. It disseminates 'willed' ideology through its actions while simultaneously harnessing organic ideology, both of which have the symbiotic effect of persuading people to uncritically accept the concepts of 'freedom', 'choice', 'responsibility', 'patriotism' and so on. These values are functional for the capitalist system (and racial capitalism), its links with international monopoly capital and the global function of capital. These relationships are succinctly captured by Greig in his assessment of the local instance:

What the excessive dependence on overseas majors - or vice versa - also means is soft-soaping on censorship. In essence, the overseas companies and the local distributors collaborate to work with censorship.

A 'soft' version of Midnight Express will be imported, on the defensible grounds that the 'hard' version would be banned outright. Expand this a little, and you get the situation where the censors themselves are protected from what is censorable: they get a false perspective because of what they don't see.

The industry theory is different: if we play ball with them, they'll play ball with us. In practice, this has meant surprising leniency in many cases. But the buddy-buddy system works in secrecy; cynics would rather know what is being agreed - what films are simply not being submitted; what films are being cut in advance; what films are being cut as a result of what informal conversations.

To some, a 'working relationship' with censors is a contradiction in terms, evidence of industry pusillanimity on matters of principle, and a practice that eventually stunts growth.

But to understand why this takes place, again it is necessary to see the nature of Satbel and its various [local and international links]... in a country with more strictly applied monopoly laws, Satbel might not exist. This ... suits the overseas majors. They run no risk of being zapped by the local authorities though they enjoy the benefits of a monopolistic situation.
NOTES AND REFERENCES


2. Ibid

3. SA Film Weekly, 2 April 1970, p. 1

4. SA Film Weekly, 23 September 1971, p. 4

5. Statement made at the Johannesburg Film Society's presentation of the Neil Smith award for the best film screened in Johannesburg during 1979. Parts of Snyman's speech were reported in SA Film and Entertainment Industry, Vol. 3, No. 4 (April) 1980


8. Ibid. p. 109

9. Ibid. p. 283

10. Cape Argus, 1 September 1911

11. The Star, 10 June 1913

12. Cape Times, 29 March 1913


14. Cape Times, 2 May 1913

15. SA Film Weekly, 19 October 1977, p. 2

16. SA Film Weekly, 25 January 1973, p. 1. Only the cinema industry was forced to appeal directly to the Minister. This arrangement was supposed to speed up the process of appeal and was acceded to by the industry on that basis. All other printed media still had the right of appeal to the courts, from Scope magazine which was always in trouble with pictures of scantily clad females to pantyhose wrappers depicting the lower torso of a model wearing one

17. SA Film Weekly, 26 April 1973, p. 3. The Interdepart-
mental Report totally ignored Satbel representations. Jones challenged Mulder on this and received a letter from Mulder's office which stated that "he is not prepared to enter into correspondence in the columns of your magazine which is designed mainly to promote the interests of the film industry [and that] as a member of the Government [he is] answerable to the electorate". Jones responded as follows:

"Connie now stands the victim of his own contradictions - this Prime Minister designate - by saying at this stage that he will not reply to S.A. Film Weekly because: 'your magazine is designed mainly to promote the interests of the industry', of course it is, and he continues: "he is as a member of the Government, answerable to the electorate of whose views he must take cognisance".

We now have a picture of the Minister doing a political slither to avoid questions aimed at his statements and conduct. He cannot, no matter how he slithers, get away with this.

Let us remind the Minister that when seeking to erect a democrat facade over his future intentions, he sought film industry views through the SATBEL deputation. His latest communication deliberately chooses to imply that he is answerable only to 'the electorate' and for his present ends members of the film industry are not members of the 'electorate'. He has switched"

18. SA Film Weekly, 28 June 1973, p. 2


20. SA Film Weekly, 10 May, 1973, p. 4


22. Harnecker, M. 1971: The Elementary Concepts of Historical Materialism. (Translated by Sadler, E. and Suchtung, W.), University of Sydney

23. This interpretation is consistently emphasised by school history books in particular

24. Springbok, according to Meyer, was based on the 'Try For White' idea. It was to be located on a university campus. Representations to Pretoria University were hostile met and the University threatened action against Meyer if he located his plot on their campus. Crucial to the plot was a rugby match being played between the University and Stellenbosch University. The company infiltrated cameramen in the crowds and used a helicopter for aerial scenes, though the Defence Force ordered the helicopter to be grounded soon after take-off. Meyer won the court
actions against him. Prior to release the film was shown to the University when they indicated that they did not want the film to give the impression that there were 'Try For White' coloureds at their University because this might affect donations or gifts given the University by individuals and organizations. The source of this information must remain confidential. For further information on the conflict between Meyer and the University see *Universiteit van Pretoria v. Tommie Meyer Films (Edms.) Bpk* 1977 (4) SA 376 heard in the Transvaal Provincial Division; and *Universiteit van Pretoria v Tommie Meyer Films (Edms) Bpk* 1978 SA 441 heard in the Appèlafdeling


27. Applications by Ster-Kinekor included the Golden Acre Complex in Cape Town and Cinerama in Johannesburg. CIC Theatres applied for multi-racial permits for all 22 of their cinemas as early as 1976. Speaking to the *Rand Daily Mail*, the CIC managing director claimed that open status was not being applied for for financial reasons but rather because CIC represented a number of overseas film companies and received much entertainment made by and featuring multi-racial groups. The contradiction which seems to elude CIC is that pressure he is talking about originates from international capital which wishes to maintain the South African market in the face of lobbying from powerful civil rights sources in America. The application of open status is, in this context, a financial based one.

28. By September 1980 a total of 23 multi-racial applications had been made to the Department of Community Development. Of these, 12 were refused, six under consideration and five granted. The only friction reported concerned an "undesirable white element" at the Baragwanath Drive-in in mid-1980. See *The Star*, 17 September 1980. The only reported public opposition to the opening of suburban cinemas during the study period was from a National Party MPC for Bedfordview who objected to the decision of the Town Council to sanction the opening of two Metro cinemas owned by CIC at the Bedford Gardens Shopping Complex to all race groups.

29. See, Sharp, B. 1979: "Reality vs Ideology", *Scenaria*, No. 11, p. 11

30. *SA Film Weekly*, 27 May 1971 argues that the need for secrecy in the administration of the South African censorship machinery is due to the fact that "Ideological arguments can find no small support in our Courts" (p.1) and that "Rule by threats and intimidation instead of by
law follows" (p. 5). As Harnecher points out, however, ideology works much more subtly than Jones realises.

31. *Hansard*, 14 February 1963, Col. 1341. The Minister was reacting to a speech by Helen Suzman of the Progressive Party Opposition, op. cit. Col. 1339 where she offers the following observations on the reasons for differential censorship:

"The American in Paris is banned for Bantu only. Why? I don't know, unless it is a scene in a nightclub where a black man perhaps performs before a white audience. *Love is a Many Splendoured Thing* is banned for Coloureds and Bantu, but not for 'white' children. Children may see this story of a girl who had Coloured blood and falls in love with an American soldier. It is all-right for children, but presumably because there is a slight touch of colour it is banned for Coloureds and Bantu. The *Roman Spring of Mrs Stone* is banned for Coloureds and Bantu and for children from 4-16. The *Tommy Steele Story* is banned for Coloureds ... *Carry on Cruising* is banned for Bantu only, because, I suppose it might give the Bantu some idea of taking over our Navy. *Gone With the Wind* is banned for Bantu only, I suppose because of the civil war in America. ... Then, interestingly enough, there is a film about African initiation rites which is advertised as 'It will shock you'. This is shown to white and Coloured males over 16 as well as to Bantu, and one wonders why whites should be allowed to see such a film at all. If it were the other way round, I wonder whether Bantu males would be allowed to see such a film'.

32. *Hansard*, 1968, Col. 4723

33. *Hansard*, 1970, Col. 3422

34. Further examples are offered by Geldenhuys, P 1977: *Pornografie, Sensuur en die Reg.* Lex Patria, Pretoria

35. *The Star*, 5 April 1980


37. Film Festivals generally obtain multi-racial permits without much difficulty, particularly if held under the auspices of a university. On occasion, the Johannesburg Film Festival simply turned a blind eye to black patrons

38. *Sunday Express*, 4 February 1979

39. Ibid

40. Immature love affairs between male teachers and school girls (or lecturers and students) are shown in *Môre Môre* (1973) and *Ensamme Vlug* (1979). Divorces and family breakdown are portrayed in *Dit Was Aand en dit Was Môre* (1977), *Iemand Soos Dy/Someone Like You* (1978), *Sonya*
(1978), Weerskant die Nag (1979) and Eensame Vlug (1979). Films like Die Spaanse Vlieg (1978), Mooimeisiefontein (1977) and Birds of Paradise (1982) offer vicarious sexual gratification, while rape and assault are intrinsic to the plots of Fifth Season/Vyfde Seisoen, Weerskant die Nag and Billy Boy (1978). Weerskant die Nag highlights the hypocrisy of the attitude that rape is acceptable within the ecological setting of 'marriage'.

41. Industry sources suggest that CIC-Warner and the Directorate had negotiated the release of this film on the condition that press critics be asked not to play up the sexual aspects of the film in their reviews.

42. Louw, P. 1973: "How to get a Film Passed", Videorama, Vol. 1, No. 2, 1970, p. 7. This journal, which claimed to be 'independent' was, in fact, put out by Satbel, and later largely funded by Irene Film Laboratories. Only information concerning the Satbel Group was published.

43. Quoted in The Star, 8 April 1980

44. One exception was Messenger of God. Protests were lodged by the Indian community. The film, however, would have been of little interest to the average white cinema-goer. As far as black audiences are concerned, they tend to show their disapproval of a film by leaving the cinema. Those who patronise South African made films are drawn mainly from the working-class, those facing proletarianization, rural dwellers or children and have little idea of the legal processes which they could mobilise to have a film banned.

45. One of the banned posters had been used for many years to advertise the film. The banned posters carried the slogans: "After the Black Takeover"; "Massacre in Kenya"; "Africans in mass murder and Africa Addio brings you what the newspapers did not dare print".

46. Sharp, op. cit. offers the example of Zulu (1966): "The words 'Whites only' or 'No Bantu' - and in one ridiculous case 'No Zulu's' for the film Zulu - were a continuous headache for film distributors and exhibitors."

47. SA Film and Entertainment Industry. Vol. 2, No. 1, 1979

48. It has been argued elsewhere that oppositional film making in South Africa straddles both the liberal-humanist and socialist positions. The films of the former (e.g., This We Can Do For Justice and Peace (1981), Awake From Mourning (1981) are unaware of the economic basis of apartheid or racial capitalism, while films falling into the latter category (e.g., Fosatu: Building Worker Unity, You Have Struck a Rock, Passing the Message etc), although conscious of the structural determinants of the apartheid political economy, are less aware of how cinematic style can obscure their intention in a way which may lead to their appropriation by capital. See
49. The two watershed cases concern Nadine Gordimer's *Burger's Daughter*, Johnathan Cape, published in 1979 and *Sestiger Etienne le Roux's Magersfontein 'O Magersfontein*, Human and Rosseau, Cape Town, 1976

50. For an in-depth discussion of this observation, and how the English press was shown up by a content analysis conducted by the Black Sash, a civil rights lobby group, see Tomaselli, K.G. and Tomaselli, R.E. 1981: "Ideology/Culture/Hegemony and Mass Media in South Africa: A literature survey", *Critical Arts*, Vol. 2, No. 2, pp. 11-13

51. See, eg., Sunday Express, 10 January 1982


55. *Hansard*, 1 September, 1966, Col. 2053

56. Greig, *op. cit.* p. 15

57. Other than Persson and Gibson Kente who was arrested while making his film, *How Long* (1974), feature film makers in South Africa get off comparatively lightly in comparison with their counterparts in other Third World countries. Torture, exile and confiscation of material made by feature film directors has not occurred in South Africa. For further details on the relationship between film makers and the state see *Index on Censorship*, Vol. 10, No. 4, 1981 which carries a special issue on the subject, as well as previous issues of this journal

58. Robert Greig in *The Star (Tonight)*, 2 June 1979. This article was one of a three part review of Tomaselli, K. G. 1979: *The South African Film Industry*. African Studies Institute, University of Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. The latter information is included because Greig used this review to impart information on the industry which would have found difficulty in finding a suitable context in a review or straight news reporting. This is a technique often used by reporters to publish information which would otherwise be lost in the gatekeeping process

59. Although *The Guest* suffered from a negative word-of-mouth in most parts of the country, the opposite was experienced in Port Elizabeth where postive word-of-mouth resulted in full houses towards the end of its week run. Despite this, the film was replaced the following week with another
contracted film

60. Robert Greig in The Star, 9 June 1979
CHAPTER 10
CAPITALIST PENETRATION - POPULAR RESPONSE
IMAGES IN AFRIKAANS CINEMA

Much of the work that has been done on South African film has emphasised text as opposed to context. While this approach has undoubted merit, it is sometimes prey to certain structural shortcomings. Emphasis on text at the expense of context -- which the preceding nine chapters have attempted to outline -- is limited, for such analysis is unable to account for the many inconsistencies, apparent lapses of continuity and seeming breakdown of internal logic evident in the dominant Afrikaans film genre, which is the subject of this chapter. Textual analysis, furthermore, does not concern itself with favourable audience responses to the apparent endless repetition of similar plots, characters, actions, locales, characterization and actors. By ignoring context, such criticism, while able to identify the differences of repeated elements between texts, makes no attempt to explain their social causation or thematic change.

Innovations in critical methods have been responsible for uncovering levels of meaning previously hidden by the personal response and aesthetically-based styles of analysis. As Victor Perkins points out, the latter methods of criticism, or what Willemen calls "impressionist dogma", are predicated upon considerations of social status of cinema as Art and the prestige of the journalist-critic. The recourse by reviewers to questions of taste locates them within a predominantly petty bourgeois class discourse. Their practice takes the form of an aesthetic criticism which most typically shifts attention from context to issues of 'taste', 'refinement', 'improving the mind' or a 'highbrow conception of 'culture' identified by Raymond Williams as "a noun of 'inner' process, specialised to its presumed agencies in 'intellectual life' and 'the arts'".

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For our purpose, a more fruitful analysis would employ the theory of semiotics which involves the study of cinema as a sign-system deriving its significance from the cultural experiences of a particular social formation. Signs reposing in the film text should not be seen purely in their own textual terms independent of an external reality. Their origin and form need to be accounted for. Not only can they be seen as cultural indicators communicating information about the wider society, but their forms are also shaped by productive forces working at specific historical conjunctures. In other words, the film text exhibits a complex mediated relationship with its context. Films are both a reflection and an expression of the classes within the society which produce them. Analysis of South African cinema as presented in this thesis thus far has assumed a context-based approach, one which is continued in this final chapter.

The present chapter will look at some of the myths externalised in Afrikaans feature films made between 1965 and 1980. These films can be classified within the general category of the insider-outsider plot, and more specifically within that, the conflict-love genre. No attempt has been made to offer a statistical — or what some scholars label as 'scientific' — analysis of these films, since statistical methods are only as good as their assumptions. In the context of cinema studies they are structurally inadequate in accounting for elements of connotation, symbolism and indeed, the entire range of secondary meanings encoded in cinema beyond the denotative. To say that 80% of Afrikaans films portray the boerendogter really tells the reader very little, for the statistical category can be measured only in terms of denotatively identifiable criteria. Such functionalist categories cannot take account of indexical and symbolic levels of meaning which lie beyond numerical tabulation reposing in, for example, allegory, symbolism, simile and metaphor. The concern of this chapter is with trends rather than entities, processes rather than form and deductively-based explanation rather than inductive description. Emphasis thus falls on deep structures rather than surface appearances, with
relationships between texts and contexts, and with the interacting signs which make up 'willed' and organic ideology governing the field of significations determining audience experiences and responses.

Encoded in the texts of Afrikaans-language films in particular, are signs which gain their cultural resonance when interpreted against the background of South African social and labour history, the penetration of international capital into Afrikaner society, of rural-urban population movements, of war and peace, of poverty and wealth, and religion. Contained within the plot structures, the characters and the social practices they represent, working unconsciously at deeper levels of signification, are to be found the suppressed traumas, hopes, fears and pre-occupations of Afrikaner culture.

Notwithstanding the fact that the South African feature film industry dates back to 1896 or that over 450 full feature films were made between 1910 and 1980, it is of significance that only from 1965 have the unacknowledged images of Afrikaner popular culture and social history made their presence felt in the sub-texts of local cinema. The encoding of this cultural and ideological information has been an unconscious process with few directors understanding why their films have had such a high appeal for the 'mass' audience other than that they have discovered a 'magical' formula.

Myths: Moulding Reality

The three main cinematic myths to which this chapter addresses itself are: the Eden myth, the urban trek and the dynamic social position of the outsider or uitlander. Although rooted in history, these myths are very often perpetuated and mobilised in an ideal form which may not correspond to actual processes, causes and origins.

The actual experience which forms the basis of these myths is the collective memory of the Afrikaans working-class domiciled in the cities. Denied channels of communication and basic
literacy, these myths were first recorded and subsequently perpetuated by members of the Afrikaans middle-classes. This petty bourgeois perspective, informed by Nationalist political imperatives, mediated a dislocation between the lived experiences and attitudes of the Afrikaans working-class and the imagined account given by these early Afrikaans writers. It is therefore clear that even in their original form, these myths were idealised fictions inspired by historical experiences. Even by the early 1940s when they were set out by Hans Rompel as being the proper content of Afrikaans films, they had become ossified and bore little resemblance to reality. It is over these romanticised myths that the Afrikaans film makers of the 1960s and '70s imposed on their plots the traumas experienced by the working class, those facing proletarianization, or, at the other end of the scale, embourgeoisement, as well as farmers who witnessed the break-up of their families as their sons and daughters were lured to the cities. In doing so, they relied on that genre of literature which acknowledged the difficulties of inevitable urbanization and which has much in common with popular literature all over the world. Many of the signs produced in Afrikaans cinema only gain their full significance when seen against the social history of Afrikaners in terms of the wider political economy.

Objectives

The identification of the 'magical Formula' rests on an analysis of the semiotics of Afrikaans cinema in relation to underlying processes which are material or economic in nature. This approach will explain how and why particular signs come about, what they stand for or signify in a specific cultural context, and how they are modified through changing economic conditions. To understand the structure of this audience-responsive formula, the analysis will separate out some of its individual components before synergetically fusing them back together in an attempt to explain the continuity or correlation between the recorded image and the social experiences of the Afrikaner since the turn of the century.
A second section of this chapter will concern itself with a brief analysis of cinema aimed at black audiences. It will discuss the links between racial capitalism, the social division of labour and the portrayal of roles played by blacks on film. More specifically, it will be argued that the ideological discourse encoded into the texts of such films are designed to ensure class domination.

Before moving on to an analysis of the insider-outsider narrative structure, it is first necessary to make some brief comments on the concept of film genres.

Genre Film: The Affirmation of Social Relations

It is not intended to debate the differing strands of genre theory which have developed since the late 1950s, but merely to remind the reader of the materialist position taken by this thesis. In so doing, it draws on the work of sociologically-based scholars such as Andrew Tudor and the radical propositions of Tom Ryall, Colin McArthur, Jean-Louis Leutrat, Paul Willemen and Stephen Neale.

The definition offered by Ryall is our starting point:

The master image for genre criticism is the triangle composed of artist/film/audience. Genres may be defined as patterns/forms/styles/structures which transcend individual films, and which supervise both their construction by the film maker, and their reading by an audience.

The genre thus is analogous with the "agreed code" of a sign-system linking the interpretations of both audience and film maker. The genre is not itself a sign-system, but an analytical category which accounts for the effects of processes of production, structuration, enunciation and the constant process of repetition and difference. Neale's contribution to the study of film genres was to move concern from the form/content opposition to a more dialectical view which contains a theoretical dynamism. He concentrated on process rather than

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form: that is to say, production rather than products, structuration rather than structure and derivation rather than formal categorization.

In line with Metz\textsuperscript{10}, Neale sees cinema as a set of social practices involving texts or signifying processes which are underscored by social and economic determinants: "genres are not to be seen as forms of textual codifications, but as systems of orientations, expectations and conventions that circulate between industry, text and subject"\textsuperscript{17}. As such, they "exist within the context of a set of economic relations and practices and are seen as the products of capitalist industry"\textsuperscript{18}. According to this view, genres as "processes of systematization"\textsuperscript{19}, interlock with, and feed audience expectation in a complex interacting relationship which links texts, industry and the economic imperatives which propel it. Genres thus affirm the content of the ideological discourse which spawned them. While the origin of genres cannot be mechanistically attributed solely to industrial economic practice as Ryall would have it\textsuperscript{20}, it can be argued that they are an expression of a particular mode of social organization which is itself consequent upon the relations of production. They reflect the imaginary relationships which cover for underlying processes, building a justification for the prevailing relations of production. As Ed Buscomb points out with regard to the Western, although there are connections between the genre and historical reality, they are not necessarily direct\textsuperscript{21}. Despite the polemical nature of Neale's analysis, he does not himself adequately deal with the question of origin. Although he does acknowledge the need for historical specificity, he talks vaguely about the "determinants and effects" of the structures and practices of the cinematic institution, and makes equally vague references to the social formation. He neglects to situate the analysis of genre within the political economy as a whole. Film genres interact, feed off and feed into the genres of other media: books, radio, television, photo-comics and theatre. Each of these media are couched within industrial practices and discursive ideological orientations which largely work to the benefit of the ruling hegemony. Genres exist
within the complex interactions of the entire social formation whose class structure is determined by the relations of production of the whole economy, not merely one sector of it, such as the film industry.

Genres are a means of cultural production and are one way in which the dominant ideas within a particular social formation are articulated and reaffirmed. It is the reaffirmation of ideas which makes them the 'ruling ideas'. This insight is by no means new. Marx and Engels, for example, noted that:

Each new class is ... compelled ... to represent its interests as the common interest of all the members of society, put in an ideal form; it will give its ideas the form of universality, and represent them as the only rational, universally valid ones.

In the Afrikaans cinema of the period under discussion, the ideas of the emergent urban petty bourgeoisie and bourgeoisie were represented as the interests of all the members of Afrikanerdom, for the criticism encoded by the film maker was usually sympathetic to these 'new classes', notwithstanding the trauma such relocation (both in a social and geographical sense) caused Afrikanerdom as a whole.

Genres may also be analysed in terms of the concept of probability. This involves the cybernetic notion of homeostasis where the content of a genre, whether Westerns, gangster films or love stories, is probable "in that it can be identified and comprehended simply by classification". This popular or 'mass' cinema is described by Andrew Tudor in terms of its consequences for society where film genres are conceived to fulfill a social need for catharsis, for acting out, for diversion and for the affirmation of widely-held values. Genre movies rarely disturb, lack innovation and are never openly deviant. This form of cinema fulfills a stable discursive function since cinema-in-general is a relatively fixed culture pattern which defines the moral and social world as well as its physical, political and historical environment. Illustrative of this point is Spyros Skouros'
use of cinema as a means to spread the 'democratic creed' to forestall communism. Because genre films dramatize, they repeat and provide a basis for an interpretive account of an accepted social order. Through such familiarity, they incline towards reassurance, shielding the viewer from alternative, possibly hostile discourses "such that the only valid enunciations apart from the authorised text itself are exegesis, commentary and reinterpretation." The Afrikaans insider-outsider narrative address, for example, tended to be repeated and reinterpreted by the same 'authors' during its fifteen year cycle between 1965 and 1980.

As "memorial metatexts," genre films embody and indemnify existing or even emergent social relations through affirmative symbolism derived from the dominant ideological discourse. As Neale points out, one of the main functions of genre is the containment and regulation of cinematic meaning, and

because viewers/readers operate with sets of expectations and levels of predictability ... it is possible to perceive instances of variation, repetition, rectification and modification. In this way, genre can be considered as a single continuous text.

In the case of Afrikaans film, the conflict-love genre, a specific instance of the more general category of insider-outsider key plot, is a belated legitimation of the restructuring of the class alliance which occurred during the early part of this century. The 'ruling ideas' encoded in these films -- what Marx refers to as the 'means of mental production' -- are consequent upon the ownership and control over the means of material production. In South Africa, Afrikaans films are predominantly financed, produced, distributed and exhibited by white, mainly Afrikaans-dominated capital, with the discursive incentive of the state subsidy paid out on the film's ability to reaffirm the hegemonic ideas. The mechanism through which this commitment is obtained is through the post hoc payment on box office performance. The systematic and coherent body of film texts which make up the conflict-love genre, "as a framework for production" and "as a form of
production" and "as a form of organization of the product"\textsuperscript{29} has a specific relationship to the economic conditions nurtured by the capitalist economy. While not the product of economic factors \textit{per se}, the structure of the genre is significantly shaped by them.

Afrikaans cinema, like all South African production, is produced under the multifaceted threat of censorship described in the previous chapter and is seen by the most ardent upholders of apartheid ideology, particularly those residing in the rural areas and small country towns. Such movies automatically express and affirm the dominant ideology, though in certain instances, may be critical of its organic elements.

In cinema 'made for blacks', genre films explain to their audiences the God-given position in life which is seen as moral, natural and inevitable. Unlike their Afrikaans counterparts, these films are rarely critical of anything. Genre films, whether aimed at black or white audiences, imply that the maintenance of racial capitalism is a pre-condition for cultural and social survival. This stance, however, is more often indicated through the structured absences of the text rather than what is present: it is taken for granted and therefore need not be mentioned. In the case of Afrikaans cinema, the perspectives offered by texts within the genre may be of either a positive or negative nature. The conflict-love story, for example, often alludes to the negative consequences of aspects of an organic ideology unresponsive to changes in the material base of Afrikaner society. On the other hand, it is also critical of the 'new classes' which have turned themselves into an intollerant wealthy urban elite.

The analysis now turns to a discussion of the content of the insider-outsider narrative, the conflict-love genre which reposes within it, its social and cultural origins and its ideological discourse.
DERIVATION OF THE 'MAGICAL' FORMULA

The narrative of the small-town or country girl who 'makes good' in the city is common to the literature of most Western societies. Often, the narrative works merely at an iconic-indexical level such as the typical Mills and Boon plot where the emphasis is almost entirely on the characters with little or no concern for context. The narratives read in serious Afrikaans literature and poetry on the other hand, overlay the concern with characters with the more embracing preoccupation of 'cultural identity'. Central to the turn of the century Afrikaans writing is a Babylonian image of Johannesburg whose first and most accessible monument is a hotel, with all the negative connotations it entails. In contrast, the most important building in rural towns is the church, a recurring symbol in the Eden phase of the conflict-love genre.

The socio-geographical content of early Afrikaans literature is predicated upon deeper structural conditions which formed the basis of the political economy. The spatial and economic relations which linked town and country are described by Basil Davidson:

the whole ... system occurred within two complementary 'zones'. The first of these were zones of mineral and cash-crop production for export; it was into these that ... European investments ... went. The second were all those other areas, for a long time much larger than the first, which produced little or nothing for export and received no investment, but were indispensable to the whole system ... because they could and did supply the zones of extractable profit, the 'export zones', with cheap labour and cheap food.

In South Africa, the mining towns attracted investment, particularly as excavation shifted from surface gold mining to deep level excavation. The massive inflow of international capital which was invested in Johannesburg after the Boer War had an indelible effect on the connections within the space economy and the structure of South Africa's political economy.
The significance of this investment is described by Isabel Hofmeyer:

Given the fact that town and country were the two major cogs that impelled the colonial economy, these two areas invariably became informing principles in the world views of different social groups living under a colonial dispensation. Town and country stood as two important beacons from which people, and the classes to which they belonged located their sense of history, identity and reality.\(^{36}\)

In an attempt to provide an adequate typology of the above themes as far as Afrikaans cinema is concerned, Robert Greig proposes the concept of the 'Eden film'.\(^{35}\)

**The Eden Film: The Never-Never Land of Pastoral Harmony**

The derivation of the Eden film is grounded by Greig's reading of George Steiner's observation of the recurrent myth running through Western art, that of the Fall from the Garden of Eden.\(^{36}\) In its original state, the myth represents people living peacefully with their fellow beings who are at one with the environment. The Eden myth offers an explanation of urban discontent and offers hope of a remedy in return.

Two versions of history co-exist in the Eden film. The first suggests that:

once upon a time, the Afrikaner was the independent master of his own pastoral destiny. He lived, as in common myths, in amity with nature and his surroundings. These included his Coloured servants. Neither Blacks nor the English disturbed the idyll.\(^{37}\)

Absent too is evidence of the internecine quarrels which characterise Afrikaner history. There is no reference to the need of the Great Trek or the various wars out of which the Afrikaner of today matured. Temporally, the Eden myth exists in the timelessness of 'once upon a time', is filtered of social origins, causation and cultural destination, while group identity is elevated to above that of the individual.
The characteristic plot which is found in the Eden component of the conflict-love genre is succinctly described by Greig:

Jan is the rugged-face son of a Western Cape wine farmer. Shots of the farm, with its white gables, agreeable family retainers. Dad looking like carved yellow-wood.

Mum isn't around. Her photo is on the wall, where it asserts a baleful influence, chastening the behaviour of the servants and the son. She died sometime in the past - it's never precisely explained how - and Pa never remarried, the vines and the cattle being good enough for him.

However, Granny is on the scene. She is the real mother-figure; ... She supervises the servants, sternly but fairly: they are children who 'like to know where they stand'.

Back to the son. He is engaged to marry the daughter of the neighbouring farmer. She is blue-eyed, blond, with a slim, feminine body, meaning flat-chested. When the pressures of the flesh get too much for him, he drives his tractor round frenziedly or bashes one of the servants. Sex is not an issue with her, nor emotion with him.

Thus, the plot of the Eden film in its purest form centres around a loving couple who, with the help and guidance of a matriarch, resolve the problem of suitable marriage partners. Alternatively, the mother is absent and the father mediates. In any event, as is most clearly seen in Dit was Aand en Dit Was Môre (1978), the son of the soil, the boere son, marries the daughter of the earth. They live happily ever after.

Over this first version is superimposed a second dimension of history which admits the Fall from the Garden of Eden. The idyll of the first version is shattered with the intrusion of the urban Afrikaner or outsider. S/he is threatening and antagonistic to the natural harmony of the pastoral relationships. It accepts the fact of the Great Trek, the dispossession by the English of the Afrikaner and the subsequent Anglicization, the migration from the farm to the town, urbanization and the acceptance of what, at first, seems an alien, but later, natural way of life. The general plot goes something
A Jo'burg girl black- or red-haired, in a sports car loses her way and arrives at the farm. She lures the son away. The blonde fiancée suffers in silence, but she's never angry, just sorry and alone at night, might let a single tear escape her eyelids as she gazes at the Papagaaiberg.

The son leaves home. He ends up in Hillbrow, which is Hell in the demonology of the SA film. But eventually he comes back. Granny ... who trekked with Retief and singlehandedly routed Chaka, Dingaan and anyone else you care to mention, including Milner, Rhodes, Kitchener, Smuts and De Villiers Graaf ... dies of shock.

What happens to the redhead? She dies, when her car goes out of control.

The polarities are farm/Hillbrow; blonde/redhead; town/living/country living; the old ways and the new ways.

Although the conflict-love genre cycle ran for fifteen years, it is difficult to plot the two distinct phases of the two genres over time. The outsider or villain is an intrinsic part of the genre's conventions and is necessary for the dramatic conflict and its resolution. The genesis of the genre in Debbie (1965), for example, symbolically encodes most of the signs pertaining to both versions of history. On the other hand, Dit Was Aand en Dit Was More, made thirteen years later, denies the Fall and acts out its drama in pastoral simplicity. Against this unpolluted form of refracted history which oscillates to a greater or lesser degree in Afrikaans film during the fifteen year cycle, is superimposed the progressively darkening opaqueness of the second version symbolised in the move to the city. This trajectory does not oscillate, it is purposive, determined and unidirectional.

While the concept of the Eden film is potentially productive, it carries with it a number of other difficulties which need to be resolved. The main problem as initially formulated is the difficulty of dating its cinematic origin, its evolution and devolution. The Eden film, implies Greig, is superceded
by the "War film", but linked by a certain trauma which permeates both. Application of the concept requires that the Eden film is accepted in its polluted cinematic form where the insider-outsider theme is dominant, reflecting an Eden-like nostalgia for things pure. This facilitates both an identification of the genre cycle and allows a certain semiotic dynamism whereby the signs signifying the myth fade in and out in a continuum nourished by organic ideology, cultural imagery and social discourse which is reinforced by other media like poetry, literature, radio, theatre and television. Indeed, the linkages are multiple: many of the recurring signs which contribute to the Eden myth first made their appearance in Afrikaans literature. The insider-outsider genre was soon adopted by radio in the form of soap operas; from there it became the content of films and photo-comics. More recently, this genre has become identifiable in television series. There are backward linkages too, particularly from film and television to radio and literature. The periodization of the genre in its film form, 1965-1980, is thus not an anomaly but the cinematic apex of the ongoing development of the genre cycle as it spans different media.

The purely religious/cultural content of the Eden myth, however, is unable to account for the material and economic processes which structure the genre. As will be shown, during the period which characterises the conflict-love story, which is the dominant narrative address within the insider-outsider category, there occurs a lessening emphasis on a simple rurally-based religious lifestyle. This happened partly because audiences increasingly failed to identify with Eden mythology or pastoral values as is evidenced in Dit Was Aand en Dit Was Môre. Over this pure state, and one supported by the cinema-going audience, is a simultaneous material superimposition and an increasing pre-occupation with the acquisition of consumer goods, conspicuous consumption and bourgeois lifestyles. As the genre developed, exhibiting instances of repetition and difference, the Eden content curve diminished, while the curve of material acquisitiveness and ostentation increased. The genre thus established the variety of the mainstream narrative.
(the conflict-love story) across a series of individual films, and organised and systematised the differences in each text, thereby filling the gap between the text and the system. In other words, as the narrative system developed, a more overtly materialist content was substituted for the pastoral values of the Eden content. As will be shown later, this aspiration for materialist values is indicative of the Afrikaner's love-hate relationship with capital.

The Insider- Outsider Conflict: The Traumatic Love Affair With Capital

Whereas the Eden myth desperately tries to reaffirm traditional mythical values, the dominant key plot externalised in the ten tensions between the insider, who derives his/her origins from Eden, and the outsider, who represents the Fall, is countered by the affirmation and inevitability of urban culture and of its material base. The symbols collected around the new classes include all the trappings of the nouveau riche: ostentatious mansions in large beautiful gardens, fast sports cars or Mercedes Benz's/BMW's, flamboyant clothes and expensive jewelry. The urban Afrikaner as outsider is characterised by the signs which the insider attributes to a foreign way of life. The outsider is distant, socially remote, selfish, self-centred, scheming and arrogant. S/he is met with suspicion and hostility by the insiders. As a visitor to the farm, the outsider is destructive to its harmony, its religious simplicity and mythical reality. Like urban capitalist culture which s/he represents, the outsider sexually attracts and ultimately coopts the insider, transforming him/her into a restless urban animal who foresees the farm, his/her family and the rural community.

The social practices associated with individualistic urban living initially bring with them a state of limbo, an uneasy cultural inbetweeness, if not a traumatic revised perspective of old, traditional and pastoral values. The genre is structured in such a way that it suggests social acknowledgement of the primacy of urban values. In accepting the cultural

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transfer from farm to city, the genre has furthermore adapted to the changing perceptions of the outsider in accordance with the shifting set of social relations occurring within the South African political economy.

The key plot made its first appearance in Debbie (1965), directed by Elmo de Witt, and produced by Tommie Meyer for Jamie Uys Films. The logical working-out of the various themes which made up the genre underwent numerous permutations during the subsequent fifteen years. The cycle was completed with April '80, released in 1980.

It is to an analysis of this narrative system that we now turn.

The Conflict-Love Story: Vehicle for the Key Plot

Genesis of the "uitlander"

During the early phase of the genre, the plot was characterised mainly by an urban-rural value clash manifested in the social roles of insiders versus outsiders. The love relationships usually involve a threesome, two vieing for the love of a third. One of these characters is the outsider. The characters and roles vary according to the plot, but recur constantly across the range of texts which constitute the genre. The variation in their roles and genders, the plot and locales provide the essential differences between texts, or what Neale calls "differences in repetition". The range of difference in repetition varies markedly within the genre. Some films exhibit few differences, even having the same actors, while others redefine the outer limits of the genre in new ways which exhibit a high variation of difference and extend the narrative terrain of the genre. This extension usually involves the insertion of a new locale, the city for the farm, for example, or a new site of cultural struggle, the Border for the City.
The year 1903 marked the crystallisation of a number of circumstances resulting in the urban-rural value clash. The Anglo-Boer War had created a large number of penniless Afrikaner refugees pushed off their land and farms and forced to seek work in the towns to ensure a livelihood. This exodus was exacerbated by the rinderpest epidemic of 1902 which destroyed most of the cattle herds left in tact by the British. This state of affairs was even the more unpalatable given the discriminatory behaviour of the British colonists seen, for example, in Dookry is Min. O'Meara, for example, states:

Within the imperialist colonial states a clear cultural oppression operated against Afrikaans speakers. Long before the war had ended the independence of the Republics, so generating a fierce cultural response, the language movement of the Cape had inspired a strong cultural nationalism. More importantly, in an essentially peripheral economy dominated by the ideology of imperial interest, for those Afrikaners unprepared to accept cultural assimilation and who possessed a modicum of training rendering them unsuitable for manual labour, employment opportunities were limited. English was the language of the Economy. 

The situation is described more bluntly by Wilkins and Strydom: "From the bitterness of military defeat, they were forced to the greater bitterness of economic subjugation by the same foe, British Imperialism". This Afrikaner hostility had been intensified through the change from surface gold mining to deep-level excavation. Whereas in the former case previous to the 1890s, a single prospector aided by only a few 'natives' was able to pan for gold, deep-level mining required large capital commitments and centralised mining rights in the hands of a few, usually British entrepreneurs. Consequently, the power of money became a threat to Afrikanerdom: "the forefathers of Afrikanerdom sat on the sidelines watching how excessive wealth was accumulating in the hands of individuals who were to them, foreigners or 'uitlanders'". Wassenaar also states that gold and the wealthy individuals associated with it were identified as the enemy which had "herded Afrikanerdom ever more closely into a condensed group with their back to the wall". This repatriation of wealth worked at the levels of both capital
and labour. On the latter, General Smuts, for example, before the Anglo-Boer War noted that the majority of Cornwall miners sent all their money 'home'.

The newly urbanised Afrikaner 'poor white' found himself in an invidious position. Initially he had neither the skills for non-manual labour nor the right colour skin for manual labour in the mines. The imported skilled miners whose main aim was to 'make their pile and clear', saw the Afrikaner as a threat to his position and sought to keep him out at all costs. In 1907, however, large numbers of unskilled Afrikaans workers were given the opportunity by mining capital to scab on these foreign skilled strikers, but were not paid at the same rate. This marked the Afrikaner's entry into mining on a large scale. Later, united with imported labour against mining capital they were successful in entrenching the colour bar which functioned to stop the erosion of white wage levels. Although cheap black labour had existed from the earliest days of Dutch settlement in the Cape, it was the increasingly mechanised labour process within the mining industry and consequent deskilling, which resulted in the colour bar. Henceforth, South Africa's history has centred on the legitimised division between black labour on the one hand, and white capital and the quasi-working class on the other.

The urban-rural value clash was compounded by the 1913 mining strikes and brought to a climax by the execution of a rebellious labour leader, Jopie Fourie. Agriculture remained in a depressed state, mining speculators were intensifying the land squeeze and high unemployment on the Rand caused a drop in the remittances Afrikaner migrant workers returned to the rural areas for the support of their families left behind. This in turn stimulated a further urban migration, a period when "politically and economically, the Afrikaner had been reduced to slave in the land of his birth". These conditions gave rise to the formation of a group calling itself "Jong Suid-Afrika" (Young South Africa) in 1918, soon to become known as the Afrikaner Broederbond. Dan O'Meara has pointed to the urban, petty bourgeois, northern-dominated orientation of the Bond
and has shown how economic opportunities were limited by both class and language. There was little chance of large scale alliances between the Afrikaner petty bourgeoisie and any element of imperialist capital. The urban Afrikaner in the Transvaal found himself politically and economically isolated.

Conditions were less traumatic in the Cape than in the North and the long established and prosperous commercial agriculture in the Western Cape and Boland provided a viable basis for a political and economic alliance between petty bourgeois elements and commercial agriculture. This gave rise to the possibilities of accumulation independent of mining capital. The Cape agricultural capital was to lead to the development of the Cape National Party, Die Nasionale Pers, SANLAM and SANTAM. These organizations were to be financed by the rural bourgeoisie, run by the urban petty bourgeoisie and grow through the mobilization of the full spectrum of rural support.

In the Transvaal prior to 1934, Afrikaner nationalism saw the problems of 'poor whitism' in rural terms, requiring a return to the land or 'the farm' as it was referred to colloquially. The petty bourgeoisie, being politically more isolated, was required to confront an economically more hostile world than the majority of Afrikaans speakers who had never experienced the prosperity of the Cape. At this stage, the political struggle of the northern petty bourgeoisie was built on an alliance with poorer farmers (as opposed to the strong fraction of capital in the Cape) as well as Afrikaans workers, a class fraction which grew out of the farming group.

The dissolution of the PACT government in 1934 evidenced, on the political level, the split between the broad base of rural Afrikaner nationalism, and the urban interests of the petty bourgeoisie. As O'Meara remarks:

It is precisely this ideologically isolated position, reflecting the total economic independence of the northern petty bourgeoisie, which gave the Broederbond its significance. From the outset it expressed its concern with urban issues. It saw the problems of poor whitism and the position of Afrikaners generally as an urban rather than rural phenomenon. Its solutions were never to be sought simply at the level
of politics, but in the ownership structure of the industrial economy, by challenging the nature of South African capitalism itself.\(^{33}\)

Clearly, the socio-political and economic bases of Rompel's ideal Afrikaans movie had been superceded by economic growth occurring within Afrikaans capital. The capture of the alien economy, while initially relying on agricultural capital, was later consolidated with urban capital generated by the now large financial houses, supported by an increasingly powerful Afrikaans press. These are the symbolic themes of the conflict-love genre. Given the conditions of its genesis, the growth of Afrikaner capital through companies like SANLAM, it is not surprising that film directors/scriptwriters take a sympathetic stance with regard to the outsider who represents the urban Afrikaner petty bourgeoisie. This interpretation was, furthermore, aided by the capture by Afrikaans capital of the film industry itself and was to contribute to a more responsive climate as far as Afrikaans film was concerned.

Given the poverty of urban living, skills basically agricultural in nature and their cultural anathema to urban living, it is not surprising that the northern Afrikaners preferred life on the veld\(^{34}\) where they were the masters of their own economic destiny. Numerous historians have dealt with the religious and cultural nature of the bond between the Afrikaner and his agrarian heritage\(^{35}\). It is this ideology which is seen in the Eden film where the unspoiled mythical image of the Afrikaner remains paramount as in Dit Was Aand en Dit Was Môre where s/he lives in that "never-never land before gold was discovered, uitlanders intruded and agitators invented the race problem"\(^{36}\). Other examples in this vein include Boland (1974) and Somer (1975). The Eden film, however, in which rural values -- "no sex, no violence, no cities" -- remain paramount, appeared to have a diminishing attraction for the Afrikaans film-goer. More acceptable is that strain of Eden film which admits the fact of the move to the city, even if it sometimes denies the permancy of urban living. This permutation shows a nostalgic longing for a return to the ancestral farm and articulates the
aim of the migrant Afrikaans worker to accumulate sufficient capital to enable him to return to 'the farm', that state of cultural purity, independence and economic sanctity.

Farming symbolizes the roots of the insider; the opposite of the outcast urban mentality. 'The farm', its soil (bodem) -- a timeless state of being -- is a physical memory of recent origin for Afrikaners, given the short time that they have been urbanised.Thematically, 'the farm' functions as a cultural memory and represents the 'traditions' on which the Afrikaner nation tries to maintain group cohesiveness:

Though within living memory, the relationship between the film farm, Eden, and the surroundings of the urban dweller is indirect. Eden has metaphorical tinges. Thus the function of Eden films for the city-goer is nostalgic. For some viewers, the Eden film will fulfill the functions that pastoral poetry fulfilled for a Restoration court: it provides a stylised set of values, etched with quaintness for the contemplation of the viewer. The function, then, is to provide values which are, as it were, preserved in amber. The viewer can choose whether or not to make the connection between them and his world.57

The traditional, unspoiled mythical structure of the rural Afrikaner remains intact in Dit Was Aan en Dit Was Môre. Though unsettled by the red-haired villainess from the city, a divorced boeredagter, and so on, these elements are functional to the conflict identified in the genre. In de Witt's comedy, Kom Tot Rus (Come to Rest), the over-urbanised father settles on his dream farm in the Bushveld. He and his family leave the urban rat-race and try to escape to a peaceful country life, the rustle of the wind in the mopani trees and the jackals howling at night. The sleek Mercedes is replaced by a farm truck. Even in the bushveld there are the symbols of the city: the seductive English widow, a small-time crook and an artist who rides a motorbike. Besides, the father really doesn't know how to farm. In Wild Geese (1977), the Afrikaans mercenary has joined the invading force simply to make enough money to buy a farm. This counter-migration, however, was an ambition which, in reality, was realised by only a few. The image of 'the farm' nonetheless
remains encoded in South African linguistic patterns and the content of other media. Despite the apparent audience disinterest for the purer forms of Eden film, it is this strain of the genre which most closely approaches the original blueprint for an 'authentic' Afrikaans cinema propounded by Rompel.

In opposition to the rural location of the insider is the external threat of the outsider or uitlander who is seen by the group as a shifty, smooth-talking, greedy and destructive character whose presence results in stresses and strains on the cohesion of the in-group.

The "uitlander": the shifting enemy of Afrikanerdom

The uitlander, like the other roles discussed in this study, is analysed in terms of the social role s/he plays, his or her social relations with other participating or absent characters, and his/her position within the class structure of the South African social formation.

At this stage we may draw on Stone's definition of the uitlander, which is often used in a pejorative sense, substituting for 'outsider':

The 'uitlander' is the migrant whose orientations are overwhelmingly economic; who has no wish to settle permanently; who has no affective ties with the host society; who has a desire to preserve his own culture and way of life with a minimum of conformity to that of the host community; and who does not scruple to leave the sinking ship if his treasure is likely to be drowned with it.

In Afrikaans film, the uitlander stands for a social role which is of a two-tiered order. The first tier concerns the outsider in the widest sense. He is identified with British imperialism, and more latterly, with English-speaking South Africa. When not seen in the film itself, the uitlander is often referred to in conversation on the dialogue track. The uitlander, however, rarely speaks English even though
identified with British imperialism. This may be partly due to the warping effect of the state subsidy system which demands language purity within cinema and which rewards purely Afrikaans films with a higher payment than English language versions. The scriptwriter or director may be unaware of the origins of the role and repeats it without thought. In any event, the outsider remains an ambiguous figure in the conflict-love story. As Greig notes, the Afrikaans director will not be so blatant as to cast an English-speaking actor in the role of the villain. While this was true at the time of the publication of Greig's article, in that same year, 1980, the uitlander in April '80 WAS English speaking. The uitlander is both character and symbol: as far as the film director is concerned, the uitlander is simply the third party in the love conflict; but at a deeper level of significance, one not necessarily realised by the film makers, the uitlander does indeed stand for British imperialism and capital's attraction for the 'new classes' of Afrikaner.

The second tier refers to the urbanised Afrikaner who has cut his/her ties with what Rompel calls the "solid inherited boere-karakter". S/he is portrayed as a traitor to the values and ideals of the Afrikaner nation and has become contaminated with volksvreemde and volksegevaarlike influences. Rompel's statement mentioned earlier that "at the root of the matter the urban Afrikaner is not radically different from his rural fellow citizens" should be seen as an acknowledgement of the possibility of these prodigal sons eventually returning to their soil. This attitude is a consequence, not of the fact, as Rompel argues, that the Afrikaner is essentially rural in character, but because the Afrikaner was historically thwarted in his attempts to wrest economic power away from the British entrepreneur.

The cultural origins of the "boeredogter"

The cultural indicator of the boeredogter is the chief concern of this chapter for she plays a pivotal role in determining the relationship between insiders and outsiders. Semiotically,
the boeredogter stands for the ideological connection between capital and culture. She is a dynamic subject who sets the pace for social adaption as she is constantly exposed to and interpellates new sets of social practices thrust upon her by adjustments occurring in the political economy. At the start of the genre she is a matmed heroine, a status she maintains for nearly three-quarters of the genre cycle; towards the end, she is reaccepted into the fold, but on her terms. In the following pages, the social role of the boeredogter is analysed on three levels of signification: as an icon she stands for the idea of a young girl; indexically, she represents severe cultural trauma; and as a symbol she stands for first alienated, but later repurified, Afrikaans capital.

Before proceeding with the semiotic analysis, we first need to assess her relationship to the boereesem for these two signs together signify both the unity/disunity of the group as well as the popular Afrikaans response to the penetration of English capital from the early days of the mining industry to at least as late as 1980.

The origin of the boeredogter is rooted in the Eden myth and her presence is manifested in 'the farm'. She is marked, from the beginning, as the proper companion of the boereesem, equally enshrined in the mythical values of the Eden-farm. In a film like Dit Was Aand en Dit Was Noêre the two signs interact mainly on an indexical level where the conflicts are personal rather than social. Myth, however, is a second order indexical sign and at this level, the roles mythify the cultural purity of the agricultural economy hankered after by Nationalist organic intellectuals like Dr DF Malan in the 1930s. The boeredogter, however, only gains her full significance when she spurns her pre-determined partner and attempts to break out of her culturally inherited way of life.

Typically, the boeredogter matures in time into her ideologically designated role as boerevrou (farmer's wife). Her link with the uitlander is sexual and violent and brings her into contact with the culturally alienating influences of imperial
and international capital. She foresees the cultural purity of the Garden of Eden, escapes its protective barrier and adopts a new way of life, one which acknowledges the Fall and which has previously been embraced by the urban Afrikaner petty bourgeoisie. Her shift from one ecological setting to another with its different social organization of discourse symbolises a disintegration of pastoral values, social adaption and individualism. The uitlander to whom she is drawn is seen as a force which threatens group cohesion and identity. Through her new interpellation she becomes an outcast; she is no longer an insider, she has fallen from grace. Her association with the uitlander even if a member of the 'new classes' creates a new challenge, for this alliance threatens the integrity of Afrikaans pastoral culture, posing a threat to the mythical nature of 'the farm'. Her separation from the boere-seun symbolises the breakdown of Afrikaner unity. In order to maintain and re-assert cultural cohesion, the group has to remain closed; the uitlander is rejected and the wandering boeredogter is excommunicated; she is not allowed to remain or return, for her presence will ultimately lead to the destruction of the authority structures and traditional values symbolised by 'the farm'. Although the boeredogter, at her most abstract level, is a recurring element in most Afrikaans film, she is most typically found in the conflict-love genre which is most appropriately able to encode the cultural responses of the threatened in-group. Inevitably, the boeredogter must be punished for her betrayal: she is the communion wine which cleanses the body of the group. The methods by which she is purged include unnatural death, often at the hand of, or because of, the jilted party; alternatively, she may be blind, pregnant out of wedlock, commit suicide, be raped, traded in for cash, rejected because of her colour, or even a leper. The insider-outsider plot is thus a cinematic replay of a recurring theme in Afrikaner history, that is the tension between the individual and the group. At the same time, this structure seeks to explain existing conflicts by suggesting that the conflict began with the move from the farm. And finally, the structure is allegorical, depicting, as a warning, the danger that outsiders pose to the group identity, and the
continuing value of rural based traditional values

Put in more abstract terms, the films of the insider-outsider category show the demands that are being made by an industrial-based economy locked into the global function of capital. These imperialist impulses cannot be rejected entirely, they can only be co-opted and partially translated into the social objectives of the interior bourgeoisies in the Afrikaans 'new class'. Neither can international capital be captured. The only course of action remaining was the one adopted by the Broederbond which acknowledged that in the battle to establish a volkskapitalisme, cultural changes and social adaption was basic to this objective for it required urbanization by Afrikaners on a massive scale. The boeredogter represented both the trauma of this change as well as the determining capitalist influences of it.

Historical reflections of the "boeredogter"

The genesis of the connotative elements of the boeredogter are rooted in the cohesive role played by the Afrikaner women during the Anglo-Boer War. During this period (1899-1902) it was the Afrikaner women who had to tend the soil, raise the children, run the household and supply food and shelter to commandoes in the area while their men were away fighting. A strongly matriarchal society thus emerged where the women became the dominant supportive element, both in terms of moral and logistical support. As wife of the Boer-soldier, mother and often sole parent of her children, as farmer and behind the lines supplier, she became mythified as a Volksmoeder (Mother of the People). A loyal Afrikaner subject, the Volksmoeder provides spiritual and moral guidance, is unwavering in her ideals but flexible in her actions, pure and determined as she watches over the volk and its efforts to cope with external threats. (It was this image that Rautenbach was criticising in Jannie Toteisens and Die Kandidaat where the Volksmoeder has herself become part of the hypocrisy and the madness of present day Afrikanerdom).
The mythical status of the Volksmoeder was enhanced as she stoically endured the terrible conditions in the British concentration camps into which she and her children were herded during the later part of the War. There, resulting from unsanitary conditions and a lack of fresh food, nearly 26 000 women and children died, ravaged by disease. These women assumed the status of martyrs and symbolised the continuing flame of cultural purity in the midst of a devastating assault by British imperialism against Afrikaners, and what they considered to be their divine heritage and wealth. Even after the British victory on the battlefield she remained on 'the farm', now impoverished and laid waste, while her husband and older children laboured for the enemy in the towns and cities. The consequent hatred by the Afrikaner of the British continues to the present, a sentiment which is questioned in Elmo de Witt's film, *Beeld vir Jeannie* (1976).

The boeredogter is the progeny of the Volksmoeder. It is she who is destined to carry on the task of mothering, both as many babies as possible as well as the Afrikaans nation which has fought back on the economic battlefield, regaining a large measure of its wealth. Where the Volksmoeder resisted the imperialist onslaught, the boeredogter is more expedient as seen in her collaboration with English and, by implication, international capital. She is the sell-out, the traitor, however inevitable her actions in terms of the volk as a whole. In *Beeld vir Jeannie*, the conflict is manifested through the antagonism between the 'new class' of enlightened urban Afrikaner and the old unyielding stalwarts of the nation who, like the Pharasees, are complacent and self-righteous, refusing to conceded any morality which clashes with their code. The setting is the dorp (country town) which stands for South Africa. It is called Hoffmansdal. Its inhabitants are the upright God-fearing people of South Africa. The dramatic conflict is generated when the town councillors decide to erect a statue in memory of 2000 Afrikaner women who died in a concentration camp near the present day town during the Anglo Boer War. The statue was to stimulate inspiration for the future and symbolise an eternal tribute to the noble aspects of the Afrikaner, one
which will emphasise the suffering and affliction of the internees. The long-haired Pretoria artist engaged by the town council questions their self-righteousness and arrogance. He is opposed by the town's lawyer who is unapproachable and aggressive and who demands to know the sculptor's attitude towards Afrikaner sentiment. The lawyer is supported by the Town Clerk who attributes the Afrikaners' downfall to artists and writers, but the sculptor gets a more sympathetic though initially uncommitted hearing from the headmaster as well as the dominee (minister of religion), who proposed the original idea of erecting a statue in the town's square. Having questioned the cultural suitability of the sculptor, the council is disgusted and enraged at his choice of model, matric pupil Jeannie Moolman, for she is an unmarried mother censured by the church and considered unfit to epitomise Afrikaner womanhood. The town's ostracism remains despite the fact that she conceived her son from a boereboer who died for his country on 'the Border' or that she put her child up for adoption. The boeredogter is drawn to the sculptor who is married to a critically injured woman.

Against the backdrop of the town conflict Jeannie despairs of winning the sculptor-uitlander and commits suicide just before he is able to declare his love for her. His grief at the death of Jeannie is, however, somewhat balanced by his moral victory over the verkrampte town councillors.

Boelvir Jeannie identifies a crucial element of the boeredogter which concerns her ability to adapt to changing circumstances. Though reviled by the 'older Afrikaner' she is symbolically tied to the spatial trajectory of Afrikaner economic power. The direction of this movement was inexorably towards the cities for they were the site of economic struggle, not the rural areas, isolated as they were from international capital. The cities were the battlegrounds where imperial capital engaged with national capital. The boeredogter was prepared to die for her dream and legitimised the striving for a volkskapitalisme just as the Volksmoeder supported it in an agricultural form. But where the Volksmoeder was able to
maintain her cultural integrity and economic purity even at the expense of hypocrisy as in *Die Kandidaat* and *Jannie Totsiens*, the boeredogter did not resist cultural contamination and openly declared her new allegiance. The resulting urbanization offered anonymity and a chance to cast off the close restrictions of rural communities, and above all, the opportunity to interpellate different material-based social practices. It is to this urban interpellation that we now turn.

"Debbie" (1965): the case of the 'lost' "boeredogter"

Although the recurring sign of the boeredogter had been evident in popular Afrikaans literature for some time, it was only in 1965 that it appeared in Afrikaans cinema in a clearly discernable form. Its tranference from literature to cinema was direct, occurring through a cinematic adaptation of T. du Toit's novel, *Groen Koring* on which Debbie is based. It was a bestseller first published in 1948. Comments producer Tommie Meyer:

> everywhere we heard that it was a book that had authenticity and which dealt with something that every family experienced ... that at one or another time there is a girl in the family who is expecting a baby out of marriage ... [that platteland (country) parents] send their sons and daughters to university and then they remain in the city?

The film systematically exposes the consequences of the urban-rural value clash, the social dangers of premarital sex and the heartbreaking problems which face the unmarried mother. The setting is the fun and freedom of an Afrikaans university campus versus the diligence, austerity and hard work of 'the farm'; fast cars versus the tractor; individuality versus the group/family/community; the urban claustrophobia of Hillbrow versus the unpolluted spaciousness of the countryside. Debbie's humiliated, stubborn rural parents disown her, while the cynical, pragmatic social-climbing urban parents of the city-reared boyfriend even explore the possibility of aborting the foetus to prevent their son from having to marry Debbie. Tearjerkingly melodramatic, the film continually stresses the dangers of this kind of situation and reveals the unhappiness, the guilt, the
deprivation, social ostracism and loneliness forced on the characters.

Reaction to Debbie was vociferous. State imposed sanctions included a 4-16 age restriction. An appeal to the Minister, supported by the highly conservative Vrouefederasie (Federation of Afrikaans Women), the Transvaal Administrator, Dr I Nicol and Dr AP Treurnicht, resulted, paradoxically, in the extension of the restriction to 4-21. Newspaper reports condemned the PCB decision, Dr Nicol, for example, telling his sons to take their girlfriends to see the film. The extent and influence of the film's supporters had the result of conferring the quality of 'author-ization' to the film makers and the restriction was totally lifted within a few days. Not only was the sign of the boeredogter legitimised within the ecological setting of cinema, but even the most conservative sections of Afrikanerdom had indicated acknowledgement of the social problems of urban living. Though the boeredogter had been 'lost' in the theme of the film, her experience was argued to be of didactic significance to those who were not yet lost.

Having established the cultural connection between the boeredogter and the social responses of the audience, we may now examine the semiotic qualities of the sign of the boeredogter in more detail.

The Boeredogter as Multi-faceted Sign

As has already been alluded to, the sign of the boeredogter works on three basic levels of signification: iconic, indexical of cultural trauma and as a symbol of capital.

At the first level the boeredogter represents the idea of a young girl. The image is solely denotative. An icon offers no knowledge about actual relationships, its relation is purely one of likeness: elements of the central idea of a young girl include purity, group ties and respect for traditional values. An icon, however, implies a second level meaning as it cannot be autonomous. It must be compared to something else. The
boeredogter exerts a relative autonomy through her individuality. She attains an identity in the face of others, the villainess, for example. Her identity does not result from the opposition per se, but is manifested in the opposition. At this second indexical level the icon intercepts a whole range of cultural meanings not derived from the sign itself, but from the way society uses and values both the signifier and the signified. At this level, the boeredogter stands for the 'maimed heroine', indicating some sort of trauma about her status in society. This trauma, a consequence of capital, is manifested in her individuality and her attraction to the uitlander since the resulting alliances are seen to threaten group cohesion. It is at this point that the sign activates a second order indexical meaning, known as myth. The boeredogter is not only an individual, but she carries the connotative elements of purity, of cultural and social procreation, of extending the lineage of the Volksmoeder. The genre conventions require that in terms of her perceived betrayal she must be seen to be maimed or defiled. She cannot, therefore, carry the torch of Afrikaner purity handed to her by the Volksmoeder and so her mythical status has to be denied. As in Debbie, she has become a threat to 'the farm' with its content of 'authority', 'tradition', the 'fine and the noble', and so on. She is ostracised by her own people and cast out by her parents who are totally unable to understand what has happened to her. She is disapproved of by the servants and her other rural acquaintances. Yet, her assimilation into the 'new class', the urban petty bourgeois community, is often equally traumatic. Jeannie, for example, has a politician father who does not take much interest in her; Debbie has difficulty in relating to her urban friends. She becomes estranged from her boyfriend and is very much alone by the end of the movie. Endings are often unresolved and ambiguous, the director not knowing which way he should go, at least during the early phase of the genre. Despite her debilitating trauma she survives, if not in body then in spirit. Her survival is due to her sympathetic treatment by the director: she epitomises for him, profit and financial success -- the boeredogter is an intrinsic component of the magical formula. Whether blind, crippled, maimed or a leper, she will
never return to the farm; neither will she be reaccepted into the fold. Her prodigal tendencies (symbolizing the Afrikaner quest for industrial/financial capital) has traumatised the whole of Afrikanerdom and while 'the farm' (standing for cultural stability) existed as the guarantor of cultural integrity within the confines of Eden, this national trauma had yet to resolve itself through time. Initially, this trauma would, in the film itself, only build up during the unfolding of the plot with the maiming, degradation, self-imposed isolation or death of the boeredogter occurring at the end of the film. By 1979, she was dead before the film even started. In Herfsland (1979), for example, the opening scene starts with her funeral. Whereas Debbie and Jeannie Moolman were but country-born unmarried mothers, in Herfsland, the boeredogter not only committed suicide, but was also a drug addict, neurotic and mixed up with hippies. She was estranged from her husband and was an impossible wife. Despite these negative aspects, she was also a poetess and a winner of the Ingrid Jonker Prize. This extreme trauma and early death of the boeredogter indicated an intensified traumatic status needing resolution to be a part of the genre films to follow. This was effected in the War movie to be dealt with later, as well as the intervention of the dominee who was the main character through which the director advocated a change in social attitudes. Before continuing the discussion of the boeredogter, it is useful to locate the social role of the dominee in the conflict-love genre.

"The "dominee": tension management

Like the sign of the boeredogter, the dominee also communicates on three basic levels. Iconically, he is identified as a man; indexically he stands for social stability; and symbolically, he represents the state, the source of 'willed' ideology. In the conflict-love story, the dominee is initially cast as the stodgy embodiment of 'the fine and the noble' and as the purveyor of the traditional values found in the rural areas. He is one of the volk, an affirmative symbol rather than a leader, a man who has the trust of his flock who turn to him in times of uncertainty and tension. Inexorably drawn into the conflict
between the insiders and the outsider, he is, at first, non-committal: he is torn between the hypocritical reactions of the volk and his sympathy for the boeredogter, her problems and the positive aspects she signifies as the Afrikaner of the future. In Beeld vir Jeannie, the dominee initially sides with the town councillors, but is immediately sympathetic to the ideas of the uitlander notwithstanding his relationship with Jeannie. The dominee in Wat Jy Saai (1979) finds himself powerless against the scandal-mongers who object to a local doctor swimming with the boeredogter school teacher in a river. He is pressurised by events and later reluctantly supports condemnation of the doctor who is spuriously accused of getting his girlfriend pregnant and then aborting the baby. His considered behaviour and clear scepticism of the hypocrisy of the town's people is clearly contrasted against the obscene eagerness of his flock to pass judgement on the couple. In Eensame Vlug (1979) the dominee tries to the boeredogter's foster father to treat her more gently, that she could not be held responsible for the death of her step-brother.

The full significance of the dominee is seen in Ter Wille van Christine (1975). In the context of the conservative dorp (allegorically standing for South Africa), this film is as explosive as it would be in Northern Ireland. Here the church itself is the site of struggle. Symbolical of the state, it witnesses the conflict between the Church Council and its two ministers. The dorp, Swartruggens, like Hoffmanskloof, stands for the nation as a whole. The boereesew is a dominee, Paul. He has fallen in love with a Roman Catholic nurse, Christine. His father is a dominee in the same church. The boeredogter, who is in love with Paul, is the daughter of the antagonistic church elder. The outsider is, of course, Christine. The elder wishes Paul to marry his daughter. Paul has the support of his father and one of the council members. The choices presented by Dominee Paul's love for Christine are radical: they are between following the letter and following the spirit of Christ's teachings; between adapting to change and ossifying; between serving abstractions, whether political or religious and accommodating human beings with unique feelings.
Christine, who escapes back to the city, is fetched by Paul. Following a tirade from the antagonistic church elder on how Christine has caused a split in the community, Paul decides to take up a calling in another congregation. At the last moment, however, Paul and Christine are supported by the more sympathetic elder who addresses the congregation during an evening service.

Forced to make his choice, the dominee usually sets himself apart from the volk by defending the boeredogter -- or the boere slew -- against the hypocrisy of the group. Sometimes his actions are overt, often they are implied. Ultimately, the dominee himself, through his defence of the boeredogter, comes to reassess his own values, convictions and cultural attitudes. He becomes as in Ter Wille van Christine, the moderator between the old and the new. The dominee is both leader and follower: leader because he commands inherent respect as a man of God who represents the chosen People (Volk); follower because he has been awakened to a new set of social relations separate to and away from 'the farm'. Indeed his role in film may be compared to the dilemma facing the various sections of the DRC of today as it agonises over and increasingly questions previously accepted ideologies and cultural attitudes.

The dominee, however, remains sceptical of the nouveau riche urban Afrikaner whose interests are financial, social mobility and self-advancement. If his presence is synonymous with Eden and those films located on the farm or in the dorp, in films acting out their conflicts in the city, he is much less visible. Where he does appear as in Eensame Vlug and Herfsland, he is subdued, ineffectual though understanding. In the latter film he is subject to the domineering personalities around him, in this case a politician father.

The father is against his foster child, Carina, step-sister of the deceased drug addict, marrying his widowed son-in-law. The dominee, the boere slew, had already asked his step sister for her hand in marriage. She declined but asked him to officiate at her wedding. When his senator father hears of
this he forbids his son to have anything to do with the couple for he holds his son-in-law responsible for his daughter’s death. In the ensuing altercation, the senator hits his son. As if gaining new strength from this belligerent action on the part of his father, the dominee becomes his own man, and defies his father by officiating at the marriage. Thus the dominee shows up the hypocrisy of the older generation and adapts to the new tasks set for him in an urban environment.

In the war film, the dominee is in uniform for the problem of resolving social conflicts is no longer only a moral one, but an ideological one as well. Where the civilian dominee was the chief mediator, in the war film he is replaced by the police and the military.

Having outlined the role of the dominee we now return to the discussion of the boeredogter.

The "boeredogter": development and ideological reorientation

While the signs of the boeresem, boeredogter, Volksmoeder and dominee recur in other genres and more penetrating films as well after 1965, it took a while for the industry to capitalise on the popularity of the conflict-love genre identified by Debbie. The next major example of this genre, Sien jou Môre (1970) was made by the successor of Jamie Uys Films, Kavaliers, also with Tommie Meyer as managing director. Directed by Elmo de Witt, the film was adapted from WA de Klerk’s novel, Die Belydenis van Nelta Bell. It is a much more blatant treatment than that of Debbie and unashamedly sermonises through the idealistic boeresem who is a medical student. The boeredogter is an art student from the Boland who hovers near the brink of permissiveness as she tries to help the urban villainess who is a drug addict. In line with the genre conventions, the villainess-uitlander has captivated the boeresem. The villainess recovers from her addiction, but is tempted again and dies. The arch uitlander, even more threatening than the villainess, who is the cause of these personal problems is a wicked liberal professor, the "pitch black villain (blood red communist)".

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As the publicity brochure states, the youth of previous generations could base their values on their forebears, but today these values have been revised by the exigencies of the technological and scientific era. Into this world the boeredogter enters with her betrothed, the boereseun. He is, however, drawn to the villainess and he abandons the boeredogter. Mediated through the uitlander professor is the 'enemy': liberalism, student protest marches ('more say for the students'), folk singing, dagga (marijuana) and beat music. All of these activities coalesce into that easily identified insidious influence: communism. The university is thus shown as the site of struggle, the node of 'communist' indoctrination.

In Môre Môre which is located in Hoffmansdal, the same fictitious town which served as the backdrop for h Beeld vir Jeannie, the boereseun loses the boeredogter, a matric schoolgirl, to the outsider school teacher. This film, however, lacks the depth of Debbie, h Beeld vir Jeannie or Siëna Jou Môre, following the conventions of the genre in a technical and superficial way. The narrow minded-merciless community deprive the couple of their innocent happiness. The film ends with the teacher leaving town after an athletics match in which the boeredogter is accidently killed by the boereseun in the javelin event. The boeredogter just happened to get in the way, he was actually trying to hit the teacher.

The stage is now set for a reorientation of the role and functions of the boeredogter. The economic and political trends which stabilised during the early 1970s after the high growth rate and age of consumerism heralded by the decade of the sixties found the boeredogter more and more in the cities and less and less on 'the farm' or in the dorp. The second trek (or urban trek) is taken for granted and the tussle is not necessarily hinged on the question of urbanization, but is now located mainly within the characters themselves in their representation of social roles. The urban-rural conflict becomes the struggle between 'good' Afrikaners and 'bad' Afrikaners within the city itself. This shift accepts the Rompel stereotype that the city Afrikaner is not all that different from his
rural counterpart. He has merely relocated himself onto a new farm, the smallholding, and brought his bywoner with him to tend the grounds, as in, for example, Erfgenaam (1971). In this film, the bywoner's daughter is the boeredogter who is drawn to the bourgeois landowner's son, who reminds his violently disapproving money-grabbing tycoon father that "Love is the greatest inheritance". The outsider as 'Afrikaner made good' takes on this role because of his ruthless capitalist outlook, an ideology which is equally criticised in later films like Iemand Soos Jy/Someone Like You (1978) and Rienie (1980). Presented without justification or motivation in these three films, as well as in many others, are people who have transported the ancestral farm to the city. They live on large plots, are housed in ostentatious mansions staffed by a citified bywoner. The tractor has been replaced by a Mercedes 350SE, the farmhouse with a highrise office tower, the voorkamer (sitting room) with a snooker table, while the kitchen and lounge literally bristle with technological gadgets. 'The farm' has become an embarrassment. In Rienie, for example, the farmer is dominant, the bywoner a drunkard, and his daughter, Rienie, without a mother. The bywoner sells his daughter to a childless rich urban Afrikaner couple. This new, younger boeredogter is underage, she is forced into the urban trek against her will though she remains unaware as to the reasons why she is spending her 'holiday' with surrogate parents. She has been spared the traumas of maturation undergone by the older, wiser boeredogter. She is simply a naïve pawn traded for financial gain by the bywoner who is embarrassed by his identity.

Rienie is perhaps one of the most significant examples of this genre, despite the fact that it was released mainly through the drive-in circuit, at least on the Witwatersrand. It shows a depth of plot, an intricacy of dramatic structure and a style of camerawork which is lacking from the more sentimental renditions of the conflict-love genre which preceeded it. Where the camera in the films already discussed offers sharp images, is clinical and predictable and is used mainly to get an exposure, in Rienie, the camera is a significant part of the signification process. It encodes historical depth, complex relationships
and social power through low angle, subtly lit and multiple layered imagery.\textsuperscript{68}

The emphasis in \textit{Rienie} has moved away from the conflict-love aspect and concentrates more on the role of the young \textit{boere-dogter}. The film provides a unique example not only of the transition from rural to urban motifs, but because it provides a parallel evocation of family groups, one, part of the rural bourgeoisie located on 'the farm', and the other located on the urban surrogate farm. In the former, the farmer is a slick, successful, authoritarian and dominant personality who is not ungenerous to his \textit{bywoner} who is seen as weak, a drunkard lacking moral fibre prepared to sell his daughter. Once having sold his daughter, however, his character undergoes a metamorphosis and the best traditional Afrikaans values come to the fore -- hard work and courage in the face of tremendous odds, self-sacrifice and quiet nobility.

The urban surrogate farmer, in contrast, is ruthless, harsh and avaricious. He is a much more extreme characterisation than his rural counterpart. He has no redeeming features. He also has a \textit{bywoner}. This city \textit{bywoner} is old and wise, kind and gentle, an avuncular figure who dispenses good sense and sympathy in equal measure. He is the one who keeps this urban unit together, whereas it is the farmer himself who holds the rural unit together on 'the farm'.

Unlike the character in previous movies, the \textit{boere-dogter} in \textit{Rienie} is not faced with having to overcome her trauma. Others do this for her. Her new urban mother assumes the responsibilities of buying her and shielding her from the knowledge of her father's terminal illness. She is the sifting device who weans the innocent \textit{boere-dogter} away from the farm and protects her from the ruthlessness of urban wealth and its questionable methods of accumulation represented in the behaviour of her foster father. \textit{Rienie-as-boere-dogter} remains unaware of these traumas. Her role epitomises and offers a clear indication of contrasting social derivations which originate from a common cultural base. \textit{Rienie} encapsulates both sides of the
rural-urban trek and acts as a bridging film between the two sets of farms in the genre (one rural and one urban) and shows that they are not separate, but parallel.

Symbolically, *Rienie* shows the interpenetration of urban and rural capitals. Although 'the farm' is not necessarily shown as a poverty-stricken area, the fact of migration by the *boeredogter* or *boereseun*, suggests that it is outshone by the more material attractions of the city. It is rare that the farmhouse matches up to the size and magnificence of the urban dwelling, for example. It will be remembered that the Afrikaner attack on the foreign dominated capitalist system was financed by rural capital but fought in the cities. During the course of this economic struggle it would have been surprising if some benefits of the victory did not rub off on to the rural bourgeoisie itself. *Rienie* alludes to such effects: the well-to-do, socially remote farmer who lives in a modern urban-style unfarm-like house. Unlike his city counterpart, however, he retains a measure of humanity and compassion; he has not been totally spoiled by capital. Even the drunken *bywoner*, once he has sold out to capital, changes and tries to get back the daughter he was forced to sell in a moment of necessity. But it is too late, the move is irrevocable. Despite Rienie's desire to go home, she cannot, for her father discovers that he is dying. Accepting that she must now stay with her foster parents, her father visits her to break the news of his condition. Rienie, unaware of the reasons behind her move to the city, meanwhile mounts a horse which bolts. Her father, not yet seen by Rienie, runs after it in an effort to save her. He is critically injured as he runs across a road. The driver of the car is none other than Rienie's nasty foster father who just happens to be coming home in his XJ6 Jaguar. Rienie is not hurt and is eventually taken to see her father in hospital where he dies. Rienie stays with her new parents.

In *Rienie* the *boeredogter* is an unwitting, but total slave of capital. Being blonde, however, she remains pure. Although a victim of social degredation, she is no longer a maimed
heroine. She symbolises the inexorable work of capital which by 1980 had integrated both the rural and urban strands, that is to say, the rural and urban bourgeoisies.

Rienie was made in 1980 and ties up many of the issues raised by earlier films. This film did not mark the end of the conflict-love genre cycle, it suggested its future. The genre, however, stagnated because of the truncating effect of television. It is now appropriate to return to a discussion of earlier films of the general insider-outsider category to trace the growth and completion of the conflict-love story. As with Debbie, most of the films in the general category occur in the city. More specifically, it is the university campus which provides the site of the conflict. If not a campus, university students are nevertheless the film's discursive characters. Examples are Sien Jou Môre (1970), Vergeet My Nie (1976), Liefste Veertjie (1975), Springbok (1976), Die Winter van 14 Julie (1977), Nicolene (1978), Eensame Vlug (1979), Kiepie en Kandae (1980) and April '80 (1980). The university environment is significant because it is often the first time that boerdedohters and boere seuns come into close and continuous contact with alternative discourses and competing permissive ways of life. The academic ecological setting, like the church, is a highly influential ideological node which has played a remarkable role in the Afrikaner struggle towards the attainment of a volkskapitalisme. At the same time, however, it is also a 'liberalising' agent which fuels the independent conduct of the boerederoger. The revision of her social role, that of the still saintly boere seun and of the uitlander, is the result of the restructuring of the key plot which no longer sees social relations in terms of rural versus urban ways of life, but more dialectically in communist versus nationalist terms. This is particularly evident in the content of films like Sien Jou Môre, Eensame Vlug, Die Winter van 14 Julie, April '80 and the host of war films which potmarked the 1970s, and particularly the last few years of the decade.

The indexical and symbolical modification of these signs are a consequence of changes in the political economy. The idea
of the urban Afrikaner has been accepted in cinematic myth. This advance, however, has taken its toll, for the cultural purity of the boeredogter has been spoiled and polluted with elements previously only found in the 'enemy': imperial capital. Apart from Rienie, she is aware of her degradation. Here, as a second generation boeredogter, fostered by a first generation boeredogter, she is protected from the now submerged cultural trauma.

The uitlander is still there. S/he is either the avaricious, self-centred Afrikaner capitalist who lives on his urban farm, or s/he is a red-haired drug addict, communist student, Roman Catholic or an ex-convict. This character exists in relation to a new psychological state which co-exists with, but has to a certain extent superceded the Garden of Eden, the purity symbols of the farm or 'eie bodem' (own soil). At this point of the genre cycle, that state is an urban capitalist one with the 'enemy' in its midst. The uitlander cannot escape his past by settling in a rural valley community as in Ongewenste Vreemdeling (Undesirable Stranger - 1974). The ex-murderer in Vergeet My Nie (Don't Forget Me - 1976) influences the daughter of a professor into taking on a 'revolutionary stance' against the 'establishment'. He is warned off by the university principal and eventually sentenced for a crime he did not commit. Rich domineering mothers, the antithesis of the original connotations attached to the Volksmoeder, try to prevent their children from marrying 'poor' Afrikaners, as in Sonneblom Uit Parys (Sunflower from Parys - 1974) and Snip en Rissiepit (1973).

At its most introspective and defensive, the urban variety of the conflict-love story which is critical of mindless wealth and destructive individualistic striving is found in Plekkie in die Son (A Place in the Sun - 1979) where the insiders have retreated into a leper 'colony'. Those inside talk about the uitlanders, those outside the asylum. The urban born boeredogter, married to a Trust Bank whizz-kid husband, is gradually rejected by her family and the marriage disintegrates. The metaphor of being a leper in the context of a
maimed heroine suggests that she has undergone some degrading contact. Her touch is defiled, affecting not only the present generation, but the next as well. This sense of pollution, of isolation is reinforced when the old husband and wife are rejected by their children and are forced to seek sanctuary in the asylum once more. The role of the boeredogter in Flekktie in die Son is an advanced one: a city slicker, dark-haired and naive; not only has she lost the innocence of rural purity, but she is rejected at her destination: wealth, opulence and urban living. The mirrors of the genre are turned inward in this film with a terrible vengence suggesting something highly traumatic about the social structure. The conventional patterns are disintegrating and new unsettling, destructive material-oriented practices are replacing them. Group cohesion and identity are being ruthlessly superceded by individualistic, anonymous and selfish capitalist values. Even within the social sanctuary of the asylum, there are problems. The estranged boeredogter is drawn to the doctor. This doctor/patient relationship is exposed by a jealous female doctor; added to this is a pregnant mistress and a horrific birth scene with a disposable neonate. Yet, despite all this trauma, the film has a happy ending and the couple come together.

With the location of the key plot in the urban milieu alone, the conflict, often seen in generational terms, has added a new dimension, a conflict, or rather, an embarrassment of classes. This has already been mentioned with regard to the rich upwardly mobile parents trying to prevent their children from marrying lower-middle-class spouses (for example, Sonneblom Vit Parys and Iemand Soos Jy). Of a more serious nature are the ideological tendencies and cultural differences between the elite of Waterkloof Afrikanerdom, and the stagnant petty bourgeoisie who live in Krugersdorp seen in 'n Seder Val in Waterkloof (A Cedar Falls in Waterkloof - 1978). The film does not portray the two groups as discrete classes: "they were branches of the same Baobab which had grown in different directions and were now coming at each other". In the original play on which the film is based, the new Afrikaner speaks
English; the old Afrikaner comes from the *plaas* (farm) with chickens on the back seat and fur on the dashboard. The old Afrikaner is an embarrassment, but it is the new Afrikaner who is criticised for allowing the old Afrikaner to be an embarrassment. The film has made a number of crucial changes. The elite Afrikaner speaks Afrikaans, while the old Afrikaner has been substituted for a lower middle-class–urban family of Krugersdorp *jollers* (revellers). The film has thus shifted the plot to within an urban context alone: BMW's versus a hotted up Ford Cortina with racing stripes and an orange on the aerial and fur on the dashboard; gracious living versus *plaasjapie* (country bumpkin) behaviour; decorum versus mayhem; sexual restraint versus lustiness, and so on. These oppositions are not found in different classes for that would suggest that the Afrikaner group is not a group, but within the same family: an *Seder Val* in *Waterkloof* "did acknowledge that an Afrikaner did exist who preferred to not be publically associated with the beer, sunny skies, braai and Chevrolet culture, let alone the meisie [girl] working in the massage parlour". The cedar or pillar of Afrikanerdom, Professor van Vuuren, is driven by an ambition to become the chairman of an influential and prestigious Academy. His accession to this position depends on obtaining the support of two professors from Bloemfontein who are invited to sojourn at his mansion in Waterkloof.

Into the rustic, smart, bourgeois and idyllic Waterkloof environment arrive van Vuuren's noisy, undignified and loquacious family from Krugersdorp, packed like sardines in their souped-up Cortina. Van Vuuren's ambitious wife tries to get rid of them, but they move in anyway. Peeved at their unfriendly welcome, they decide to employ a "sex bomb masseuse" to "fix" the professor and discredit him before his superiors. Two further masseuses work on the two Bloemfontein professors when the family realise what they have done to van Vuuren, to try to redress the balance and blackmail the eminent visitors. The film thus exposes the pretension and hypocrisy of the Afrikaner elite. The group may have divided in terms of ways of life but the resulting conflicts can still be resolved by the elite discarding their pretentions and returning to the
tradition of more simple ways. Although *Seder Val in Waterkloof* lacks the role of the *boeredogter* or *boerieën*, it does not fit into the general insider-outsider category. It is significant because it questions the concept of an outsider within the group. Where *Plekkie in die Son* shows distinct group disintegration, *Seder Val in Waterkloof* suggests that that disintegration is merely the result of the pretention of the 'new classes', the Afrikaner elite. Self-examination can result in a *raprochement* between the two branches, and this is shown in graphic terms in *Seder Val in Waterkloof* where professor van Vuuren discards his way of life and goes off with one of the masseuses. This resolution in the relationship between the 'insider' and 'outsider' is crucial for the continued development of the key plot. The integration of a different set of social and sexual mores which no longer separate the group heralded the redefinition of the outsider or enemy. The enemy is no longer 'imperial capital' represented in the city and its sinful ways. Capitalism and its corresponding social practices, sexual permissivity under certain circumstances, and looser social ties are now accepted. The enemy has shifted his location: he represents an external threat beyond South Africa's borders and he makes use of the *uitlander* within the border.

The *uitlander*'s new position is the result of a new war, a new set of traumas consequent upon capital and bent on the destruction, not so much of Afrikaner culture, but of the South African 'way of life' (and racial capitalism in particular). The oppositions are capitalism versus communism, or more specifically, *volkskapitalisme* versus communism, and within that black versus white. This conflict is manifested in a new mental state, typified by 'the Border'. 'The Border' stands for the imperialist world onslaught (articulated as the 'total onslaught') which, like the British war on the Boers, seeks to take away what belongs to Afrikanerdom: its wealth, its culture and its God-given privileged position in life. Like 'the farm', 'the Border' is a state of being. Causation is taken for granted, no explanation to account for this state being necessary: it's there, omnipresent and continuous, a
state to be expected, like sleeping or death.

The "Uitlander": Transition to Black Terrorist

The sign of the uitlander becomes more complex as a result of the transition from 'the Farm' to 'the Border'. It should now be analysed not as a two-tiered, but a three-tiered structure. First, though now less important, remains the image of the English-speaking South African who is influenced by international liberalism. The second is a new kind of Afrikaans villain, who is not only defined by his urban geographical location, but by the fact that he is a coward and/or wants to flee the country. The third element of the outsider is a revolutionary one, contingent upon the intensified racial conflict generated out of the smoke, killing and rhetoric of 'the Border war'. This international conflict has led to a widening of the definition of Afrikaner. The outsider is no longer limited to English speakers and the urban petty bourgeois Afrikaner. No more is she seen in purely white terms: she has become a mortal enemy characterised by his blackness (red communist) and his AK47 automatic rifle.

Although a number of war films had been made since the early 1970s, for example, Zebra (1971), Kaptein Kaprivi (1972), Aanslag op Kariba (1973), See Soldate (1975), Die Rebel (1976), Bank, Hennery and Friend (1976), few of these fit easily into the overall insider-outsider category. Perhaps the first to do so was Die Winter van 14 Julie (The Winter of 14 July - 1977) which did not go to war as such, but tried to capitalise on the new ideological theme. The rationale offered by producer Tommie Meyer is reminiscent of his reasons for making Debbie twelve years earlier:

Every parent in South Africa at the moment has at least a family member or a child or nephew or a friend who is at the Border, or who will go to the Border. 72

The film follows the now conventional plot. A national service-
man meet a girl. They fall in love, sleep together; she falls
pregnant. He is an orphan and is considered unsuitable as a husband for the boeredogter by the interfering mother. The girl's father suggests that she does not tell her boyfriend about her pregnancy, that she goes away to have the baby and then returns to a normal life at home. The boeredogter, however, decides to have an abortion and makes arrangements with a fifth year medical student. She breaks off her relationship with her boyfriend but tells him her problem in a letter to be given to him by her brother, a fellow national serviceman, once they have reached Grootfontein in South West Africa. The boyfriend goes absent without leave (AWOL) and persuades the boeredogter to marry him even though she is underage, and without her parents' permission. She borrows her cousin's birth certificate and the couple are married by a magistrate. On learning of the wedding, her parents take steps to have the marriage annulled. Her brother, also AWOL, opposes this action and a huge family quarrel ensues. The mother, realising that the family would be torn apart if legal steps are taken eventually condones the marriage for the sake of unity. The outsider, now an insider, returns with his brother-in-law to face their punishment from the military for being absent without leave.

Although a sentimental and technical application of the genre conventions, Die Winter van 14 Julie struck a cord with viewers, particularly English-speaking audiences in Natal. Thematically it is important for it marks a fundamental shift in the treatment of the outsider. For the first time he is accepted back into the fold, though he has degraded the boeredogter and brought shame to the group. In previous instances, the group basically remained closed. The boeredogter, if still alive, linked up with the outsider beyond the confines of her close community. Now the outsider is accepted by the group itself, but in a different context: that of a war against the outside. The new alliance demands unity, even if it is of an uneasy nature. In the wider society, the English speaking South African (the outsider) has been accepted by the insiders (Afrikaners) as they combine to resist the 'total onslaught' both economically and on the battlegrounds of 'the Border'.

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Elements of the war situation have filtered into other films of the conflict-love genre as well, notably *Eensame Vlug* (1979) and *Grensbasis 13* (1979). In the former film, the outsider who was on the inside (Walter) seals his rejection because of his cowardice at a military camp in Angola which resulted in the death of three of his comrades-in-arms. One of his army companions was a university lecturer, Simon, who is also Walter's uncle. Simon falls in love with Walter's girlfriend, Julie. She is an unsuspecting orphan who is blamed for her step-brother's death by her foster father. Her brother was killed while scaling a dangerous cliff at her encouragement. She is attracted to the lecturer who offers a promise of help. Simon divorces his estranged wife. Walter tries to humiliate Simon who is no longer able to protect him. Walter's parents are told of his cowardly deed in Angola. He is rejected by his parents. In a last desperate act he tampers with Simon's skydiving parachute while Simon and Julie sit in the club house. As they prepare to board the plane, Walter helps Julie put on the parachute, the one that will never open .... The *boeredogter* dies in the fall.

References to 'the Border' are seen in an increasing array of films of all genres, not to mention television, radio soap operas, news and so on. It even appears in films intended for the overseas market where such references are meaningless, for example, *Someone Like You* (1978) and *Fifth Season* (1978).

The adopted child is another recurring element of the conflict-love genre, indicating her displaced roots if she is the *boerelodt*er. Originally a symbol of alienated Afrikaner capital represented in her move to the city, in the city itself she stands for miscreation as she marries this capital with international capital. Out of this integration flows a repurified capital, seen most clearly in *April '80*. An understanding of how this came about requires some discussion of the war film

The War Film: The *Boerelodt*er Becomes Repurified

Stimulated by the continual threat of the border war and the
increasing probability of urban terrorism, Afrikaans films have begun to reflect such conflicts. Whereas the treatment of the boeredogter remained fairly constant during the first thirteen years of her cinematic life, between 1978 and 1980 she underwent a rapid modification, a function of adjustments in the base of the South African economy as Afrikaner and English capital began to merge in their collaborative efforts to thwart the 'total onslaught'.

Unlike the American post-Vietnam films such as Coming Home, The Deerhunter and Apocalypse Now which are highly critical of America's involvement in South East Asia and the resulting devastating social consequences for that society, South African films using the theme of the border war are totally uncritical. Apart from the pro-Vietnam war film, The Green Berets, made during the war itself, it took the American industry more than ten years to reflect the images of the war. In contrast, the South African film industry followed the troops into action with no qualms at all. This discursive support was helped along by a number of British companies who capitalised on the escalating war situation on the sub-continent with films like Wild Geese (1978) and Game for Vultures (1979).

The war film created the opportunity for a new kind of white male hero. Partly because war is perceived as a male activity, women are usually portrayed 'at home'. The men pair up as twins, one tough and hard, the other sensitive and soft? In Eensame Vlug it was the mature, brave and confident lecturer with the immature, weak and cowardly step brother of the boeredogter; in Die Winter van 14 Julie, the impulsive love-stricken orphan is balanced by the boeredogter's stable, clear-minded and pragmatic brother; Forty Days portrays two demobbed soldiers, one who is rough, tough, hard-living and foolhardy, while his friend is sensible, serious and vulnerable. In Grensbasis 13, the captured boeresein is philosophical and soft, while his comrade who rescues him is determined, pragmatic and strong. The conflictual elements initiated by these films develop more fully in the war movie. Here, the drama is couched in the symbolism of a man divided and having to
lose that side of himself that might threaten group membership. To the extent that war involves the individual as a member of society, the personal ties become anti-social." In *Forty Days* the sensitive *troepie* (soldier) defies the institutions of society as he tries to re-orient himself to civilian life. Both literally and symbolically, Afrikaans films with a war theme deal with civil war: war within the body politic and within the individual.

A structuralist analysis of war movies *per se* reveals a society which confronts reality and the complexities of life by a simplistic reduction to binary opposites: good versus bad; war versus peace; black versus white; communism versus capitalism; Marxism versus Christianity and so on. More specifically, the themes found in the sub-texts of these films exhibit the following oppositions: terrorist (black) = bad; soldier/policeman (white) = good; and 'loyal' black (especially those fighting on the side of South Africa) = good + bad (a sort of reformed black).

*Terrorist* (1978), based on the Grootfontein murders encapsulates the above oppositions without questioning. Initially banned, it was granted censorship exemption when the director altered the ending to indicate that terrorists will be apprehended and punished. The subtle photography observes the desert in a way which emphasises the territorial conflict. Although the film contains little overt right-wing propaganda, its offers a disturbingly accurate reflection of white South African attitudes regarding the guerilla conflict: the mindless slaughter, the tacit acceptance that black must kill white, the lack of motivation for such killings, the ubiquitous Kenyan who fled the Mau Mau who talks endearingly about "black bastards". The guerillas do show some individuality, though one of them is directed to laugh for extended periods at odd moments suggesting brutal malevolence rather than humour. *Terrorist*, despite its difficulty in obtaining distribution (being only 70 minutes in length) encapsulates the dominant discourse on 'terrorism' seen in order versus anarchy...
Wild Geese (1978) is an embarrassing example of racial moralising where black and white solve their differences in terms of the dominant apartheid discourse. Financed by British banks and South African investors, the film glorifies the heroic myth of white mercenaries in Africa come to save the black man from himself. The film enlists the cinematic codes in the service of the mercenaries inverting history in the process. By placing the camera behind the mercenary rifles, the attacking black hordes are made to seem like invaders in their own country. As Robert Stam points out, the film camouflages its racism by means of two plot devices. First, the mercenary force includes one token black (as does the platoon in Grensbasis 13), whose presence masks the racial character of the slaughter. Genocide seems more palatable when its perpetrators are 'integrated'. Secondly, the entire operation is performed on behalf of a black leader -- Limbani -- who is repeatedly characterised as "the best there is". But "the best there is" appears as sick, helpless, dying, literally carried on the backs of whites. In a transparent imitation of The Defiant One's, Limbani winds up being carried by the 'racist' South African whose racism is presumed to contrast with the 'non-racism' of the other mercenaries. This ex-South African policeman first calls him "Kaffir", then "man", then more endearingly, "bloke". In this white rescue fantasy, the Limbani of the 1970s speaks oddly like the Sidney Poitier of the 1950s: he pleads for love and integration. The blacks, he says, must forgive the white past and whites must forgive the black present: "We need each other white man". Thus centuries of colonialism are cancelled out in the misleading symmetry of an aphorism. Game For Vultures is even more crude than Wild Geese, making out that all blacks are stupid communist dupes.

Elmo de Witt's Grensbasis 13 (Border Base 13 - 1979) continues the conflict-love plot in the war film. It portrays action and a remarkably good reflection of battle in the bush. The camera is on the side of the South African forces. The
classic triangular love affair involves a police lieutenant, a female doctor and a stay-at-home girlfriend. The doctor on the border is blonde, fair and Aryan: she is the city boere-dogter-gone-north. The outsider is a smooth, materialist Afrikaner "wat die land wil vlug" (who wants to flee the country). The stay-at-home girlfriend's mother wants her to marry this new villain rather than a police lieutenant. Though the mother, who is clearly a socialite, has a son who is also a policeman, she feels that members of the Police Force are not good enough for her daughter. This situation offers the director the opportunity to make a number of unctuous remarks about the valiant heroes defending South Africa.

The girlfriend remains torn between the outsider and her mortally wounded ex-fiancé. The lieutenant takes it upon himself to rescue his girlfriend's brother who has been captured by the terrorists. This is the surface structure. The hidden unconscious meaning is contained in de Witt's treatment of his subject matter. First, like all other references to 'the Border' no motivations or reasons for this state are offered. Secondly, implicit in this film is the assumption that border duty is voluntary. The South African Police and not the Defence Force is involved. A passing reference to the possible exposé on foreign television, that the captured policeman might be forced to acknowledge that his role was not voluntary, is given as the official reason for a daring raid to secure his rescue. Third, the conflict is not related to the larger politico-economic causes, the battle of opposing ideologies. The reasons for the war and the resulting social dislocations are ignored. The rescue has nothing to do with social remorse or societal guilt. It is a device to satisfy the conventions of melodrama in that the lieutenant considers himself responsible for the safety of his captured friend, simply because he promised the family that he would look after him. On the other hand it also has an affirmative function. As Robert Greig concludes:

I infer from all this that marrying policemen is the patriotic duty of white South African girls. An interesting idea, on a par with making babies for Botha'.
In line with the conventions of the conflict-love genre somebody has to die an unnatural death. In *Grensbasis* 13 it is not the *boeredogter* nor the outsider: it is the lieutenant. He is shot while trying to rescue his friend, not by his lover or the outsider, but by the enemy. That enemy has a black skin: he is the 'stupid communist dupe' *uitlander*. The film also heralded a number of other significant thematic and symbolic modifications. Having lost her purity and virginity in the city, the *boeredogter* who had become dark-haired is again blonde. She has regained her purity and moved to the bush. The bush on 'the Border' is the site of the armed struggle and she not only heals wounds but heals the soul as well. She falls in love with the lieutenant who is doing his duty both for his country and the family who rejects him. Just as capital-in-general supports the war, so the *boeredogter* supports the policeman who is fighting in the war. He is rewarded for his bravery with a sexual intimacy outside of marriage. Where Debbie was ostracised for her sexual conduct, the doctor in *Grensbasis* 13 is venerated. Since the *uitlander* is shown to be the personification of influences originating from outside South Africa, the *boeredogter* cannot be degraded anymore. The outsider who remains within the country is no threat at all and is depicted as a lazy lounge lizard. The *boeredogter*’s new status and affirmation of her sexual conduct is symbolised in the scene towards the end of the film where she accepts a medal at a ceremony on behalf of her dead lover. This *boeredogter* has no discernable familial ties, though the kinship network is strong. In this film she performs some of the functions of the *volksmoeder*: she is behind the lines dispensing not food and shelter, but healing and sexual support. Like Rienie, she suffers no cultural or social trauma, just a personal loss. She naively acts out her practice unaware of the influences guiding her actions; she is no longer an outcast but like the *volksmoeder*, an intrinsic element in the battle for the security of Afrikanerdom. She has re-established her mythical status under the conditions determined by a new conflict, a new set of social relations and an enemy who can only be defeated militarily. The cinematic *boeredogter* in *Grensbasis* 13 has lost the depth of character
of previous generations: "Dr Jane is the stock albino ... - the figure of Aryan purity who is infinitely accommodating, passionless, brave and vacuous."

Made at the same time, Forty Days (1979) takes its title from the Cliff Richards hit song which in the South African context marks the count-down to the end of full time national service. Forty Days is frivolous, fast moving and humorous. Made in English, its characters speak in South African-English and the slangish grammar and pronunciation which results from a two year absence from civilian life. Technically, the film is incredibly badly made which perhaps accounts partly for Ster-Kinekor scepticism of its box office potential. Its flawed continuity and erratic surface structure, however, camouflages a deeper ideological tension. The dialectic is quite blatant: police (good) versus disco sub-culture (bad); Defence Force (good) versus personal chaos (bad) which in a broader context can be seen as Institutionalism (good) versus Individualism (bad). The film mainly takes place in the demonic ecological setting of Hillbrow. Drugs, alcohol, prostitution, permissiveness, homosexuality and crime, and family rejection meet the two returning soldiers. Jock, the gentle, less confident extroopie finds that his girlfriend is married and expecting a baby, that his mother has moved without leaving a forwarding address while his sister and brother-in-law are unconcerned and bound up in their own lives. Eventually he moves in with his self-assured fellow serviceman and his girlfriend. His friend, Stevie, is shot during a robbery attempt, his girlfriend fired from a disco where she works and Jock resists appealing to the institutions of society for help. Stevie's girlfriend dies in a fall from her balcony and Jock calls the police.

The police are portrayed as charming, friendly fellows, always ready to help and paternalistically guide young men in danger of falling into bad ways. Shot from low camera angles they literally beam assurance and benign concern. Contrasted with this institutional benevolence is the anarchic portrayal of civilian life characterised by the Hillbrow disco scene.
The disco culture is hardly a typical experience for a returning troopie or a reflection of civilian life. In Forty Days it represents the shady and the sinister activities of the underworld.

The film suggests that the Defence Force and the Police are the only viable agents of stability, law and order. Throughout the film is the insistence and reiteration of the help and guidance offered by the Defence Force which is contrasted with a demonstration of the pitfalls of going it alone: "I don't need the army -- they ran my life for two years" is shown to be wilful and counter-productive. Predictably, it is the police who save the two ex-soldiers from their own determined obstinacy.

A recurring thematic element of the film is the socially condoned submerged violence. The most obvious example of this is where Jock attacks and robs a homosexual who solicits him in a bar. In a later scene he is remorseful only over the fact that he is guilty of robbery. He gives the money to the woman who has taken over his mother's flat, goes back to Mandy and Stevie's apartment where is is consoled by Mandy who makes love to him. While there is a latent homosexual theme in the war film itself -- between the tough and the more sensitive soldier duo -- it is to be violently repressed when confronted overtly. Although the homosexual in Forty Days is well dressed and lives in an elegant flat, he is nevertheless part of the internal enemy threatening social stability. He is therefore punished without remorse.

Forty Days marks a departure from previous films in that it attempts, albeit in an incomplete way, to account for the difficulties experienced by young men in a war situation and separated from their families for two years. It was described by the majority of press reviews as "South Africa's Coming Home" and lauded as "A cut above the usual" and as a film which "restores faith in the local film industry". The press reviewers simply confirmed the dominant discourse in their columns for the film was certainly one of the most inept.
of the decade on both a technical and a plotting level.

Whereas America's post-Vietnam war films provide an almost painful self-examination of the effects of the war on American society, and particularly on the men involved with it, the South African films are superficial, stereotyped and even glib. In both Grensbasis 13 and Forty Days, the war is there -- a fact of life, not discussed or rationalised -- simply accepted. In both films the police who represent Institutionalised South Africa are lauded and made out to be pillars of society. Both portray the population back home as uncaring, uninterested, bound up in their own petty lives and unable to comprehend the rigours of border life. These issues are best left to those who know -- the Defence and Police Forces. They are the key to social and personal stability. Only they are able to help. These repressive apparatuses have superseded the family as the unifying factor. The social fabric of the group is unable to maintain is cohesion without Institutional help. The key element of that cohesion, the dominee, has been superseded by repression in the guise of help.

The above section has identified the main themes to be found in films which owe much of their plotting to the war situation. A certain social disorganization is balanced by the absorption of the outsider-within into the group itself while identifying a more clearly discernable uitlander in terms of the colour of his skin, or whether he speaks Chinese or Russian. The boerendogter is now totally integrated into the new urban society-at-war, with its more liberal sexual values. From suffering the indignities of being a maimed heroine in earlier films, she has graduated and been elevated to a new, higher repurified status within Afrikanerdom. The structures of authority and traditional values of 'the farm' have been transplanted in a modified form to 'the Border'. Group cohesion and loyalty have given way to a more abstract Institutionalism managed not by the dominee but by the Police and Defence Forces.
These cinematic trends and the codes employed to reinforce the dominant discourse were followed through by Jan Scholtz in *April '80* which marked the termination of the conflict-love genre in its dominant form.

*April '80*: The Case of the Reclaimed *Boeredogter*

Despite universal acclaim from the press which lauded *April '80*'s bold move into 'politics', 'urban terrorism' and so on, this film, more than anything before it, bolsters the dominant discourse. The film does not question or criticise, nor does it sympathise with the outsider. By manipulating the genre conventions the director is able to offer the illusion of contention and controversy while simultaneously vindicating the surveillance and repressive actions of the state repressive machinery.

Again, the role of the *boeredogter* is crucial to an understanding of the film and the significance of the genre. In *April '80* the *boeredogter* is not only born in the city but she is *English-speaking* (that is, bilingual) as well. She is dark-haired rather than blonde and defensive rather than naive. In losing her Aryan status she has gained capital as an ally. Her home life, however, remains difficult, for the clash of cultures has yet to be resolved. Her mother is of Afrikaans origin; paradoxically she is a civil rights lawyer who now speaks English. Her father is a professor of English on an English-language inland university campus. He is accused by his wife of thinking liberally, acting liberally and living liberally but who "votes Prog and says thank God for the Nats". The parents are divorced. The *boeredogter*, Carol, lives at home with her father.

The *boere seun*, whose father belonged to the militant *Ossewa-brandwag* (OB) during the Second World War, falls in love with Carol -- a prerequisite of the new set of genre conventions. She, he and her brother are all students at the university. Carol's brother, Alex, is the outsider. He is a student activist who, in setting off some pamphlet bombs inadvertently
kills two innocent bystanders (who just happen to be PFP voters). Against his will, the Boereseun who grew up in a fishing village on the west coast, is persuaded by the Security Police to spy on Alex through Alex's sister. The plot is complicated when the Boereseun falls in love with Carol and then refuses to inform on her brother. His ties with the Volk, however, prove too strong and in the face of graphic evidence shown him by the Security Police on acts of terrorism implicating Alex by association, he backs down and again agrees to inform on his girlfriend's brother. This decision is made in spite of his knowledge of his father's acts of sabotage and terrorism while a member of the OB during World War II. Both the OB and present day student activists, he argues, were fighting for freedom, albeit on different ideological grounds. The Boereseun sticks to this interpretation despite a violent reaction from his father who insists that he turn Alex in. In a development non-continuous with the internal logic of the plot, the Boereseun, after the visit home with Carol, decides to inform the police of Alex's guilt. Alex lures the Boereseun into a deserted building in Vrededorp. In the meantime Alex's father, who has disowned him, his sister, who will no longer protect him, and the police all arrive on the scene. Alex shoots the Boereseun and is killed by the police in return. Carol, a witness to the event runs, not to her brother as might be expected, but to the Boereseun and professes her love for him. The last shot is of the couple walking along the beach in longshot at sunset. The Boereseun walks into the sea and throws his crutch into it. They live happily ever after.

An examination of the film's subtext will show an opposing interpretation to those offered by the press critics. First, Alex plays the stereotyped image of a 'terrorist': he has an unmanageable black beard, long bushy hair, is irrational, aggressive, short-tempered and a racist, continually vilifying Afrikaners. His political motivations are reduced to an unhappy childhood, while the treatment of the subject matter is reminiscent more of the heady days of the late 1960s and early '70s when frenetic student politics conceived of apartheid in
libertarian terms as an irrational ideology premised on racial and cultural differences. The film is titled *April '80*, yet is unaware that English student concerns have moved away from this liberal-humanist perspective and now see the clash as one between capital and labour where apartheid discourse mobilises racial and cultural differences to rationalise the class structure in terms of racial capitalism. Where students once identified Afrikaners as the source of apartheid, by the mid-1970s, it was realised that the perpetrator of apartheid was capital *per se*. Whether that capital was of English or Afrikaans origin was considered irrelevant. *April '80* then, is an uneasy amalgam of misunderstood outdated liberal values superimposed on supposedly current events. As such, it is a trivialised reflection of English student politics whether in 1980 or a decade previously.

Second, the continuity lapse mentioned earlier is not only a function of the *boereesun's* ties to the *volk*, but also of the genre which calls for a socially reassuring movie, not one that classes the terrorist acts of the OB and student activism in the same category. In present day South Africa the myth of the OB is part of the new moral order as far as Afrikaners are concerned whereas student activism is not. Indeed, student protesters and activists were literally bludgeoned into submission in 1972 while their leaders were all banned or detained in 1973. Thus, where the OB 'terrorist' is now seen as politically legitimated, the student 'terrorist' is regarded as a criminal, a communist dupe who is morally degenerate. He must be punished and dies, as do the two PFP supporters, killed by their own kind. The implication is that the PFP Opposition also stand for moral and social disorder.

Third, when Alex realises that the police net is closing on him he appeals to a foreign agent, presumably a Russian, judging from his typecasting and strange accent, for help. Unaccountably this is denied. Alex's mother tells him to give himself up as no country in the world will give asylum to a "murderer". Alex has nowhere to go. The resolution of the plot is ensured: he will die in the shootout with the
boereseun. By building this assumption into the film, the director has again either misread or ignored the reality of resistance in South Africa. At least five countries ringing South Africa would have given Alex political asylum. It is also highly unlikely that Alex would have been in contact with so improbable a figure as the 'Russian agent' who was shown to be a smooth, suave unconcerned double-talking subversive. By foreclosing Alex's escape route, the director was able to ignore world pressure on South Africa or the fact that tens of thousands of South Africans, black and white, have been granted political asylum, not to mention the few serving life sentences who managed to escape from maximum security prisons.

Unlike earlier examples of the conflict-love genre, criticism is not levelled at the self-righteous volk, and the boeredogter is not denigrated in any way. Following her liberated role in the war movie, she becomes the heroine: she is marked for and marries the boereseun. Thus, April '80 is the conduit which provides for the rapprochement between the previously estranged boereseun and boeredogter. The deeper significance of April '80 is that the inter-penetration of English by Afrikaans capital has largely been accomplished. Implied too, is that the 'foreign' capitalist system has been adapted to a Volkskapitalisme reflecting the Afrikaner heritage and lifestyle. Outsiders such as the student activist will die, black South Africans will accept what's deemed good for them and the insiders, both Afrikaans and English speaking, will coalesce into the new group which will remain closed to outsiders or uitlanders such as blacks.

The conflicts in April '80 are offered as a clash of cultures rather than one between capital and labour. The only non-white character, the coloured printer of the pamphlets, rejects Alex's liberalism and takes bitter reassurance in the prevailing political order:

What sort of justice do you expect in this country when the radicals take over? What sort of democracy? Have you forgotten how they kicked the coolies out of Africa, how they treated the whites, the geno-
icide against other tribes?

This compendium of conventional wisdoms, usually uttered by expatriot white settler types such as the Kenyan in *Terrorist*, leads to the alienation of Alex from his fellow activist. By directing the black character to mouth this sort of common sense, the film trivialises and negates the commitment and actions of white 'radicals'. Where earlier films in the genre cycle criticised aspects of an Afrikaner ideology unresponsive to changes in the material base of the political economy, *April '80* reassures the viewer that the consequences of that ideology -- terrorism and subversion -- can be reduced to non-structural elements such as personality foibles and the immaturity of dissidents. Alex's political motivations, for example, are reduced to the fact that he had an unhappy childhood and was rejected by his father. By shifting causation onto the biographical-psychological, the director is able to isolate Alex from both his family and the more sympathetic world beyond South Africa's borders, not to mention black South Africans themselves.

Of importance in *April '80* is the reposturing of the genre conventions. Roles have been switched, the terrorist outsider, Alex, dies, not the *boerendogter*. The trauma originally experienced by the *boerendogter* as she adjusted from rural to urban living has been replaced with a conflict rooted in cultural differences between English and Afrikaner which is, however, resolved in a happy marriage. In other words, the indexical function of the sign of *boerendogter* has altered from indicating cultural trauma to one standing for a state of cultural attainment and social self-confidence through the resolution of the original causes of that trauma. Having initially asserted her difference to the *volk* in *April '80* she has lost much of her relative autonomy and has reverted to a semi-autonomous -- the stock albino -- character whose identity is no longer manifested in the opposition. She has come back into a relocated fold facing a new enemy. She is not drawn to the outsider anymore and the villainess has disappeared from the scene.
As a symbol the boeredogter stands for capital. Her migration to the city stands for the penetration by Afrikaans capital of English capital. This integration brought about a high degree of cultural trauma and cultural pollution. In due course, however, the alien elements represented by the city were adjusted to and adapted to an urban Afrikaans lifestyle. Having initially excommunicated the boeredogter, the boereseun was deployed to reclaim the second generation English-fathered boeredogter. The conditions for her reintegration were present in the film for although an English-speaker, she always spoke Afrikaans to the boereseun. The pairing of these two characters symbolises the rapprochement of English and Afrikaans capital standing united in the face of an external foe, despite continuing language and cultural differences.

Whereas the earlier conflict-love movies examined the relations between insiders and the outsider, all of whom were white, the genre restructured itself with the emergence of 'the Border war', placing more emphasis on relations between insiders in the context of a war against the outside. In the war film, the (predominantly black skinned) uitlander too, has switched allegiances. No longer representing British imperialism, he is now cast in the more sinister role of representing communist expansionism. Unlike the earlier uitlander who was white and who we got to know though his/her characterisation on the screen, the black outsider, as Greig observes, is a "dark inscrutable inhuman enemy: to portray the outsider would entail humanising him and this would imply at least a partial denial of the category of enemy".

The major cycle of Afrikaans film characterised by a diminishing Eden content has come and gone. Where the dominee once mediated the Security Police now tread; where 'the farm' enshrined traditional values, 'the Border' condones sexual liberation; where the boeredogter was once degraded she is now heralded; where the boereseun was drawn to the villainess he is now matched with the boeredogter: the state of Eden has been replaced by a state of materialism, militarism and the Security
POLICE

FILMS MADE FOR BLACK AUDIENCES

It is not intended that the discussion of cinema made for black viewers should form a major portion of this thesis. It is offered rather as a counterpoint to the Afrikaans cinema discussed above since it largely offers images of oppositional population movements consequent upon racial capitalism. This 'ethnic' industry owned entirely by white capital is very young and during the period 1965 to 1980 only thirty films had been made. Apart from the Heyns Films productions, those whites engaged in the production of films for black audiences work on the peripheries of the established industry and are regarded with bemusement in the light of the poor technical quality of their films. Budgets are low, ranging from an incredible R10 000 to R40 000. Crews are usually made up of the scriptwriter/director/cameraman and his assistant who are helped by an interpreter.

Extensive work has already been conducted on cinema aimed at blacks both in terms of production practice and content. The studies done hypothesised that the ideology encoded into the text of these 'black' films assume the function of ensuring class domination and forces the exploited to accept their conditions of exploitation as natural, moral and inevitable. In the context of this study, this hypothesis may seem at first glance to be functionalist and determinist. However, such is the practice of the film makers concerned and the structure of the genres they have developed, that it is difficult to justify an analysis from a less vulgar standpoint. This will become clear in the brief overview of the three main genres which have emerged in this cinema.

The three types of film do not necessarily occur in a temporal sequence or identifiable clusters, but tend to overlap, a function of the different stages of ideological manifestation of racial capitalism. In general, it would appear that the earlier images offered correspond to the concept of Grand
Apartheid while later refractions acknowledge the accommodation of the emerging black petty bourgeoisie. Before proceeding with the analysis of the different genres, it will prove useful to extract some general observations on this cinema which apply to nearly all the films to be discussed.

The Discourse of Structured Absences

The most striking absence in films aimed at blacks is the non-portrayal of whites. The characters live in a utopian black world which ignores class relations and warps the social formation. As Harriet Gavshon points out, by omitting the source of the social conflict and smoothing over racial tension, the producers of these films are merely signalling the conflict itself. The tension cannot be avoided and the absence of the ruling classes highlights the fact of conflict. The only way to deal with it is to omit it.85

Similarly, the narrative structure legitimates the absence of political issues. This is motivated by a desire among the producers to offer 'entertainment', a delimited appropriation of discourse which denies the category of 'politics'. Besides, many of the producers of these films themselves exhibit an organic ideology which leaves no doubt that they support the most conservative and reactionary fraction of the dominant discourse. Censorship is not a problem as far as thematic issues or treatment is concerned, although there have been problems as far as dress is concerned.86 By omitting 'politics' the dramatic conflict has to be attributed to biographical-psychological factors mediated by plot devices. The absence of structural conditions in the drama means that collective conflict and group solutions as found in Afrikaans films are missing; in films aimed at blacks the source of the problem is the individual him/herself. Individual solutions are therefore required to solve individual problems. Collective activity implies the existence of a wider society and more abstract social struggles and are therefore avoided.

Although these films avoid 'politics', the wider 'society'
and take refuge in 'apolitical' and 'universal' themes, the fact of their existence suggests a specific response to the conditions found in a particular historical conjuncture. Films aimed at black audiences will now be discussed in terms of three basic categories, the 'back to the homelands' movie, the co-opted movie and the conditional urban movie.

The 'Back to the Homelands' Movie

At the most extreme end of the spatial trajectory of 'black' films are the 'back to the homelands' movies which are an explicit evocation of apartheid policy. This category is similar to Flora and Flora's "disintegration-integration" category of South American photonovella which stresses the shift in values which separates the worker from his primary group or community. While Flora and Flora's categorisation implies the adaptation of the individual to an industrial economy and the acceptance of values which are consistent with capitalism, it is unable to account for the peculiar South African situation where blacks are forced back to the homelands once having adopted a degree of capitalist practice. Gavshon offers the functional category of 'traditionalism' to account for the South African process since the films in this category reproduce in their narrative structure a return to roots in terms of the conditions of racial capitalism.

The films in this category are found primarily in the Bayeta Films catalogue where the imagery is deeply rooted in the traditional concept of blacks as unsophisticated and raw rural dwellers. The films usually begin with the hero, a well dressed urbanite carrying a suitcase returning 'home'. He returns by car, but more usually by bus. Often he is simply walking through the bush. Once there, he slowly but surely discards his urban ways and by the end of the film is dressed in skins, feathers and beads. He never returns to the city. Maloyi (The Witchdoctor - 1978), for example relates the story of a sophisticated city-born woman who is bewitched by a tribal sorcerer. She discards her Western ways for the mysticism of tribal life. A musical, Vuma (1978) describes the courtship

The representations in these films define a limited and fixed social discourse, one that is technically inept, culturally ignorant and often racist. Although both *Ngomopho* and *Wangesa* both qualified for the maximum subsidy amount (R45 000 and R70 000 respectively), few of the other films in this category even qualified. Black audiences were generally wary of films in the category and did not see them.

The Co-opted Movie

The second type of film is the co-opted movie where black film makers are financed and controlled by Nationalist capital. In addition, attempts were made to co-opt oppositional film makers whose previous work and public statements showed them to be highly critical of apartheid. All the films in this category were made by Heyns Films, the front company for the Department of Information.

Whereas the previous category is identified by the narrative represented, it is more difficult to offer a description of the films under this category. Hence the co-opted film category accounts for the origin of the capital with which they were largely financed. Although they were supposed to substitute for the heroes and villains of American 'B' pictures and adapt cultural myths, the actual content of these films often is much more adventurous and 'accurate' than those of the first category. The co-opted film projects an indigenous identity of sorts which has been ideologically filtered by white anthropological 'advisors' to correspond with the dominant discourse. The black director employed to make these films, Simon Sabela, had little choice in the script or how it would be treated. The whites choose them, "Then I have to
revise them, and bring them into touch with reality". The reality that Sabela is talking about is of course the dominant discourse. As with the above category, the plots and storylines are sealed within a classless black society although one or two whites are seen in unexpected roles such as a secretary to a black businessman. Where the 'traditional' 'back to the homelands' movie was primarily located in the homelands or showed a movement towards those areas, the co-opted movie is largely located in the urban areas of 'white' South Africa, or at least in a small town. Where the average budget of the 'traditional' film was about R50 000, sometimes as low as R10 000, films in this category ranged from R105 000 for *Ikati Elimnyana* (The Black Cat - 1975) to R155 000 for *Inkunzi*. The latter film was financed by the Transkei Development Corporation. Here, a Transkeian man returns to his homeland and becomes a successful shopkeeper. It differs from the 'traditional' category in that although returning 'home', he does not foresake his capitalist values and regress into crude tribalism. This film, like *Indedama* (The Orphan - 1975) which traces the fortunes of an orphan Transkeian child from his rural origins to his qualifying as a doctor, fits somewhere between Flora and Flora's "disintegrated-integration" and "consumer-oriented" categories. The latter category functions to reinforce the value of consumerism which by necessity is central to capitalism. Social mobility is made a value in itself and is measured in terms of possessions, and in the South African case, profession. Most of the other examples in this category reflect the confusion of rural and urban values found in black urban societies. *Ngwanaka* (My Child - 1976), for example, is a love story set against a background of feuding taxi owning families and township thugs. A notorious township burglar is the subject of *Ikati Elimnyama* while *Setipana* (The Blanket Story - 1979) carries overtones of the "disintegrated-integration" and consumer oriented categories. In this film, one son of a chief becomes a doctor in London who returns to work among his people, while the other, unambitious but brave, succeeds his father as chief.

The fact that Sabela, though a co-opted petty bourgeois black
director, is invested with a degree of autonomy in direction (information funds notwithstanding), is significant in terms of audience empathy. His films, although simple, nevertheless incorporate his urban-rural ambivalences, a function of the feeling of temporality which exists amongst black urban dwellers. Despite Sabela's ignorance of the effects of structural violence, these films reflect the confusion and disorientation experienced by township inhabitants. This was to be expected, for until late 1979, black urban areas were simply dormitory towns which housed the labour serving industry in the 'white' areas.

Despite the fact that the films made by Heyns were largely funded by the Information Department they rarely approach the crude and overt racism or propaganda content of films in the previous category. Indeed, one wonders why they were made at all when the private 'industry' was taking an even more conservative line than the state itself. At about the time that the Department was closed down another trend was beginning to emerge which, while one strand did have something in common with the co-opted movie, the other escaped into fantasy.

The Conditional Urban Movie: Impermanence and Escape

The general category of conditional urban movie accounts for two distinct genres which are partly a consequence of the increasing attempts by capital and the National Party to harness the support of the growing black middle classes in terms of racial capitalism. In physical terms this is being done through the granting of municipal status to satellite housing spaces like Soweto and the granting of 99 year home ownership leases. The government has accepted the permanency of urban blacks while capital realised after the 1976 riots that suitable living conditions are a prerequisite if a stable and contented workforce is to be maintained.

The first strand of genre which may be identified under this category is the gangster movie such as Utsotsi (1978), Phindesela (1979) and Umzingeli (1979). These films show
that 'crime does not pay'. Greed, not need is the motivation. Ignoring the structural causes of poverty, the gangster film suggests that people who are out of work are lazy, indolent and not interested in jobs that are available. The moral of these films is that 'hard work assures success'. This work ethic is presented as common-sensical and the structural conditions militating against social mobility are ignored.

Constrasted with the gangster movie is the disco film. This category coincides directly with Flora and Flora's "total-escape" category where cinema provides a means of escape. They exist on the level of fantasy and ignore real conflicts. Stimulated by the township successes of Saturday Night Fever and other disco titles, black audiences were prepared for films like Isoka (1979), Botsotso (1979), Botsotso Part Two (1980) and Umdlali (1980). Most of these films were made by Ronnie Isaacs assisted by Jimmy Murray, who show a much greater cinematic flair than other producers making films for black audiences. Although drawn out and using shots of extremely long duration, rarely changing camera angles or moving the camera, they are not patronising, racist or humourless. Isaacs admits the fantasy element of his films which are set in 'white' areas. This obviates having to deal with repressive apparatuses such as Administration Boards. In any case, the appropriate visual conditions do not exist in the townships. The narratives are simple, structured around disco dancing. The plot is a fairytale similar to the story of Cinderella. In Luki (1978), for example, the hero who is a dustman wants to go to the "Ball", but like Cinderella, he does not have the appropriate clothes. Miraculously he gets the clothes, wins the 'princess' and the respect of his peers. The basic theme is that all Luki has to do is to change his class position by changing his clothes and learning to dance. By the end of the film his brother is no longer ashamed of him and in his next film, Botsotso Part Two, Luki is no longer a dustman.

Such disco motifs, whether an accurate reflection of an aspect of black city life, or simply a perpetuation of the white
film maker's stereotype of blacks as having an innate 'sense of rhythm', do nevertheless convey an understanding of change in the black worker's conditions of existence. Unlike the above categories, these films do not bombard the viewer with messages telling him/her that s/he is not suited to city life. Although no real work relations are portrayed the conditional urban movie tacitly accepts that urban status of the black, though still separate from the mainstream of urban white culture.

Lying outside the above triple typology are two further categories of cinema which may be identified in terms of their perceived audience and treatment of theme.

Authentic Cinema

Films in the authentic cinema category, although dealing with other than white characters, are designed to appeal to a wider than purely black audience. Such offerings are not intended for a particular population group as either Afrikaans film or cinema aimed at blacks. Because of its theme, treatment, characters and style, such films actively solicit cross-cultural and inter-racial audiences. Examples are *Jim Comes to Joburg* (1949) and *Magic Garden* (1961) both made by Donald Swanson. The former film deals with the experiences of a black ruralite as he arrives and tries to cope with the strange life in Johannesburg. It is a highly humorous film and has a number of scenes with the famous Jazz Aces band which developed an African jazz. Of a more serious nature, certainly more traumatically accurate is Zoltan Korda's *Cry the Beloved Country* (1951) adapted from Alan Paton's novel. Other examples include Jamie Uys' *Dingaka* (1964) and Fugard and Devenish's *Boesman and Lena* (1973) and *Marigolds in August* (1980). These are but the few films made in South Africa which would fit easily into this category.

Cinema of Popular Culture

Films in the category of popular culture most closely
approximate Third Cinema which has as its aim the decolonization of culture and the liberation of the working class. Only one film, Gibson Kente's black financed *How Long* (1976) would fall into this category. Despite Kente's middle class determination and the absence of structural causation in both his theatre and this film, by virtue of the origin of the finance and its theme, *How Long* qualifies in this category. The film was banned on four counts: obscenity, blasphemy, causing harm to race relations and prejudicing the security of the state.

The other film which might fit into the category of popular culture is Lionel Rogosin's *Come Back Africa* (1959). Though made by an American working under the cover of a commercial film unit making a musical, this film is by far the most incisive to have been made on apartheid. It is perhaps the only film which builds economic causation into its treatment, both in terms of starving workers off the land and forcing them to seek work at near starvation wages in the towns. The central character is Zachariah who is continually at the mercy of the state repressive apparatuses, ruthless employers, gangs of *tsotsis* (township thugs) and so on. He watches his family break up as his children grow up amid the violence and filth of the streets, his wife's desire for social mobility and the eventual rape and murder of his wife by a *tsotsi*. The film climaxes with the devastating effects of the apartheid system on Zachariah's personality when he finds his dead wife. The closing shot is of Zachariah going berserk. He is seated at his kitchen table and beats its fist down on it in mid shot. The downward motion is intercut with flashbacks -- hundreds of mineworkers proceeding down a staircase in a mine, two trains drawing up on either side of a railway platform disgorging thousands of commuters running as if for their lives towards the exit, an army of black workers striding sullenly and purposefully through the city -- all to the monotonous beat of a drum. This is an ending of utter despair and defeat. Through it is communicated the structural violence of apartheid, not only on the individual, but its workings as a system of exploitation.
*Come Back Africa* is the very antithesis of cinema aimed at black audiences. What is absent in the latter is present in the former; the population migration is the opposite of that shown in the 'traditional' movie; the utter degradation of the urban dweller is contrasted to the superficial cultural disorientation found in the co-opted movie; and the promise of becoming a prince in the conditional urban movie, whether by hard work or fantasy, is shown to be nothing more than a capitalist myth.
NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. See eg., Puth, G. 1976: Die Inhoud en Gehalte van 'n Steekproef Suid-Afrikaanse Rolprente voor die Instelling van Televisie. Verslag Nr. KOMM-10, HSRC, Pretoria. This factor analysis, while identifying differences between English and Afrikaans films in terms of basic categories such as crime, substance abuse etc., is unable to explain them. Neither did the author follow up his original analysis after the commencement of television to identify any before-after differences.


6. Some theorists talk of film being a "model" of reality as is done by Fourie, P. 1982: "Interkulturele Probleme in Beeldkommunikasie", Communicare, Vol. 3, No. 1, pp. 60-73. To assume that a film is a "model" of reality, however allegorical, symbolic or abstract, is misleading for it implies a functionalist and deterministic connotation which leads to a mechanistic and over-simple correspondence between 'reality' and the "image of reality". It furthermore, ignores the complex ideological debate which has revolved around the Metzian concept of the 'impression of reality'.


8. Although the consideration of genre has received extensive attention from literary scholars, Northrop Frye, for example, its analysis with regard to film has been much more sporadic. The few studies that do exist,
however, are marked by a greater degree of semiotic rigour and materialist sophistication

Briefly, as far as cinema is concerned, three phases can be discerned. The first, discussed by Perkins *op. cit.*, equated genre with formula, the result of mass production. The connotation is a pejorative one applied mainly by highbrow critics. The second phase of genre analysis accepted that film production is rule-bound, enveloped in social history. Two approaches to the study of film genres emerged as a result of this acknowledgement. One was a structuralist-based auteurism which search for discursive regularities, and within these, the signature of individual expression. This school was fuelled by Russian formalism and linguistic and anthropological tenets. The other school, modelled on the work of Leavis, was a literary auteurism. This school took as its starting point the uniqueness of the individual artist.

Willemen *op. cit.* points out that these two strands of genre theory -- literary auteurism and structuralist auteurism -- initially developed as opposition theoretical discourses to the dominant orthodoxies. In time, however, the Leavisite variant was absorbed by formal education and journalism. The result was that genre theory became largely redundant.

However, the publication of Colin McArthur's *Underworld USA*, Jim Kitses' *Horizons West* and Andrew Tudor's work marked a return to the consideration of genre in films with the added dimension of film-society relationships. This work, published in the early 1970s, was consolidated by scholars such as Ryall, Buscombe and most recently, Stephen Neale.


12. All quoted in Neale, *op. cit.*

13. Ryall, *op. cit.* p. 28


17. Neale, op. cit. p. 19
18. Ibid., p. 51
20. Ryall, op. cit. see p. 28
24. Quoted in Variety, 7 January 1953.
25. Tudor, op. cit. pp. 131-151
27. Leutrat, quoted in Neale, op. cit. p. 51
28. Ibid
30. Examples are Jacob Lub, Totius and Jochem van Bruggen
31. See Hofmeyer, op. cit.
34. Hofmeyer, op. cit. See, eg., Lub's novels: Donker Johannesburg (1910), In en Om die Goudstad (1912), Het Swart Gevaar (1913), Eenvoudige Mense (1908). See also Totius' poem Trekkerswêe, Harm Oost's play, Ou Daniel and van Bruggen's Op Vrede en Rande, published in 1912.
37. Greig, op. cit. p. 16
38. Greig, R.J. in The Star (Tonight) 4 August 1979
39. Ibid
40. Neale, op. cit. p. 50
41. Ibid
44. Wassenaar, A. 1977: Assault on Free Enterprise: The Freeway to Communism. Tafelberg, Cape Town, p. 114
45. Ibid. p. 112
47. Tilby, A.W. 1914: South Africa 1486-1913. London, p. 446. Many of these migrants, however, settled permanently in South Africa
49. Despite the influence of gold mining on South African society, it forms the subject of very few films. Those that have been made such as Pressureburst (1971) and Gold (1974) structure their plots around inter-personal relationships and disasters. Jopie Fourie was made into a television programme of the same name by Jan Scholtz but was nothing more than a whitewash of Fourie's anarchic Nationalist sentiment
50. O'Meara, op. cit.
51. A significant feature of the villainess concerns her Boland accent. According to Greig, op. cit., p. 17: "The accent of villainesses in Afrikaans films is usually the artificial, precious, slightly Frenchified account of Waterkloof, Pretoria. It is contrasted with the earthy Boland accent. (There is an additional irony here: Afrikaans actresses, born and bred in the Transvaal, frequent travellers abroad and to all intents and purposes detribalised, have told me that their popularity depends in part on the ability to assume a Boland accent. This apparently says to the audience that although the actress belongs to a slightly disreputable profession, she is nevertheless in tune with the traditional verities of the Afrikaner)"
52. O'Meara, op. cit. p. 160

53. Ibid. p. 163


56. See RJ Greig's review of Dit Was Aand en Dit was Môre in The Star (Tonight), 8 September 1977

57. Greig, op. cit. 1980, p. 18


59. Greig, op. cit. 1980, p. 17

60. Rompel, H. 1942: Die Bioskoop in Diens van die Volk. Deel II, Nasionale Pers, Kaapstad, p. 60

61. Greig, op. cit. 1980

62. Interview with Meyer in April 1981

63. It will be remembered that this is Therborn's, op. cit. p. 84 term

64. Neale, op. cit. p. 52 points out that genres serve as basic units for the calculation and investment of profit

65. See R.J. Greig's review of the film in The Star (Tonight), 7 October 1975

66. Review in Die Volksblad, 2 June 1970

67. A bywoner is a sub-tenant who lives on a farm. The term usually has the connotation of a 'poor white' who has been displaced from his property and forced to subsist on the charity of another. The bywoner shares many similarities with the sharecropper in the American South

68. Other films in the genre tend to use the camera merely to get an exposure. If the camera is moved -- tracked, panned or hoisted -- this is done for the sake of movement, rather than for any significatory effect. Rienie, on the other hand, employs a style of camerawork which clearly marries camera style with content
69. John van Zyl in an unpublished review of the film entitled A Leap of Lepers: Plekkies in die Son comments on the indulgence of this film: "The abysmal quality of the narrative ensures that no tear is left unjerked ... Even soap operas have certain restrictions!"

70. Greig in The Star (Tonight) 4 August 1979

71. Ibid

72. Meyer interview, op. cit.

73. Greig, op. cit. 1980, p. 21

74. Ibid

75. One of the supporting programmes to Terrorist was a Department of Information documentary about the army. Made in Afrikaans it is "remarkable only for the dogged way it discovers reds, soviet, marxists, socialists and communists under every stone and in every building beyond the borders". See Greig, R.J. in his review of the film published in The Star (Tonight), 6 December 1978. This documentary was later replaced by a film made by Hetherington, the director of Terrorist, made for the Woolboard


77. See Robert Greig's review of Grensbasis 13 in The Star (Tonight), 4 June 1979

78. Ibid

79. Sunday Times, 27 May 1979

80. Rosmary Raphaely in The Star (Tonight), 1 June 1979

81. The original script clearly locates the action on the campus of the University of the Witwatersrand. Reference is also made to the National Union of South African Students, of which Alex is a member. This Union, or NUSAS, is an ultra-liberal English language student body which has repeatedly come under fire from the state and many of its leaders have been banned. After examination of the script, the producer was denied permission by the University's Vice-Chancellor from using the University as a location. The film was subsequently shot in various locations including Rand Afrikaans University, the Johannesburg College of Education and Goudstak. Although references to Wits were deleted, the implication that the fictional university its Wits is clear. This was reinforced by a pre-publicity release which carried the headline "Politics at Wits"

Prior to the release of the film it was screened to NUSAS who objected to their image in the film. These were also deleted from the final version
such, Afrikaans cinema in particular, substituted for television as it shaped and culturally naturalised a vast Afrikaner urbanisation process which had begun at the turn of the century.

### Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACF</td>
<td>African Consolidated Films Ltd</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACT</td>
<td>African Consolidated Theatres Ltd</td>
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<tr>
<td>AF</td>
<td>African Films Ltd</td>
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<tr>
<td>ART</td>
<td>African Films Trust</td>
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<tr>
<td>ATT</td>
<td>African Theatres Trust</td>
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<tr>
<td>BONUSKOR</td>
<td>Bonus Investment Corporation</td>
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<tr>
<td>BIFD</td>
<td>British International Film Distributors</td>
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<tr>
<td>BIP</td>
<td>British International Pictures</td>
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<tr>
<td>BTI</td>
<td>Board of Trade and Industries</td>
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<tr>
<td>BOSS</td>
<td>Bureau of State Security</td>
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<tr>
<td>CARPO</td>
<td>Christian Afrikaans Film and Photographic Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>DP</td>
<td>Directorate of Publications</td>
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<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Dutch Reformed Church</td>
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<tr>
<td>FAK</td>
<td>Federation of Afrikaner Cultural Societies</td>
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<tr>
<td>FPPA</td>
<td>Feature Film Producers Association</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fox</td>
<td>20th Century Fox-Film</td>
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<tr>
<td>FVB</td>
<td>Federal Peoples Savings Ltd</td>
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<tr>
<td>IVTA</td>
<td>International Variety and Theatrical Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>KARPO</td>
<td>Afrikaans Churches Film and Photographic Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>MGM</td>
<td>Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGM</td>
<td>Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer</td>
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<tr>
<td>NPPA</td>
<td>Motion Picture Producers Association of South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OVB</td>
<td>Ox wagon Sentinel (Ooswagbranding)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCB</td>
<td>Publications Control Board</td>
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<tr>
<td>PHEC</td>
<td>Parade Home Entertainments Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NABO</td>
<td>Reddingsdaadbond Amateur Film Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDB</td>
<td>Reddingsdaadbond</td>
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