Ideology, hegemony and HIV/AIDS: The appropriation of indigenous and global spheres

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Abstract

Ideology is a fundamental aspect of society, and ideological analysis has been applied to the development of explanatory frameworks for understanding structural dominance within social formations. Structural and post-structural conceptions of ideology have focused on macro-ideological phenomena and processes, offering explanation of relations between economic base and super-structure as they inter-relate with ideological dominance. Ideologies serve the interests of particular social formations or classes over others, and at the macro-level this has to do with organised thought as it relates to power. This thesis explores the concept of ideology and related concepts of dominance, power and hegemony, through relocating macro-level understandings and analysis of ideology within analysis of superstructural entities – notably organisations, groups and elites. HIV/AIDS is an ecological phenomenon that is accompanied by processes of sense-making that incorporate ideological dimensions in the public sphere, particularly in relation to social policy and strategy. Ideological discourses about HIV/AIDS have drawn on specific epistemological foundations and world-views, incorporating intersections with parallel ideologies, and in many instances being directed towards achieving expansion and dominance of particular ideas. This ideological strategy incorporates the construction of common sense. Ideological claims are reiterative, but are also related to processes of legitimation that combine structural relations with communicative power. A South African HIV/AIDS programme, loveLife, is utilised as a case study to demonstrate ideological trajectories over time. The inter-relation between claims about the HIV/AIDS epidemic, claims about impact of the loveLife programme, and the utility of alliances and structural partnerships in legitimating such claims is explored. These claims-making processes are found to also occur at global level through the active resourcing and facilitation by loveLife programme’s founding funder, the Kaiser Family Foundation. These activities intersect in the development of an ideological bloc that is directed towards expansion and dominance through appropriation of indigenous and global discourse spheres.
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I, Warren Martin Parker (Student Number: 891150099), declare that this thesis is my own original work and that where use has been made of the work of others, it has been duly acknowledged in the text. This thesis is submitted in fulfilment of the Doctor of Philosophy Degree in Culture, Communication and Media Studies in the Faculty of Humanities at the University of KwaZulu-Natal in Durban, South Africa.

It has not been submitted before for any degree or examination, or to any other university.

Signature: _____________________ Date: ____________________
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AIDS</td>
<td>Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amfar</td>
<td>American Foundation for AIDS Research</td>
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<tr>
<td>ANC</td>
<td>African National Congress</td>
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<tr>
<td>CBO</td>
<td>Community-based Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>CADRE</td>
<td>Centre for AIDS Development, Research and Evaluation</td>
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<tr>
<td>DHS</td>
<td>Demographic and Health Survey</td>
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<td>HIV</td>
<td>Human Immunodeficiency Virus</td>
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<tr>
<td>HST</td>
<td>Health Systems Trust</td>
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<tr>
<td>KABP</td>
<td>Knowledge, Attitudes, Beliefs and Practices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KFF</td>
<td>Henry J Kaiser Family Foundation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M&amp;E</td>
<td>Monitoring and Evaluation</td>
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<tr>
<td>MDM</td>
<td>Mass Democratic Movement</td>
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<tr>
<td>MTC</td>
<td>Media Training Centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>NASHI</td>
<td>National Adolescent Sexual Health Initiative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non Governmental Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>PPASA</td>
<td>Planned Parenthood Association of South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RHRU</td>
<td>Reproductive Health Research Unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>SABC</td>
<td>South African Broadcasting Corporation</td>
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<tr>
<td>STD</td>
<td>Sexually Transmitted Disease</td>
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<td>STI</td>
<td>Sexually Transmitted Illness</td>
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<tr>
<td>TB</td>
<td>Tuberculosis</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNAIDS</td>
<td>United Nations AIDS Program</td>
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<td>UNGASS</td>
<td>United Nations General Assembly</td>
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<td>VCT</td>
<td>Voluntary Counselling and Testing</td>
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<td>World Bank</td>
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CHAPTER 1

Introduction

The loveLife programme was first launched in South Africa in September 1999 (after operating initially under the acronym NASHI – National Adolescent Sexual Health Initiative). It was immediately positioned as an HIV prevention programme that was going to single-handedly halve prevalence of the virus amongst youth and address the ‘limited impact’ of existing HIV/AIDS programmes (loveLife 1999a). Founded and core-funded by the US-based Henry J Kaiser Family Foundation (with additional initial funding by the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation and Old Mutual), loveLife brought together a consortium of implementing partners – the Health Systems Trust (HST), the Reproductive Health Research Unit (RHRU), Advocacy Initiatives, the Planned Parenthood Association of South Africa (PPASA) and the Media Training Centre (MTC) – as well as collaborating partnerships with the Department of Health, the National Youth Commission, the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), The Sowetan and the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC).1

The programme’s approach emphasised public relations largesse, linkages with political and economic elites on an unprecedented scale, and a distinctive emphasis on claims-making in relation to HIV/AIDS including related statistics and programme ‘impacts’. Organised under the auspices of First Lady, Zanele Mbeki, in 1999, loveLife included an advisory board of 25 politicians, government officials, corporate and media representatives, church leaders, entertainers and youth – only two of whom had any credentials in reproductive health or HIV/AIDS.2

1 Over time these partnerships have shifted, and by 2002 the implementing partners comprised only HST, PPASA and RHRU. Relationships with UNICEF, The Sowetan and the National Youth Commission also fell away. Expansion of relationships with other partners is explored elsewhere in this thesis.

2 The initial advisory board (titles listed at the time in loveLife 1999a) included Zanele Mbeki (First Lady and convenor), King Goodwill Zwelithini (Zulu King), Zindzi Mandela-Hlungwane (entertainment promoter and daughter of Nelson Mandela), Saki Macozoma (MD of Transnet), Marcel Golding (Chair of Hoskins Consolidated Investments), Connie September (Member of Parliament), Archbishop Njongonkulu Ndungane (Anglican Archbishop), Brenda Kali (Programme Director, SABC1), Nina de Klerk (Director of the Association of Advertising Agencies), Eddie Mhlanga (Chief Director, Department of Health), Khopotso Mopka (AIDS counsellor), Tim Modise (radio broadcaster), Thandi Mazwai (vocalist, Bongo Muffin), Chantel
At the time of the programme’s outset, a number of colleagues and I were running the national Department of Health’s Beyond Awareness HIV/AIDS communication programme. The campaign was grounded on critical reflections of the Department’s previous approaches to communication (particularly the poorly conceptualised HIV/AIDS play Sarafina II\(^3\)) and specifically contested linear and top-down communication interventions:

> Goals and objectives for health communication can only be set if there is a realistic understanding of the complex factors that influence health in the first place. The role of communication in influencing health therefore, requires an integrated approach that includes a clear understanding of people’s contexts, and the various preventative and support strategies required to promote and improve health. (Parker et al 1999:22)\(^4\)

At the time international thinking around HIV/AIDS communication in relation to sexual behaviour change was also being reviewed. Following a series of international expert workshops convened by the United Nations HIV/AIDS Programme (UNAIDS), and Penn State University, it was noted that many of the existing theories and models “focus primarily on individual behaviour and make little or no allowance for the role of the social and environmental context of disease prevention interventions” (UNAIDS/Penn State 1999:15). Weaknesses of these models were noted as follows:

- The simple, linear relationship between individual knowledge and action, which underpinned earlier interventions, does not take into account the variation among the political, socioeconomic and cultural contexts that prevail in the regions;

- The emphasis on quantitative measures (rather than qualitative inferences or a combination of both) results in distorted interpretation of the meanings and realities in observed behaviours;

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\(^3\) Sarafina II was an HIV/AIDS awareness play initiated by the then Minister of Health, Nkosizana Zuma, who commissioned playwright Mbongeni Ngema to produce a follow-up production to his internationally successful play and film, *Sarafina*. Ngema was contracted and provided with relative flexibility in terms of budget, expending some R13-million in the pre-production phase.

External decision-making processes that cater to rigid, narrowly focused, and short-term interests tend to overlook the benefits of long-term, internally derived, broad-based solutions;

The assumption that individuals can or will exercise total control over their behaviour has led to a focus on the individual rather than on the social context within which the individual functions, and disregard for the influence of contextual variables, such as culture and gender relationships;

There is an assumption that decisions about HIV/AIDS prevention are based on rational, volitional thinking with no regard for more true-to-life emotional responses to engaging in sexual behaviour;

There is an assumption that there is a sequential linear relationship between knowledge, attitude, belief, behaviour and practice (KABBP), when engagement in sexual intercourse often precedes any rational decision based on full or even partial knowledge of risk-taking behaviour;

There is an assumption that creating awareness through media campaigns will necessarily lead to behaviour change;

There is an assumption that a simple strategy designed to trigger a once-in-a-lifetime behaviour, such as immunisation, would be adequate for changing and maintaining complex, life-long behaviours such as consistent condom use (UNAIDS/Penn State 1999:23-24).

It was remarkable that in spite of both local and international thinking being positioned as critical of top-down interventions located in mass media communication, a programme that both implicitly and explicitly ran counter to these critiques (loveLife) was, as I shall demonstrate, being located at centre stage of the response to HIV prevention in South Africa. Moreover, the programme had garnered extensive support internationally and locally and had secured considerable multi-year multi-million rand funding commitments. Furthermore, the considerable funding base of the programme introduced a range of practices that ran counter to those established by existing programmes. For example, in contrast to conservative fiscal practices and acknowledgement of broad-based interventions, loveLife emphasised flashy high cost launch events, whilst programme communication was heavily weighted towards singular promotion of the loveLife programme through public relations activities. Other anomalies included statistical pronouncements and
generalisations about the epidemic in South Africa that ran counter to any existing research findings, with such pronouncements being linked to the notion that a single programme, loveLife, would on its own, transform HIV prevalence amongst youth in South Africa.

In the early phases of the programme, the objectives were framed as follows: “to initiate a national conversation about the loveLife brand and excite the popular imagination about loveLife” and to “make explicit the link between sexual behaviour and HIV” (loveLife 2001a). This ‘conversation’, located directly within the linear top-down approaches to communication that both Beyond Awareness and UNAIDS/Penn State were so critical, was positioned within a paradigm that ran counter to related concerns about the need to recognise cultural diversity, gender relations, spirituality and socioeconomic conditions that were inter-related with HIV prevention (see UNAIDS/Penn State 1999). The loveLife launch campaign, for example, was framed by discourses of ‘sexual titillation’ such as a billboard campaign entitled ‘foreplay’ (see Figure 1), and stickers with slogans such as ‘the naked truth’, ‘use your mouth’ and ‘oral sex’ (loveLife 2001a:12-13). These representations, in effect, constructed loveLife’s target ‘market’ – young people aged 12-17 – as strongly focused on sexual pleasure with parallel constructions centred on youth as materially oriented, brand driven consumers.
The notion of 12-17 year old South African youth as mono-cultural, unified by sexual desire and materialist consumption, directly contradicted obvious diversities of language, culture and access to disposable income amongst youth, whilst divergent stages of sexual awareness and maturity within the ‘target’ age group was masked in the conflation of 12-17 year old youth as the ‘target’ group. The predominance of families living in poverty throughout South Africa contradicted the orientation towards a bourgeois aspirational ‘positive lifestyle’ – positioned as integral to achieving the goals of the loveLife programme, whilst differing relations to sexual activity within the 12-17 year old age range needed to be recognised rather than conflated.

In spite of these contradictions and theoretical deficiencies, loveLife continued to garner political and financial support. Cabinet ministers were often on hand to launch loveLife activities;\(^5\) in 2000, R47-million was contributed to the programme by the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation;\(^6\) and in 2001 a direct grant of R75-million over three years was made by the South African Treasury (Hickey & Whelan 2001). Supportive partnerships were expanded to include relationships with the Independent

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Newspaper Group and the Sunday Times to produce and distribute the youth magazines ThethaNathi and S’camto respectively, and the programme was diversified into an eclectic mix of activities including: a national level communication campaign incorporating broadcast, print and outdoor media; telephone helplines for youth and parents; event-based activities including ‘love-tours’, a ‘loveTrain’ and loveLife games; service provision through a relatively small number of community-based Y-centres, adolescent friendly clinics and community-based franchises; peer education through youth ‘GroundBreakers’; and a programme focusing on parents. Event-based activities were also expanded into wider tangents over time – for example, in 2002 loveLife partnered with EarthShip Mission Possible, a project of polar explorer Robert Swan, to send a group of GroundBreakers to Antarctica. This was followed by the trucking of the yacht around South Africa and display at the World Summit on the Environment in Johannesburg. A partnership with the Royal Cape yacht club included loveLife participation in the Cape to Rio yacht race and a later trip up the west coast of Africa. Such forays had very little to do with HIV prevention – the Antarctica trip was linked to cleaning up the environment, whilst the other yachting ventures were linked to encouraging sailing the involvement of disadvantaged youth in sailing:

Dr David Harrison, CEO of loveLife said: “The concept of the loveLife GroundBreaker Challenge is to demonstrate to young people that by pushing personal limits, even ‘impossible’ goals can be achieved. Even though only ten GroundBreakers will sail to Rio when they return to South Africa they will lead a sailing development programme, hopefully involving hundreds of teenagers throughout South Africa. The partnership between loveLife and the Royal Cape Yacht Club will hopefully encourage sailing clubs around the country to take young people from disadvantaged backgrounds to participate in the challenge, expanding their horizons and at the same time breaking down the perception that sailing is a whites-only sport.”

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The programme’s strong emphasis on public relations activities was weighted towards launches, often including international and local elites – for example in May 2001, King Goodwill Zwelethini (also a member of the loveLife Advisory Board) and musician Harry Belafonte, inaugurated a loveLife Y-Centre in KwaZulu Natal; in the same month, the launch of a loveLife Y-Centre in Orange Farm included Zwelethini, Zanele Mbeki (loveLife ‘Convener’) and various local musicians; and in September 2002, former President’s Nelson Mandela and Bill Clinton, along with Hollywood actors Kevin Spacey and Chris Tucker, were on hand to launch the GroundBreaker programme at Orange Farm. Local politicians such as Deputy President, Jacob Zuma, Minister of Health, Manto Tshabalala-Msimang, religious leaders such as Archbishop Desmond Tutu and entertainers such as Pieter Dirk Uys were also drawn in, and appeared in a series of advertisements promoting the loveLife ‘Parent Campaign’ in 2002.

As I shall demonstrate in this thesis, such endorsements, in combination with financial resources and partnerships with various corporates, bolstered the programme’s positional power within the AIDS field in South Africa. Through such linkages, the programme had in effect commandeered the sphere of HIV/AIDS programming in relation to youth in South Africa, with little consultation on the ground, nor with organisations working in the field, whilst at the same time constructing the notion that it was the loveLife alone that youth found meaningful. Young people and HIV/AIDS in South Africa were homogenised and commodified by loveLife, and as I shall show, communication about the programme centred on reiterative claims-making that marginalised other programmes in the field. This approach in effect, and over time, involved an appropriation of the indigenous HIV/AIDS and HIV/AIDS-youth sphere – a process that as I demonstrate, also occurs within the global sphere.

Reflexivity and social inquiry

One of the early problems to be confronted in developing this thesis was the positioning of myself in relation to the research subject (the loveLife programme). Much of my work as Director of the Centre for AIDS Development, Research and

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12 This event garnered front-page publicity in the Independent Newspaper Group’s weekly, the *Sunday Independent* (2002, September 9) Clinton and Madiba enthrall Orange Farm. There was also some PR spin-off via invited elites – for example, then University of Witwatersrand Vice Chancellor, Norma Reed, included references to dancing with Mandela at the ‘inspirational launch’ in her regular column in *Wits Edge* (September 2002).
Evaluation (CADRE) was related to contributing to, and managing national level HIV/AIDS communication activities in combination with conducting related theoretical and practical research in the HIV/AIDS communication field. It appeared initially that there was potential to explore analysis of the loveLife programme through adopting a narrative method that would allow for “self-reflexivity, systematically problematis[ing] the position of the researcher in relation to his/her subject/s, and critically examin[ing] how data is collected and interpreted in terms of observed relations” (Tomaselli 2004:6). My embeddedness in the field and in relation to the subject, seemed to suggest that such an autoethnographic approach would provide a useful methodological frame. Ellis defines autoethnography as:

*a genre of writing and research that displays multiple layers of consciousness, connecting the personal to the cultural… Auto-ethnographers gaze, first through an ethnographic wide-angle lens, focusing outward on social and cultural aspects of their personal experience; then they look inward, exposing a vulnerable self that is moved by, and may move through, refract and resist cultural interpretations. (Ellis 1999:673)*

Ethnography, the anthropological approach from which autoethnography is derived, is about contexts – but more so, it is about researchers within contexts: researchers who see, feel and touch the world they describe, transcending the notion of researcher as a distant objective observer and reaching into the notion of researcher as subjective participant. Although most ethnography is located outside of the researcher’s own lived context, autoethnography provides the framework for intersubjective and theoretical accounts within the researcher’s own contexts (see Tedlock 2000). This approach allows researchers to address the tensions that exist in social research which are rooted in objectifying the subject and include the problem of potentially isolating the researcher from his or her socio-cultural and political history.

Ethnographic method has to do with research methodologies that attempt to delve deeply into the subject’s milieu with a view to exposing a culture from the point of view of those who live it. There is less clarity however, regarding the nature of objectivity within the context of researcher as subject, where subjectivities are foregrounded over objectivity. The empirical principles of social science research lend themselves to an authoritative voice of the researcher, often conveyed in a distant, clinical and passive voice. In autoethnography the voice of the author shifts, drawing the reader in through active voice, into the world of the author’s subjective
perceptions. This requires balance if one is to avoid an egocentric account that blurs what is being studied — a balance between writing from within the context and authorial narcissism. This has to do both with matters of narrative style and matters of subject. With regard to the latter, Bullough and Pinnegar suggest:

> When biography and history are joined and when the issue confronted by the self is shown to have relationship to and bearing on the context and ethos of a time, then self-study moves to research... Each self study researcher must negotiate that balance, but it must be a balance – tipping too far toward the self side produces solipsism or a confessional, and tipping too far the other way turns self-study into traditional research. (Bullough & Pinnegar 2001:15)

Autoethnography includes other limitations – notably, the blurring of methods of recall and documentation, and limits of reliability within narrative (see Ellis & Bochner 2000)

In exploring the utility of autoethnography as a methodology for PhD level inquiry, it became clear that it was unlikely to be sustainable in relation to the subject at hand. Specifically, I had no interest in immersing myself in a more sustained and direct way within the loveLife programme as a researcher. My relation to the loveLife programme as ‘I’ was depersonalised, and had more to do with the relation of the theoretical framework of loveLife to its practical construction in the public sphere. I was more interested in its implications for HIV/AIDS policy in South Africa, than as an entity to be engaged intensively, and therefore a more conventional academic approach to inquiry has been adopted.

Such a relation to the subject cannot however, simply be bypassed. I remain in some ways connected to the research subject by virtue of my individual and work-related interests in the sphere of HIV/AIDS, and this needs to be addressed. Reflexivity, which includes critical analysis of one’s own biases and acknowledgement of the relation of researcher to subject (see Kleinsasser 2000), is a necessary part of qualitative research practice. It serves as a process within itself, addressing researcher/author subjectivities including gender, class and culture, unmasking theoretical assumptions, critically examining method and process, and at the same time contributing to introspective learning. As Jordan & Yeomans (1995:393) suggest: “Reflexivity… operates on the basis of a dialectic between the researcher, research process and its product”.

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Addressing the contradictions of the loveLife programme involves the development of a methodological approach that is underpinned by a range of theoretical frameworks derived from cultural studies – particularly theoretical approaches to ideological construction as they intersect with processes of dominance. Whilst this theory-led critical approach is less served by a narrative method, there are certain aspects of my location in the field that require foregrounding of ethics and reflexivity with respect to the research project and research subjects.

In a more typical ethnographic research project, human subjects are studied within defined contexts and informed consent involves obtaining permission to work in the study ‘community’, to seek consent from individual informants, and to be clearly identified as a researcher. Dingwall (1980) addresses this question, exploring the complex variations of subjects who are primary, secondary or marginal to the project, and illustrates the impracticalities of obtaining permission from each person. He suggests that one method of addressing the problem is to be as overt as possible about data collection and to provide mechanisms for subjects to critically engage the researcher. This approach contrasts with covert research methods whereby researchers insert themselves into research contexts without identifying their research interests – for example, posing as mental patients, air force recruits, alcoholics, and voyeurs (Homan, 1980).

For the most part, the inquiry in this thesis deals with the loveLife programme’s public constructions and representations, and what this data allows is an exploration and analysis of patterns of ideological construction in discourse that can be related to the functioning of ideology that exposes contradictions and dominance. What is less possible however, is the relation of such discourses to the concept of ideological intent of the agents located within loveLife – i.e. it is one thing to foster ideological processes that are contradictory and to be ignorant of them, but quite another to consciously foster such processes consciously. Various research strategies might be adopted to explore this latter point, including, for example, interviewing the various individuals who constitute the loveLife programme, or covertly engaging with the loveLife programme. This approach may, however, pose ethical problems in the sense that research subjects might need to be kept uninformed about the critical nature of the inquiry. A related problem was that as a researcher and practitioner in the field, I was known to be critical of the loveLife programme, and this might influence attempts at open inquiry. Additionally, critique of the programme (amongst
other programmes and related HIV/AIDS policies) was a function of my work in the HIV/AIDS field and could not be sublimated to the research inquiry.

A central question of this thesis is the exploration of the relation of contradiction to ideological representation – a process that is nuanced by understanding whether contradictions are consciously known (and perpetuated in spite of being known), or are simply a product of structural relations. Access to data that might contribute understanding to this question involved some level of covert research – i.e. accessing internal loveLife programme documents via third parties on the one hand, and sublimating declaration of my interest as a researcher on the other. With regard to the former, the process of obtaining documents was not consciously followed as a research strategy, but individuals who had access to internal documents did on occasion provide these to me. The documents were not particularly ‘secret’ or startling, but did provide important insights. For example structural relations and related mechanisms that had fostered particular aspects of ideological representation were revealed through access to legal contracts between the loveLife programme and the Independent Newspaper Group/Sunday Times: both contracts contained clauses that suggested that critical reporting on the loveLife programme by either newspaper group was potentially constrained, whilst in the case of the Independent Newspaper Group, the existing pro-bono practice of promoting the Department of Health’s national toll free AIDS Helpline alongside HIV/AIDS stories was required to be replaced by direct promotion of loveLife’s youth helpline ThethaJunction. Monitoring reports of the ThethaJunction helpline demonstrated contradictions between ‘internal’ knowledge and public claims – for example, at a time when claims were being made to receiving 60 000 calls a month internal data was showing maximum levels of around 28 000 calls a month, with considerably lower numbers of calls actually being answered. In loveLife evaluation studies, claims were also

13 See Memorandum of Understanding between loveLife and Independent Newspapers (Pty) Ltd (October 2001) and Contract Agreement between loveLife and the Sunday Times (January 2002).

14 For example, over the period November 2000 to October 2001, the average rate of calls was 28 545, with a peak of over 65 000 in one month (apparently in conjunction with running of a competition). In the following quarter, the number of calls ‘offered’ (i.e. calls to the line) versus calls ‘handled’ (i.e. calls actually answered) was also monitored, and it was noted that over the period October 2001 to December 2001 calls ‘offered’ ranged from 19 223 to 25 550, with calls answered ranging from 12 775 to 18 782. In essence, the average call rate to the line was below 25 000, whilst actual calls answered were lower still. (See loveLife (2001) Monitoring and evaluation of loveLife, September 2000 to August 2001, and loveLife (2001) Quarterly monitoring report, October 2001 to December 2001.) Claims to an average of 60 000 calls were however being made publicly when framing the loveLife programme. For example, at a conference in the United States, president of the Henry J Kaiser Family Foundation, Drew Altman, claimed during a presentation on loveLife in March 2002: “There is a toll free telephone hotline staffed by trained counsellors that is now mind blowing to me, receiving 60,000
being made that correlated exposure to the loveLife programme with HIV/AIDS related behaviours and practices. For example, as I later demonstrate, although monocausal correlation was suggested in a final research report (Pettifor, Rees, Steffenson, Hlongwana-Madikizela, MacPhail, Vermaak, & Kleinschmidt 2004), questions about exposure to Soul City and the Red Ribbon Campaign had been asked in survey questionnaires, and in pre-publication drafts it was shown that young people had as high or higher levels of exposure to these other HIV/AIDS programmes other than loveLife itself.\footnote{15} This important and relevant observation was omitted in the final report.

Another research approach that may be considered covert involved engagements with the loveLife programme through subjecting the programme to public critique in relation to the contradictions identified through various research processes (including, but not exclusively, research related to this thesis). This included participation in internet discussions as part of a debate brought about by an international communication website, the Communication Initiative (which elicited public correspondence from the loveLife programme);\footnote{16} a paper critical of loveLife presented at the First South African AIDS Conference (which elicited private correspondence from the director of the loveLife programme); and access to private correspondence between loveLife and \textit{Fair Lady} magazine in response to an impending article on the programme.\footnote{17}

Homan (1980) refers to covert research as being framed by processes where the researcher’s relation to the subject is not overtly stated, raising the question as to whether this form of sociological inquiry is legitimate – for example, in the case of his own research into Pentecostal churches, where the pragmatic consideration of “going underground would afford the greater opportunity of observing the normal language-behaviour of old-time Pentecostals” (p. 49). One concern is the right of the research subject(s) to privacy – for example, to not have themselves observed in relation to research, or alternately, to not have been provided with the opportunity for

\footnote{15} These figures are presented in Chapter 5 on p. 120. (See draft and final versions of Pettifor, A., Rees, H.V., Steffenson, A., Hlongwana-Madikizela, L., MacPhail, C., Vermaak, K., & Kleinschmidt, I. 2004.)


\footnote{17} These discussions are detailed elsewhere in this thesis.
informed consent. Bulmer (1980) questions the validity of ‘dishonest representation of interests’ by suggesting that this is rationalised by an ends-means argument, but acknowledges that there are degrees of ‘deception’ and that covert methods cannot be ruled out entirely as methods of social research. Again, the examples that apply to the present research do not involve deception in terms of attempting to directly obtain documents from loveLife, nor were third parties requested to procure such documents. A guiding principle in this regard, has been to defer to a concept derived from journalistic ethics, which has to do with public interest – i.e. in the context of a complex HIV/AIDS epidemic, it would be in the public interest to know that a large scale programme drawing on public funds is involved in practices that appear to be related to vested rather than public interests (for example, making claims that are known to be untrue, or threatening critics of the programme). Equally, it would be both legal and legitimate to draw on sources documents not immediately located in the public domain. In the present instances, the data at hand has provided important insights and support to theoretically founded arguments (including informing further lines of inquiry), and can thus be understood as ethically forming a legitimate part of the research inquiry. There is also perhaps a converse ethical requirement – notably, that ignoring or failing to integrate such information would work against the concept of public interest (and by extension, research interest).

Exploring how the programme might address critiques made in the public domain, immediately positions critiques and responses within discourse fora that may well be subjected to analytic research. There is perhaps some blurring of the lines here in terms of my formal work in the AIDS field, and my role as PhD student, given that in both instances, public level critique need not necessarily be related to declaring parallel research agendas – any public discourse is subject to analysis. Similarly, whilst responses to some of these critiques may have taken the form of letters, it does not necessarily follow that such letters fall out of the public frame of reference (or research frame), whether or not they are addressed to single individuals (including myself).

**Defining the research project**

HIV/AIDS is an ecological phenomenon that has impacted directly on material conditions and lived experience globally. In South Africa the epidemic has reached prevalence levels in excess of ten percent in the general population, and in some populations, regions, and contexts, infection levels are far higher (Shisana et al 2002;
UNAIDS 2004b). AIDS interventions thus occupy an important place within the sphere of public policy and funding investment. Interventions in response to AIDS occur at all levels of society, including both organic and relatively informal responses (such as small groups of individuals working collaboratively to provide care to individuals who are ill or to children orphaned by AIDS at grassroots level) as well as formal responses located within the state or other formal institutions and groups. All AIDS interventions require resources to be sustained, and larger national and international level programmes are often resource intensive. Similarly, at most levels of intervention, a competition exists between programmes, organisations and groups to secure acceptance, and in some cases expansion and dominance, within the broad response to the epidemic. This direction towards dominance, whether formal or informal, overt or covert, involves ideological dimensions – specifically the framing in the public sphere of the ideas that constitute a given programme or intervention, and further, related processes of legitimation. Ideology thus intersects with discourse processes that foster dominance.

Whilst not all groups or organisations working in the HIV/AIDS field in South Africa emphasise ideological discourses (i.e. discourses about the core ideas framing their activities), nor do all seek dominance or expansion (for example, through reiteration of their claimed impacts), at some level or another, any group or organisation requires some framing of its core ideas, goals and processes to function within society. AIDS work carries with it a sense of social purpose that is interconnected with moral purpose, of contributing positively to society, and as a result AIDS groups and organisation related foundations and donors are assumed to be functioning primarily with the social good in mind – a process that I shall demonstrate, allows for appropriation of particular spheres. Whilst some degree of competition for resources and related ideological positioning is inevitable, what set the loveLife programme apart from the outset was the apparently concerted investment in securing competitive advantage through employing a range of strategies that were intrinsically ideological, at the same time occupying a position that contradicted emerging theoretical frameworks that sought to inform future communication-oriented HIV/AIDS policies and strategies. As I shall demonstrate, this process was situated both within and beyond discourse, in a complex of alliances, partnerships and structural relations. Within this context, discourse can be understood not simply as the use of language, but a particular use of language that has to do with the production of knowledge – i.e. a language practice. Discourse has to do with constructing knowledge over a range of texts – by “both producing and
It was the reiterative and positional discourses about the loveLife programme that captured my attention. Particularly, what was interesting in relation to my involvement as a researcher and practitioner working in the HIV/AIDS field, was that as much as there were critical perspectives of the programme embedded within discourses of colleagues working in the field, the programme itself was able to expand and dominate AIDS policy thinking with little need to address latent critiques and resistances. Equally, whilst it was possible to critically reflect on the programme, theoretical frameworks immediately at hand appeared insufficient for explanatory analysis of the phenomenon of its dominance. The focus of this thesis is the development of such a theoretical framework, and utilising it to apply concepts of ideology to organisational level dominance processes. This has involved a return to what might be termed ‘classic’ cultural studies texts – primarily the work of the Birmingham School during the 1970s and 1980s which explored and developed post-structural thinking around ideology, drawing extensively on the work of Marx, Althusser, Gramsci and Poulantzas (see Thomas 2000). Drawing on these analyses, but working past economism, I have set out to recast understanding of the role of discourse within ideological production and reproduction, exploring processes conducive to legitimation and dominance within the context of the social predicament of HIV/AIDS. The loveLife programme is drawn upon as a case study, and is used to demonstrate the complex of ideological relations that underpin attempts to secure dominance within the HIV/AIDS field locally and globally.
CHAPTER 2

Theorising ideology and ideology critique

The emerging phenomenon of HIV/AIDS in the 1980s was very much located in public discourse. During this phase, emphasis was placed on biomedical orientations that focused on the viral nature of HIV and modes of infection. These discourses were not without ideological dimensions: HIV infection was attributed to risky sexual practices amongst gay men, Haitians and Africans, and politicking was rife amongst scientists laying claim to the ‘discovery’ of the virus. This period laid the foundations for a wide range of social explanations of behavioural and social factors that contributed to vulnerability to HIV infection, as well as extending to the social spheres that lay beyond individual HIV infection. Explanations with regard to the latter were largely grounded in social and biomedical research involving analyses of epidemiological trends in relation to intersections with sexual behaviours, practices and contexts.

Whilst such research, functioning in concert with the range of responses and interventions, was integral to the development of HIV/AIDS policy, these processes have also formed the foundation for a wide range of ideological developments in relation to the disease and including constructing, legitimating and replicating particular interpretations of the epidemic. The concept of ideology offers an understanding of the relationship between social and material conditions and the ideas that frame social life in any given era. Ideologies are all pervasive systems for structuring thought and action with a primary orientation towards ensuring dominance of particular ideas at one level or another.

The roots of ideology

Ideologies can be understood as clusters of ideas that are related to the coherence of society. One or more ideologies may be generalised throughout society, or may apply more specifically to fractions of society. Ideologies can work in concert or can be antagonistic to each other. Certain constructions within ideologies may be specific to
a particular ideology, but ideologies as a whole overlap with other ideologies and ideological formations and are thus not readily understood as unified sets of ideas. Ideologies may be deeply embedded in the economic base of society and may be termed macro-ideologies, whilst others are related to macro-ideologies but are situated in the superstructure and are less embedded in the base.

Ideologies can be understood in a neutral way as a systematic and elaborated set of ideas with a relative coherence, or alternately, critically, as ideas that involve subjectivities that include contradictions and distortion. The Marxist conception of ideology has emphasised the notion of ideology as distorted ideas that are derived from economic relations of production and reproduction which are functional to maintaining imbalanced relations of dominance. In this sense, ideology has a negative polemical conception: “The ruling ideas are nothing more than the ideal expression of the dominant material relationships, grasped as ideas; hence of the relationships which make the one class the ruling one, therefore, the ideas of its dominance” (Marx & Engels 1986:13). Ideology overcomes the contradictions that are implicit in the processes of class domination through perpetuation and legitimation of particular ideas within the political superstructure through the state.

Dominant ideologies regulate and limit conflicts between classes as well as other disproportionately empowered social formations. A critical concept of ideology requires an understanding of how distorted ideas enter into the social domain, and how they become accepted as valid. As Hall (1996:29) describes it, in the classical Marxist conception of ideology: ideas arise from and reflect material conditions; these ideas express social relations and their contradictions in thought; these ideas provide the motor of history; these ideas are determined by the economic base; there is an interplay between the economic base and the ideas that make up ideology; and there are ruling ideas which are located within the ruling class.

Subjectivity is intrinsic to the concept of ideology. For Durkheim, society is made up of social representations that are systematic, collective and conducive to social cohesion through the interplay between beliefs and practices that are institutionalised. Society is thus a “formation of social representations, of constraining norms and patterns, a normative structure, an ideological community” (Schmid 1981:59). Althusser, like Durkheim, sees knowledge as a system of production that is held together and reproduced through practices – “ideology is a representation of the imaginary relationship of individuals to their real conditions of existence” (Althusser 1971:104). For Althusser, knowledge is institutionalised.
through practices that are constrained and contained through ideological and repressive state apparatuses in such a way that social conditions are perpetuated. Important to the concept of ideology then, is the production and reproduction of knowledge, and in the Marxist conception, knowledge is the product, in the final instance, of the economic base.

A phenomenological conception of ideology is advanced by Berger and Luckman whereby “the subjective mind creates a subjective reality (externalisation) which, as time goes by, turns into institutions, traditions and culture (objectification) and then finally acts back on the mind and shapes it – (internalisation)” (Schmid 1981:62). The production of ideology in this sense, rests within productive activity. Productive activities are transformed, through repetition, into practices. We are born into activities and consequently, practices. These exist both in the domain of physical experience, and at the same time are abstracted in consciousness – i.e. actions have both a physical and mental aspects. Practices are interrelated through the general processes of production and reproduction, and in their abstract form, interrelated via ideology. Thus:

... a socio-economic formation, understood in the Marxist sense as a mode of production within the superstructure, can be seen as a network of interrelated practices, each of which produces its spontaneous ideology. The implication of the concept of social formation is that each single practice is an interrelated practice of a common whole which can be described in terms of its ‘logic’. Thus, the capitalist social formation is a network of practices patterned by a capitalist logic. (Schmid 1981:66)

In this view, the human subject is the starting point for the formation of ideology, but at the same time becomes subject to its reproduction. This latter concept is similar to Althusser’s conception of interpellation whereby ideology ‘recruits’ or hails subjects and at the same time ‘transforms’ them so that they become subjects: “They live the relation with their real conditions as if they themselves were the autonomous principle of determination of that relation. The mechanism of this characteristic inversion is interpellation” (Laclau 1986:27).

Therborn notes that interpellation within ideology has three fundamental modes that:

... subject and qualify subjects by telling them, relating them to, and making them recognise: What exists, and its corollary, what does not exist... the visibility of the world is thereby structured by
the distribution of spotlights, shadows and darkness; What is
good, right, just, beautiful, attractive, enjoyable, and its
opposites. In this way our desires become structured and
normalised; What is possible and impossible; our sense of the
mutability of our being-in-the-world and the consequences of
change are hereby patterned and our hopes, ambitions and fears
given shape. (Therborn 1999a:18)

Activity and practice can be understood as cohering in a narrow ideological way, but
also broadly through the interrelation of practices in the social domain that constitute
broader overarching ideologies. Practices interrelated by activity may be distinct,
such as within economic classes, which may have divergent ideological perspectives,
but are bound together by the overarching ideology-logic of the dominant economic
system. For example, rulers and ruled relate to the world in substantially different
ideological ways, as do labourers and managers, men and women, children and
adults, poor and wealthy – any number of categories that are divergent by virtue of
their activities and practices, yet these co-exist within particular ideologies.

For Marx (1986:15) “the mode of production of material life conditions the general
process of social, political and intellectual life. It is not the consciousness of men that
determines their existence, but their social existence that determines their
consciousness”. Overarching ideologies, such as in the social system of capitalism
are self-legitimating because of overwhelming determination by the economic base.
However, such ideologies are also held together by cross-cutting practices that may
be ideological in different ways, for example: the bourgeoisie and the peasantry can
practice the same theology; the same forms of gender dominance; the same
acts of exchange – yet their experience of social and material conditions differs markedly.
As Markus (1991) points out:

fetishistic modes of thought ‘arise from the relations of
production themselves’ [and] are the ‘direct and spontaneous
outcomes’ of the elemental social practices of individuals…
fetishistic forms of thinking enable individual social agents to
orient themselves successfully within the given system of social
relations which are taken as the fixed prior of their life. (p. 91)

Such processes have to do with alienation and are related to the conception of
ideology that incorporates the notion of ‘false consciousness’. This latter concept is
however differently expressed by Marx and Engels (1986) in the German Ideology,
where false consciousness is primarily related to the activities of bourgeois
intellectuals, with the working classes being more aware of the contradictions of their relationship to production, thus allowing for the process of class struggle.

Critiques of the Marxist position centre on determinism, which can be seen as undermining the independence of ideas; reductionism, where ideas are seen as directly derived from the economic base; and the delineation of ideas that occurs only in class terms (see Hall 1986:45). The value of the Marxist concept however, at its broader level, is that it traces how social ideas arise and are transformed into ideologies, and further, how these are connected to economic activities – the logic of which necessarily requires some level of distortion for its maintenance. In Althusser’s expanded structuralist conception, ideology is lifted out of a purely economic system, with greater emphasis being placed on processes of domination which occur through mythical representations of the world involving subjectification that are perpetuated by ideological and repressive state apparatuses.

A dual conception of ideology is offered by Poulantzas (1973), which involves an overarching dominant ideology that incorporates sub-ideologies, whereby elements of a range of ideologies are included within the dominant ideology. The dominant ideology is perpetuated by the ruling class, which is “encompassed in the concept of hegemony whereby the dominant class manages to represent itself both as internally unified and as unifying the general interests of people” (Boswell, Edgar & Baker 1999:363). For both Althusser (1971) and Poulantzas (1973), ideology is materialised through particular formations such as education, religion and law, which have the effect of subjectifying individuals and obscuring contradictions.

Ideology has to do with sets of ideas that are oriented towards internal coherence and consistency that emanate from and/or serve the interests of particular social classes, formations or groups. As Lull (2000:13-14) observes: “Organised thought is never innocent; it always serves a purpose. Ideologies are implicated by their origins, their institutional associations, and the purposes to which they are put…”. Ideology is expressed through processes of systematically organising, articulating, circulating and perpetuating ideas. Ideology and discourse are thus interdependent, for it is only through discourse that ideologies can be brought into being and sustained.

In the context of HIV/AIDS, social response to the epidemic incorporates mechanisms for simplifying and making coherent, complex and rapidly changing material and social phenomena through discourse. Thought is organised, and through processes of organising and articulating ideas, particular interpretive frames are
constructed that function ideologically, that seek to interpellate subjects. HIV/AIDS is a phenomenon that impinges on material conditions and lived experience, and it follows that the social representation of the disease incorporates an ideological dimension.

**Ideology and dominance**

Hegemony involves understanding the mechanisms through which ideology mediates contradictions to maintain ideological dominance. Gramsci works from a dualist notion of politics where force and consent coexist – ideas are not simply imposed, but rather they are mediated by the lived experience of subordinate classes. The political strategy of this approach involves leadership and consent, which takes into account the nature of particular classes:

> [the dominant class]... leads classes which are its allies, and dominates those which are its enemies. Therefore, even before attaining power a class can (and must) ‘lead’; when it is in power it becomes dominant, but continues to ‘lead’ as well... There can and must be a ‘political hegemony’ even before the attainment of governmental power, and one should not count solely on the power and material force which such a position gives in order to exercise political leadership or hegemony. (Gramsci 1971:57-58)

Gramsci’s account of ideology involves a conception of the materiality of ideology as “an organic and relational whole, embodied in institutions and apparatuses, which welds together a historical bloc around a number of basic articulatory principles” (Laclau & Mouffe 1985:67). Ideology thus becomes the terrain where struggles are played out. The ideological totality however, is greater than materialist conceptions of class struggle, because it incorporates political domains that are not framed simply in class terms and do not necessarily have any ‘class belonging’. As Laclau and Mouffe (1985:68) note, ‘class does not take state power, it becomes state’. Class hegemony is thus based on historical products of class struggle, but once incorporated into the state, a different set of interests prevail. The value of the Gramscian conception of ideology is that through merging ideas with a political account of dominance, ideology becomes understood as interconnected with social mobilisation.

Although the concept of hegemony offers an understanding of processes of developing and maintaining ideological dominance, it is only intended as a partial
explanation of such dominance. As Mumby (1997:347) points out, there has been an
overemphasis in communication studies on “issues of domination (even if such
domination is read as consensually derived and non-coercive) with a corresponding
neglect of resistance and transformation as the dialectical ‘other’ of the exercise of
relations of power and domination”.

Ideology mediated through hegemony allows for dominance “by securing the
‘spontaneous consent’ of subordinate groups including the working class, through
the negotiated construction of a political and ideological consensus which
incorporates both dominant and dominated groups” (Strinati 1998:165). This notion
of consent has to do with an acceptance of the general direction of social life and the
need for social stability, and what amounts to trust in the elite formations that
constitute the dominant group. Hegemony is thus:

… the spontaneous consent given by the great masses of the
population to the general direction imposed on social life by the
dominant fundamental group; this consent is historically caused
by the prestige (and consequent confidence) which the dominant
group enjoys because of its position and function in the world of
production. (Gramsci 1971:12)

Hegemony is produced and reproduced through discourses which insert and reiterate
ideas so that they become ‘popular knowledge’, overcoming alternate interpretations
of social life and material conditions, and serving to subordinate resistance through
constructing common sense:

Common sense is the folklore of philosophy, and is always half-
way between folklore properly speaking and the philosophy,
science, and economics of the specialists. Common sense creates
the folklore of the future, that is as a relatively rigid phase of
popular knowledge at a given place and time. (Gramsci
1971:326)

Common sense allows that the dominant social formation and relations of production
are embodied in hegemony as a legitimated consensual framework within which
individuals are complicit. As Hall, Lumley and McLennan (1978:50) note, within
common sense, there is an “absence of a ‘consciousness of historicity’ and hence of
self-knowledge as the principal feature that condemns common-sense thinking to a
position of dependence and subordination”. Common sense is related to ideology in
the way that social cohesion depends upon consciousness being subjugated to
leadership of the dominant class, avoiding the consequence of social upheaval inherent in class struggle. Hegemony allows for concessions to take place, provided they do not threaten the dominant social formation. The dominant class can make ‘sacrifices’ but…

there is no doubt that such sacrifices and such a compromise cannot touch the essential; for though hegemony is ethical-political, it must also be economic, and must necessarily be based on the decisive function exercised by the leading group in the decisive nucleus of economic activity. (Gramsci 1971:161)

Hegemony involves the unequal representation of ideas through the production of common-sense conceptions that overwhelm expression of contradictions. In all societies the naturalness of conceptions of tradition, culture, personal liberty, economic ordering and transaction, leadership and the like, together form part of a common-sense framework that is not readily undermined. This is a significant power, given that lived experience is often in stark contrast to common sense. For example the relationship between the concept of the generation of wealth through work, and the contradictory lived experience of vast imbalances in remuneration for work/effort. In this way, common-sense conceptions that occur within hegemonic frameworks are explicitly related to ideology, dominance and power:

[The concept of hegemony]… suggests that there is a set of cultural and social practices, ideas and interpretations that can be recognised as naturally occurring, not socially constituted, givens in social life. These tend to be presented as essential elements in the formation of the self, in developing a relationship between self and society, and in locating both on cognitive maps of socio-historic experience. (Mosco 1998:242)

Capitalist states have survived as a result of successfully ensuring that the conditions serving their reproduction have been maintained, and this has been achieved through processes of legitimation that have been economic (as in relations of production), and political, in the sense of hegemony (which moderates disruptions of the deeper economic order).

In relation to HIV/AIDS, ideas are constructed with a view to making sense of the emerging epidemic. This incorporates processes of common-sense making through legitimating practices – for example, the use of research and other knowledge related discourses, which, in the process of their simplification, constitute a common-sense
framework of the epidemic. Ideological practices involve discourses emanating from 
elites which frame understanding and articulate contemporary knowledge and 
forward movement. This process of articulation is lead by a wide range of 
international organisations including research generating institutions, United Nations 
(UN) organisations, governments and the like, and it is through this process that a 
dominant world-view (in the global sense) and resultant common sense has been 
constituted in relation to the epidemic. This macro-ideological frame is constituted as 
a range of ideologies and ideological positions which constantly interact with elites 
forming alliances and addressing critiques that emanate both from within dominant 
elites, as well as from less dominant groupings. Contested discourses include, for 
example, the aetiology of HIV and AIDS, behavioural versus contextual causality of 
HIV infection, capital-intensive top-down intervention strategies versus 
developmental horizontal and bottom-up approaches, individualised versus 
social/contextual interventions, and rights-oriented approaches versus regulatory 
approaches. Processes of common-sense making (i.e. dominance of particular 
discourses) thus occur in relation to HIV/AIDS as much as they would occur in 
relation to any other social struggle.

Communicating ideology and hegemony

Laclau and Mouffe (1985) refer to the concept of articulation as the process of 
modifying the relation between ideological elements, with the product of articulation 
being discourse. Larrain (1985:130), links ideology and language “not in the sense 
that ideology is found in the use of language, that is, in the selection and combination 
of signs, but also in the sense that the material practices which are at the basis of 
ideology are construed as languages, as systems of signification”. Signification and 
discourse have to do with language as social practice whereby language is a 
fundamental structure of society, but at the same time is constituted by society:

*Ideology therefore appears a crucial phenomenon to be studied in 
connection with language; not that ideology is necessarily a 
special language or that one can locate ideology in a particular 
kind of discourse. Ideology is rather a level of meaning, which 
can be present in all kinds of discourses. (Larrain 1982:130)*

The work of Barthes (1977; 1993) draws on Saussure’s structuralist semiology to 
locate an understanding of ideology within linguistics, where language and speech 
represent the latent underlying discourse structure and manifest discourse content
respectively, and where the latent structure is concealed from the manifest content. Barthes derives the concepts of denotation and connotation from the Saussurian strand of semiology, and these concepts in turn become points of formulation of his fundamentally ideological concept of *myth*.

The basis of Saussure’s thinking was the understanding of signs as incorporating dyadic relationships between signifier and signified. Each sign thus has a sensory element, the signifier, and an object element, the signified. In general, the relationship between the signifier and signified is arbitrary and unmotivated. There is no causal relationship between a word and its real world object other than that the word is an agreed upon sign for the object, and this allows that signification is a process that is entrenched culturally through convention. This latter notion leads to an understanding that signs only exist within a context of sign systems or language systems which in turn incorporate *langue*, a system of differences between signs, and *parole*, the individual instances sign usage. *Langue* is dependent upon an underlying structure of rules that determine how signs might be used and is thus implicitly a product of convention developed through temporal social institutionalisation. Individuals may readily construct complex meanings through combining signs (*parole*), but the *langue* itself resists modification (Fiske 2000; Barthes 1977; Saussure 1974).

Saussure’s structuralism allows for considered understanding of the nature of signs and sign systems, but once signs are used, it becomes necessary to shift towards a cultural and ideological analysis that relates to how meaning is brought about. Volosinov recognises that ideology is a product of consciousness that is in turn a product of signs: “Everything ideological possesses meaning: it represents, depicts, or stands for something lying outside itself. In other words, it is a sign. Without signs there is no ideology” (Volosinov 1987:146). He argues further for an ideological framing of the semiotic:

*This ideological chain stretches from individual consciousness to individual consciousness, connecting them together. Consciousness becomes consciousness only once it has been filled with ideological (semiotic) content, consequently, only in the process of social interaction.* (1987:147)

Ideology and language are thus interdependent, with language being the basis of ‘ideological creativity’. In Barthes’ extension of the basic signified-signifier-sign relationship into a second order of denotation and connotation, a sign is made up of a
denotative content, which involves pointing to its object – for example a photograph of a car – and a connotative content which relates to the meaning which lies beyond the literal representation – for example, by the way the car is portrayed in to symbolise particular meanings (Barthes 1977, 1993). This approach is not dissimilar to Peirce’s triadic construction of signs where iconic, indexical and symbolic elements co-exist. For Peirce, a likeness or icon relates to signs that can be interpreted by looking like that for which they stand – for example a picture – which has sensory qualities that are similar to what it represents. An index involves inferred signification – for example a weathervane indicating wind direction, or a sundial indicating time of day. “The sign draws attention to the existence of the unseen – it has an existential relationship to the phenomenon it depicts” (Tomaselli 1996: 30).

Extending the concept of connotation is Barthes’ formulation of myth. This concept focuses on distortion, whereby myth is an elaboration of connotation that has shifted into the domain of meaning – a process that serves both to obscure underlying ideas and to perpetuate particular interpretations. Myth is a system of communication that is located beyond, but derived from, denotative and connotative sign systems of semiology – ‘myth is a type of speech’ (Barthes 1993:109). When located in discourse, myth is defined not by its object, but by the location of a particular discourse within broader systems of discourse. Following from the dyadic relationship between signifier and signified, which gives rise to the sign (first order), the sign becomes the signifier for a second order semiological system, which has to do with the construction of meaning. Connotation is thus the agent of myth:

*Myth has an imperative, buttonholing character: stemming from an historical concept, directly springing from contingency... it is I whom it has come to seek. It is turned towards me, I am subjected to its intentional force, it summons me to receive its expansive ambiguity. (Barthes 1993:124)*

Myth and ideology are interconnected. Ideology has to do with how myths coalesce into a system of ideological legitimation, of shifting ideas into common sense in the service of obscuring underlying conditions. Myth thus operates at a third level whereby myths are “subservient to ideology, a third order sign operating within the realm of the symbolic. Signification at the level of myths symbiotically interacts with the logical grid of significations – it slides between the second and third orders” (Tomaselli 1996:67). Unlike conventional language where signs are unmotivated, myth involves motivation – specifically the construction of ideological meaning that
allows myth to be conceptualised as a metalanguage. Myths draw on the naturalistic construction of first order signs, but are socially constructed in the second order, drawing on notions of universality to allow for their location in the domain of common sense. Myth evokes meaning through a process of signification that is ahistorical in form, allowing for distortion:

*Myth is a value, truth is no guarantee for it; nothing prevents it from being a perpetual alibi… Entrusted with ‘glossing over’ an intentional concept, myth encounters nothing but betrayal in language, for language can only obliterate the concept if it hides it, or unmask it if it formulates it. The elaboration of a second-order semiological system will enable myth to escape this dilemma: driven to having either to unveil or liquidate the concept, it will naturalise it.* (Barthes 1993:123, 129)

Myth thus succeeds in achieving common-sense legitimation by the implication of its truthfulness. However, there is not an absolute false consciousness at work – rather, the concept allows that there is a relational understanding of dominated and subjugated myths within discourse. What Barthes proposes

*is nothing so much as an anthropology of modernity. Like the anthropologist, he is looking at the belief systems, the material practices, the structures of valuation, and so on, that constitute our culture’s socio-logic… The ambition of semiology manifests itself here as a desire to pinpoint the range of ways humans exist, sustain themselves… and interact.* (Polan 2001:459)

In essence, the world of production, and the reproduction of the world.

Similarities exist between the concepts of myth, interpellation and common sense. Myths perpetuate dominant ideology through efficiently shifting the heterogeneous complexity of human society into a simplified construction that softens contradictions and presents social relations as an apparently seamless homogenous whole. “The very end of myths are to immobilise the world: They must suggest and mimic a universal order which has fixated once and for all the hierarchy of possessions” (Barthes 1993:155).

Myths can only be effective if they succeed in being perpetuated – so whilst myths can be constructed by dominant *and* marginalised groups, it is the dominant group that have access to the means to reproduce myths at a level sufficient for their perpetuation. At a primary level then, myths are open signs which allow for multiple
interpretations, but become closed signs when their meaning becomes naturalised through consistent propagation: “While both dominant and dominated groups within a socio-political system propagate myths, it is the myths spoken from the seats of power whose objective is the maintenance of power, which become the public myths” (Tomaselli 1996:72). As a result, in a terrain of competing myths, it is the group that has control over the means of reproduction of ideas – typically located via access to political power and systems of information production and dissemination – that can ensure that their mythologies are reinforced, perpetuated and naturalised.

In relation to the above, it can be seen that tensions exist between material and ideal conceptions of ideology, and that these concepts attempt to achieve an understanding of the relationship between ideology and discourse. The materialist view attempts to understand how domination is achieved and perpetuated by masking contradictions emanating from the economic base, allowing “a particular form of consciousness (which) gives an inadequate or distorted picture of contradictions, either by ignoring them, or by misrepresenting them” (Larrain 1983:27). But ideology in this conception is not completely resistant to the processes of struggle and tensions that are described between concepts of ‘false consciousness’ and ‘critical consciousness’ so, whilst the notion of an overarching ideological system is endorsed as a product of lived experience and economic relations, it is the contradictory elements of lived experience that give rise to critical consciousness. Theorising the concept of ideology then becomes an attempt to explain

how the forms of consciousness generated by the lived experience of subordinate classes and social groups facilitate the reproduction of social relations and thus impede such classes and groups from developing forms of consciousness that reveal the nature of their subordination. (Purvis & Hunt 1993:478)

Hegemony is located within a dominant ideological frame, with space created for limited counter-hegemonic dissent through discourse. The structural foundations of language, conceived of as determining consciousness, allow for a structural conception that is similar to that of the relationship of lived experience to ideology. These two systems have in common, the process of discourse. In one sense, the ideological dimensions of discourse include that which lies beyond language in the conventional sense – and becomes language (or semiotics) in the broader sense – i.e. physical and social constructs that constitute lived experience. ‘Articulation’ may be expressed through action or through language, but it has ultimately to do with the
construction and contesting of meaning through discourse: “Discourse is constitutive of social relations in that all knowledge, all argument, takes place within a discursive context through which experience comes to have, not only meaning for its participants, but shared and communicable meaning within social relations” (Purvis & Hunt 1993:492).

Ideology and myth are intimately connected to processes of fostering power and effecting subjugation – both as determined by their structural underpinnings, and within processes of articulation of meaning through discourse. Hegemony incorporates a process of myth-making through common sense that involves fixing and closing meaning, and it is the process of fixing and closing meaning that is central to moderating conflicting discourses between dominating and dominated ideologies.

**Representation of ideology**

Ideologies are subjective and thus involve processes of representation. For Coward and Ellis (1977:78):

*Ideology is a specific social practice: an articulation of the fixed relations of representation to a specific organization of reality, relations which establish the positions that it is possible for the individual to inhabit within the social totality. It closes off the contradictions of the human subject with the imaginary identifications of unity.*

Hall (1985:103-4) cautions against an all-encompassing approach to ideological discourse – “it does not follow that because all practices are in ideology, or inscribed by ideology, all practices are nothing but ideology”. Ideological discourses do specifically involve the production and reproduction of ideological effects, linking social practices with social processes: “Ideological discourses contain forms of signification that are incorporated into lived experience where the basic mechanism of incorporation is one whereby sectional or specific interests are represented as universal interests” (Purvis & Hunt 1993:497). Communication of ideology through discourse is a conscious activity that encompasses processes of providing explanation of theoretical underpinnings and world-view, of addressing contradictions, of connecting to related supportive structures and ideologies, and of promoting populism (i.e. expansion of common sense) with a view to dominance.
Hall’s (1993) encoding/decoding concept emphasises communication as a transmission process that is “a ‘complex structure in dominance’, sustained through the articulation of connected practices, each of which, however, retains its distinctiveness and has its own specific modality, its own forms and conditions of existence” (p91). It involves an underpinning set of technical infrastructure, relations of production and frameworks of production that allow for encoding of meaning through mass media delivery systems which then give rise to the process of decoding meaning via technical infrastructure which transforms into relations and frameworks of production to complete the circuit. Meaning is a central concept and communication is dependent upon meaning being taken through processes of decoding that are linked to ideas being ‘put to use’. Hall cautions however, against concepts of communication that are implicitly behaviourally deterministic. The determinate moments are encoding and decoding.

Encoding/decoding allows for construction of polysemic connotative signs and meanings, but incorporates an acknowledgement that there is an orientation towards ‘dominant or preferred meanings’, which are, in essence, ideological. These function in context:

*Meaning is polysemic in its intrinsic nature: it remains inextricably context bound. It is caught in, and constituted by, the struggle to ‘prefer’ one among many meanings as the dominant. The dominance is not already inscribed in structures or events, but it is constructed through the continuous struggle over a specific type of practice – representational practice. (Hall 1989:47)*

Although Hall (1989) suggests structures are less deterministic, it remains that dominant ideological readings are influenced by mechanisms and structures within the encoding process that are hegemonically oriented.

Analyses of processes of ideological domination have been applied regularly to the mass media have been largely critical of libertarian and pluralist notions of a free press, recognising the interrelation between capitalist modes of production and media validation of the dominant economic and ideological bloc. Political economists have noted that there has been an over-determination of the role of the mass media and suggest that focus should extend to “decentring the media… viewing systems of communication as integral to fundamental economic, political, social and cultural processes in society” by recognising parallel systems within the family, religion,
education and other formations/systems that serve a capitalist mode of production (Mosco 1998:71). In this sense, the political economy of communication is constructed from the interrelation of communication exchange and social relations – specifically an assumption that it is an integral relation that is mutually constituted. Mosco notes that central to this approach is an epistemological skirting of idealism and essentialism – positioning political economy of communication as a realist epistemology that has to do with broadening the knowledge process “from simple determination to multiple, dynamic interactions” (1998:137). The approach is also critical, integrating analysis and transformation through intellectual praxis premised on the ‘ubiquity’ of social change.

In relation to AIDS, primary ideological discourses which function mainly at the level of public policy, are disseminated through a wide range of representational mechanisms including dialogue, discourses at conferences and related events, via research papers and reports, through the mass media, and other discourse mechanisms. These may be termed genres of discourse. Secondary HIV/AIDS discourses, which relate mainly to individual conceptions, behaviours and practices are also constituted within broader ideological frameworks, but are subservient to them: for example, the foregrounding of individual knowledge and behaviour as the primary focus of AIDS interventions, whilst at the same time masking underpinning structural conditions that perpetuate the epidemic. These discourses also occur within a range of genres – typically advertising and purposive programming via mass media (television, radio, print, outdoor), small media (leaflets, posters, booklets, audio tapes, video tapes), and dialogue-oriented approaches (drama, participatory activities, counselling). There is thus an ideological layering of meanings in relation to HIV/AIDS, which extend from public policy through to individual behaviour.

**Language and representation**

Language constructs meaning because it is a semiotic representational system. Language is inextricably linked to cultural (and ideological) production in the sense that

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18 For example, labour migration breaks up families and contributes to a range of vulnerabilities to HIV infection, yet the dominant discourse is the notion that interventions should focus on the knowledge and behaviours of migrants within the workplace, and not on the structural conditions that give rise to their vulnerability. Such dominant discourses naturalise the notion that it is the morality of the individual, not the underlying ‘morality’ of the economic system that gives rise to migrancy, nor the profit-making corporates which benefit from the system that should be addressed.
culture is concerned with the production and the exchange of meanings – the giving and taking of meaning – between members of a society or group… Thus culture depends on its participants interpreting meaningfully what is happening around them, and ‘making sense’ of the world, in broadly similar ways. (Hall 1997:2)

Hall (1997) sees cultural meanings as being directly related to social practices and as having cultural effects. He notes that discourses ‘cluster ideas, images and practices’, and he defines ‘discursive’ as “any approach in which meaning, representation and culture are constitutive” (p. 6). Consequently, while semiotics addresses the ‘how’ of representation, the discursive approach has to do with cultural aspects of meaning – the social practices that emerge as a result of discourse. Representation is thus an active process of construction and reception – encoding/decoding. As Grossberg (1984:399) notes: “Texts reveal their social significance, not on the surface of images and representations, but rather, in the complex ways that they produce, transform and shape meaning structures”.

Representation of ideology through discourse applies to the construction of meaning at the primary level (underpinning epistemological assumptions and relation to macro-economic ideologies); at the secondary level, to the second tier of ideas that involve the pragmatic aspects of ideology – i.e. ideology in practice; and at the tertiary level, to processes of legitimation and hegemony. Whilst to some extent discrete, these levels also overlap and interact. Primary level constructions are abstractions; secondary level constructions are largely descriptive; whilst tertiary level constructions involve justification through masking and co-opting ideas with the purpose of fostering expansion. Primary level constructions are fundamental and largely internally consistent, whilst secondary and tertiary level constructions are opportunistic having to do with legitimation and consent.

The ideological process can be understood not as a circuit, but as a spiral whereby ideology is represented through reiteration and legitimation in support of the development of common-sense constructions, but is at the same time subject to critique. Critique is addressed through non-fundamental adaptations via hegemony. Ideology is thus continuously in a state of flux, although the core theoretical underpinnings remain intact. Each level is mediated by processes of representation.
Ideology formation in relation to AIDS is thus in a continuous state of flux as a result of a wide range of factors including the process of assimilating new knowledge, but extending to legitimation and the addressing of conflict through hegemonic and other dominance practices.

Ideology and the subject

Ideology has a material existence. Its purpose is to organise and unify meaning in the service of social cohesion. In doing so it produces and reproduces human subjectivity. In capitalist social formations, subjectivity is oriented towards the construction of class positions through the integration of the state and the formations of capital. In the Marxist conception, the reduction to class formations is limiting and subject to obvious critiques, but this does not negate the concept of ideology arising out of and reflecting social conditions, and the necessity of hegemonic dominance for overcoming the contradictions of social relations as they are expressed economically. All societies are constituted from systems of interaction that are in essence economic – whether or not they are capitalist per se. The organisation of human society requires specialisation of one form or another, resulting in differentiations in forms of labour that ensure survival of the individual and/or family and/or larger forms of social organisation. Forms of labour are intrinsically unequal, and in any social order this gives rise to hierarchies of power that are political. Differentials of power have the capacity to ‘excite’ the social fabric, and potentially
give rise to ruptures unless contradictions are contained. A dominant class-based ideology thus serves to contain contradictions through orienting human consciousness away from positional conflict through the process of hegemony. Consequently, differentials of power are perpetuated. Hegemony allows that human subjects can perceive elements of contradiction as a result of reflection emanating from lived experience and material conditions (and also potentially through alternate ideologies or fragments of alternate ideology), but at the same time the dominant ideology, through hegemonic practice, is able to universalise the legitimation of the power of a dominant social group or class.

Human society is complex, as are the ideologies to which it gives rise. This complexity exists to the point that any ideology is impossible to perceive or describe beyond its general traits. Ideologies are constantly in a state of flux, both in their overarching form, and in their content. Ideologies dominate by virtue of their capacity to shift emphasis. Dominant ideologies are structurally embedded, involving organised forms of explanation and validation of social conditions that allow for their perpetuation without necessarily devolving to the use of force or repression. Ideologies are ambiguous in their masking of contradictions, and are vulnerable to critique (i.e. the discourse process of exposing underlying assumptions, biases and legitimations). Ideologies may be subverted through critique, but their power is not readily diminished if they have reached the point of being consolidated into dominant hegemonic forms. Contesting dominant ideologies requires a unification of ideas amongst non-dominant ideologies to the point that they have sufficient impetus to overcome dominant ideologies, and in turn become dominant themselves – i.e. a process of systematic counter-hegemony.

Ideologies are indisputably linked to the contest for domination of social ideas and this necessitates some explanation of dominance in ideology. Part of the problematic of economism per se, is that it frames dominant ideology largely in class terms, but overlooks cross-cutting ideologies that are drawn into the frame of dominance in a way that complexifies and strengthens dominance and power of particular social groups and classes. Ideologies incorporating particular constructions of race, gender, religion and rights, amongst others, are often part of a dominant ideological bloc. Alternate constructions of the same phenomena may be utilised to articulate and organise resistance to domination. The interplay of ideological elements can thus be understood as an ideological bloc, whilst in a dominant form, the bloc consolidates power via hegemony, amongst other strategies of dominance.
In the case of AIDS, as the epidemic advances, ideological assumptions about how the epidemic is constituted, and what responses are appropriate, become dominant. These forms of dominance are articulated through discourses that legitimate particular practices (i.e. ‘theory’, research) and through practice (i.e. supporting and resourcing particular HIV/AIDS interventions). Over time, a dominant ideological bloc has developed globally, the ideology of which has become entrenched as a dominant construction of the epidemic. Global AIDS policy, for example, is largely defined and regulated by the United Nations agency UNAIDS. Policies pertaining to regions such as sub-Saharan Africa are determined via reference to research that is conducted largely by non-indigenous organisations and research agencies, with the consequence that indigenous perspectives and solutions are marginalised. In the case of Uganda, for example, much was made of declines in antenatal HIV prevalence in the early 1990s, and it has been argued that this was a product of bottom-up indigenous responses to the epidemic including the establishment of local-level support systems for people and families affected by the disease, as well as foregrounding of political will and commitment (see Low Beer & Stoneburner 2004). In response, various reinterpretations of what occurred in Uganda have been developed at the level of global policy. This has involved the skirting of bottom-up and horizontal forms of organisation in favour of a reorientation towards individual response – for example, the attribution of the ‘ABC’ (abstain, be faithful, use a condom) concept as being primary in Uganda, and the prioritisation of top-down imposition of national level AIDS councils. These assumptions favour top-down intervention rather than emphasis on the potentials for the development and support of bottom-up and horizontal forms of response (the latter of which more closely mirror what actually occurred in the early 1990s in Uganda). Similarly, given a dominant orientation within global AIDS policy that incorporates emphasis on medical science, biomedical approaches are emphasised as pathways to addressing behavioural aspects of HIV and are also more likely to secure favour and investment. For example, a large proportion of the global HIV budget is dedicated to research into HIV vaccines and HIV preventive vaginal microbicides, both which only offer potential solutions many years downstream from the present epidemic. These concepts however, draw legitimacy as a product of their ‘scientific’ orientation, and alongside biomedical and curative aspects, are readily framed as common sense. In contrast social and community-led bottom-up approaches are financially marginalised in spite of their contemporary relevance, as a product of their complexity.
Critique of ideology

Analysis of ideology is a critical concept that presupposes that ideologies include and involve negative characteristics that have to do with a combination of distortions and differentials of power. Critique of ideology involves, in essence, the unmasking of contradictions and related power differentials.

Shelby (2003:156-7) distinguishes between non-evaluative and evaluative conceptions of ideology. A non-evaluative conception is largely descriptive of ideological values or doctrines and is non-judgmental. An evaluative conception is a critical conception whereby negative values are assumed to exist within ideology. He locates ideology within belief systems, positing that such beliefs are shared within a group, and are known to be widely held; ideological beliefs form, or are derived from, a coherent system of descriptive and/or normative thought; ideological beliefs are related to identity of group members; and ideological beliefs impact significantly on social action and social institutions (Shelby 2003:158). In other words, ideological beliefs are directly related to forms of social action that are, in one way or another, institutionalised. Shelby’s description is however, considerably weighted towards consciousness and subjectivity, implying rather than emphasising the relation of beliefs to social practice which are more consistent with Poulantzas’ view that ideology involves lived relations materialised as social practices (see Boswell et al 1999a:366).

Shelby draws on Geuss’s methodological approaches to the critique of ideology. These include epistemic critiques (empirical validity, consistency, logic, etc.), functional critiques (negative consequences of particular systems of belief), and genetic critique (whereby negative elements are derived from the aetiology of beliefs). This suggests both a rationalist and a moral approach to critique that is functional to exposing contradictions in ideological belief systems from a transformative point of view. More specifically, ideologies may be seen as intrinsically negative in the sense that they are ‘wrong’ because they involve domination, exploitation and inequality. Critique of ideology then, is itself ideologically weighted:

The critic of ideology aims to reveal the illusory nature of ideologies so that the structures of domination and exploitation that they conceal and reinforce can be seen for what they are and that, thereby, the oppressed can more clearly see what direction their political efforts should take as they struggle collectively to
A critical approach to ideology involves analysis of the ways that ideas are constructed, legitimated and perpetuated. The construction of ideology has to do with mechanisms of representation through communication that formally set out the framework of a particular ideology in such a way that it retains an apparent logic and internal coherence. Such construction can be considered primary to any given ideology. The legitimation of ideology involves the development of a secondary tier of arguments that support and expand upon the primary construction. Perpetuation relates directly to the dissemination of core primary and secondary elements of the ideology through communicative discourse, but also through consolidation in terms of economic and other forms of organisation that are structural in nature. The political purpose of ideology is expansion and dominance, whilst hegemony has to do with addressing and moderating critique. In relation to the above, assumptions underpinning the understanding of ideology can be summarised as follows:

- Ideology involves a consolidation of a particular world-view or framework of relating to the world that purposively excludes or limits alternative understandings. In this sense all ideologies are distortions of reality; (Marx & Engels 1986; Gramsci 1971)

- Ideologies are constructed through the production and reproduction of ideological forms of knowledge located within discourse; (Schmid 1981; Hall 1986; Laclau & Mouffe 1985)

- Ideological distortions mask underlying contradictions and inequalities and the strength of ideologies lies in their capacity to appear common sense, reasonable and logical; (Gramsci 1971; Purvis & Hunt 1993)

- Ideologies seek expansion and dominance and are consolidated and perpetuated through discourse. Expansion may be further secured through varying degrees of force and/or processes of hegemonic consent; (Gramsci 1971; Therborn 1999; Lull 2000)

- Ideologies become dominant through institutionalisation that includes economic institutionalisation as well as linkages to supportive economic, political and social power formations that are oriented towards drawing in relationships to other ideological formations; (Althusser 1971; Laclau & Mouffe 1985)
Hegemony includes addressing, managing and moderating critique, and reconstituting of elements of ideology wherever expedient; (Gramsci 1971)

Ideologies are in a constant state of flux as a result of interrelation and engagement with social processes. Ideologies are however, at the same time, resistant to change. (Gramsci 1971)

Critique of ideology may at first sight appear to be a moral project that weighs one ideological perspective against another from the point of view of privileged truth – a position that may be only indirectly related to empirical reason. Such forms of judgment however, are not integral to critique of ideology. Instead, critique of ideology is both a hermeneutic and an empirical project that involves theoretical and practical analysis. It is centred not on truth, but on transparency. To circumvent a moral truth position and to focus on transparency, critique of ideology necessarily involves counter-ideological frames of reference. Critique of ideology thus takes the form of an inquiry into the relative grounding of ideological claims, and an exploration of what is revealed and what is masked. Such inquiry is implicitly ideological.

Ideologies, their related representations and structural manifestations, can be categorised at various levels. Macro-level ideologies such as capitalism, racism, and patriarchal gender-power relations have long and complex historical trajectories that incorporate structural embedding in economic and social formations. In some ways, macro-ideologies may be described as totalising, given that they pervade through multiple societies and, in the Marxist conception, have engineered consent through brute economic force. The core principles of these macro-ideologies have repeatedly been subjected to ideological critique, and their illusory and oppressive aspects repeatedly unmasked, yet they have remained dominant. Critiques have brought about some superstructural changes that have been addressed through hegemonic practices for ameliorating dissent. In democratic capitalist states, for example, there has been recognition of, and interaction with, labour unions; rights frameworks that reject racism have often been entrenched in legislation; and power imbalances have been addressed through systems of rights that foster gender equality. Fundamental structural aspects have however remained intact and thus macro-level ideologies are deeply resistant to change. In South Africa, for example, the foregrounding of racial oppression in apartheid-era capitalism was functional for a period of time, but became dysfunctional as local and international resistance grew and economic production and profits were negatively impacted. This contributed to a reformulation
in the post-apartheid era that shifted certain elements within the superstructure, but ensured continued domination of the inequalities embedded within the capitalist status quo.

Ideologies are a product of social life and ideological dominance is related to social cohesion. An interplay exists between ideologies as they emerge as a product of conditions of existence and economic relations on the one hand, and the shaping of society through ideas on the other.

At a superstructural level there exist a wide range of ideologies including non-dominant ideologies that are positioned as ideologies of resistance – for example social movements such as those that resisted apartheid and racism, and anti-globalisation movements that resist global capitalism. Other ideologies involve consolidation of ideas around particular social phenomena – for example poverty and health – whilst others have to do with organising particular practices within social life – for example religion, education, gender, politics (in the sense of political parties), and phenomena such as HIV/AIDS. As Freeden (2001:6) points out: “Ideologies are the arrangements of political thought that illuminate the central ideas, overt assumptions and unstated biases that in turn drive political conduct”.

The structuring and consolidation of ideas within superstructural ideologies includes a political dimension – i.e. the articulation of a simplified descriptive framework for organising and understanding social complexity that is oriented towards expansion. In this sense ideology can be applied not only to social formations such as classes, but also to organisations and groups within society. Analysis of political practices of ideology may be applied as much to micro-ideological practices as it may be applied to macro-ideological practices. In effect, political practice is ideological practice, having to do with seeking dominance of ideas through discourse.

Ideologies are descriptive of both the present and the future with the latter being represented politically as an improvement of the social conditions of the present. This political dimension is forward looking and involves an ideological conception of social transformation that is part of the process of securing positional hegemony. The political ideological model of social transformation is however, not necessarily radical – rather it is a useful mechanism for overcoming contradictions through hegemonic consent that includes expansion and dominance. Interpellation incorporates processes of past, present and future – what exists, what is good, what is possible (Therborn 1999). For an ideology to become dominant it needs to be
sufficiently connected to economic structures as well as political and cultural formations, and it needs to be capable of addressing contradictions. As Joseph describes it:

_We might develop the objective basis of hegemony by looking at Gramsci’s conception of the passive revolution. This notion is used to describe the attempts by the ruling group to organise the ‘superstructure’ in line with ‘structural’ developments. Gramsci has in mind the situation in Italy where the ruling class attempted to compensate for its historical weakness by carrying through a reorganization of civil society in order to pre-empt the direct activity of the masses. This reorganization takes the form of modernisation which is in line with the structural developments that are occurring in the economy. It seeks to cultivate these changes in order to try and prevent any potential crisis, by putting into practice a far-reaching reorganisation that creates the impression of progress._ (2001:183)

Ideological frameworks allow that contradictions exist, and these are moderated by articulation of promises of a better way of life that overcome the many contradictions that are inherent in the lived experience of social and material conditions. In South Africa, for example, poverty and unemployment are dominant features of present day social life, and anti-poverty rhetoric is central to government political discourse. The contradiction of the widespread lived experience of poverty is explained away through promises of a better life for all through social development primarily led politically by the African National Congress (ANC) in collaboration with the private sector and other social actors locally and globally. Although lived experience and material conditions may be experienced as oppressive, ideological explanations of reality and their related visions for the future are thus capable of populism through common-sense making, and are positioned to ameliorate dissatisfaction with the present.

Baradat (1994:7-8) provides a useful summary of some of the key features of ideology including: a political orientation that offers a view of the present and future with the latter oriented towards material improvement of the present; attainability within a relatively short timeframe (a single lifetime); an action-orientation that provides an understanding of steps to be taken towards change goals; and direction (communication) towards the masses.
The concept of transformation as embedded within ideology is interconnected with domination of ideas, given that it is through the concept (or promise) of change that contradictions are overcome and that the necessary foundations for dominance are provided. In this sense, ideology is not simply about bringing about ‘false consciousness’ through limiting awareness of contradictions and maintaining a static status quo. ‘False consciousness’ conceptions are unsustainable as a result of the differential between material conditions and ideas as they are formulated within ideology – contradictions are concretely apparent to disadvantaged and disempowered groups and classes, and may also be so to dominant classes (although less penetratingly experienced). The political aspect of ideology – of transformation, of improving social and material conditions – thus provides ideologies with a power and capacity to be sustained over time. It is not ‘false consciousness’ that sustains ideology but rather practices of dominance that maintain consent through political discourse focused on common-sense making, extending where necessary to consent-making through accommodation of critique. Force and repression are however largely removed from the equation. The use of physical force, whilst it may bring about the visible trappings of consent (by reducing overt resistance), tends to sharpen contradictions and not overwhelm them, thus increasing the potential for resistance. Ideological dominance thus includes the efficiency of softening perception of contradictions by functioning mainly in the sphere of discourse.

In relation to the above, critique of ideology involves not only analysis and deconstruction of ideological ideas and action in relation to the present, but also in relation to their political formulations of the relationship between present and future. Ideological domination inevitably includes the development of structural relations that foster domination integrated with dominating discourse practices. Whilst various ideologies may include alternate explanations of the world and visions for the future, they often incorporate fundamental commonalities that allow for strategic collaboration – i.e. formation of an ideological bloc, which, in the dominant phase incorporates hegemony: for example the ideological bloc that exists between state and capital in Western democracies. Hegemony involves management and moderation of intra- and inter-ideological contradictions and synergies. The challenge within an ideological bloc is to ensure internal coherence and stability – a functional relation as well as a structural one. Hegemony lends to the economic superstructure, a system for addressing the ideological surpluses that are the product of contradiction. As Mouffe (1987:221) notes: “…the political struggle was far more

19 As opposed to legislative and other social regulatory forms of force.
complex than had ever been thought by reductionist tendencies, since it did not consist in a simple confrontation between antagonistic classes, but always involved complex relations of forces”.

In the context of HIV/AIDS particular interpretations of the epidemic coalesce into ideological systems of thought. These constructions are related to the economic base of society, and are embedded within them – for example, it is ideologically expedient to shift from view, the masking of contradictions that underpin labour migration and its fostering of HIV infection, or horizontal and bottom-up social mobilisation in favour of top-down intervention.

**Ideological reproduction**

The production and reproduction of ideology involves a process of generating meaning in relation to social and material conditions. Hall (1995) asserts that meaning is a ‘social production, a practice’, and that meaning is constructed through language and symbolisation – which is a flexible process. He further notes that the process of construction involves a systematic process that is directed towards narrowing interpretation:

> Because meaning was not given but produced, it followed that different kinds of meaning could be ascribed to the same events. Thus, in order for one meaning to be regularly produced, it had to win a kind of credibility, legitimacy or taken-for-grantedness for itself. That involved marginalising, down-grading or de-legitimating alternative constructions. (Hall 1995: 67)

The question becomes how such meanings are contained within a narrower frame and how this occurs within dominant communication systems. Hall argues that the social practices of the media – technology, editing practices and the like – are processes of codification that play a determining role in ‘recurrent signification’. The process of making meaning within a particular paradigm and contributing to closure, is related to the Althusserian concept of ideology operating within a superstructural closed circuit that perpetuates the economic mode of production by obscuring its contradictions. However, this structural-functional conception requires expansion into the concept of the struggle for ideas and meaning, which suggests a relative autonomy of ideology. Ruling ideas are not the totality of ideas – rather they are dominant ideas that constantly impose a limiting function on critical discourse – which is in part, expanded through the concept of hegemony. Dominance over
economic processes extends to dominance over ideological processes through winning consent of subordinate groups. Ideas are constantly in flux, but are moderated through a process of reformism (or transformation) that allows change to be contained within the dominant ideology (or bloc): “the gradual but continuous absorption, achieved by methods which varied in their effectiveness, of the active elements produced by allied groups – and even those that came from the antagonistic groups” (Gramsci 1971:59). Economic crisis and concomitant experience (lived conditions) sharpen awareness of contradictions and constantly challenge the processes of constructing meaning. The struggle for meaning cannot therefore be removed from the concept of ideology – ideology and ideological struggle are intertwined, with the ultimate tension being between reformism and revolutionary action in relation to contradictions. Ideologies thus offer an explanation of lived conditions and a promise of social transformation, with dominance being contested through a struggle for meaning that is further moderated by cross-cutting interests of all individuals and classes, which are weighted towards social stability.

A framework for analysis

Ideologies are structured and consolidated ideas that are generalised throughout society that relate to social coherence. Ideologies involve distortions that simplify interpretations of lived experience and material conditions, and as a consequence, offer a limited view of the world. Ideologies also include a political vision of the future. The political purpose of ideologies is expansion and dominance. Ideology is thus not a fixed articulated body of ideas – rather ideology involves processes of consolidating and replicating ideas.

Ideologies may be structurally embedded within economic and social systems (macro-ideologies) located in broad based social formations or may be largely situated within the superstructure within single or inter-related groups (blocs). Ideologies include explanations of social inequality and disproportionate relations of power. Contradictions inherent in inequality and simplification of the interpretation of lived experience and material conditions are moderated through processes of dominance that allow critique to be contained. Ideologies are communicated through processes of signification and discourse, which subjectify lived experience. Part of this subjectification is a political process within hegemony that masks and moderates elements lived experience through a vision for the future. Ideologies ‘hail’ their
subjects through interpellation but are not necessarily capable of ensuring individual subjectification – i.e. the dialectical relation is never removed.

Hegemony has to do with serving the interests of dominant groups or classes and expanding the popular base of a particular ideas and particular practices through addressing critique. Critique of ideology involves epistemological and empirical approaches that seek transparency and set out to reveal limitations and contradictions of ideologies with a view to reformation and/or transformation.

Ideology and ideological analysis has largely been applied at the macro level, directed towards explanations of systemic relations such as those embedded within capitalism, or explanations of the dominance of particular social classes via intersections of base-superstructure relations as they relate to the state, or to transitions of power in relation to the state. Theories of ideology have been to a lesser extent applied to groups within society or inter-relations between groups, yet ideology and hegemony may as equally be applied to such formations. Single groups, or groups collectively, may be seen as functioning ideologically if they function politically at the level of inserting ideas into the public sphere with a view to influencing social practices. When ideologies are directed at publics and are related to public goals they are immediately also functioning with a view to situating particular ideas in a superior position to others, and thus ideology and dominance are intertwined. In relation to a group/organisation, or bloc of groups/organisations, ideology has to do with servicing vested interests.
CHAPTER 3

Methodological approaches to ideological analysis and critique

HIV/AIDS, as a material/ecological phenomenon, has required explanation at a social level and emerging knowledge has been consolidated through a range of discourses. These discourses have coalesced into various trajectories related to the ideological dominance of particular ideas, or the establishment of common-sense perspectives, with the consequence that they influence HIV/AIDS intervention policies and practices. These function ideologically through reiteration and legitimation, and in the trajectory towards dominance, are likely to incorporate hegemonic strategies to consolidate power and to address critique. Hegemonic power includes both structural and ideological forms of dominance.

The loveLife programme has utilised discourses to addresses a range of groups including AIDS researchers, strategists, policy makers, and the general public on the one hand, and the programme’s stated ‘target group’ of 12-17 year old youth on the other. This has included both discourses about the loveLife programme – its assumptions, is vision, its relationships to other organisations and its impacts – as well as discourses that have to do with creating a ‘positive lifestyle’ amongst South African youth for the suggested purpose of transforming sexual and reproductive health practices with a view to mitigating individual and social risk to HIV/AIDS. This thesis examines the ideological discourses and practices that relate to what might be termed the meta-discourses of the loveLife programme – discourses that involve representation of the programme as an appropriate and viable intervention in relation to AIDS. These discourses occur both within South Africa and globally.

The following chapter outlines a range of analytic issues to be considered towards framing a methodology for analysis. This includes reflections on processes of representation; epistemological foundations (including quantification, causality and consumption); processes of legitimation (including moral panic, research
discourses); and dominance practices (including structural linkages and mechanisms for addressing critique).

**Construction of ideology**

Ideologies have theoretical and pragmatic dimensions and are a product of processes of social organisation that include the coalescing of ideas as a consequence of social and material life, as well as the construction of ideas through discourse into bodies of knowledge that are descriptive of the past, present and future.

Ideology can be distinguished from culture, the latter being the totality of meanings and social practices in any given group or society, whilst the former can be understood as the subset of discourses that are specific to ideological practice. Freeden defines ideological practice as “the performance of, and participation in, an identifiable regularity of action or thought, one replicated as well as shaped by other such practitioners. It is hence a communal activity taking place in social space and occurring over time” (2000:304). He notes further:

> To analyse an ideology (as distinct from to participate in formulating one) is to categorise, elucidate and decode the ways in which collectivities in fact think about politics, the ways in which they intentionally practice the art of political thinking, and unintentionally express the social patterns which that kind of thinking has developed. That analysis encompasses a span ranging from what is done to what can be done. It includes and exploration of what ideologies claim should be done, but excludes any judgment concerning what ought to be done from an external, absolute or unitary moral viewpoint. (Freeden 2000:304)

Ideologies thus create linkages between knowledge and social practice – ideological praxis – a political engagement with the world through transformative practice. Ideological praxis adds a conscious and proactive dimension to the construction of ideas:

> Ideologies are ubiquitous yet crucial political phenomena that operate at the intersection of language, power and allegiances to public goals. They are attempts to manage the usages of political language and, through them, the political practices are shaped, recalled and given voice by such language, in order to determine the policies of groups, most notably societies, without which
individuals are disoriented and hence incapacitated. (Freeden 1999:413)

Ideologies involve the formation of human subjectivities and in this sense they are a material force in social relations that, to a greater or lesser extent, reproduce subjects through interpellation. Interpellation affects both dominant and non-dominant ideologies – i.e. lived experience and material conditions may give rise to identification with alternate non-dominant ideologies.

Ideologies have inertia in the sense that they are related to simplification and masking of aspects of social life and material existence through attempting to present consistent and coherent meanings through discourse. Consistency of ideas necessarily involves resistance to change. However, such consistency exists only so far as it is expedient, and through the process of hegemony ideological ideas and frameworks can be modified to ensure that they are sustained:

*Ideologies retain their relevance to changing circumstances only by constantly revising and ‘up-dating’ their basic concepts. Nevertheless, if an ideology is to exhibit a degree of internal coherence over time, it must have a distinctive core of concepts of propositions and an internal reference system of themes and questions.* (Hall 1986:34)

Macro-level ideologies such as capitalism, gender, race and religion have been institutionalised over long periods of time and are structurally embedded in the economic base (and consequent superstructural social practices) and are thus, as a matter of course, dominant. Ideologies located predominantly in the superstructure are potentially shorter lived and more vulnerable. However, integration of superstructural ideologies within conceptual frameworks and social practices reproduced by macro-level ideologies allows for consolidation of power. Ideologies operating within the broader framework and assumptions of dominant macro-ideologies thus tend to be more stable and more capable of power and dominance.

Any given ideology is both flexible and inter-related with other ideologies. As Therborn notes:

*They [ideologies] have no natural boundaries, no natural criteria distinguishing one ideology from another or one element of an ideology from its totality. Particularly in today’s open and complex societies, different ideologies, however defined, not only*
coexist, compete and clash, but also overlap, affect and contaminate one another. (1999a:79)

It is important therefore, to integrate a contextual understanding within any analysis of ideology – i.e. a contextualisation of the relationship to parallel ideologies and ideological practices.

**Ideology and representation**

Hall (2002) defines representation as the production of meaning through language. Representation involves two interlinked systems of representation – a classifying system or ‘conceptual map’ and a semiotic system that is constituted through signs and language:

*At the heart of the meaning process in culture… are two related ‘systems of representation.’ The first enables us to give meaning to the world by constructing a set of correspondences or a chain of equivalences between things – people, objects, events, abstract ideas, etc – our system of concepts, our conceptual maps. The second depends on constructing a set of correspondences between our conceptual map and a set of signs, arranged or organized into various languages which stand for or represent those concepts. The relation between ‘things’, concepts and signs lies at the heart of the production of meaning in language. (Hall 2002:19)*

Hall (2002) draws on Foucault’s concept of discourse, which casts a relationship between knowledge and power in the production of meaning. Discourse “never consists of one statement, one text, one action or one source. The same discourse, characteristic of the way of thinking or the state of knowledge at any one time… will appear across a range of texts, and as forms of conduct at a number of different institutional sites within society” (Hall 2002:44). This is related to Foucault’s (1988) concept of *episteme or discursive formation*, which refers to discourses addressing the same objects with the same patterns and commonalities occurring across a range of texts. Knowledge is thus interconnected with power through discursive formations that generate meaning (truth) through repetition and reiteration:

‘Truth’ is to be understood as a system of ordered procedures for the production, regulation, distribution, circulation and operation of statements. ‘Truth’ is linked in a circular relation with systems
of power which produce and sustain it, and to effects of power which it induces and which extend it. A ‘regime’ of truth. (Foucault 1988:133)

Knowledge linked to power thus has the “power to make itself true” (Hall 2002:49). For Foucault, ideological critique has to do with the “possibility of constituting a new politics of truth” whereby the challenge is to detach “the power of truth from the forms of hegemony, social, economic and cultural, within which it operates at the present time” (1988:133).

Ideological discourses can be thought of as ‘regimes of truth’ that involve positioning of world-views and political ideas with the intent of bringing about interpellation. In terms of construction, ideologies are layered discourses. At the first level are epistemologically derived orthodoxies – ideas that have to do with assumptions about what constitutes knowledge. These may involve explicit theoretical frameworks or epistemological assumptions, or alternately, these assumptions may be relatively untheorised frameworks that have an implicit epistemological foundation (orthodoxies). At the second level are the rationalisation and legitimation of ideas. This includes discourses that reiterate foundational assumptions and which expand these into broader sets of ideas. At the third level are the interplay of structural relationships to other ideologies and ideological formations that involves a struggle for dominance including hegemony.

In relation to discourse analysis, Hodge and Kress note the need for a hermeneutic strategy characterised by “endemic suspicion, a critical doubt that texts mean what they seem to, an apparent certainty that somewhere a very different ‘real’ meaning lies hidden” (1993:160). Such scepticism is implicit within any ideological analysis – however the true/false dichotomy needs to be avoided. Critique of ideology involves processes of analysis and deconstruction that are oriented towards transparency with a view to revealing the limits of paradigmatic assumptions and lacunae in terms of what is masked. This extends to an exploration of power that is embedded in discourses through discourse genres which allow both a reiterative aspect and a structural aspect and which intersect with structural relations of access to the means of producing discourse.

Ideology critique is a critical evaluative process that is centred on peeling away layers, unpacking contradictions and analysing processes of domination. It is in itself an ideological process and can be understood as a counter-hegemonic activity in so much as it sets out to organise critical thinking and to unmask assumptions
underpinning dominance. Ideological critique that takes place in the public domain and that organises critical ideas ideologically (through reiteration and legitimation) becomes transformative in the sense that an ideological struggle of ideas is established.

**Discourse power**

Cultural Studies includes analysis of the intersections between ideology and culture. In the case of British Cultural Studies, the ‘circuit of culture’ model – which incorporates inter-related processes of representation, production, consumption, identity and regulation – has become central to analysis of contemporary cultural discourses. The direction of analysis however, is from materialised products/objects outward – for example, analysis of the Sony Walkman (du Gay et al 2001), analyses of photography, museums and news reporting (Hall 2002), advertising and fashion (du Gay 1997), music (MacKay 1997), and the body (Woodward 2002). Such approaches offer insights into the ideological and cultural dimensions of cultural artefacts, but what is necessary is a related approach that is more focused on the production and reproduction of culture/ideology per se – i.e. analysis operating in the opposite direction, from the originating ideas towards materialised practices.

Ideological analysis involves understanding the layering of ideological discourses from the basis of theoretical underpinnings, through reiterative discourse processes and structural/hegemonic relations. This includes an understanding of how discourses are produced and reproduced in social life, and how ideological ideas are consolidated, reiterated and inter-related to other ideas in a struggle for dominance.

Concepts of ideology and ideological effects within Communication Studies, Cultural Studies and related disciplines have often been applied to the mass media, with early explorations centring on media as agents of propaganda. As Curran, Gurevitch and Woolacott note, the media were seen as:

> powerful propaganda agencies brainwashing a susceptible and defenceless public. The media propelled ‘word bullets’ that penetrated deep into its inert and passive victims. All that needed to be done was to measure the depth and size of penetration through modern scientific techniques. (1995:11-12)
This propaganda orthodoxy was not readily accepted and challenged on the basis of naïve determinism rooted in linear theories of communication. As Tomaselli points out:

_The concept of propaganda reflects the deterministic history of the communications discipline as a whole. Propaganda was seen as the archetypal case of the communications process in general, and was based on the mechanistic cause-effect C-M-R model. As it was discredited, so too, the idea of propaganda became increasingly problematic. (1992:19)_

Although empirical approaches directed towards quantifying media influence were generally dismissed, Marxist and neo-Marxist approaches recognised that media played a role in the reproduction of society through maintaining class domination. Although the two positions were counterpoised, each offering alternative visions of determination, Curran _et al_ (1995:14) note that where the approaches intersect is the notion that the media play “a strategic role in reinforcing dominant social norms and values that legitimise the social system” – i.e. reiteration of meaning, not determination of meaning. Hall (1993) moves some way towards this middle-ground conception of mass media through his notion of preferred meanings within the concept of encoding and decoding, although contemporary shifts in cultural studies have moved towards the relation between identity and the subject. Identities are “points of attachment to the subject positions which discursive practices construct for us… They are the result of a successful articulation or ‘chaining’ of the subject into the flow of discourse” (Hall & du Gay 2002:6).

A focus on the construction of ideological meaning necessitates that closer attention be given to discourse and discourse processes, with a lesser emphasis on the construction of subject identities. Strategic ideological practices – including for example, public relations and political ‘spin’ – are conscious ideological practices that cannot be underplayed in contemporary analysis of discourse, particularly given that there is a resurgence in the use of these approaches across a range of discourses. The 2003 war in Iraq, for example, was largely predicated upon and justified by, the myth of ‘weapons of mass destruction’ by the United States and British governments. This myth, which became the meta-narrative in the build up and early phases of the war, was continuously propagated, with ‘spin’\(^{20}\) being applied to

\(^{20}\) In an analysis of the concept of ‘spin’, Gaber (2000) shows how a concept contained in a text such as a government announcement is reiterated and further shaped through reactions to announcements, publicising speeches, and reacting to reactions. Spinning is, in essence, a process
deflect attention as it became apparent that no such weapons [chemical weapons] existed. The first television broadcasts of the entry into Iraq showed soldiers and journalists repeatedly putting on and removing chemical suits and gas masks in preparation for their entry into Iraq. This established the focal point of the justification for the war, at the same time introducing the concept of ‘good’ weapons (coalition bombs and missiles which kill/maim people indiscriminately and destroy infrastructure), and ‘bad’ weapons (Saddam Hussein’s alleged chemical weapons which kill/maim people indiscriminately, but which leave infrastructure intact). This ideological masking allowed for a repeated irony to occur – Western television reporters standing alongside wrecked buildings, blown up cars and dismembered bodies (as a result of mass destruction wrought by ‘good’ weapons), lamenting that Saddam Hussein’s ‘weapons of mass destruction’ were still nowhere to be found. ‘Good’ weapons were thus depoliticised, whilst ‘bad’ weapons were intrinsically political.

Ideologies mask alternative perspectives and contradictions through reiteration and legitimation, and it follows that part of this process involves methods of propaganda, including contemporary practices of public relations and ‘spin’. Ellul (1973:9-19) sees propaganda as a scientific process that is driven by scientific rules and empiricism which, to be effective, must be total: “The propagandist must utilise all of the technical means at his disposal”, it must be “continuous and lasting” and “it must be organized”. Viewed negatively, propaganda has a conspiratorial aspect to it – for example Henderson’s (1943:71) definition of propaganda as “a process which deliberately attempts through persuasion techniques to secure from the propagandee, before he can deliberate freely, the response desired from the propagandist”. Conversely, in liberal pluralist definitions, propaganda is constructed as an ethical practice related to the dissemination of knowledge – originally framed in this way by the Catholic church, but in contemporary communications, often being defined as corporate communications or public relations. Herman and Chomsky recognise that media institutions are vulnerable to propagandistic manipulations because of their ties to parallel ideological elites and their structure as profit-making concerns, although, Herman (2000:102) notes in relation to the Herman/Chomsky propaganda whereby a particular theme or message is kept in public attention through nuancing it in a variety of ways, and manipulating media attention on the issue. It can be used to promote ‘in-group’ discourses, but also to destroy opposition – for example, by ‘stoking the fire’ around negative conceptions of ‘out-groups’. Such destruction also has consequent profit benefits to US-based corporates, when it comes to ‘reconstruction’.

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model, that the “model describes a decentralised and non-conspiratorial market system” which is open to manipulation by elites.

Therborn (1999), in an examination of the social organisation of ideological discourse, provides a categorical system for exploring dominance. He distinguishes between discursive and non-discursive practices – the former being related to representation, and the latter being the deployment of ‘affirmations and sanctions’ that are connected to a ‘particular structuring of social discourse’ (1999:82). Non-discursive practices involve the social orderings of dominance. Political rituals of nationalism such as marches, flag waving or anthems, for example, are related to an organisation of the ideological order that affirms nationalism. In this instance, the process of affirmation has a legitimating function. He further outlines discursive forms of sanction that shift subjective interpellation into an objectification of the subject. These include:

- **Excommunication**, whereby the subject/object is excluded from meaningful discourse by being described as, for example, traitorous, vexatious or insane;

- **Restriction**, whereby there are socially institutionalised restrictions on who may speak, how much may be talked about, what might be talked about and on what occasion;

- **Shielding**, whereby particular discourses and authors are protected, or are recognised as the main (or only) ones who can make valid assertions;

- **Repetition**, whereby given discourses are incessantly repeated, such that the only valid enunciations apart from the authorised text itself are exegesis, commentary and reinterpretation;

- **Delimited appropriation of discourse**, whereby discourses are restrictively situated – for instance religious discourse, ‘education’, political speeches and discussions are situated in determinate ecological settings: churches, schools, political campaigns. (Therborn 1999a:81-84)

These categorisations are applied to various manifestations of apartheid ideology by Tomaselli (1992), who notes how mass media formations including the state controlled broadcast media, the liberal press and the alternative press employed such non-discursive strategies. He argues for democratisation of communication that includes ‘bottom-up’ and horizontal approaches.
Black (2001:133-134) provides additional typologies of propaganda including:

- A heavy or undue reliance on authority figures and spokespersons, rather than empirical validation to establish truths, conclusions, or impressions;

- The utilisation of unverified and perhaps unverifiable abstract nouns, adjectives, adverbs, and physical representations, rather than empirical validation to establish its truths, conclusions or impressions;

- A reduction of situations into simplistic and readily identifiable cause and effect relations, ignoring multiple causality of events;

- A time perspective characterised by an over emphasis or under-emphasis on the past, present, or future as disconnected periods rather than a demonstrated consciousness of time flow;

- A finalistic or fixed view of people, institutions, and situations divided into broad, all-inclusive categories of in-groups (friends) and out-groups (enemies), beliefs and disbeliefs, and situations to be accepted or rejected in toto;

- A greater emphasis on conflict than on co-operation among people, institutions, and situations.

Parallels can be found between such conceptions and the imperatives of ideological discourse. Ideologies depend upon a range of discourse practices that seek to interpellate subjects through common-sense processes of simplification, reiteration and legitimation. Such representations lean towards propagandistic representation – for example, positive orientations of particular viewpoints, simplifications, endorsement and legitimation, connotation and myth, and temporal inconsistencies may be utilised. Propagandist representations promote positive conceptions of particular ideological points of view thus incorporate valorisation (whereby a particular ideological formation or viewpoint is represented as good, moral, right, just, leading), and hyperbole (whereby positive characteristics are exaggerated). Negative conceptions of threats to particular ideological viewpoints are achieved by othering – by diminishing threats and critiques by undermining them.
**loveLife and representation**

The loveLife programme is represented through a complex of discourses. These discourses articulate perspectives on the past, present and future in relation to the AIDS epidemic. This can be understood as representing specific ideological positions including, for example, the notion that HIV/AIDS can be understood through quantitative behavioural research, which is amplified into assertions that youth are the ‘driving force’ underpinning the epidemic; that other interventions addressing HIV prevention amongst youth in South Africa have failed; that loveLife is a new vision of prevention that will bring about significant impacts in HIV reduction over a short period of time; and that loveLife is succeeding in changing sexual behaviours of youth (loveLife 1999a; loveLife 2000d; loveLife 2002b, 2002c; loveLife 2003a, Harrison & Steinberg 2002). These representations are fixed ideologically through repetition and reiteration via a range of discourse genres including mass media genres, events, brochures, conferences, research reports, elite discourses and the like.

Ideological discourses are seldom discrete, and are also not necessarily constructed coherently when it comes to outlining core doctrines and beliefs. In relation to a particular ‘object’ – in this case the loveLife programme – ideological dimensions can however be read through ideological typologies recurring through various discourses emanating from the programme. Such discourses also originate from the ideological bloc that is interrelated with the programme. The loveLife programme can thus be understood as being represented within the framework of Foucault’s concept of *episteme* or discursive formations – loveLife itself, and the various elements of the ideological bloc within which it is located. Methodologically, this may be explored through examining:

- Implicit epistemologies, which are embedded within orthodoxies (or common-sense representations) that include quantification, concepts of cognitive behavioural causality and concepts of youth in relation to globalisation;

- Processes of legitimation, which include moral panic, behavioural research and elite discourses which service the construction of ‘common sense’;

- Practices of ideological domination which may include coercive practices – for example excommunication and/or other practices outlined by Therborn;
Hegemony, which includes the entrenching and expansion of an ideological bloc incorporating elites, as well as consent-making practices.

**Epistemologies and orthodoxies**

The loveLife programme is grounded within an implicit epistemology of quantification and assumptions about behavioural causality that contribute to the construction of common-sense representations of HIV/AIDS and youth in South Africa. This is further framed through particular orthodoxies in relation to youth sexual behaviour on the one hand, and youth identity on the other. The discourse orientation here, is to insert into discourse, a series of ‘self-evident’ constructions of the programme and its context. Used in this way, common sense can be understood as a process that is related to rationalisation and coherence:

> Social actors must always mediate between maintaining a natural internal coherence and coping with external phenomena, whether material or social. Thus, the ‘common sense’ of the social order (as various ideological formations) may originate in the collective; but, if persistent, it is soon internalised in the ‘taken-for-grantedness’ of the individual’s natural attitude. (Lewis 1992:283)

**Quantification**

Quantitative epidemiological research has been foregrounded in HIV/AIDS research as a function of the science of epidemiology. In the case of HIV/AIDS, epidemiology involves analysis of the relationship between HIV infection patterns, behavioural and contextual factors (primarily demographic), which are employed to inform public health strategy. It sets out to identify correlations between contextual risk, behavioural risk and disease risk and/or infection. In the early phase of the AIDS epidemic in the United States, for example, epidemiological methods were used to track the emerging disease amongst gay men with a view to understanding infection patterns and identifying the infectious agent – a process that led to the ‘discovery’ of HIV.

Epidemiology is specifically about studying excessive occurrences of disease – and epidemiological methods are primarily quantitative: “Quantification is a central activity of epidemiology because the standard epidemiological measures often require counting the number of cases of disease and examining their distribution.
according to demographic variables such as age, sex and race” (Friis and Sellers 1999:11). Quantitative and epidemiological research is also generally associated with a positivist paradigm that emulates the natural sciences, and which in turn constructs a particular conception of objectivity and truth: “Positivists utilize empirical methodologies borrowed from the natural sciences to investigate phenomena. Quantitative strategies serve this positive-science ideal by providing rigorous, reliable and verifiable large aggregates of data and the statistical testing of empirical hypotheses” (Berg 2001:10).

Research in general, and quantitative research in particular is intrinsically ideological in the sense that it involves aggregation, simplification, and objectification. It can also be related to the concept of the Panopticon, a concept that encompasses systems of surveillance that are related to power, and that underpin descriptive knowledge of the world – a process that shifts human subjects into objects (Foucault 1980).

Quantitative HIV/AIDS research in South Africa has been largely descriptive, employing large and small-scale surveys focusing on responses to questionnaires oriented towards understanding knowledge, attitudes, beliefs and practices (KABP). Quantitative surveys have also extended to gathering HIV and syphilis biomarkers through surveys of female antenatal clinic attendees (for example, Department of Health 2002). More recently, surveys have combined HIV surveillance with KABP approaches (for example, Shisana et al 2002). Such data, and its analysis, is constrained by the limits of questionnaire-based approaches that allow for only aggregate rather than individual level understanding. For example, such surveys cannot explore the diverse reasonings and contextual factors that underpin individual responses to closed-ended questions. Consequently, quantitative data is only meaningful at an aggregate level, where responses to questions are analysed proportionally. Analysis cannot devolve to individual level responses with a view to addressing why a particular respondent may have answered in a particular way. Analysis of biomarkers, such as HIV antibodies in blood or saliva, or syphilis antibodies in blood, can be used to demonstrate a relation to demographic patternings. Such data is however insufficient, even when combined with KABP data, to provide understanding specifically how and why infection might have occurred.22

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22 For example, in quantifying HIV prevalence one is measuring infections that may have occurred up to a decade previously, whilst the behavioural data gathering relates to present behaviours and practices, which may be considerably removed from previous risk practices.
KABP findings are largely represented through percentile breakdowns of responses to particular questionnaire items, and may be linked to demographic categories such as race, age range, and geographic location, amongst others. Such forms of quantification mask a range of underlying contextual complexities. For example, responses to questions are typically presented discretely, such as “56% of white youth aged 15-19 said they used a condom at last intercourse” but rationale for particular responses are not gathered. Such rationale may however include a range of important information such as a respondent not understanding the question clearly or at all (and responding either yes or no); or purposely misleading the questioner (by, for example, giving an answer that is known to be socially acceptable); or as a product of knowing he/she is HIV positive (and therefore using a condom); or wanting to have a child (and therefore not using a condom), and so on.

Quantitative research may also incorporate processes of deeper correlative analysis – notably multivariate analysis – which attempts to more closely produce understanding of causal pathways. It remains however, that causal relationships cannot be sufficiently demonstrated in many instances given that in real terms the originating data is limited in scope – particularly in relation to contextual and cognitive rationale. Consequently, within such research there is an ideological effect that contributes to masking contexts of material conditions and lived experience in relation to the epidemic, which renders contradictions invisible.

Quantitative research has been extensively integrated into representational practices of the loveLife programme through discourse. Such discourses include implicit and explicit constructions of social phenomena as quantifiable, whilst at the same time positioning quantification as offering an explanation of the complexities that constitute the HIV/AIDS epidemic. Within loveLife, quantification is employed as a representational practice, and is fundamental to processes of ideological construction that mask complexity.

**Behavioural causality**

Cognitive approaches conceptualise human behaviour as a process that is led through mental intention, whilst behaviourism foregrounds external stimuli:

> We think and then act; we have ideas and then put them into words; we experience feelings and then express them; we intend, decide and choose to act before acting. Behaviourists, on the other hand, look at antecedent events in the environment and the
Cognitive theories of behaviour have been at the forefront of HIV prevention interventions since the early 1980s and include theories such as the health belief model (Becker 1974), the theory of reasoned action (Ajzen 1980), the AIDS risk reduction model (Catania et al 1990), and theories of social learning (Bandura 1986), amongst others. These theories foreground volitional control over behaviour and assume, in the case of HIV prevention, that an individual will adopt a number of strategies to mitigate risk of infection. Cognitive HIV prevention strategies include, for example, choosing not to have sex, choosing to have non-penetrative sex, choosing to be faithful, choosing to reduce one’s number of sexual partners, or choosing to use a condom. What is masked however, are the complex power relations that are integral to sexual interaction. Specifically, any act of sex, consensual or not, involves more than one individual, and sexual activity thus implicitly involves dynamics of power. In the case of consensual sex, for example, any conscious HIV prevention strategy needs to be referenced to power relations between sexual partners that reshape the concept of willed behaviour. It is noted in Parker (2004a:2), for example, that an individual may adopt the strategy of staying faithful to his/her sexual partner, but still face infection because of an unfaithful partner; a young person may be coerced or persuaded to engage in sexual activity by a person older than themselves, towards whom trust and authority is a culturally determined norm; emotional needs for love, comfort and support may overwhelm imperatives for HIV risk reduction; physical needs for food and shelter may be exchanged for sex as a matter of survival; desire for material goods such as fashion items, cell phones or money may foster transactional sexual relationships; fear of physical violence may influence sexual decision-making within an established relationship; differential power relationships within the family or within school and other institutions pose risks for coercion, child sexual abuse and rape; and fragmented social contexts, along with poor policing and justice systems contribute to sexual violence and rape. Other contextual factors that influence and exacerbate HIV risk include poverty, unemployment, labour migration, rapid urbanisation, and war. Thus, in relation to quantitative research, given underlying complexities, causal pathways between behaviour and HIV infection are poorly established.

With regard to the meta-discourses of the loveLife programme, causal claims have regularly been made – for example: “Among sexually-experienced young people who are aware of loveLife, 69% say loveLife has caused them to abstain from sex or
reduce their number of sexual partners; 78% say loveLife has caused them to use condoms” (loveLife 2002c:2). Over and above being based on leading questions, such propositions are linked to a cognitive-behavioural paradigm that suggests that ‘knowing about loveLife’ can be correlated with marked shifts in sexual behaviour and that this relationship is a causal one. Knowing about loveLife is decontextualised from knowledge of other HIV prevention programmes, as well as a wide range of other contextual factors that may influence behaviour – for example, illness and death of parents and relatives from AIDS, orphaning, and living in poverty – all of which give rise to a range of psychosocial needs. Related differentials of power that frame and determine when and how sex might occur are also overlooked. The construction of a causal relation to HIV prevention through ‘knowing about loveLife’ therefore masks a range of deeper factors that relate to risk perception and behavioural response.

**Youth, modernity and consumption**

Modernity is a social process that has come to be identified with the progressive globalisation of industrial modes of production that has produced “social divisions that intersect with, but are not reducible to, class” (Hall, Held and McGrew 1993:3). Globalisation is linked to the development of technology and communication systems that have supported global economic expansion. The concept is viewed by some as a new world order that “is a benign force leading us ultimately to the era of converging world incomes… converging institutions as democracy becomes a cultural norm, and cultural richness as people of different backgrounds interact more frequently” (Milanovic 2002:2). In other conceptions it has a conspiratorial aspect whereby globalisation is seen as:

> a cover concept for global capitalism and imperialism… bringing about increased domination and control by the wealthier overdeveloped nations over the poor underdeveloped countries, thus increasing the hegemony of the ‘haves’ over the ‘have-nots’… that produces an undermining of democracy, a cultural homogenisation, and increased destruction of natural species and the environment. (Kellner 2002:286)

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23 In real terms this construction involves fuzzy logic anyway. Any person who had been exposed once to the programme could answer yes, as could a person exposed repeatedly. Over and above this aggregation, the notion that simply knowing about the loveLife programme can be translated into a causal relation to behaviour requires explanation of what constitutes ‘knowing’ and ‘what is known’, and how this might contribute to a causal relation. Validity is constrained as a product of not providing any form of explanation as to how such a correlation might work in the first place.
The economic foundations of globalisation have been perpetuated within the political framework of neo-liberalism which can be understood as “a broad structure of beliefs founded on right-wing, yet not conservative, ideas about political democracy, individual freedom, and the creative potential of individual freedom” (Peet 2002:62). Whilst the free market approach to global economic expansion has to do with flows of goods and capital between core and peripheral economies that are held in place by political and economic structures, globalisation is entrenched by cultural approaches that seek to homogenise individuals and promote consumerism through mass media communication channels. Sklair (1999:158) notes that in poorer regions of the world the “culture-ideology of consumerism prioritises the exceptional place of consumption and consumerism in contemporary capitalism, increasing consumption expectations and aspirations without necessarily ensuring the income to buy”. The ideology of consumption is represented largely through discourses and genres of advertising, along with endorsement of a consumer-oriented way of life – mainly via television and film products emanating from the developed world. This extends to culture industries oriented towards concepts of branding and fashion.

In a report on the state of South Africa’s population 2000, the Department of Social Development recognised the negative consequences of globalisation, noting a shift from state to market that in South Africa could lead to marginalisation, vulnerability and poverty:

While some may benefit from these measures [globalisation trends], they often have an adverse effect on those who are socially excluded from economic market relations… People caught up in poverty, or who are at risk of becoming poor, use the assets available to them, such as family and community networks and basic resources to fend off the social impact of globalisation. But when these assets are depleted, the ability of the poor to cope under adverse conditions diminishes. (Department of Social Development 2000:6)

The loveLife programme represents youth identity as incorporating reification of consumption within the framework of globalisation – specifically the consumption of branded goods and valorisation of global brands and products. For example:

“We’ll keep providing the latest issues, info and entertainment tailor-made for you positive-thinking, info-hungry young go-getters out there. We’ll also look at that catch-phrase we keep dropping – a positive lifestyle – and what it really means: making
positive choices, being motivated, believing in the future and yourself... The world’s getting smaller and it’s time we realise we’re all drivers, not passengers, on a global journey to good, healthy living. So start your engines.” (S’camtoPrint 2003, February 2:3)

loveLife publications such as S’camtoPrint integrate discourses on sexual health, personal reflections, fashion, music, films and the like, interspersed with advertisements for global and local branded goods, Hollywood films and a general emphasis on the intersections between global and local:

“Stylish Stepping: Dickies is a hip American clothing and footwear that’s organic, kwaito, pantsula, cross-cultural – and very cool. Dickies is about expression and culture”; “Wear a legend: Fubu showed its versatility in 2001 by launching Fubu Records, followed in 2002 by Fubu Eyewear. So don’t expect Fubu to lay low now – its sweet smell of success will soon be available countrywide with the debut of Plush fragrances for men and women. Answer these two questions and you could win…” (S’camtoPrint 2003, February 2:18)

The construction of youth identity in this way services the ideological function of homogenisation that masks the diversity and complexity of South African youth. In relation to consumption, most households in South Africa are unable to dedicate expenditure to the consumption of costly branded fashion items – items which typically range in cost from R200 to R700 each. In 2000, for example, 80 percent of South African households had annual incomes less than R46 221 [R3 851 per month], and 60 percent had incomes of less than half this amount, R22 509 [R1 875 per month] (Statistics South Africa 2002:28). Additionally, 12-17 year old youth – the programme’s primary target audience – do not ordinarily have independent access to disposable income for the purposes of intensive consumption of the kind advocated by loveLife.24

The relation between consumption and HIV prevention is not clearly defined by loveLife. Rather, it is positioned as an assumed by-product of a focus the concept of a ‘positive lifestyle’, which is positioned in relation to a failure of other programmes to get young people to internalise personal risk:

24 Children in this age range are typically in school, are unlikely to be employed, and are dependent on their parents for economic survival. Furthermore, the impacts of HIV/AIDS also exacerbate youth poverty by virtue of the death or parents and caregivers, and/or the need to care for ill parents and relatives, and/or the need to provide care for siblings in the case of orphaning.
It was thus critical to establish a programme which attracted young people and with which they wanted to identify and talk about. Recognition that a major influence on post-liberation South Africa is the global youth culture of music, fashion, pop icons and commercial brands led to the positioning of loveLife [as] an aspirational lifestyle brand for young South Africans. (Harrison & Steinberg 2002:4)

The logic of the interrelation between the two constructions is unexplained, and it is assumed at a common-sense level, that if young people pursue the trappings of materialist consumption within the paradigm of globalisation, it follows that they will at the same time pursue self-preservation by preventing their own HIV infection through identification with an aspirational lifestyle brand.

**Legitimation**

Ideologies necessarily involve processes of legitimation that are oriented towards bringing about and sustaining dominance and expansion. Legitimation has to do with simplification and reiteration: “Ideologies are the arrangements of political thought that illuminate the central ideas, overt assumptions and unstated biases that… drive political conduct” (Freeden 2001:6). Legitimation shifts ideological discourses into the domain of common sense through focusing on rationalising particular representations. Legitimation also has to do with reinforcing ‘the right to rule’, whether or not that right is a product of consent and/or consensus. In the case of the loveLife programme, this includes discourses of moral panic, empirical rationalisations employing quantitative research, and discourses emanating from within related dominant ideological formations.

**Moral panic**

Moral panic is an ideological discourse that Hier argues is “a form of moral regulation… formulated in terms of a critical conception of ideology which allows for the discursive [re]production of a sense of phenomenal security through a moral economy of harm” (2002:312). Moral panic involves the identification of a threat to a community or society that is personified through identification with an individual, group and/or social practice which is advanced through discourse and explicitly or implicitly infers a call to social action. Moral panic discourses “arise because, as with all sociological phenomena, threats are culturally and politically constructed, a
product of the human imagination” (Goode & Ben-Yehuda 1994:151). One aspect of
the ideological dimension of moral panic is that it works from the position of what is
normative, identifying an ‘other’ who are imbued with negative non-normative
characteristics. Ideological direction is thus given to and ‘us-and-them’ dichotomy.
Whilst an objectivist position assumes a phenomenological relation to moral panic –
whereby it is related to social conditions such as disease or death, social dysfunction,
conflict, exploitation and social injustice – the constructionist view locates moral
panic in the ideological domain through discursive identification of the threat
counted by ‘the other’ and validation of particular pathways to action.

The construction of moral panic has largely been studied in relation to the mass
media and involves the homogenisation of ‘the other’ as a ‘moral threat’ to society:

A condition, episode, person or group of persons emerges to
become defined as a threat to societal values and interests; its
nature is presented in a stylized and stereotypical fashion by the
mass media; the moral barricades are manned by editors,
bishops, politicians and other right thinking people; socially
accredited experts pronounce their diagnoses and solutions; ways
of coping are evolved or resorted to; the condition then
disappears, submerges or deteriorates and becomes less visible.
Sometimes the subject of the panic passes over and is forgotten,
except in folklore and collective memory; at other times it has
more serious and long lasting repercussions and might produce
such changes as those in legal and social policy or event the way
society conceives of itself. (Cohen 1972:9)

Within the context of the loveLife programme, youth are identified as ‘the other’,
and are causally located at the centre of the HIV/AIDS epidemic:

Already more than 4-million South Africans (10% of the
population) are HIV positive. Conservative estimates are that in
excess of 10 million South Africans will die of AIDS in the next 5-
10 years. In the past year the rate of HIV infections among
adolescents aged 15-20 years increased by 65%... failure to
influence the sexual behaviour of this age group will have
incalculable consequences for the scale of the HIV epidemic in
South Africa (loveLife1999a:1).

Moral panic thus serves an ideological purpose in drawing attention away from the
specific conditions that contribute to youth vulnerability to HIV – for example,
coercive sexual encounters framed by high age differentials between sexual partners (and related adult culpability), and a range of contextual factors including family breakdown as a product of labour migration, gender disempowerment, and the like (see Kelly & Parker 2000; Kelly, Ntlabati, Oyosi, van der Riet & Parker 2002a).

**Research discourses**

Youth sexual behaviour and youth responses to the loveLife programme are overwhelmingly represented through quantitative research. This includes a series of specific research reports that have been positioned as either informing understanding of youth at a given point in time, or evaluating responses by youth to the loveLife programme. As outlined further above, quantitative research carries with it a common-sense orthodoxy that is interconnected with the epistemology of natural science. Within this paradigm, quantitative approaches are understood as a specialised branch of social science founded on concepts of methodological rigour – for example, sampling methodologies, standardisation of measures and indicators, detailed and standardised methods of data collection, statistical tests based on mathematical formulae, amongst others. (see Friis & Sellers 1999; Becker 1996; Bryman 1984). Although loveLife surveys draw on the implied rigour and validity of quantitative research, research activities are at the same time characterised by inadequate explanations of methodology and narrow interpretations of findings that are oriented towards valorising the loveLife programme (loveLife 2001a; loveLife 2002b; Parker 2003a). Similarly, fuzzy logics are evident in claims made in the programme’s monitoring reports (loveLife 2003b) – for example, under the heading ‘expanded national and community dialogue and debate’ it is stated that

“loveLife attracted considerable independent media coverage during 2002. The total value of below the line media coverage received by loveLife was around R29 million… This coverage [print] was achieved through a total of 1195 print articles during 2002, with a total circulation of around 66 million for the whole of 2002 (all publications combined). Overall, most media coverage (80% of the value) was estimated to be positive, 20% negative and 2% neutral… The peak in the value of positive press generated in May coincided with the launch of S’camto GroundBreakers II. (p14-15)

The concept of ‘attracting considerable independent’ media attention suggests that loveLife is an entity within the South African social formation that is newsworthy
and that this stimulates journalistic interest. This masks the formal relationships
loveLife has with a range of newspaper groups as well as the organisation’s public
relations practices that purposively engage the media through press releases, media
advisories, invitations to events and other activities to generate copy. Additionally, in
the claims outlined above, the volume of articles is quantified to suggest that
combined reach of the publications in which loveLife articles appeared is 66-million
– a total considerably more that the total South African population of 45-million.
This reach is also quantified in monetary terms as R29-million. Absence of
methodological explanation makes it impossible to understand how particular
quantifications were achieved, what judgments were made to reach particular
numerical conclusions, and what qualitative categorisations and judgments were
employed to constitute ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ coverage. Masking of
methodological processes shifts the discourse of findings into a common-sense
framework that requires that quantifications be taken at face value and conclusions
legitimated on the basis of an assumed underlying objective scientific method. This
example demonstrates how discourses of quantitative research and implicit validity
and legitimacy are utilised in such a way that they incorporate valorisation and
hyperbole.

Hegemonic consolidation

Structural hegemony relates to economic and social structures, whilst agential
hegemony “corresponds to the normal understanding of the struggle for dominance,
the application of strategy, the exercise of power, the striving for consent, the
articulation of interests, the construction of blocs and the battle of ideas”. Hegemony
thus involves strategic alliances of social groups that allow authority to be exerted
over subordinate groups and it is this aspect of hegemony that relates to developing
positional dominance. This notion adds to an understanding of Gramsci’s (1971)
concept of consent, given that hegemony is specifically to do with understanding
particular practices of dominance. Whilst dominant social formations are readily
identified within broader base/superstructure relations, within the context of analysis
of the ideology and hegemonic practices of groups it is useful to explore the concept
of leadership as framed by Gramsci (1971). In this instance, the ideological practice

25 This approach is typically used by public relations agencies, who justify monthly retainers and
fees by providing clients with tabulations of the assumed publicity value of newspaper column
centimetres achieved and suggesting that these have equivalencies to formal advertising.
of ‘leading’ through the establishment of inter-relations with existing dominant formations and groups can be considered as fundamental to establishing dominance of a particular group.

**Elite endorsement and structural linkages**

Ideological discourses have to do with particular forms of power and dominance. In Marxist terms, ideological discourses are constituted within the ruling class through a range of interactions between the state, capital and related ideological formations. Studies of the intersections of power within the ruling class have largely been understood in relation to the politics of power, with Marxists emphasising dynamics of class, and liberal-pluralists emphasising the dynamics of elites (Higley & Moore 2001). Elites personify structural power – for example, political leaders, leaders within the civil service, leaders within corporate formations including the mass media, leaders within educational institutions, all of whom are functional to decision-making that affects public policy and social process. The concept of elite can be extended to include what might be termed ‘opinion elites’ whose capacity to inform social processes is not specifically embedded within structural formations, but whose opinions and representations shape and inform world views and political processes – for example entertainers, religious leaders, academics – whose opinions are valued within society. Elites may also be located within counter-ideological and counter-hegemonic processes, whereby leadership is given to ideas and movements within civil society that contest dominant ideologies and ideological formations.

Elites are important to processes of representation in the sense that particular discourses devolve to particular individuals by virtue of their structural/elite positioning. Gramsci sees ideas as ‘material forces’ and that these are weighted not numerically, but in terms of who generates them:

… the expansive and persuasive capacity of the opinions of a few individuals, the active minorities, the elites, the avant-gardes, etc.
– i.e. their rationality, historicity or concrete functionality. Which means it is untrue that all individual opinions have ‘exactly’ equal weight. (1971:192)

Elite discourses have been widely used to legitimate the loveLife programme. These discourses occur within particular historical moments – for example, the launch of specific components of the programme, in relation to research findings, or in relation to broader commentaries on HIV/AIDS in relation to youth. For example, loveLife
brochures include statements of elite support alongside overviews of the loveLife programme (loveLife 2002b; 2003a; 2004a).

Elite endorsements are ideological in that they provide a linking relation to other ideological formations, and in this sense provide the foundations for the linkages that constitute ideological and hegemonic blocs. Elite endorsements function at the level of legitimation, but shift into hegemonic discourses as a result of reiteration and structural/functional linkages to the loveLife programme. These together provide support to processes of ideological dominance.

The concept of elites can be linked to analyses of political economy – which can be defined as “the social relations, particularly the power relations, that mutually constitute the production, distribution and consumption of resources” (Mosco 1996:25). The political economy of communication is positioned as intersecting with “dynamic geometries of power embedded in social relations throughout society, noting that it incorporates “unequal structures of representation” (Mosco 1996:244). Studies of mass media have linked media representations to dominant ideology as a result of mass media discourses “amplifying and extending the existing predispositions that constitute the dominant culture, not [in] creating them”, whilst at the same time being “closely linked to the dominant power structure through ownership, legal regulation, the values implicit in professional ideologies in the media, and the structures and ideological consequences of prevailing modes of news gathering” (Gurevitch et al 1982:14-16). The political economy of the media thus involves the intersection between analysis of media institutions and institutional relationships on the one hand, and the construction of particular meanings through discourse as a result institutionalised practices on the other. This method of analysis can be applied to other ideological groups. For example, it is necessary to understand how ideological groups are structured, how they relate to other ideological groups, and how this structure of alliances is employed in processes of representing, legitimating and reiterating a particular ideology. It is recognised that ideologies are never discrete – they are connected to macro-ideologies and parallel superstructural ideological formations to constitute an ideological bloc that reinforces conditions of dominance.

The loveLife programme has been consciously structured in relation to a range of formations, institutions and organisations including international funding organisations (Henry J Kaiser Family Foundation, Gates Foundation, the Global Fund for HIV/AIDS, TB and Malaria), global institutions (UNICEF, World Health
Organisation and UNAIDS), the state (South African Government and Department of Health), local organisations (RHRU, PPASA, HST), media institutions (*Sunday Times*, Independent Newspaper Group, SABC, SAfm, Ster Kinekor, Metro FM), and corporates (Anglo American, Vodacom, Avis, SAA). These structured partnerships form the basis of a hegemonic bloc that allows for a positional dominance of the loveLife programme. Linkages to elites and other ideological formations are also constituted through advisory boards and groups that ostensibly provide oversight and guidance to the programme and it is through these linkages that elites provide support, endorsement and legitimation of the loveLife programme. It is through such linkages that power is derived – given that the related formations, institutions and organisations are already politically, socially and economically dominant.

**Critique and hegemonic consent practices**

At the intersection of representation and ideology is a struggle for meaning. Ideological meanings are constructed through reiterative discourses that are directed towards dominance of particular ideas. Dominance is interdependent with common-sense frameworks (or orthodoxies) that are amplified through discourse practices that include processes of legitimation, with ideology being reinforced through structural-functional linkages to parallel dominant ideological formations/institutions/groups. For Gramsci, domination and leadership are conscious processes:

*The supremacy of a social group manifests itself in two ways, as ‘domination’ and as ‘intellectual and moral leadership’. A social group dominates antagonistic groups, which it tends to ‘liquidate’, or to subjugate perhaps even by armed force; it leads kindred and allied groups… It subsequently becomes dominant when it exercises power, but if it holds it firmly in its grasp, it must continue to lead as well.* (Gramsci, 1971:57-8)

Although he is referring here to the ascendancy of a social group to a position of dominance within the state, this conception can be applied to processes of ascendancy and the managing of hegemonic processes within any ideological group. The loveLife programme, through a range of political and structural processes has assumed (without any broad-based support), intellectual and moral leadership for HIV/AIDS prevention in relation to youth South Africa. This has been entrenched

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through a range of structural/functional linkages that are reiterated through ideological discourse practices.

Ideologies are inherently contradictory, and it follows that in the process of securing dominance, ideas will be contested. Ideological critique may occur on the surface – essentially criticism of particular ideas that does not necessarily address fundamental ideological dimensions. Such critique may take place within the dominant common-sense framework, so, for example, the loveLife programme may be critiqued for fundamental methodological errors or for drawing inappropriate conclusions from quantitative research data, but not necessarily in relation to the epistemological limits of quantitative research *per se*. This differs from deeper levels of critique, which are centred around unmasking underlying assumptions and contradictions – for example the orthodoxy of quantitative research, or ideological distortions that are the result of particular representations (i.e. the unmasking of fundamental contradictions). As Lears (1985:577) observes: “hegemonic culture depends not on the brainwashing of ‘the masses’ but on the tendency of public discourse to make some forms of experience readily available to consciousness, while ignoring or suppressing others”.

Critique is a deeper process that takes place outside of the domain of common sense – it does not defer to common-sense rationale. Some forms of critique are thus reformative, whilst others are transformative. Deeper levels of critique often involve a consciously counter-hegemonic orientation that is explicitly (or implicitly) ideological. Counter-hegemony involves the self same processes that are necessary to ideological construction and representation – distortions that are the product of orthodoxies, legitimation reiterated through discourse in combination with the development of an ideological bloc.

*A revolution can be made and defended only through the creation of widespread popular consent as a result both of an ideological struggle and a concrete programme of reforms. A new collective will is created around a new historical project… weakening the adversary can only be met by waging a hegemonic struggle, in which the working class goes beyond an economic-corporate vision of its task and unites a new historic bloc. (Showstack Sassoon 1987:221)*

Consent is a hegemonic process that involves overcoming both criticism and critique without devolving to force and violence given that “violence *qua* violence is highly unstable, unpredictable and costly” (Fontana 1993:144).
Whilst discourse is the process through which consent is achieved, it is also interrelated with power, and in this sense consent should not be thought of as a passive process through which ideology is reproduced. In other words, there is a coercive element located within discourse that is not simply about shifting ideas into the realm of common sense. Coercive discourse is foregrounded in the techniques and practices of propaganda, which allow ideas to be weighted in particular ways so as to invoke power. These include, for example, practices of dominance through discourse identified by Therborn (1999) and Black (2001) including excommunication, restriction, shielding, and discourses of legitimation. Processes of consent and legitimation are weighed in favour of dominant ideologies, and superstructural ideologies that are linked to them: “Because members of the dominant class largely control the base or material structures and processes of social relations, they have a distinct edge in ideological battles. Thus, always underlying the superstructural overdetermination, is the determinacy of the base” (Lewis 1992:281). For Gramsci (1971), hegemonic consent is linked to leadership and the giving of direction to social life that is a product of, and a pathway to, ideological dominance.

In relation to the loveLife programme, critical perspectives may be silenced by limited access to discourse fora. With a view to understanding the possibility of latent critical perspectives, a telephone survey was conducted by the Centre for AIDS Development, Research and Evaluation (CADRE) in 2002. This involved discussions with 49 individuals holding management positions in governmental and non-governmental organisations whose functions encompass HIV/AIDS and youth related work. These responses give insight into the range of perspectives that exist in relation to the loveLife programme, and foreground the limitations of critical perspectives dislocated from the public sphere. Critical perspectives of loveLife have also occurred within the public sphere – for example, articles in publications such as *Fair Lady, The Citizen, Noseweek,* and the *Mail & Guardian.* Some critiques have also been brought to the fore through complaints to bodies such as the Advertising

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27 Selection was made through identifying youth-oriented HIV/AIDS organisations listed in the national HIV/AIDS directory. Interviews explored a range of perspectives on the loveLife programme and respondents were guaranteed anonymity. Interviews were tape-recorded, transcribed and analysed using qualitative research software. These critiques are analysed in relation to the ideological aspects of the loveLife programme. Additional information on the protocol and questions is included in Appendix 1.

Standards Authority, as well as at conferences and other fora, including, for example, internet discussion groups.29

Critique of ideology is dependent upon access to a range of discourse genres and fora through which to direct critique. Counter-hegemonic discourses require spaces within which to locate discourse, yet such spaces are not readily accessible. In the case of the loveLife programme, for example, discourses of criticism and critique are not readily located in the large media groups which have partnered with loveLife; government support and funding of the loveLife programme limits space for alternate discourses emanating from non-governmental organisations or individuals located within government structures who are dependent upon political or government support themselves; and critiques of research findings are interdependent with appropriate frameworks for delivering critique. It is in this sense that the knowledge/power relations that are embedded within discourse, can also be understood as existing beyond discourse, within structural power relations that provide space to particular discourses whilst excluding others. In effect, ascendant and dominant ideologies control discourse processes through power that is determined by imbalanced access to the means to produce and reproduce knowledge.

**Methodological considerations**

The categorisations above provide a theoretical framework for exploring ideological dominance of the loveLife programme – an entity which is produced through a range of alliances and partnerships and which operates within the context local and global response to HIV/AIDS. The following chapters integrate this theoretical framework with a range of discourses emanating from the programme, related discourses by associated elites, and commentaries and discourses emanating from individuals and groups offering criticism and critique of the programme.

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CHAPTER 4

Epistemologies and orthodoxies

Foucault’s concept of *episteme* refers to historical relations that underpin knowledge and consequently discourse. *Episteme* has a generative function – it is the foundation from which knowledge and discourses are built: “Foucault is at pains to stress that an *episteme* is not in itself a form or body of knowledge; it is a structure defining the conditions that both make knowledge possible and restrict its scope” (Macey 2000:113). *Episteme* represents the aspects of knowledge construction that give rise to orthodoxies – standardised and/or dominant ways of viewing the world and of explaining lived experience and material conditions. Orthodoxies service processes of ideological masking by virtue of narrowing understanding of social conditions, and at the same time shifting these narrow frameworks of understanding into ideological domination through common sense. In the case of loveLife, three epistemological orientations have been central to discourses about the programme – quantification, behavioural causality and youth modernity in relation to consumption.

**Discourses of quantification**

Quantitative methods of understanding behavioural and social aspects of HIV/AIDS in South Africa are central to discourses of the loveLife programme. It is through quantification that the founding assumptions of the programme are laid out, and it is through quantification that loveLife’s activities and ‘impacts’ are articulated. The programme’s founding assumptions are grounded in a series of quantitative assertions – for example: 4-million South Africans are HIV positive… HIV infection amongst youth increased by 65 percent in a year… more than a third of babies annually are born to mothers under 18 year’s of age (loveLife1999a:1). Quantification is central to a range of reports produced by the programme and quantitative discourses are used to offer analysis of the contemporary HIV/AIDS context (loveLife 2000c; 2000d; 2001c) as well as the impacts of the loveLife programme (loveLife 2001a; 2002b; 2003a). Quantification is also embedded in other discourses – for example, the goals of the programme: “loveLife aims to reduce
the incidence of HIV among 15-20 year olds by 50 percent over the next three to five years (loveLife 1999a:2); and other quantifications including numbers of partner organisations, overall budgets, calls to the helpline, estimates of cost-benefit and the like (loveLife 2003a; Harrison and Steinberg 2002). Quantification is reiterated in a range of other discourses within genres including events, press releases, media reports and statements:

If current infection rates continue, half of all South Africans below the age of 15 could become infected over the next 10 years (Mail and Guardian 2003, 22 May); loveLife reaches more than 100 000 young people a month through youth centres, school sports, toll free helplines, government clinics and community bodies (Business Day 2003, 8 August); Surveys showed that eight in ten youths had heard of it, while over 85% identified ‘very strongly’ with its messages. (SAPA 2003, 3 December)

Young people, HIV/AIDS and the loveLife programme are thus reduced to a patchwork of numerical descriptors that are put forward as verifiable facts (although sources and means of verification are seldom mentioned). Reduction to quantification involves reification through shifting subjects into objects, in the process, creating a common-sense naturalised framework that sees the complexities of social life reduced to categories and proportions, whilst allowing for a mythical discourse framework to be perpetuated:

Because numbers seemingly expel private interests and ambiguity, they are respected as trustworthy forms of discourse… Precisely because of their reductive and summative capacities, numbers are a powerful symbol system. (Peters 2001:436)

At an ideological level, quantification is used in relation to an explicit explanatory power – the world of HIV/AIDS and the response via the loveLife programme can be ostensibly understood through numbers. Quantification draws on a relation to natural science that “relies on a presupposition of empirical verification, that is, the notion that we can rely on our sensory perception of the world to provide us with accurate data” (Angen 2000:381). In relation to ideology, quantification involves a process of simplification that masks a complex of underlying conditions and relativities. Quantification implies a one-to-one relation between discourse and the object of discourse – and further, a one-to-one relation with lived experience. Quantification is oriented towards the common-sense frameworks of natural science to which all individuals are attuned and inclined as a product of the processes of human learning.
Early processes of learning, for example, include a series of cause and effect relations that allow for interaction with the world – objects fall to the ground if we release them, our bodies move as a result of willed actions, we feel pain as our bodies collide with material objects. It is through this orientation that the logic of causal relations is readily imposed, and the world of scientific explanations of social reality are naturalised as we progress through life. We thus have a natural inclination towards positivism that is rooted in scientific logics, and which, in turn, is readily imposed on social logics.

Processes of quantification and mathematical measures, reduced to percentages along narrow indices, divorce understanding of human subjects as constituted through a complex of social interactions that are interdependent with material conditions. Quantification can thus be understood as intrinsically ideological, as a ‘regime of truth’. The authority of mathematical constructs, combined with descriptors of distribution, concentration, probability and projections constitute a ‘knowledge’ of the world that is removed from human social interaction: “In this approach to knowledge constitution, interaction of the objects of study (not subjects) is unnecessary… a fact is constituted outside the structure of social relations” (Young 1981:122). It is in this way that quantification is also related to alienation – an alienation from the complex processes that give rise to numbers in the first place:

Postivism attempts to equate the understanding of social reality with the scientific explanation, prediction and control of natural reality as practiced by the ‘hard’ sciences of physics, physiology, chemistry or biology. Using the methods of natural science to study social relationships and human beings however, requires that one to reify or make abstract and static living human beings, necessarily distorting them from the outset. (Kirkpatrick, Katsiaficas & Emery 1978:7)

A particular feature of the loveLife programme’s quantifying discourses has been a general lack of reference to source. Numbers are presented as ‘stand-alone’ with no explicit linking of source documents and reports from which they may have emanated. The matter-of-factness of unsourced quantifications in such discourses clearly holds considerable power, to the extent that they are not readily critiqued (in some cases, in spite of obvious inherent illogic). For example, the statement “more than a third of babies annually are born to mothers under 18 years of age” which is unreferenced in loveLife 1999a, is an obvious impossibility, given that female child-bearing age extends from the mid teens to the mid-forties and only a proportion of
teenagers are sexually active by the age of 18 – yet this ‘fact’ has been sustained through a number of iterations (see loveLife 1999a; 1999b; 2003b). Such data are readily refuted, though critique of such inaccuracies is not readily inserted into public discourse, and consequently the claim may survive numerous iterations – i.e. it becomes ‘true’ as a product of uncontested reiteration.

In tracing this claim, its first usage can be found in an early loveLife publication – an overview of the national adolescent-friendly clinic initiative, which states “Adolescent child bearing is significant with teenage pregnancies representing one third of all births – 330 per 1 000 live births” (loveLife 1999b:1). It also appears in the programme’s 2002 Communication Strategy (2003b), as “one in three women in South Africa has given birth before the age of 18”. In loveLife 1999b, the statement is referenced to a government report on social development prepared for the World Summit on Social Development (Republic of South Africa 1995). Whilst this paper is not available in public domain, it draws on statistics published in the government Green Paper entitled “Population Policy for South Africa” (Ministry of Welfare and Population Development 1995). Here reference is made to the ‘teenage pregnancy’ rate as “330 per 1 000 women under age 19”, citing the Copenhagen report as its source. The number is misquoted in loveLife 1999b as being all births amongst all women, not the birth rate amongst teenagers, and then is further misrepresented by shifting the age range from under 19 to under 18 years of age in loveLife 1999a, thus adding ideological weight to the argument that teenage females are both irrepressibly sexually active, and at the same sexually irresponsible.

The making of quantitative claims without reference to their historicity also allows a range of other, more recent studies to be ignored. In this way, statistics more useful to supporting particular claims are foregrounded, whilst alternate statistics remain outside the discourse frame over extended periods of time. Similar discourses, with similar limitations, were identified in Parker (2003:3) – for example, the statement that “10 million South Africans will die of AIDS in 5-10 years” and “rape, violence and coercion are common features of adolescent sexual behaviour”.

Unreferenced quantitative research data are common to loveLife discourses, and create an apparent inherent authority – an authority that does not defer to the academic and research practices of referencing data. Rather, the practice is to appear all-knowing and beyond reproach by wielding numbers in an authoritative way,

30 For example, the 1998 Demographic and Health Survey, which provides a comprehensive overview of reproductive health.
building foundations for arguments that legitimate a particular patterning of solutions – and directing attention towards the pathways to solutions claimed up-front by the loveLife programme. In this way ‘truth-claims’ are constituted as myth, which then devolve to common-sense constructions of youth sexuality through reiteration.

Through the utility of quantitative data, there is an opportunity for multiple levels of ideological masking. At the first level, underlying social processes are hidden through quantification; at a second level, original sources of data are hidden from view; at a third level, a particular vision of the context of HIV/AIDS in South Africa is mythologised, at a fourth level, the ‘reality’ described is divorced from its historicity, and at a fifth level, it is only the loveLife programme that is positioned to address this ‘problem’.

For Barthes, such processes of mythologising remove the capacity to see beneath the surface:

*In passing from history to nature, myth acts economically: it abolishes the complexity of human acts, it gives them the simplicity of essences, it does away with all dialectics, with any going back beyond what is immediately visible, it organizes a world which is without contradictions because it is without depth, a world wide open and wallowing in the evident, it establishes a blissful clarity: things appear to mean something by themselves.*

(1993:143)

Discourses of quantification in the loveLife programme also extend beyond description of the present, functioning ideologically with references both to the past and to the future. They are linked explicitly to ideological constructs of social regulation *led* by the loveLife programme. For example, interventions of the loveLife programme are positioned as having been set in motion with the aim of bringing about change in youth sexuality that is constructed in its contemporary form as imperilling the country as a whole. This is framed by the goal of “aiming to reduce the incidence of HIV among 15-20 year olds by 50% over the next three to five years” through a “brand driven, sustained multidimensional national programme” (loveLife 1999a:2). It is worth noting that the goal itself, which has an obvious appeal to funders and policy-makers, becomes the product of shifting iterations to avoid having to address the failure of achieving a monocausal relation to such a

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31 In this example, levels of teenage pregnancy are non-normative, teenagers are immoral and irresponsible and their behaviour needs to be contained.
narrowly framed outcome. In later iterations the goal is modified slightly: “loveLife seeks to cut the HIV infection rate among young South Africans by 50 percent” (loveLife 2002c:1), which excludes reference to the timeframe, and in an even later iteration of the loveLife brochure the goal is repositioned as being “to substantially reduce the HIV infection rate among young South Africans” (loveLife 2003a:1) – here without any reference to a 50 percent reduction in prevalence nor a timeframe.32

In these reiterative but modified constructions, the pattern remains – it is always some time in the future that the goal will be achieved, with later iterations being marked by subtle shifts that mask the failure to achieve previously stated goals within the set timeframes.

These modifications have clearly involved a conscious process during the production of the loveLife brochures. In the case of the latter two publications (and a later iteration in 2004), the text and layout are virtually identical save for minor modifications to specific sentences such as those described above. Although the 50 percent decline is clearly not readily achievable, attempts are however made in other discourse genres to preserve the notion that loveLife is an active causal agent in the decline of HIV in South Africa – for example, loveLife director, David Harrison, is quoted in the Sunday Times as stating: “The decline in HIV prevalence from over 17% to 14% in teenagers attending antenatal clinics over the past three years, coupled now with a flattening in incidence33 in 20 to 24 year olds, is encouraging” (Sunday Times, 2003), whilst a similar construction is also employed in a paper by Harrison where he compares two non-comparable datasets – antenatal clinic data and the results of the population-based HIV survey conducted by the HSRC – to suggest a decline in youth prevalence (Harrison 2003). In both instances, Harrison’s analyses misrepresent the studies to which he refers: The data for under 20 year olds in the antenatal survey (Department of Health 2003:9) are as follows: 2000 (16.1%), 2001 (15.4%) and 2002 (14.8%) – not a decline of 3 percentage points from 17% to 14% as claimed – but rather a decline of 1.3 percentage points – i.e. less than half the claimed decline, which Harrison finesses by rounding off percentages in opposite directions. The Department of Health report also notes that there is an apparent stabilisation of HIV prevalence between 2001 and 2002, but it does not conclude that this is a statistically significant change (Department of Health

32 This same statement is repeated in a later version of the loveLife brochure in 2004 (loveLife 2004a).
33 The claim to incidence reduction cannot be made, given that antenatal data reflect prevalence only, and incidence is not readily calculated from the data at hand.
2003:9) – i.e. no conclusion can be drawn from the differences in antenatal percentages over time as presented in the Department of Health report.

In relation to the second claim, which compares antenatal data and population-based data, the assumptions are poorly founded. Antenatal studies sample pregnant females attending antenatal clinics, whilst population-based data sample a population as a whole. Shisana et al (2002) note that a statistically significant lower HIV prevalence was found when comparing the 2001 antenatal survey with the 2002 population-based survey. This was found to be as a result of the survey showing that: “not all young women are sexually active, as opposed to pregnant women in the antenatal data, who are by definition practicing unprotected sex” (Shisana et al 2002:59). In other words, pregnant females (the primary/only sample in antenatal studies) constitute a risk group that is different to their non-pregnant peers by virtue of the former being 100 percent sexually active and less likely to be using condoms, whilst the population-based sample includes females who are not sexually active, as well as contraceptive users and consistent condom users – i.e. the surveys are not directly comparable.

Harrison’s statement in the Sunday Times is linked to descriptions suggesting the loveLife programme is contributing to HIV decline. In the paragraphs preceding the HIV data, for example, it is stated:

*Harrison said of the 16 Y-centres across the country: “We believe they have had a tremendous impact. Over 50 000 young people in surrounding schools go through our programmes every year”. He said loveLife had done baseline surveys of self-reported sexual behaviour and STI and HIV prevalence rates which would enable them to track their impact. (Sunday Times, 2 November 2003)*

Thus, given that loveLife Y-centres are claimed to interact with 50 000 young people, and that HIV prevalence is claimed to have gone down, the implication of a causal link is established. Within the context of these claims, new frames of meaning are established. Data on pregnancy amongst teenagers is reformulated and represented to suggest that teenagers contribute one third of the total of all births, and further, that it is teenagers under 18 (not 19) who constitute this ‘reproductive miracle’; a relatively small (and not significant) percentage point difference in antenatal data over three years (16.1%-14.8% = 1.3%), is reformulated and represented as 3 percentage points; and datasets derived through explicitly different methodologies are reformulated and represented as directly comparable. These subtle shifts are directed ideologically to support particular trajectories of claims-making,
and the utility of quantitative data, by virtue of its implicit relation to scientific rigour, allows for quantitative claims to be spoken authoritatively and to occupy terrains that are beyond critique.\footnote{In relation to the shifting description of antenatal data, for example, within which discourse genre and within which discourse forum would one insert a debate about the minutiae of statistical distortions and claims?} 

A critical approach to analysis fundamentally requires a process of ‘endemic suspicion’ as suggested by Hodge and Kress (1993). Such critique may operate as much within a given paradigm (in this case, by critiquing claims made whilst operating within the paradigm quantitative social research) as well as outside the given paradigm (for example, by critiquing the limitations of the epistemological underpinnings of quantification as an ideological construct). In the case of the former, the loveLife programme’s quantitative discourses and assumptions can be unpacked and unmasked through analysis of the relative ‘truth’ of numbers in relation to the ‘truthfulness’ of their representation. Selective representations have taken place that have been reproduced in tandem with manipulations of ‘facts’ constituted and reiterated apart from their original referents – a process that services the ideological process legitimation where consent is achieved through the common-sense authority and implied legitimacy of quantification, combined with authority derived from a lack of opportunity for antithetical discourses that enter the public sphere in instances where misrepresentations might be identified. Equally, critique of representations at this level are relative. In some instances, the difference between ‘nitpicking’ and serious scientific dispute needs to be borne in mind – i.e. the differences between allegations of misrepresentation through small manipulations and allegations of ‘scientific fraud’ or illegitimate claims-making.

Quantification has the ideological characteristic of appearing value free, of being objective, of being sufficiently representative of a social totality, of existing in the present-tense, and of concretising lived experience. Concepts of validity and reliability in quantitative social research are derived from historical developments in the ‘science’ of quantitative research, whereby a history of reflexive critique has contributed to robust approaches to sampling, development of well defined measures and indicators, approaches focusing on distancing observer and observed, introduction of external checking systems, and replication of systems of statistical analysis that allow for generalisation (Bryman 1984). Any deference to quantification, rigorous or not, carries with it an assumed relation to scientific practices of social research that are ideologically bound to systems that are
considered to be rigorous and methodologically sound. Use of quantification in the discourses of the loveLife programme thus carry an implicit relation to scientific rigour and validity.

Reference to quantitative research is one of a number of quantifying discursive strategies employed by the loveLife programme that function ideologically. Forms include the drawing of quantitative inferences: for example, loveLife is referred to as “South Africa’s national HIV prevention programme for young people” (loveLife 2002c; 2002a), which infers that loveLife constitutes the ‘numerically’ dominant national response addressing youth prevention. This claim is in contrast to (and masks) a range of national level programmes address a similar audience in relation to HIV prevention – for example, the Department of Health funded Khomanani Campaign,35 Soul City,36 and the national school-based lifeskills programme run by the Departments of Health and Education. Other quantitative inferences include reach of the programme’s activities – “loveLife television programmes broadcast to a potential weekly audience of six million teens” (loveLife 2002c:4); “nearly four million school students are eligible to participate in the loveLife games” (loveLife 2003a:4); as well as current and future plans “loveLife will establish adolescent-friendly health services in 200 public clinics by 2003, growing to 900 by 2006” (loveLife 2003a:4). Such quantifications are obvious manipulations that claim potential rather than actual reach (‘potential weekly audience’; ‘eligible to participate’). Equally, future plans are not the same as current operational activities.

Quantification, as a meta-narrative, linked with reiterated quantitative constructions of the past, present and future, constitutes an ideological frame in service of common sense. Quantification offers an ideological advantage in that numbers can be utilised to foster particular emphases and notions of lived experience, and nuanced to provide ideological direction to particular arguments. This includes a capacity to suggest cause and effect relations.

**Discourses of causality**

The science of epidemiology is grounded in concepts of biomedicine that follow a mechanistic approach to disease. In the case of particular micro-organisms, disease is

35 See www.aidsinfo.co.za. Khomanani is a national campaign commissioned and funded by the Department of Health, and targeting youth amongst other audiences.
36 Soul City receives some of its funding through government, targets youth, and operates nationally. See www.soulcity.org.za.
reduced to a single causative factor (e.g. germ or virus), or may be attributed to genetic factors that predispose individuals to disease. It is also recognised that diseases extend beyond singular causes and that a chain of causality may extend to a range of social and contextual determinants at the individual or population level. These are assumed to be potentially demonstrable through empirical modelling (Weed 2002:440). Although there is some deference to social factors, epidemiological approaches are largely derived from biomedical assumptions, and have been critiqued on the basis of having a weak or absent theoretical basis (Shy 1997; McKinlay 1998).

In relation to HIV/AIDS, epidemiology has focused on the concept of behaviour as being the vector through which disease can be tracked and monitored. This approach has been widely used to guide public health policy and to develop an understanding of the impacts of HIV/AIDS interventions. Armstrong notes that epidemiological criteria of causality emphasise cognitive-biological plausibility over social-contextual plausibility with the result that, for example:

the rate of AIDS [HIV] is explained by how many sex partners a woman has, [and] the biomedical perspective is that a woman has ignorantly or foolishly exposed herself to multiple opportunities of infection. According to the dominant paradigm, it will not be considered causally relevant that unemployment and wage levels of the local economy… mean that engaging in the sex trade is a woman’s best chance for supporting herself… (Armstrong 1999:28)

As a consequence of the predominance of this view, policies and interventions have relied extensively on epidemiology, incorporating an emphasis on concepts of volitional behaviour change rather than attempting to understand underlying conditions of inequality and risk that contribute to HIV infection. In a similar way, campaigns in South African workplaces, largely led by corporates themselves, have been directed towards increasing awareness and knowledge amongst migrantworkers, and interventions such as condom promotion and dissemination whilst underlying economic systems that give rise to HIV risk in the first place are not considered – notably, separation of families as a product of labour migration, which structurally influence HIV infection. As Lurie notes:

Too often we have shied away from structural-level interventions for fear that the problems are so systemic that we cannot have an
impact. But South Africa needs to decide whether a system that separates families for extended periods of time is one that should survive in the new democratic era. Alternatives include sustainable rural development programmes that offer local employment opportunities thus mitigating the need to migrate in the first place. At the same time mining companies in particular should be making real attempts at providing family-friendly housing – at present only about 2% of miners live in such accommodation. (Lurie 2002:12)

The concept of knowledge within individual behavioural approaches to programming is also located within particular ideological assumptions – “knowledge means neutral information with the magic power to change attitudes and behaviours by ‘empowering’ people to make what seem to be self-evidently wise decisions” (Patton 1990:1). There is certainly no dearth of campaigns and related interventions disseminating HIV/AIDS ‘knowledge’ in South Africa, amongst other countries, but as Patton further notes, such systems of knowledge explicitly foreground biomedical knowledge, emphasising

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\text{science-logic over complex folk-logics [that] make people dependent on the medical bureaucracy and leads to the idea that information by itself is efficacious in producing behaviour change… The new scientific knowledges associated with AIDS research almost perfectly rationalize the systems of social control which predate them, especially those which silence or distort the speech and culture of ‘minority communities’. (Patton 1990:1-2)}
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Siedel and Vidal (1997) refer to this as a medico-moral approach to health policy. In the case of HIV/AIDS, individuals are constructed as ignorant and as being imbued with an inability to overcome internal drives that result in indulgence in unhealthy practices. Unhealthy practices are in turn, assumed to be overcome through individual will as a product of knowledge provision. This is related to the notion of a ‘healthy lifestyle’ whereby individuals develop a tacit interest in their health and moderate their activities and behaviours to conform to an ideal state of individual well-being. This notion is put forward as a central concept within medical sociology:

37 This study explored the HIV status of miners and their partners and it was found that of the serodiscordant couples (where one was HIV positive and the other HIV negative), a third of cases involved HIV positive women who had HIV negative partners. This counters the dominant discourses that construct migrant males as the only vectors of HIV infection, with women as passive asexual ‘recipients of infection, whilst also highlighting the breakdown of the family as an important factor in transmission of HIV.
Health lifestyles are ways of living that promote good health and longer life expectancy. Healthy lifestyles include contact with the medical profession in the case of checkups and seeking of advice, but the majority of activities take place outside of clinics and doctors offices. These activities typically consist of choices and practices concerning a proper diet and food habits, exercise, weight control, rest and relaxation, and the avoidance of stress, smoking, drug abuse and the excessive consumption of alcohol… (Cockerham 1992:82)

The notion of health as a lifestyle has been drawn into loveLife programme discourses, and has been structured within an ideological framework that foregrounds the relationship between knowledge, behaviour and lifestyle. The interface between these concepts is then located in a range of interventions where it is claimed that loveLife will (monocausally) halve or reduce HIV prevalence amongst youth. Survey data is then utilised to bolster the programme’s explanatory discourses – for example, the inter-relation between knowledge and practice: “many still do not know important facts about the disease and how it is prevented or treated. Moreover, many sexually active teens are making unsafe choices and hold attitudes that put them at risk of HIV infection” (loveLife 2000c:2). Knowledge is put forward as the primary means of mediating infection, and is further applied to youth as an undifferentiated risk group who are all assumed to be at similar risk of HIV infection. This patterning of health knowledge as consumption is problematised by Colquhoun (1997:450): “[Traditional] research tends to portray young people as simplistic, unthinking cultural dopes susceptible to the ‘health messages’ developed by health ‘experts’ and consumer messages produced by advertisers”. The concept of ‘risk group’ is noted by Seidel and Vidal (1997:65) to involve a weak reductionist medico-moral assumption that favours a singular notion of risk rather than addressing complex social factors. The discourse of lack of knowledge is interrelated with discourses of promiscuity and generalised ‘inappropriate’ behaviour that avoids deeper levels of understanding of risk and its mediators. As Wallace notes:

Research on factors influencing transmission of HIV infection has tended to ignore questions of context, yet each individual contracting the disease is deeply enmeshed in constraints defined by socioeconomic, geographic, historical and other contexts. These constraints may profoundly influence, or even determine, behaviour patterns associated with risk of acquiring disease, and can determine the magnitude and risk for a given population. (1991:847)
That risk is sexually mediated, and that youth are predominantly sexually active, has been a central thesis in loveLife reports and brochures (loveLife 2000a, 2000c, 2001c, 2002c). These assumptions are related to epidemiological modelling exercises that construct the idea that half of all youth will become infected with HIV in their lifetime (loveLife 2000a). This type of modelling – future projection of HIV infection – has been consistently employed in understanding HIV/AIDS trends, and has as a result, entered the domain of common sense as a scientifically legitimised form of crystal ball gazing that produces a range of ‘what if’ scenarios, without explicitly stating the assumptions made in constructing projections. The emerging scenarios conclude that massive impacts will occur if immediate action is not taken – and in this instance, ideological direction is given to the loveLife intervention as a primary solution to the problem. Long-term demographic modelling of this kind is an inexact science at best, and any number of scenarios can be produced, depending upon assumptions made at the outset. Although in the original study (loveLife 2000c), there is some discussion on the limited basis upon which to make assumptions from antenatal HIV prevalence data,38 the notion of half of South Africa’s youth becoming HIV positive is widely utilised by loveLife sans caveats in subsequent discourses and iterations. Located within the context of the loveLife programme, such generalised projections also service the function of suggesting that all youth are at similar levels of risk. In relation to such background claims, loveLife is positioned as the singular programme that can be monocausally linked to changes in youth behaviour. This claim is regularly implied and reiterated – for example, in the text and on the cover of a 2002 survey report it is claimed that:

- 62% of all young South Africans know about loveLife;
- Of those who know about loveLife 76% say loveLife has made them more aware of the risks of unprotected sex; 65% say loveLife caused them to delay or abstain from sex;
- 64% of those who know about loveLife say it has created opportunities for them to talk to their parents about HIV/AIDS;

38 The 2000 report itself introduces the caveat: “Children and the elderly who are at substantially lower risk of HIV, are not captured by antenatal surveys. Even among adults in sexually active age groups, the antenatal survey prevalence figures do not reflect the lower overall risk of men, people who are less sexually active, and communities using the private sector. However, recent studies indicate that fertility among HIV-positive women is substantially lower than among uninfected women, in all but the youngest age groups, and this suggests that the antenatal survey may in fact underestimate HIV prevalence in women of reproductive age in many communities.” (p. 7)
Among sexually experienced youth who know about loveLife, 78% say loveLife has caused them to use a condom; 69% have reduced their number of sexual partners; 63% say they are more assertive in insisting on condom use (loveLife 2002b).³⁹

These claims extend to other reports, brochures, conference presentations and media pronouncements as part of reiterative discourses.⁴⁰ The survey itself involves a manipulation of a number of standardised approaches to evaluative quantitative research. These include:

- failure to adequately describe or amplify details about sampling methodology;
- use of leading questions to construct a causal relation between ‘knowing about loveLife’ and adopting particular points of view or practices;
- failure to contextualise findings in terms of the limitations of either the sampling methodology or the relative unreliability of leading questions used in this way;
- failure to contextualise the involvement of the funding body – the Kaiser Family Foundation – as primary agents in conducting the survey, analysing data and drawing evaluative conclusions.⁴¹

Most national level surveys secure legitimacy by providing careful explanations of how respondents were sampled to achieve representivity, how fieldwork was implemented and how data was managed. This typically requires several pages of explanation and supportive appendices. In contrast, the 2002 loveLife report limits such explanation to a single paragraph, providing no information on fieldwork processes, and including the caveat in relation to sampling that there is a “plus or minus 2.3 percentage point sampling error for all youth” and for “subsets of respondents the margin of sampling error is higher”.⁴² This single paragraph explanation constitutes a significant ideological power, given that the methodology is untransparent and thus impossible to critique, except in relation to its lack of

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³⁹ Some of these statements are also reproduced on the cover of the 2004 loveLife brochure (loveLife 2004a).

⁴⁰ For example, this report formed the basis of loveLife’s presentation at the 2002 Barcelona International AIDS conference and was reported in local and international media. In addition, it is foregrounded in the 2002, 2003 and 2004 loveLife brochures.

⁴¹ Whilst it is not uncommon for AIDS campaigns and organisations to conduct or to closely oversee evaluation of their activities, such research necessarily needs to include some reflection on the biases such an approach might introduce, and state how these were addressed – i.e. a statement of the limitations of the study in regard to potential bias.

⁴² This practice occurs in other loveLife studies as well (loveLife 2000c; 2001a).
transparency. Equally, the introduction of the caveat allows for any claim to be made, given that the caveat can be raised in defence should an indefensible critique be made.\textsuperscript{13}

No mention is made of the limitations implicit in research data being analysed by KFF, the founding funder of the loveLife programme. In relation to the causal claims, a somewhat ingenious approach is adopted – asking young people aged 12-17, in the context of a survey that is obviously about loveLife, whether loveLife had caused them to change, rather than using indirect and comparative measures. This effectively masks any reference to a multiple and complex chain of causality and constitutes instead a series of ‘leading questions’ – i.e. questions that are biased in that they suggest the preferred or desired answer within the structure of the question. As such, no inference can ethically be drawn from such a finding (see Taylor-Powell 1998). Equally, the question is asked only of a causal relation to loveLife, and not to a range of other programmes also targeting youth (e.g. Soul City, Khomanani). No reservations are put forward in the loveLife survey report to indicate the ethical limitations of the questions posed.

Such findings have utility beyond the framework of public discourse. For example, they were contained in a proposal for $68-million for youth friendly clinics and related programme activities made in the first round of proposals to the Global Fund for HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (GFATM). Although reviewed by a panel of technical experts in the form of a Technical Review Panel, it appears that the limits of causal claims were not a matter of concern, given that the proposal was both successful, and also amongst the top five highest grants made globally for HIV/AIDS in round one. Related arguments for massive levels of funding for the loveLife programme are put forward as being linked to the pressing need to move quickly without needing to consider any absolute proof that the programme is effective:

\begin{quote}
LoveLife estimates that it requires $40 million per annum ($6.6 per 12-17 year old) to fund its national HIV prevention programme at optimal levels and a conservative estimate of economic benefit to economic costs is (1.4-1.9):1… Although definitive proof of success is significant reduction in HIV rates
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{43} There were disproportionate levels of youth within the survey who had heard about loveLife through channels that were not widely available at national level – for example, 23% heard about loveLife from a Y-centre, yet there were no more than seven functioning Y-centres located in communities nationwide at the time of the survey. This imbalance suggests that it is highly unlikely that the sample was nationally representative (Parker 2003).
among young people, we cannot wait for final confirmation.
(Harrison and Steinberg 2002:4)

In this way causal discourses have a structural effect relating to dominance – in this case, such claims are utilised to secure funding. Securing funding, in turn produces a related structural power.

**Discourses of youth, modernity and consumption**

Capitalism and globalisation are intertwined – a process recognised by Marx and Engels in the *Communist Manifesto* long before the term globalisation was put forward:44

*The bourgeoisie cannot exist without constantly revolutionizing the instruments of production, and thereby the relations of production, and with them the whole relations of society… The need of a constantly expanding market for its products chases the bourgeoisie over the entire surface of the globe. It must nestle everywhere, settle everywhere, establish connections everywhere.*

(2000:5-6)

This world market is translated into a system of exploitation that gives “a cosmopolitan character to production and consumption in every country” that redefines needs: “In place of the old wants, satisfied by the production of the country, we find new wants, requiring for their satisfaction the products of distant lands and climes… we have intercourse in every direction, universal inter-dependence of nations” (Marx & Engels 2000:6).

The ideological effects of mass cultures of consumption, which include homogenisation and alienation through consumption of entertainment and material goods, were explored by the Frankfurt School in the United States and were linked to the decentring of class identity. As Berger notes, the purpose of the culture industry was “to manipulate the consciousness of the masses so as to maintain current social, economic and political institutions” (Berger 1995:45). It is through the reification of consumer products that symbolic relations to identity are constructed, and it is in this context that the focus on particular forms of ‘leisure’ activity and the consumption of branded consumer goods,

44 In this instance, global capitalism is framed within the notion of bourgeois imperialism.
which are marketed to elevate their relation to the status of the individual, translate into alienation from lived experience:

The focus on leisure pursuits and private expenditures breeds privatism, selfishness, and reluctance to take care of social needs and to spend money in the public realm. Capitalism... is not simply an economic system, but a kind of culture in which everything is subordinated to consumption. (Berger 1995:55)

The loveLife programme explicitly fosters inter-relations between individualism, materialism and consumption that are encapsulated within the concept of a ‘healthy lifestyle’, with the assumption that HIV prevention and other social ills intersect with, and are moderated by, aspiration to materialism:

Despite HIV/AIDS and other social problems such as poverty or unemployment, surveys consistently show that young South Africans are highly optimistic about their futures. loveLife’s message reflects this powerful optimism, motivating young people to accept sexual responsibility as an essential part of a healthy lifestyle that will help them to achieve their goals and aspirations. (loveLife 2003a:5)

In other words, armed with ‘aspiration’ and ‘optimism’ it is assumed to be possible to float over the exigencies of HIV/AIDS, poverty, unemployment, and other social problems to sustain a ‘healthy lifestyle’ (See Figure 3).
This notion is connected to particular constructions of health that locate individualism at the centre, and this in turn, is constructed as something that can be consumed. Cockerham, for example, outlines the concept of healthy lifestyle in terms of Weber’s categories: “‘Stiliseierung des Lebens’ (stylisation of lifestyle), ‘Lebensführung’ (life conduct), and ‘Lebenschancen’ (life chances)” (1992:83-84). This view recognises that life chances are related to “the probability of finding satisfaction for interests, wants and needs”, which are interconnected with being located within upper and middle-level socioeconomic groups. The loveLife programme is implicitly located in a paradigm that foregrounds knowledge and individual responsibility as primary areas of intervention building on youth

optimism\textsuperscript{46} irrespective of material conditions, and it is on this basis that the programme incorporates a range of knowledge-based interventions that seek to “encourage more open discussion about sexuality and the connection between sexual behaviour and sexual health problems such as HIV” (2002c:5). This conception is located within a ‘lifestyle’ of consumption that blends interests in fashion and branded consumer items with the concept of improving life chances. This is in contrast to historical trajectories of South African youth. Township youth post the Soweto uprisings of 1976, symbolised a so-called ‘lost generation’, who were both deeply entrenched within the political struggle and deeply affected by it. They were commonly represented as a generation for whom “violence and cruelty were the norm, coupled with the destruction of their own education and prospects” (Everatt 2000). There has, however, been a rapid transition from this vision of youth to the location of youth within paradigms of consumption, as ‘the hottest target market for advertisers’. As Everatt (2000) notes of the post-revolutionary period: “The transformation was complete. The feared foot-soldiers of the revolution had been put in their place and moulded to fit the new, consumption-driven capitalist South Africa”. Pessimism about youth was thus readily converted into an understanding of their potential as a new market that could be integrated into a local economy that was also, after years of economic isolation, being rapidly integrated into the global economy.\textsuperscript{47} The implications of this consumer ideology – the mediation of existence and consciousness in the present tense – divorces subjects from the developmental potentials of historical reflection, promoting instead a view of the world that is constantly looking towards the future through the lens of regulated commodity fetishism.

The vision of South African youth as hedonistic consumers runs counter to paradigms of youth framed by concepts of youth development. For example, in the early post-apartheid era, a community-centred mobilisation through the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) was intended to overturn the inequalities of apartheid. The role for youth was envisioned as embedded within the concept of community development and social purpose:

\textsuperscript{46} “Be there in 2010” is an example of a slogan linking the forthcoming world cup soccer event, scheduled to be held in South Africa in 2010.

\textsuperscript{47} More recently, and in particular, through neo-liberal policies such as the New Partnership for African Development (Nepad). As Taylor and Vale (2000: 413) note: “… the neo-liberal economic solutions which have been chosen for South Africa’s future advance the single idea of redistribution in the economy which continues to display the symptoms of white wealth and black poverty, the same structure which marked the country’s unhappy past”.
Youth development... must focus on education and training, job creation, and enabling young people to realize their full potential... It must restore the hope of our youth in the future, and in their capacity to channel their resourcefulness and energy into reconstruction and development. (ANC 1994:73)

The RDP however, was rapidly subsumed into a range of neoliberal economic policies – notably the Growth, Employment and Redistribution Programme (GEAR) and the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD). As Peet notes, a “drastic reorientation from growth through redistribution to redistribution through growth as a process of colonisation: internal discursive processes articulated with and were disciplined by external discursive, political and financial pressures” (2002:55). Such shifts in discourses of economic development provided a space for the affirmation of post-apartheid youth as consumers, connected to global visions of youth:

… the idea of the global teen market – a kaleidoscope of multi-ethnic faces blending into one another: Rasta braids, pink hair, henna hand painting, piercing and tattoos... Global youth marketing is a mind-numbingly repetitive affair, drunk on the idea of what it is attempting to engineer: a third notion of nationality – not American, not local, but one that would unite the two, through shopping. (Klein 2001:120)

loveLife feeds directly into this global youth marketing discourse, arguing in its promotional brochures and related reports that this form of identification provides a logical path to HIV prevention, whilst at the same time intersecting with and actively promoting the very same celebration of multi-ethnic homogenised vision of youth consumption fashion, global brands, and Hollywood movies described by Klein (loveLife 2003a; Harrison and Steinberg 2002). It is also suggested that this vision can be applied to all youth: “It’s an amazing time to be a teenager growing up in South Africa. We have it better than any previous generation of South Africans. Better education, more opportunities and greater access to a huge and exciting global community” (S’camto Uncut 2004:1). This view of South African youth transcends geographic location or other heterogeneities: “… a youth market that is more media

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48 For example, predominantly Hollywood films are promoted via loveLife’s partnership with local distributor, Ster Kinekor (S’camtoPrint, 2003, February 2, p. 16); high cost fashions are advertised directly as part of feature articles on fashion: “Ntombi wears a lace off-shoulder top (R799) and denim skirt (R599) from Nicci Boutiques; and competitions feature brands such as Diesel, Soviet and Revlon (S’camtoPrint, 2002, April 7; April 21). See also Figure 3.

savvy and brand conscious than any previous generation in an intensively competitive national marketing milieu with penetration into the remotest parts of South Africa” (loveLife website, 2003). The interlinked discourses of youth homogeneity relating to consumption, sexuality and sexual choices that are combined in the concept of a ‘positive lifestyle’ and which recur in various discourse genres, mask the complexities of living in poverty as well as cultural and linguistic diversities, disparities of relative power, and a range of structural conditions that limit the capacity of youth to determine their future and their risk to HIV infection. As Kelly et al note:

In spite of whatever homogenising forces may impact on young people, the mediators which underlie these differences [locality, socio-economic status, educational level, age, gender and physical capacity, amongst other characteristics], continue to impact in a major way on HIV vulnerability and response. (2002a:8)

The loveLife programme’s universal vision of youth and its intersections with global culture may also be culturally alienating and unproductive for youth – particularly youth living in conditions of poverty. For example, in a survey by Naidoo in Orange Farm, where loveLife has a Y-Centre one youth resident noted:

…already it is the adoption of American sports and then at the same time now they start behaving like Americans… The whole thing is actually destructive in terms of culture. Because at the end of the day, you’ll see people aping the very same Americans – the language they speak and so on, irrespective of whether that is the right word to say or whatever, the just say it because they are trying to emulate someone else. (2003:15)

**Epistemological critiques as method**

There has been surprisingly little attempt in HIV/AIDS sociological research, to constitute critical theoretical frameworks for understanding the epidemic. Much research remains grounded in epidemiological and public health approaches that rely heavily on quantitative *description* with theoretical frameworks implicitly or explicitly deferring to cognitive theories of behaviour, or generally positivist modalities of thinking. A literature review exploring young people and HIV/AIDS

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conducted by Kelly, Parker and Oyosi (2002b), for example, reveals a predominance of quantitative research, with qualitative studies centred largely within cognitive and descriptive paradigms of human behaviour. As Kelly et al note:

*Many of the models which dominated the first decade of social science research into AIDS are premised on the assumption that individual reason is a necessary element in the chain of events leading to behavioural outcomes… These models tend to downplay the social and cultural character of behaviour. (2002b:72)*

Ideological framing of problems and solutions has devolved to a combination of quantitative approaches largely located within paradigms of epidemiology, combined with cognitive behavioural frameworks linked to consumption. These approaches have become the dominant orthodoxies through which the emerging HIV/AIDS epidemic has been understood, and emerging knowledge has consequently been consolidated in a stepwise fashion within this ideological frame.

The relative power of the quantitative *episteme* is that it confers ideological power to the point that numbers can be adapted to fit particular constructions – for example, the heightened hyperbole achieved through misrepresentation that includes omission of references to original sources,51 massaging of numbers upward or downward,52 and reframing of numbers when their temporal dimensions,53 are limiting. Similarly, concepts of causality outlined and supported by ‘evaluation’ of the loveLife programme reinforce assumptions of linear causal relations between interventions and responses at the same time masking of all interventions targeting youth with the exception of loveLife. Related constructions of the importance of an individualised ‘positive lifestyle’ as having a positive correlation with HIV prevention removes from view the underpinning structural conditions of poverty and disempowerment that mitigate against choice-making in relation to HIV prevention. loveLife’s discourse of causality is also interlinked with the propaganda function of valorising the programme – both at its outset where claims are made about what will be achieved, and, as the implementation of the programme progresses, where claims are made about ‘impacts’ and ‘achievements’. Such claims work at the edge of particular scientific discourses, obtaining validation and power from the historical

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51 For example, teenage pregnancy rates.
52 For example, Harrison’s subtle doubling of antenatal shift from 1.3% to 3%.
53 For example, the reframing of loveLife’s objective of halving prevalence in three to five years to less explicit reductions over longer or unstated timeframes.
developments of scientific disciplines (for example, the development and validation of methodologies of sampling and survey research), whilst at the same time applying simplification by representing methodological processes ‘in summary’ and claiming causal impacts through the use of methodologically inadequate leading questions. These claims run in parallel to discourses suggesting the programme has a deep understanding of South African youth identity (which is presented as homogenous), whilst at the same time constructing such identity through linkages with consumption and globalisation and masking the structural conditions and contradictions of disparate and heterogeneous youth contexts.
CHAPTER 5

Legitimation and discourse

Legitimation is a rationalising process sustained through reiteration of reasonings and ways of understanding a particular problem incorporating the framing of particular solutions in response. It involves arguments for, and justifications of, particular courses of action drawing on a range of strategies that have to do with elevating particular ideas as valid. Foucault’s concept of epistemic communities is also related to legitimation. For example, elites who have an “authoritative claim to policy relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area” (Haas 1992:23) are an important part of legitimating discourses:

*Epistemic communities are conceptualised and defined as thought communities (Denkgemeinschaft), made up of socially recognised knowledge-based networks, the members of which share a common understanding of a particular problem/issue or a common world-view and seek to translate their beliefs into dominant social discourse and social practice. These thought communities might be local, national or transnational.* (Antoniades 2003:26)

In relation to social policy, epistemic communities assume authority to speak to particular social conditions and to construct solutions. The concept of the episteme then, can be applied to discourses occurring across genres and emanating from sources including elite individuals and organisations, who/which reiterate similar points of view. Legitimation is also conferred via particular orthodoxies – as has been described, orthodox assumptions underpinning the validity of quantification as a means for understanding the intersections of HIV/AIDS behaviour; concepts of causality related to the relationship between knowledge and action; and the naturalising of globalisation and consumption as pathways to a healthy lifestyle. In this chapter the ideological trajectories of these orthodoxies are further explored.

Quantification, causality and constructions of youth intersect in a range of legitimating ideological practices. *Moral panic* is an ideological approach that has
the ideological function of framing causal pathways. It includes constructions of the amoral ‘other’ and incorporates both quantitative and causal orthodoxies within such constructions. Evaluative research is another ideological strategy that is equally underpinned by logics that are interdependent with quantification and reifying particular assumptions about causal pathways, whilst elite endorsements and structural linkages integrate common-sense constructions with a view to influencing public policy.

Hegemony involves two interconnected processes – the development of an ideological bloc that consolidates power through structural linkages between elite individuals and the groups they represent, and practices that are functional to dominance. Hegemony through discourse however, is primarily related to consent, whilst other ideological practices incorporate masking of contradictions through reiteration or attempting to undermine counter-ideological discourses.

**Moral panic and legitimation**

The concept of moral panic involves construction of a causal relation to a social ‘problem’ that identifies a particular group as a threat to society. In Cohen’s (1972) terms, moral panic is a transitory phenomenon that relies on stereotypical representations against which a range of elites position responses, and which may lead to sustained processes of regulation. In Policing the Crisis, Hall et al (1978:17) note that regulation involves a “shift of attention from the deviant act… treated in isolation, to the relation between the deviant act and the reaction of the public and the control agencies to the act”. Moral panic involves a disproportional emphasis on a particular group or event whereby:

> the official reaction to a person, groups of persons or series of events is out of all proportion to the actual threat offered, when ‘experts’, in the form of police chiefs, the judiciary, politicians and editors perceive the threat in identical terms, and appear to talk ‘with one voice’ of rates, diagnoses, prognoses and solutions… (Hall et al 1978:16)

Moral panic includes convergence of events with various stereotypical constructions of the non-normative ‘other’. In Britain, for example, a relatively small number of instances of mugging became conflated and amplified through state and media discourses into converging representations of youth, race and crime:
Where convergence between two or more social elements occurs, the possibility is created for a process of amplification in which the significance of the threat or danger is increased or enhanced... The amplification engendered around mugging resulted in a dispersed set of anxieties ‘coming together’. ‘Race’ became a major theme through which authoritarian responses to issues of social order were articulated. Race figured in the political vernacular since the muggings were committed, or were presented as being committed, by black males. Race also became associated with ‘youth’ since the offenders tended to be young teenage males while their victims were elderly. (Hunt 1999:512)

Moral panic is a type of myth. It functions at the connotative level, separating historical moments from their historicity, inflating particular aspects of the ‘moment’ whilst masking others. Myth involves a “privation of history: [it] deprives the object of which it speaks of all history. In it, history evaporates. It is a kind of ideal servant: it prepares all things, brings them, lays them out, the master arrives, it silently disappears...” (Barthes 1993:151). The ideological function of moral panic is legitimation through the implication of truthfulness about particular social events and moments in history, which in turn serve longer-term process of ideological domination. The ‘object’ of moral panic may be derived from an event or analysis of a singular social phenomenon that is rapidly devolved into generalisation. Mythologies of moral panic construct preferred readings that are achieved both through the mythological matter-of-factness of the descriptive construction of a social problem, as well as through reiteration that gives rise to: “a specific cultural-social formation in which strategies encoded into the text attempt to define the ways audiences bring these texts to bear on their own social experiences – according to the encoded preferred reading” (Grossberg 1984:403).

Moral panic serves as an ideological vehicle, a particular form of discourse, that constructs problems through amplifying and reiterating certain perspectives whilst masking others, incorporating discourses that direct attention towards particular ‘solutions’ or forms of social regulation. McRobbie and Thornton (1995:562) argue that moral panics are vehicles of dominance which function hegemonically by “orchestrating consent, by actively intervening in the space of public opinion and social consciousness through the use of highly emotive and rhetorical language which has the effect of requiring that ‘something be done about it’... The moral panic then becomes the envoy for dominant ideology”. Moral panics do not necessarily bring about tangible changes within their historical moment, but they
may service processes of social regulation in the long run. In relation to Policing the crisis, Hier notes that there is the development of

*a more integrated understanding of moral panic as an envoy of the dominant ideology, geared towards the consolidation of hegemony conceived of through the discursive regulatory apparatus of law and order, which taps into civil society anxieties and which deflects attention from the real crises of the capitalist mode of production.* (2002:321)

Analyses of moral panic have been widely applied to a range of social groups and ‘behaviours’ including, amongst others, constructions of mods and rockers (Cohen 1972), mugging (Hall et al 1978), ritual child abuse (Victor 1998), and paedophilia (Chritcher 2002). Mass media (i.e. news media), are considered central to the process of articulating moral panic – usually functioning in concert with social formations including the state, civic groups and other elites. Moral panic is thus seen as “a process [through] which politicians, commercial promoters and media habitually attempt to incite” (McRobbie & Thornton 1995:560). It does not necessarily follow however, that moral panic discourses specifically have to occur within the mass media. In the context of HIV/AIDS, moral panic may be used to frame arguments within discourse genres other than news media channels – for example, funding proposals, reports, or brochures. Such genres have a greater potential to foster legitimation, given that they are situated within self-contained (closed) spheres of discourse as opposed to the (relatively) public sphere of mass media. The former process is defined by Therborn (1999) as a ‘delimited appropriation of discourse’ whereby there is a restriction on critique. In the public sphere, moral panic discourses may be subject to ‘aberrant’ decoding and critique (Fiske 2000), whereas closed discourse genres offer greater potential to fix meaning and limit aberrant decoding.

*Promiscuity and youth*

Moral panic is, in essence, a method of rhetoric that serves the ideological function of constructing a world-view in conjunction with a course of action. HIV/AIDS and moral panic have been linked through discourses of promiscuity and ‘risk groups’ since the beginning of the epidemic. In the early 1980s, HIV/AIDS was constructed causally in direct relation to homosexual promiscuity. As the epidemic progressed, discourses of promiscuity were extended to other ‘risk groups’ which were homogenised by virtue of their social and sexual practices – notably prostitution,
intravenous drug use, migrant work and truck driving as well as ethnicity. As Bolton observes:

*promiscuity stands out as the key concept, dominating and linking together diverse genres of thought and discourse about AIDS. Sometimes it is in the foreground, its presence explicit, even shrill, constituting the core of the discourse, the central symbol or variable around which the facts of AIDS are organized and interpreted. At other times it is in the background, its presence more subtle, sotto voce, quiet, implicit.* (1992:145)

Promiscuity is defined in the *Concise Oxford Dictionary* as “indis-criminate… having sexual relations not limited by marriage or cohabitation… casual, carelessly irregular” (1979:888). Historically associated with a non-normative sexual drive, promiscuity has taken on a new weighting in the era of AIDS through an association with individual risk. Promiscuous individuals are seen to widen the pool of infection and are identified as the root cause of AIDS as a social problem. Since the early 1990s however, the ‘risk group’ aetiology of HIV/AIDS has shifted from the margins of particular contexts of infection to a focus on less homogenous groups. There has been a particular emphasis on youth, reinforced by the supposed propensities of youth for risk-taking in general, and sexual risk-taking in particular. These discourses are central to an explanatory model for youth vulnerability to HIV, and as Warwick and Aggleton found, this construction is pervasive in research studies focusing on youth and HIV/AIDS:

*Most usually seek to identify in ‘adolescents’ (as young people in these studies are invariably called), certain qualities which are likely to render the person concerned particularly vulnerable to HIV infection and AIDS. These qualities often include emotional instability, a propensity to sexual experimentation, risk-taking, alcohol abuse and an involvement with illicit drugs. These attributes are often assumed to inhere quite unproblematically in all ‘adolescents’, but more especially in street youth, working class youth, college students and young people from minority ethnic communities.* (2000:89)

As a consequence, discourses about young people put forward a dangerous sexual pathology that presents as “a priori and without question, the view that young people as a group are unknowledgeable, irresponsible in their relationships with others, immature and easily led” (Warwick and Aggleton 2000:99).
Within the context of the loveLife programme, the moral panic rhetoric is regularly invoked through conflation and exaggeration of teenage promiscuity. For example:

LoveLife’s design responds to the fact that the sexual behaviour of teenagers drives the epidemic in South Africa. This assertion is based on the large proportion of the South African population that are under the age of 20 years (40%), a significant number of whom report high-risk sexual behaviour… (Harrison and Steinberg 2002:2-3)

In this instance, the rhetoric of youth ‘driving the epidemic’ positions youth culpability as a legitimate construction of causality in relation to HIV/AIDS and draws on statistics to reinforce this view. The statistical positioning above conflates teenagers with all young people below the age of 20, described as 40% of the population and three quarters of whom range in age from 0-14 and are highly unlikely to be engaging in ‘high risk sexual behaviour’. Even older youth are not uniformly at risk during their adolescence. As a moral panic construction however, this conflation drums up the proportions of young people at risk, reinforcing the notion that all young people can be lumped together irrespective of age and other demographic, economic and cultural factors.

The notion of widespread generalised risk, with similar conflations, is also invoked in other discourses. For example, the notion that 50% of youth will become HIV positive reinforces youth as a ‘driving force’ of the epidemic and underpins loveLife’s ‘Be there for 2010’ campaign (Figure 4) through the inference that ‘being’ there is a product of not having died of AIDS. The campaign suggests that HIV risk is massive and that half of young people will be dead or HIV positive by the time of South Africa hosts the 2010 soccer World Cup:

Practically every South African in this sports crazee (sic) country of ours would love to be there… but by 2010 more than 8 million South Africans are likely to be HIV infected, and about 5 million will already have died. If you are under 20 years of age

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54 For example, loveLife’s own survey shows only 48% of South African youth aged 15-19 stated that they had ever had sex (Pettifor et al 2004:37).

55 Risk to HIV infection is relative to exposure to sexual partners who are HIV positive, and this is more likely to be related to exposure to older persons who have had more sexual partners and have been sexually active over longer periods of time – i.e. older youth and adults. Young women in South Africa have been noted to generally have partners older than themselves (Kelly & Parker 2000; Pettifor et al 2004) and the mean age difference between females and their most recent sexual partner was found in one study to be four years older, and 6% of females had a partner 10 or more years older than themselves (Pettifor et al 2004:44).
today, odds are even that you will be one of the 8 million HIV infected in 2010… (S’camtoPrint, 17 August 2003:17)

Figure 4: ‘Love to be there’ campaign poster

This construction of widespread risk to youth under 20 is based on modelling of the HIV epidemic commissioned by loveLife.56 As has been noted, modelling is relative to underpinning assumptions, and optimistic or pessimistic slants and assumptions can be incorporated into any modelling exercise. In the examples discussed above, quantification used to justify constructions of the scale of ‘the problem’ and its consequences – a characteristic of moral panic discourses highlighted by Hall et al (1978). In the case of mugging in Britain, statistics were decontextualised and manipulated within the framework of moral panic and has Hall et al (1978:10-17) observe: “We think it requires to be explained why and how the weak and confused statistical evidence came to be converted into such hard and massively publicised facts and figures”.

Moral panic discourses are argued to be short-lived, largely invoking debate at a particular point in history, and then subsiding (Goode and Ben-Yahuda 1994; Ungar 2001). However, moral panic may also be reiterative over time. For example, in 2003, a national billboard campaign utilised the image of black male torso embraced by multi-hued arms and hands was presented alongside the slogan “Everyone he’s

56 This study is referred to in Harrison and Steinberg (2002), but is not available in the public domain.
slept with, is sleeping with you” whilst another positioned females as sexually predatory “One roll-on all women want” (Figure 5). In both instances, the myth of youth promiscuity is reinforced, with attribution of blame oriented towards male youth (specifically black male youth in the first instance) and a black female in the second and females as irrepressibly sexually wanton in both. These themes and images resonate with constructions in the early part of the loveLife programme, and are regularly reiterated through research and other discourses over time. Moral panic thus services an ideological end of legitimating the loveLife programme by positioning loveLife as regulating irrepressible youth sexuality.

*Figure 5: loveLife billboards*

**Evaluation and legitimation**

The process of evaluation involves assessment of concepts and interventions with a view to establishing the potential or actual relationship between activities and their outcomes. Approaches to evaluation include *formative* evaluation, which explores goals and assumptions of the intervention; *process* evaluation, which involves ongoing analysis and reflection during the period of intervention; *outcome*
evaluation, which involves analysis of the consequences specific to the intervention in relation to specific indicators; *impact* evaluation, which analyses the degree to which the programme’s objectives have been met; and *economic* evaluation, which involves cost-benefit analysis of the intervention (see Mantell, DiVittis & Auerbach 1997, Gentry, Gilliam, Hotgrave & Sy 2002). Evaluation is directly linked to policy and strategy, and provides guidance as to whether activities and programmes are meeting stated objectives, whether they should be continued in their present form, or whether they should be modified or discontinued. In relation to HIV prevention programmes, policy questions include behavioural impacts (short and long-term), HIV incidence reduction, replicability, generalisability, cost effectiveness, emphasis in relation to spending on other diseases or emphasis on particular communities versus others (Holtgrave 2002). In the early phases of the HIV/AIDS epidemic there were often only a limited number of interventions addressing HIV prevention. These interventions engaged relatively well-defined and geographically contained ‘target’ groups, with the result that it was possible to define, monitor and evaluate interventions directly against programmatic inputs, and to draw conclusions accordingly (see Mantell *et al* 1997; Gillies 1998).

In the context of a generalised HIV epidemic however, there is a wider complex of mechanisms that relate to individual perceptions of the epidemic, and over and above interventions there are other discourses and experiences that frame individual constructions and responses to the epidemic. These include internal psychological processes; interaction with others through dialogue; sense-making that includes a location in socio-cultural responses to the epidemic; knowing a person who is HIV positive or who has died of AIDS; being HIV positive oneself, and so on. This is described in Table 1 below, in relation to communication.
### Table 1: Forms of HIV/AIDS communication

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<th>ACTIVITY</th>
<th>COMMUNICATION COMPONENT</th>
<th>EXAMPLES</th>
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| **Mass Media HIV/AIDS Campaigns (purposive)** | • Television programming and advertisements  
• Radio programming and advertisements  
• Print articles and advertisements  
• Outdoor signage | Typically conducted by government and NGOs, but including purposive activities of broadcasters and other media formations:  
• HIV/AIDS related advertisements  
• HIV/AIDS related dramas, documentaries, features  
• HIV/AIDS related columns, talk shows  
• HIV/AIDS related slogans, songs |
| **Mass Media content (non-purposive)** | • Television programming  
• Radio programming  
• Print articles | • HIV/AIDS content within news dramas, documentaries, features  
• HIV/AIDS content within columns, talk shows, letters pages |
| **HIV/AIDS small media** | • Leaflets, brochures, booklets, books  
• Exhibitions, flip charts, stickers, posters, signs, murals | Typically produced as part of HIV/AIDS campaigns or awareness activities:  
• HIV/AIDS related leaflets, brochures, booklets, books  
• HIV/AIDS related exhibitions, flip charts, stickers, posters, signs, murals |
| **HIV/AIDS events** | • Events, meetings, gatherings  
• Theatre, drama | Typically conducted by government and NGOs:  
• HIV/AIDS related events, meetings, gatherings  
• HIV/AIDS plays, puppet shows, story telling |
| **HIV/AIDS policy discourses** | • Announcements  
• Conferences, meetings, workshops  
• Events  
• Journal articles, reports | Typically conducted by organisations working in the HIV/AIDS field including government, NGOs, foundations, donor agencies, Charities, policy agencies, research organisations, lobby groups and elites. Includes communication about:  
• HIV/AIDS Research  
• HIV/AIDS Policy and legislation  
• HIV/AIDS related campaigns and programmes |
| **HIV/AIDS public relations discourses** | • Announcements, press releases, press conferences  
• Conferences, meetings, workshops  
• Public relations events including launches, press conferences | Statements emanating from government officials, or persons in organisations as well as other elites, public and/or popular figures. May include statistical claims, claims to impacts, statements about the past, present or future. |
| **HIV/AIDS icons and artefacts** | • Photographs, images, Artworks  
• Quilts, memory boxes  
• Utility items | Items that may include aesthetic and/or utility value such as photographs, AIDS quilts, memory boxes |
| **HIV/AIDS structured interactive communication (conversation-based)** | • Structured interactive communication | Typically conducted as part of campaigns and programmes:  
• HIV/AIDS related school-based lifeskills programmes  
• HIV/AIDS related helpline services, social services  
• HIV/AIDS related counselling, structured dialogues  
• HIV/AIDS related workshops |
| **Social action and mobilisation** | Communication as a product of involvement in HIV/AIDS activities | • Wearing/using HIV/AIDS related utility items  
• Attending meetings, gatherings, rallies  
• Formal or informal HIV/AIDS work including prevention, treatment, care and support activities |
| **Interpersonal dialogue** | Conversations, arguments, discussions | Wide-ranging communication relating to contextual experiences of HIV/AIDS |
Table 1 outlines the complexity of sources of HIV/AIDS information via discourse. Purposive mass media campaigns form only one aspect of a wide range of communication related to the epidemic. These discourses are also not necessarily consistent in terms of content and include a range of purposive and non-purposive constructions. The notion therefore, that causal pathways can be established by particular content (for example, emanating from loveLife) inserted into one or more discourse channels, is problematic.

Approaches to monitoring and evaluation by loveLife have largely focused on reach of the programme – for example, quantifying the number of billboards, the number of advertisements broadcast, print media coverage, calls made to the national helpline (loveLife 2003b), as well as knowledge of, and interaction with, programme elements, and causal claims (loveLife 2002b, loveLife 2004b). This approach does not take into account the potential impacts of parallel HIV/AIDS interventions, let alone the complex of factors that might influence HIV prevention amongst youth.

In the early phases of the loveLife campaign, evaluation activities were mainly small scale. These were summarised in a report (loveLife 2001a) and in a journal article by researchers connected to the programme (Stadler & Hlongwa 2002). The summary report includes information on a number of research studies, and is characterised by the provision of only limited information on research methodologies and sampling approaches. In this report there is information relating to a number of ‘surveys’ that were conducted to assess brand equity; overall effectiveness [of the campaign] and message take-out. Two brand equity ‘surveys’ were conducted and both are described under the following premise: “In order to assess the brand equity and overall effectiveness it was necessary to generate data that was random and from

57 Which includes the outcomes of public relations activities by the loveLife programme.
58 An emphasis is placed here on counting calls to the line whether they were answered or not, as well as omitting information on the qualitative nature of the call – specifically whether it was a ‘genuine’ or hoax call. Hoax calls are a significant problem for South African toll free helplines, sometimes reaching levels of 80% (see Parker et al, 2003b).
59 The article by Stadler and Hlongwa entitled ‘Monitoring and evaluation of loveLife’s AIDS prevention and advocacy activities in South Africa’ appeared in an apparently peer-reviewed academic journal, Evaluation and Program Planning, which provided added legitimation to the findings. This particular issue of the journal was, however, a special issue produced in partnership with UNAIDS and loveLife funders UNICEF and was not peer reviewed through the normal process. Instead, articles were selected and reviewed by UNAIDS and UNICEF. Personal communication, Jonathan Morell, Editor: Evaluation and Program Planning, 15 March 2004.
which generalizations can be made. Two national surveys served this purpose” (loveLife 2001a:16). 60

The ‘national’ surveys were conducted by Research Junxion (Survey One) and Kaufman, Levine and Associates (Survey Two) respectively, and are described as having sample sizes of ‘n=1000’ and ‘n=141’. Survey One comprised 600 adolescents aged between 12 and 17, and 400 adults over 25 years of age ‘stratified by gender, race and settlement type’ who were interviewed using a ‘closed questionnaire interview’. Survey Two is described as ‘random sample of 70 taxi rank adults and 92 school children’ comprising ‘short interviews of five minutes’ in schools and at taxi ranks (age ranges are not mentioned). Expanded information on methodologies including sampling representivity, are not provided.

Findings are presented in narrative form, and are supported by tables and pie charts. Results are presented as percentages. Survey One: “The national survey… revealed that more than half (57.5%) of the total sample population had heard about loveLife. Black urban respondents reported higher rates (66.7%) of exposure than white (only urban) respondents (45.7%)” (loveLife 2001a:17). And in Survey Two: According to Research Junxion’s national survey almost half of the respondents (41.8%) perceive loveLife’s aim to ‘encourage safe sex’, while 23.4% felt that it aimed to prevent HIV/AIDS and 35.2% felt that it was to warn about the risks associated with sex such as teenage pregnancy.” (loveLife 2001a:19). The third survey employed ‘theatre techniques’ with white (n=110) and black (n=107) respondents between 12 and 50 years” (loveLife 2001a:23).

In these studies, a claim is made to national representivity, in spite of small unrepresentative sample sizes, as well as unclear methods of sampling. In claiming national representivity, and then masking actual numbers by focusing on percentages, a form of ideological direction takes place whereby skewed and insubstantial research is represented as being true of the whole of South Africa and generalisable nationally. This is further reinforced through the prominent use of tables, bar graphs and pie charts (see Figure 6).

60 Italics added.
Leading closed ended questions are also used in these studies – for example: “The message provides important information on how to avoid HIV/AIDS (42.7%)”; “The message caught my attention and made me think about issues of sex (35.2%)”; “The message caused me to talk about sex and HIV/AIDS to others” with only one extreme negative option “The message used crude language and was embarrassing (3.1%)”. Successes are claimed sans caveats, and inferences to national representivity and impact are reiterated:

In just under 12 months loveLife has succeeded in creating national recognition among close to 60% of the population. And over 90% of people who know about loveLife can accurately
identify it as a safe sex campaign promoting healthy living for young people. More than 80% of people surveyed rated loveLife as an effective new approach that has caused them to think and talk about sex and HIV/AIDS. loveLife has had a remarkably balanced impact across age groups and regions, but has definitely had greater impact among black South Africans than whites. (loveLife 2001a:25)

**Sustaining moncausality**

Key to the loveLife’s causal argument is the negation or masking of potential impacts of other campaigns, even though in some instances this information may be gathered as part of survey activities. For example, as part of a 2003 evaluation of the loveLife programme, questionnaires included references to Soul City and the Red Ribbon Campaign. Figure 7a shows an initial draft copy of the survey. This information was omitted from the final report (see Figure 7b). This suggests that an intentional process of ideological masking has taken whereby deference is given to a monocausal construction of the loveLife programme’s reach.

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61 Bold text added.

62 The initial draft report was not made available in the public domain, but was provided on condition of anonymity.

Figure 7a: 2004 Draft Survey

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<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>50%</td>
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<td>50%</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>50%</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Although just under two-thirds of youth reported knowing of any national HIV prevention programmes, 85% of youth reported having heard or seen loveLife, 91% of young people reported having heard of Soul City and 90% had heard or seen the Red Ribbon Campaign. There were no significant differences in awareness of any programmes by age or gender.

For all three national campaigns, more youth living in urban formal areas reported being aware of them compared to youth living in farm areas, for example, 93% of youth living in urban formal areas compared to 65% of youth living in farm areas had heard or seen loveLife.

Knowledge of Three National HIV/AIDS Campaigns by Geographic Area

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Campaign</th>
<th>Urban Formal</th>
<th>Urban Informal</th>
<th>Rural Formal</th>
<th>Rural Informal</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>loveLife</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soul City</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Red Ribbon</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Figure 7b: 2004 Final Survey

Table 30: Awareness of National HIV/AIDS Programmes/Campaigns by Gender and Age

<table>
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<td>Yes</td>
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<td>65%</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>60%</td>
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<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Although just under two-thirds of youth reported knowing of any national HIV programmes/campaigns, when they were specifically asked if they had heard or seen the loveLife youth prevention campaign and simultaneously shown the logo, 85% of youth reported having heard or seen loveLife. There were no significant differences in awareness of loveLife by age or gender.
As has been previously noted, loveLife’s evaluation research has fostered claims-making with regard to causal relationships between knowledge of loveLife intervention and responses of sexually active youth to (leading) questions that suggested loveLife had brought about condom use (78%) and reduction in sexual partners (69%) at national level (loveLife 2002b). The later 2003 survey was considerably more rigorous, and included a comprehensive approach to sampling that generated a final sample size of 11,904. The survey questionnaires and methodologies were reviewed by various research experts, as was the final report. Although, as is noted above, key information was left out of the final report, the section on perceptions of the loveLife programme contradict previous assertions of massive impact:

While being aware of loveLife and participating in its programmes is an essential element, it is hoped that through this interaction youth will change their behaviour or act in some positive way as a result. Among all youth, 24% reported that they had done something as a result of what they saw or heard about loveLife. Fifteen percent of all youth report having talked to someone about loveLife as a result of what they saw or heard. Fewer reported looking for more information on sex, sexuality and relationships (4%), looking for more information on loveLife (3%), or calling ThethaJunction (1%). Sixty-one percent did nothing as a result, and 16% had not heard of loveLife. When all youth were specifically asked whether they had communicated with others about loveLife, 33% reported having talked to someone about it. Of the 33% of youth who reported talking to someone about loveLife, the majority (74%) reported talking to friends. Fewer indicated they had talked to a teacher or classmate (11%), a partner (8%), a sibling (7%), or their parents (5%). (Pettifor et al 2004:71)

Although the inclusion of this finding is surprising, it does not necessarily follow that suggestions of negligible impact by the programme would be incorporated into subsequent discourses or into other discourse genres. Instead previous constructions were reiterated in other discourses. In the 2004 loveLife brochure (2004c), which was launched at the same time as the survey, for example, previous causal claims from the 2002 survey were prominently reiterated in the text. This ideological direction extends to the brochure’s cover, continuing the practice of inferring that
loveLife is an impactful programme, and failing to defer to the later findings reported in 2004 (See Figure 8).

*Figure 8: 2004 brochure cover*

Over-emphasis on quantification in evaluation research is noted to be problematic as it masks individual experiences of health interventions. MacPhail and Campbell (1999) note that quantitative approaches essentialise the notion that individuals control and determine their health through improvements in knowledge, awareness and ‘self-efficacy’ whilst masking the complexities that underpin individual responses. As Springett points out:

*In the promotion of health, we are looking at complex social phenomena requiring complex interventions. Those interventions may take the form of a project or programme but equally could take the form of a policy or an innovative social change. There is no ‘magic bullet’, but multiple strategies producing multiple*
outcomes, some intended and some not. There is also no clear linear relationship between input and outcome. Any given outcome is usually the product of complex interactions between factors and concepts. Any evaluation framework needs to be flexible enough to capture this. (2001:141)

Given that evaluation research is “the process of determining the worth, merit, or significance of entities, and evaluations [reports] are the outcome of that process” (Scriven 1998:80) there is a need for sound methodologies and objective distance. Emphasis on evaluation as a framework for ‘proving’ interventions rather than ‘learning’ about interventions is problematised by Springett (2001), who points out that pre-determined measures and indicators give little consideration to the perspectives of the subjects upon whom the intervention has been imposed.

Evaluation research cannot be divorced from the range of interests that exist around a given intervention. Poor performance against objectives is likely to have negative consequences for further funding of programmes, and may also prove embarrassing to stakeholders who have endorsed the programme. In the case of loveLife, there is much at stake, and there is a need for the organisation to tread carefully by balancing, on the one hand, a stated commitment to comprehensive monitoring and evaluation (loveLife 2002c; 2003a), and critical reflection of the programme’s impacts and cost effectiveness. Internal commissioning and control of monitoring and evaluation processes ensures that critical questions and analyses are not pursued (with the notable exception of two paragraphs in the 2004 report); that other interventions are excluded from the frame of reference (i.e. the omission of references to Soul City and the Red Ribbon campaign); and that the conditions underpinning youth vulnerability to HIV are masked by the causal assumptions tied to the loveLife programme (i.e. knowing only about loveLife).

Research and evaluation reports are complex documents, and there is a need to ensure that interpretations are not skewed by misunderstanding – particularly when reports are released to the media. This requires careful management of the process of inserting research findings into the public domain. In the case of the 2004 report, Health-e, a Kaiser Family Foundation (KFF) funded news service, was utilised to actively support the launch of the report. Five media reports were produced and released to the media.64 This allowed for particular interpretations of the report to be represented – for example: “A major new survey found that ‘younger teenagers’ are

64 See www.health-e.org.za (7 April 2004).
mostly HIV negative”, with additional commentary by loveLife CEO Harrison: “If we can enable them to stay that way, we can turn off the oxygen tap constantly fuelling the flames of the epidemic” (The Star, 7 April 2004:3). Other articles incorporate commentary from Harrison, loveLife researchers and other individuals. All five press releases emphasise the first section of the report that dealt with HIV prevalence amongst youth, with no reference made to the finding that loveLife’s impacts were negligible. In effect, a preferred reading was inserted into the public sphere through the capacity to control discourse production processes via KFF funded Health-e. Furthermore, the potential for a critical reading by other journalists was reduced – for example, it was unlikely that editors would commission an independent journalistic review of the report (including seeking commentary from independent researchers) when five pre-packaged articles were available. This level of control is enhanced by active partnerships between Health-e and various newspaper groups who benefit economically through not having to produce or pay for news articles, as well as partnerships and contracts between newspaper groups and loveLife, which limit the likelihood of critique. Repetition (see Therborn 1999) of the same interpretations of the findings is used extensively across the five Health-e articles – for example, shifting discourse towards identifying gender disempowerment as a ‘driving force’ underpinning HIV prevalence: “According to David Harrison… one of the key factors driving this gender disparity is the fact that women are exposed to a greater degree of coercion” (The Star, 7 April 2004). Harrison also fosters the construction of new ‘folk devils’ – “For Harrison, the country’s ‘violent culture of death’ associated with violent crime, the high road-accident rate and the cheap cost of life contributed to this nihilistic attitude” (The Star, 7 April 2004:7). These strategies constitute shielding (see Therborn 1999) – whereby particular discourses are protected, and critiques are kept outside the discourse frame.

Ndaki, K. (2004, April 7) AIDS survey shows teens are future’s hope, The Star. Ndaki is an employee of Health-e.
Ibid.
Chapter 6

Structural linkages, communicative power and hegemony

Whilst legitimation is a product of the orthodoxies underpinning particular discourses in combination with claims-making, the ideological processes of legitimation may also incorporate structural linkages and associations between groups and/or elites. In the case of loveLife, these forms of legitimation occur both globally and locally. Structural linkages and elite endorsements are functional to processes of hegemonic consent, given that ideological power is both concentrated and expanded through such linkages. The establishment of an ideological bloc by a group through leadership is related to hegemonic direction. To understand hegemony therefore:

*It is not enough to say that [a group] exerts its dominance over other groups. We should look at how the group must also have behind it the economic, political and cultural conditions that allow it to put itself forward as leading* (Joseph 2000:183)

Constructing a bloc of this nature is a political project that involves the building of strategic alliances. In the case of loveLife, it is the loveLife programme that is the object of political focus, with linkages designed to foster the programme as object. The more structurally embedded an ideological project, the more power it is likely to have at its disposal – i.e. external threats are diminished by the collective ideological weight of the bloc of alliances. This produces and reproduces the power to “get things done” (see Therborn 1999). Agency is achieved, both through leadership, and through access to communicative power. In relation to loveLife and communicative power, the Henry J Kaiser Family Foundation (KFF) includes structural linkages, partnerships and associations. For example:

- Partnerships: with United Nations and with UNAIDS;
- Linkages: with a range of researchers incorporated within the Global HIV Prevention Working Group;
Linkages with organisations and individuals on a sustained or *ad hoc* basis in relation to discourse fora such as conferences.

In South Africa such linkages are managed via the partnership that constitutes loveLife – the partnership between the Reproductive Health Research Unit (RHRU), Health Systems Trust (HST) and the Planned Parenthood Association of South Africa (PPASA) – which is managed as a separate entity (the loveLife programme). These structural linkages, partnerships and associations include:

- Direct economic relationships: For example, with funders including the South African government; the Nelson Mandela Foundation; Anglo American Chairman’s Fund; Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation and the Global Fund for HIV/AIDS, TB and Malaria.  
  
- Co-operative economic relationships: For example cost-sharing or supportive arrangements with South African corporates including media groupings such as SABC, Independent Newspaper Group, *Sunday Times*, Ster Kinekor and Primedia, as well as other corporates such as Spoornet, Avis and Mondi Paper.

- Elite associations: For the most part involving direct linkages via the loveLife Advisory Board, and which includes elite individuals located within corporates such as Tokyo Sexwale (Mvelaphanda Holdings) and Saki Macozoma (Nail); individuals located in government such as Manto Tshabalala-Msimang (Minister of Health); media representatives such as Marcel Golding (e-TV) and Moegsien Williams (*The Star*); religious leaders such as Njongo nkulu Ndungane (Anglican Bishop) and Molefe Tsele (South African Council of Churches); and media ‘personalities’ such as Penny Lebenyane (radio presenter) and Kim Engelbrecht (actress). Elite associations also extend to other involvements – for example endorsements by Deputy President, Jacob Zuma, and Nobel Laureate, Desmond Tutu, as well as local entertainers.

Funding partners, UNICEF and Old Mutual dropped out by 2002, as did implementing partners, MTC and Advocacy Initiatives. The relationship with the Global Fund is managed via the South African government through the Country Co-ordinating Mechanism (CCM).

Note that the South African Advisory Board comprised more than 30 individuals by 2004 including a number of changes to the initial board established in 1999. Other members include: Beatrice Marshoff (Premier, Free State); Kaiser Nyatsumba (Vice President Corporate Affairs, Anglo American Corporation); Zindzi Mandela (CEO, ZEE-ZEE Productions); Maria McCloy (Black Rage Productions); Barney Pityana (Vice Chancellor, Univ. of South Africa); Njabulo Ndebele (Vice Chancellor, Univ. of Cape Town); Connie September (Member of Parliament); Molefe Tsele (General Secretary, South African Council of Churches); Buti Tlhagale (Bishop of Johannesburg Diocese); Irene Mennel (Trustee, Nelson Mandela Children’s Fund); Mercy Makhalemele (Tsa-Botosogo Community Organisation); Anu Nepal (Commissioning Editor:...
Informal and *ad hoc* associations also occur, constituting temporary linkages that are of value in relation to ideological legitimation – for example visits to the loveLife programme by a range of elite figures including former US presidents Jimmy Carter and Bill Clinton, entertainers such as U2 singer Bono, and actors such as Kevin Spacey and Chris Tucker.

These structural linkages are inter-related with a range of discourses affirming and endorsing the loveLife programme, and intersect with processes of ideological representation through access to communicative power. They are also dependent upon, and interdependent with, the foundational ideological arguments upon which loveLife is constructed – i.e. epistemological underpinnings that are manifest in moral panic, quantification, concepts of causality and constructions of youth identity. It is these underpinnings that have allowed the positioning of loveLife as a common sense entity with a right to claim an ideological position as *the* national HIV/AIDS campaign for youth in South Africa. The foundational constructions of the loveLife programme thus allows for young people in the context of HIV/AIDS in South Africa to be commodified, shifting the loveLife programme into an ideological realm whereby it too becomes an object that has a ‘use value’.

The KFF and the loveLife programme, by virtue of a range of initial structural linkages and associations, was in a position to assume leadership in relation to youth and HIV/AIDS in the late 1990s. This positional leadership was also assumed in relation to the epidemic globally, and has been consciously resourced by KFF. Parallel ideological discourses have been helpful to this process, for example, the concept of public-private partnerships (PPPs) as it has been applied to HIV/AIDS. This strategy, which has been primary to UN discourses generally, as well as being applied to HIV/AIDS.70 PPPs have been positioned as “the policy innovation of our time” (Hayes 2001:4). Walt (2000; 2001) notes that this concept is interconnected with globalisation. In relation to health, this has allowed decen-
potentials to influence of global policy, promotion of image by association, and the like. A further benefit, is that the PPP concept is poorly conceived in relation to accountability and transparency:

The policy paradigm of pursuing public-private ‘partnerships’ has created a new political culture – a culture that carries a high risk of UN agencies ignoring public interests or embarking on unacceptable trade-offs of public interests in favour of business interests. (Richter 2003:10)

As Bruno (2002) observes in relation to the UN, PPPs have allowed corporates the opportunity of ‘blue-washing’ – “wrapping themselves in the blue flag of the United Nations”, with little requirement to do anything else. Linder (1999) notes that the PPP concept is ideologically legitimated as a “political symbol and policy tool” via common-sense associations with notions of wartime solidarity working in conjunction with neo-liberal doctrines that reinforce privatisation and free market concepts related to globalisation, allowing for masking of vested interests such as profit (for corporates), or technical expertise and support (for non-corporates). Richter (2003) points out that there are a number of issues at stake in relation to vested interest – for example:

- Commercial actors using the interaction to gain political and market intelligence information in order to gain political influence and/or competitive edge;
- Business actors using the interaction to set the global public agenda;
- Business actors using the interaction to ‘capture’ intergovernmental public agencies;
- Developing an internal climate of censorship and self-censorship in UN agencies;
- Weakening efforts to hold transnational corporations publicly accountable (p. 15).

These same concerns may be applied to the relationship between foundations and UN structures. In the case of the KFF, this rhetoric has been useful for securing intersections and structural relations with the UN which have in turn, allowed for ideological positioning of a range of KFF's interests.
Ideological strategy and the Henry J Kaiser Family Foundation (KFF)

The founding agency of loveLife, the Henry J Kaiser Family Foundation (KFF), is a private foundation based in Washington with funding resources of over $500-million. The Foundation’s orientation is closely aligned with an explicitly ideological approach and is described by the organisation’s president, Drew Altman, as follows:

- **Information:** First, we are in the information, not the grant-making business. While most foundations see their principal product as grants, we see ours as information from the most sophisticated research to basic facts and numbers… We try to inform decision-making on major issues that affect millions of persons, especially the most vulnerable and disadvantaged…;

- **Audiences:** Second, we have a clear sense of our three audiences: policymakers, the media, and the general public. We put the fruits of health services and health policy research into formats that these three audiences can readily digest… The Kaiser Family Foundation places a special premium on communications and uses a range of strategies to cut through the information overload in health…;

- **Profile:** Third, we have sought a somewhat higher profile than other foundations have…;

- **Style:** Fourth, to accomplish our goals, we have developed a somewhat unusual operating style. While we are part grant-making organisation, we are also part policy institute, with a substantial in-house analytic capacity in some areas…;

- **Media partnerships:** Fifth, to reach the general public with information about health issues, we have developed a broad range of partnerships with commercial media organisations, from The Washington Post and US News and World Report, to ABC and NBC, to MTV and even Glamour magazine. In no case do we fund these organisations. Rather, these are joint ventures that combine our research capacity, subject knowledge, and ability to provide information through toll-free numbers and worldwide websites…;

- **Programme in South Africa:** Sixth, since 1988 we have operated a major programme in South Africa, our only international involvement… In South Africa we do many of the things we do in the United States. The work is directed to helping that nation to develop a more equitable health care system and a
successful democracy. Our South Africa enterprise receives about one-fifth of our funds and is work to which we are deeply committed (Altman 2002).  

What Altman is describing are the underlying assumptions that relate to an ideological role for KFF that emphasises a relation to shaping US and global health policy. A foundation that is ‘in the information business’ is atypical of foundations generally. Whilst most foundations operate from a set of ideological assumptions, this orientation is more typically driven through grant-making processes whereby grants are provided to organisations whose activities are consistent with the foundation’s aims and objectives. An orientation towards simplifying information for policymakers is explicitly ideological. ‘Partnerships with commercial media organisations’, defined as joint ventures are explicitly oriented towards providing such formations with KFF’s research and policy perspectives, and particular ideological discourses are fostered through linkages to dedicated ‘worldwide’ websites and toll free numbers. This process has as its focus, the maximising of access to, and entrenching of, communicative power. Particular strategic direction is given to leveraging power over expenditure in US healthcare (amongst other orientations). As Altman notes:

71 With regard to South Africa, KFF claims commitment to “developing a more equitable health care system” and to “deep commitment” to the country, and the organization has links with government, NGOs and other entities. KFF’s website claims that the organisation has: “developed a national initiative that is geared towards reducing the HIV rate of infection amongst young people by 50% (i.e. loveLife. The concept of ‘geared’ here suggesting that it is not simply an aim of the organisation to achieve a 50% HIV reduction, but that it is presently structured in such a way that it might do so); provided the essential information on which government health policy and program plans are based; instigated the decentralization of health management nationally; helped in the training of most top-level health officials in the country; established key national resources in reproductive health, child health and health systems development on which government relies heavily; supported development of a charter of patient’s rights which government has adopted.” South African partners are listed as loveLife, Health Systems Trust, the Reproductive Health Research Unit (RHRU) and Planned Parenthood Association of South Africa (all loveLife partners), Health-e, the Treatment Action Campaign, Oliver Tambo Fellowships, the Child Health Policy Institute at the University of Cape Town, the Mandela Award and the Global HIV Prevention Working Group and the Health Systems Development Unit at the University of the Witwatersrand. http://www.kff.org/about/southafrica.cfm, retrieved 7 August 2004.

72 In 2004, for example, KFF partnered with The Washington Post and Harvard University to conduct a survey on “South Africans at ten years of democracy”. This survey explored opinions of South Africans, with the final report presenting frequencies on a range of opinion related questions which were all compared on the basis of race: for example, approval of political leaders, or opinions about HIV/AIDS. This racial construction reinforces that notion that there is a primary causal relation between race and opinions of South Africans in relation to ‘democracy’, masking other socioeconomic and contextual factors that might be related to opinion. The findings of this survey were then utilised to produce a number of articles about South Africa in The Washington Post. See http://www.kff.org/kaiserpolls/SouthAfrica.cfm, retrieved October 2004.
This was the challenge we confronted when the Kaiser Family Foundation was substantially remade in the early 1990s. At that time we asked one over-riding question: “how can we best have an impact with about $30-$40 million in grants to award each year in a rapidly changing, trillion dollar health-care system?”. With little more than half a billion in assets, compared to the billions available to several larger foundations, we believed that adding another $30-$40 million a year in conventional grants to such a vast healthcare system was not a recipe for playing a national role. (Altman 2002)

This approach is concomitant with the practice assuming ideological leadership and is specifically to do with positioning and perpetuating concepts of what is ‘right’, what ‘works’, and what must thus be reproduced. As an organisation functioning ideologically, KFF thus seeks influence over public policies through the strategic application of ‘modest’ resources.

Altman also acknowledges that KFF operates on the margins of normal systems of accountability:

*Foundations are not accountable in the traditional sense. They do not make a profit or loss that can be evaluated by investors. Unlike government agencies, they are not constantly scrutinized by the press or by legislative bodies that must approve their programmes and budgets. This difference gives foundations their freedom to take risks and to try new things not generally possible in the commercial or public sectors. But it also means that accountability is essentially self-imposed; the evaluation of performance and impact is a judgment call that must be made by the foundation’s board and staff.* (Altman 2002)

Accountability as a concept is linked to the notion of limiting the abuse power in contexts of governance – i.e. power at the level of public policy: “Accountability is about restraining the exercise of public power, it is inextricably linked to justice and legitimacy in politics” (Woods 2002:70). It includes systems of checks and balances that ensure that vested (private) interests are made transparent, and that decision-making is guided by the concept of public interest. As a consequence, operating outside of the normal framework of public scrutiny, KFF is free to pursue agenda’s of its own choosing. Inserted into the framework of US and global health policy, alongside claims of being ‘non partisan’, KFF is able to wield considerable ideological direction and entrench communicative power and influence. Furthermore,
KFF is able to achieve this without deferring to systems that would ordinarily limit the wielding of such power – i.e. self-imposed accountabilities are very different from public ones.

**Structural foundations of loveLife**

The primary structural-economic relation to loveLife is that of the founding funder, the KFF. KFF’s involvement in South Africa extends back to the late 1980s when it provided funding to the Health Systems Trust (HST) and the National Progressive Primary Health Care Network (NPPHCN) – both of which were aligned with the then Mass Democratic Movement (MDM). KFF also conducted health-related research in the country during this period.

The funding of NGOs alongside conducting policy-related research facilitated links with a number of African National Congress (ANC) members in the progressive health movement in the 1980s and 1990s, and smoothed entrée into the political and economic elites that emerged post-1994.73 During this period, KFF continued its support to HST and also produced a number of research-based analyses of the healthcare environment including a household survey; an analysis of donor involvement; an analysis of linkages between South Africa and the United States; and a survey of public perceptions on political change in entitled ‘Reality check: South African’s views of the new South Africa’, which was produced in partnership with Independent Newspapers. 74

It was in the post-transition period that KFF began conceptualising the loveLife programme.75 In March 1999, Michael Sinclair, Deputy Vice President of the KFF, and Judi Nwokedi, a former employee of NPPHCN and member of the closed corporation Advocacy Initiatives, met with Dr Welile Shasha of the Department of Health, to put forward the concept of a new youth-oriented HIV campaign. The briefing document noted that:

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73  Personal communication, Jerry Coovadia (2003).


75  loveLife was at first entitled the National Adolescent Sexual Health Education Initiative (NASHI).
Over the past 18 months the KFF has undertaken an extensive investigation of the best models internationally of public health education campaigns designed to effect behaviour change. The most salient lesson from the substantial international experience in this field is that single message (e.g. use a condom or get AIDS); single medium (e.g. television) campaigns have only limited impact. The Foundation’s investigation has included analysis of the HIV/AIDS prevention efforts already tried or underway in South Africa. Although there are about 400 organisations working in HIV/AIDS education nationally, their work is mostly parochial and of only limited impact. (Advocacy Initiatives 1999)\(^76\)

This positioning outlines how readily KFF was able to assume authority based on its relation to strategic research on health in South Africa. Notably, the organisation assumed authority in relation to assertions about existing interventions without necessarily backing these up – for example, concluding that there was little merit in existing interventions by simply inserting this bald ‘fact’ into their fax backgrounder to the meeting with Shasha. The notion that interventions were confined to television programmes or condom messaging was particularly ill informed. Soul City was at the time, a multimedia intervention conveying diverse information, and Soul City activities extended to providing support through the provision of educational materials and other activities nationally. The Beyond Awareness Campaign, which was first initiated in 1997 and which constituted the government’s overall communication response to HIV/AIDS at the time, was specifically structured to extend beyond mass media and to provide communication resources and training to a range of governmental, non-governmental and grassroots organisations. There were also other national and provincial communication campaign activities including a government led school-based lifeskills programme. In sum, a diverse range of approaches to HIV prevention that extended considerably beyond condom promotion or single media use.

This act of legitimating KFF’s perspective by alluding to unreferenced research findings is patterned elsewhere in KFF’s activities – and in this instance, is an assertion that allowed for the positioning of a KFF-led intervention as something appropriate, worthwhile and filling a supposedly glaring gap in HIV/AIDS response in relation to youth. Outlining plans for a “broad based, sustained (3-5 years), multi-dimensional co-ordinated effort”, KFF indicated a commitment of R15-million for

\(^{76}\) Facsimile transmission to Dr W Shasha from Judi Nwokedi, 1 March 1999.
the first two-year phase – noting that there was an expectation of co-funding from other sources. The new intervention would be sustained for five years, it would be “upbeat, optimistic and fun”, and it would be informed by ongoing research and evaluation (Advocacy Initiatives 1999). In essence, the intention was clear. With the blessing of the Department of Health, KFF was set to move ahead with its plans, irrespective of the validity of its underpinning research without any consultation with organisations working in the HIV/AIDS field beyond the national health department.

Initial partners in the venture, which was at first named the National Adolescent Sexual Health Initiative (NASHI), were Advocacy Initiatives (media and entertainment), the Media Training Centre based in Cape Town (print and radio), the Planned Parenthood Association of South Africa (services and outreach), the Reproductive Health Research Unit (research and evaluation), and Health Systems Trust (financial administration).77 loveLife was launched at Gallagher Estate in Johannesburg on 15 September 1999, with first lady, Zanele Mbeki as convenor. Initial partnerships with the media sector included SABC (who were to broadcast Jika Jika, a youth talk show; S’camto a youth documentary magazine programme; and ‘Codi: loud and clear’ aimed at 6-12 year olds), YFM, 5FM, Metro FM, Vukani, Bushbuckridge radio, and The Sowetan newspaper. The first board comprised 25 members, including various ANC stalwarts, media executives and entertainers.78,79

The range of funders, partners, board members and activities extended deeply into political, media, corporate and international elites, allowing loveLife to become entrenched and legitimated with backing extending to diverse political and corporate ‘will’. The direct linkages via the advisory board to this group of elite representatives allowed for the establishment of an ‘in’ group who offered both endorsement and protection, whilst formations that might threaten or imbalance this arrangement were excluded – for example, individuals with expertise in the HIV/AIDS field (i.e. researchers and academics were absent).

In securing funding for loveLife, KFF was able to offer other funders ‘matching grants’ – a process that allowed KFF to expand and retain control over financial resources through strategic investments. For example, in 2000, the Bill and Melinda

77 Media Training Centre dropped out of the programme in 2000, and Advocacy Initiatives, in the persona of Nwokedi also dropped out when she was appointed to a senior position (public broadcasting) at SABC.
78 See Chapter One.
79 By 2002, the consortium was comprised of RHRU, PPASA and HST with loveLife functioning as an independent entity headquartered in Johannesburg.
Gates Foundation provided a $7-million as part of a ‘matching grant to fund loveLife’ (United Press International, 2000, July 12). In 2001, an agreement directly framed as a public-private partnership between KFF and government was established involving a R25-million per annum commitment to loveLife by government over three years with matching funding of R100-million per year being provided by KFF. This process took place beyond the framework of the normal tender procedure, and precluded equal access to such funding by any other organisations active in the HIV/AIDS field.

Funding relationships between corporates and the loveLife programme also intersect with a range of mutually beneficial ideological interests. For example, in 2003 Anglo American announced a R30-million grant to loveLife. This elicited a range of discourses mutually supportive to the complex of partnerships underpinning loveLife. For example, the loveLife partner, the Sunday Times, offered the rationale for naming Anglo’s Tony Trahar ‘Business Times Business Leader of the Month’ as follows:

…it is more recent developments that have prompted the naming of Trahar... including Anglo’s partnership with loveLife, a national HIV prevention programme. Besides providing R30-million to loveLife via the Anglo American Chairman’s Fund, the group – which was the first in South Africa to provide antiretroviral therapy for its employees in November last year – has committed itself to working with loveLife and other partners to bolster public-sector primary healthcare clinics. (Sunday Times 2003, 12 October)

Similarly, Executive Director, Richard Feachem, of one the Global Fund for HIV/AIDS, TB and Malaria, which also funds loveLife, noted of the Anglo deal:

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80 United Press International (2000, July 12) Gates Foundation pledges $100-million to fight HIV/AIDS.
82 For example, in a discussion with Susan Goldstein of Soul City, it was noted that they were unable to access funds through the same mechanisms that had been utilised by loveLife (personal communication, November 2002).
84 Sunday Times, 2003, October 12, Anglo's top man goes to the heart of transformation.
This is an exciting example of how the Global Fund’s investments can help leverage in-country partnerships and resources. This initiative will provide a strong model in Africa of a nation-wide effort to establish comprehensive HIV/AIDS services, including prevention, treatment and care in public clinics.”

Trahar was also keynote speaker at the 2003 Mandela Award ceremony, which allowed the opportunity to provide an overview of Anglo’s HIV/AIDS policies and to reiterate constructions of the value of public-private partnerships, loveLife and the Global Fund. Anglo also went on to win a leadership award presented by the Global Business Council on HIV/AIDS for its partnership activities, again allowing the opportunity to reiterate particular constructions of loveLife, but also to valorise the partnerships underpinning it – particularly the concept of PPPs:

*The program has brought together a broad-based coalition of international foundations, South African media and government agencies, and members of the private sector to fight the HIV/AIDS epidemic through nationwide media campaigns and a network of youth centers.*

These various positionings and valorisations provide an example of the circular nature of ideological discourse when it is embedded within structural linkages and associations. At every turn, the opportunity to legitimate and valorise the loveLife programme is taken. This is achieved by virtue of the construction of a hegemonic bloc of structural relations and associations that allow such reiteration to occur within a framework of common interests. In this example, it involves legitimations of the concept of PPPs intersecting with interests in relation to loveLife, which allows this process to occur internally within the bloc, masking underpinning associations, in a way that is ideologically beneficial to entities within the bloc. This process is followed through a range of other structural mechanisms, and in relation to access to other fora.

This phenomenon is somewhat related to the concept of epistemic communities whereby there is an intersection between organisations that includes:

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Shared normative and principled beliefs, that provide a value based rationale for social action;

Shared causal beliefs, which are derived from analysis of practices leading to, or contributing to, central problems;

Shared notions of validity that are intersubjective and that validate knowledge;

A common policy enterprise (Haas 1992).

Epistemic communities have however tended to be defined somewhat apolitically within international relations literature, and what can be usefully added to these concepts, is the process of masking underlying conditions. For example, by foregrounding loveLife, a contradiction is created in the masking of other interventions, also active in the same sphere. Similarly, in the case of Anglo, the mining corporate’s culpability in sustaining labour migration, which has been linked to HIV vulnerability, is also masked (Lurie 2002).

The Mandela Award

With regard to structures over which KFF holds sway, the Mandela Awards have served as an important site for legitimating and reiterating claims about loveLife. The Award was instituted in March 1993 by KFF and named in honour of Mandela on the basis of his “universal standing as a symbol of the struggle for equity and democracy in South Africa and in appreciation of his personal interest in the work of the Foundation” and noting that

the idea for the Award arose out of conversations with Mr. Mandela shortly after his release from prison about underscoring the importance of health to South Africa’s future… Mr. Mandela’s idea for the Award was that it should place on a pedestal the efforts of individuals who make extraordinary contributions to improving the health and health care of the most disadvantaged sectors of the population. It was also his idea that the Award recognize similar efforts in the U.S. underscoring linkages with the U.S. but also that the struggle for better health is international. 87

87 See www.kff.org.
The Award has been utilised to support linkages between KFF and other institutions, and to promote the loveLife programme. In the example further above, Anglo’s Trahar is given the right to speak by virtue of KFF’s control over the Mandela Awards. This has the ideological effect of underpinning entrée into other discourse fora – for example, the Global Business Council on HIV/AIDS – and such entrée incorporates opportunities to introduce loveLife into such discourses.

The Mandela Award is also used to foster other linkages and processes of ideological endorsement. For example, linkages between KFF and the UN were cemented in 2001 when Secretary General Kofi Annan presented the Mandela Award to UNAIDS Executive Director, Peter Piot, in recognition of “his outstanding leadership in the global struggle against HIV/AIDS”, simultaneously valorising KFF’s involvement in the epidemic and noting the importance of structural linkages via PPPs:

*Let me also express my warmest thanks to Drew Altman and the Kaiser Family Foundation… for their leadership, vision and generosity in our common fight against HIV/AIDS. Your participation is a model of the sort of public-private partnership we need to win this fight… The United Nations family looks forward to building further on that partnership as we step up our struggle from now on.” (Kofi Annan, 25 June 2001)*

Piot, in turn, provided endorsement to loveLife, stating during the ceremony: “[loveLife] is one of the greatest programmes I’ve ever seen because the driving force is young people themselves” (Piot, 25 June 2001). This statement is subsequently preserved over time through its insertion into loveLife’s brochures (loveLife 2002c; 2003a). Other recipients of the Mandela Award have also had links to loveLife – for example, Nobel Laureate, Desmond Tutu and South African High Court Judge, Edwin Cameron have both provided support to loveLife. Tutu promoted the loveLife parent campaign, and Cameron sits on the organisation’s advisory board. Mercy Makhalemele, who received the award in 2004, is also a member of loveLife’s advisory board. She has also provided direct support to the programme – for example, visiting the UK-based AIDS Consortium along with David Harrison of loveLife and Michael Sinclair of KFF to put forward “loveLife’s

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strategy and progress and to engage with participants on the challenges of HIV prevention amongst youth globally”.

Other structural linkages in South Africa

Over the duration of the loveLife programme, numerous PPP linkages with corporate partners have been pursued. In many instances these have been positioned as ‘in-kind’ relationships that involved some form of resource commitment to loveLife. For example, at the launch of the loveLife Groundbreaker programme in Orange Farm in 2002, it was noted that these partnerships, valued in excess of R50-million, included:

- Airtime provided on television and radio by SABC;
- Cost-sharing provided by the Independent Newspaper Group and Sunday Times in the production of ThethaNathi and S’camto;
- Cost-sharing provided by Mondi Paper – loveLife’s ‘exclusive paper supplier’;
- Cost-sharing on outdoor media production by Custom Group Holdings;
- Extension of entertainment opportunities to youth in underserved communities by Ster Kinekor;
- Support to loveLife broadcast facilities by Sentech;
- Support to the loveTrain by Spoornet;
- Raising public awareness of loveLife by SAA;
- Support to groundbreaker training by Vodacom;
- Support to an information and communications network by The Digital Partnership;
- Support to fitness and health promotion at Y-Centres by Medscheme (loveLife 2002d:3).

Structural linkages provide opportunities for endorsements of the loveLife programme but also offer other ideological intersections. In relation to the concept of PPPs, structural relations are positioned as benign intersections framed by mutual

interests in addressing the HIV/AIDS epidemic in South Africa – for example, as expressed by Independent Newspaper Group’s Ivan Fallon:

Independent Newspapers has pledged its commitment in the fight against the HIV pandemic by signing a five-year contract with LoveLife… Chief executive Ivan Fallon said: ‘The group is aware of the toll HIV is taking on the country and wanted to be much more proactively part of the national effort. We believe a key to reducing the impact of the HIV epidemic in South Africa is to slow the rate of infection among young people.’ (The Star, 3 October 2001)93

These structural linkages however also extend to underpinning contractual arrangements that involve alignments of power that offer competitive structural and ideological advantage to loveLife over other HIV/AIDS programmes. Contractual arrangements between the Independent Newspaper Group and also the Sunday Times involved obligations in relation to the publication of loveLife’s youth magazines, ThethaNathi and S’camto, extending to the inclusion of restrictive clauses regulating the arrangement in loveLife’s favour:

For the duration of this agreement, the Company [Independent/Sunday Times] will not, either directly or indirectly, engage in any way, either on its own behalf, or on behalf of others, in the provision of content of such a nature as would or might be likely to compete or interfere with the publication of the product.94

Additionally, Independent Newspaper Group were required to “incorporate the ThethaJunction (loveLife Helpline) as a tag line on all HIV stories in all its titles” and to “routinely promote the Product with front-page main body leads in issues carrying the product, masthead inclusion in the Tonight section and street posters in major centres promoting each issue of the product”.95 The contractual obligation to promote the ThethaJunction helpline number was specifically structured to undermine the promotion of the national toll free AIDS Helpline – an intervention funded by the national Department of Health. Up to that time the Independent Newspaper Group’s daily, The Star, had routinely published the AIDS Helpline

93 The Star (2001, October 3) LoveLife and South Africa’s Independent Newspapers Join to Fight HIV/AIDS.
94 This appears as clause 4.8 of the contract with the Independent Newspaper Group, and clause 6.3 of the contract with Sunday Times.
95 See clauses 4.6 and 4.4 in the contract with Independent Newspaper Group.
number alongside AIDS-related articles on a pro-bono basis. The contractual requirement to replace this practice with the insertion of the ThethaJunction helpline had the ideological effect of delegitimizing the national AIDS Helpline, whilst at the same time having the related effect of reducing awareness of a service more relevant and useful to the readers of *The Star*. Specifically, the AIDS helpline provides services to all age groups rather than being focused on the narrow age range serviced by ThethaJunction. Additionally, at the time that this contractual obligation was being aggressively pursued, the ThethaJunction Helpline was considerably less efficient than the AIDS Helpline. In August 2002, for example, two dummy calls were made to the AIDS Helpline and ThethaJunction respectively. Two scenarios were constructed on the basis of the inclusion of the ThethaJunction number alongside a story in *The Star* on antiretroviral drugs.

In one dummy call, the caller identified herself using the phrase ‘PWA’ meaning person living with HIV/AIDS, to which the ThethaJunction counsellor responded: “What is a PWA? Is it a drug?” (and to which the caller responded “No. It is someone who is living with the virus”). As the discussion proceeded the caller asked: “To get the drugs, do I have to have a prescription from a doctor?”, to which the ThethaJunction counsellor responded: “I am not sure about that, what I can do is to give you the AIDS Helpline number, they can know more because their deal with it daily: 0800 0123 22”. The caller then requested further information:

**Caller:** *From the paper they have also written something about the Treatment Action Campaign [TAC], I would also like to know how to get hold of them. Do you have their numbers?*

**Counsellor:** *Usually when they write something in the paper they also write their numbers and website.***

**Caller:** *No, they did not, the number that is written in the paper is the ThethaJunction number.*

**Counsellor:** *Thetha junction, why? Please hold I would like to ask others around here. Which paper is that?*

**Caller:** *The Star.*

**Counsellor:** *When?*

**Caller:** *Monday and Tuesday*

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96 CADRE (2002, August 7) Transcript of call to ThethaJunction.
Counsellor:  *Please hold again. I want to ask others here because I do not understand why they wrote Thetha junction number and not TAC if the story is written by TAC.*

Caller:  *The story is not written by TAC, it’s about TAC, now I want to get hold of TAC.*

Counsellor:  *No one knows the number for TAC. Have you tried Telkom 1023.*

Caller:  *No*

Counsellor:  *Please hold, I want to ask this person if this person does not know the number, I would suggest that you call the AIDS Helpline. It seem like there is no one who knows the number for TAC. Please phone the AIDS Helpline it’s a free number as well.*

In this instance it is clear that there was little co-ordination between loveLife’s ideological requirement that the ThethaJunction helpline number be displayed in Independent Group titles, and the actual delivery of an efficient helpline service. Furthermore, the lack of competence on the loveLife line involved referral to the AIDS helpline in any event. This was not a singular occurrence. In the second call to ThethaJunction, this time introducing a question about the use of the drug *Nevirapine* for pregnant women, the same situation occurred, with the counsellor stating: “I am sorry I can’t really give you very many details, and I don’t know why they put our numbers, but let me give you the AIDS Helpline number and I am sure they will be able to give you more information about this”.\(^{97}\) In contrast, the two dummy calls to the AIDS Helpline employing the same two scenarios, elicited direct and considered assistance. The caller enquiring about *Nevirapine* was referred to a doctor, whilst in the other scenario the concept of ‘PWA’ was understood and the number for the TAC was provided.\(^{98}\)

loveLife’s partnerships with entities that have control over discourse genre’s follow similar emphasis on securing competitive advantage – for example, the partnership with SAA includes a monthly column in SAA’s *Sawubona* magazine on loveLife. Articles typically reinforce loveLife’s quantitative claims alongside claims to being South Africa’s national HIV/AIDS programme for youth.\(^{99}\) The arrangement with Ster Kinekor involves placement of loveLife posters at Ster Kinekor cinema’s and

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\(^{97}\) CADRE (2002, August 7) Transcript of call to ThethaJunction.

\(^{98}\) CADRE (2002, August 7) Transcript of calls to the AIDS Helpline.

inclusion of loveLife information on popcorn boxes. This relation also extends to exclusivity in relation to advertising within the cinema’s – for example, the Society for Family Health was unable to secure rights in 2002 to flight its public service advertisements promoting condoms at Ster Kinekor cinemas.\[100\]

**Elite rhetorics and the loveLife programme**

Elite rhetorics function differently to structural relations. They involve associations, often once-off interactions, that are magnified through media representations at the time, but also in other genres over time – for example, loveLife’s brochures reiterate quotations by a range of elite figures with the effect of claiming ongoing knowledge and endorsement of the programme by the elite individual in question. In 2002, for example, former US President, Jimmy Carter, accompanied William Gates Senior (Bill Gates’ father) on a tour of South Africa where Carter stated:

> loveLife encourages young people to talk about AIDS – how it’s transmitted, how to protect themselves, and how to talk with others. If there is any leadership vacuum at the national level, it is more than offset by the leadership among young people. Today we saw the future of South Africa – bold teenagers… unafraid to speak out about HIV/AIDS. These are the heroes of the new South Africa. (Jimmy Carter 2002)[101]

This statement is reiterated in all three editions of the loveLife brochure (loveLife 2002c; 2003a; 2004a). Similar statements, disassociated from their original contexts, have also been employed to secure ongoing legitimation. For example, Richard Holbrooke, CEO of the Global Business Council on HIV/AIDS (“loveLife is one of the best examples of good practice in the world today”), Peter Piot, UNAIDS Director (“loveLife is one of the greatest programmes I’ve ever seen because the driving force is young people themselves”), Stephen Lewis, UN Envoy for HIV/AIDS in South Africa (“loveLife is an inspired combination of a hard-hitting media campaign and services to youth, bringing together an absolutely forthright discussion of all of the most difficult issues”), as well as local elites such as Jacob Zuma, Deputy President (“we see loveLife as a hugely creative, rather daring and audacious, forceful youth-focused programme”) and Molefi Sefularo, Minister of Health in the Northwest Province (“loveLife is beginning to help the youth and

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100 Personal communication, Rob Eiger, Director: Society for Family Health, November 2002.
government of South Africa to turn the tide of HIV in this country”). More often than not, these affirming statements are derived from contexts constructed by KFF/loveLife in the first instance – the Carter statement is in the context of an arranged visit to loveLife; the statement by Holbrooke is made at the 2002 Nelson Mandela Award ceremony; 102 Piot’s statement occurs when receiving the 2001 Mandela Award; 103 and Zuma’s statement is made at the announcement of the PPP between loveLife and the South African government. 104

Again this process is a circular ideological process. Originating discourses are in essence ‘set up’ by KFF as a product of constructing and resourcing the original events, a process that confers ‘right to speak’ on selected individuals. That right is inter-related contexts that pre-determine what is spoken about – i.e. the loveLife programme. Further, the temporal relation is shifted by the capacity to magnify and reiterate such endorsements and legitimations over time – for example, within loveLife’s organisational brochures.

**Ideological control and discourse genres**

KFF has secured communicative power by specifically focusing on processes of ideological reproduction. The Mandela Awards are only one aspect of this ideological matrix. Other elements include the utility of websites that are related to the promotion of global health policy, as well as fora such as conferences and meetings.

KFF’s communicative power has been particularly reinforced via the development of a dedicated internet-based communication system – Kaisernetwork.org – which includes daily news reports, webcasts, e-mail updates and the like, and includes direct linkages to global fora – for example, US-based and global health and HIV/AIDS conferences. Individuals and organisations can receive regular information as well as host components of the website (e.g. daily news briefs) on their own websites. Although the site and related network is positioned ideologically

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103 See further above.

104 Elite endorsements recur in other fora – for example, at the launch of a loveLife Y-Centre in Orange Farm in September 2002, Bill Clinton and Nelson Mandela were in attendance as were Hollywood actors Kevin Spacey and Chris Rock. In May 2002 rock star Bono toured South Africa with US Treasury Secretary Paul O’Neill and visited loveLife, where Bono asked David Harrison “What can we do to help. Is it drugs we should bring, or do you need a bigger budget?” *The Star* (2002, May 24) Bono left speechless by Soweto AIDS Clinic.
as being non-partisan and independent: “The mission of the Kaiser Family Foundation is to provide timely, reliable, and non-partisan information on national health issues to policymakers, the media, and the general public”,\(^\text{105}\) its function incorporates a complex of ideological trajectories.

In 2004, the kaisernetwork.org was selected to provide officially endorsed internet support to the 15\(^\text{th}\) International AIDS Conference held in Bangkok\(^\text{106}\) and this relation provides an example of the ideological advantages that a centralised dissemination system offers. Linkages to, and implicit endorsements by the International AIDS Conference have a legitimating effect, given that this biannual conference is the largest conference of AIDS researchers, policy-makers and activists globally. The general website of the conference – www.aids2004.org – directs users to www.kaisernetwork.org for conference webcasts and other reports. Kaisernetwork’s home page on the conference in turn, directs users to a range of reports – many of which are oriented towards KFF’s own analyses. For example, users are prominently directed to a ‘Bangkok Notebook’, which features five transcripts – four of which are reflections on the conference proceedings by KFF Research Fellow, Jackie Judd. Related links on the website sidebar direct users to KFF projects including loveLife’s home page, KFF’s section on HIV/AIDS, and KFF activities in Bangkok. ‘KFF Activities in Bangkok’ include references to numerous ‘satellite’ sessions at the Bangkok Conference sponsored by KFF and other ‘partners’ – a number of which feature affirming discourses about the loveLife programme. In addition to highlighting KFF satellite sessions in the side bar, the website provides links to various KFF produced ‘fact sheets’, poster sessions and an Exhibition Booth – all of which focus exclusively or partially on loveLife and which include further links to webcasts and transcripts. Users are also provided with an opportunity to link to a page entitled ‘South Africa’, which in turn offers overviews of, and sublinks to, loveLife and the Mandela Award (See Figures 9 and 10 below).

\(^\text{105}\) The extend mission includes: “To advance that mission, the Foundation established kaisernetwork.org in November 2000. Kaisernetwork.org is the premier online resource for timely and in-depth coverage of health policy news, debates and discussions. This free and comprehensive multimedia service connects users to the events, people, information, and research that shape health policy.” See http://www.kaisernetwork.org/static/about.cfm, retrieved 7 August 2004.

\(^\text{106}\) See http://www.kff.org/hiv/aids/bangkokactivities.cfm, retrieved 7 August 2004: “kaisernetwork.org was the official webcaster of the XV International AIDS Conference. kaisernetwork.org provided daily coverage of the conference – including webcasts, interviews, news summaries and more – allowing individuals to ‘virtually attend’ the conference via www.kaisernetwork.org/aids2004.”
Figure 9: Kaisernetwork.org Bangkok Conference Home Page

XV International AIDS Conference - Daily Coverage
Bangkok, Thailand | July 11 - 16, 2004

Kaisernetwork.org provided daily coverage of the XV International AIDS Conference from Bangkok, Thailand, including workshops, interviews, new summaries, and more. Visit our Guide to Coverage.

Daily Conference Update

Friday, July 16, 2004 – Thai children directly affected by AIDS performed at the closing ceremonies of the XV International AIDS Conference in Bangkok, Thailand, emphasizing to delegates the importance of their work to stop HIV and AIDS. Everyone who opposes challenged conference participants to appreciate the urgency of their task and to strive toward unity.

Bangkok Notebook

Science magazine correspondent Jon Cohen concludes a week-long series of interviews with Kaiser's Jackie Judah and shares his observations about what was accomplished in Bangkok.

Daily HIV/AIDS Report

- XV International AIDS Conference Focuses on 'Politics' of Increasing Anti-Retroviral Drug Access
- Mandela, Others Call for Increased Funding at End of XV International AIDS Conference


Session Webcasts

- Video Highlights from the XV International AIDS Conference

Daily HIV/AIDS Report


Newsmaker Interview

Sumit Solomon, M.D., of India was the first doctor to detect HIV in the Indian population. She continues to be a leading expert on the disease and talked with Kaiser's Jackie Judah about the epidemic in her country.

2004 Report on the Global AIDS epidemic

UNAIDS announced that the number of people living with HIV/AIDS has risen in every region of the world. Last year almost five million people became newly infected with HIV -- more people than any previous year.

Community Responses to HIV/AIDS

These videos feature interviews with people who are frontliners in the fight against HIV/AIDS.
Conferences are important ideological discourse genres, providing opportunities for expanded reiteration via websites and news media. They are ritualised fora that involve the ideological construction of knowledge through the reification of experts and expertise, who secure the right to speak by virtue of particular expertise and training, association with particular elite organizations, and more particularly, access to financial resources that allow attendance in the first place. As a consequence of functioning within a framework of ideological positioning that is assumed to foster research, scientific advancement and public policy, conferences readily mask vested interests and accountabilities. Whilst the right to speak may be secured somewhat independently through calls for abstracts and related selection, a less transparent strategy is that of hosting a sponsored ‘satellite session’. At the International AIDS Conferences, and other conferences, satellite sessions are offered to interest groups wishing to sponsor presentations or workshops during the conference. This facility provides an additional source of revenue to conference organisers, whilst providing interest groups an opportunity to present their perspectives without having to submit abstracts for scientific review. In Bangkok, for example, satellite session proposals
were evaluated by the conference organising committee on the basis of “content merit, overall quality and organisational plan in order to ensure consistency with the scientific and ethical standards of the Conference”.107

At a range of KFF sponsored (and/or co-sponsored) satellite sessions in Bangkok, a number of individuals spoke on behalf of and/or endorsed the loveLife programme. The sessions included:108

- “Towards an HIV-Free Generation: Lessons and Experiences From Large-Scale Youth HIV/AIDS Prevention Programming Research”;109

- Meet the Leaders: Showcasing Media Partnerships – The Global Media AIDS Initiative;

- The Power of the Media in HIV Prevention: Hype or Help? Recent Evaluations of Three Media-Based HIV Prevention Campaigns.110

The session entitled “Towards an HIV-Free Generation” was moderated by Ward Cates of Family Health International and was structured around a presentation made by Judith Auerbach of Amfar.111 Both individuals are directly associated with

109 Hosted by the UN Foundation, Kaiser Family Foundation, the African Youth Alliance and the UNAIDS Interagency Task Team on Young People, this session reviewed ‘leading’ prevention efforts, focusing on four programmes operating primarily in Africa, and addressed ways to scale up prevention efforts and measure their effectiveness.
110 A transcript of this session was not available. The summary notes: “The Kaiser Family Foundation co-hosted this panel with YouthNet/Family Health International, MTV U.S. and MTV International in cooperation with the UNAIDS Interagency Task Team on Young People (IATT/YP). The session reviewed recent evaluations of three of the leading public education campaigns that focus on HIV/AIDS – loveLife (South Africa), MTV International’s Staying Alive (Europe, Latin America, Asia, and Africa), and MTV USA’s Be Safe/Fight For Your Rights: Protect Yourself (U.S.A.). All three campaigns use the media extensively to build awareness and educate as well as connect individuals to services. The Kaiser Family Foundation is a primary partner in each of the campaigns. www.kaisernetwork.org, retrieved August 2004.
111 Relations to loveLife by the session chair and keynote speaker were masked: Judith Auerbach, Vice President of Public Policy at the American Foundation for AIDS Research (Amfar) and Ward Cates, President of Family Health International are both members of loveLife’s Technical Advisory Group yet this relationship was neither stated at the meeting, nor noted in the accompanying speaker biographies. Speaker biographies available at http://www.kaisernetwork.org/health_cast/hcast_index.cfm?display=detail&hc=1221, retrieved 7 August 2004. This practice also occurs elsewhere. For example, Auerbach appeared as a speaker at an August 2004 event hosted by the World Bank entitled “HIV prevention amongst young people: Measuring the impact”, which focused specifically on loveLife. The meeting, which is positioned as being independently hosted by the World Bank, was chaired by Debrework Zewdie, Director of HIV/AIDS Programmes at the World Bank. Zewdie is also a member of loveLife’s Technical Advisory Board. See
loveLife. The session was sponsored by four organisations: African Youth Alliance (AYA); The Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation; the UN Foundation and the UN Interagency Task Team on Youth. The session was positioned as a “review of leading prevention efforts, address ways to scale up prevention efforts, and ways to measure the effectiveness of prevention programs” with Auerbach’s presentation setting the scene by providing a review of four ‘large-scale youth interventions’ – loveLife, the Southern African Youth Initiative or SAY, the Africa Youth Alliance or AYA, and YouthNet. This was followed by presentations from representatives of each organisation. All four interventions are linked to the session sponsors, and thus the positioning of ‘leading prevention efforts’ is an ideological construct that flows from the vested interests of the session sponsors.

Auerbach begins her presentation by referring to a “recent meeting convened by the World Health Organisation” which she refers to as the ‘Talloires Group’113, which set out to “assess the evidence for policies and programmes to achieve the global goals and targets for young people and HIV/AIDS.” The goal of this meeting, she notes, was to begin to identify youth HIV prevention programs that were ready to be scaled up and implemented more widely (kaisernetwork.org 2004a:5-6). The Talloires meeting, which took place on 25-28 May 2004, was described as a ‘global consultation’ organised by WHO, UNAIDS, UNFPA and UNICEF, under the aegis of the UNAIDS Interagency Task Team on Young People along with ‘other partners’. The ideological slant of this global ‘consultation’ was strongly weighted towards international organisations, with very little representation from regions most affected by the epidemic or indigenous campaigns, loveLife being the only campaign represented.114 In Bangkok, Auerbach situates the ‘consultation’ as a rigorous review of global programmes:


112 http://www.kaisernetwork.org/health_cast/hcast_index.cfm?display=detail&hc=1221, retrieved August 2004

113 This is incorrectly transcribed as the Toulouse Group and I have reverted to the correct spelling above. The meeting is given this name by virtue of having been convened in Talloires, France.

114 Other partners are listed as the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine; The Liverpool School of Tropical Medicine; The Alan Guttmacher Institute; Population Services International; American Foundation for AIDS Research; Colombia University; Education, Training, Research Associates, US; Centres for Disease Control and Prevention, US; Department for International Development, UK; the Global Fund; Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit; Institute of Tropical Medicine, Antwerp; International Labour Office; International Planned Parenthood Federation; Johns Hopkins University; loveLife; Ministry of Finance, Uganda; Medical Research Council, UK; Population Council; United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization; University of Windsor; University of Zimbabwe; US Agency for International Development; the World Bank; YouthNet. With the exception of the Uganda
Participants at that meeting systematically reviewed evidence from school-based, media, health services and community level interventions to determine what works best with respect to increasing knowledge and skills, reducing vulnerability and decreasing HIV prevalence among young people in developing and to a lesser extent, developed countries. The Talloires Group took into consideration a number of factors in this assessment, including the threshold of evidence, the quality of intervention, knowledge of the process of the intervention, the quality of the outcome measure that were looked at and the context in which the intervention occurs.115

Auerbach then directs her review towards four programmes that merit ‘scaling up’ including the loveLife programme. The rhetorical pattern adopted within her discourse involves a series of poorly founded assertions and claims. In her introductory remarks, for example, she asserts that “in South Africa for example, virtually all 13 and 14-year olds are HIV negative”. This assertion contradicts findings of the Nelson Mandela/HSRC survey (the only study to review HIV prevalence in the 13-14 age range), which found prevalence amongst 2-14 year olds to be 5.6%.116 Auerbach then proceeds to reproduce the argument that youth are the driving force underpinning HIV prevalence in South Africa:

South Africa has a particularly large young population – 42% are under the age of 20. So according to some modeling projections, the significant change in the sexual behavior of young people on the order of about a 20% reduction in risky behaviors across a spectrum of sexually active teenagers could trigger declines in HIV incidence among young people by between 20 and 50%, which in turn, could contribute to a drop in overall prevalence rates for the population.117

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116 The Nelson Mandela/HSRC survey (Shisana et al 2002) does not provide HIV prevalence levels for single ages – i.e. 13, 14. All other surveys of HIV – notably the national antenatal survey and the RHRU/loveLife survey of 2004 both exclude children under 15.

She thus reiterates the claims made elsewhere by loveLife in brochures and reports (loveLife 2001a; 2001c; 2002c; 2003a), and by Harrison and Steinberg (2002) providing a foundation for assumptions and arguments that suggest single large-scale interventions might contribute moncausally to massive declines in prevalence. This point, and subsequent arguments, are central to arguing for the relevance of scaling up the programmes she reviews in her presentation. With regard to loveLife, she proceeds through a series of assertions, affirmations and arguments as follows:

- **Affirmation of the notion that loveLife needs additional funding to meet its goals:**
  
  “With respect to unpredictable cost changes, in the case of loveLife, the weakening of the US dollar over the past two years has actually reduced the loveLife annual income by about 40%. Although by 2006, promised money from the Global Fund for HIV, TB and Malaria will help fill the shortfall, loveLife will still need additional funds to sustain its current programs in 2005 and to expand its reach to include the most marginalized population of South African youth who reside in farms and deep rural areas”.

- **Affirmation that loveLife is rigorously evaluated:**
  
  “A strong monitoring and evaluation strategy employed from the beginning of a program allows for meaningful and valid assessment of program outcomes. loveLife, for example, included in its evaluation plans and has carried out a nationally representative household survey with both behavioral and biomedical or biological measures, including HIV testing, as well as measures of exposure and involvement in loveLife programs”.

- **Affirmation that loveLife performs considerably better than other programmes:**
  
  “… over 2.4 million calls were received by loveLife’s call line, which is compared to 12,000 received by the government’s hotline”.

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119 Ibid, p. 22. Auerbach follows this with the false assertion that the 2003/4 RHRU/loveLife survey was conducted two years after implementation, when in fact the survey was four years into the programme. “While not a true baseline in the sense that the survey occurred 2 years into the implementation of the program, it does provide a baseline from which to compare the future impact of the program…” (p. 22). Constructed as a ‘baseline’ the survey and the loveLife programme are ideologically shifted away from the temporal reality of little impact against stated goals (e.g. 50% HIV reduction), and financial reality of multi-million dollar expenditures with little demonstrable impact, into a new space framed as an intervention that is still in its infancy and that will bring about considerable impacts.

120 Ibid, p. 25. See also Parker 2003, which points out that this comparison is made between total calls received by the loveLife helpline, in comparison to calls that have been filtered for relevance (excluding hoax calls, calls not answered, calls shorter than 1-minute). loveLife’s analysis of calls fails to recognise the importance of measuring only calls that are answered and that include a dialogue that is relevant to the purpose of the line.
Conflation of statistical association between awareness of loveLife and monocausal influence: “And I should mention that loveLife has about an 85% exposure rate.¹²¹ So most youth in South Africa have been exposed, to some degree, to loveLife. But those who have been exposed, compared to those who have not, 9% are more likely to have talked to their parents about HIV, 6% are more likely to have talked to someone other than their parents about HIV, and 16% are more likely to believe that they could do something to avoid HIV... And there are also analytic data from the loveLife national household survey showing a greater proportion of those exposed to or involved in loveLife reported risk reduction behaviors than those not exposed to the program. So those exposed or involved were 11% more likely to have changed their behaviors to avoid getting HIV. They were 6% more likely to have been tested for HIV and they were over 8% more likely to have used a condom at last sex.”¹²²

Emphasis on quantification and quantitative assertions of impact and reach: “And loveLife has certified 106 NAFC – National Adolescent Friendly Clinics – which averaged 200-300 visits per month in 2002. Over 7,500 youth received clinical services in the Y center in the 4th quarter of 2002 – 40% were new visits, doubling from 2001. And again, the proportion of male clients in NAFC clinics increased to 11% of all visits, from 2% the year before. So we’ve¹²³ increased access to health services... And over 380,000 12 to 15-year olds and 2.8 million 16-year olds and over, were reached by the loveLife games in South Africa, which promote positive lifestyle and healthy living to ameliorate disease vulnerability.”¹²⁴

¹²¹ See further above for reference to similar levels of exposure achieved by Soul City and the red ribbon campaign, which were excluded from the final RHRU/loveLife 2004 report.
¹²² Ibid, p. 27. This assertion reflects a simple association between loveLife and particular reported patterns. It cannot, however, be used to demonstrate a monocausal influence. Youth exposed to loveLife may also be exposed to other interventions, and such youth may also be considerably different in a range of respects to youth who were not exposed – i.e. reduction to percentages and claims to impact are methodologically unsound. Equally, simple exposure – i.e. awareness – is highly unlikely to be causally linked to change. Auerbach also omits the observation made in Pettifor (2004), that illustrates limited impact of the programme.
¹²³ Ibid, p. 29. A Freudian slip with respect to Auerbach’s association with the loveLife programme?
¹²⁴ Ibid, p. 29. The notion of ‘reach’ referenced here is somewhat questionable as a measure of engagement. Attending a single event can hardly be equated with a likelihood of significant impact, or be assumed to place attendees on a particular behavioural pathway with respect to HIV prevention. In particular, the notion of ‘ameliorating disease vulnerability’ through an event locates the construction of the loveLife programme as an intervention that, in whatever form, has an overwhelming impact by virtue of little more than once-off exposure, and that it is this and not the context within which people live that determines vulnerability.
Claims to monocausal impacts on HIV prevalence: “So, moving to the big question about HIV prevalence itself – at this point, only loveLife has data linking its programs to HIV infection rates. And these are preliminary. The 2003 national household survey detected a 10% HIV prevalence rate among 15 to 24-year olds in South Africa. And when viewed along with data from the 2002 Department of Health survey and the HSRC national survey, this does suggest a slight decline in HIV prevalence among 15 to 19-year olds and a leveling off among 20 to 24-year olds... The survey furthermore found that young people who participate in loveLife programs are significantly less likely to be HIV positive. And this is participation, not merely exposure to the programs. Female participants are 40% less likely to be HIV infected and male participants are 30% less likely to be HIV positive than non-participants. loveLife’s quasi experimental community study found that young people in communities with Y centers and with the NAFC clinics, had lower HIV STI and pregnancy rates than their counterparts in matched communities that didn’t have the programme.”

Auerbach’s points were further embellished in a follow-on presentation by a former loveLife groundbreaker, Sibulele Sibaca who states: “I’m not going to talk stats. I’m not going to talk about the impact loveLife has had in South Africa as a whole. I’m going to talk about the impact loveLife has had in my life and how much it has invested in me as an individual”.

She goes on to speak about how she lost her parents to AIDS, and how loveLife had changed her life and how she was looking forward to the 2010 soccer world cup – a reference to a loveLife campaign that recurs in other discourse genres, notably billboards and loveLife’s youth magazines.

125 HIV prevalence is not strictly speaking a measure of ‘infection rate’. Infection rates have to do with HIV incidence – i.e. the number of infections occurring over a given time period.

126 Ibid, p. 29. This claim is highly contentious. Firstly, there is very little concrete evidence to draw the conclusion that HIV prevalence amongst youth is declining from the sources referenced. Antenatal data is not particularly sensitive to declines at an aggregate level (i.e. where all data from sentinel sites around the country is aggregated) and the declines referred to are not considered to be significant. There is no time-based comparison with regard to the 2002 Nelson Mandela/HSRC survey (i.e. a decline can only be potentially shown in a repeat study using a similar sampling methodology), whilst the RHRU/loveLife survey (Pettifor et al 2004:3), which was conducted a year later (and used a similar sampling methodology), actually showed higher prevalence in the 15-24 year age group in comparison to the Mandela/HSRC survey – 10.2% vs 9.3% with higher variations for females (15.5% vs 12%) (Pettifor et al 2004:31). With regard to loveLife programme participation – this is a comparison made from a single cross-sectional study, not over time, so no such conclusion can reliably be drawn – it is simply a measure of association. HIV prevalence is highly variable in communities so the nation that a ‘quasi-experimental’ model can take into account such variances in current prevalence and risk is also methodologically problematic.

127 Ibid, p. 47.
The ideological pattern in Auerbach’s argument, supported by Sibaca, follows a particular logic and structure that directs listeners towards particular conclusions. This logic and structure is reiterated elsewhere in loveLife discourses and can be outlined as follows:

- **Premises:** That youth are the driving force underpinning the epidemic; that loveLife is South Africa’s national HIV programme for youth; and that loveLife has a strong monitoring and evaluation plan;

- **Justifications (often devolving to orthodoxies such as quantification):** loveLife is more impactful than other programmes; loveLife has proven causal impacts on youth sexual behaviour and HIV prevention (and failing to mention the wide range of other programmes that exist in South Africa);

- **Testimonies:** whereby lived experience of youth testimonials in the context of events are portrayed as having a stand-for connotative relation to the lived experience of South African youth in general;

- **Goal orientation:** whereby ‘ideological’ reproduction ('scaling-up', including the need for additional funding) of the object (loveLife) is prioritised within the discourse.

The linkage between ideology and hegemony in this instance is the interrelation between the process of agency and the assumption of ‘authoritative’ leadership, incorporating structural relationships to other groups, masking of vested interests and relationships, and concretisation of the goal orientation. Communicative power is singularly vested in KFF, who provide the resources to access the discourse forum itself, and who determine the ‘right to speak’. Auerbach’s apparent independence as a senior representative of Amfar (and by omitting reference to her longstanding linkage to the loveLife programme as a member of the Technical Advisory Group) also serves a legitimating function.

Auerbach’s discourse is characterised by processes of ideological masking in the sense that what is conveyed is the logical flow of the argument directing the viewer/listener towards a preferred set of meanings – in this case, that loveLife is a legitimate, effective programme that merits replication (i.e. reproduction of the object) – while masking a range of contradictions including the notion of monocausality (which is further reinforced by not referencing the complex of HIV programmes reaching youth in South Africa, as well as assumptions that it is only
intervention that fosters HIV prevention behaviour), and conflation of reach of the programme and associative quantitative findings, with actual impacts.

With regard to the validation of discourse, McKerrow (1983:198) notes: “Ideological discourse is validated, not by timeless truths or the inexorable progress of necessary laws, but by the historically situated community in which it is expressed”. The construction of ideology is a material practice that includes “rituals, practices and actions that constitute the process of interpellation” (Boswell et al 1999:360). The ritualised spaces of conferences, workshops and presentation, include a power relation that governs the right to speak, with audience members positioned as passive listeners, sometimes with limited rights to ask questions within a limited time frame.

Auerbach’s discourse echoes some of the characteristics of propaganda identified by Black (2001), namely, reliance on authority figures (Auerbach), physical representations (youth testimony), a finalistic view of institutions (loveLife is markedly better than others working in the field, there are no other ‘competitors’), and reduction to cause and effect relations, ignoring multiple causality (loveLife’s claimed causal impacts). The conference space can also be understood as a ritualised space which includes a relation between speaker and audience within which discursive authority is vested in the speaker – i.e. the conference space is a ritual that affirms the notion of authority (and authorised voice) of the speaker. In the case of satellite sessions, the processes of vesting authority in particular speakers – a process determined by session sponsor KFF – is masked. Additionally Auerbach’s direct links to the loveLife programme are kept outside the discourse frame.

At another Bangkok presentation, “Showcasing Media Partnerships”, UNAIDS Executive Director, Peter Piot, provides an introductory endorsement to the loveLife programme by referring to it as a “very pioneering programme” (kaisernetwork.org, 2004b:6) – a reiteration of other endorsements of the programme by himself. This session focuses on the UNAIDS/KFF ‘Global Media Partnership’ which was founded under the auspices of UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan earlier in 2004, in partnership between KFF and the UN. The partnership specifically constructed between large-scale global and national media corporates with an emphasis on broadcast media – for example Viacom, BBC, MTV, SABC and Time Warner. Formations that have historically addressed the relationship between media and HIV/AIDS have been excluded from the coalition. These include the United

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Kingdom-based PANOS organisation, SafAIDS (based in Zimbabwe) and Jour-
AIDS (based in South Africa), as well as indigenous responses by mediaworkers
themselves – for example, Journalists Against AIDS – JAAIDS (based in Nigeria),
the Association of Journalists Against AIDS in Tanzania – AJAAT. At the
Bangkok session, neither this gap in participation, nor the longstanding historical
responses by these organisations is masked. Instead, emphasis is given to the notion
that media responses to HIV/AIDS are something new:

In an attempt to accelerate the scale of awareness, on January
15, 2004, the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan convened a
meeting of media leaders from all over the world. The purpose of
the gathering was to explore how the media can join the fight in a
more coordinated and effective way. This groundbreaking
meeting organized by UNAIDS and the Kaiser Family
Foundation with additional support from the Bill and Melinda
Gates Foundation sought to change the way the industry thinks of
itself when it comes to contributing to the global response to the
epidemic.

Over and above being positioned as a new response, media interventions in relation
to HIV/AIDS are positioned as needing to be driven from the top down by corporate
heads.

The structural linkage to the Global Media AIDS Initiative provides KFF access to a
range of discourse fora, whilst at the same time offering opportunities to reiteratively
position the loveLife programme. For example, in the founding report disseminated
at the launch of the initiative in January 2004, there are a number of references to
loveLife including the reiteration of claims to impact:

Respondents in a national survey of youth reported changes in
their sexual behaviour, including greater abstinence, delay of
sexual debut and increased condom use, as a result of this
programming. More than three quarters said loveLife had made
them aware of the risks involved in unprotected sex. (UNAIDS
2004a:20)

KFF’s Altman also punted loveLife at the coalition’s launch event:

129 See www.panos.org; www.safaids.org; www.nigeria-aids.org;
130 Kaisernetwork.org. (2004b). Showcasing media partnerships: The global media AIDS initiative,
loveLife is a South African campaign to educate young people about HIV/AIDS using a combination of media, community initiatives and centres and a hotline... Our evaluations are showing that significant percentages are reporting delaying sex, practicing safer sex and going and getting tested for HIV as a result of that multi-media approach.\textsuperscript{131}

The insertion of the loveLife name into discourses about the Coalition also occurs elsewhere – for example in November 2004, a media announcement about a ‘creative expert’ meeting in New York, it is noted that the discussion will include “participation from loveLife, South Africa’s largest youth campaign, which works with media, schools and youth groups”\textsuperscript{132}

The Media Coalition’s Bangkok satellite session was sponsored by KFF and BBC World Service Trust, and included a presentation made by Angela Stewart-Buchanan, Media Director of loveLife. Buchanan introduces a number of poorly grounded claims – “250 000 calls [are made] on a monthly basis” to the organisation’s helpline; “99% of households have access to radios” and that television programmes “are getting through to 90% of households”.\textsuperscript{133,134} In this instance, Piot’s validation of the loveLife programme at the outset has the ideological effect of providing legitimation to Stewart-Buchanan’s subsequent claims, reinforcing both Stewart-Buchanan’s right to speak as well as conferring ideological authority and legitimation to the content of her discourse.

The Bangkok Conference satellite sessions provide opportunities for expanding discourses about the loveLife programme to other fora. This is achieved in the first instance via insertion of such discourses into media releases and promotional activities at the conference itself, as well as via kaisernetwork.org. Discourses about loveLife were also inserted into KFF’s HIV/AIDS policy information briefing documents released at the time of the Conference.\textsuperscript{135} Similarly, UNAIDS documents...

\textsuperscript{131} http://www.kff.org/hivaids/phi011504oth.cfm, retrieved August 2004
\textsuperscript{132} First ever global HIV/AIDS creative meeting at the United Nations brings together creative experts from 35 media companies. Biz.yahoo.com/prnews/041123/nytu036_2.html, retrieved 29 November 2004. The source of the press release describing this meeting is Viacom, another KFF partner.
\textsuperscript{134} Shisana et al (2002:93) found that 82% of youth aged 15-24 had access to radio a few days a week or more, and 66.7% to television at the same rate of access.
\textsuperscript{135} For example, A global policy briefing on youth and HIV/AIDS, only mentions one intervention by name (loveLife): “Many of the strategies identified in the context of prevention are also important for care and treatment of young people. For example, South Africa’s National
released during the Conference included claims-making reifications of the loveLife programme. UNAIDS’ 2004 Global Epidemic Report, for example, provides overviews of HIV prevalence around the globe, and includes summative discussion about key focus areas. In a section of the report addressing HIV/AIDS and youth, the work of loveLife is highlighted:

In South Africa, a survey found that the innovative media approaches and messages of ‘loveLife’, the national young people’s HIV prevention programme, have been helpful in breaking down social taboos regarding adolescent sexuality, promoting responsible sexual behaviour and increasing use of comprehensive health services. Working through 900 government-run clinics to promote youth-friendly health services, ‘loveLife’ has ‘Y-Centres’ or youth centres that provide HIV education and sexual health services in a recreational environment. (UNAIDS 2004b:97)

This claim to operation in 900 clinics is considerably more than numbers claimed in other contemporary accounts. Auerbach refers to 106 clinics (see above), whilst an RHRU presentation reporting on the NAFCI initiative at the Bangkok Conference refers to the programme being implemented in 69 clinics, and KFF president, Drew Altman, claims 200.137

It is through the intersections of structural alliances and elite discourses, wider ideological reiteration is achieved. For example, association with the UN through links to Piot/UNAIDS and Kofi Annan, organisations such as Amfar, FHI and the UN Foundation, and media entities such as the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) and MTV. Laclau and Mouffe (1982) note that meaning in ideology depends on inter relations within an ideological bloc. Association and formal partnerships with UN structures provides for legitimation, and also nuances how meaning is achieved. Meanings with the legitimatory support and implicit endorsement by elite

Adolescent-Friendly Clinic Initiative (NAFCI), a part of loveLife, the national HIV prevention program for young people, is being expanded to incorporate antiretroviral treatment and monitoring as the country rolls out treatment to its HIV positive population. Kaiser Family Foundation (2004, July) HIV/AIDS Policy Fact Sheet.


representatives and ‘partners’ strengthen the contribution such discourses make to fostering hegemonic consent: “Hegemony is not an external relation between pre-constituted social agents, but the very process of discursive construction of those agents” (Laclau & Mouffe 1982:100). Whilst for Laclau and Mouffe (1982), such interrelations are noted at a broader structural level – for example, race, gender, class – such articulation may also occur between organisations and groups and it is this process that is functional to consent-making.

This strategy is replicated in a wide range of other communicative activities undertaken by KFF and has been in place since the inception of the loveLife programme. It has followed both similar discursive strategies, and similar patterns within discourses – specifically formulaic structuring of argument and claims-making combined with legitimatory linkages and spoken by apparently independent ‘experts’, by officials from ‘partner’ organisations (whose direct relations are sometimes hidden), and supplemented via video clips and personal testimonies by South African youth who are part of the loveLife programme. Some examples of these practices are discussed below.

**The Global HIV Prevention Working Group**

The Global HIV Prevention Working Group is a KFF initiative (co-convened with the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation) that is linked to the UN. UNAIDS Executive Director, Peter Piot is included in the ‘working group’, and the groups activities include UN endorsement during launches of reports and within other discourse genres.\(^{138}\) The group is described as follows:

> The Global HIV Prevention Working Group is an international panel of nearly 40 leading public health experts, clinicians, biomedical and behavioral researchers, and people affected by HIV/AIDS. The Working Group seeks to inform global policymaking, programme planning, and donor decisions on HIV prevention, and advocate for a comprehensive response to HIV/AIDS that integrates prevention and care.\(^{139}\)

The Working Group is chaired by Helene Gayle (Gates Foundation), JVR Prasada Rao (Indian Ministry of Health and Family Welfare), David Serwadda (Makerere

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University, Uganda) and co-convened by Drew Altman (KFF). It includes a number of loveLife associates – for example, Judith Auerbach, Tom Coates, William Makgoba, and Debrework Zewdie, all of whom are on the loveLife Technical Advisory Group.  

Although the listing of group members includes the note: “Organizational affiliations are provided for identification purposes only, and do not indicate organizational endorsement”, the listing of organisation names provides necessary legitimation to the functioning of the group. Over and above topics directly addressed by the Group, each of reports emanating from the Group provide a mechanism for positioning the loveLife programme as an important and relevant programme that can be utilised to inform HIV/AIDS policy and strategy at a global level:

- Global Prevention Working Group (2002:10) – *South Africa’s national HIV prevention program for youth, known as loveLife, seeks to empower young people in South Africa to protect themselves through a multi-component program that includes saturation of youth-oriented media with HIV awareness messages; expansion of adolescent health services in South Africa’s 5,000 public health clinics; creation of a national network of youth centers that provide health services in a non-clinical setting; and mobilization of a national corps of youth*

140 Members in 2003 are listed as follows: Judith D. Auerbach, National Institutes of Health, USA; Mary Bassett; Seth Berkley, International AIDS Vaccine Initiative, USA; Jordi Casabona, Hospital Universitari Germans, Trias i Pujol, Spain; Tom Coates, Center for AIDS, Prevention Studies, University of California, San Francisco, USA; Awa Marie Coll-Seck, Minister of Health, Senegal; J. Peter Figueroa, Ministry of Health, Jamaica; Geeta Rao Gupta, International Center for Research on Women, USA; Catherine Hankins, UNAIDS, Geneva; Salim Abdool Karim, University of Natal, South Africa; Milly Katana, Health Rights Action Group, Uganda; Susan Kippax, University of New South Wales, Australia; Peter Lamptey, Family Health International, USA; Kgapa Mabusela, loveLife, South Africa; Marina Mahathir, Malaysian AIDS Council, Malaysia; William Makgoba, Medical Research Council, South Africa; Rafael Mazin, Pan American Health Organization, USA; Michael Merson, Yale School of Medicine, USA; Philip Nieburg, Center for Disease Control and Prevention, USA; Jeffrey O’Malley, International HIV/AIDS Alliance, United Kingdom; Peter Piot, UNAIDS, Geneva; Vadim Pokrovsky, Russian Center for Aids Prevention and Control, Russia; Tim Rhodes, Imperial College, University of London, United Kingdom; Zeda Rosenberg, International Partnership for Microbicides, USA; Bernhard Schwartlander, WHO, Geneva; Yiming Shao, National Center for AIDS/STD Prevention and Control, China; Moses Sichone, UNICEF, Zambia; Mark Stirling, UNICEF, New York; Donald Sutherland, Centre for Infectious Disease Prevention and Control, Health Canada, Canada; Paolo Teixeira, Ministry of Health, Brazil Ronald O. Valdiserri, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, USA; Mechai Viravaidya, Population and Community Development Association, Thailand; Catherine Wilfert, Elizabeth Glaser Pediatric AIDS Foundation, USA; Debrework Zewdie, World Bank, USA. See Global Prevention Working Group (2003).


142 This ambitious plan was reiterated in the early phases of the loveLife programme, although the subsequent proposal in 2002 to the Global Fund for HIV/AIDS, TB and Malaria, plans were only put forward for 900 clinics (at a cost of $68-million over five years) – see further below. As noted above, the claim already be operating in 900 clinics is inserted into the UNAIDS Global Epidemic Report 2004.
peer outreach volunteers. loveLife has been widely embraced by youth in South Africa, and nearly 70 percent of young people who have heard of loveLife say they have reduced their number of sexual partners as a result of the program.

❑ Global HIV Prevention Working Group (2003:9). Taking Youth-Oriented Prevention to Scale in South Africa [heading]. Although research has identified a broad range of prevention projects that appear to produce significant behavior change, few such projects have been brought to scale. In South Africa — where the future course of the epidemic will largely be determined by the sexual behaviors of the 40 percent of South Africans under age 15 — a central challenge is to convert smaller-scale prevention projects into broad-based programs capable of reaching millions. loveLife — a partnership between the South African government, more than 100 community-based organizations, US foundations, and the corporate sector — is scaling up on a nationwide basis a comprehensive package of proven prevention approaches, with the goals of reducing by one-third the number of young people who engage in high-risk sex and of encouraging a substantial percentage of young people to delay initiation of sexual activity.... A comprehensive evaluation of the program is underway to determine its impact on young people’s sexual behaviors and on the incidence of HIV and STDs.

❑ Global HIV Prevention Working Group (2004:9). South Africa’s national HIV prevention program for youth — loveLife — supports development of HIV service delivery in government clinics around the country. In partnership with the South African mining company Anglo American, loveLife is working to integrate prevention and HIV treatment programs in communities where Anglo American has its main operations.

The findings of these reports are further reiterated in other discourse genres and fora – for example, via media releases and conferences, and within a wide range of UN, other websites and in the news media. Patterns include loveLife being positioned as “South Africa’s national HIV prevention programme for youth”, claims to causal impacts (e.g. 70% reduction in number of sexual partners correlated with hearing about loveLife); assertions that loveLife should be scaled up; and the notion that the course of the HIV epidemic is underpinned exclusively by youth behaviour.

143 For example, those of UNAIDS, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, as well as various news reports.
Ideological positioning of loveLife at other events and conferences

The ideological elements of the discourses outlined above follow similar discursive strategies to promote the loveLife programme in previous years. These activities extend as far back as 2000, when the loveLife programme was in its early phases. Many of these activities have a US and/or European orientation, including events with linkages to the UN system, but incorporating conferences and other events that have a global orientation such as the biannual international AIDS Conference.

The approach to discourse typically combines ‘expert’ discourses, video presentations and testimonies by South African youth or members of the loveLife programme. Promotional activities are also intensified around global AIDS conferences and gatherings – for example, the International AIDS Conferences in Durban, 2000; Barcelona, 2002; and Bangkok, 2004; as well as the UN General Assembly on HIV/AIDS in 2001. In the month prior to the 2004 Bangkok Conference, a conference session entitled “Youth and Health” Generation on the Edge” was held in Washington, and included a plenary session featuring KFF President and CEO, Drew Altman, and Mandla Sibeko, assistant to CEO of loveLife. Altman starts out by noting that loveLife provides an example of “the effective use of media to reach young people” and that:

… its purpose is to connect young people to the services provided by the program, which include thousands of peer counselors – they call them GroundBreakers – across the country, youth centers called Y-centers which are the most exciting youth venues I’ve ever been to, loveLife’s national adolescent friendly clinics — a network of now 200 clinics, but eventually it will be 900 clinics — which are being transformed into places young people might actually want to go to. I can report to you the strategy of using media to connect young people to services seems to be working, so for example, 300,000 young South Africans every

144 The Durban conference received funding from KFF/loveLife and SABC in support of the conference launch event. Spin-offs at the launch included prominent loveLife branding (banners and flags), and each delegate received a pack of brochures and reports on loveLife during the launch event. As a consequence, loveLife was immediately inserted into the frame of reference of a wide range of researchers and opinion leaders globally, and was positioned as an intervention that was going to make massive impacts on HIV prevalence amongst youth in South Africa.

145 Claimed number of callers to the line vary in iteration. Auerbach refers to 2.4 million calls which translates into 200 000 calls per month. It is unclear how closely based in fact such numbers are, but in any event the total number of calls to the line are not representative of the number of
month — not every year, but every month — are now calling the
loveLife Hotline because of the media campaign that got them
interested in it.\(^{146}\)

Shortly after Altman’s presentation, a video presentation is shown that ends with a
clip of Nelson Mandela stating “HIV-AIDS is one of the greatest wars facing
humanity in the world. It is a war against humanity, and that is how we should fight
it” to which Altman quips – “Now, one of my best rules is: I never follow Nelson
Mandela, so thank you very much.”.\(^{147}\) The latter reference illustrates a further
legitimating strategy – association of the Mandela name with discourses about
loveLife. Mandela appears on video a number of times during the session referred to
here, and is further referenced by Sibeko. Sibeko starts with a video clip that includes
Mandela saying:

> We have to speak frankly about HIV/AIDS. This is exactly what
we did when we fought apartheid. That could only be done by
being outspoken. To talk frankly about sex in order to save the
lives and future of our children will not destroy, but will
[inaudible] destruction of our country. We love our children
enough for us to talk about sex.\(^{148}\)

Sibeko goes on to claim that more than 50% of the population in South Africa are
under 15\(^{149}\) and then makes a number of assertions about the media environment in
South Africa:

> In fact, South Africa is proud to have been given an award for the
past three years of having young readers, the only country in the
world that has young readers who read newspapers. Ninety
percent of young South Africans listen to radio. A higher
percentage also watches television.\(^{150}\) It has created an
opportunity for loveLife to position itself in the heart and heads of

\(^{146}\) Kaisernetwork.org. (2004c). Youth and Health: Generation on the Edge. Plenary: Tuned In,
Turned On: The Impact of Media and Marketing on Youth Behavior, Global Health Council,
Washington, June 2, p. 10.

\(^{147}\) Ibid, p. 4.

\(^{148}\) Ibid, p. 28.

\(^{149}\) See further above, where Auerbach draws attention to this proportion, but puts the number at 42%
under 20.

\(^{150}\) In the following month in Bangkok, Stewart-Buchanan wields different numbers.
young people around where our young people are at, which is really through television, newspapers, and radio.\textsuperscript{151}

His presentation is rounded off by reiteration of the programme’s links to Mandela and Bill Gates, and the need for loveLife to be scaled up:

\begin{quote}
I think this brings me back to the conclusion of my presentation, and once again, this is a very good example of a message that Nelson Mandela sent out in September last year in a forum with young people with Bill Gates. He said the fight against AIDS will indeed require another social revolution. Once more the youth of our country are called upon to play a leading role in a social revolution, as they did so heroically in the revolutionary struggle against Apartheid. That is an important message. It basically says that programs that are small like loveLife have got to become big. It’s got to be in the heart and headspace of young people in order to change and have the normative behavior change… \textsuperscript{152}
\end{quote}

These patterns also occur elsewhere. In September 2000, UNAIDS, UNICEF, UNFPA, loveLife/KFF, and UNDP hosted a ‘town hall’ meeting at the United Nations in New York entitled ‘Men make a difference’. The meeting followed a discursive format of questions and discussion from the floor, and the overall programme was centred around reflections and testimonies provided by loveLife officials Judi Fortuin and Mandla Sibeko, and youth participants – David Schneider, Joel Makitla and Mashapa Machaba.\textsuperscript{153} Introducing the meeting, President of the 55\textsuperscript{th} UN Session General Assembly, Harry Holkeri, observes that “young people between the ages of 15 and 24 are a the greatest risk and that they represent over half of the newly acquired infections”.\textsuperscript{154} Opportunity is then given to Sibeko and loveLife youth participants introduce the loveLife programme.

At the UN General Assembly Special Session (UNGASS), which was held in July 2001, KFF and loveLife were prominent on the programme. A special event was held to promote loveLife, and KFF conducted a number of press briefings on the overall HIV/AIDS epidemic as well as specifically about the loveLife programme.

\textsuperscript{152} Ibid, p. 33.
\textsuperscript{154} Ibid, p. 2-3.
The loveLife event at UNGASS included presentations by various KFF and loveLife representatives, a video presentation showing its activities in South Africa, and various supportive statements from ‘loveLife’ youth who had been flown to New York for the event. UNAIDS and KFF also co-hosted a media briefing on the global epidemic, which ran back-to-back with a media briefing on loveLife. In reviewing the epidemic, Altman notes in his introduction:

*There is consensus everywhere on the need for a comprehensive and integrated approach… prevention efforts must give priority to young people. Over half of all new HIV infections globally are among young people under the age of 26. That is why we are spotlighting South Africa’s loveLife programme here today.*

In the briefing on loveLife, Michael Sinclair of KFF notes:

*In starting out I want to offer three reasons [why you should be paying attention to loveLife]. In the first instance loveLife offers an unprecedented and unique effort in the world to operationalise on a national scale a comprehensive campaign with a five to ten year perspective… At the current rate of infection among teenagers in South Africa, roughly half those under 15 will become infected with HIV in the next 5-10 years. About 40 percent of the population is under 15 at the moment, roughly 12 million people, so 6 million young South African lives are at stake.*

Sinclair continues, claiming that loveLife “has adolescent-friendly services in 5 000 government clinics…”, that it “is a network of 15 Y-centers around the country…”, and that it has “a toll free telephone service providing sexual health counseling and referral, receiving something like 80 000 calls per month”.

The briefing included four youth participants Mandla Sibeko (referred to as aged 22 and a loveLife advisory board member), Michell Bowers, Nongamso Koza and

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157 Ibid, p. 2. There were considerably less NAFCI clinics than claimed here. Only 51 had been established and were active at the end of 2002 (see loveLife 2003b:47).
158 There were considerably less Y-Centres than claimed here. Only five Y-Centres were established in 2000, and only 15 were established by the end of 2002 (see loveLife 2003b:47).
159 See previous discussion about the number of helpline calls, which were shown in internal monitoring reports to average around 28 000 calls, of which considerably less where actually answered.
Edwin Thabethe. Sibeko claims that loveLife is “a youth-driven initiative” and that “young people have given loveLife the go ahead. They have given it unprecedented support… seven million South Africans tune into our television programmes and five million… listen to our radio programmes”.160 This point is reiterated by Sibeko later in the discussion and also by Koza who says “It’s designed by youngsters and it’s led by youngsters”.161 Koza also evokes Mandela (“I’m from Eastern Cape, where actually our former President, Nelson Mandela comes from”).162

The UNGASS event encompassed considerable communicative power. Promotion of the loveLife programme through a special event UNGASS in combination with interlinked press briefings run by KFF in partnership with UNAIDS, and supported by prominent individuals and organisations working in the field, allowed KFF and loveLife to secure both authority and legitimacy,163 as well as fostering opportunities to enter other discourse fora – i.e. the US and international media.164 Further to this, there was an intersection with awarding UNAIDS’ Peter Piot the Mandela Award at the same time as UNGASS, which included his direct endorsement of the loveLife programme – and which preceded subsequent endorsements. For example, in an interview in 2002 he notes: “One needs to use the culture of youth, the language, the role models and so on. The best way of getting the message across is by using the young people themselves… LoveLife is trying very hard to do that, they are getting the youth involved;165 later in that same month he is quoted as saying: “South Africa is quite a democratic country with strong debate and a strong civil voice and that is a source of inspiration. I have learnt to appreciate that there are many good things going on here. There are excellent prevention programmes such as loveLife which serve as a good example for other countries”.166 Piot’s endorsements are interlinked with resourcing the loveLife programme – for example, the fundraising website NetAID (www.netaid.org), states: “UNAIDS Executive Director, Peter Piot, has called loveLife ‘the most innovative programme in the world’. We don’t argue with

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161 Ibid, p. 4.
163 In a similar way, the UN had provided a forum for KFF and loveLife through the 2000 UNAIDS ‘Town Hall’ meeting co-hosted by UNAIDS, UNICEF, UNFPA, KFF.
I ideological expansion

One of the features of ideology is the exercise of dominance through expansion. The complex of conferences and reports, which allow the insertion of claims related to the loveLife programme into the global sphere, are oriented towards influencing global health policy as it pertains to youth and HIV/AIDS. In the latter half of 2002, KFF invited a range of individuals working in the area of health communication to attend a meeting in Geneva, with an explicit focus on the replication of loveLife and co-hosted by the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, World Health Organisation and UNAIDS. In the invitation letter to participants from Michael Sinclair of KFF it was noted that:

Reducing the rate of HIV infection amongst young people is fundamental to the global effort to curtail the HIV pandemic. The purpose of the meeting is to review key issues in scaling up, evaluation and replication of HIV prevention programmes for young people based on the experience of loveLife – South Africa’s national HIV prevention programme for youth. These issues are central to advancing understanding of more effective behavioural interventions for HIV prevention among young people worldwide. The scope and scale of loveLife’s comprehensive approach provides a unique real world experience against which to examine these issues. The Geneva workshop will examine both the technical and practical aspects of large scale behavioural interventions with a focus on evaluation and potential impact.  

At that stage no invitations were made to other HIV prevention programmes focusing on youth, nor to organisations and individuals not related to loveLife in South Africa. Replication of loveLife was the central focus of the proposed agenda including, on day one, reviews using loveLife as the case example in the following areas: what works best; initial results of loveLife’s evaluations; cost effectiveness analysis of loveLife; and HIV modelling with reference to loveLife, with similar central positioning on the second day. As preparations progressed, some of the US-based invitees queried the lack of inclusion of other South African programmes, notably

Soul City. This prompted the convenor, Ties Boerma of WHO, to invite Garth Japhet of Soul City, and also, following referral, an invitation was extended to myself. Discussions with Boerma by Japhet and myself on the relative merits of the loveLife programme ensued, culminating in our refusal to participate on the basis of points including:

- That the notion of replicating loveLife was premature;
- That a meeting in Geneva was an inappropriate context to evaluate the loveLife programme;
- That loveLife was only one of many interventions in South Africa;
- That the programme’s intention to reduce HIV by 50% lacked baseline data from which to prove this claim downstream; and
- That it was problematic that WHO, UNICEF and UNAIDS had proceeded with the meeting without any consultation with South African organisations.

These concerns, amongst others raised globally, announcing the postponement in the meeting being postponed. In his letter to prospective participants, Sinclair noted: “it is also clear from the level of interest in the meeting and its relevance to international efforts to prevent HIV infection among young people, that it is critical to ensure a strong technical basis to inform deliberations. We feel that this would best be served by commissioning additional technical background documentation.”

In 2004, KFF initiated a similar meeting, inviting a smaller group of participants from WHO, the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, and various US universities, amongst others. The meeting comprised a one-day roundtable discussion entitled “HIV prevention among young people: Measuring the impact”, which focused specifically on presenting loveLife’s evaluation, followed by a two-day extended discussion. The latter programme included further presentation of loveLife’s evaluation data, and concluded with a review of cross-institutional collaboration and a fundraising strategy.

In both instances, KFF was able to leverage resources and UN organisational partners to legitimate a high level global meeting to promote the replication of the

170 Programme of roundtable discussion, 2004, September 8, mimeo.
171 Programme entitled “Review of loveLife evaluation and research programme”, 2004, September 9-10. The purpose of the Talloires meeting referred to by Auerbach is also positioned as being to do with replication.
loveLife programme. The positioning of KFF, as a foundation functioning in health policy globally, and as a funder of the loveLife programme, allows for appropriation of HIV/AIDS in South Africa in relation to pursuing ideological interests. These include reiterative elements, but more specifically, have to do with establishing the loveLife programme as a model for replication in other contexts.

**A structural relation with the Global Fund for HIV/AIDS, TB and Malaria**

KFF’s relation to the UNGASS activities was preceded by other intersections with the UN – notably global realignments of HIV/AIDS policy in 2001 that had to do with the establishment of a Global Fund for HIV/AIDS. In the week prior to UNGASS, a ‘leadership forum’ was organised and convened by KFF, the Gates Foundation and the Ford Foundation in New York entitled ‘Curtailing the HIV epidemic: The role of prevention’. It included more than 130 high-powered delegates: Heads of state (including Yoweri Museveni of Uganda and Festus Mogae of Botswana); ministers of health (including Anna Abdallah from Tanzania, Richard Anane from Ghana, Eriya Kategaya from Uganda and Manto Tshabalala Msimang from South Africa); officials from WHO, UNAIDS (including Peter Piot), representatives from various national AIDS councils, embassies, AIDS research units, foundations, funding agencies, drug companies and the media. Presentations included keynote addresses and roundtable discussions with the main thrust of the meeting oriented towards global HIV/AIDS strategy and the emerging Global Fund. The Fund concept was initially put forward by UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, at a meeting of the Organisation for African Unity in Abuja in April 2001. Recommendations from the later KFF sponsored meeting included the foregrounding of the need for $9.2 billion for HIV prevention – of which only $1.8 billion was currently available; that funders should substantially increase their contributions the HIV/AIDS programmes (particularly to the emerging Global Fund); that prevention programmes should be based on approaches that were proven to work; that there was a need for a comprehensive global strategy; that prevention efforts should give priority to young people; that stigma should be addressed; and that structural barriers should be removed. The foregrounding of prevention and youth, alongside massive resourcing of prevention programming intersect with later discourses about loveLife that position the programme as addressing these needs. This positioning also appears

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to have been thought of in terms of downstream structural linkages and resource possibilities: One of the presenters at the New York meeting was Rand Stoneburner, an epidemiologist and researcher who had been courted by KFF to assist with the evaluation of loveLife, along with a colleague, Daniel Low-Beer. Stoneburner notes that at an informal meeting at the time, which was attended by himself, Low-Beer, Altman (KFF) and Sinclair (KFF), that Altman made a statement to the following effect:

*Kofi Annan is ill advised if he thinks that we are going to put money into the fund and give it to developing countries. We’re going to put our money in and take it out at the other end.*

This appears to have been the case. Little over a year later, the loveLife programme received a five-year commitment of $68-million for a proposal submitted through the South African Country co-ordinating mechanism. There are also related structural linkages between KFF’s strategic partners and the Fund, as well as between KFF and the Fund. For example, in 2001, prior to loveLife receiving funding, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation made a donation of $100-million to the fund for ‘innovative HIV/AIDS prevention efforts’.

Gates Foundation’s Director of HIV, TB and Reproductive Health, Helene Gayle, was also appointed as board member to the Fund. Global Fund Director, Richard Feachem, also had links to both the KFF and the Gates Foundation. For example, prior to his appointment, Feachem attended a KFF motivated meeting with US Secretary of State, Colin Powell, on PPPs and HIV/AIDS. At the meeting Gates’ Helene Gayle noted somewhat cryptically:

*Since you brought up Global Fund, I just do want to say I think this is another area where we are not yet where we need to be. But I think we’re gonna get there because we recognize how important having that be a different kind of mechanism than we’ve had before. One where we can kind of come together around the table, pool our different interests, and again, be complementary in the way we act. I think it’s going to make a big, big difference in the way we move with the Global Fund. So,*

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173 Personal communication, Rand Stoneburner, 13 April 2004.
KFF was also party to other linkages with the Fund. In September 2002, a meeting hosted by Anil Soni, Senior Advisor to the Director of the Global Fund, noted in response to the question “How can we get more involved?”:

*The Fund may receive financing from Kaiser foundation to set up a ‘Friends of the Fund’ group in DC (Washington). If this were to happen, CORE, GHC, CCIH, and other organizations would be able to get more involved.*

KFF is also noted to have provided direct ‘in kind’ support to the Fund in the form of “staff time and expertise, physical and web-based resources to support the Fund’s communication needs.”

In January 2002, the Global Fund announced that it was calling for proposals for first-round funding and requested countries to establish national level country coordinating mechanisms (CCMs) through which to review and channel proposals to the Fund. At that time it was unclear as to whether South Africa would participate in this funding process. Finance Minister, Trevor Manuel, stated at the World Economic Forum that South Africa did not need the money and that the problem lay more in government’s ability to deliver. In essence, no application was going to be made to the Global Fund. This perspective on the Fund was however, not sustained for long. On 6 March, a meeting was convened in Pretoria by the Department of Health’s national HIV/AIDS, TB and STI Directorate to discuss a submission to the Fund. Representatives were included from the Directorate, Soul City, the Centre for AIDS Development, Research and Evaluation (CADRE),

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175 See The Role of Public-Private Partnerships in the Global Fight against HIV/AIDS, www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2002/11384.htm, retrieved 14 April 2004. This meeting also featured various claims about the loveLife programme that were put forward by KFF’s Altman, including that loveLife was the world’s biggest youth prevention programme. Additionally, the concept of PPPs in relation to loveLife was also put forward: For example, loveLife is a partnership between U.S. foundations, leading South African NGOs, it is itself an NGO, the South African government, which has been a partner from the start and a major funder, and South Africa’s largest media companies. And most recently, the Mandela Children’s Foundation has joined with a $3 million commitment and a major commitment has just been made richer by the Global Fund, which is just critical, indispensable to the future of this program.”

176 CORE – Child Survival Collaborations and Resources Group is a US-Based NGO and GHC is Global Health Council. It is unclear who CCIH are.

177 Meeting minutes, The Global AIDS/TB/Malaria fund discussion, led by Anil Soni, Senior advisor to the Executive Director of the Global Fund, 25 September 2002.


179 Barber, S. (5 February 2002). Manuel will not dip into AIDS fund, Business Day.
loveLife and the Directorate’s Khomanani Campaign. At this meeting a proposal by loveLife for youth friendly clinics was put forward, and organisations represented were requested to develop proposals linking to loveLife. Soul City agreed to integrate a proposal for funding of their television series, Soul Buddyz, with the loveLife proposal, whilst other organisations elected to develop separate proposals.

It was also unclear at the time, as to whether South Africa had constituted a CCM. Nono Simelela, chief director of HIV/AIDS in the health department, was however quoted as saying that a proposal was being prepared by the Department, and this was “phase one of our approach to the fund. Because of the March 10 deadline (for applications) it was very difficult to get everyone on board, so we went with applications we already had half-cooked at SANAC’, said Simelela” (The Star, 5 March 2002).180

Some months later the Global Fund announced a grant to the South African Country Co-ordinating Mechanism (CCM).181 It transpired that only two components were to be funded by the Global Fund – loveLife and Soul Buddyz, the former to an amount of $68-million – one of the highest commitments made globally – and the latter, to an amount of $2,35-million for one year only.

Soul City were mortified to discover that only a one-year budget had been submitted on their behalf by loveLife’s David Harrison, who had retained control over the development of the proposal and budgets. This was partly due to the haste in which their proposal component was prepared, which included only a one-year budget. At no point however, had Harrison indicated that five-year budget information was required.

Although proposals to the fund are subject to assessment by a Technical Review Panel, it remains unclear how such a large amount was committed to loveLife. Although TRP reports are not available in the public domain, portions of the report pertaining to South Africa’s proposal were unintentionally included on the Global Fund’s website.182 A number of important concerns were highlighted by the TRP:183

- the proposal was unsigned;

182 Although pages relating to detailed discussion of the loveLife proposal were missing, there are references to loveLife in the remaining pages.
there was very little NGO, PLWHA and academic representation on the South African National AIDS Council (which was acting as the country CCM);

- the plans to scale up from the existing 20 clinics to 150 in one year and to 900 in year 5 were noted to be “rather ambitious and could result in a drop in quality. However RSA does have the capacity to scale up rapidly, especially through a franchise system”;

- The budget for the loveLife component was $82,794-million, but was contradicted by a request for $68-million for that same component in the overall funding request in the proposal;

- Under the heading ‘Specific Observations’ it was noted that the CCM should include “broader representation” and further, that there was “a lack of co-ordination between proposal components”;

- Under ‘recommendations’ it was noted: “This proposal needs to be resubmitted with a comprehensive review of the HIV and TB situation in South Africa. There is need to justify the programme gaps for which funding is required including a thorough review of existing available resources”.  

It is surprising that the proposal for loveLife could have been approved at all – given that loveLife’s budget contradicted the amount requested (and granted) – i.e. $68-million, and that it was recommended that the proposal needed to be reworked. The loveLife proposal included reference to their 2002 research that claimed that “More than 60% of respondents who are familiar with loveLife have positively adapted their behaviour as a result of their exposure to the programme”, with further claims including “Among sexually experienced youth who have heard of loveLife, 78% report loveLife has caused them to use condoms when having sex; 69% say loveLife has caused them to reduce their number of sex partners” and that “63% of sexually active girls report that loveLife has caused them to be more assertive in insisting on condom use”. It is unclear whether these findings were accepted at face value by the TRP, as not all pages of the report were available.

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184 It has been noted via an anonymous source that the TRP referred the proposal to a higher level within the Fund for review, and that at this level the review process was chaired by Helene Gayle of Gates Foundation.

185 Section C1, Proposal to the Global Fund, South Africa, 2002.

186 Access to the full report was requested from Duncan Earle, Global Fund Country Representative, in May 2004, but this request was refused on the basis that this information is not available in the public domain.
Other concerns are worth noting. For example, the requirement for this massive level of funding was premised on the notion that Adolescent Friendly Clinics were an urgent requirement. This notion skirts the findings of the 1998 Demographic and Health Survey (Department of Health 2002), which notes that only 10% of young women were dissatisfied with services provided at government clinics. A similar finding was made by loveLife in their 2001 research – of youth who had visited government clinics, 72% found the service ‘good or very good’, and only 9% found it ‘poor/not good at all’ (loveLife 2002b:32). In essence, loveLife’s proponents were well aware that they were requesting funding to address a problem that was neither extensive, nor pressing. Additionally, in a study of the provision of clinical services to youth by the Population Council (2001), it was found that the loveLife clinic referenced was providing injectable contraceptives to 98% of clients, with only 2% being provided with condoms (Erulkar et al 2001:18) – a practice that can be considered to be conducive to promoting unprotected sex amongst teen clients, and increasing HIV risk considerably.

**Ideological reproduction and structural links**

Reiteration and legitimation are elements of both ideological and hegemonic bloc’s, but it is the complex of reiteration via a diversity of sources across fora in combination with structural linkages that provides for a transition to hegemony. It is this process that fosters the construction of common sense by virtue of intra and inter-structural legitimations that are inserted into the public sphere. Drawing together partner organisations and associates and prominently inserting particular discourses into the public sphere, involves an agential communicative power that is derived from the ability to access financial resources. It is this process towards which KFF expends resources – for example through funding satellite sessions and participation at a range of events. Positioning discourses within high profile events, interlinked with parallel discourses in reports by ostensibly independent groups – for example UN organisations, scientists and researchers – masks underlying linkages. Equally, the prestige of the events themselves, alongside linkages with elites and dominant organisations such as the UN, allows for the direction of discourse elements to wider audiences via the news media. Complementary to this process is the support provided by kaisernetwork.org.

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Structural linkages allow power to be cumulative – including expansion and consolidation of communicative power. Such linkages are interdependent with a commonality of ideological positions and vested interests. As Joseph (2003:136) points out, “[Ideological] projects may therefore be considered in terms of their formal adequacy in matching the interests of particular groups with the facilitation of the conditions for social reproduction”. Ideological processes become concretised hegemonically through structural relations that are a product of, and that give rise to, agential power, from which dominance flows. The function of such dominance is the ideological purpose of reproduction – of ideas and social practices. As Cox puts it, in critiquing the economistic orientation of production:

*Production… is to be understood in the broadest sense. It is not confined to the production of physical goods used or consumed. It covers the production and reproduction of knowledge and of the social relations, morals and institutions that are prerequisites to the production of physical goods.* (1989:39)

When production and reproduction are understood in relation to ideology, it is not necessarily the economic reproduction of the capitalist order, but economic reproduction of the ideological object that is relevant. Ideological energies are oriented towards reiterative discourses about the loveLife programme that seek out consensus through positioning the programme as a legitimated object worthy of reproduction. This combined process includes local and global ideological discourses, interlinked with alliances that are functional (i.e. in discourse) or structural (i.e. via direct or indirect linkages), which serve in the final instance, to reinforce communicative power and dominance. These discourses also involve circular forms of legitimation – for example, over and above references to loveLife, references are made to other organisations within the bloc, with the effect of collectively valorising these other organisation’s and their intra-organisational linkages. Thus, a broad range of ideological positions are put forward, and broad range of interests are accommodated and served.

Entrée into wider discourse fora is secured by virtue of the events incorporating participation of journalists, purposive media releases and media briefings, and also parallel dissemination via kaisernetwork.org. This process is interlinked with agency – for it requires agency to assume leadership, and it is through communicative power that leadership is assumed. It is this process that locates power in the hands of the few in the service of ideological and pragmatic interests of the few.
The process of consent, which is integral to hegemony, exists in discourse. It is however separate from a liberal pluralist notion of discourse, given that agency is weighted towards particular discourses and ideological reiteration as a product of structural power. Ideological reiteration is a product of access to discourse fora, in combination with reiterative power derived via structural links to parallel ideological formations. Conversely, oppositional discourses are not readily inserted into such discourse domains, and are thus decentred. The complex of prominent global meetings outlined above, in combination with structured rhetorics valorising the loveLife programme in the public sphere, offers direction towards preferred ideological meanings, whilst at the same time limiting alternate perspectives. Many of these events are similarly structured – often to the point of appearing choreographed.

The structured discourse patterns are replicated across events, with emphasis being given to making particular points in favour of the loveLife programme, and embedding quantitative discourses alongside concepts of moncausality with a direction towards situating such claims as common sense. It appears sufficient that these arguments be reiterated in form rather than content and there is little effort to ensure that the claims made are exactly consistent between spokespersons or fora. There are, for example, considerable variances in numbers utilised by agents of the loveLife programme, such as shifting claims to numbers of youth friendly clinics. Other numbers also shift between events and spokespersons – for example, youth infection rates and rates of household media access in South Africa. This suggests that validity of numbers is less important than being in a position to make a particular quantitative assertion in deference to the logic of the argument. Form in this instance, is of greater importance than content. The numbers, whatever they might be, have more import in terms of the layering of argument and direction towards constructing common-sense conceptions.

With regard to structural linkages, ideological legitimation is continuously evoked through reference to parallel entities and ‘partners’ – for example, co-sponsoring conference sessions – as well as evocation of linkages to authority such as the names and titles and organisations represented by endorsing speakers. This extends to regular evocation and consequent legitimation via mentions of linkages to, or discourses emanating from, Nelson Mandela. In relation to such discourses, South Africa is appropriated as a site of AIDS struggle with little reference to organisations or activities outside of the frame of reference of loveLife and KFF’s special interests.
The audiences to whom KFF/loveLife address their arguments are kept ignorant of the diversity of local responses other programmes working with youth in South Africa. It does not necessarily follow that subjection at the level of discourse fora such as conference presentations is of ultimate importance (although it is obvious that members of the audience may often include policy-makers and leaders over whom ideological reiteration is intended to hold sway). The greater ideological value lies beyond the forum, within in the multilayered legitimations that accrue as a by-product of having made particular representations in particular fora, and being positioned to extend these discourses into other genres – for example, media reports and websites. This value is also secured through partnerships and structural relations.

Hegemony is interdependent with alliance-building and expansion – expanding the basis of support through partnerships, whilst at the same time drawing on the resultant legitimations to enhance the capacity to foster common-sense rationalisations and consent, as well as discourses related to replication of the loveLife programme. It is within these relations that hegemonic blocs are constructed, and it is within the functioning of the groups that constitute the bloc that opportunities for antithetical critique are excluded. Discourse fora are tightly controlled, and statements, edicts and reports emanating from such fora occur in unidirectional ways – from speaker to audience. Location in global fora is also beyond the immediate view of local interests or critique. Equally, the ostensibly philanthropic goals underpinning the notion of a foundation, in combination with a resourceful foundation such as KFF, which is eager to help at every turn – for example, by independently conducting research, by hosting meetings that are directly supportive of UN needs, by forming and resourcing coalitions such as the Global Media Coalition, or assisting the Global Fund through resourcing Friends of the Fund, or providing communication expertise – all help KFF to entrench its particular vested interests. Related discourses about the merits of PPPs are directly supportive to this process.

UN organisations are distinctly vulnerable to external lobbying by, and partnerships with, groups such as KFF. Such processes have raised concerns about the interface between globalisation and health, which is seen as perpetuating marginalisation, and in the case of global governance, a proliferation of non-state actors have been noted to be shifting balances of power (Walt 2000:4). KFF’s methodology is an example of a convergence between non-state actors and UN agencies in the form of PPPs – notably with corporates and foundations entering the sphere of global health
governance. As a consequence, representation and accountability may be compromised. As Walt describes it:

UN organizations such as WHO derive their legitimacy from near universal membership [of states] in their governing bodies. Liberal democratic governments are responsible, in the final analysis to their electorates. Global public-private partnerships cannot claim such representation, and indeed, often developing country recipients of programmes, are not included in government boards or even necessarily involved in early planning. Accountability is also problematic in public-private partnerships… there is a huge distance between global partners and their beneficiaries. They also raise questions about who is setting the global health agenda. (Walt 2002:5)

It also appears that it is possible for KFF to position its activities in relation to philanthropic goals that are apparently directed towards the public good whilst at the same time masking internal ideological agendas. Consequently, linkages are readily forged between KFF and entities such as the UN or UNAIDS, as well as a diverse range of other organisations – many of which are structurally dominant in economic and/or ideological terms. As outlined above, at virtually every turn, discourse is employed to achieve the construction of common sense through reiteration, with a particular emphasis on the loveLife programme.
CHAPTER 7
Critique and counter-critique

Gramsci’s concept of consent is related to the notion of spontaneous affirmation of the dominant political group. This ruling group then offers direction through leadership, moderating dissent through making non-fundamental concessions without resorting to coercion. At some level, consent is embedded within the structures of society, and within ideological apparatuses that frame what may be known. It is however also related to power in the sense that dominant groups are far more readily able to define the boundaries of discourse, although in general, there is an openness to the system that allows for domination to occur through a continuous process of addressing oppositional discourses by avoiding overt confrontation.

Consent is identified by Gramsci (1971) in relation to the macro-level concepts of ideology and hegemony as state and civil society interact. In this thesis, these concepts are applied to groups that assume leadership and become dominant in the public sphere of policy and social action – in this instance, in the sphere of HIV/AIDS and public health. For both KFF and loveLife, assuming leadership has involved an embedding of ideas within particular dominant orthodoxies – for example, technical discourses of quantification and causality – whilst at the same time employing ideological strategies of legitimation and structural linkages between groups to consolidate dominance. These strategies have been effective in so much as they have been financially resourced and focused at levels that are beyond the scope and framework of activities of other groups in the field. KFF, for example, is specifically structured to expend resources on influencing policy, whilst loveLife has emphasised relations with media partners and other elites in South Africa. It is these activities that are directed towards framing a dominant common sense about HIV/AIDS, youth and programmatic intervention through discourses that emphasise knowledge that is ‘true’ and activities that are strategically appropriate. As Hall (1982:85) notes, the dominance of certain formations is secured “not by compulsion but by cultural leadership” whereby consent of subordinate groups is secured. Thus hegemony involves the “colonisation of popular consciousness or common sense through the articulation of specific social practices and positions within ideological codes or chains of connotational significance” (Grossberg 1984:412).
Consent is related to power – part of which is reiterative, part of which is expansive (in that it occurs across multiple genres of discourse), part of which is related to access to discourse fora, and part of which is embedded within structural relations. Consent is also related to alliances between dominant groups/organisations (incorporating subaltern groups/organisations where necessary), and is interdependent with the perpetuation of a cultural system that legitimates particular forms of authority. As Mueller puts it:

*The ruling class could not build such a hegemonic form of domination if it did not, first, frame its particular interests in a universal way, that is in a way that could be seen to further the interests of the community as a whole, and second, make some concessions to the ‘subordinate classes’ of society. Power then, rests primarily on consent, but is backed up by coercion.* (2002:3)

Lears (1985:570) notes that for Gramsci, consent “involves a complex mental state, a ‘contradictory consciousness’ mixing approbation and apathy, resistance and resignation” and that “the outlook for subordinate groups is always divided and ambiguous”. The question then becomes, to what degree does consent actually exist? Clearly, ideology has much to do with producing and reproducing dominant ideas that are directed towards fostering consent, but it does not follow that absolute consent is produced. Rather, it has a relation to dominance and power that allows for dissent to be ameliorated within the framework of hegemony (i.e. non coercively, and via small concessions), whilst at the same time securing the benefits of concurrent power relations that involve relativities in access to discourse fora wherein antithetical discourses might be located. Limited degrees of coercion may also be applied, where necessary.

Consent is conceptually different to consensus: The former is related to allowing particular dominant ideas to be sustained (both through hegemonic compromise and through ‘silence’ by virtue of relative access to discourse fora), whilst the latter involves acceptance of ideas (potentially mediated by concepts of ‘false consciousness’). As Therborn (1999:109) notes: “whereas ‘consent’ connotes ‘agreement to’ something or somebody, ‘consensus’ refers primarily to ‘agreement among’ a group of people. Thus real interests and real points of view may be subjugated within the concept of consent by virtue of the relation between dominant and subordinate groups, relative structural power, and relative capacity to insert discourses into the public sphere. In other words, there may exist a consciousness of the contradictions within a particular hegemonic framework, and at the same time,
the nature of the hegemonic framework constrains opposition. This suggests that there remains a coercive element to consent that is structurally determined, whereby structural relationships within a hegemonic bloc, in combination with imbalances in power, confer on the powerful, greater opportunity to control access to discourse – i.e. control over the occurrence and recurrence of ideas within the public sphere. This power has a repressive element that is not entirely dislocated from coercion. As Fiske observes:

_Because the material and political conditions of subordination constantly and inescapably remind the subordinate of the inequalities between them and the power bloc, such consent is always fragile and precarious… consent has to be achieved on multiple issues between multiple social formations, and thus, as a theoretical concept is better suited to cope with social diversity than is the more homogenized and homogenizing concept of consensus._ (1993:41)

It has been argued that lived experience intersects with ideology in such a way as to bring contradictions to consciousness. It is therefore assumed that latent critiques exist by virtue of such consciousness. What is required is an exploration of this process, and related processes of response towards critique. In the case of loveLife, it appears that there has been a relative intransigence to critique that has differed from accommodative processes of consent. Specifically, ideological reiteration appears to have over-ridden any attempts at accommodation.

**Latent critiques of the loveLife programme**

During the latter months of 2002, a review was conducted by CADRE to assess organisational perspectives of the loveLife programme. The views of some 49 individuals holding senior management positions in a range of organisations operating within the HIV/AIDS field in relation to youth were canvassed. The organisations included national and provincial government, government funded AIDS Training, Information and Counselling Centres (ATICCs), and NGOs operating at national and provincial level. Organisations were identified via the national HIV/AIDS Directory in combination with snowballing techniques that sought referral to similar organisations by respondents.

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188 See www.aidsdirectory.co.za
The review was conducted through telephonic interviews that followed a standardised question guide (See Appendix 1). Respondents were also asked about loveLife campaign elements that they were aware of as well as questions including whether the consortium running loveLife were seen as consultative and collaborative; how loveLife related to the work that respondent organisations were doing; whether the loveLife campaign was cost-effective; whether it was well informed in terms of theoretical framework; whether it was sensitive to gender issues; how respondents thought loveLife shaped youth culture; and what respondent opinions were of the organisation’s research and evaluation activities. Respondents were granted anonymity to allow that discussion could flow freely. All interviews were tape-recorded and transcribed. Transcriptions were checked and then imported into HyperResearch OSX for coding and analysis.

All 49 respondents had heard of loveLife and nearly all (47) were in a position to provide reflections of their perspectives and experiences of the programme. Selected responses are thematised as follows:

- Profile and orientation of the programme
- Contextual contradictions and the paradigm of consumption
- Constructions of youth sexuality
- The limitations of research

**Profile and orientation of the loveLife programme**

During the period up to the end of 2002, the loveLife programme was presented in various local discourse fora as an appropriate, highly resourced intervention that was effective in impacting on HIV prevalence amongst youth in South Africa. This extended to claiming to be South Africa’s national HIV prevention programme for youth, and rationalising the programme’s massive budget with claims to impact. These latter claims were viewed cynically by a number of respondents – particularly

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189 Most qualitative surveys of this nature incorporate anonymity. Citations of text however require some level of description to allow for the contextualisation of comments made. In this instance, the type of organisation represented is identified as a general category, and these are then numbered to distinguish between individuals responding in each category.

190 Analysis in HyperResarch allows that the position of any given text can be identified by its position in the original transcript and its character range. The individual transcripts and positions and ranges of texts drawn upon are provided in footnote references.
the relationship between access to financial resources and sustainability, as well as the contradictory relation to impact:

*I think if you throw that amount of money at anything then it will have a profile, so I don’t think that the fact that it’s in your face necessarily means that it’s a success of the campaign... You tend to focus on why so much is being spent on this. And I don’t think it’s an issue of just spending money. It’s just that and then the fact that it’s not making an impact.* (NGO, Gauteng, R1)\(^{191,192}\)

*It has to be effective before it can be cost effective. So in order... one would have to be able to show that it has a positive effect before you can even look at cost. But what I can say is that it is an extremely expensive campaign and one wonders if that is the best use to which that money should be put. Certainly I don’t think so.* (NGO, National, R2)\(^{193}\)

The large budget employed by the loveLife programme and relative accountability and transparency of such high levels of expenditure were also called into question:

*I think what they should do they publish a report that, that is the money that they have received and wherever and say this is the money that we have spent, how much administration cost. I am very worried about administration costs especially.* (Department of Education, Western Cape, R1)\(^{194}\)

The inter-relation of the massive budget of the programme with needs on the ground was also viewed as problematic – specifically the focus on imbalances in resource allocation the needs of children who had been directly impacted upon by HIV/AIDS were seen as more pressing:

*I can think of much better things to do with money. Do you know what I would do with that money? Do you know that we’ve got 22 000 orphans in our province? We need to start addressing the orphan situation and things like that.* (Department of Education, Free State, R1)\(^{195}\)

\(^{191}\) Note that the numbering format adopted is as follows: Organisation description, geographic location/scope, respondent number in that category (preceded by ‘R’). Footnotes reference the character range of the text in the transcript.

\(^{192}\) 10057-10559, 2211-2404, NGO Gauteng 1.

\(^{193}\) 21061-21400, NGO, National, R2.

\(^{194}\) 10493-10741, Department of Education, Western Cape, R1.

\(^{195}\) 26667-26893, Department of Education, Free State, R1.
We should be mobilizing around an emergency that’s going to change our country… That sort of money should be put into crisis management. But then you get into politics and the whole thing is so disturbing. I just want to tell you that I’ve got information here that is something like 360 children who should be getting child support grants. Six are getting them in the rural areas about 60-80 kilometres from where I live and I’ve got to live with that. So the issues are huge. Ask those people what they think about loveLife. (NGO, KwaZulu-Natal, R1)\textsuperscript{196}

Some respondents had direct experience of ostentatious expenditure within programme activities, as well developing inappropriately expensive facilities within impoverished communities – specifically Y-centres and clinics. In the case of the latter, this was seen as negatively impacting upon morale in non-resourced facilities:

*I was quite horrified last week. I happened to go to meet people at the Hilton Hotel in Durban, which is a fairly high-market hotel, and it was just inundated with people working on the loveLife games. There must have been an enormous cost to it… They have these Youth Centres. The cost of those – the two of them that I have seen in KZN – are in the order of about four and a half million. Now you can’t put a four and a half million rand establishment in the middle of the rural community in KZN – it would just stand out as a white elephant.* (NGO, KwaZulu-Natal, R2)\textsuperscript{197}

*What I hear clinic personnel or provincial people, people working in the adjacent clinics are saying is… ‘We can’t even afford the basic things. How come does this neighbouring clinic have chill room, and this and that, and a radio and whatever.’ It’s in a sense creating, first of all, a lot of animosity between staff… feeling that they are neglected and under-resourced and so forth. Also the feeling that it’s going to blow up in somebody’s face, because you can’t sustain it.* (Department of Health, National, R1)\textsuperscript{198}

Implicit in these discourses, is the notion that funding on HIV/AIDS should be expended cost-effectively, accountability and transparently. The contradictions observed are clearly correlated with contrasting lived (worked) experience of a range

\textsuperscript{196} 17744-18328, NGO, KwaZulu-Natal, R1.

\textsuperscript{197} 2831-3222, 9170-9469, NGO, KwaZulu-Natal, R2.

\textsuperscript{198} 9949-10429, Department of Health, National, R1.
of complexities in addressing HIV/AIDS and youth – and specifically, that ostentation and massive expenditure is unsound within such contexts.

Related to these critiques however, is sense of resignation. Respondents appear to be functioning within a framework where it is assumed that there is little more that can be done than to observe the contradictions within the programme – (see Lears 1985). It is however observed that contradictions are not necessarily sustainable, and that the programme’s interventions might eventually ‘blow up in someone’s face’ – by implication, requiring the programme to be rationalised differently. Within the framework of the present however, the power to continue unchallenged is positioned as inevitable.

**Contextual contradictions and the paradigm of consumption**

loveLife is explicitly located in a paradigm that assumes young people are motivated by individual aspiration to consumption, and that this form of identity can be exploited to bring about aspiration to a ‘healthy lifestyle’ that has self-preservation (i.e. HIV prevention) at its centre. Respondents noted however, that the majority of young people they were working with were poor, and that this conception was not readily integrated into the loveLife programme’s paradigm nor operational practices. The relation to loveLife amongst the majority of youth living in poverty was perceived to be alienating and counter-productive, and in addition, HIV was noted to be exacerbating the impacts of impoverishment. Consumption was also perceived as being interrelated with vulnerability to exploitation as a product of the valorisation of materialist values.

> You should be looking at servicing the needs of all young people. Poor people. Poor young people. Young people are fucked up because of HIV, or their family situation, and it [loveLife] doesn’t. It really does assume that you’re of a certain class. (NGO, Gauteng 1)

> I’m worried about the kind of consumerism that’s involved with the branding. I know they have kind of alliances with clothing labels and kind of products, and you know… I would even go so far as to say as, you know the kind of sugar daddy phenomenon, where young women are sleeping with guys to get money or

199 12085-12329, NGO, Gauteng, R1.
things, could be encouraged by the kind of materialism that I’m seeing. (NGO, Gauteng, R2)

I find it very distinct from an African way of life. Very distinct from the South African reality. I find that it is talking... talking above our heads. Because it is talking about things that I’m not aware of. I mean the kind of youth culture that they are trying to create is the one that is more like bourgeoisie, you know, which once again does not fit the realities of South Africa. Because the bulk of the youth of this country is not bourgeoisie and they can’t even aspire to be bourgeoisie. They are even far away from even being there, you know. So, ya, that’s my concern. (Department of Health, Western Cape, R1)

Consumption and materialism were often identified in relation to the notion that the programme was Americanised, and in this sense was noted as contradictory to South African culture and counterproductive in the generalised context of poverty. loveLife was also seen as targeting a particular socioeconomic group – the wealthier African middle-class.

It’s very Americanised. And I think that young people might say it’s fine and they like it, because that’s the way they are... but whether it’s really to the advantage of us as South Africans in the long run, I’m not sure. I can’t really say I would approve of that. (Department of Health, National R1)

Do I think that they’ve got their brief correctly? And I think no. If it comes to the HIV/AIDS issues, if it comes to lifestyles, maybe for an American they’ve got it correctly, but for a South African they’ve missed the boat. (Department of Health, Western Cape, R1)

I think they may be shaping youth culture in a kind of American pop style and really reinforcing that kind of idea that comes as part of globalization of the world if you like. And I think this could be reinforcing the whole consumer idea. You know. You must have nice things in order to be a respectable person. I think they are reinforcing those sorts of concepts, which are very very

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200 8822-9356, NGO, Gauteng, R2.
201 21189-21794, Department of Health, Western Cape, R1.
202 21015-21280, Department of Health, National, R1.
203 23730-23960, Department of Health, Western Cape, R1.
difficult in communities that are impoverished. (NGO, KwaZulu-Natal, R4)\textsuperscript{204}

Within these discourses it is apparent that loveLife’s common-sense construction of youth modernity in relation to globalisation that is interrelated to a pathway to a healthy lifestyle is readily identified as being poorly founded. As one respondent observes: “I think that there is an assumption there that you are trendy and you wear the right sort of clothes and you look very attractive, that you are going to practice safe sex. Which I think is an extraordinary assumption” (NGO, KwaZulu-Natal, R4).\textsuperscript{205} The contradiction between poverty and consumption is sharpened by the relation of poverty to HIV/AIDS. As such, this construction is not readily internalised as a common sense or ‘taken for granted’ notion and is further seen as neither empirically grounded nor rational.

Over and above ideological constructions and practices in relation to youth, the structural hegemonic construction of the loveLife programme operates along similar lines. The advisory board and corporate partnerships are heavily weighted towards the emergent and/or established black middle classes in parallel with well established media corporates which provide associative support and reinforcement to the thrust towards consumption. Naidoo (2003) notes in her review of the loveLife Y-Centre in Orange Farm, that there is very little emphasis on working with or engaging other organisations in the area: “I don’t think they are willing to work with us because they have everything that they need. They have the offices, clinics and things. We have nothing” (p. 17). Similarly, the youth magazines S’camto and ThethaNathi celebrate the notion of an individualistic, consumption oriented ‘global youth culture’ and position South African youth culture as operating largely within this homogenous paradigm. This is in contrast to the historical trajectory of South African youth struggle, which is framed by a decentering of individualism:

\begin{quote}
The value system and the imagery is western materialism. We can’t handle this epidemic off Western materialism. And if you look at the greatest strengths we draw on, we draw on part of social cultural traditions of humanism, mobilization, volunteerism, and quite strong kind of African traditional value system. (Department of Health, Gauteng, R1)\textsuperscript{206}
\end{quote}

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{204} 21214-21719, NGO, KwaZulu-Natal, R4.
\textsuperscript{205} 9148-9366, NGO KwaZulu-Natal, R4.
\textsuperscript{206} 18416-18737, Department of Health, Gauteng, R1.
\end{flushleft}
Constructions of youth sexuality

The loveLife programme has constructed young people aged 12-17 as a homogenous group in terms of sexuality. Constructions within research have argued that children in the younger age range (12-14) are already or potentially sexually active, and that the overall age range is representative of a group that is contributing to escalating levels of HIV (see Harrison and Steinberg, 2002). Respondents however recognise that this age range is not homogenous in terms of sexuality and sexual risk:

… at 12, 13, children are still in primary school. And there is a big difference between those children and the ones in secondary school… children go through so much change. In grade 7, standard 5, they are still kids, they are still playing with dolls and cars. (ATIC, Free State, R1) 207

We have problems with the younger kids… We’re making a mistake of putting them in the same category. Talking of 12-17 because there is actually quite a big distinction between 12-14 year olds and then 15-17,18 year olds. And trying to tailor-make the things for them as one group is maybe problematic. (Department of Health, National, R1) 208

The inclusion of explicit sexual imagery and language was also seen as counterproductive to existing programmes in schools, as well as undermining parental concerns regarding emerging sexuality:

As a black parent I do feel that it is far too explicit and in many ways they have not taken one step at a time into talking sex and sexuality. Its really gone outrageous, calling a spade a spade and just goes flat out to break the silence and to uncover mystery. It’s not what I as a parent would love for my child. I would like them to go a little step at a time and to go through one stage at a time. Its gone way out, to an extreme. (NGO, KwaZulu-Natal, R5) 209

Currently there is very little said about abstinence. There is very little said about faithfulness and partners on a long-term basis. What you see is, kind of, all as if everybody is sexually active and

207 9312-9712, ATICC, Free State, R1.
208 13388-14086, Department of Health, National, R1.
209 5000-5438, NGO KwaZulu-Natal, R5.
no provision is made for the kids that are not sexually active and that wish to abstain. (Department of Health, National, R1)

It is in these contexts that loveLife is noted to impinge on a range of particular concerns regarding how youth sexuality should be addressed – and specifically, that loveLife messages are ill considered and assume authority over discourses that would normally be framed differently in ideological apparatuses such as families and schools. loveLife is thus considered to be impinging on normative ideological functions within such apparatuses in a counterproductive way in relation to the social crisis of AIDS. Additionally, the programme impinges directly on practices within particular settings – for example, schools or within the mainstream media:

You have no idea about the problems I’m going through with the principals at the schools and the parents. You must see some of the letters I get from the parents because they think it is me that is implementing loveLife… I want to put something to you. Do you think this is something that is nice to go into the newspapers. I got it out of the loveLife book here. ‘Get lost in discovering your lover’s body. Talk dirty. Talk sexy. Play games. Find out how many different parts of the body can feel sexy without touching the genitals. Play with each other using your fingers or any other part of your body. There are many ways to reach orgasm and as long as you body fluids do not get close the other persons genitals or throat you can have great fun without risk.’ A child reads this … You can go to Playboy… and get something like that. Not so blatantly in books that are being distributed to children. Can you imagine … (Department of Education, Free State, R1)

Ideological representations of gender are also problematised, particularly within a context of post-apartheid South Africa, where gender imbalances have been constitutionally recognised. The perception is that loveLife have little conceptual understanding of the relation of gender to HIV/AIDS, let alone sexism and disempowerment.

I really do not understand nine tenths of their billboards. And when I do understand it I am offended as a woman. There was the one… the most blatant one is that one with ‘ride’ as if women are ponies that they must be ridden. That one I think its blatant it...
just invites a slap in the face… There was one with a woman’s legs around a man and another women touching the man’s arse and stuff like that. It feels to me, and I am not conservative, but it feels to me as if they took the whole sex issue and shifted it totally out of proportion just to be funky and with it and so that they can be seen that they have the teenagers ears and that they are better than government type of thing… (Department of Health, National, R2)²¹³

In this context programme content impinges with value systems that have been constructed to address and counter sexual objectification of women, yet their portrayal is of women not only as sexual objects, but also as sexually aggressive and non-discriminating. This runs counter to constructions of gender in relation to sex which foreground rights discourses as embedded in the South African rights framework, and specifically sets out to counter the objectification of women.

**The limitations of research**

The research conducted by the loveLife programme raises questions about accountability and it appears that scepticism is readily engendered when research claims are disproportional to the complexities of behavioural impact – a context with which respondents are familiar:

*I’m also research person, you know. I’ve read their research and my main concern always was [that] if you do your own research and get companies to do your research, and you pay them, how neutral or effective is your research? The question is how effective is this research that you are doing yourself. I mean you’ve got a vested interest in it. (Department of Health, National, R3)²¹⁴

I’ve seen the evaluations and they are done by loveLife themselves, commissioned by loveLife and carried out by loveLife. I’ve not seen any external evaluation… But there is very little outside of what loveLife themselves have commissioned, which is very dodgy. (ATICC, Free State, R1)²¹⁵

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²¹³ 2976-3309, 10949-11113, 4586-4979, Department of Health, National, R2.
²¹⁴ 8460-8700, 8828-8945, Department of Health, National, R3.
²¹⁵ 15009-15254, ATICC, Free State, R1.
Research methodologies were also viewed as lacking in transparency, with causal claims being made in ways that were unsupported by data:

They don’t give you a huge amount of detail on their reports… they’re very skimpy on methodology and the conclusions that they draw also seem to be a bit somewhat tenuous. I know that the casualty issue is a big one in my view they don’t even try to link their programme with anything… obviously you can’t… they just announce that these outcomes are related to them. (NGO, Gauteng, R3)\textsuperscript{216}

They really need to account on their methodology and their research. And they also need to account on their organisational accountability to this country and not just hob-nobbing with politicians on their advisory committee. I mean real accountability. (Department of Health, Gauteng, R1)\textsuperscript{217}

\textbf{Ideology and critical awareness}

Ideologies attempt to interpellate human subjects, and “situate individuals in time and space by reference to personal, positional and social characteristics” (Abercrombie et al 1994:154). At the same time, ideologies have an “inherently dialectical character” and are interdependent with the notion of ‘the other’, with ideologies also functioning in contexts where ideas compete with and/or reinforce each other. Ideology thus relates to human subjects as conscious actors, whereby there is an interplay between a range of ideologies and processes of sense-making that are interconnected with lived experience and critical consciousness.

Ideology is collectivised within hegemonic processes, which are initially brought about by “the building of a broader political alliance, the formation of a new consent, the expanding of one’s social basis of support, and political mobilisation against the ruling class” (Kalyvas 2000:353). This same process applies to counter-hegemony. Unless critique is mobilised ideologically and collectively through conscious organisation and reiterative communication, it is destined to be accommodated within the hegemonic bloc through consent (or by extension, through resignation). Although consent by accommodation involves compromise, it does not necessarily follow that compromise is anything more than a superficial addressing of critique.

\textsuperscript{216} 24015-24530, NGO, Gauteng, R3.
\textsuperscript{217} 42646-42903, Department of Health, Gauteng, R1.
Also, in any given hegemonic order, in any given historical moment, it may be possible to deflect critique through other means without having to resort to compromise – for example by limiting the frameworks within which critical discourse might occur, by reinforcing reiterative capacity, or by deferring to discursive strategies such as excommunication, restriction, shielding, or delimited appropriation (see Therborn 1999a:82-84).

Critique is a fundamental activity in counter-hegemonic processes. Its purpose is to bring about a crisis of authority and legitimacy by exposing contradictions. Critique however, is dependent upon the range of practices that occur in constituting hegemony – i.e. the transition of ideas into organised forms of thought, as well as mobilisation into ideological and hegemonic blocs that are positioned to articulate critique via access to reiterative communicative power. Without this level of organisation, consent is maintained within the dominant ideology by virtue of the ‘silence’ of opposing thought. One orientation of the concept of consent is that it is a product of democratic structures and processes of Western political practice, which are assumed to involve a free flow of ideas, and a relatively free access to public discourse domains. This argument is weak however, given that access to communicative power is relative to political, ideological and hegemonic power, with the consequence that dissent is marginalised. In other words, processes of consent, even in democratic contexts, include a coercive element that is brought about by the structural weight that dominant ideologies are able to secure and enforce within the public sphere. Oppositional discourse and critique thus requires concerted action if it is directed towards ideological forms that are already dominant, and that have to a greater or lesser extent, become hegemonic.

Critique is a product of contradictions that are brought into the domain of consciousness through intersections between lived experience, material conditions and the manifestations of ideological dominance. Consent is thus not necessarily an outcome of willed consent amongst dominated groups. Rather it incorporates a process of suppression based in power relations that include a coercive element. This coercive element is embedded structurally within the contradictions of dominance, but extends to coercive practices that constrain critique. Critical thought is therefore endemic in society as a product of ideological contradictions, whether or not ideological dominance is secured through consent or through coercion. The critical discourses outlined above demonstrate the existence of latent critiques that extend deeply into the fundamentals of the loveLife programme including its programmatic
assumptions, constructions of youth sexuality and gender, and research claims. These critiques address directly and cogently, contradictions within the loveLife programme, yet implicit in the critiques are the notion that there is little that can be done to address them. Although the interviews did not set out specifically to address reflections on processes of engagement, nor the concept of critique, a number of respondents referred to attempts to address their concerns directly to loveLife:

*LoveLife have never opened the doors for any kind of joint work. You know I have tried to open some of those doors and not really succeeded. They have got a specific way doing things, and you know, they don’t really want to talk outside of the way they do things. And also to engage professionally on some of the issues around HIV/AIDS, I find that doesn’t work with loveLife people. They have very specific kind of mandate, and they have kind of stuck to that. They are not interested in talking about issues such as living with HIV, testing and counseling, treatment, stigma, you know. So I think there are big gaps in the whole campaign.* (NGO, Gauteng, R2)²¹⁸

The experiences of this respondent also highlights that the approach to addressing critique within loveLife is removed from the notion of accommodating critique through mechanisms of consent – i.e. no concessions are made:

*I’ve noticed a lot of loveLife employees can become quite defensive of their stuff. I mean yes, they kind of open themselves up for attack, but unfortunately don’t engage creatively or constructively with criticism. They kind of resort to the usual arguments like ‘you’re not the target audience’, ‘you wouldn’t know’, ‘there’s proven research saying the stuff works’, which I mean really, is very dismissive of anyone who has an opinion.* (NGO, Gauteng, R2)²¹⁹

Other respondents noted a similar pattern of response: “They treat us like we are stupid, but they don’t know what they are doing. You know what I am saying. Where does the assumption come from that they know it all. It’s their opinion, you know” (Department of Health, Gauteng, R1).²²⁰ Direct engagements with loveLife director, David Harrison, were also met with inflexible response:

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²¹⁸ 13715-14539, NGO, Gauteng, R2.
²¹⁹ 15590-16038, NGO, Gauteng, R2.
²²⁰ 41490-41700, Department of Health, Gauteng, R1.
We’ve tried to get them to come to meetings and I think my discussion with David [Harrison] confirmed that they have a very fixed programme which is determined – whether it’s determined by the funders or whoever – but that’s the feeling I get, there is very little flexibility for discussion or negotiation about what they do. (NGO, Gauteng, R1) 221

Within the national Department of Health, which, by virtue of providing and overseeing government funding of the programme, is part of the loveLife partnership, neither engagement nor concession were forthcoming.

I know that some of my colleagues go to their meetings. And the overall perception that I have of these types of meetings are that they are arrogant and that they dictate whatever they want to do. Government does not really feature very high on their agenda on what we are doing. For instance we have a campaign on ABC but they are not interested in ABC they do XYZ. This is the type of perception that I get from my colleagues that they are not really interested in following the countries overall strategy. (Department of Health, National, R2) 222

It is these experiences that suggest that hegemony and power are interlinked, and that consent is only necessary when critiques cannot be moderated by power alone. Individual level critiques, taking place outside of an organised and mobilised discourse framework, are dismissed by virtue of that lack of organisation and/weight of mobilisation. This is also loosely related to Therborn’s concept of excommunication – whereby antithetical arguments are dismissed as being illogical, and that the arguer simply ‘doesn’t understand’, is unknowing and his/her arguments are thus invalid. It is worth noting however, that critiques across organisations are distinctly similar, and the potential for mobilisation along common ideological lines therefore also exists.

The idealised visions of ideological domination as involving, on the one hand a dichotomous conception of force and consent, and on the other, involving an overwhelming degree of ‘false consciousness’ and/or interpellation, need to be understood as incorporating contradiction and complexity. Ideological domination is not achieved on an either-or basis – force and consent interplay to various degrees.

221 15008-15333, NGO, Gauteng, R1.
222 7949-8466, Department of Health, National, R2.
Equally, whilst the goal of ideology might be to bring about interpellation, it does not follow that contradictions emerging from lived experience are ameliorated by the dominant ideology. Rather, the collective weight of domination that combines structural relations between organisations and communicative power, includes a coercive element. Therborn (1999:95-98) recognises that such forms of coercion are inter-related with acquiescence. These include:

- Accommodation, where “rulers are obeyed because the ruled are constituted to regard other features in the world as more salient to them then both their present subordination and the possibility of an alternative regime”;
- Inevitability, which relates to ignorance of an alternative in relation to marginalisation;
- Sense of representation, which assumes representivity within the rulers;
- Deference, which involves “enunciations of what is good about the present rulers”;
- Fear, which brings about acceptance;
- Resignation, which “derives from considerations of what is possible in a given situation”.

Whilst intended to offer explanation at the level of social formations, the concept of acquiescence is important to understanding the relationship between dominance and resistance. In the examples above, acquiescence is achieved through resignation – the sense that there is little that can be done within the given situation. Alternately, that over time the contradiction’s will “blow up in someone’s face”, but that this will take place independently of oppositional mobilisation.

HIV/AIDS programmes working in the field advance their strategic interests differently, with many interventions functioning and legitimating their activities within the framework of a single organisation, rather than requiring independent legitimation through structural linkages to others. This is not to say that structural linkages do not exist – many NGOs, for example, receive funding and have formal or informal linkages and partnerships with national and provincial government – but the rationale for the linkages is not particularly oriented towards an ideological functioning (i.e. legitimation of the particular programme). The product of these different operational strategies is that the construction of an ideologically motivated bloc automatically entrenches power over groups that are not organised along similar
lines. Critique is thus relative to power, which in turn is relative to concerted ideological mobilisation.

There is an interplay between hegemony and power located within a particular group or ‘power bloc’ and accommodation through consent. In the case of loveLife, power is interdependent with the hegemonic bloc that provides structural support to the programme – structural linkages to government, local funders (e.g. Mandela Foundation), and wide-ranging elites. This power is exercised, even within the bloc itself. For example, although the national Department of Health is a stakeholder in the programme, there is little opportunity for internal critique, which suggests that power to determine the direction of the programme is not interdependent with consent (nor consensus) within the power bloc.

Fiske introduces the concept of power located within a power bloc as ‘imperialising’ power that operates vertically from the top down, and can be contrasted with weaker, bottom-up forms of power:

*I propose to call strong, top-down power ‘imperialising’ and weak, bottom-up power ‘localising’. The aim of imperializing power is to extend its reach as far as possible... Its systems are exploited best by formations of the power-bloc because they have the most to gain and the least to yield by submitting themselves to its discipline. (1993:11)*

He further notes that the contrasting form of power, ‘localising’ power, is not concerned with the domination of other social formations and is “not concerned with constantly expanding its terrain, but interested in strengthening its control over the immediate conditions of everyday life” (Fiske 1993:12). Imperialising power has to do with subordination, and this suggests that there is an interplay between force and consent that is functional to hegemony. In this sense, consent-making is interrelated to relativities of power, with structural power incorporating an element of force by virtue of being related to a hegemonic bloc that limits the entry of critical discourses into the public sphere. In the case of loveLife, structural power, with its direct linkages to discourse fora, delimits the potential for critical discourses to be articulated publicly, whilst the localising nature of power within groups that perceive critique, moderates the necessity for organised critique. In this context, critique is addressed by resistance the loveLife programme – no quarter is given to critiques that are not immediately threatening. As Fiske notes: “Discourse is always a matter
of contestation, and it is in the interests of the dominant social formations whose alliances comprise the power-bloc to repress or deny this contestation” (1993:15).

**Critique, consent and coercion**

Individual level critiques occurring outside the public sphere are readily addressed by deferring to structural and agential power – i.e. there is little reason for private (non-public) critiques to be addressed, but not all critiques occur outside of the public sphere. Dominance involves a wide range of ideological intersections, which are summed up by Eagleton as follows:

> A dominant power may legitimate itself by promoting beliefs and values congenial to it; naturalizing and universalizing such beliefs so as to render them self-evident and apparently inevitable; denigrating ideas which might challenge it; excluding rival forms of thought, perhaps by some unspoken but systematic logic; and obscuring social reality in ways convenient to itself. Such ‘mystification’, as it is commonly known, frequently takes the form of masking or suppressing social conflicts, from which arises the conception of ideology as an imaginary resolution of real contradictions. (1991:5-6)

In the latter half of 2002, for example, *Fair Lady* (a national ‘women’s’ magazine), commissioned a former Culture Communications and Media Studies student at the University of Natal, Richard Delate, to produce an article on the programme. Delate proceeded to conduct a series of interviews for his article. However, as the process continued, and prior to any publication of material by *Fair Lady*, loveLife director, David Harrison set out to diminish any possible critique that might occur in relation to the article. In a letter to *Fair Lady* editor, Anne Donald, Harrison outlines his rationale as follows:

> I am writing to restate our serious concerns about the commissioning of Richard Delate to write an investigative article on loveLife. While I accept your assurance that you would not permit *Fair lady* to be used unfairly, I need to bring to your

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223 *Fair Lady* were in fact an early partner in the loveLife programme and were commissioned to produce a regular column targeting young teens. Tensions arose however between writers at *Fair Lady*, and representatives of loveLife, who insisted on full editorial review and control, and the column was consequently dropped (Personal communication, Lindy Wilbraham, November 2002). At the time of commissioning Delate, *Fair Lady* were pursuing a new editorial strategy that emphasised critical journalism (Personal Communication, Richard Delate, July 2002).
Harrison goes on to allege that Delate describes himself as a ‘loveLife dissident’, that interviewees from the Department of Education and Independent Newspapers had both contacted him telephonically to say that “Richard Delate is on a mission to trash loveLife”, that internal documents provided to Delate had been circulated to others, that Delate visited loveLife facilities unannounced, and that his investigation was inadequate because he only visited one Y-Centre and none of the “sixty government clinics or over a hundred NGOs working with loveLife” (Harrison 2002:1-2). In conclusion, Harrison notes: “I look forward to hearing from you. While we have no reason to doubt the good faith of Fair Lady, some of the allegations being made are very serious and we also wish to reserve our rights to defend the good name, reputation and important work of loveLife” (Harrison 2002:3).

In this instance Harrison adopts a number of discursive strategies interrelated with structural power to undermine critique of the loveLife programme and to prevent such critique from occurring in the public sphere. In this instance, the threat of legal action offers an important coercive element that is positioned to bring about acquiescence. Although, for example, Harrison is at pains to assert the notion that Fair Lady is an independent media entity operating within the general framework of journalistic ethics (e.g. ‘the good faith of Fair Lady’), he inserts his complaint prior to completion of the article (let alone publication), and explicitly threatens to take legal action should the article not meet his expectations. In other words, he is evoking fear. Fair Lady thus has to balance the risk of the threat to legal action with rights to freedom of expression.

Labelling Delate a ‘loveLife dissident’ draws on a discourse construction prevalent at the time that was used to debunk the discourse power of ‘AIDS dissidents’ – a small group of scientists who denied the relationship of HIV to AIDS and whose ideas were being fostered by President Mbeki. By inference, Harrison positions loveLife as ‘scientifically true’, much as the scientifically established relationship between HIV and AIDS. Delate denies ever describing himself in this way (Personal communication, Richard Delate, November 2002).
alien and so on. The excommunicated person is condemned… to ideological non-existence, he is not to be listened to”, and restriction, whereby a person’s right to speak is positioned as interdependent with what he might say and is ‘buttressed’ by ‘material sanctions’ (Therborn 1999a:82-84). Delate is positioned as vexatious and insane, working to irrational agenda’s. Similarly, his discourse, by implicit threat of legal recourse, should be restricted – he has no right to speak, nor to say what he wishes to say.

In relation to excommunication, Harrison’s assertions draw on *ad hominem* arguments – i.e. attacks on his person, that are utilised to infer the logic that his personal agendas undermine an objective accounting of the loveLife programme. *Ad hominem* argumentation was defined by Locke as relating to “press[ing] a man with the consequences drawn from his own principles or concessions,” and was later expanded by into a broader definition as arguments that were “addressed to the peculiar circumstances, character, avowed opinions, or past conduct of the individual” (Walton 2001a:209). The approach has to do with refuting the arguer’s point through avoiding direct response to the argument itself – an approach in discourse that allows attention to be shifted away from the argument towards suggestions of implicit weakness in the intellectual standing and propriety of the arguer. As Walton further notes – “the attack alleges that the arguer has some kind of defect of ethical character, like dishonesty for example, and then uses that allegation to try to suggest to an audience that the arguer’s argument should be discounted” (2001a: 210).

*Ad hominem* includes a number of subtypes or strategies (See Walton 2000a):

- Abusive argument – whereby the arguer is attacked directly and personally (i.e. the person is a bad person). In such instances the objective value of the argument is, on the surface, undermined by shifting emphasis to the person of the arguer, suggesting that the standpoint of the arguer should be contextualised by his or her ‘moral’ character. By inference, the argument suggests at the same time, that the critique is advanced from the basis of ethical and moral purity, and that the argument put forward by the arguer is so fallacious and improbable as not necessitating direct refutation of the argument itself.

- Circumstantial argument – whereby a suggestion is made of a conflict between the argument put forward, and a person’s actions or practices (i.e. to suggest inconsistency, not practicing what they preach);
Bias – whereby the arguer is suggested to have a vested interest in the conclusion of the argument, and therefore presenting an argument selectively;

Dogma – which is used to suggest that the arguer lacks the capacity to be open-minded in advancing his/her position – for example, grounding argument from the point of view of religious or political beliefs.

All four subtypes are employed by Harrison in his argument to Donald, and these strategies were indeed successful. Although *Fair Lady* did not defer publishing Delate’s article, Harrison’s assertions contributed to the inclusion of a response to the article (which he was given the opportunity to read prior to publication) on behalf of the loveLife programme. The response skirts any form of accommodation, relying simply on reiteration of previous claims:

*Up to 50 percent of our children under the age of 15 will, sometime in their lives, contract HIV – unless we change the course of the epidemic… We could even halve the rate of new infection and reverse the course of the epidemic. To achieve this we need an effective, large-scale national campaign in place now… All projections point to benefits far outweighing costs… Two thirds of those exposed to loveLife say they are now more likely to delay and abstain from sex. 80 percent of sexually active people exposed to loveLife say they now use condoms more consistently.* *(Fair Lady 2003, January)*

Excommunication and restriction, in combination with *ad hominem* strategies, are utilised elsewhere by the loveLife programme and Harrison. In October 2002, for example, the Communication Initiative, a website run by a range of organisations active in health communication globally, initiated a debate on HIV/AIDS communication in South Africa. In an initial discussion relating to loveLife, Harrison reflects on a *Washington Post* article that was critical of loveLife’s billboards, positioning the authors, Daniel Halperin and Brian Williams, as follows:

*I’m also not sure that the best evidence concerning a public response to the billboards can be gauged from ad hoc questioning of individuals on a trip throughout South Africa. I think just think that more systematic, objective (and not uncritical) evaluations are available – and we’re happy to share them.*

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In essence, Harrison suggests that the commentary in question was an unsystematic exercise conducted by individuals on a ‘trip’, and that loveLife’s own authorised texts which ‘even’ include critique, are the only ones that are valid – a notion Therborn (1999) refers to as shielding – i.e. only some discourses are allowed to exist. In his response, Halperin notes:

What Harrison terms our ‘ad hoc questioning of individuals on a trip throughout South Africa’ in fact consisted of systematic qualitative research conducted by myself, a University of California at Berkeley trained medical anthropologist (PhD) and epidemiologist (post-doctoral training), and Brian, a well-known, highly-regarded South African HIV researcher (PhD trained in epidemiology at the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine). But then, I suppose, while LL’s focus groups are advertised as ‘state of the art evaluation,’ ours must have been merely ad hoc questioning...

Similar critiques of Halperin and Williams were advanced in letters to the Washington Post at the time of the article, which Halperin notes, alleged that “our article was a ‘typical fly-by-night hack piece thrown together by American safari researchers who simply don’t understand the South African reality…”

Ad hominem responses were also constructed in response to public critiques by advertising executive, Peter Vundla, in July 2003. At a public meeting, Vundla accused loveLife of ‘racial insensitivity’, implying that the HIV/AIDS pandemic was a ‘black thing’, and being ‘so pervasive, so extravagant, yet so frivolous’ (City Press, 5 July 2003).

Harrison’s response was to state that:

It is ironic that on a day when I am in rural KwaZulu-Natal visiting clinics and community centres, Vundla is standing on a podium addressing a business meeting in Johannesburg calling us frivolous… we have invited Vundla to come and witness for himself what loveLife is doing after he made similar remarks in April, but he chose not to take the opportunity, and instead became an armchair critic tearing down the efforts of loveLife. (City Press, 5 July 2004)

228  Ibid.
229  City Press (2003, 5 July) Vundla lambastes loveLife.
Here Harrison adopts abusive argument, positioning himself as ‘good’ and ‘righteous’ and Vundla as ‘bad’. Equally, Vundla is accused of dogma, by virtue of failing to be open-minded. Instead, he is an ‘armchair critic’. A further response was elicited in a letter to City Press, ostensibly by a loveLife groundbreaker, Mathapelo Potsane, which includes ideological intersections with ad hominem arguments in combination with reiterations of loveLife’s research findings:

*I don’t think he’s aware of the fact that 62% of South Africa has heard about loveLife and of those who have heard about loveLife, 76% say it has made them aware of the risks of unprotected sex, and 65% of those who know say loveLife has caused them to delay having sex… Get off your high horse and come walk a mile in my size 4 Hi Tec takkies and sit in on one of my positive lifestyle sessions… Besides, what good is a ‘man with impeccable advertising credentials’ if he can’t inspire. (City Press, 19 July 2003)*

In August 2003 my own insertion of critique into the public sphere, in the form of a conference paper entitled “Reappraising youth prevention in South Africa”, which was presented at the First South African AIDS Conference in Durban, elicited similar responses. The paper, which outlined empirical lacunae in loveLife’s claims, included reference to:

- A monocausal orientation and limitations of the claim to reduce HIV prevalence by 50% in three to five years;
- False assertions about HIV/AIDS in South Africa;
- A competitive approach in relation to other programmes and active undermining of the red ribbon campaign and the toll free AIDS helpline;
- Use of leading question in surveys.

Harrison’s response in September 2003, entitled ‘Your crusade against loveLife’, followed an accusatory approach making a number of false allegations about myself and Delate (who was then a CADRE employee), drawing on various ad hominem assertions, and concluding with the threat to legal action as follows: “We will carefully monitor your actions with respect to loveLife, and should you persist, we will reserve all rights in this regard”. Ad hominem assertions included:

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230 City Press (2003, 19 July) Vundla’s criticism is just hot air.
231 Letter by David Harrison (2003, 17 September).
“You either have little understanding of basic methodological principles of sampling, triangulation or analysis, or you have deliberately misstated the facts to suit your own purposes” (bias; dogma);

You feel that you could have done better (circumstantial argument);

You and your organisation have engaged in questionable ethical practices under the guise of research (abusive argument);

Many observers have pointed out that your actions are undermining your own integrity and academic standing (dogma). \(^{232}\)

Similar to the approach used in relation to *Fair Lady*, Harrison positions loveLife as fair and balanced at the outset: “We have no problem with genuine critique of our work”, before proceeding to defer to legal threats and other assertions.

In relation to the responses to Vundla, Delate and myself, there is clearly little attempt to moderate any aspect of the loveLife programmes or its claims. Instead these are dogmatically sustained in favour of a coercive strategy incorporating threat and designed to undermine critique and generate fear (primarily of legal action, but additionally, in the case of Vundla, for example, of being attacked and undermined publicly). Although all three critiques were made in public fora – Vundla and Delate in the press, and myself in a conference setting – all were countered by attack and reiteration, rather than accommodation. Harrison’s further responses in his letter regarding my questioning of loveLife’s research predominantly involved justification rather than retraction, and included additional false claims – for example, the claim that more than a third of babies were born to women under the age of 18, which was refuted, is suggested to have been withdrawn soon after it was originally published in 1999. It however recurs in loveLife’s 2003 monitoring report (loveLife 2003b:51). He also claims that the limitations of loveLife’s early national surveys (upon which loveLife based considerable claims to success) were “market research” and were supplemented by “a comprehensive evaluation plan” – hardly the positioning that the earlier surveys enjoyed when data was utilised to promote loveLife as a monocausal entity.

Given that loveLife is situated within an extensive ideological bloc that is hegemonised by virtue of structural linkages to a range of parallel dominant organisations including the state, there is little need for the programme to defer to

\(^{232}\) Letter from David Harrison entitled “Your crusade against loveLife” (2003, 17 September).
critique when coercive responses can instead be employed. In particular, loveLife is not bound by the need to accommodate critique – and as is observed in the interviews with NGO representatives – the programme simply continues on its path in spite of critique. There are numerous other critiques of the programme – for example, critical articles in *Noseweek*, and *The Citizen,* amongst others; critiques by other individuals, for example lawyer Christine Qunta; internet newsgroups; and critiques that take the form of seeking legal redress – for example, appeals to the Advertising Standards Authority or SABC in relation to loveLife’s billboard content. On one occasion at the end of 2002, loveLife sent out an e-mail circular entitled “Friendz of loveLife” in response to “several media reports critical of various aspects of loveLife”. The media reports were positioned as being based on “inaccurate information and in some cases, deliberate misinterpretation of the facts”. The circular responded to critiques in relation to promoting teenage sex, the obscurity of its billboards, problematics of its research (and how these were addressed by oversight from the Center for AIDS Policy at the University of California at San Francisco), and reiterating various claims to reach and impact. However, in relation to critiques over the extended time period since the programme’s inception, only some critiques are addressed directly. For the most part, the utility of access to communicative power, mainly through directed public relations activities, allows for reiteration of constructions of loveLife through reporting on programme activities, launches and the like, in combination with claims to wide reach and impact.

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234 Qunta, C. (2002, 27 September). Questions loveLife needs to answer, *Business Day.* Qunta critiques loveLife on the basis of poorly conceived content in relation to culture: “Why does loveLife assume that teenagers think it is cool to be sexually active at an early age? Why does loveLife want to teach parents how to talk to their children when they offend such parents by running ads that entrench the view that it is perfectly okay to engage in sex at 14 or 15 as long as condoms are worn?”, and further “We should be wary of allowing one organisation to monopolise funding and media space at the expense of organisations in the communities most affected, who do not have the access to the international funding that loveLife has.”

235 For example, the Communication Initiative debate in 2002.


237 E-mail by David Harrison, Friendz of loveLife, December 2002.
**Structural level critique**

Whilst critique in relation to external individuals and organisations, it is assumed that these would occur within the ideological bloc that surrounds loveLife, given that intra-bloc organisations may disagree with strategic direction. Certain groups have removed themselves from the bloc over time – for example Media Training Centre and Advocacy Initiatives are no longer part of the implementing partnership, UNICEF ceased funding of loveLife, and Zanele Mbeki quietly disappeared from the Advisory Board. These shifts have however occurred outside of the public domain and it is therefore unclear what premised them. Equally, many of the alliances that constitute the bloc have little to do with determining the strategic direction of loveLife – for example, funding entities are specifically buying into loveLife’s existing model, whilst corporate funding and ‘in-kind’ contributions as well as elite individuals, engage with the programme in relation to securing an association with youth and HIV/AIDS in South Africa – for example, the benefits secured by Anglo in terms of receiving recognition and Awards when funding loveLife. In all of these engagements it appears that the content and direction of the loveLife programme is uncontested. In 2004 however, a dispute arose between the South African government and the Global Fund around the funding of loveLife – specifically financial reporting on achievements in relation to securing further tranches of funding for the implementation of the National Adolescent Friendly Clinic programme. This includes recruitment of clinics, training of staff, conducting quality assessments, fitting chillrooms and loveLife kiosks, appointing and training GroundBreakers, and conducting programmes in schools. Over the quarter 1 November 2003 to 31 January 2004, loveLife reported operating 99 clinics (many of which were operational under Department of Health funding), equipping 72 with chillrooms and kiosks, and appointing and training 156 GroundBreakers – making a request for $3,177,779.\(^{238}\) In the following quarter a request was made for a further $3,008,667 on the basis that 200 clinics were operational (an average of 1.6 clinics per working day),\(^{239}\) 166 had completed full quality assessment, and 345 GroundBreakers had been trained.

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\(^{238}\) Global Fund request summary, SAF-102-G02-C-00.

\(^{239}\) The NAFCI concept involves the recruitment and orientation of clinics towards adult friendly operation.
Global Fund monies are paid direct to the South African treasury, which then disburses funding according to internal processes. Transfer of second tranche funding to loveLife was delayed on the basis of concerns raised by the ministry of health regarding performance claims – specifically, claims to performance within the 2003/2004 quarter, with HIV/AIDS programme Chief Director, Nono Simelela, stating:

\[\text{loveLife received their first allocation of money on 30 January this year, and the organization sent a second request three months after that… The department first need to evaluate this request… I discharged a team to go and double-check the books, because loveLife does not only get money from the Global Fund, but receives R75-million from the government. (SABC News, 25 May 2004)}\]

This delay prompted Global Fund Director, Richard Feachem, to threaten to rework the funding arrangement to allow the Fund to give money to loveLife directly, bypassing the checks within the existing process: “It’s intolerable that the money gets stuck in Pretoria. And if Pretoria can’t move it for any reason, then we will simply withdraw it and establish direct relationships with the people actually doing the work.” Feachem’s comments drew the ire of Health Minister, Manto Tshabalala-Msimang, who noted that the department wished to avoid the possibility of loveLife ‘double-dipping’ into funds, and the need to ensure that South Africa adhered to the “good financial management and reporting” that was one of the key principles of the fund, and further, that “Dr Feachem has no right to threaten to reorganise arrangements between the Fund and South Africa without establishing what the facts are.”

Following this dispute, President Mbeki devoted his weekly newsletter to the issue under the headline “Accepting goodwill should not make us subservient”, in which he traced the debate and noted that the delay had been prompted by loveLife

requesting a second disbursement “a mere two months after it had received its first tranche”. loveLife had also failed to indicate which activities utilised South African government funds, and which were attributed to Global Fund monies. Feachem was also seen as undermining South Africa’s sovereignty and autonomy in relation to the Fund, and Mbeki reports Tshabalala-Msimang’s letter to Feachem as noting:

I am not only shocked but also deeply disturbed by loveLife’s irresponsible action in this regard… It is my considered view that he could not have been provided with the relevant information by anybody but loveLife… loveLife in this instance disregarded and disrespected such cordial platform, but chose to go to the Global Fund with such misleading information… I must further point out that it is clear to us that this kind of misleading by loveLife presents critical lessons to us such as that organizations like loveLife will, from time to time, use media sensationalism to achieve narrow selfish objectives, which consequently lead our Government into being undermined, as is now the case. (Mbeki 2004, 28 May)

Mbeki then goes on to link US-based ratings that define country risk assessments for investments in South Africa, and that accusations such as those levelled by Feachem, promoted the notion that “everything in Africa is bad, a racist stereotype”. Mbeki concludes:

In his comments, Professor Feachem referred to the Global Fund grants voted for South Africa as ‘our money’ to emphasise the relationship between the benefactor and a recipient of benefaction… he emphasized the power of the benefactor to do in our country as it pleases, and our helplessness to do anything in this regard, because of our poverty… we would betray those who sacrificed for our liberation, and corrupt our freedom, if we succumbed to the expectation of some of those more richly endowed than ourselves, that our poverty should condemn us to perpetual subservience. This will not do. (Mbeki 2004, 28 May)

Mbeki and Tshabalala-Msimang’s critiques bring to the fore a range of contradictions in relation to the funding of loveLife—specifically the power relations between the Fund and the South African government. Alongside this, loveLife had been forced to account for its outputs. It is unclear what the long-term repercussions of this dispute might be, given that it involves senior government officials who hold sway over funding processes. On the short-term however, it appears that there has
been little impact on the relationship with the KFF. On 6 July 2004, KFF hosted a gala dinner at the Westcliff Hotel in Johannesburg at which Deputy President, Jacob Zuma, was a guest speaker. Zuma drew attention to KFF’s investment of $200-million in South Africa over 17 years, noting that loveLife had made “tremendous progress” and pointing out that

*while appreciating the role of loveLife, we cannot ignore that fact that it has often stirred controversy. There are constituencies in our country who have at times argued that loveLife promotes promiscuity amongst youth and who lobby government to withdraw financial support for this programme… Others were even horrified at my role in participating in loveLife’s campaign… Slowly but surely the results are becoming visible… Dr Altman and all trustees, let me in closing once again express our appreciation of the support the Foundation has given us over the last 17 years. It is a valuable partnership, which has worked tremendously for this country. We urge you to continue working with us in this second decade of our freedom. (Zuma, 2004, 6 July)*

Previously, Zuma himself had been publicly embarrassed as a result of his association with loveLife when African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP) MP, Cheryllyn Dudley read from a loveLife manual in Parliament that stated that it was “essential for children by at least grade six to have a clear understanding of the exact mechanics of how to give a female an orgasm, including how a female or a male can give a woman oral sex”, to which Zuma responded, “I can’t answer on wrong things that people do that are unnatural. I can’t talk about that” (Business Day 2002, 13 June). In spite of these problematic associations however, and in the case of Mbeki and Tshabalala-Msimang – critiques of underlying contradictions – the government relationship with KFF, grounded in the loveLife programme, was set to continue.

**Counter-hegemony**

The limitations imposed on HIV/AIDS activities by the loveLife programme have been articulated on various fronts. These critiques include concerns about programme content, issues relating to validity of research assertions and claims to

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impact, and an aggressive, intransigent and competitive approach that impinges on the work of other organisations. Additionally, within some sectors of the political sphere, it is recognised that loveLife places ‘selfish’ interests over public/governmental interests. loveLife’s power base, in the complex of associations and structural links that extend locally with corporate entities and elites, as well as globally with entities including dominant policy defining formations such as the UN and UNAIDS, allow for forward movement without addressing consent by accommodation. At the ideological level, reiterative discourses and claims, maximised by KFF’s conscious strategy globally, and the loveLife programme’s related strategy locally, have reinforced common-sense perceptions of the programme, to the extent that individual-level critiques have been insufficient at mobilising wider dissent. Within sectors that are informed by grounded experience in the HIV/AIDS field, the contradictions of the loveLife programme are readily apparent, and critiques readily articulated, including the potential in some instances, to insert these into the domain of discourse within the public sphere. For the most part however, these are interrelated with limited mobilisation and acquiescence.

Naidoo’s analysis of response to the loveLife programme by community members in Orange Farm (Naidoo 2003), illustrates that such perspectives may be informed by lived experience without necessarily being interdependent with a high degree of knowledge about HIV/AIDS or research. For example:

*I think they should go back to their boardroom and look at the problems facing Orange Farm because if they are getting funding just to make youth happy, its not a bad thing… but in terms of priorities, to prioritise this thing? We have many problems.* (p. 11)

and

*I think there must be somebody who’s on top there who’s trying to promote loveLife, to make it look as if it is doing good for the community, you know. But at the end of the day it’s not doing much. More especially if you look at the funds that are allocated to them.* (p. 16)

Insertion of such perspectives into the public sphere is complex, in this instance only occurring as a product of a research activity. Whilst such perspectives might undermine common-sense constructions of the programme, it is however the combination of ideological reiteration across diverse fora, incorporating structurally-based ‘knowledge elites’ that underpin common sense. These include experts in the
field who are acknowledged by their associative positioning with elite organisations such as the UN and UNAIDS, or researchers associated with universities and research institutes, or individuals such as Nelson Mandela, and it is against all of whom it is complex to mount critique. Equally, KFF and the loveLife programme have relied on propagandistic structuring of argument incorporating the construction of ‘common sense’ sequential logics underpinned by orthodoxies of moral panic, quantification, causality, and materialist consumption: for example, youth are the driving force underpinning the epidemic (moral panic), the epidemic is a crisis (moral panic) other programmes have not worked or are inferior (moral panic), high cost high impact intervention is needed (quantification), loveLife offers a monocausal pathway to solve this problem (causality), this can be achieved with a ‘lifestyle brand’ (materialist consumption); loveLife understand youth (materialist consumption), loveLife indeed has wide reach and is making demonstrable impacts (quantification/causality). Spoken from the seats of power, as Tomaselli (1992) puts it, and inserted into a range of discourse fora and genres, such discourses underpin the capacity to orient and perpetuate common-sense constructions.

**Ideological resistance and hegemony**

Ideology and power are intertwined, and ideology, when positioned in relation to lived experience always encounters critical consciousness and resistance by virtue of the role of ideology as a mechanism for simplifying and explaining away contradictions. As Foucault observes

> Where there is power, there is resistance, and yet, or rather consequently, this resistance is never in a position of exteriority in relation to power… [The] strictly relational character of power relationships… depends on a multiplicity of points of resistance: these play the role of adversary, target, support, or handle in power relations. These points of resistance are present everywhere in the network of power. (1990:95)

For Gramsci, sustaining power involves accommodation through consent – a conception primarily designed in relation to the dominance of social formations. The ascendant ideological bloc wins consent as it ascends to power, and sustains this consent by virtue of accommodating opposition. As Fiske notes:

> because the material and political conditions of subordination constantly and inescapably remind the subordinate of the
inequalities between them and the power-bloc, such consent is always fragile and precarious, is always subject to contestation and consequently has to be constantly won and rewon. (1993:41)

The conceptions of resistance outlined further above offer insight into awareness of contradictions and subjugations – loveLife contradicts experiences and approaches to the epidemic that have been established ideologically through different pathways, loveLife has a base in power that is contradictory to its value, loveLife’s constructions of response to the epidemic are dysfunctional, and loveLife is grounded in self interest. Ideology in this sense, does not uniformly bring about overarching interpellation, although elements of it may be sustained within common sense. Resistance to particular ideological constructions are weakened by limited access to discourse genre and fora – i.e. access to communicative power is relative, and weaker access has the effect of sustaining and entrenching power. Equally resistance within the public sphere is weakened by virtue of tending to be isolated to once-off engagements, rather than sustained reiterative attacks. Similarly, resistance to the loveLife programme, although emanating from diverse sectors, and although occurring over time, has not been organised between individuals, groups and organisations resisting the programme. Thus, it is possible for loveLife to acknowledge critique, and instead of addressing it, simply point out that the critics are wrong, in combination with continuing on a reiterative pathway. Equally, resistance can be addressed coercively through a combination of strategies of attack – notably undermining the attacker through political discursive strategies incorporating excommunication supported by ad hominem approaches to argumentation that involve undermining or removing ‘the enemy’ from the discourse sphere, or alternately through invoking fear of sanction. In essence, an authoritarian orientation, rather than a democratic one.

Hegemony is the product of assuming leadership and mobilising resources that are directed towards dominance. This is an intrinsically political process requiring both ideological processes situated in discourse alongside concrete actions and practices that are reinforced by structural linkages. These actions are pursued and sustained through a complex heterogeneous hegemonic bloc. In this sense, the loveLife programme is not one coherent entity, but a complex of entities within which loveLife is a common interest, a mutual collaboration – but the bloc itself incorporates a wider range of interests. In this sense, ideology is diffused to the point of making it to all intents and purposes, unassailable. Resistance is one thing, but attack is another, and given that systematic attack is the only effective way to
insert discourses of resistance in the public sphere, such attack needs to be diffused across the range of entities within the hegemonic bloc. It is however, difficult to envisage how this might be achieved – for example, on what basis does one resist the multiplicity of endorsements of, and associations with, the loveLife programme. On what basis is the UN’s endorsement of the Global Media Coalition, with its tangential endorsements of the loveLife programme engaged; similarly the Global HIV Prevention Working Group, or individual endorsements of the programme by various elite figures. KFF’s approach to power has been an imperialising one that has operated both locally and globally, making resistance more complex, and this represents a wide sphere of access to communicative power. Equally, resistances are less likely to be global ones, given that this requires access to resources on a global scale instead they are at best located locally. Given differentials of power, resistance devolves to defensive localist strategies, as opposed to active organised resistance – for example, the localised attempts at resistance through ad hoc engagement with the loveLife programme as described by NGO representatives working in the HIV/AIDS field. Resistances beyond one’s immediate locale are however possible – for example, the critical discussion of the loveLife programme on the Communication Initiative website had global reach, as did the active resistance of the planned 2002 Geneva meeting co-ordinated by WHO. One would also assume however, that structural level resistances – particularly within the bloc itself, might bring about a ‘crisis of authority’ – for example Mbeki and Tshabalala-Msimang’s recognition of loveLife’s political compromise of their authority by eliciting Feachem’s assistance directly, and critiquing government management of Global Fund monies. Mbeki’s critique specifically, is located in discourses of struggle and anti-imperialism, which given his parallel authority, would be likely to compromise the loveLife programme and KFF’s related positioning. Yet, on the short-term, this does not appeared to have brought about a crisis of any kind. Zuma instead, provides endorsement of KFF involvement in South Africa, and there appears to have been little direct sanction (as articulated in the public sphere at least).

It is insufficient that counter-hegemonic response to the differentials of power incorporated in the loveLife programme be addressed through discourse in a ‘struggle for meaning’ on an ad hoc basis, for it is the structural power that is at the same time globalised, that sustains the loveLife programme. This is not to say that a ‘struggle for meaning’ is not incorporated within resistance, but this struggle requires reflection on strategic pathways, ideological structuring and political action. At the first level, ideological mobilisation involves setting a common agenda:
Summing up the dominant aspect or aspects of the crisis, identifying the crucial target… and defining what is possible and how it should be achieved. Such mobilization develops through a breach in the regime’s matrix of affirmations and sanctions, which in normal times ensures compromise or acquiescence and the successful sanctioning of oppositional forces. This breach grows to the extent that it is itself successfully affirmed… (Therborn 1999:116)

At the second level, as Therborn suggests, it involves establishing a breach – a pathway through which to bring about a crisis of authority and legitimacy in the public sphere. In historical terms, relatively large scale, rapid, mobilisation. This might involve a return to the past – for example, evocation of the values that were entrenched in the HIV/AIDS movement prior to (or currently functioning alongside) the loveLife programme – for example: avoiding moral panic constructions and blame; avoiding claims-making; acknowledging complexity in relation to causality; recognition of the value of bottom-up perspectives and mobilisations; suspicion of corporate and governmental power blocs; resistance to Northern constructions of Southern ‘problems’ and the like. Similarly, mobilisation involves alliance building and a relation to structural power, and equally an ideological direction that is forward looking. In essence, resistance mirrors the strategies that bring about ideological dominance and subjugation in the first place, and sustained resistance requires the development of ideological and hegemonic blocs to the point of dominance. Within this entire process, the simplifications and masking of complexities and contradictions that are necessary to ideology, remain necessary to ideology.
Chapter 8

Conclusions

Ideology is a fundamental aspect of society, and ideological analysis has been applied to the development of explanatory frameworks for understanding structural dominance within social formations. Ideologies are generalised throughout society and include dominant, dominated and ascendant bodies of thought. Structural and post-structural conceptions of ideology have focused on macro-ideological phenomena and processes, offering explanation of relations between economic base and super-structure as they inter-relate with ideological dominance.

Ideologies are in essence, summative frameworks for understanding the world that incorporate reference to the past, present and future and are directed politically towards dominance. These include the notion of an interpellative aspect that is related to identity and subjection. It is recognised however, that interpellation is relative to consciousness of contradictions related to material conditions and lived experience. In this sense, ideologies are never totalising. Rather, ideology may be understood as a process of producing and framing meaning:

*Ideology works as a practice, not merely by producing its own system of meaning but rather, the power of a particular system to represent its own representations as a direct reflection of the real, to produce its own meanings as experience.* (Grossberg 1984:409)

Gramsci (1971) offers an understanding of how ideologies become ascendant and dominant, and how dominance is secured over time through inter-relations between common-sense constructions and consent. Ideologies serve the interests of particular social formations or classes over others, and at the macro-level this has to do with organised thought as it relates to power.
Ideological trajectories

This thesis has sought to explore the concept of ideology and related concepts of dominance, power and hegemony, through the utility of relocating macro-level understandings and analysis of ideology with analysis of superstructural entities – notably organisations, groups and elites (accepting that there is some relation to the base and to the macro-ideological frame). Ideological constructions intersect directly with emerging ecological phenomena such as HIV as a product of the need to address the exigencies brought about by the disease. Consequently, HIV/AIDS has been correlated with the need to develop policies and strategies to address the influence and impacts of the disease on society. Such responses have been articulated within the public sphere through discourse.

Ideological discourses about HIV/AIDS have drawn on particular epistemological foundations and world-views, incorporating intersections with parallel ideologies, and in many instances being directed towards achieving expansion and dominance of particular ideas. This ideological strategy has been located within existing common-sense frameworks, operating in conjunction with the ideological utility of particular constructions that foster rapid acceptance of ideas and the need to move forward, including, for example, discourses of moral panic, but also related strategies such as the need to massively resource the loveLife programme without necessarily having sufficient evidence upon which to base such investment:

Although definitive proof of success is significant reduction in HIV rates among young people, we cannot wait for final confirmation. Intermediary indicators, namely: i) public response to interventions; ii) predictors of sexual behaviour; and iii) self-reported sexual behaviour known to mediate HIV reduction can provide tentative evidence of positive change… [2002 findings] suggest that loveLife is on the right track. (Harrison & Steinberg 2002:4)

This ideological argument, directed towards expansion and dominance, has functioned in concert with patterned reiterative approaches to claims-making, intersecting with structural relations. Reiterative claims through discourse, founded in particular epistemological assumptions, and integrated via discourse with

247 See Harrison and Steinberg. (2002:4). “loveLife estimates that it requires $40-million per annum to fund its national HIV prevention programme at optimal levels”.

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structural alliances and access to discourse genre’s and fora, are fundamental to ideological direction and common sense. As Therborn puts it: “All ideologies operate in a material matrix of affirmations and sanctions, and this matrix determines their interrelationships” (1999:33).

The patterning of loveLife’s ideological development and trajectory is depicted in Figure 11, below. The figure illustrates the inter-relation between epistemological foundations and subsequent process of ideological discourse. These include foundational claims, interlinked with legitimating processes and counter-critique strategies that allow discourses to be reiterated and legitimated in service of common sense.

Figure 11: Ideological trajectories towards the construction of common sense

Particular claims can be considered fundamental to the ideological process – specifically claims that rationalise and justify the relevance of a particular ideology to social goals. In the case of loveLife, these goals are framed as influencing the reduction of HIV amongst young people through reducing HIV infection, and claiming legitimacy based on supposed causal impacts. Table 2 below illustrates the
trajectory of a particular set of causal claims to do with early impacts of the loveLife programme as they have been reiterated in selected discourse genres and fora. The pattern includes extensive reiteration, with no accommodation in the later period in spite of contestation and critique with regard to these particular claims. In this instance, although it was known through loveLife’s own research that the programme had had negligible national impacts (Pettifor et al 2004:71), and that other critiques had problematised methodologies as poorly grounded, 248 (which taken together, would have informed understanding of the limits of such assertions), the claims were inserted on the cover of loveLife’s 2004 brochure (2004a), and on the organisation’s website as late as November 2004. This trajectory illustrates the utility of particular discourses in supporting causal claims to impact, as well as the limitations of the concept of consent via accommodation – i.e. ends-means orientations allow overall ideological goals of expansion (and rationalisation of the same) to subsume intra-organisational knowledge of the limitations of the programme, whilst consent by accommodation does not necessarily follow critique of the limited empirical foundations upon which the claims are made.

248 Including points raised in relation to methodological aspects of the research by CADRE on Communication Initiative and Parker (2004).
### Table 2: Trajectory of reiterative claims to impact

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Claims</th>
<th>Reiteration</th>
<th>Timeline</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• 62% of all young South Africans know about loveLife;</td>
<td>Claims first appear in a document entitled “Chartpack: Selected Findings from a Forthcoming Report: The 2001 National Survey of South African Youth” [249].</td>
<td>February 2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Of those who know about loveLife 76% say loveLife has made them more aware of the risks of unprotected sex; 65% say loveLife caused them to delay or abstain from sex;</td>
<td>Claims reiterated on the Communication Initiative website on page entitled: &quot;Impact Data - loveLife Campaign - South Africa: Examples from most recent independent evaluation: 2001&quot; [250].</td>
<td>April 2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• 64% of those who know about loveLife say it has created opportunities for them to talk to their parents about HIV/AIDS;</td>
<td>Claims reiterated loveLife (2002b), a research report describing a ‘national survey of South African youth’.</td>
<td>May/June 2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Among sexually experienced youth who know about loveLife, 78% say loveLife has caused them to use a condom; 69% have reduced their number of sexual partners; 63% say they are more assertive in insisting on condom use.</td>
<td>Claims reiterated on the cover of loveLife (2002b), framed by the title of the report ‘loveLife’s for us...’</td>
<td>May/June 2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Claims reiterated in loveLife brochure (2002c).</td>
<td>May/June 2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Claims reiterated on Kaisernetwork.org – “loveLife Campaign Shows Signs of Influencing sexual behaviour of South African youth” [251].</td>
<td>June 2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Claims reiterated in “Behaviour Change: The cornerstone of prevention” (Harrison &amp; Steinberg 2002), presented at 14th International AIDS Conference in Barcelona</td>
<td>July 2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Claims contested in submission to Communication Initiative discussion on HIV/AIDS communication by CADRE [252].</td>
<td>October 2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Claims contested in submission to Communication Initiative discussion on HIV/AIDS communication by loveLife [253].</td>
<td>October 2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Claims reiterated in e-mail entitled “Friendz of loveLife” circulated by loveLife Director, David Harrison [254].</td>
<td>December 2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Claims reiterated in summary in article in Fair Lady (2003, January). Includes modified claim – 80% of sexually active young people exposed to loveLife say they now use condoms more consistently.</td>
<td>January 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Claims reiterated in loveLife brochure (2003a).</td>
<td>Early 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Claims reiterated in a letter by loveLife GroundBreaker, Mathapelo Potsane, to City Press, contesting Peter Vundla’s critique of loveLife [255].</td>
<td>July 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>loveLife director Harrison suggests that the survey in question is ‘market research’ and part of a more comprehensive evaluation plan. [256].</td>
<td>September 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Claims reiterated on cover of loveLife brochure (2004a).</td>
<td>March 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Claims reiterated on loveLife website [257].</td>
<td>November 2004</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


[256] Letter from David Harrison entitled “Your crusade against loveLife” (2003, 17 September)

**Appropriation of indigenous and global sphere’s**

Structural relations with existing dominant ideological entities have underpinned the capacity of KFF and loveLife to become ascendant, to assume leadership, and in effect, to appropriate elements of indigenous and global public sphere’s in relation to youth and HIV/AIDS. This has been inter-related with the legitimating authority derived from the notion of philanthropic and social goals, but has been interdependent with the strategic resourcing of a range of structural linkages. Alliances and related access to elites has involved diverse sectors ranging from UN organisations, through to former US presidents, rock stars such as Bono, Hollywood actors, politicians, corporate heads and the like. As Burton and Higley point out, elite formations may include relatively strong integration (in this case centred around the loveLife programme), but wide differentiation and autonomy in relation to their own diverse and specific interests:

*Elites are enmeshed in dense and interlocked networks that cut across factional and sectoral boundaries and provide connections and access to key decision-makers. Elite functional differentiation is extensive and each sectoral elite possesses substantial autonomy.* (2001:187)

In relation to ideological expansion and ascendancy, discourse provides the fundamental link between these wide-ranging structures, and access to, and resourcing of, discourse genres and fora (i.e. securing communicative power), has been integral to this process. Emerging discourses have often included a circular aspect in relation to the ideological bloc – i.e. it is not only the loveLife programme that is reified and valorised, but additionally one or more of the entities constituting the bloc. This circular ideological process is functional to the hegemony. As Grossberg notes:

*Hegemony is the ongoing process by which a particular social bloc (made up of various class fractions) maintains its position of power by mobilizing public support for its social projects in a broad spectrum of social life. Hegemony is a question of leadership… it involves the colonization of popular consciousness or common sense through the articulation of specific social practices and positions within ideological codes or chains of connotational significance.* (1984:412)
Dominance and direction towards common sense is inter-related with reiterative discourse practices as they intersect with communicative power. Whilst theories of persuasion and propaganda have generally been dismissed by virtue of their implicit relation to linear models of communication, it cannot be ignored that propagandist strategies are relevant to ideological discourse. There are many similarities between the coercive ideological strategies identified by Therborn (1991) – notably excommunication; restriction; shielding; repetition; and delimited appropriation of discourse – and those identified by Black (2001) – notably reliance on authority figures; abstractions; physical representations; simplifications; temporal disjunctures; finalistic points of view and competition. Other strategies including hyperbole and othering, in combination with approaches to structuring arguments and justifications, and insertions of false logics such as encompassed within *ad hominem* constructs, are all functional to the same end – ideological direction towards dominance.

**Approaches to ideology critique**

The central purpose of this thesis has been to develop analytic approaches for understanding how ideology emerges in the context of an epidemic such as HIV/AIDS, and how particular ideological processes are directed towards dominance. Approaches to analysis have involved an expanded repertoire of strategies. These include: analysis of epistemological foundations; analysis of discourses incorporating particular epistemologies/orthodoxies; analysis of claims-making discourses; analysis of structural linkages, partnerships and alliances; analysis of processes of legitimation and analysis of communicative power and access to the public sphere. These intersect with analyses of latent critiques and critical discourses as they relate to hegemonic and counter-hegemonic processes. The overall process can be modelled as follows (Figure 12):
Critique of ideology is oriented towards identifying and unmasking contradictions and related differentials of power. The approach is essentially an evaluative one that is directed towards achieving transparency as opposed to being informed or directed by a particular moral purpose. This process is however itself ideological, in that exposing contradictions has the effect of weakening particular ideological
constructions, and such critique may be introduced into counter-hegemonic processes.

In the case of KFF and loveLife, the analysis undertaken has allowed for a theoretical and practical exploration of contradictions that were framed by discourse constructions and structural inter-relations. Analysis of public level and latent critiques suggests that contradictions are readily understood by various sectors, and thus, whilst ideologies may be structured to achieve interpellation, it does not necessarily follow that interpellation is achieved to a large degree.

Countering critique within a framework that includes dominant access to communicative power, in combination with structural power, has not required that the loveLife programme devolve, to any great extent, to the concept of accommodation by consent. Instead, it has been possible to defer to ideological reiteration (via dominant access to communicative power), alongside coercive power (threats of legal action, *ad hominem* attacks on critics). In this sense, the programme has been engaged in a ‘war of position’.

Dominance may be countered both passively and actively. Active dominance is inter-related with mobilisation, but there is little likelihood that the loveLife programme poses sufficient threat to engender mobilisation amongst those organisations that perceive its contradictions. Whilst critical discourses may become more vocal, coherent and sustained, the pragmatic interests of programmes working in the HIV/AIDS field are unlikely to be mobilised unless the threat posed by loveLife directly affects their pragmatic activities. Rather, some degree of acquiescence is likely.

Within the bloc that constitutes loveLife, it is apparent that contradictions may also be articulated – for example, Mbeki’s framing of loveLife’s vested interests. However, on the short-term at least, it appears that deference is given to maintaining the status quo within the bloc as a whole – thus Zuma’s acquiescent reification of KFF’s involvement in South Africa, including involvement in the loveLife programme.

Clearly, both KFF and loveLife involve a range of contradictions that are, over time, likely to become more transparent – both by virtue of *ad hoc* critiques, as well as being a product of the complexity of sustaining contradiction within global and local HIV/AIDS policy and strategy. There is little to suggest that the loveLife programme will be in a position to make good on its promises and claims, and there is some risk
to the organisation as a result of this. There is, for example, a growing cynicism in relation to the global AIDS Conference that has to do with how the ‘right to speak’ at such fora, and a global call has been made for change. This includes contesting the dominance of drug companies at such fora, failure to provide a forum for debate, and marginalisation of resource poor groups and countries. The International AIDS Society, which manages the conference, has indicated its intention to explore future directions for the conference through a broad-based consultative process. Such dissention may contribute to broader critique of ideologically dominant groups.

The massive resources required to sustain the loveLife programme, even within the global framework of increasing financial commitments, is unlikely to be sustained, as the need for funding to be directed to other growth points of the epidemic becomes apparent – for example the emerging epidemic in Asia. Some strategic direction has been given by KFF to the notion of replicating loveLife as a model for application elsewhere. It is this direction that is central to the global positioning of the loveLife model in wide-ranging discourse fora as a successful and replicable approach to HIV prevention. However, although it may have been possible to secure positional influence over the first round of Global Fund grant-making (amongst other spheres), it is unlikely that reiterative claims-making alone can sustain the programme at the level of global policy and strategy development in relation to HIV/AIDS. The Global Fund, for example, has considerable resource shortfalls (Global Fund Observer, 2004 August 24), and is unlikely to be in a position to further fund existing grantees beyond initial commitments. Similarly, it is unclear whether the South African government would continue beyond its own three-year commitment to the loveLife programme.

Clearly, within the present climate, counter-hegemonic discourses will continue to be aggressively countered, and it remains to be seen whether contradictions can be sustained over extended periods of time.

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260 Somewhat ironically, it appears that KFF is diversifying its ideological strategy. A recent report was produced under the auspices of Y-Press, a non-profit news organisation housed in Indianapolis, describes a visit by Michal McDowell, a 15-year old student, who travelled with her mother, KFF board member, Jennifer Drobac, to South Africa. It describes her involvement in a tour along with KFF, “one of several funders” who toured “loveLife facilities to determine whether to renew their pledge in 2005”. She describes walking through the “slums of Soweto”, of wanting to vomit at the smell of human waste, how 85% of South Africa’s youth have heard about loveLife, and how about one-fourth said they did something as a result of the loveLife.
campaign. She concludes: “However, loveLife needs money. Since it receives a large portion of
its funds in US dollars, that aid has been cut significantly by the dollar’s weak exchange rate. One
result is that loveLife has been unable to answer more than one-third of the 300 000 calls it
receives every month on the hotline.” Perhaps an interesting way to pass the time on a visit to
South Africa with mom. Alternately, a sign that any and every opportunity for ideological
reiteration must be identified and integrated into the overall strategy for ideological dominance.
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Appendix 1

Survey of NGO impressions of the loveLife campaign

Introduction

Hello, my name is __________. I am conducting a survey on behalf of CADRE to look at the impressions of NGOs of the loveLife campaign. I would like to set up a time to interview a person from your organisation. We would like to speak to a senior person who is involved with HIV/AIDS communication and who can represent the views of your organisation. (Get name of person if this is not the person to interview)

The questionnaire would take about 30 minutes to complete. If you have time now, could we go ahead. If not, could we set a time.

The questionnaire is anonymous. I will only record the type of organisation you are from (e.g. Provincial health dept; NGO, Gauteng etc.). We will be recording the interview for quality control purposes, and to ensure that your opinions are reproduced exactly.

1. Which elements of the loveLife Campaign are you aware of? (unprompted)
   Billboards/Taxis
   ThethaNathi newspaper insert
   S'camto newspaper insert
   Print advertisements (S'camtoPrint) (I think this is same as above)
   TV advertisements/programmes
   Radio advertisements/programmes (eScamtweni on Metro)
   loveLife games
   loveTrain
   Antarctica tour/Love Tours
   GroundBreakers
   Thetha Junction Helpline
   Y-Centres / NAFCI Clinics
   Parent Campaign / Parent Helpline
   loveLife Website
   Other. List:_______________________
2. Of the above, which TWO aspects would you like to talk about?
   Billboards/Taxis (Skip to 5)
   ThethaNathi newspaper insert (Skip to 6)
   S’camto newspaper insert (Skip to 7)
   Print advertisements (Skip to 8) (S’camtoPrint)
   TV advertisements (Skip to 9)
   Radio advertisements/Programmes (eScamtweni on Metro) (Skip to 10)
   loveLife games (Skip to 11)
   loveTrain (Skip to 12)
   Antarctica tour/love Tours (Skip to 13)
   GroundBreakers (Skip to 14)
   ThethaJunction (Skip to 15)
   Y-centres / NAFCI Clinics(Skip to 16)
   Parent Campaign / Parent helpline (Skip to 17)
   loveLife Website (Skip to 18)
   Other ___________________________

3. What is your general impression of the BILLBOARD/TAXI campaign?
   Do you think the billboards effectively target 12-17 year old youth?
   Do you think the billboard messages are clear? (Give examples)
   Can you describe any experiences you have had recently in relation to information on the billboards?
   Do you have any views, positive or negative, about the words, messages or images used in relation to gender? (Give examples)
   Do you have any views, positive or negative, about the words, messages or images in relation to the use of language and symbols? (Give examples)

4. What is your general impression of the THETHANATHI insert?
   Do you think ThethaNathi effectively targets 12-17 year old youth?
   Do you think the information is clearly conveyed? (Give examples)
   Can you describe any experiences you have had recently in relation to information in ThethaNathi?
   Do you have any views, positive or negative, about the words, messages or images used in relation to gender? (Give examples)
   Do you have any views, positive or negative, about the words, messages or images in relation to the use of language and symbols? (Give examples)

5. What is your general impression of the S’CAMTO insert?
   Do you think S’camto effectively targets 12-17 year old youth?
   Do you think the information is clearly conveyed? (Give examples)
   Can you describe any experiences you have had recently in relation to information in S’camto?
   Do you have any views, positive or negative, about the words, messages or images used in relation to gender? (Give examples)
Do you have any views, positive or negative, about the words, messages or images in relation to the use of language and symbols? (Give examples)

6. What is your general impression of PRINT ADVERTISEMENTS?
   Do you think the print ads effectively target 12-17 year old youth?
   Do you think the information is clearly conveyed? (Give examples)
   Can you describe any experiences you have had recently in relation to information in print ads?
   Do you have any views, positive or negative, about the words, messages or images used in relation to gender? (Give examples)
   Do you have any views, positive or negative, about the words, messages or images in relation to the use of language and symbols? (Give examples)

7. What is your general impression of TV ADVERTISEMENTS / PROGRAMMES?
   Do you think the TV ads / programmes effectively target 12-17 year old youth?
   Do you think the information is clearly conveyed? (Give examples)
   Can you describe any experiences you have had recently in relation to information in TV ads / programmes?
   Do you have any views, positive or negative, about the words, messages or images used in relation to gender? (Give examples)
   Do you have any views, positive or negative, about the words, messages or images in relation to the use of language and symbols? (Give examples)

8. What is your general impression of RADIO ADVERTISEMENTS / PROGRAMMES?
   Do you think the radio ads /programmes effectively target 12-17 year old youth?
   Do you think the information is clearly conveyed? (Give examples)
   Can you describe any experiences you have had recently in relation to information in radio ads / programmes?
   Do you have any views, positive or negative, about the words, messages, or programme content in relation to gender? (Give examples)
   Do you have any views, positive or negative, about the words, messages or programme content in relation to the use of language and symbols? (Give examples)

9. What is your general impression of the LOVELIFE GAMES?
   Do you think the games effectively target 12-17 year old youth?
   Do you think the games are effective for conveying HIV/AIDS information? (Give examples)
   Can you describe any experiences you have had recently in relation to the games? (Give examples)
   Do you have any thoughts on the games in relation to gender? (Give examples)

10. What is your general impression of the LOVETRAIN?
   Do you think the loveTrain effectively targets 12-17 year old youth?
   Do you think the loveTrain is effective for conveying HIV/AIDS information? (Give examples)
Can you describe any experiences you have had recently in relation to the loveTrain? (Give examples)
Do you have any thoughts on the loveTrain in relation to gender? (Give examples)

11. What is your general impression of the ANTARCTICA TOUR/LOVE TOURS?
Do you think the Antarctica Tour effectively targets 12-17 year old youth?
Do you think the Antarctica Tour is effective for conveying HIV/AIDS information? (Give examples)
Can you describe any experiences you have had recently in relation to the Antarctica Tour? (Give examples)
Do you have any thoughts on the Antarctica Tour in relation to gender? (Give examples)

12. What is your general impression of the GroundBreakers?
Do you think GroundBreakers effectively targets 12-17 year old youth?
Do you think the GroundBreakers is effective for conveying HIV/AIDS information? (Give examples)
Can you describe any experiences you have had recently in relation to GroundBreakers? (Give examples)
Do you have any thoughts on the GroundBreakers in relation to gender? (Give examples)

13. What is your general impression of the THETHA JUNCTION HELPLINE?
Do you think ThethaJunction effectively supports 12-17 year old youth?
Do you think ThethaJunction is effective for conveying HIV/AIDS information? (Give examples)
Can you describe any experiences you have had in relation to ThethaJunction? (Give examples)
Do you feel that the helpline has the necessary technical capacity?
Do you feel that the helpline has the necessary linguistic capacity?
Do you think that the counsellors are sufficiently informed and supported?

14. What is your general impression of the Y-CENTRES/NAFCI CLINICS?
Have you ever visited or referred people to a Y-Centre/NAFCI Clinic. If yes, which one, and what were your impressions?
Do you think the Y-Centres/NAFCI Clinics meet the needs of 12-17 year old youth?
Do you think the Y-Centres/NAFCI Clinics are effective for conveying HIV/AIDS information? (Give examples)
Can you describe any experiences you have had in relation to Y-Centres/NAFCI Clinics? (Give examples)
Do you have any thoughts on the Y-Centres/NAFCI clinics in relation to gender? (Give examples)

15. What is your general impression of the PARENT CAMPAIGN / HELPLINE?
Do you think the Parent Campaign / Helpline effectively supports parents of 12-17 year old youth?
Do you think the Parent Campaign / Helpline is effective for conveying HIV/AIDS information and/or providing appropriate support to parents? (Give examples)
Can you describe any experiences you have had recently in relation to the Parent Campaign / Helpline? (Give examples)
Do you have any thoughts on the Parent Campaign / Helpline in relation to gender? (Give examples)
Do you feel that the helpline has the necessary technical capacity?
Do you feel that the helpline has the necessary linguistic capacity?
Do you think that the counsellors are sufficiently informed and supported?

16. What is your general impression of the LOVELIFE WEBSITE?
Do you think the loveLife Website responds to the concerns of 12-17 year old youths?
Do you think the loveLife Website is effective for conveying HIV/AIDS information? (Give examples)
Can you describe any experiences you have had recently in relation to the loveLife Website? (Give examples)
Do you have any thoughts on the loveLife Website in relation to gender? (Give examples)

17. Do you feel that the consortium running loveLife are consultative or collaborative in their approach to other organisations? (Give examples either way).

18. In general, does the work of loveLife simplify or make more difficult the work that you are doing? (Give examples)

19. Do you think the loveLife campaign is cost-effective? (Give examples)

20. Do you think the loveLife campaign is well informed in terms of theoretical framework and research? (Give examples)
   What are your opinions on research/evaluation emerging from the loveLife campaign? (Give examples)

21. Do you think the loveLife campaign is sensitive to gender issues? (Give examples)

22. How do you think loveLife shapes youth culture in South Africa, if at all?

23. Can you give me two or three words or concepts that summarise or describe your view of loveLife

24. Is there anything else you would like to add?
We are contacting various government departments as well as NGOs throughout the country. Are there any particular people or organisations you would suggest we contact?